Abstract

The present study aims to explore Ottoman centralization and modernization in the

province of Baghdad, between 1831 and 1872. The study, which was based upon a variety of

sources, and primarily upon the Ottoman and British archives, is an attempt to administrative

and political history of Ottoman Iraq.

The study is divided into six chapters. After an assessment of the literature and

approaches on studying the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, chapter one contains a

general introduction on the geography, the people, and history of the Ottoman Iraq. The

consequences of Iraq’s geography on agriculture, Iraq’s peripheral position on the Persian

border and its implications for provincial politics are underlined. In chapter two, the decline

and fall of decentralist structures such as the Mamluks in Baghdad, the Jalilis in Mosul and

the Kurdish emirates in northern Iraq are explained. Parallel to the disintegration of the

autonomous entities, the growing presence of Ottoman state (centralization) is emphasized.

Chapter three attempts to explain changes in the borders among the Iraqi provinces and

Baghdad’s position as the provincial center. Then, the fluctuations in the authority of the

provincial governor are analyzed in relation to the centralist and de-centralist forces. As

opposed to the common tendency in Iraqi historiography which distinguished Midhat Pasha

from the rest of the governors, this study brought Reşid Pasha and Namık Pasha to the

forefront as the harbinger of Midhat Pasha’s reforms. The increasing Ottoman state control

and the improvements in the general security of the province were also mentioned here.

Chapters four and five seek to consider the extent to which the Tanzimat reforms were

carried out in the Ottoman Iraq. Special importance is given to the establishment of provincial

administrative councils and the implementation of two significant laws, namely the Provincial

Law of 1864 and Ottoman Land Code of 1858 in the region. The Vilâyet Law extended the

provincial administrative mechanism at the expense of tribal dominions. Through several

offices (such as the office of kaymakam/mültezim and membership in the provincial councils)

the tribal sheikhs were incorporated into the provincial administration. Having analyzed

Ottoman politics of tribe, chapter five focuses on the implementation of Land Code of 1858,

which targeted the tribal structure that dominated the province for centuries. Although the

code aimed individual registration of the land, the tribal sheiks and city merchants emerged as

big landowners. However, despite this side effect, there appeared significant changes in the

landholding patterns and agricultural production.

Finally, chapter six analyzed the modernization of various aspects of life in Baghdad. Special

emphasis was given to the introduction of steam navigation, telegraph communication,

modern schools, print houses and publication of provincial newspaper. There is no doubt that

these public works played crucial role in incorporating Iraq not only to the imperial center but

also to the international networks. In this regard, the Tanzimat centralization and

modernization went hand in hand in Ottoman Baghdad. Therefore, one of the main points of

this dissertation is to explore Ottoman origins of modern Iraq.

Keywords: Ottoman Baghdad, modernization, centralization, Tanzimat, tribes

ÖZ

Bu çalışma 1831–1872 tarihleri arasında Bağdat eyaletindeki Osmanlı merkezileşmesi

ve modernleşmesini incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Muhtelif kaynaklara, özellikle de Osmanlı

ve İngiliz devlet arşivlerine dayanılarak yapılan bu çalışma Osmanlı Irak’ının idarî ve siyasi

tarihi incelemektedir.

Çalışma altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Literatürün ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin Arap

vilayetlerinin çalışılmasındaki yaklaşımların genel bir değerlendirmesinin ardından, birinci

bölüm Osmanlı Irak’ının coğrafyası, demografik yapısı ve tarihi hakkında genel bir giriş

içermektedir. Bölge coğrafyasının tarım üzerindeki sonuçları, Irak’ın (İran sınırında) periferik

konumu ve bunun vilayet politikalarına etkilerinin üzerinde durulmuştur. İkinci bölümde,

bölgedeki adem-i merkeziyetçi yapıların (Bağdat’taki Kölemenler, Musul’daki Celililer ve

kuzey Irak’taki Kürt emirliklerinin) düşüş ve yıkılışları açıklanmaktadır. Buna paralel olarak

da Osmanlı Devleti’nin vilayetteki mevcudiyetinin artması (merkezileşme) vurgulanmıştır.

Üçüncü bölüm Irak vilayetleri (Bağdat, Musul, Şehrizor ve Basra) arasındaki sınır

değişiklikleri ve Bağdat’ın hıtta-i Irakiye’nin merkezi olması açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra

Bağdat valisinin yetkilerindeki dalgalanmalar merkez-çevre ilişkileri açısından analiz

edilmiştir. Midhat Paşa’yı, vilayette görev yapan diğer valilerden ayrı tutan Irak tarih

yazımındaki genel eğilimin aksine, bu çalışma Midhat Paşa’nın başarılarının öncüleri olarak

Reşid Paşa ve Namık Paşa dikkat çekmektedir. Osmanlı Devleti’nin bölgede artan kontrolü ve

vilayetin asayiş ve güvenliğindeki ilerlemeler de bu bölümde incelenmiştir.

Dördüncü ve beşinci bölümler Tanzimat reformlarının Osmanlı Irak’ında ne kadar

uygulandığını tartışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda vilayet meclislerinin kurulması, 1864 Vilayet

Kanunu ve 1858 Toprak Nizamnamesinin bölgede uygulanması üzerinde durulmuştur.

Vilayet Kanunu vilayetteki idari mekanizmayı aşiretlerin hakim oldukları bölgeler aleyhine

genişletmiştir. Kaymakamlık/mültezimlik gibi bazı görev ve makamlar aracılığıyla aşiret

şeyhleri vilayet idaresine eklemlenmişlerdir. Osmanlı aşiret politikasının analiz edilmesini

müteakip, beşinci bölümde asırlardır vilayette baskın olan aşiret yapısını hedef alan 1858

Toprak Nizamnamesinin uygulanmasına odaklanmıştır. Nizamname toprağın bireysel olarak

kaydını hedeflediyse de, askerlik ve vergilendirilme korkusu aşiret şeyhleri ve tüccarların

sonuçta büyük toprak sahipleri olmasına neden olmuştur. Fakat bu yan etkisine rağmen,

toprağın elde edilmesi, işlenmesi ve tarımsal üretimde önemli değişiklikler gözlenmiştir.

Altıncı ve son bölümde ise Bağdat yaşamının muhtelif alanlarında yaşanan

modernleşme incelenmiştir. Bilhassa nehirlerde vapur seferlerinin başlatılması, demiryolu ve

telgrafın vilayette kullanılmaya başlaması, modern okulların ve matbaaların açılması ve

vilayet gazetesinin yayınlanmasına vurgu yapılmıştır. Şüphesiz bu imar faaliyetleri Irak’ın

hem imparatorluk merkezine hem de uluslar arası ağlara eklemlenmesinde önemli rol

oynamıştır. Bu açıdan Tanzimat merkezileşmesi ve modernleşme Bağdat’ta eş-zamanlı olarak

yürütülmüştür. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma modern Irak’ın Osmanlı köklerine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bağdat, aşiret, modernleşme, merkezileşme, Tanzimat

Introduction

“I mention Baghdad first of all because it is the heart of the Iraq, and with no equal on earth either in the Orient or the Occident, it is the most extensive city in area, in importance, in prosperity, in abundance of water, and in healthful climate… People emigrate to it from all countries, both near and far, and everywhere there are men who have preferred it to their own county.”

Al-Yakubî ∗∗∗∗

Baghdad, being one of the most important cities of the Eastern World, has had a

special image in the minds of both Muslims and non-Muslims. Let alone the

significance of Baghdad in the Muslim world as one of the first cities established in

Islamic civilization, it has been very salient for the Turks as well. Even before their

expedition to Anatolia, Turks were quite active in Baghdad and Samarra during the

whole ninth century. It was not only the home of Ali Baba and the Sinbad tales, or

the capital of Caliph Mansur and Harun Al-Rashid, but it was also the “red apple” of

many outstanding rulers like Tughrul Bey, Celayir, Timur, Shah İsmail, Selim I,

Süleyman the Lawgiver (Kanuni), Murat IV and Osman II.1 Baghdad is frequently

remembered as being one of the most important religious sites, with tombs of many

religious figures, such as the fourth Caliph Ali, Hussain (grandchild of the Prophet

Muhammad), Imam Azam (the founder of Hanafi School of thought), Abdulkadir

Geylânî, Sühreverdî and many others; however, it was at the same time the homeland

∗ Ahmad ibn Abi Ya‘kub ibn Ja‘fer ibn Wadih al-Abbasi, known simply as al-Ya‘kubi, was born in the first decades of ninth century and died in Egypt in 284/897. 1 For the significance of Baghdad in oral culture see Micheal Cooperson, “Baghdad in Rhetoric and Narrative”, Muqarnas, Vol. XIII, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996, pp. 99-113.

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of many Ottoman intellectuals such as Fuzûlî, Ruhî, Ahmed Vâsıf, and Ahmet

Haşim, just to name a few. Baghdad had thus been a center of many cultural and

scientific activities. Ottoman sources indicate that the number of Ottoman poets who

were born in Baghdad was more than thirty-five.2

Apart from its importance in rhetoric and narrative, there is no doubt that

Iraq, both in the past and present, represents a “miniature of the Middle East”. As it

will be presented in detail, almost all of the principal ethnic elements (Turks, Arabs,

Kurds, and Persians) co-existed in the province of Baghdad and perhaps the most

authentic religions/sects (Sunnites, Shiites, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jacobites etc.) also

lived there. And this peaceful co-existence had given Iraq a sui generis character.

Studying Arab Provincial Capitals

Many approaches have been used in explaining various aspects of the Ottoman Arab

provinces. Perhaps the richest of these approaches have been those employed in the

urban history of the Ottoman Arab provinces.3 Starting from the early decades of the

last century, scholars of urban history produced a vast literature on the Arab

provincial capitals. Cities like Cairo, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tunis and

Algiers were the most studied urban centers. The Iraqi provinces have until recently

been ignored. Even in the studies of Andre Raymond they were only slightly touched

on.4 Perhaps Mosul, out of all Iraqi provinces, has drawn the most attention; recent

studies have shed considerable light onto its history.

2 İskender Pala, “Bağdat”, Zaman, 16 and 30 January 2003. 3 For a comprehensive study on the literature of urban history of the Ottoman Arab Provinces see, Nelly Hanna, “Survey of Urban History of Arab Cities in the Ottoman Period”, Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi (TALID), Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 89-102. 4 See André Raymond, Osmanlı Döneminde Arap Kentleri, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995. French scholars studied mostly Maghreb provinces and to some extent, Cairo and Aleppo. Iraq had been one of the Arab provinces that was regarded by French scholars as Britain’s ‘private hunting

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After long debates on whether “Arab/Islamic City” was a proper explanatory

framework for Middle Eastern Cities, urban categories such as “port cities”, “large

cities”, “medium cities”, or “dyad or triad cities” have been used in the literature.5

Because this dissertation is more of a political and administrative history, issues of

whether the Iraqi provinces of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra were Ottoman or

Arab/Islamic cities will not be dealt with here; nonetheless, Chapter six will briefly

look at the urban history of Ottoman Iraq. The modernization that the Iraqi provinces

underwent and the transformation of Basra in the second half of the nineteenth

century into a “port city” have been given considerable attention.

In the late 1960s Albert Hourani put forward a ground-breaking approach in

the history of the modern Middle East. Since then, the “politics of notables” and

factionalism among local forces have been a dominant explanation, and this

explanatory framework cannot be said to have been overthrown.6 Hourani’s work

paved the way for new studies on local Arab actors. Karl K. Barbir has shown that

the notables in eighteenth century Damascus seem to have been less powerful than

grounds’; and therefore, attracted very few French researches. André Raymond, “French Studies of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab Provinces”, Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 2004, p. 60. 5 While studies written by Çağlar Keyder, Eyüp Özveren, Donald Quataert, Edhem Eldem, and Daniel Goffman focused on the Anatolian experience, studies of Michel Tuchscherer and İlber Ortaylı had emphasized the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. See Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman and Bruce Masters, The Ottoman City Between East and West: Aleppo, İzmir and İstanbul, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Michel Tuchscherer, “Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea – Gulf of Aden Region in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, in Leila T. Fawaz and C. A. Bayly (eds.), Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002; and İlber Ortaylı, “Port Cities in the Arab Countries-A Study of the Disintegration of the Arab-World in the 19th Century with special Reference to Basra", Türk Arap İlişkileri 1. Konferansı, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Ankara, 1979, s. 221-232. The sixth volume of TALID is also devoted to Turkish Urban History. See especially Yunus Uğur, “Şehir Tarihi ve Türkiye’de Şehir Tarihçiliği: Yaklaşımlar, Konular ve Kaynaklar”, TALID, Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 9-26 and Nelly Hanna, “Survey of Urban History of Arab Cities in the Ottoman Period”, TALID, Vol. 6, 2005, pp. 89-102. 6 See Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and Politics of Notables” in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds.,) Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 42. For the criticisms addressed to Hourani’s “politics of notables”, see Eldem, Goffman and Masters (eds.), Ibid., pp. 4-6.

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their counterparts in the Balkans.7 In a similar fashion, Philip Khoury’s Urban

Notables and Arab Nationalism bears the influences of Hourani’s framework.8 As far

as Ottoman Iraq is concerned, it can be said that the pre-1831 period was more

fruitful in terms of influence of local notables. The Jalilis and Umaris in Mosul were

good examples of great local families. On the other hand, in Baghdad, in the absence

of local families with a tradition of leadership, the Mamluk household could provide

the needed ‘asabiyya.9 In this context, as it was emphasized by several scholars, it

was Mamluk households rather than the “civilian” elites who dominated Baghdad.10

However, when the period covered in this dissertation is taken into consideration, the

history of the Mamluks (Kölemen) in Baghdad will not be analyzed in detail, only the

fall of these local dynasties will be discussed.

The fall of the Mamluks in Baghdad in 1831 changed the local dynamics of

the province, and the local elites began to increase their influence. The province of

Baghdad in the Tanzimat period had only religious and secular notables. While the

former consisted of a provincial learned class, (qadi, nakîbü’l-eşrâf, na‘ibs and

müfti); the latter was dominated by tribal leaders. The ulema had a substantial role in

everyday life in Baghdad, but, as Hourani noted, their social power must have been

limited by the hold of Shi‘is and Bedouins over the countryside.11 Provincial

merchants, amirs and aghas were also among the secular notables. Towards the end

7 Karl. K. Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1700-1758, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 71-74. 8 Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. In a later article, Khoury put forward his reserves for “politics of notables” as an explanatory framework, see “The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited”, Revue des Etudes du Monde Musulman et Méditerranéen, 55-56, 1-2 (1990), pp. 215-218. 9 Hourani, Ottoman Reform, p. 50. 10 See Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 11 Hourani, Ottoman Reform, p. 51.

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of the Tanzimat Era, the merchants in Iraq increased their volume of trade and

wealth; in this context, the Jewish merchants of Baghdad came to occupy a

significant place among the secular notables of the city. The elected members of the

provincial administrative council coincided significantly with the local notables.

Hence, as it will be analyzed in the third chapter, the minutes (mazbata) of the

provincial administrative council give us an important idea about the local notables.

The secular notables derived their wealth mostly from land and trade.

The “politics of notables” was, to a great extent, used for urban/provincial

factionalism. Similarly, in Baghdad there were cases in which tribal leaders and

urban notables formed coalitions against Ottoman rule. To take an example, the

disaffected Kurdish chief, Bedir Han, formed alliances with the discontented urban

notables of Mosul.12 The influence of the secular notables in Baghdad decreased in

time, as the Ottoman government began to de-construct the tribal structure of the

country. With the re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule, the governor-general restored

gradually his influence and authority, and the urban notables were overwhelmed by

his power.13

The issue of how the Ottomans approached the provincial notables, especially

the tribal leaders, will be explored in the fourth chapter. However, it should be noted

that the Ottoman policy toward the provincial notables in Baghdad reached its peak

point during the reign of Abdulhamid II. In this regard, Gökhan Çetinsaya’s Phd

12 Ibid., p. 63. 13 The case of Damascus presents an opposite perspective. For a comparison see Elizabeth Thompson, “Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: The Damascus Advisory Council in 1844-45”, IJMES, 25, 1993.

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thesis provides salient insights on the relationship between the Ottoman Sultan and

the provincial religious (nakîbs) and secular (tribal) notables.14

Hourani also draws attention to internal and external forces while explaining

the history of the modern Middle East. He warns us to be aware of two interlocking

rhythms of change: “that which reforming governments and thinkers and external

forces tried to impose upon society, and that which a great stable society with a long

and continuous tradition of thought and of life in common was producing from

within itself, partly by its own internal movement, and partly in reaction to forces

coming from outside”.15 Scholars like Khadduri, Issawi and Marr advocated the idea

that ‘social and economic changes in modern Middle Eastern societies like Iraq are

Western-induced’.16 As noted by Haj, by ascribing the social change to external

forces this approach overlooked the importance of internal forcesin shaping domestic

development.17 In nineteenth-century Iraq, the external forces alone cannot account

for change and modernization. Instead, both internal and external (Ottoman-Arab and

European) forces were influential in reform and modernization processes; however,

the latter had only an auxiliary role per se. As will be detailed in this study, while the

Tanzimat reforms were imposed by the Sublime Porte through the governors in

Baghdad, the influence of the European powers cannot be denied.

14 Gökhan Çetinsaya’s thesis will be soon published in a book form under the same title. However, I have made reference to his dissertation; see Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908, PhD Thesis, University of Manchester, 1994. 15 Albert Hourani, “How Should We Write the History of the Middle East”, IJMES, Vol. 23, 1991, p. 129. 16 See Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951; Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East: 1800-1914, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966; The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. 17 Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power and Ideology, New York: SUNY Press, 1997, p. 2.

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Until the 1990s, most historians did not question the process of incorporation

of periphery economies into the world market, preferring instead to dwell on the after

effects of the Western impact on the developing societies of the Middle East, Africa,

and Latin America. Their interest was confined to explaining the rapid transformation

of these economies after the impingement of an industrializing West in search of raw

materials, a free supply of labor, and cheap markets.18 However, in the last two

decades, there appeared considerable works, which attempted to analyze the history

of the modern Middle East through perspectives of “underdevelopment” and

“dependency”.

Scholars, using Wallerstein’s world-system theory, tried to answer questions

like: To what extent was the nineteenth century Levant/Middle East incorporated into

the world-economy? What were the effects of the first wave of globalization on

Middle Eastern societies?19 In this regard, Sarah D. Shield’s Mosul Before Iraq,

attempts to present the economic history of nineteenth and early twentieth century

Mosul. The effects of the Tanzimat, of economic activities, of trade networks and of

regional integration are the main issues that are addressed in Shield’s work.20

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Ottoman Baghdad experienced

quite a significant transformation. This period witnessed the incorporation of the

region into the rest of the empire, and into the world economy. The introduction of

the telegraph as well as the improvement of the steamship service on the twin rivers

of the Mesopotamia had certainly strengthened Baghdad’s ties with the central lands

18 Hala Fatah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf 1745-1900, New York: SUNY Press, 1997, p. 19. 19 For the reflections of this theory on Ottoman studies, see Ebubekir Ceylan, “Dünya-Sistemi Teorisinin Osmanlı Tarihi Çalışmalarına Yansımaları”, TALID, Vol.1, 2003, pp. 81-95. 20 Sarah D. Shields, Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells, New York: SUNY Press, 2000, p. 40.

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of the empire. Furthermore, the pacification and elimination of Kurdish principalities

in northern Iraq and semi-autonomous hereditary governors in Mosul, and the

settlement of nomadic tribes gave the region the stability it had needed for so long.

There is no doubt that by the early 1870s, Ottoman Iraq was more connected

to the international networks. Two outlets Iraq, namely Basra as the port city in the

south of the region and the twin rivers in the north, played a significant role in this

The opening of Suez Canal was perhaps one of the most important turning points in

terms of the commercial development of Ottoman Baghdad. Within a few years,

there was an enormous increase in the export of agricultural goods, especially

cereals.21 The Suez Canal made the ports of Ottoman Iraq, especially Basra, much

nearer to the Mediterranean. All these regional developments contributed to the

process of de-tribalization and led to a trend of sedentarization.

Sedentarization was actually what the governors were trying to achieve for a

long time. Some of the governors, especially Midhat Pasha, benefited from these

conjectural developments to break the tribal structure of the region. The export

oriented agricultural production made the lands more valuable than ever before and it

increasingly became the crux of the sheikhdom. The commercialization of

agriculture led the tribal sheikhs to give priority to rich estates, rather than their

tribesmen. Land replaced the manliness, courage, superior strength, and warrior

prowess as the central ideal of sheikhly/tribal culture. However, almost all of these

developments started towards the end of the period studied in this dissertation.

Although the world-system approach can provide a significant framework in

explaining the economic as well as political processes in Ottoman Iraq, to do this one

21 For the effect of the Suez Canal on the expansion of the Iraqi market, see Roger Owen, ‘The Middle East in the World Economy‘, London & New York: I.B.Tauris, 1993, pp. 182-3.

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would have to analyze a longer time period, -perhaps till the First World War-, which

exceeds the limits of this dissertation.

Another group of studies analyzes Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces in the

framework of imperial practices and discourses, which came to be labeled as Ottoman

imperialism or colonialism.22 Exaggerating what was literally meant in these imperial

discourses, some of the Arab scholars (mostly nationalists and socialists) have argued

that the Arab provinces were in fact the colonies of the empire. One of the recurrent

themes emphasized in these arguments was the transfer of the provincial economic

resources to the imperial center.23 It is true that the Ottoman use of imperial

discourse, which was frequently derogatory towards nomadic cultures, can be found

both in the state archives and private letters.24 Yet one should also notice that this

imperial discourse was not limited to a certain ethnicity, the Arab people in this case,

but it can also be seen as directed towards the nomadic Turks in Anatolia as well.25

The question of whether the Ottoman administration in Baghdad was a colonial rule

will be excluded from the present dissertation. Suffice it to say that the imperial

discourse of the Ottoman rulers in Baghdad was part of the centralization,

modernization and Ottomanism projects.

22 For example, see Ussame Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism”, in Jens Hanssen, Stefan Weber, Thomas Philipp (eds.) The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002, pp. 29-48; also in the same volume Christoph Herzog, “Nineteenth-Century Baghdad Through Ottoman Eyes” pp. 311-328, and Thomas Kühn, “Ordering Urban Space in Ottoman Yemen”, pp. 329-347. 23 For example, Samira Haj argued that the Ottoman Empire that was already on the way to financial bankruptcy aimed greater exactions from the Arab provinces. See Samira Haj, “The Problems of Tribalism: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Iraqi History”, Social History, Vol. 16, No: 1, 1991, p. 54. 24 The imperial discourse is well documented in the works of Selim Deringil and Edhem Eldem. See Selim Deringil, “They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, July 2003, pp. 311-342 and Edhem Eldem, “Osman Hamdi Bey’in Bağdat Vilayetindeki Görevi Sırasında Babası Edhem Paşa’ya Mektupları”, in Zeynep Rana (comp.) Osman Hamdi Bey Kongresi Bildirileri, İstanbul: Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1992, pp. 65-98. 25 The expression “etrâk-ı bî idrâk” is well known, which was used for the nomadic Turks.

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The scope of the study:

Considering all these approaches, it is my contention that the Ottoman rule in Iraq,

when compared to other Arab provinces, needs more scholarly attention. The scope

of this study is the history of the Ottoman Iraq, namely the Iraqi provinces of

Baghdad, Mosul, Basra and Shahrizor, during a period which can roughly be referred

to as the Tanzimat Period. Therefore, in this dissertation, I use “the province of

Baghdad” so as to include all of these Iraqi provinces.

One of the basic concerns of this study is to reveal the process of Ottoman

centralization and modernization in the province of Baghdad, which was in the

easternmost periphery of the empire. The dissolution of decentralist/authonomous

structures and the extension of Ottoman central power at the expense of tribal

dominions will be emphasized. The process of modernization, and centralization was

closely related and this dissertation clearly underlines the Ottoman origins of modern

Iraq.

On the other hand, the implementation of basic Tanzimat reforms in a

province, which was much different, in terms of its geography, demography and

societal structure, from the province in the heartlands of the empire, was another

concern of this study. Some of the Tanzimat reforms, such as the Land Code of 1858,

contradicted with the realities of the region and, I think, the responses given to the

application of Tanzimat reforms will contribute significantly to the literature on the

subject. In this context, this study will be in an attempt to reveal how Tanzimat was

perceived from Baghdad.

It is for these reasons that this study is more of administrative and political

history. Before assessing the place of Baghdad in regional and international

networks, the maps of administrative and political history have to be drawn in detail.

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Nevertheless, this dissertation does not aim to explain every aspect of nineteenth

century Iraqi history, because it is restricted by length and available resources.

The Ottoman rule in Iraq is generally divided into five periods. The first

period starts with the conquest of Suleyman (Kanuni) in 1534 and continues until the

entry of the Safavids into Baghdad in 1622. The second period covers the era

between 1638 and 1749, which signify Baghdad’s re-conquest by Murad IV and the

beginning of the Mamluk rule in Baghdad. The third period between 1749 and 1831

is generally known as the Mamluk period. The fourth period starts with the fall of the

Mamluk rule and ended with the governorship of Midhat Pasha in 1869. The fifth

and final period ended in 1917, when Baghdad was occupied by the British forces.26

This study will be focusing mainly on the fourth period of Ottoman rule, that

is to say, from 1831 to 1872. As was mentioned above, Midhat Pasha’s governorship

(1869-72) is considered to be the beginning of the final period of Ottoman rule in

Baghdad. However, unlike Cemil Musa Neccar, I preferred to include Midhat

Pasha’s governorship into the fourth period, because it represented the culmination

of the Tanzimat governorship in the province of Baghdad.

This present study takes the year 1831 as the beginning point, because this

year is not only an important turning point in the whole history of Ottoman Iraq, but

it also represents the transition of Iraq from a medieval to an international structure.27

Salman, for example, regarded the fall of the Mamluk rule as the end of the “feudal

social order” and the beginning of the modern age.28 Another significant aspect of

1831 is the end of decentralized rule and beginning of a centralized Ottoman 26 Cemil Musa Neccar, Al-İdâra al-Osmânî fî Vilâyeti Baghdâd,1869-1917, Cairo: Madloubi Bookshop, 1991, p. 68. 27 Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925, p. 279. 28 Kamal Abdal-Rahman Salman, The Ottoman and British Policies Toward Iraqi Tribes: 1831 to 1921, PhD Thesis, The University of Utah, 1992, p. 1.

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administration. The period studied in this dissertation also falls significantly into the

third period of Albert Hourani’s periodization of Ottoman history, during which time

the beginnings of modernization were witnessed.29 Therefore, this study also

allocates considerable room to the modernization of Ottoman province of Baghdad.

This dissertation aims to reveal the dynamics of Ottoman rule in the province

of Baghdad. In order to test the data, comparisons have been done with other

Ottoman provinces. In this sense, Damascus had significant resemblance with

Baghdad, because it was also a center of the Ottoman army, namely the Fifth Army.

The present study is divided into six chapters. After an assessment of the

literature and approaches on the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, chapter one

contains a general introduction on the geography, the people, and history of the

Ottoman Iraq. In chapter two, the decline and fall of the decentralist structures such

as the Jalilis and Kurdish emirates, will be explained. Parallel to the disintegration of

the autonomous entities, the growing presence of Ottoman state is emphasized.

Chapter three attempts to determine the provincial borders among the Iraqi

provinces. Then, the authority of the governor is analyzed in relation to the centralist

and de-centralist forces. The increasing Ottoman state control and the improvements

in the general security of the province will be mentioned here.

Chapters four and five seek to consider the extent to which the Tanzimat

reforms were carried out in the Ottoman Iraq. Special importance will be given to the

establishment of provincial administrative councils and the implementation of two

significant laws, namely the Provincial Law of 1864 and Ottoman Land Code of

1858 in the region. The tribal structure of the region and the Ottoman politics of tribe

will be discussed. Finally, chapter six analyzes the modernization of various aspects

29 Hourani divided Ottoman history roughly into four phases, of which the period from 1760 to 1860 was the third phase. Hourani, “Ottoman Reform”, p. 42.

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of life in Baghdad. Special emphasis will be given to the ‘technologies of colonial

age’, that is to say, new methods of communication (introduction of steam

navigation, railroads and the beginning of telegraph communication) and the

improvement of schooling and printing (provincial print house and newspaper). The

concluding remarks will be followed by appendices including documents from

Ottoman and British archives.

Sources:

As far as the sources used in this study are concerned, there is no doubt that the

Ottoman archives are the most salient source of information for the Ottoman rule in

the province. The catalogues of the İrâde collection and the Sadâret Mektûbî Kalemi

are the most extensively used archival documents. Other catalogues were also used,

but they varied in terms of data concerning the province of Baghdad. Ayniyât

defterleri contained the copies of documents sent from the Sublime Porte the

governor in Baghdad; however, they are, to a great extent, about ordinary incidents

such as murder and theft.30 Ottoman archival documents obviously formed the bulk

of this research. Beside the Ottoman archives, British consular reports (Public

Record Office, Foreign Office) were also explored. Both archival sources are used

complementarily.

Provincial yearbooks (sâlnâmes) were published in most vilâyets, on a rather

irregular basis, beginning as early as 1284-1286 (1864-1869), namely after the

enactment of the vilâyet law. The earliest yearbook for the province of Baghdad

30 BOA, Ayniyât Defterleri, 1283-1296 (1866-1879). Also see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi, (Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, yayın no: 42, ikinci baskı ), İstanbul, 2000, p. 204.

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dates back to 1292 (1875).31 Though even the publication of the first sâlnâme of

Baghdad was not within our period of study (1831-1872), it contains significant data

regarding the administrative history of the province.

On the other hand, the Ottoman official chronicles are significant sources that

have been, and still are, widely used. However, as S. H. Longrigg pointed out, for the

official historiographers of Ottoman Empire, Iraq had been of interest only when a

siege or rebellion occurred.32 The data in these chronicles should be supported by the

Ottoman archival documents.

Moreover, memoirs and travel accounts of provincial officials have an

outstanding importance. For instance, the memoirs of Midhat Pasha and Direktör Ali

Bey are quite valuable. Midhat Pasha wrote his memoirs in his last years in the

prison of Taif. In his two-volume memoirs, he tells every details of his life,

allocating a great chapter on his governorship in Baghdad. Similarly, the study

written by Ali Haydar Midhat, son of Midhat Pasha, is another significant work on

the life of Midhat Pasha. Mehmed Hurşid Pasha’s Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd is almost

unique in its genre. On the other hand, the travel accounts written by European

travelers such as Felix Jones, Lady Anne Blunt, Austen Henry Layard, and Pierre

Ponafidine are also quite valuable for the history of Ottoman Baghdad. These travel

accounts have invaluable data concerning Iraqi tribes.

Besides these memoirs and travel accounts, Zewra, the official newspaper of

Baghdad province, is one of the most salient primary sources.33 Since this newspaper

31 David Kushner, “The Administration of the District of Palestine, According to the Ottoman Yearbooks, 1864-1914”, Osmanlı Araştırmaları, XVIII, p. 125. 32 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 327. 33 The issues of Zewra newspaper, that corresponds to the Midhat Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad, are kept in the National Library (Milli Kütüphane) in Ankara, and in the Hakkı Tarık Us Library in Istanbul. I already have copies of the first 100 issues in my personal library.

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contains domestic as well as well foreign issues, it becomes an indispensable source

for the history of Ottoman Baghdad. Zewra began to be published in 1869; hence, it

is quite vital in understanding Midhat Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad. Finally,

besides these primary sources, secondary sources on nineteenth-century Iraq were

also explored extensively.

Literature on Ottoman Rule in Iraq

It is well known to the students of history of the Middle East that academic studies

on the late history of Baghdad, that is the history of the Ottoman rule in the region,

are quite limited. Most of the works on Baghdad are either on the heyday of Islamic

civilization, namely the Abbasid period, or on the modern history of Iraq, that is, the

post-Gulf War era. When compared with other Middle Eastern cities such as Aleppo,

Damascus, Yemen and Jerusalem, it becomes quite clear that Ottoman Baghdad has

been neglected by the academe.

There are considerable works on the foundation of the city and the caliphate

period. The Abbasid Empire, with its powerful rulers like Mansur and Harun al-

Rashid, the Dâru’l-Hikmet as the center of scientific activities, and the “one thousand

and one night” tales, attracted the attention of many people. And this interest was

well reflected in the literature. However, the Ottoman rule in the Arab world was to a

large extent neglected and it is generally regarded in the Arab historiography as ‘dark

ages’, because it was (and to some extent is) thought that in this period the Arab

people were subjugated by the Ottomans and this was perceived as a kind of

imperialism.34 The nationalist viewpoint is the leading reason for such a pessimistic

34 Albert Hourani mentions that when he asked a well-known historian of the Middle East the reason why he left the period of 1516-1918 out in his studies, he replied that it was because there was really no Arab history during these centuries. See, Albert Hourani, “The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East, in Kemal Karpat (ed.) The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974, p. 61. For the attitude of the Arab scholarship toward Ottoman State, see

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historiography against Ottoman/Turkish rule in the region. Moreover, until recently

there was (and to some extent, there has been) obviously a “chronic reluctance of

scholars working on Arab cities to explore Ottoman documentation”.35 Hence, the

Ottoman period in the Arab historiography is either skipped or shortly summarized.

In the words on Ehud R. Toledano, “the nationalist narratives had either written the

Ottomans out of Arab histories, or relegated them to the role of villains, responsible

for the sorry state of the Arabs found themselves in after the First World War”.36 No

doubt, the historiography on Ottoman Baghdad has its share of this negligence and it

is quite astonishing that studies with great titles such as “The Making of Modern

Iraq” or “ Iraq: from Sumer to Saddam” allocate only four-five pages or a small

chapter encompassing the whole Saljukid, Mongol and Ottoman Periods.37

However, after the 1980s, there appeared considerable monographs, which have

significantly revised these nationalist narratives. As Toledano pointed out,

The first thing these monographs have accomplished is the re-attachment of the 19th century to the Ottoman era in Middle Eastern and North African history. The nationalist –and Orientalist- narratives end the Ottoman period at the close of the 18th century, and present the 19th century rather as a precursor to the rise of the Arab nation-state in the middle of the 20th century.” In that ill-defined period, various “founders of modern ….” (fill the blank with the appropriate country name) operated in so-called “proto-nationalist” environments, “beginning of” reigned supreme in titles, and Ottomans were to be neither seen nor heard.38

Abou-el-Haj, Rifaat Ali. “The Social Uses of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule”, IJMES, Vol.14, No:2, May 1982, pp. 185-201. 35 Eldem, Goffman and Masters (eds.), The Ottoman City, p. 8. 36 Ehud R. Toledano, “What Ottoman History and Ottomanist Historiography Are- Or, Rather Are Not”, Middle Eastern Studies, 38/3, 2002, p. 205. 37 See for instance, Foster, Henry A. The Making of Modern Iraq, Norman: University of Oklahoma Pres, 1935 and Simons, Geoff. Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, (2nd ed.) London: MacMillan Pres, 1996. 38 Toledano, p. 205.

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Furthermore, two factors have been effective in the proliferation of the

academic works on Iraq. The first factor was the emergence of archaeology as a

science, which was unknown before the nineteenth century. A century ago, antiquity

and archaeology were the only interests that attracted visitors from the West to Iraq.

And it is not surprising that many European diplomats and travelers had interest in

the archeological characteristics of the region. The second factor was the rise of oil

as a vital source of energy. There is no doubt that oil, as a new source of energy

attracted the interest of the Great Powers to the region. In short, oil and science

opened a new age in the history of Iraq.39 The fruits of this proliferation in

publications are especially visible in the last three decades. Although the number of

the studies on Iraq proliferated, those having academic competence and necessary

archival sufficiency do not exceed the fingers of a hand.

S. H. Longrigg’s Four Centuries of Modern Iraq still remains the pioneering

study on the Ottoman rule in Iraq. Longrigg made use of a wide range of sources

ranging from Ottoman and Arab chronicles, European and other traveler accounts, to

records of the East India Company as well as many related monographs. The author

also provided an excellent list of travelers who passed from the region between 1533

and 1914. Despite the wide range of sources, Longrigg could not go beyond a mere

chronological narration. He is further criticized for dwelling upon political history

and ignoring the social history. The final chapters of his book are allocated to the

modernization of Iraq in the late nineteenth century, which will be detailed in this

study as well. Moreover, several important archival sources, which are very crucial

for the history of Ottoman Iraq, namely Ottoman archives, the consulate reports in

Public Record Office, in London, and the Zewra newspaper published in 1869 in

39 Steward Perowne, “Life in Baghdad: Anniversary Lecture”, Asian Affairs, vol. 34, No: 3-4, (1947), p. 251.

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Baghdad, were not used by the author. This present study will, in this sense, be in an

attempt to include these sources.

For the Mamluk period of Iraq (1749-1831), there are two leading studies.

Tom Nieuwenhuis’ Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq tries to sketch out the

societal picture of Iraq in the period preceding the one this dissertation focuses on.

The book was published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers in a series of studies in

social history. Therefore, the author tries to fill in the scanty areas of Iraqi social

history. After a chapter on the structure of Mamluk power, an extended chapter on

“the rural world” treats the politics and society of villagers in sedentary areas and of

tribesmen who led a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence. Unfortunately, the author

of this book only used the French archival sources, ignoring the Ottoman and British

ones. The archival shortcoming of Nieuwenhuis’ book was compensated for in

Mehdi Jawad Habib al-Bustanî’s PhD dissertation, prepared at İstanbul University, in

1979.40 This dissertation concentrates not only the Mamluk rule in Iraq, but also the

re-assertion of Ottoman rule under the governorship of Ali Rıza Pasha (1831-1842).

Al-Bustanî made use of extensive Ottoman and British archives and the archival

documents formed the main skeleton of the thesis. However, the narrative is much

too dependent on the archival documents, leading it to document fetishism; this

makes the thesis more descriptive and less analytic.

As for the works on the nineteenth-century Ottoman Iraq, many of them

neither at all nor slightly make use of Ottoman archival sources, which are, no doubt,

the most important sources of information for the Ottoman rule in the province.

Studies in Arabic generally make references only to Ottoman sâlnâmes of Baghdad,

the yearbooks for the province. Since the sâlnâmes are not uniform in character and

40 Another PhD thesis on Mamluks of Baghdad has recently been published; see Thomas Lier, Haushalte und Haushaltspolitik in Baghdad 1704-1831, Würzburg, Ergon Verlag, 2004.

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cannot be regarded as totally correct or up-to-date, it becomes difficult to determine

the exact dates of certain changes and developments. Though they can still supply us

with data which do not exist elsewhere and can show some trends of development in

the different areas with which they deal41, it is more appreciable when the data in the

sâlnâmes are compared and cross-checked with other archival sources. Among the

Arabic literature on the subject, Abdülaziz Süleyman Nevvar’s Târîh al-Irak al-

Hadis min Nihâyeti Hükmi Davud Paşa ilâ nihâyeti Hükmi Midhat Paşa, and Cemil

Musa Neccar’s Al-İdâra al-Osmânî fî Vilâyati Bağdâd come to forefront, but their

use of Ottoman sources are limited with state and provincial yearbooks (sâlnâmes).

With regard to studies concerning the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, two

scholars’ works come to the forefront, namely that of Frederick Anscombe and

Zekeriya Kurşun. In his The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia

and Qatar Anscombe presents valuable insights on the incorporation of Kuwait into

the province of Baghdad and Midhat Pasha’s absorption of Al-Ahsa. Focusing more

on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the author emphasizes the

resurrection of the Ottoman role in the Gulf, the Ottoman-British rivalry in the region

and the relations between the regional powers and the local notables whether tribal

sheikhs or political entrepreneurs. Kurşun’s studies on Necid, Al-Ahsa and Qatar are

well documented by archival sources and provides regional analysis in the light of

the formation of two states, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar.42 In this sense, the

Wahhabi ideology and its effects on the region was presented in detail.

Of the studies that focus on Ottoman Mosul, works of Dina Rizk Khoury and

Sarah Shields are well known by the students of Middle Eastern history. On the one

41 Kushner, “The Administration”, p.126 42 Zekeriya Kurşun, Necid ve Ahsa’da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti: Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud Devletinin Ortaya Çıkışı, Ankara: TTK, 1998 and idem., The Ottomans in Qatar: A History of Anglo-Ottoman Conflicts in the Persian Gulf, İstanbul: İSIS Yayımcılık, 2002.

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hand, Khoury’s State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1534-

1834, spotlights the linkage between provincial and imperial politics in three

centuries, and it emphasizes the provincial elite and its relations to the state and

economy with regard to processes of war making and tax farming. Khoury’s studies

certainly prepare a good background for understanding the nineteenth century of the

city. In this context, Shield’s Mosul Before Iraq, starts where Khoury has left,

namely the 1830s. She attempts to present the economic history of the nineteenth

century and early twentieth century Mosul. In this regard, the effects of the Tanzimat,

economic activities, trade networks and regional integration are the main issues that

are addressed in her book.

In a similar fashion, Hala Fattah’s Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia

and the Gulf 1745-1900 analyzes the region through the complex dynamics, which

formed a “regional market”. The trade patterns, commercial axis between cities, and

the implications of Wahhabi ideology are skillfully highlighted in a trans-regional

perspective.

There is no doubt that in no country in the world there are archeological

remains richer than in Baghdad. Antiquity, and the curiosity to visit the places named

in the Holy Books were almost the only interest that attracted visitors from the West

to Iraq. This fact is reflected in the number of travelers who visited the region. It is

also no surprise that several of the British consuls in Baghdad, among them Claudius

James Rich and Austen Henry Layard are the best-known ones, had archaeological

concerns as well. Layard’s Nineveh and Its Remains is perhaps the most outstanding

work in this sense. The travelers are necessarily transient and discontinuous;

therefore, the majority of their writings helps and verifies details rather than

constitute a sound basis for research. The traveler accounts also bear the danger of

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having orientalist approaches. Despite this jeopardy, they usually have significant

data, which cannot be otherwise found in archival documents. In this respect, the

works of J. B. Fraser, H. B. Lynch, A. H. Layard, James Felix Jones and Lady Anne

Blunt are among those that first come to mind.43

Decentralization Vs Centralization: Center-Periphery Relations

The tension between the provincial forces and the central government has been

identified as one of the most critical problems of Ottoman history in the post-

classical period.44 In particular, the eighteenth century is very abundant in terms of

the decentralist structures; it is for this reason that this century is usually referred as

the “Age of the Âyâns”.45 This issue attracted the attention of many scholars who

sought to use the center-periphery relations as a key explanatory framework for

Ottoman studies.46 These works emphasized a confrontation between the center and

the periphery. It was the âyâns (provincial notables) and local dynasties, which did

mostly rise in prominence, using this prepared ground for decentralization. The

decentralist forces were not only in the Anatolian provinces, but were also valid for

the Arab provinces as well. When we look at the Arab provinces, the Karamanids (in

Tripoli), al-Husainiyyah (in Tunisia), the Chehab (Şihâbî) amirs and Zâhir al-Umar

43 For a complete list of travelers, see appendices in Longrigg’s Four Centuries and Neccar’s Al-İdâra al-Osmânî fî Vilâyeti Bağdâd. 44 Halil İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration”, Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, ed. by Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale: Southern Illinous University Press, 1977), p. 51. 45 See Bruce McGowan, “The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812” in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 and Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık, Ankara: TTK, 1994. 46 Among these scholars Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper are the first ones to be remembered. See Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”, Daedalus, 1973 (Winter), pp. 169-190 and Heper, “Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special References to the Nineteenth Century”, International Political Science Review, Vol.1, No:1, 1980, pp. 81-105.

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(in Lebanon), al-Azms and Ahmad al-Jazzâr (in Syria and Palestine), the Suuds (in

Necd), the Kurdish begs (in southeastern Anatolia and Kurdistan), the Jalîlîs (in

Mosul), and the Mamluks (in Baghdad) were among the leading quasi-independent

regimes.47 The Ottoman center could no longer tolerate autonomous notables and

dynasties as intermediates between himself and his people, and Mahmud II showed

his decisive attitude to end this situation after 1812. Mahmud II’s aim was to restore

the centralized government system. Therefore, the imperial centralization had started

long before the Tanzimat Edict. The Tanzimat, though not emphasized in the

Gülhane Edict, re-emphasized this process. As a corollary of this, the two decades

after 1830s witnessed the suppression of these âyâns and local dynasties, who had

established their hereditary rule over extensive territories.48 The Azms of Damascus

came to an end in 1807, the Mamluks of Baghdad in 1831, the Jalilis of Mosul in

1834, and the Karamanids of Tripoli (Libya) in 1835.49

When we have a closer look at the province of Baghdad, it becomes clear that

despite its importance, it remained, from its conquest in 1534 until the mid

nineteenth century, in the periphery of the Ottoman Empire.50 It was never as

thoroughly integrated into the empire or as directly administered by the Ottomans, as

was the western half of the Fertile Crescent. However, the Mamluk rule (1749-1831)

was the apex of quasi-independent rule in the province. Perhaps the most striking

47 For a general account of the semi-autonomous dynasties see Yılmaz Öztuna, Devletler ve Hanedanlar: Türkiye 1074-1990, 2 Vols, Ministry of Culture, 1989, pp. 423-537. See also W. Hardy Wickwar, The Modernization of Administration in the Middle East, Beirut: Khayats, 1962, p. 17; Abdülaziz Süleyman Nevvar, Târîh al-Irak al-Hadîs min Nihâyeti Hükmi Davud Paşa ilâ Nihâyeti Hükmi Midhat Paşa, Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi li’t-Tibaah ve’n-Neşr, 1968, p.15. 48 İnalcık, Centralization, p.51. See also, Hourani, “Ottoman Reform”, pp. 41-68. 49 Neccar, p. 26. 50 Between 1534 and 1917, Baghdad remained under Ottoman control except for 15 years (1623-1638).

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sign of this was that the governors appointed by the Sublime Porte were considered

as “alien pashas”.

When the Sublime Porte decided to put an end to Mamluk rule in Baghdad in

1831, the Mamluks gave up the internal rivalry among themselves and united against

the newly appointed governor, Ali Rıza Pasha. The takeover of the local government

will be explained in next chapter; however, it should be noted here that the Mamluk

rule was a quasi-independent regime and the accounts that labeled it as an

independent political entity are exaggerated. It is true that the imperial center could

not appoint its own governors; or more correctly, the governors appointed by the

central administration could not establish their authority and therefore, they were

soon withdrawn.51 The imperial center could rather elect one of the Mamluk

candidates for the provincial governorship. However, this does not mean that it was a

mere spectator to the provincial politics in Baghdad. At least four Mamluk governors

were dismissed with the intervention of Sublime Porte.52

The international conjuncture also played a role in the inability of Ottoman

central government to intervene against local rulers. Especially the wars with Russia

in the first quarter of the nineteenth century prevented the Sublime Porte to canalize

necessary military forces towards the Arab provinces. In such conjuncture, local rule

in the easternmost periphery of the empire certainly facilitated foreign influence and

intervention, which the Ottoman central administration could not accept.

It is quite interesting that Ottoman attempts for centralization and extension

of direct rule in Baghdad and Mosul were eased by natural disasters. First, the plague 51 The uncooperative attitudes of local population, the unpaid Janissary and the Iraqi tribes were effective in this. See John R. Perry, “The Mamluk Paşalık of Baghdad and Ottoman-Iranian Relations in the Late Eighteenth Century”, in Sinan Kuneralp (ed.) Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History I, İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 1987, p. 60. 52 Tom Nieuwenhuis, Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq, Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982, p. 97.

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of 1831 diminished the Mamluk armies seriously and decimated the capital. Then

came a violent spring flood. The two disasters enabled the easy takeover of the city

in the end. On the other hand, the locust invasion in Mosul in 1824-1825, which

devastated the Mosuli countryside and led to famine, further exacerbated the political

crisis in the city; consequently the Jalili rule came to an end.53

This present study starts with the year 1831 as the beginning point, because

this year is not only an important turning point in the whole history of Ottoman Iraq,

but it also represents the watershed between the periods of “local rule” and the period

of restored Ottoman centralization.54 The trends of decentralization and provincial

autonomy in Baghdad were reversed in the nineteenth century when administrative

centralization and reorganization, undertaken by the Ottoman government as part of

a comprehensive reform and modernization program, were extended to Iraq.

The Mamluk period of Baghdad is usually referred to as “Pashalik of

Baghdad”. Literally, “pashalik” meant the place ruled by a pasha; however, it seems

that this term came to be used for the provincial periphery, where local forces had

considerable strength. In Ottoman Iraq, both the introduction of Ottoman direct rule

and later the Tanzimat reforms put an end to the old system of pashalik which in the

past had in fact encouraged decentralization.55

The taxation system in the provinces was very much affected by the center-

periphery relations. As one gets far from the imperial center, the miri system

decreases as well. For example, while Mosul had the traditional miri system,

53 Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834, (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 209. 54 Nieuwenhuis, p.VII. 55 The term had also been used for provinces like Bosnia, Syria and Palestine. See Moshe Ma‘oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 31.

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Baghdad, Basra and Al-Ahsa was farmed out to tax farmers.56 It is well known that

the change (in fact corruption) of the traditional timar system played significant role

in the strengthening of the local âyâns.57 In this regard the Tanzimat reforms

envisioned to centralize the system of tax collection. Hence, muhassıls, who were

sent to the provinces, were to collect the provincial revenues in the name of the

central treasury. Similarly, in Baghdad, change in the taxation system came before

the Tanzimat. It was in 1831 that the re-integration of Iraq into the Ottoman central

government resulted in a change in the tax farming methods. In the pre-1831 period,

the Mamluks of Baghdad employed a system of lifetime tax farming (mâlikâne),

which was a practice peculiar to the eighteenth century. After the establishment of

Ottoman direct rule in Baghdad, the new governor, Ali Rıza Pasha, tightened the

conditions of the contract and changed it “from lifetime contracts to a shorter period

of from one to three years, under direct supervision of the imperial treasury in

İstanbul”.58 In short, this change in the tax farming system was in fact a reflection of

imperial centralization.

The imperial incentive for centralization in Baghdad was also strengthened by

the fragility of the periphery. The Mamluk regime was fragile not only in its loyalty

to the Sublime Porte, it was also brittle in its relations with foreign powers. On the

one hand, there were the Wahhabi forces increasing their threat towards Ottoman

Iraq and despite repeated orders from İstanbul, the Mamluks were reluctant in

56 In the classical period, the timar/sâlyâneli division was quite complex. While some of the sancaks of Baghdad was under timar system, some others were ruled as salyaneli. However, in the nineteenth century this division was clearer. See Halil Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlı Döneminde Irak’ın İdari Taksimatı”, Belleten, LIV, No. 211, Aralık 1990, pp. 1236, 1248 and 1249. 57 Halil İnalcık, “Eyâlet”, in El2. See also, Süleyman Oğuz, Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi ve Doğu Rumeli Vilayeti (1878-1885), Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1986, p. 16. 58 Keiko Kiyotaki, “The Practice of Tax Farming in the Province of Baghdad in the 1830s”, in Colin Imber, Roads Murphey and Keiko Kiyotaki (eds.) The Frontiers of Ottoman Studies, London: I. B. Tauris, 2005, p. 91.

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meeting this menace. On the other hand, the growing presence of England and

France, both in İstanbul and Baghdad, enabled them to intervene in the appointments

of governors in Baghdad.59 They overtly lobbied for certain governors in the

province. Moreover, it is also well known that England and Iran were quite

influential in instigating the Kurdish tribes within the province.

This state of fragility accelerated the Ottoman incorporation of Baghdad. As

it is well known, the primary objective of the Men of Tanzimat in their reform

program was to transform the Ottoman Empire into a modern centralized state and to

re-establish a firm control over its semi-autonomous and virtually independent

provinces.60 And there has been a commonly accepted contention that “the Tanzimat

reforms succeeded only in those regions of the empire more accessible to the central

administration.”61 Hence, the hand of the central government in the provinces was

strengthened and a centralized bureaucracy was created.

Parallel to this development, the Sublime Porte curbed the powers of the

provincial governors, and provincial councils were founded as part of

decentralization policy.62 However, as it will be discussed later in detail, this only

increased the bureaucratic correspondence between the provincial periphery and the

imperial center and to some extent paralyzed the provincial affairs. To remedy this,

the regulations issued in 1850s restored the governor’s authority and powers. Instead

of weakening the provincial periphery for the sake of imperial centralization, the

59 Mehdi Jawad Habib Al-Bustanî, Bağdattaki Kölemen Hakimiyetinin Tesisi ve Kaldırılması ile Ali Rıza Paşa’nın Valiliği (1749-1842), PhD Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1979, p. 370. 60 Ma‘oz, Ottoman Reform, p. 30. 61 Chirstoph K. Neumann, “Ottoman Provincial Towns from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century: A Re-Assessment of their Place in the Transformation of the Empire”, in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (eds.,) The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Beirut: Ergon Verlag, 2002, p. 143. 62 Heper, p. 93.

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Sublime Porte implemented Ottomanization and localization simultaneously and

recovered the center-periphery relations from the framework of a “zero-sum game”.63

The imperial fermâns dated 1852 and 1858 reinstated the power or the

provincial governor as the chief authority over all matters in the province and the

sole agent of the central government.64 The Sublime Porte decided that a

considerable concentration of responsibility in the hands of the provincial governors,

as in those of the French prefect, would make for more effective central control.

Henceforward, all correspondence between central ministries and their field agents

was to be directed through him”.65 Apart from the restoration of the old powers of

the provincial governors, the extension in the functions of the government was

certainly the reflection of the mid-nineteenth century centralization. For example,

formerly the security of the strategically significant passageways was provided by

the derbentcis in return of exemption from the avarız tax. But with the Tanzimat

reforms, such duties were given to the security forces of the government.66 The

extension the functions of local governments will be elaborated below in the

framework of provincial public works and modernization.

63 Jens Hanssen has earlier pointed that out the center-periphery relation does not have to be in zero-sum game framework. See Jens Hanssen, “Practices of Integration: Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire”, in Jens Hanssen, Stefan Weber, Thomas Philipp (eds.) The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002, pp. 50-51. 64 Stanford J. Shaw, “The Origins of Representative Government in the Ottoman Empire: An Introduction to the Provincial Councils, 1839-1876”, in Near Eastern Round Table 1967-68, ed. By R. Bayly Winder, New York: New York University Press, 1969, p. 90. 65 Wickwar, p. 17. 66 İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri, Ankara: TTK, 2000, p. 17.

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Tanzimat Centralization: Provincial Law of 1864 and the Land Code of 1858

Tanzimat centralization had already been applied in the provincial councils, which

was introduced Baghdad at the very beginning of the 1850s. Like other provincial

councils throughout the empire, the meclis-i kebîr of Baghdad was comprised of

provincial notables, in addition to military and administrative high-ranking officials.

While the latter two had ex officio positions, the local notables (both Muslim and

non-Muslim) were elected by the populace.67 At the end, the councils in the province

of Baghdad, both in the sancaks and kazâs, served to the integration of the provincial

notables first to the local administration and then to the imperial center.

The trend of centralization in provincial administration was further

emphasized with the implementation of Vilâyet Law of 1864 and Land Code of 1858

in Baghdad. As Heper points out, these reforms were attempts on the part of the

center to increase its control over the periphery.68 The application of these reforms in

Baghdad will be elaborated in detail in Chapters four and five; however, it should be

remembered that the very purpose of the law was to strengthen the power of the

lower levels of government, including the administrative councils, by delimiting and

specifying the powers and duties of the officials and councils on all levels of

government.69 The 1864 Vilâyet Law created a highly centralized and hierarchical

bureaucracy and the scope of authority of the provincial governor was further

increased.70 Though some of the leading provincial officials were still appointed

67 Neumann, p. 143. 68 Heper, p. 95. 69 Shaw, p. 96. 70 For the centralist aspects of Provincial Laws of 1864 and 1871 see Carter V. Findley, “The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed From the Center” in David Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986, pp. 8-9.

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from the center, the governor was the supervisor of all provincial affairs within his

jurisdiction. The provincial headquarter was the center for all provincial affairs. The

centralist structure of the law of 1864 was further strengthened with the amendments

in the law in 1871. Though the law of 1871 improved the provincial division of

labor, it also increased the control of the central administration. It is also known that

the sancak organization in the provincial centers was abolished, leaving it to the

direct control of the governor. However, it seems that the central sancak of Baghdad

retained its position as provincial headquarter.71 Mutasarrıf Şakir Bey, who was in

charge of this office in the early 1870s, was an important bureaucrat in the provincial

administration. Furthermore, the law also incorporated the nâhiyes fully into the

provincial administration.72 Later, it was during the grand vizierate of Mahmud

Nedim Pasha, who was known for his decentralist leanings, that there was an attempt

to abolish the provincial law of 1864 because of its emphasis on centralization.73

The Land Code of 1858

The implementation of the Land Code of 1858 was another means of Ottoman

centralization, because the main objective of the code was “to reassert the state’s

right to its agricultural lands, supposedly usurped in part or totally by feudal or semi-

feudal local forces in the provinces”.74 With the application of the code the process

of de-tribalization, which promoted the power of the center over the tribal periphery,

71 “… ve nefs-i Bağdad sancağı dahi bir muutasarrıflık i‘tibâr olunmakla beraber merkez-i vilâyet burası ittihâz edilmiş olduğundan…”, PRO, FO 195/949, No: 7, From Herbert to H. Elliot. 72 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 63. 73 Abdülhamit Kırmızı, “Rules of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908”, PhD Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2005. 74 Haim Gerber, The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East, Boulder, Colo.:, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987, p.68.

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was accelerated. However, it should also be kept in mind that many of the Tanzimat

reforms were implemented in a “trial-and-error” method and the regulations were re-

designed according to responses received from the provinces. In this context, the

application of the Land Code in Baghdad had slight changes when compared with the

provinces in the heartland of the empire. The slight changes and the resulting

consequences will be discussed in detail in the fifth chapter.

Nevertheless, the level of centralization and Ottomanization was much

dependent on the personal capability of the governor. Strong and initiative-taking

governors like Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha achieved much towards centralization

and Ottomanization. Therefore, I agree with Jens Hanssen, who considered

governors like Midhat Pasha as the “center in the periphery”.75

The Centralization-Modernization Nexus It can be said that the process of centralization and modernization went hand in hand

in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Ottoman modernization was not only

visible in the provincial administration, but its reflection in the public works was

very significant. Until the nineteenth century, some of the administrative

responsibilities were carried out by vakfs, religious congregations (millets) and other

local groups. However, with the Tanzimat reforms, the Men of Tanzimat considered

the public works, especially those related to the municipal services, among the duties

of central, and therefore provincial, administration.

First of all, the improvement of the means of communication and

transportation between İstanbul and Baghdad facilitated the politics of centralization.

With the completion of a direct telegraph line between İstanbul and Baghdad in the 75 Hanssen, p. 51.

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early 1860s, Iraqi provinces became closer to the imperial center, and this enabled

much faster communication between the two. As it will be mentioned in the first

chapter, Baghdad’s remoteness from the center prevented the Sublime Porte to act on

certain provincial affairs on the spot. However, towards the end of our period the

control of the center in the Iraqi provinces increased considerably. Similarly, the

improvement of the roads and streets (both within the city and between-cities), the

enhancement of steam navigation, the introduction of modern schools, the opening of

print house and the publication of the first Iraqi newspaper were not only means of

modernization, but also of centralization. For instance, the most characteristic feature

of the organization of the new Ottoman system of education was its centralization,

resulting in uniformity of administrative procedure, curriculum planning and

methods of instruction for all schools of the same type. Al-Qaysi has already pointed

out how this centralization was carried out in Baghdad:

In administrative organization, the decisions of the entire teaching and administrative personnel depended upon the Ministry of Education in İstanbul. The financing of new schools and new positions as well as a general increase in financial support took place only with the approval of a central authority. In curriculum planning, the same fields of instruction were covered in all schools of similar type and the same numbers of hours were provided for each grade.76

The modernization in the province was more visible in the public works.

Improvement in the public works was significant at least in three points: firstly, it

was through the constructions and/or repairs of public works that an increasing state

control was felt among the local people. Secondly, public buildings displayed “the

presence of the state at the local level”, government house (hükümet konağı), clock

tower, modern schools and hospitals being among the more visible signs of the state

76 Abdul Wahhab Abbas Al-Qaysi, The Impact of Modernization on Iraqi Society during the Ottoman Era: A Study of Intellectual Development in Iraq, 1869-1917, PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 1958, p. 55.

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in the local landscape.77 And finally, the public works in the tribal areas, especially

roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and telegraph, played very significant roles in the

process of de-tribalization. In the words of the A. M. Hamilton who was

commissioned to construct a road in Rawanduz, there are two important factors for

the construction of a road, commercial and administrative. “Every state, in the past

and now, used roads and highways to keep the order and security. And once the

highway network enters an area, the primitive people would accustom to the modern

and civilized way of life, as least by copying that way of life. …The roads constructed

in Mosul and Kirkuk had already begun their pacifying roles”.78 Therefore, the

extension of public works and buildings meant also the extension of a modern way of

life at the expense of traditional tribal structures.

Perhaps the most striking means of modernization was the issuance of the

first provincial newspaper, namely Zewra. Like other Tanzimat newspapers, Zewra

acted as a teacher, and educated the people of the province toward a modern way of

life. As we will see, Zewra’s guidance was not limited to a certain aspect of life, but

it ranged from agriculture, education, public relations to de-tribalization.

A further reflection of centralization and modernization was felt in the

imperial ceremonies. What Selim Deringil has ably shown for imperial center during

the Hamidian regime is also valid for Baghdad in the 1860s and early 1870s.79 By

means of imperial ceremonies, which were given a special emphasis during the

second half of the century, the people of locality could feel the presence of the

77 For a similar interpretation on Ankara and Edirne during the Tanzimat period, see Yonca Köksal, “Imperial Center and Local Groups: Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Edirne and Ankara”, New Perspectives on Turkey, No: 27, Fall 2002, p. 116. 78 A. M. Hamilton, Kürdistan’dan Geçen Yol, (trans. Zeki Yaş) İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2001, pp. 69-70. 79 Selim Deringil Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909, London: I. B. Tauris, 1998, pp. 16-43.

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center. This imperial symbolism included the celebrations of certain events such as

the anniversaries of imperial births and enthronements (velâdet ve cülûs-i pâdişâhî)

and the use of philharmonic bands for certain provincial events.80 The Zewra

newspaper conveys very colorful narrations of these instances.81 For example, during

the anniversaries of imperial births and enthronements the governor-general accepted

the visits and good-wishes of provincial notables, high-ranking administrative and

military officials and the consuls of the foreign states. This was followed by a feast

organized by the governor. In the evening the administrative and military buildings

were lighted with oil-lamps and the celebrations continued with fireworks until mid-

night. Such celebrations were done in some of the sancaks of the province and local

notables took part actively. The corvettes in the Basra dockyard also celebrated the

birthday of the Sultan with cannon shots.82

It is quite interesting that while the anniversaries of imperial births and

enthronements were celebrated with magnificence, there is no hint indicating the

celebration of religiously important days/nights such as the anniversaries of

Prophet’s birth (mevlid kandili) and the first revelation of the Holy Qur’an (kadir

gecesi). It is even doubtful that the religious holidays (bayram) were celebrated.

Only on one occasion did the birth of the Sultan coincide with the berât night, and

the two were celebrated together.83

In a similar fashion, the military philharmonic band was used in the opening

ceremony of a new bridge in Baghdad. New ships were released to the river with the

80 BOA, İ. DAH. 31876, 22 M 1278 (30 July 1861). Cülûs-ı hümâyûn-ı hazret-i pâdişâhîden dolayı Beyrut ve Bağdad taraflarından arabî târîhlere dair. 81 For such narrations of celebration see Zewra, No: 3, 6, 55 and 94. 82 BOA, İ. DAH, 34407, 13 L 1279 (3 April 1863). 83 Zewra, No: 94.

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philharmonic band as well. And finally, during the visit of Nasıreddin, the Shah of

Iran, the welcoming ceremony included an official military parade and a demo of

military practices and maneuver (ta‘lîm ve tatbîkât).84 In a nutshell, all these

ceremonies were indeed the reflections of growing state presence in Ottoman Iraq.

84 The Zewra newspaper is very rich in terms of the preparations made for the visit of Nasıreddin Shah. See Zewra, No: 95-100.

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Chapter I

Ottoman Iraq: Geography, People and History

Geography Comes First

Iraq has probably been one of the leading territories in the world in which geography

played very crucial role in the social, economic and political history of the country. It

was the mountains in the north and the rivers in central and lower Iraq that came

first.85 The mountainous country of northeastern Iraq has been for centuries the home

of Kurds. The mountains were important shelters for Kurdish tribes who often

rebelled against the provincial administration. Climatologically this region differs

from the south: while the north was in a rainfall zone, central and lower Iraq did not

receive sufficient rain and therefore had been described as irrigation zones.86 The

rainfall in the north was usually sufficient for agriculture, but life in the rest of the

country was dependent on canals and irrigation. In the words of Charles Issawi, “in

perhaps no other country in the world is prosperity so directly dependent on an

intricate system of irrigation”.87

Agriculture was the most significant source of income in Ottoman Iraq. Since

agriculture cannot be sustained by limited rainfall, the Euphrates and Tigris have

become the life-giving veins of this geography. The greatest concentration of villages

has, therefore, been in the valleys and lowlands of the Tigris and Euphrates. Salinity

was a serious problem that affected about two-thirds of the land and has resulted in

85 Here I was inspired by Fernand Braudel’s phrase “mountains come first”. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, New York: Harper and Row, vol. 1, 1972, p. 25. 86 For a map of rainfall and irrigation zones, see Nieuwenhuis, p. XVI. 87 Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East, Chicago, 1966, p. 129.

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the abandonment of large areas of agricultural land. The low humidity, hot sun and

high rates of evaporation, which decrease the benefits of winter rains, make these

two rivers more valuable.88 Unlike the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates flooded

irregularly and the flood season did not coincide with the growing season of the

agricultural crops. As Fernea clearly pointed out:

Unlike the Nile, no great distance exists between the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates and the alluvial plain. Thus the flood follows quickly upon the winter rains, the April peak coming too late for the winter crops and too early for the summer planting. Until 1958, when the flood control installations were completed at Wadi Tharthar, the Tigris regularly flooded into the streets of Baghdad in flood season and ravaged the countryside between the capital and the Gulf. On the other hand, in midsummer the supply dwindles radically and severely limits cultivation.89

In the core of the country, rain was both insufficient in quantity and untimely, since it

usually rained mainly from December through March, which was too late for the

winter sowing season.90 Central and lower Iraq were dominated by two rivers,

namely the Euphrates and Tigris, and they were the main sources of irrigation.

When compared with the north, the central and lower parts were much

influenced by the annual floods. Apart from unpredictable and abrupt floods, the

rivers in Mesopotamia frequently changed their riverbeds. These floods not only

made large-scale irrigation difficult but also seriously damaged the bridges on the

rivers and the harvest. That some European travelers compared the floods of these

rivers to the big flood of Noah gives some clues about the effects of these floods on

88 Robert A. Fernea, ‘Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq’, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 7. 89 Ibid., p. 8. 90 Issawi, p. 129.

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the people of Baghdad.91 The floods usually left behind many marshes, and these

marshes affected the sanitary conditions in Baghdad seriously, they were to become

the sources for epidemic diseases, especially malaria and cholera.

An ever-threatening problem in the delta of Iraq was that the Euphrates and

Tigris have their annual flood season in March, April and May, which was too late

for the winter crops. On the other hand, it was too early for the summer crops:

summer crops were often the victims of droughts. Without effective organization of

irrigation, without desalination and without a certain political stability, any continued

and stable agriculture was impossible.92 However, despite the floods, the contribution

of the Euphrates and Tigris to agriculture is indisputable. The river waters were

brought to the inlands via canals, which made the river lines attractive for settlement

and agriculture. The rich soil of the Mesopotamia, when combined with the river

waters, produced generously and, as a result of this, agricultural produce was the

leading export item. Aside from their contributions to agriculture, the rivers, as long

as they were kept navigable, were very significant in the management and

development of commercial activities, which will be dwelled upon in the next

chapters.

The climate in Iraq differed considerably, ranging from 120º F in the summer

to 20º F in the winter.93 During the summer (April to October) the weather is

extremely hot and dry, which naturally affected the social organization of the people.

The people of Iraq had to adapt their life to this climate. A common feature of Iraqi

91 Lady Anne Blunt talked about Hît as the place where Noah constructed his ark. For her, this lower valley of the Euphrates is just the place where a great flood would have come. Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968. 1st vol, p. 166; also see A. M. Hamilton, Kürdistan’dan Geçen Yol [The Road through Kurdistan], trans. by Zeki Yaş, İstanbul: Avesta, 2001, p. 35. 92 Nieuwenhuis, pp. 4-5. 93 Issawi, p. 129.

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households is the serdâbs, which were built underground for the purpose of

protection from the hot weather. The climate is distressingly humid in the south.

Lower Iraq was dominated by vast deserts and marshes. Thanks to the marshes and

inundations or tides, the cultivation of rice and dates had a great share in Iraq’s

commerce.

Arab geographers used the term “al-Jezîrah” to denote the northern part of the

territory situated between the Tigris and the Euphrates.94 While Euphrates retained

its original name (Fırat), “Shatt” was the usual abbreviated term for the Tigris used in

Ottoman documents, stressing its proximity to the provincial center, because the city

of Baghdad was established on the banks of the Tigris River.95 As many travelers

stated one of the most important features of Baghdad was its being on the Tigris

River. The greater part of the city lies on the eastern bank of the river, called Resâfe.

The western bank was called Kerh or Zewrâ.96 The two parts of the city were tied by

a floating bridge of pontoons.

Another geographical characteristic of Iraq, especially in the south, has been

the tidal activities. Obviously southern Iraq has been the region most influenced by

the tides. The effects of the tides had been felt from the Gulf to Sûku’ş-Şuyûh on the

Euphrates, and to the tomb of Prophet Uzayir on the Tigris. In this region the river

94 Normally the term signifies essentially an island and secondarily a peninsula; however, by extension, this same term is applied also to territories situated between great rivers or separated from the rest of a continent by an expanse of desert. See M. Canard, “Al-Djazirah”, EI2. 95 Literally the word “Shatt” originally meant one side of a camel's hump, and “Shatt al-Wadi” meant a canyon's, a valley's, or a stream's bank or side, or the rising ground next to the bottom. Eventually, “Shatt” became most commonly used in the sense of a stream's bank. In modern Mesopotamia-Iraq it has indeed often been used to describe a stream. This usage is a relatively recent one. Y. Callot, “Shatt”, El2. Dijle was also commonly used in Ottoman documents in referring to the Tigris River; however, when “Shatt” was used separately, it referred to the Tigris River. 96 Caliph Mansur’s famous city of Baghdad was originally built on the western bank of the Tigris. However, in the course of time, it was ruined as a result of frequent floods. Therefore, the eastern bank of the Tigris was preferred as the administrative center (makarr-ı hükûmet). The old center of Baghdad came to be referred to as Karşıyaka. See Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, (transcripted by Alâattin Eser), İstanbul: Simurg Yayınları, 1997, pp. 49-50.

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waters increase for six hours and then they withdraw, repeating this process twice a

day. The tides were most visible in the beginning, in the middle and at the end of

each lunar month. At these times the level of the water in Basra increased more than

15 feet.97 During the tides the water level in Basra and its environs increased and this

enabled the ships with greater tonnage to sail up to the city center of Basra. From the

city center the commercial goods were moved further to the districts of the city with

small boats. Normally, the rivers were not navigable for ships with greater tonnage

and therefore they had to await the tides. Due to the flow of tides, the Basra harbor

became accessible for the big ocean ships once every 15 days. The benefits of the

tides were not limited to the commercial activities; they had a crucial role in

irrigation too. They provided natural irrigation for the region ranging especially from

Kurna to the Gulf. As a corollary of this, the dates of Basra were well irrigated and

they not only became famous, but also made up a large part of Iraqi export items.

The geography and the chronic instability or insecurity of the region, had

considerable effects on the life style of the people there. As Nieuwenhuis rightly

pointed out, agriculture was negatively affected by the lack of safety and stability

and, as a corollary of this; it paved the way for the promotion of tribal pastoralism

and nomadism.98 Moreover, in order to avoid plunder, people in the region looked

for safe places to practice agriculture. Apart from its effects on agriculture and

sanitary conditions, the floods created marshy and lake-like places known as hevr.

The hevrs became good shelters for the rebels.99 Since such places were difficult to

reach, the officials in Baghdad built retaining walls along the rivers so as to deprive 97 Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, p. 7. 98 Nieuwenhuis, pp. 7 and 73. 99 “Eşkıyâ-yı merkûmenin asıl melâz ve melce’leri bir takım sazlık ve kamışlık ve bataklıktan ibâret olan ve hevr ta‘bîr olunan göller olmasıyla…”, See Zewra, No: 20.

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the hevrs of water and make them dry.100 Moreover, in the northern and northeastern

areas, the villages in the hilly and mountainous places enabled local people to be in a

secure place and out of easy reach.101 Hence, the geography was a significant

obstacle, especially in dealing with rebellious tribes, because even if the local forces

overcame geographical difficulties such as the unevenness of the river-areas, the

bifurcations, the dikes, the intersecting canals and the marshes, the rebellious tribes

had the opportunity to retreat into the marshes, over the Persian frontiers or vast

deserts and steppes.102 The geography on which the people lived also affected their

allegiance to the government in Baghdad. For example, while the tribes on the

Persian borders in the East or in the Syrian Desert in the west often had conflicts

with the local government, the riverain tribes were more cooperative. The fact that

tribes in the riverain area were more tied to the land than elsewhere and engaged in

agriculture played an important part in their cooperation.103 In a nutshell, it should be

noted that the ecological, demographic, economic and political problems of Ottoman

Iraq are interrelated and cannot be separated from one another.104

Baghdad: The Eastern Periphery?

The remoteness of Baghdad from the imperial center had profound implications. This

remoteness was beyond the physical distance between the center and the periphery,

and in the course of time Baghdad became a metaphoric element in explaining the

remoteness of everything. The best examples of this metaphoric usage can be found

100 Zewra, No: 20. 101 Nieuwenhuis, p. 119. 102 Ibid., p. 160. 103 Ibid., p. 179. 104 Ibid., p. 6.

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in Turkish proverbs: “Ayranın olsun sineğin Bağdat’tan gelir” 105, “Sora sora Bağdat

bulunur”, “ Yanlış hesap Bağdat’tan döner” and “Aşığa Bağdat sorulur mu?”.106

Similar usage of the same word can also be seen in Turkish idioms, such as

“Bağdat’tan gazel okumak”. In addition to the metaphoric use of Baghdad, it is quite

interesting that although different in etymology, the name of the region, Iraq, has

been spelled exactly the same as the Turkish word “ırak”, meaning distance: “Sevene

Bağdat ırak değildir” (To the lover, Baghdad is not far off) and “Gözden ırak olan,

gönülden de ırak olur” (Far away from sight, far away from heart). These proverbs

indicate that Iraq in general and Baghdad in particular have had a strong presence as

clichés in the Ottoman/Turkish intellectual mind.

In the classical period the distance between İstanbul and Baghdad took 197

days to traverse during the military mobilizations.107 However, for non-military or

civilian purposes the same route was certainly much shorter to travel. In the second

half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the steamer services, one could travel from

Istanbul to Baghdad or vice versa in only 35-40 days108. There is no doubt that the

time spent in traveling to Baghdad prevented the Sublime Porte from intervening in

provincial politics when necessary. For example, when one of the leading tribal 105 The same proverb is also used with “honey”: “You need only to have ayran (or honey), then the flies come from Baghdad”. 106 As Christopher Herzog noted, there are fourteen Turkish proverbs that mention Baghdad, which is more often than any other city, including holy cities like Mekka. Christopher Herzog, “Nineteenth Century Baghdad through Ottoman Eyes”, in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber (eds.), Empires in the Cities: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002, p. 313. 107 In the classical period there were three main roads: Sağ kol, Sol kol and Orta kol. These three roads were further subdivided into a secondary road. The way to Baghdad was through the Anatolian middle route (Anadolu orta kolu), which included the route from Üsküdar to Baghdad and Basra. See Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Osmanlılarda Ulaşım ve Haberleşme (Menziller), Ankara: PTT Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002, p. 39. 108 There were many factors that might lengthen the duration of the journey. To give an example, Vecihi Pasha, then governor of Mosul, arrived in Mosul in 56 days. The bad weather conditions in the sea route and the quarantine application in Birecik were the main reasons for the delay. BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264 (5 March 1848).

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sheikhs, Sufuk al-Faris, opposed Ali Rıza Pasha in 1834, the Porte decided to send

Agah Efendi to investigate the situation in the province. However, when Agah

Efendi arrived in Baghdad the problem in question had already been resolved.109

On the other hand, the time of transit from London had taken six months by

the Cape Town route and four months by the overland route. However, in the first

quarter of the nineteenth century it was reduced by one-third.110 The bad roads,

which were frequently blocked by tribal insurgents, made Baghdad further remote

from the Sublime Porte.111 Nonetheless, the sea or river routes were obviously faster

and easier to travel. Therefore, sea and river routes were most commonly used as

long as they were available. The most frequently used routes were as follows:

Istanbul, İskenderun, Diyarbakır, Mosul, Baghdad; or Istanbul, Samsun, Amasya,

Tokat, Sivas, Harput, Diyarbakır, Mosul and Baghdad.112 As Longrigg rightly

pointed out, the geographical position of Baghdad, which throughout history has

made it part of the great Eurasian land bridge and a highway of peoples and of trade,

gave it priority in modern times as a short-cut to India and the East–and as such

made it a sphere of rival European diplomacy in the nineteenth century.113

Both the Euphrates and the Tigris were very crucial in reaching Baghdad. As

tributary rivers, such as Zap and Diyala, join the Tigris, the flow of water increases

and makes the Tigris more suitable for navigation. Navigation towards the south had

been easy and fast; however, the opposite was almost impossible. Among many

109 Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, Vakanüvis Ahmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı-Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999, vol: 4-5, p. 786. 110 Perowne, p. 252. 111 Nieuwenhuis, p. 76. 112 This was the usual route, especially after the advent of steamer service on the Black Sea. 113 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg and Frank Stoakes, Iraq, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958, p. 13.

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kinds of river-crafts, the kelek was the most commonly used by the local people.114

Thanks to the river flow, the kelek navigated only downwards, and there was no

chance to go upward with a kelek. It was only with the river steamers that one could

navigate upward, but even with the steamers upward navigation lasted several times

longer than downward navigation. Ahmed Midhat, who worked with Midhat Pasha

in the late 1860s, describes Baghdad, therefore, as having a conical-shaped entrance

and likens it to a mouse trap or the basket of a fisherman, both of which have easy

entrance but difficult exits.115 The flow of the rivers did not only affect travel per se.

The direction of river flow was at the same time very much related to communication

and social interaction between the cities and districts on the riverside.116

Due to its remoteness and the difficulties in land transport Baghdad had

sometimes been considered as the compulsory place of accommodation for state

officials. The travel from Baghdad to Istanbul was not only long but also expensive

and dangerous to one’s health. Therefore, Baghdad was sometimes considered to be

a place of banishment.117 It seems that Basra, rather than Baghdad, was more likely a

place of banishment. The badness (vehâmet) of its weather was the leading reason for

114 Bağle, Bot, Şüvey‘î and Belem were the crafts used for commercial and military purposes. See Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, p. 7. Kelek was commonly used by ordinary people. It was made of goat skins. After inflating and tying hundreds of goat skins, a kelek is created. See Ali Bey, Dicle’de Kelek ile Bir Yolculuk, İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2003. 115 Ahmed Midhat, Menfa: Sürgün Hatıraları, İstanbul: Arma yayınları, 2002, p. 148. 116 For instance, for the role of the Tigris in the life of Tikritîs, see Ronen Zeidel, Tikrit and the Tirkitis: A Provincial Town, Regional Community and the State in 20th Century Iraq, PhD Thesis, University of Haifa, 2004. For the influence of change in the flow of the Euphrates over the conversions into Shiism, see Yitzhak Nakash, “The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes to Shi‘ism”, IJMES, Vol, 26 (1994), pp. 443-463. 117 Uzunçarşılı is one of those who mentioned Baghdad as a place of banishing. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 4/1, Ankara: TTK (5th print), 1995, p. 44.

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this.118 Especially the dockyard in Basra had a considerable number of banished

officers. Though not frequently, some of the sub-governors (mutasarrıfs) of Basra

came to Basra for banishment.119

A considerable number of provincial officials resigned from their offices and

left Baghdad. The fact that they could not get used to the water and weather (âb-ı

havasına imtizâc edememek) in Baghdad and Basra was the most common reason for

resignation.120 For this reason, it was difficult to bring talented bureaucrats to

Baghdad.

Population and the People of Baghdad

The population estimates for Ottoman Iraq varied considerably. There is a multitude

of population estimates in the nineteenth century made by travelers, diplomats,

journalists and politicians. While the numbers given by Vital Cuinet seemed to be the

most accurate among the European accounts, the Ottoman governmental statistics are

comparatively the most reliable sources for population estimates, Baghdad

representing the best example of the difference between European and Ottoman

sources in this respect.121 As far as Ottoman Iraq is concerned, the demographic

118 “… Basra mutasarrıflığı hakkında dahi çünkü oranın vehâmeti havâsı cihetiyle buradan münâsib ve muktedir birinin intihâb ve irsâli emsâli vilâyetle bir emr-i müşkil olarak …”, BOA, İ. DAH. 23612, 22 S 1273 (22 October 1856). 119 For example, Maşuk Pasha, mutasarrıf of Basra, came as the result of his banishment. See BOA, İ. DAH. 15488, dahiliye lef 1, 19 Ca 1268 (11 March 1852). “Basra eyâleti mutasarrıfı sa‘âdetlü Maşuk Paşa bendeleri oranın derkâr olan vehâmet-i havasına mebnî gelirken menfâya geldiği misillü...”, 120 For an example see, BOA, İ. DAH. 12575, 23 B 1266 (4 June 1850). 121 As Justin McCarthy rightly put it, “the only accurate way to know a population’s size is to count people, and the Ottomans were the only ones in the position to count their own population”. That Vital Cuinet based most of his statistics on Ottoman sources played an important role in the accuracy of his estimates. Justin McCarthy, “The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq”, Asian and African Studies, 15, (1981), pp. 4 and 35.

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evolution of Iraq generally paralleled that of other Arab provinces122; however, the

population records are less perfect and inferior to those, for instance, of neighboring

Syria.123 The lists indicating the provincial divisions of the empire in 1831 are good

examples of this. Although most of the provinces were cited with their sub-

provinces, the sub-provinces for the Iraqi provinces were not listed.124 This

inferiority was obviously the result of Baghdad’s remoteness from the center, its

being on the periphery of the country, the tribal structure of the people, and the level

of nomadism within the province. The first Ottoman population estimate of 1831 did

not include demographic data concerning the Iraqi provinces of Baghdad, Mosul,

Basra and Shahrizor. The population estimates prior to the late 1860s are said to be

less reliable; therefore, one can only make informed speculations about earlier

populations and is thrown back onto theory.125 One can also argue that the Ottoman

administrative control, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, when

Ottoman centralization was improving, was not strong enough to register the

population in Iraq. These factors certainly support the imperfection of population

records in the region; and to a great extent, they reflect the situation in the Iraqi

countryside, because, unlike in the rural areas, we have more confidential records

pertaining to the urban centers of Ottoman Iraq. For example, the official newspaper

of Baghdad, Zewra, provides significant data concerning the urban population of the

city in the late 1860s.

122 M. S. Hasan, “The Growth and Structure of Iraq’s Population, 1867-1947”, in Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East, Chicago, 1966, p. 154. 123 McCarthy, pp. 3 and 7. 124 Fazıla Akbal, “1831 Tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İdari Taksimat ve Nüfus”, Belleten, Vol. 15, No: 60, 1951, p. 618. 125 McCarthy, p. 42.

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For the period under survey in this study, the population estimates made by

various authorities for Ottoman Iraq range from 2 to 4.5 million. The considerable

difference between the two extremes of the population estimates is due to the fact

that some population estimates lacked or excluded the demographic data for certain

districts like Mosul, Sulaimaniyah and/or Kirkuk, while some others added Kuwait,

Najd and al-Ahsa to Ottoman Iraq.126 The first Ottoman data concerning Iraq’s

demographic structure was presented in the first yearbook (sâlnâme) of Baghdad

province in 1875.

Table I: Population Estimates for Ottoman Iraq in 1292/1875 Sub-provinces Male population Number of

Households

Baghdad 250,000 65,000

Mosul 145,296 48,946

Sulaimaniyah 124,790 23570

Hillah 700,000 100,000

Shahrizor 127,060 39270

Ammarah 257,330 50,065

Basra 62,905 19,084

Muntafiq 300,000 50,000

Al-Ahsa 32,619 9,065

Total 2.000.000 400.000

Source: Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Bağdad, sene 1292 /1875.

However, since the population survey (tahrîr-i nüfûs) had not been completed by

1875, the data given in this sâlnâme was far from being perfect, and this fact was

126 For example, the population estimate done by British Consul-General Sir A. R. Kambell in 1866-1867 excludes the districts of Mosul and Sulaimaniyah. M. S. Hasan, “Growth and Structure of Iraq’s Population”, Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 20, 1958, p. 351.

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already noted in the sâlnâme.127 As Kemal Karpat, who also based his estimates on

Baghdad sâlnâmes, pointed out, the numbers, especially those concerning the

nomads, were the product of guessing.128 This is evident because the total numbers

were arranged in such a way that the round number of two million was reached.

Likewise, the number of households was miscalculated. Although the households

numbered 405.000, the number 400.000 is given. The inconsistencies also confirm

that Iraqi population estimates have had serious problems. Despite its imperfection;

however, the same sâlnâme certainly gives considerable data concerning the Iraqi

population.

Justin McCarthy’s calculation of the population of Ottoman Iraq, including

Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, is presented below in Table 2. For the Iraqi population in

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, McCarthy presumes an increase at a

rate greater than approximately .011 a year.129 However, when the civil (dis)order,

general sanitary conditions and the frequency of epidemics are taken into account,

we can say that the rate of population increase was slower at the beginning of the

nineteenth century. The population growth rose steadily during the century. As

Hasan pointed out, between 1867 and 1890 Iraq’s population rose at an average rate

of 1.3 per cent per annum, and this rate of population increase further rose to 1.8 per

cent per annum between 1890 and 1905.130 The civil disorder, tribal rebellions and

127 “Bağdad vilâyetinde mutasavver tahrîr kâ‘idesi icrâ olunamamış olduğundan bi’l-cümle elviyede kâin cevâmi‘ ve buyût ve dekâkîn ve sâirenin sıhhati vechle mahallerinden defteri alınamadığı gibi mevcûd hayvânât ve nebâtâtın kemmiyetine dâir istatistik cedveline dahi destres olunamadığından mündericâtında zarûrî görünen noksân şeylerin ikmâli sene-i âtiye sâlnâmesine bırakılmıştır.” 1292 senesi Bağdad Salnamesi. 128 Kemal Karpat, Osmanlı Devletinde Nüfus, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2002, p. 189. 129 McCarthy, p. 39 and Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, p. 37. 130 Hasan, “Growth and Structure”, p. 340. Hasan provides also data concerning Iraq’s population after 1867. However, since his main source for the nineteenth century Iraqi population is only British consular reports, I prefer to use the data provided by Ottoman sources. For a critique of European sources for the population estimates in Iraq see McCarthy, pp. 3-44.

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conflicts, and epidemics were not infrequent until the last quarter of the nineteenth

century. Until this time the combination of civil unrest and epidemic diseases kept

the population in check.131

Table II: Population estimates for the three provinces of Ottoman Iraq. Province Year Population

Baghdad c. 1898 1.300.000

Basra c. 1908 1.150.000

Mosul c. 1909 828.000

Source: Justin McCarthy, “The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq”, Asian and African Studies, 15, (1981), p. 39.

Apart from the urban and rural populations, Ottoman Iraq had a considerable

nomadic population. Although the weakest population estimates are, of course, those

for the nomadic population, local sources indicate that the latter was not less than the

former two.132 Hence, the total Iraqi population (including Kuwait, Najd and Al-

Ahsa) is calculated to be almost 4-4,5 million people.133 It is not difficult to find the

reasons for the omission of Bedouins in population estimates. Since they were mostly

mobile, it was almost impossible for the government officials to register them.

Perhaps more important was the fear, by the nomadic people, of military conscription

and taxation. Any attempt by the provincial officials was regarded as an initiative on

behalf of both military conscription and taxation. One can easily observe that during

the nineteenth century there was an absolute as well as relative decline in the

131 McCarthy, p. 44. 132 Zewra, no: 18. See also Zekeriya Kurşun, “Osmanlıdan Amerika’ya Tanımlanamayan Ülke: Irak”, Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz and Yahya Başkan (eds) Irak Dosyası, İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı yayınları, 2003, Vol. 1, p. 1. Zewra reports that the majority of the population was Bedouin. Nieuwenhuis, p. 179. 133 Kurşun, “Osmanlıdan Amerika’ya”, p. 1.

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nomadic component of Iraq’s population. The percentage of nomadic people in

Baghdad’s population in 1590 was 62 %, and then it declined to 35 % in the late

1860s and further declined to 17 % in 1905.134 Obviously, one should be careful in

using these figures, because it is not always possible to distinguish the nomads from

the sedentary people, and there are also instances where the two categories

intermingle. However, it is crystal clear that these figures are sufficient to indicate a

tendency toward sedentarization.

The demographic structure of the Iraqi population was not uniform and it

varied considerably from region to region. The arid and semi-arid areas in the west

and south have had very sparse populations. Nomadic tribes were important in these

areas and in the extensive Al-Jazirah region, northwest of Baghdad. It was again in

the irrigation zone that the social and economic unit was the tribe rather than the

village.135 The Iraqi provinces had the lowest rate of population per square. Basra

had the lowest rank in this regard among the 36 provinces of the empire. Baghdad

and Mosul were in 33rd and 32nd position respectively.136 Furthermore, the population

growth, birth rate and family size showed significant differences in northern, central

and southern Iraq. As Hasan pointed out, the regional population has risen about

five-fold in the North, over four-fold in the Centre, and well under three-fold in the

South during the period 1867-1947.137 In terms of rates of population increase, this

134 Roads Murphey, “Some Features of Nomadism in the Ottoman Empire: A Survey Based on Tribal Census and Judical Appeal Documentation from Archives in İstanbul and Damascus”, Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, 1984, p. 192; Hasan, Growth and Structure, p. 352. 135 Gerber, The Social Origins, p. 69. 136 Karpat, p. 189. 137 Hasan, “Growth and Structure”, p. 340. Although these data are for the period 1867-1947, they intersect with at least one decade during the period of this study. Comparing the regional population increase for the periods 1867-1919 and 1919-1947, Hasan stated that the differential growth in the regional populations tends to increase over time. However, this does not deny the existence of different regional population growths before 1867.

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corresponded to 1.8 percent annum in the North, 0.7 in the Centre, and 1.6 in the

South during 1867-1890.138

The demographic characteristics also varied from the urban population to the

rural and nomadic populations. As stated earlier, the nomads constituted more than

50 % of the total Iraqi population.139 As the result of Ottoman policy to settle the

nomadic population, the number of nomads in Iraq declined considerably during the

nineteenth century. This decline in the nomadic population was mostly felt in the

Center and it was also reflected in the increase of rural population. The rural

population consisted of agricultural and pastoral people: in other words, settled and

semi-settled people. The family size among the rural groups was bigger when

compared with that of urban groups. As Hasan pointed out,

The relatively better health conditions and living standards in the three major cities entail a lower death and infant mortality rate than those that are likely to have been prevailing in the vast rural areas and the smaller towns, which suffer from harder health conditions and stark poverty. The gross birth rate is likely to be lower in the former than in the latter, owing mainly to the decline in the size of family.140

Whether settled or nomadic, the tribes formed probably the largest groups. Only the

population of Muntafiq tribal confederation was estimated to be approximately one

million people.141

138 Ibid., p. 341. 139 Hasan considers the number of the nomads to be one third of the total population. During the nineteenth century the general trend was towards the sedentarization of the nomads, and the nomadic population declined over the nineteenth century. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that the ratio of nomads was higher in the first half of the century. That the Ottoman sources showed the number of nomads to be not less than the settled population should be evaluated in this way. Ibid., p. 341. 140 Hasan, “Growth and Structure”, p. 342. 141 Zewra, No: 11. Women were also taken into account in this estimate. “Bağdâd vilâyeti dâhilinde kâin aşâyirin en cesîmi ve cem‘iyyetlisi Müntefik aşîreti olduğu ma‘lûmdur. Aşîret-i mezkûre müte‘addid kabâile münkasem olarak zukûr ve inâs tahmînen bir milyon nufûsu hâvî olup…”.

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The urban population, on the other hand, was composed of people living in

the big cities and towns with more than 5000 in population.142 People living in the

urban places earned their livelihood through handicraft industries, internal or

regional (Middle Eastern) trade, or administration. For the city center of Baghdad,

the Zewra newspaper reports a population survey done during the governorship of

Midhat Pasha (1869-72). According to this survey, the number of households in the

city center of Baghdad (including Azamiye and Kazımiye) was 18407.143 Here, we

should note that the term hâne (household) in Baghdad did usually include more than

one house, because a household in Iraq referred to a place encircled with a wall.

Within this place houses are situated around the (h)avlu (courtyard). And there were

several houses around the same (h)avlu. Therefore, in order to have a rough estimate

of population, Mehmed Hurşit suggests multiplying the number of households by

two or three.144

In another issue of the Zewra, the city of Baghdad was mentioned as having

more than 150,000 inhabitants, including women; but this estimate excluded the

gurebâ (lonely and destitute people) and foreign nationals.145 These population

estimates also make it clear that we have more detailed data on urban populations,

and as one moves from urban centers to the countryside the population estimates

142 Hasan, “Growth and Structure”, p. 351. 143 Zewra, No: 9. Here, the number of households also conforms with the data given by Halil Sahillioğlu. He based his study on the report of Abdurrahman Pasha, who served in Baghdad from 1876 to 1879. See Sahillioğlu, pp. 1255-1257. 144 For example, Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, while mentioning Mendeli and Hankin, states that “Buralarda bir divâr ile muhât olan mahalle bir hâne ıtlâk olunur. Hâlbuki bir hâne derûnunda ikişer üçer odalı iki, üç ve daha ziyâde dâireler olarak herbir dâirede birer ikişer iyâl ikâmet ettiğinden haber verdikleri mikdârın iki üç misli hâne farz olunmak gerekir.” Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, pp. 80 and 91. 145 The Zewra, No: 12. In a region like Baghdad it was almost impossible to count the women during any population survey. For instance, even as late as 1906, an attempt to include women in the population survey was not welcomed and led to tension among local people. Shields, Mosul Before Iraq, p. 40.

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becomes imperceptible. As Ortaylı stated, the population figures that existed in

relation to the nineteenth century mostly concern urban centers.146 After the

implementation of the Vilâyet Law in Baghdad, Midhat Pasha made a population

survey for Baghdad that included also Azamiye and Kazımiye. Accordingly, the

following table shows the distribution of urban population in the city of Baghdad in

terms of religion and nationality.

Nationality Religion or Ethnicity

Male population Total

Muslims 52689

Jews 9325 Ottoman Nationals

Christians 1258

63272

Persian 2126

British 265

Russian 14

French 3

Foreign Nationals

Austrian 3

2411

Total 65683 65683

Table III: Population estimate for the city center of Baghdad (including Azamiye and Kazımiye) in 1869. Source: Zewra, No: 9.

Another important feature of the population of Ottoman Iraq that is also

partly visible in Table 3 is its multi-religious and multi-ethnic characteristics. There

is no doubt that the demographic structure of nineteenth-century Iraq was far more

colorful than that of today. That Iraq has for centuries absorbed many immigrant and

intrusive peoples, certainly contributed to this ethnic and cultural richness. In the

146 Ortaylı, “Port Cities”, pp. 221-232.

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world of beliefs, Iraq accommodated members not only of big religions like

Christianity and Judaism; it also made room for extreme beliefs like those of the

Yezidîs, Shiites, Bahais and many others.147 It is not surprising that Ottoman

Baghdad had the largest Jewish population in the Arab east. In the seventeenth and

nineteenth centuries the Jews of Baghdad received two major waves of migrants

from Iran, which were the result of persecution of the Shi‘a authorities.148 In the first

quarter of the nineteenth century, they composed 10 to 15 percent of the total

population in Baghdad.149 In the course of the nineteenth century they continued to

grow and that growth reached its culmination at the beginning of twentieth century.

There was also a considerable Christian population, especially in Mosul.150 In

the urban center of Baghdad, the Turkish population, as the governing class,

generally occupied the northern quarters of the city; the mercantile classes of

Muslims, Christians and Jews, having separate quarters in the central parts of the

town, were dispersed over the rest of the city.

On the other hand, as far as the ethnic formation of the province is concerned,

apart from the Ottomans, the Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Armenians were the

leading groups in the Iraqi mosaic. Though the ethnic and religious groups had co-

existed for centuries, there were regions with a high concentration of a specific

group. Although the ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of any group could be

147 Although Muslim in origin, the Yezidis are considered to have deviated to the extent that they could no longer be regarded as Muslim. Nestorians, Armenians and Jacobites were the leading Christian heretical groups in (northern) Iraq. See Shields, Mosul Before Iraq, pp. 45-46. 148 Masters, p. 59. 149 Nieuwenhuis, p. 73. 150 In the city center of Mosul they numbered some 6,000 of a total population of about 43,000 in 1845. To compare, the Jewish population numbered 1,456. Ibid, p. 73 and fn 212. Among the Christian sects, in Baghdad there were Chaldeans (who were Nestorians converted to Catholicism), Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholics (fewer), Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics and very few Protestants. See Longrigg and Frank Stoakes, Iraq, p. 24.

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distinguished by its physical appearance, it was regional identification that came to

the forefront. For example, while the frontier-dwelling Kurds preferred to live in

mountainous northeast Iraq, the Arabs formed the majority of central and southern

Iraq. This ethnic division was also reflected in the world of beliefs. While the Sunni

version of Islam, adhered to by Kurds and Arabs, dominated in northeast Iraq, the

Shiites were mainly concentrated in the Holy Cities (Najaf and Karbala) and the

southern parts of the province. Baghdad, situated near the geographic center,

reflected within itself the division between the predominantly Shi'ite south and the

largely Sunnite north. The Shiite population was, therefore, mainly of Arab origin. It

is also known that, as there were mass conversions among the Iraqi tribes from

Sunnism to Shi‘ism beginning in the late eighteenth century and intensifying in the

nineteenth century, the percentage of the Shi‘i population increased considerably,

constituting roughly half of Iraq’s population at the turn of the century.151

The centre of the province was inhabited not only by Sunnites and Shiites,

but also by many non-Muslims. The Jews and the Christians usually had a much

higher concentration in the urban centers of Baghdad and Mosul, respectively.

However, one should also note that this regionalism did not prevent them from co-

existing. There were certainly many towns and villages that had a very

heterogeneous population.

151 Nakash points out the factors that played a role in these mass conversions as follows: The rise of Najaf and Karbala as the two strongholds of Shi‘ism from the mid-eighteenth century, the Wahhabi attacks on the two cities, the functioning of Najaf and Karbala as Iraq’s major desert market towns, the change in the water flow of the Euphrates and, most importantly, the Ottoman policy of tribal settlement beginning in 1831. In the early twentieth century the number of Shi‘is were considered to be approximately 1.5 million. Nakash, pp. 443-463; The rise of the Shi‘i population in the province made the central government take necessary precautions in the late nineteenth century, especially during the reign of Abdulhamid II. See Selim Deringil, “The Struggle against Shi‘ism in the Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter Propaganda”, Die Welt des Islams, 30, 1990, pp. 45-62.

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A final word regarding the demographic heterogeneity of Ottoman Iraq

should concern the non-Ottoman population living in the region. Since Western

interest in the region increased noticeably during the nineteenth century, citizens of

foreign countries such as Persia, England, France, Russia, Austria and India became

parts of the local population. The number of foreigners increased proportionally with

the increase of Western influence in the region. The development of Western interest

in the province had many purposes, political, economic and religious considerations

being the most important ones. For instance, American Protestant missionary

activities, supported by the British consuls, were active in the province of Baghdad at

least since the beginning of the 1840s.152 It is quite interesting that in 1897 the city of

Baghdad alone had the biggest group of foreign nationals (which numbered 33.270)

after that of the capital, Istanbul.153 The number of foreign nationals continued to

increase in the second half of the century, and developments at the turn of the

century, such the Baghdad Railway project, further attracted the foreign interest.

The heterogeneity of the population was also reflected in the spoken

languages. Arabic, Turkish and Persian were the leading spoken languages. Usually

people were speaking more than one language. For instance, the frontier-dwelling

Kurdish tribes in the northeast Iraq spoke both Kurdish and Persian. On the other

hand, there were many people in Baghdad who spoke Turkish and Arabic. Turkish

was intensively spoken among the Turkoman people in Erbil and Kirkuk and among

the Ottoman officials in Baghdad. Usually it was the geo-political locality that

determined whether the inhabitants were to be monolingual or multi-lingual. For

instance, the people in the cities with a Shiite concentration like Najaf, Karbala, or

152 On missionary activities in Mesopotamia see The Times, 2 December 1844. 153 Cem Behar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun ve Türkiyenin Nüfusu, 1500-1927, Ankara: T. C Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi 2, 1996, p. 52.

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the cities on the Persian border felt it somehow compulsory to speak Persian in

addition to Arabic or Turkish/Kurdish. Furthermore, while Kurdish was one of the

leading languages spoken in the province, Turkish and Arabic were treated as the

official languages.154

Needless to say, the population of Ottoman Iraq, like that of other Ottoman

provinces, was undercounted. As McCarthy noted, foreign nationals were the best-

recorded groups, because they were subject to passport and border controls.

However, the distinction between Persian and Ottoman nationals was probably

blurred. On the other hand, the “rural millets”, Muslims, Armenians, Syrians and

Chaldeans, were the most poorly represented groups.155 Children, women and the

Bedouins were the most striking groups to be omitted in the population estimates.156

For instance, the numbers in Table 1 do not include children and women.

From time to time, there were discussions on whether nomadism was

contingent on geography. Especially in Iraq, it was difficult for a peasant to fulfill the

need for water, pasture, etc. in one region, which meant that he had to move all the

time.157 Since good pastures were scanty even in the irrigation zone, the tribes

struggled, not infrequently, for control over the pastures, and this necessitated

permanent tribal mobility. The irregular navigability of the rivers and the lack of

control over vital parts of the transport routes further contributed to the

154 The Zewra newspaper, for example, was published in Turkish and Arabic. The people of Baghdad, whether they spoke these languages or not, were required to follow the news and the announcements in this newspaper. The Zewra newspaper will be analyzed in detail in the sixth chapter of this dissertation. 155 McCarthy, pp. 39-40. 156 McCarthy shows that very few women, especially those who were self-supporting heads of households (bive), appeared in the censuses. Obviously the number given for women does not represent the actual female population in the province of Baghdad. See McCarthy, p. 40. 157 There is a lively discussion in Zewra newspaper whether nomadism was contingent upon the geography or not. The editor of the newspaper denies this contingency and gives examples from the settled population of Baghdad. See Zewra, No: 10.

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predominance of nomadism.158 However, it is quite clear that in the course of the

time the nomad population decreased in favor of urban population. As the local

government grew increasingly stronger during the second half of the nineteenth

century, the nomads were encouraged or forced to settle down, and therefore the

proportion of nomads diminished within the total Iraqi population.159 On the other

hand, a tribal organization could consist of nomads, semi-nomads, fellahîn (those

dealing with agriculture) and ma‘dan (those engaging in herd breeding). For

instance, the Banî Lâm tribe, among many others, was a good example of this kind of

tribal organization. Some of them engaged in agriculture in certain months of the

year and for the rest of the year they gained their livelihood from animal

husbandry.160

Furthermore, the Bedouins had a mobile life style, but this does not mean that

the tribes were moving over the whole of hıtta-i Iraq. The tribes usually had a certain

geographic area in which they lived and moved from one place to another, namely

dirah. For example, the region from Kurna in the south to the great canal, known as

Ümmü’l-Cebel, was settled by the Muntafiq tribal confederation; and the region from

Ümmü’l-Cebel to Shattü’l-Hayy was settled by the Banî Lâm tribal confederation.161

There are even maps that indicate the tribal areas of influence. This tribally identified

geography did not have clear-cut boundaries, but tribal boundaries were known not

only by the members of the tribe but also by other tribes.

158 Nieuwenhuis, p. 7. 159 Hasan, “The Growth and Structure”, p. 154 160 In winter, nomadic tribes were in the Persian mountain ranges, in spring as far north as Qara Tepe and beyond, and in summer near the Tigris area. See Nieuwenhuis, pp. 137-138. 161 Mehmet Hurşid Paşa’s Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd provides maps that show the tribal areas of influence. See p. 63.

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Mamluks in Baghdad

In the seventeenth century the weakening of the central authority of the Ottoman

government gave rise to local despotisms in the Iraqi provinces as elsewhere in the

empire. From 1638 until the establishment of Mamluk (Kölemen) rule in 1749,

Baghdad was ruled by more than twenty pashas, but there was no real development.

There is no doubt that the frequent change of governors paved the way for instability

in the province. The pashas were almost semi-autonomous, and the power of the

Janissary was great. The insurrections of tribes and the rebellious governors of Basra

further exacerbated the instability in the region. Because of the wars with Austria,

Russia, Prussia and Venice between 1683 and 1699, the central government was not

able to pay sufficient attention to the region. It was only during the governorship of

Daltaban Mustafa Pasha that Ottoman control over Kurna and Basra was restored

with a military campaign in May 1701.162 The Ottomans at first attempted to rule the

Iraqi provinces directly, but in the seventeenth and eighteentth centuries the

weakened government in Istanbul was obliged to concede extensive autonomy to

provincial governors, and some areas were beyond the reach of Ottoman authority

for extended periods.

The appointment of Hasan Pasha (1702) and then his son Ahmed Pasha

(1724) to the governorship in Baghdad set the necessary stage for the beginning of a

new period in Iraq. Hasan Pasha was brought up in Enderun and therefore wanted to

set up a system in Baghdad that resembled the imperial palace administration in

İstanbul. He established a hass oda, hazine (treasury) kiler odaları (kitchens) and a

mekteb (school).163 Such a provincial administration was quite unusual for the central

government. That the provincial army dissolved, the tribes rebelled and maintained a

162 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Cilt: IV/ I, Ankara: TTK, 1995, p. 4. 163 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, “Bağdat” - Osmanlı Dönemi -, DİA, p. 434.

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disrespectful attitude towards the provincial government made Hasan Pasha in his

early years think about a long-term solution.164 He purchased Abkhaz, Georgian and

Circasian slaves from the slave market of Tiflis and educated them in the provincial

palace along with the sons of local notables. There were almost 200 sıbyâns and they

were taught not only general science courses, but also courses on riding and

weaponry.165 The graduates of this mekteb used to enter the office of their patrons

and at the end assumed significant positions in the provincial administration. Hasan

Pasha endeavored much to improve the province. He struggled against the tribal

rebellions and enhanced commercial life in Baghdad. He even conducted a campaign

against Iran and conquered Kirmanshah in 1723.166 When Hasan Pasha died, his son,

Ahmed Pasha, who was the governor of Basra, followed him. Ahmed Pasha followed

his father’s path and completed the campaign against Iran by conquering Hamedan,

Hürremâbâd, and Erdelân.167 Ahmed Pasha, like his father, contributed considerably

to the welfare of the province. The long governorships of Hasan Pasha (20 years) and

his son Ahmed Pasha (21 years) enabled the people of Baghdad to embrace these

rulers. In the meantime, the Mamluk system became more established.

After the death of Ahmed Pasha, the Sublime Porte appointed several

governors to the province of Baghdad, but they were unsuccessful and did not stay

long.168 The son-in-law and kethüdâ of Ahmed Pasha, Mamluk Süleyman Agha, was

164 Al-Bustanî, p. 5. 165 Sabit, Bağdadda Kölemen Hükûmetinin Teşkîliyle İnkirâzına Dâir Risâledir, İstanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1292, pp. 6-13; Erdinç Gülcü, “Bağdat Kölemenler Hükümeti (1749-1831)”, in Irak Dosyası, compiled by Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz and Yahya Başkan, İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2003, p. 219. Besides the slaves, there were a number of sons of Baghdad ‘noblesse’, but their number dwindled in time. See Nieuwenhuis, p. 26. 166 Uzunçarşılı, pp. 180-181. 167 Ibid., pp. 181-182.

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then the governor of Basra; he wanted to benefit from the situation and fought

against the governor-general in Baghdad. However, Süleyman was dismissed from

his governorship in Basra and the province of Basra placed under the administration

of the governor of Baghdad.169 Between 1747 and 1749, the Sublime Porte

endeavored to prevent the creation of Mamluk power by appointing governors from

the center. However, since the Mamluks had already established their strongholds

militarily and politically, non-local governors were no longer accepted by the local

people.170 There were a number of disadvantages for the non-local governors in

Baghdad. First of all, they were feared by the people of Baghdad because they were

regarded as tax-hungry. Secondly, due to lack of experience in provincial politics, a

non-local governor would not be in a position to keep the local actors, especially the

great tribes, in check.171 It is also known that a number of governors appointed by the

Porte had been killed by the local elites before they took over provincial power;

some of them were killed even before they reached the city.172 Therefore, the

Sublime Porte had to appoint the former governor of Basra, Süleyman, nicknamed

Ebu Leyla173 as governor of Baghdad in 1749. Süleyman Pasha was, without doubt,

one of the fruits of the Mamluk system and he had good knowledge of local

affairs.174

168 Yekçeşm Ahmed Pasha, Kesriyeli Ahmed Pasha, Tiryaki Mehmed Pasha were respectively appointed after the death of Ahmed Pasha in 1747. 169 Al-Bustanî, p. 8. 170 Nieuwenhuis, p. 25. 171 Ibid., p. 25. 172 Ibid, p. 25. 173 Basra was at that time a springboard for the Baghdad governorship. The nickname (Ebu Leyla) was given to Süleyman Pasha after his midnight campaigns against the rebellious tribes. 174 Gülcü, p. 216.

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The governorship of Süleyman Pasha (1749-1762) marks the beginning of

Mamluk (Kölemen) rule in Baghdad. From this time onwards, the central government

in İstanbul was not able to appoint governors from İstanbul, but only to select or

confirm one of the Mamluks for the governorship. Only posts like the provincial

kadı, the Janissary Agha and some governorship that could be given only to local

candidates, were directly appointed by the Sublime Porte.175 Süleyman Pasha gave

importance to the Mamluk system in the province and favored the Mamluks in the

provincial posts. This meant a decrease in the significance of military and

administrative officials appointed by the center. The main positions in the local

administration were given to a patrimonial group and to the pasha’s coterie. The

following paragraph gives some clue concerning the degree of freedom that the

Mamluks had in the appointments:

The Mamluks consolidated direct appointment-control over places like Basra, Mardin and Kirkük, which had been used by Hasan and Ahmad Pasha to expand their territorial influence. The Mamluks appointed governors themselves and fiercely defended themselves against any violation of this assumed right.176

The Sublime Porte attempted between 1762 and 1780 to change this tradition

in provincial appointments177; however, the governors, mostly non-local, reigned for

a short period of time and without much influence. Hence, the governorship was

given to able Mamluk slaves and İstanbul, incapable of taking the necessary steps,

had to ratify the de facto situation. Thenceforth, when a governor died, it was usually

one of his kethüdâs who assumed the new governorship. However, this process also

175 The defterdâr was also accountable only to the Porte. Nieuwenhuis, pp. 25 and 169. 176 Ibid., p. 170. 177 In 1762 Sadeddin Pasha was appointed as governor, but he died before he reached Baghdad. In order to prevent the struggle for provincial power among the Mamluk Aghas, İstanbul appointed Ali Agha, who was mütesellim in Basra, as the new governor of the province. See Al-Bustanî, p. 9.

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resulted, not infrequently, in rivalry and overt insurrection against the new governor.

The Sublime Porte could only confirm the governorship of the one who eliminated

his rivals for provincial administration. This was the case in the appointment of

Ömer Agha in 1764, who rebelled against the ruling governor, Süleyman, and after

defeating him became the governor.

The Sublime Porte, although ineffective in provincial politics, dismissed

unsuccessful Mamluk pashas and sent new governors from neighboring provinces.

For instance, Ömer Pasha could not provide stability in Kurdistan and could not

prevent the siege of Basra by Zendî Kerim Han in 1775. Therefore, he was dismissed

from his post.178 Ömer Pasha was killed by the new governor, Ispanakçı Mustafa

Pasha. Ispanakçı Mustafa Pasha behaved harshly against the Mamluks and this led to

resentment in the province. Upon the annexation of Basra, he was dismissed and

executed by the Porte. The governors until 1780 were either unable or unsuccessful

in provincial politics.

Süleyman the Great ruled in Baghdad for 22 years (1780-1802) and he

suppressed both the Arab and Kurdish tribes who rebelled against his rule. His long

rule witnessed the strengthening of the Mamluks against the local forces. His efforts

towards the rebels were appreciated by the Sublime Porte. The last years of

Süleyman Pasha witnessed the expansion of the Wahhabi movement. The Wahhabis

invaded al-Ahsa (1792-95), Najaf, Kubeyse, Ane and Karbala (1801). Although

Süleyman Pasha sent first the Muntafiq tribe and then an army under his kethüdâ, Ali

Agha, both armies were defeated.179 When Süleyman Pasha died in 1802, he was

succeeded by his kethüdâ Ali Agha.180 Ali Pasha’s term was also a period of turmoil.

178 Ibid., p. 10. 179 Kurşun, Necid ve Ahsa’da pp. 28-37.

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He struggled with the Bilbas tribe, the Yezîdis and the Baban leader of

Sulaimaniyah. The advance of the Wahhabi forces into Iraqi territory and the

reluctant attitude of Ali Pasha towards a military encounter with the Wahhabi forces,

despite several imperial decrees, damaged his prestige. Upon the murder of Ali Pasha

by one of his slaves, Süleyman (the Little) Pasha came to power in Baghdad

province, including Basra and Shahrizor.181

Süleyman Pasha was also not to remain in his office long, because he did not

follow the traditions in provincial administration.182 Halet Efendi was sent to

Baghdad to dismiss him and to provide stability in the province. In his report Halet

Efendi stated that none of the notables of Baghdad such as the Şâvîzâdes, the Jalîlis

in Mosul and Janissary Aghas demanded the office of governor, because it was

impossible to appoint a non-Mamluk governor.183 The Mamluks, although they

numbered only a thousand184, had influential contacts in Istanbul. Let alone the

appointment of a non-Mamluk governor, the pasha in Baghdad did not allow the

180 The succession for governorship was not always easy and without internal struggle. When Süleyman Pasha died, the Janissary Agha (Ahmed Agha) wanted to be the next governor; however, after a period of bargaining (especially on the transfer of Süleyman’s treasury) Ali Agha was appointed as governor. See Al-Bustanî, p. 20. 181 The murder of Ali Pasha was considered by the Sublime Porte to be a good opportunity to appoint a non-Mamluk governor. Yusuf Ziya Pasha was appointed as the next governor, but he delayed his arrival to Baghdad for the sake of taking necessary security measures. In the mean time, the public opinion in Baghdad was in favor of Süleyman the Little and the investigations indicated that a non-Mamluk vizier would not deal successfully with the Persian intervention in the north and Wahhabi incursions in the south. The lobbying activity of French Ambassador in Istanbul, Sebastiani, and Süleyman’s agreement with the Sublime Porte to send the remainders (muhallefât) of Ali Pasha played important role in his appointment. See Al-Bustanî, pp. 29-31. 182 First of all, he broke his promise to pay the remaining money of the previous governor; although he prevented the growth of Wahhabi movement, he showed some sympathy toward this movement; he interfered with the realms of neighboring governors, and finally he tried to implement his way of judicial patterns. See Al-Bustanî, p. 33. 183 Cevdet, Tarih, vol. 9, pp. 371-378. Only the Kurdish Baban leader Abdurrahman Paşa demanded the governorship, but his demand was rejected by the Sublime Porte on the ground that the Baban emirate was not more loyal than the Mamluks. Moreover, unlike the Mamluks, the Babans had a tendency to favor Iran. Al-Bustanî, pp. 45-48. 184 Cevdet, Tarih, vol. 8, p. 172.

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officers (mübâşir ) who were sent from Istanbul to stroll in the city freely. No high-

ranking bureaucrats of İstanbul could stay in Baghdad long.185 In the end, the armies

of Halet Efendi defeated Süleyman Pasha and his followers, but Halet Efendi had

again to appoint a Mamluk governor, namely Abdullah Pasha.

During his governorship (1810-1813), Abdullah Pasha made a military

campaign against Baban leader Abdurrahman Pasha and defeated him decisively,

forcing him to flee to Iran. Said Pasha, son of Süleyman the Great, took refuge with

Muntafiq sheikh. Abdullah Pasha died in the campaign against Said Pasha and the

Muntafiq tribe. He was succeeded by the victorious Said Pasha, to whom the soldiers

and the population had already shown sympathy.186 However, in a short period of

time the deeds of Said Pasha (1813-1816) had shown that he was not a proper person

for the office, either. The allegations that he collected illegal taxes and minted coins

in his name made the Sublime Porte to dismiss him and appoint a new Mamluk

ruler.187

Although some scholars consider the very beginning of the nineteenth century

as the symbolic end of the Mamluk Era in Baghdad,188 Davud Pasha as a Mamluk

governor has a distinct place in the history of the Mamluks. Davud Pasha was not

only the last Mamluk governor of the Pashalik, but he was also one of the leading

governors who served in nineteenth-century Baghdad. According to Al-Bustânî, he

185 Al-Bustanî, p. 36. 186 That Said Pasha was the son of Süleyman the Great, whose activities and service were appreciated by the Sublime Porte, played an important role in gaining this sympathy. 187 Al-Bustanî, pp. 56-59. 188 The death of Süleyman the Great, the most powerful Mamluk ruler, and the Russian occupation of Tiflis, which was not only the homeland of the later Mamluk Pashas but also the source of slaves were considered to be the signs of the decline. See Nieuwenhuis, p. 182.

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was the most intellectual governor in Baghdad after Midhat Pasha.189 He contributed

considerably to the development and modernization of the Pashalik. He renovated

the city wall, the streets, many mosques and madrasas. Moreover, he established

weapons and textile factories to meet the needs of the army. His efforts in improving

land and river transport were remarkable.190 During his governorship between 1817

and 1831 Davud Pasha set the necessary ground for a more autonomous provincial

administration. When he did not obey the imperial fermân concerning the minting of

coins, the Sublime Porte prepared to dismiss him. The overt revolt of Davud Pasha

led to a military campaign by Ali Rıza Pasha, then the governor of Aleppo. The great

plague of 1831 seriously diminished not only the Mamluk army but also the

population of the city, and this helped considerably in the political and military

takeover.

The dismissal and defeat of Davud Pasha was certainly an important turning

point in the history of Ottoman Iraq. It not only ended the almost one-century-long

Mamluk rule in Baghdad, but it also put an end to the autonomous nature of the

provincial administration. For a long time, the Sublime Porte tried to nominate its

own governors, but each time the attempts were in vain. Baghdad was an important

frontier province and the Persian claims to Iraqi territories made the situation more

fragile. Political instability and a leaderless provincial administration were the most

dangerous choices for Istanbul. Therefore, whenever there appeared a problem in

succession, the Sublime Porte tried to solve the problem quickly, which usually

paved the way for the recognition and appointment of the leading Mamluk candidate

for the governorship. The Persian peril and the increasing fragility of the Pashalik

189 Ibid., p.60. 190 Al-Bustanî, pp. 60-62 .

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necessitated strong governors and stability. The central administration in Istanbul

sometimes thought to appoint strong governors like Tosun Pasha, then governor of

Jeddah, or Kavalalı İbrahim Pasha to govern in the Pashalik, but the established

Mamluk order prevented the appointment of a non-Mamluk governor.191 The

removal of Davud Pasha and the Mamluk regime was the first step of a long process,

which aimed to bring the central state back in provincial periphery.

191 It is also reported that Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha was, for a while, thought to be the governor of Baghdad and Mosul. See Mustafa Nuri Paşa, vol. III-IV, p. 269.

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Chapter II

“Bringing the State Back In”:

The Re-assertion of Ottoman Direct Rule in Iraq

The Fall of the Mamluk regime in Baghdad

The Sublime Porte was surely not content with the long-standing Mamluk rule in

Baghdad. Many attempts were made in order to intervene into the procedures of

political succession in the province; however, the governors who were appointed by

the Porte were not allowed by the local powers to govern the province. The alliances

among the provincial governor, Janissary corps and the tribes forced the alien pashas

to accept the de facto situation in the pashalik. The Sublime Porte even sent ex-grand

viziers as governor to Baghdad, but they could not succeed as well.192 There were

several factors that made the Porte more resentful from the ruling Mamluk regime.

First of all, the Mamluk pashas were not complying with some of the imperial

decrees and they were escaping from legal responsibilities against the Sublime Porte.

For example, in many times, the Sublime Porte wanted Süleyman Pasha (the Great)

and Ali Pasha to go militarily over the Wahhabi movement.193 Süleyman Pasha did

well in the internal affairs of the province but he could not show the same success in

the regional politics. The fear of failure and defeat against the Wahhabis made him

delay the problem, paving the way for the Wahhabis to strengthen themselves.194 The

Wahhabi movement started originally in Hijaz but began to extend its sphere of

192 Ex-grand vizier Yusuf Pasha was sent to Baghdad as governor in 1807; however, he had to soon recognize Süleyman the Little’s governorship. Nieuwenhuis, p. 77. 193 Gülcü, p. 222. 194 Ibid., p. 222.

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influence over Baghdad. Mamluk ruler’s reluctance to pay the necessary annual

payments was another overt revolt against Istanbul.

Secondly, the expansion of Persian control over the border zone was a source

of resentment for İstanbul. Although the Erzurum treaty of 1823 pacified the frontier

problems, it was not to the advantage of Baghdad in all respects, because with this

treaty the Persian forces were to remain in Kurdistan and Persian overlordship

continued in Sulaimaniyah.195 Besides, the Persian threat was far from being a

symbolic, because two Iraqi provinces, Mosul and Basra, were besieged earlier in

1747 and 1775 respectively.196 As Nieuwenhuis clearly pointed out:

Iraq was a special case, in that the Persian threat and the tribal problems not only kept the pasha’s forces in the pashalik of Baghdad, but induced both Porte and Mamluks to co-operate despite conflicts. Tactical alliances between Persian authorities and pashas seem at times to have been established, but Mamluk attempts to seriously oppose the Turkish overlord remained absent.197

Moreover, Persia, as part of its centuries-long foreign policy, tried to benefit from the

weak positions of Ottoman Empire. In the 1830s, upon the defeat of Ottoman

militaries against the forces of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, Persia sent an envoy to

İstanbul. The envoy dared to offer Persian military assistance in return for Baghdad

being a Persian territory. If this is not acceptable, they also offered to pay (money) for

it.198

195 Nieuwenhuis, p. 43. 196 In 1734 and 1743 Nadir Shah invaded Mosul twice and the city was defended heroically by Hüseyin Pasha. In 1775, Kerim Khan Zand besieged Basra, which led to fall of Umar Pasha from Baghdad governorship. 197 Nieuwenhuis, pp. 170-171. 198 BOA, HH, No: 37560-J. The Persian offers were also quoted in Şehabeddin Akalın, “Mehmed Namık Pasha”, İÜEF Tarih Dergisi, Vol. 4, No: 7, September 1952, p. 132.

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Also during the Crimean War, Iran was to side with Russia. İt was even

reported that she provided logistics (munitions and food staff) to Russia.199 Upon

these developments, Reşid Pasha made military preparations. However, the Persian

Shah later withdrew his support upon the demand of religious notables not to co-

operate with Russia against a Muslim state. Again in 1858, when the news reached

Baghdad that the Persian Shah was approaching the frontier with 20,000 soldiers,

Ömer Lütfi Pasha prepared his army and went to Sulaimaniyah, where he learnt that

the Shah had returned. In short, such instances indicated that the “Persian peril” was a

permanent threat and it harassed the imperial security, upon which the Sublime Porte

put greater significance.

There were also some attempts to bypass the Mamluks by means of the

Janissary Aghas and the Baban Begs; however, they all proved to be futile. The

rejection of alien-pashas by the Mamluks was supported by the desire in continuity in

local government. It was part of the general practice that the appointed governor

brings quite a number of his kin and coterie to the provincial administration.

Moreover, as the alien-pashas were usually less aware of the regional problems than

the long ruling Mamluks, it would have taken long times to handle regional

problems.

Earlier we have seen that the Sublime Porte attempted to put an end by

sending senior officials like Halet Efendi and Sadık Efendi.200 When the efforts of

these officials came to be fruitless, it became clear for the Sublime Porte that Davud

Pasha will not compromise unless a military campaign is made; therefore, Ali Rıza

199 Abbas Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq Baynal İhtilalayn (1258-1917), Vol. 7, Baghdad: The Trading and Printing Compony, Ltd., 1935-1956, p. 107 200 In accordance with their tasks, these officials were given significant distinctions. They were given the privilege to issue imperial decrees (fermân) in the name of the sultan and they had also fermâns in hand, in which only the name of the governor was to be filled by these officials. Al-Bustanî, pp.76, 80.

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Pasha was commissioned for this task.201 The murder of Defterdâr Sadık Efendi by

Davud Pasha was the last drop that caused the glass overflow.202 Later Davud

understood his fault and apologized from the Sultan by means of British ambassador

in İstanbul. However, it was too late, because the overthrow of Davud Pasha had

already become a matter of self-prestige for the Sublime Porte. This was quite

evident in the fact: The Sublime Porte was earlier trying to collect the avarız

payment which amounted to 6,000 kese akçe in 1831203; however, of this amount

Davud sent only 1,000 kese. When the military campaign became inevitable, the

Sublime Porte had to mobilize an army of 15,000 soldiers. This costed the Porte

25,000 kese akçe, which was much higher when compared with the required avârız

tax.

Furthermore, the lack of security in the region was also quite important factor

that stimulated the Sublime Porte for action. The British consular reports describe the

conjuncture of the mid 1830s as follows:

… The Koords have gone so far towards converting Anatolia and Koordistan into mere pastures for their herds and flocks; they had so nearly driven away from the extensive tracts they overran the settled population and with it cultivation and production, they had so completely cut off Baghdad from all direct communication with Constantinople, from all intercourse with the rest of the empire, … …the communications with Baghdad were entirely interrupted not only for caravans but even for Tatars… and they had impeded so seriously the intercourse between the contiguous towns and districts, that had not an attempt been made to check their further extension and

201 Ali Rıza Pasha had earlier suppressed a rebellion in Ayıntab in 1246/1830 and gained sultan’s appreciation. He was very interested in Baghdad and it was he who informed the Porte about the murder of Defterdâr Sadık Pasha by Davud Pasha. Ibid., pp. 168 and 90. 202 The murder of a high-ranking bureaucrat, who was sent to Baghdad with a special mission, was a serious crime against the Porte. Upon this incident the people in Baghdad were waiting for decisive act of the Porte. The foreigners left the city, and the tribes withdrew their support for Davud Pasha. The situation was quite appropriate for the dismissal of Davud Pasha. Ibid., pp. 90 and 97. 203 The Ottoman Empire was defeated by the Russians in 1827 and it had to pay compensation to Russia. The amount of compensation was divided among the provinces and Baghdad had its share of 6,000 kese akçe.

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to bring them under the control of regular government, and should that attempt not be successful they would ever? long have reduced Anatolia and Koordistan to a waste, a country of uncommon fertility and capability would soon have ceased to yield not only revenue but allegiance to the Sultan, and Baghdad and its dependencies would probably have erected itself into an independent Pashalic, or would have formed an appendage to the territories of a neighbouring power.204

Before the military campaign, Ali Rıza Pasha tried to assure the support of

leading tribes. While some of them, like the sheikh of Ka‘b, rejected to do so and

sided with Davud Pasha, Shammar al-Jarba and the Kurdish Mehmed Beg in

Rewandüz supported Ali Rıza militarily.205 On the other hand, Davud was delivering

hil‘ats in order to increase his faction. In the meantime, an imperial decree was

issued which guaranteed the forgiveness of Davud and his family on the condition

that he leaves the city without battle.206 When the news and the imperial orders

concerning the dismissal and replacement of Davud with Ali Rıza Pasha reached to

the people of Basra and Kirkuk, they welcomed with great joy.207 In Baghdad people

attacked and plundered Davud’s saray, the provincial palace and showed their

allegiance to Ali Rıza Pasha.208 Davud Pasha, realizing that his palace was no longer

safe, fled and hided in one his slaves’ house.209 When the army led by Ali Rıza

entered the city there was almost no opposition, except a few short local resistances,

because Davud had already lost the support of the local people. More important than

this was the fatal influence of the plague. The plague diminished Davud’s army

204 PRO, FO 195 / 113, “Memorandum Regarding the Koords”. 205 Al-Bustanî, pp. 107-109. 206 The imperial decree was also published in the newspapers in İstanbul. Ibid., pp. 122-123. 207 Ibid., pp. 107-108 and 118. 208 BOA, HH, No: 22645. Also Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, 2-3, pp. 632. 209 Davud was later caught by the local people and submitted to the local kadı. He was kept under custody until the arrival of Ali Rıza Pasha. Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, vol. 2-3, p. 631.

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considerably and Davud himself could not escape the illness at the beginning, but

recovered soon.210 After his defeat, Davud Pasha was sent to İstanbul and then

banished to Bursa.211 However, his dismissal was a watershed in the history of Iraq,

because from then on Iraq was more strongly tied to Ottoman central administration.

The End of Mosuli Jalilis in Mosul

After the destruction of Mamluk dynasty and the extension of Ottoman direct rule in

Baghdad, the next steps were the Jalilis of Mosul and the Kurdish emirates. In

Mosul, the household of Jalilis was very effective in the city. The household

descended from Abdul Jalil and İsmail Pasha became the first Jalili governor of

Mosul in 1726. Therefore, when compared with the Mamluks of Baghdad they ruled

longer. The Jalilis gained the favor of the central administration as tax farmers and

procurers of provisions. Especially the defense of the Hussain Pasha al-Jalili against

the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia in 1775 played an important role in winning the

hearts of the rulers in Sublime Porte. In the course of time, the Jalilis became the

most powerful actor in the Mosuli politics by combining their position as premier

procurers of provisions with that of holders of large mâlikânes and their

administrative positions as provincial governors.212 Their contribution to the

development of Mosul was undeniable; however, in the late 1820s the public

210 Ibid., pp. 630-631. 211 Although there was an expectation for the execution of Davud, his life was forgiven and after his banishment to Bursa he later continued to serve in the central administration. 212 Khoury, State and Provincial, p. 57.

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complaints intensified claiming that they were ruling unjustly and extorting the

public revenues for their own interests.213

Normally the Pashalık of Baghdad during the Mamluk era did not include

northern Iraq and Mosul. It was limited to Baghdad and Basra. However, in the

heydays of the Mamluk rule their sphere of influence had extended to southeastern

Kurdistan, the Mosuli hinterland, Jizrah and Mardin.214 The Mamluk rulers tried to

expand their control over Mosul and lobbied for this eagerly.215 Davud Pasha, when

writing to the Sublime Porte for the appointment of new governor to Mosul, wanted

the new governor to be under his command (taht-ı vezâret). However, the Sublime

Porte prevented this on the grounds that it did not want the Mamluk rule to be the

second Muhammad Ali affair, and therefore tried to keep it limited to Baghdad and

Basra. On the other hand, the Jalili rule, being aware of Mamluk attempts to

intervene in Mosuli politics, kept a distance from Baghdad politics.216 For example,

they did not support Baghdad’s military campaigns against the Kurdish emirates in

the northeast. Let alone supporting them, the Jalilis, when suited, allied with the

Kurdish Babans and/or the Sublime Porte against the Mamluks.217 The Jalilis were

the leading source of information for the Sublime Porte on the deeds of Mamluk

213 Al-Bustanî, p. 222. 214 Ibid., p. 74; Khoury, State and Provincial, p. 57. 215 For example, Davud Pasha tried to appoint his son as governor of Mosul. BOA, HH, no: 20857. Nieuwenhuis, quoting from Kemp (chapter 3) mentiones an example of the attempts of Davud Pasha to submit Mosul to greater dependence. He had first restored control over Mardin, and after that stopped the arrival of commodities and foodstuffs by the Tigris plus the direct communication over land between Mosul and Mardin. See Nieuwenhuis, p. 200, 320f. 216 The first serious, but unsuccessful, initiative to end the Jalili rule was attempted by Süleyman the Little in 1809. Later Davud Pasha had intervened to the Mosuli politics to the extent that the Mosuli governor, Jalili-zade Ahmed Pasha, was dismissed upon his complaint to the Sublime Porte. The allegation was that the governor took Şavi-zâde Kasım Bey under his protection and infringed the general security of the province. Nieuwenhuis, p. 106; and Al-Bustanî, p. 221. 217 Ibid., p. 221.

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rule.218 Moreover, as Nieuwenhuis rightly pointed out, the Ottoman central

administration backed the Jalili rule, because a weak Mosul would give the Mamluks

an opportunity to extend their influence further and dominate the southeastern region

of the empire more than the Porte was willing to accept.219 But the Sublime Porte’s

backing lasted as long as the Mamluk rule in Baghdad prevailed.

In the late 1820s the fierce rivalry between the Jalilis and the Umaris220, the

second biggest household of Mosul, weakened the Jalilis and brought its end. The

chaotic years of the late 1820s and the decline of Jalilis further increased Davud

Pasha’s appetite for his expansionism toward Mosul. In fact, this was one of the

reasons that made the Sublime Porte act at the expense of Mamluk rule.221 The

abolition of the Janissary Corps in 1826 further exacerbated the civil strife, because

there was an alliance between the Jalilis and Janissary regiments.222 The last Jalili,

Yahya Pasha, ruled between 1822 and 1827 then he was banished to Aleppo. In 1831

Ali Rıza Pasha of Baghdad appointed an Umarî Pasha to Mosul. However, Yahya

Pasha did not waste time in Aleppo where he was in exile, and took Mosul back by

force in 1833. Therefore there appeared hostility between Ali Rıza Pasha and Yahya

Pasha. This hatred was further exacerbated by evidence indicating the latter’s 218 Ibid., p. 74. 219 The Jalilis served well and regularly to the interests of the Ottoman central administration. Unlike the Mamluks, the Jalilis supported the Sublime Porte even outside the provincial borders of Mosul. In the words of Nieuwenhuis, Mosul’s relations with the sultan had more of the characteristics of vassalage. Nieuwenhuis, p. 102 and 170. 220 The Umarîs were the religious aristocracy in Mosul. They were descendants of Umar, second caliph of Islam. They were given significant positions in the Mosuli administration with the hope that since they were coming from the genealogy of Caliph Omar and since they were respected by Mosulis, they could act as mediator in the administration and compromise the provincial conflicts. But what was hoped could not be realized. The rise of Jalili star meant concomitant decline of the Umaris in Mosul. See Khoury, State and Provincial, pp. 90, 120-129; Al-Bustanî, pp. 219-221. 221 As Nieuwenhuis noted, it is quite interesting that Mamluk expansionism and Baghdad’s expanding control since Hasan Pasha (1702-24) has been interpreted in the modern Iraqi historiography as a form of “national unification” or as a kind of “proto-nationalism”. Nieuwenhuis, p. 200, 325f and 326f. 222 Khoury, State and Provincial, pp. 71-72 and 209.

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relations with the Shammar tribal confederation. In 1833, Sofuk, sheikh of Shammar,

fled from Ali Rıza Pasha’s military forces and entered the Mosuli territory. While

following the forces of Shammar Ali Rıza Pasha found among the properties of the

tribe, a letter of Yahya Pasha to sheikh Sofuk, which evidenced the relations between

the two.223

Upon Ali Rıza Pasha’s military campaign Yahya Pasha lost the city by force

and was banished this time to Tekirdağ.224 In the same year Mehmed Said Pasha

became governor.225 One year later, in 1834 with the recommendation of Baghdad

İnce Bayraktar Mehmed Pasha was appointed as the new governor of Mosul. İnce

Bayraktar Mehmed Pasha, in collaboration with Mehmed Reşid Pasha of Sivas,

strived for subjugating the Kurdish begs and he contributed much to the development

of the city.

The Fall of the Kurdish Emirates in Northern Iraq

The Kurdish emirates were mainly concentrated in northern Iraq and Shahrizor

(Kirkuk), the latter being the administrative center of the region. The emirates were

nominally tied to the governor-general in Baghdad and the governor had the right to

appoint and dismiss the head of the emirate; however, the de facto situation was that

the governor-general had to select one of the certain dynasties. The Ottoman

authority in the region during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was

largely nominal; however, it was also powerful enough to interfere with the internal

223 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 27. 224 BOA, HH, No: 49164. 225 BOA, HH, No: 20782.

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politics of the Kurdish emirates.226 In practice, the emirates acted almost

independently during the Mamluk period and the relations between the Kurdish Begs

and the Mamluk rulers were based on mutual gains: While Baghdad benefited from

the region in terms of their military capacity especially during the campaigns against

Arab tribes, the emirates in return benefited economically and politically by being

exempted from certain taxes and acting almost independently.227 The Mamluk

governors were also seeking the support of Kurdish emirates during their accession

to the governorship. However, once the Mamluk dynasty was eliminated by the

central administration and the governors began to be appointed directly from the

Sublime Porte, the Kurdish emirates, like other local forces lost their role in lobbying

for certain governors. Mahmud II, who was determined to get rid of the local âyâns,

was also firm in extending Ottoman direct rule to Iraq.

The Rawanduz, Bahdinan, Baban and Botan Emirates were the leading

Kurdish emirates. The balance of power between these emirates and Baghdad

depended on the personality of both the governor-general in Baghdad and the

individual Kurdish Beg himself. Sometimes the Kurdish Begs became pro-Baghdad,

but sometimes they opted alternatively for Persia. Indeed, it was this alternating

loyalty that angered the Ottoman central administration most. The Persian influence

in the region and the tendency of the Kurdish emirates to take the shelter of Persian

Shah whenever they were squeezed by Baghdad, were the leading factors paving the

way for the re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule in the region.

226 Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, New York: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 71. 227 Rousseau narrates that the Kurdish overlords had even their own flag and a band of musicians accompanying them when on march. J. B. L. Jack Baron Rousseau, Bağdat’tan Halep’e Arabistan Seyahati, 1321, p. 81

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The Rawanduz (Soran) Emirate Rawanduz was the center of the Soran emirate. During the 1820s and 1830s the

Rawanduz amîrs could revive the old glory of their emirates and expand its territory

at the expense of other tribes and districts. From time to time, Baghdad used the

Rawanduzi amîrs as a counter-balance against Iran in the Kurdistan region. One of

these amîrs, Muhammed Kör (also known as Mir Kör, or Kör Mir, the blind), who

began to establish his power from 1826 onwards, had therefore cordial relations with

Baghdad. After replacing his father in 1814 at the age of 31, he began to consolidate

his power by eliminating his rivals. Shortly, he became one of the most famous beys

of Soran family.

Even when he began to expand his authority as far as Little Zab and Arbil,

and then in 1833 as far as Amadiyah, Zakho, Dohuk, Jizrah, Mardin and Nusaybin,

the local government in Baghdad could not stop him.228 Instead, as a frequently

resorted method of conflict resolution, he was appointed as mîrimîrân and the region

including Arbil and Köprü was left to him. Muhammed Kör not only plundered and

dominated the local tribes but also dared to mint coins in his name.229 He marched

over the Yezidis and killed thousands.230 He also fought with the Bahdinans and the

Botans. However, his attacks to Nusaybin and Mardin upset Baghdad very much.

The revolt of Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt was the main reason in letting

the Kurdish emirates act freely. However, the rumors that Muhammed Kör was in

contact with İbrahim Pasha, son of Muhammed Ali, accelerated Ottoman military

228 BOA, HH, No: 22346. 229 B. Nikitine [C. E. Bosworth], “Rawandız”, El2 also Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, vol. 4-5, p. 743. 230 Wadie Jwaideh, Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999, pp. 109-113.

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action against Mir Kör.231 Upon these developments and the directions of governor

of Baghdad, the Sublime Porte, for the first time since the seventeenth century,

appointed Mehmed Pasha (İncebayraktar) as the governor of Shahrizor (Kirkuk).232

The general contention that the control of Baghdad and its environs would be easier

if Kurdistan is once taken under control should have played significant role in Ali

Rıza Pasha’s initiative.233

The appearance of an army in 1835 under the command of Mehmed Reşid

Pasha, former grand vizier and governor of Sivas, meant the beginning for the end of

the Rawanduz amirs. Reşid Pasha suppressed the mutinous Mardin and detached that

area permanently from Mosul to Diyarbakır.234 In this, he was supported militarily by

Ince Bayraktar of Mosul and Ali Rıza of Baghdad. Instead of shedding blood of

thousands, the Rawanduzi Muhammad Kör had been offered peaceful surrender in

return his life. Having no choice other than surrendering Mir Kör was departed in

1836 to Istanbul. He was welcomed by the Ottoman sultan; however, he died

mysteriously in his return to Rawanduz.

The fact that Rasul Beg, brother of the rebellious Muhammad Kör, was

brought to the administration in Rawanduz, indicates that Baghdad was not yet ready

to hold power in local politics. When Rasul Bey attempted to gain local autonomy,

the new governor in Baghdad, Najib Pasha (1842-48) responded severely forcing

him to flee to Iran in 1847.235 Rasul Beg was the last Rawanduzi amîr and with his

231 Ibid., p. 117. 232 Shortly after his appointment to Shahrizor, Mehmet Pasha (Incebayraktar) was sent to Mosul and became the governor of Mosul. Upon the banishment of Mehmed Said Pasha, then governor of Mosul, Incebayraktar Mehmed Pasha replaced him. See BOA, HH, No: 22346; also quoted in Al-Bustanî, p. 236. 233 Ibid., 266. 234 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 285.

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desertion the Soran emirate came to an end. From this time onwards, Rawanduz, had

been under the Ottoman direct rule and ruled by Turkish officials. Thenceforth,

Rawanduz shrank once more to a place of minor significance.

The Bahdinan Emirate

Apart from the Rawanduz emirate, the movement of Ottoman army was to change

the fate of other Kurdish emirates as well. As Longrigg noted

In 1837, troops from outside Iraq, under Hafız Pasha, again crushed the Sinjar Yazidis; and in 1838 the Incebayraktar took up the unfinished work in Kurdistan. Amadiyyah, was finally annexed after a siege, Aqrah and Dohuk followed: the Kurdish rulers and their families became harmless pensioners in Mosul or Baghdad.236

The 1830s witnessed the disintegration of another Kurdish principality, namely

the Bahdinans. The emirate, which was centered around the city of Amadiya, was led

by İsmail Pasha, but his brother was taken hostage by Ali Rıza Pasha. The emirate

included Akra, Shush, and the Zebârî lands on the Great Zab river to the east and

occasionally Zakho to the west. The principalities of the Botan and Hakkari bounded

it in the north and that of Soran in the south.237 The abovementioned territorial

expansion of Rawanduz principality occurred at the expense of the Bahdinans and

therefore the first and the most damaging blow came from the Muhammad Kör of

Rawanduz. As MacKenzie noted

In 1249/1833 Muhammad Pasha Kör, of Rawandiz, captured Aqra and Amadiya, deposing the ruler Said Pasha, and proceeded to take Zakho. Although his sway only lasted a few years the Bahdinan family never fully

235 Jwaideh, Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi, pp. 116-119; Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, London: Zed Books, 1992, pp. 176-177. Later with the mediation of British Consul Rawlinson, Rasul Beg was accommodated in Baghdad under custody. Al-Bustanî, p. 236. 236 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 286. 237 D. N. Mackenzie, “Bahdinan”, El2.

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recovered its power and in 1254/1838 the area was finally incorporated in the sancâk of Mosul.238

When the Rawanduzi Muhammad Mir Kör defeated İsmail Pasha of Bahdinans, he

put his brother Rasul as the new ruler of the Bahdinan emirate.239 However, after the

suppression of Mir Kör, İsmail Pasha could re-establish his leadership for some more

years.

Another blow to the Bahdinan rule in Amadiyah came from Baghdad. Ali

Rıza Pasha marched over Bahdinan emirate and brought both İsmail and his brother

to Baghdad, of whom the former died here. The Pasha also appointed one of his

relatives, Mehmed Said Pasha, to Amadiyah.240 The final stroke to the emirate came

from the governor of Mosul, then İnce Bayraktar Mehmed, who put an end to the

principality and tied Amadiyah to Mosul.241

The Baban Emirate

The Kurdish Baban dynasty was the foremost Kurdish tribe in the region. The

Babans, who ruled a wide territory ranging from Sulaimaniyah and Shahrizor to

Köysancak and Hankin, for a century and half, endured until 1850. Sulaimaniyah

was the center of the Baban dynasty. Traditionally, the Babans were alternately pro-

Baghdad or pro-Kirmanshah. In order to increase their influence over the emirate

both the governor of Baghdad and the Shah of Persia intrigued and interfered with

family quarrels, but almost all the time the Babans belonged nominally to the

238 Ibid. 239 Jwaideh, Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi, p. 116. 240 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 35-36. 241 Al-Bustanî, p. 236.

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Ottoman Empire.242 They collaborated with the Ottoman government and therefore

they were given the high Turkish title of pasha. The princely position (or at least

princely pretensions) of the dynasty was threatened by the rivalry among the sons of

Abdurrahman Pasha (the greatest Baban in power between 1789 and 1812), for the

Baban leadership. The family was also weakened by constant intrigues with (and by)

Persian supporters for this or that candidate.

As noted by Nieuwenhuis, during the period between 1802 and 1831, the

dominant Baban faction played the Baghdad card, but Persian threats and campaigns

soon forced them to take the stronger side. This had negative consequences for the

Babans in the sense that they paid higher tributes to Kermanshah than to Baghdad.243

Control over Sulaimaniyah and Baban territory was significant for the governor in

Baghdad. Because in order to defend the Persian border, which had been one of the

most important tasks for the Pasha in Baghdad, a certain degree of influence and

authority there was needed. This influence at the beginning of the nineteenth century

was virtually nill.244

The final expulsion of the Baban rulers, which was inevitable under the

centralizing policy of the Sublime Porte after 1246/1830, was easier since the

appearance of signs of Ottoman-Persian frontier agreements in 1239/1823 and

1263/1847 and the destructive rivalries of the sons of Abdurrahman Pasha. In spite of

a brief "Indian summer" when new weapons and modern military methods were

introduced in the Baban armed forces, the centralizing efforts of the mid-century

governors of Iraq prevailed finally in 1267/1850, when the last of the Baban princes

242 Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, p. 171. 243 Nieuwenhuis, p.42-43. 244 Ibid., p.43.

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left Sulaimaniyah. It is also argued that the end of the Babans started in 1847 with

the Ottoman-Persian border agreement, with which Persia promised to give up her

claim on Sulaimaniyah. The emirate was totally dissolved when Ismail Pasha

replaced the last Baban. Ismail Pasha, who was a high-ranking officer in the Sixth

Army, was the first Ottoman official to rule in Sulaimaniyah as kaymakam.245

Map I: Some of the Kurdish Emirates in northern Iraq Source: Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State, New York: SUNY Press, 2004, p. 85.

245 Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, p. 37.

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The Botan Emirate

A final mention should be on the Botan emirate, which has a special place in Kurdish

history. The Botan emirate, of which the Bedirhan family was the most important

branch, was also the victim of Ottoman centralizing reforms in the region. Bedirhan

Pasha (1802/3-1869-70) became the ruler of the Botan Emirate in 1835. He bore the

title of mütesellim and controlled this strong emirate in the first half of the nineteenth

century. In 1839 he fought against the forces of İbrahim Pasha of Egypt at the battle

of Nizip. However, like other Kurdish emirates, he enjoyed great authority. It seems

that the authority of Bedirhans surpassed in many ways the authority of the Ottoman

governor in the region.246 However, this fact should not prevent us to see the

Bedirhani contribution to the Ottoman forces in stabilizing the region.

The Bedirhans were loyal to the Ottoman administration, at least until 1842.

In 1842-43, the Sublime Porte, aiming to weaken the Bedirhani authority by dividing

its lands, attached Jizrah to Mosul. Indeed, changes in the provincial borders were a

common reflection of the Tanzimat applications. While the emirate’s core lands

remained in Diyarbakır province, Jizrah, which was very important for the Bedirhan

family, was attached to Mosul, whose governor was at odds with Bedirhan Bey.247

This administrative adjustment resulted in a revolt, which is later alleged to be a

Kurdish nationalistic movement.248 However, it is commonly accepted that one of the

most serious responses to the application of Tanzimat came form Jizrah-Hakkari

246 Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables, p. 71. 247 Ibid., p. 71. 248 In the light of the archival documents, recent studies have shown that the Bedirhan revolt was not aimed at Kurdish nationalism, but it was a reaction to Ottoman centralizing reforms. For a detailed account on this issue see Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables, and Mehmet Alagöz, Old Habits Die Hard….

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region.249 It is not difficult to anticipate that the relations between Bedirhan Bey and

the Sublime Porte were uneasy between 1842 and 1847. However, Bedirhan Bey’s

attacks on Nestorians in 1843 and 1846 were also very effective in the decisiveness

of the Sublime Porte to march over the Bedirhans, because these attacks on

Nestorians aroused much discontent among the Great Powers and caused

considerable pressure on the Sublime Porte.250 The Bedirhan revolt was suppressed

and Bedirhan Bey was taken to Istanbul on 12 September 1847 (1 Şevval 1263).251

The Sacred Cities of Karbala and Najaf

The re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule was not limited to regions like Jalili Mosul,

Mamluk Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan, there were other places like the two shrines

cities of Karbala and Najaf, where Ottoman direct rule was re-established. As the city

contained roughly ten thousand Iranians, it was considered as an Iranian-dominated

stronghold, and hence as a “potential fifth column”.252 While in the eighteenth and

early nineteenth century the city was governed by Mamluk-appointed Sunnis from

Baghdad, after the first quarter of the nineteenth century local notables came to be

the actual rulers of the city.

The Shiite worldview that perceived the Ottoman ruler as a heretic and

usurper of an office that should by right belong only to the Twelfth (Hidden) Imam

249 Musa Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p. 194. 250 The Public Record Office (PRO) has especially quite rich documents on this issue. 251 On Necip Pasha’s letter to Sublime Porte concerning the end of the Baban question in Kurdistan, see BOA, İ. DAH. 8165 lef 2, 13 N 1263 (25 August 1847). 252 Juan R. I. Cole and Moojan Momen, “Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843”, Past and Present, No: 112, August 1986, pp. 115 and 128.

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(who went into occultation in the ninth century) also contributed to the autonomous

character of the city.253 In time, Karbala came to be an important shelter for runaway

malefactors and gangs, called “yaramaz,” of both Iran and Iraq. As the city became

inaccessible for the government officials, many Ottoman governors could not dare to

enter the city.

Ali Rıza Pasha’s Bektashi leanings, especially his annual mourning for the

Imam Hussain, resulted in a short rapprochement between the Sunni ruler and the

Shiite inhabitants of the city.254 However, his attempt to appoint a governor for

Karbala exacerbated the relations again. It was only after Necip Pasha’s military

operation in 1842 that the city was surrendered after a serious conflict. Necip Pasha

appointed a Sunni governor, an assistant Sunni judge and a Sunni preacher to deliver

the Friday sermons in the name of Ottoman sultan.255

The situation in Najaf was not different from Karbala. The two city-clans,

Shumurd and Zuqurt, which represented wealthier and poorer quarters of the city, not

only racked Najaf with violence throughout the nineteenth century, but also showed a

clear opposition to Ottoman rule.256 The revolt of 1852, caused by long

contemptuous disaffection, was suppressed by Ottoman troops. However, the final

submission to the Ottoman rule was provided in 1854.257

253 Ibid., p. 113. 254 Ibid., p. 124. 255 Neccar, p. 40. 256 BOA, İ. DAH. 8165, lef 2 and 3, 13 N 1263 (25 August 1847) and 5 L 1263 (16 September 1847) respectively, mention an incident in which a volunteer from Najaf enters the military, but he was taken back by the people of locality. Upon this incident, the security measures were tightened and additional police stations (karakol) were opened. Entrance to the city was also checked at the gates of the city. 257 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 288.

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***

In a nutshell, it would be not wrong to say that the two decades between the

1830s and 1850s was a period in which the disintegration of the semi-independent

dynasties and the consolidation of the Ottoman central administration in Baghdad

took place. As far as Kurdistan was concerned, the Ottoman governors, namely Ali

Rıza Pasha and Necip Pasha, thought that due to frequent Persian intervention into

the domestic affairs of Kurdistan and the rivalry among the Kurdish Beys, stability

could not be achieved with the existing Kurdish amîrs. Ottoman governors felt the

need to replace both the Kurdish emirs and the Shiite rulers with Turkish ones;

therefore, the two decades between 1830 and 1850 witnessed the dissolution of

Kurdish emirates and Shiite zones and replacement of Turkish rule in these regions.

The supremacy of the central administration, represented by local government, in all

of these regions was never again thrown into question.

Asâyiş ve Emniyet: Provincial Security in Baghdad

The re-assertion of Ottoman direct rule and the submission of local forces was a very

important step for the improvement of provincial security. It is already stated that the

Ottoman government’s main efforts were initially intended to consolidate its hold

over its dominions. However, the elimination of the decentralist forces did not mean

the resolution of all security problem within the province. In the period between

1831-1872, not only autonomous entities were eliminated, but also local rebellious

forces reduced to insignificance. The chronic lack of security was gradually but

definitely improved.

As Rifat Abu Al-Haj stated clearly,

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“Iraq had been constantly exposed to the bâdiya (desert raids and Bedouin domination) and thus persistently subjected to its raids and dominance. And although other Arab societies share in the same experience as Iraq in this constant exposure to the bâdiya, what makes Iraq’s case unique is the intensity of the exposure and the swiftness of the oscillation.”258

Therefore, the most striking threat to the provincial security was the recalcitrant

attitudes of the nomadic tribes. By consistently harassing and robbing commercial

caravans, Bedouin tribes often halted long-distance trading for months. The

Baghdad-Damascus trade route had been attacked several times, for example in 1843

and 1857.259 The mail carts were also robbed from time to time.260 Moreover, looting

and burning agricultural villages and their surrounding fields were among the most

frequently resorted policies. It is hard to state that the Ottomans could, even until the

disintegration of the empire, manage the tribes smoothly. To take an example,

Ottoman governors’ strive to subdue Shammar Jarba continued during the whole

period under survey. As it will be discussed in Chapter five, the main objective of the

Ottoman politics of tribe was to break the tribal unity and incorporate them into

provincial political mechanism. However, it should be noted that the effects of the

increased state control could only be felt in the mid 1850s.

The most acute security problem of the province was the insufficiency of the

provincial army. The Mamluk period witnessed to some extent the reform of

provincial army, but it was not strong enough. Sulaiman the Great (1780-1802) had

increased the number of Georgian bodyguards and organized them as a military

force. During the reign Davud Pasha, foreign instructors educated the provincial

258 Rifaat Ali Abou-el-Haj, “The Social Uses of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule”, IJMES, Vol.14, No:2, May 1982, p. 195. 185-201. 259 PRO, FO 78 / 538, Wood to Bidwell, No: 1, Damascus, 28 February 1843 and FO 78 / 1388, Brant to Alison, No: 8, encl. in Brant to Clarendon, No: 10, Damascus, 29 January, 1858. 260 BOA, İ. MVL, 5829, 27 M 1267 (2 December 1850).

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army and relatively modern arms were introduced.261 This army was also supported

by tribal mercenaries. When we look at the Janissaries in Baghdad, Longrigg

narrated the condition of the Corp at the beginning of the nineteenth century as

follows:

The character of the Janissaries in Iraq had changed much in the preceding century. Fewer and fewer, and finally none, of their officers came from Stambul. Drafts of recruits ceased to arrive from abroad, and the lack was made good by local enlistment. Their last appearance, perhaps, as a force with any pretence of imperial character was in the succession struggles of 1802. Thereafter –and indeed before- the Janissaries were but a corps locally raised, locally paid, and similar in all essentials to the Baratli or Tufenkchi, though still ready with the phrases into which tradition had crystallized, and differing somewhat in dress and function.262

When Mahmud II abolished the centuries old Janissary Corp and established Asâkir-i

Mansûre-i Muhammediye in İstanbul, he also sent orders to the provinces for similar

actions.263 However, Davud Pasha kept the orders secret and he gathered all

Janissaries. Then, he enrolled all of the Janissary Corp into the newly created

Nizâmiye Army.

The tribal structure of the province was the most important obstacle for

provincial security. In Baghdad, banditry was a way of living for certain tribes, and

murder, highway robbery (kat'-ı tarîk), and plunder were the most frequently met

incidents.264 The use of gun was very common from the very young boys to the older

men. It was not uncommon that 15 years old boys could be found among bandits. The 261 Ibid., p. 251. 262 Ibid., p. 260. 263 For the recruitment to the new army in the Arab provinces see, Hakan Erdem, “Recruitment for the “Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad” in the Arab Provinces, 1826-1828”, in Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem and Ursula Woköck (eds.) Histories of the Modern Middle East, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 189-206. 264 In Ottoman archival sources and Zewra neswpaper, there are many cases of such incidents. For example see BOA, İ. DAH. 41300; Zewra, No. 8. The Anaza, Shammar and Hamawand tribes were the most notorious ones in this respect. See Sinan Marufoğlu, ‘Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak, 1831-1914’, İstanbul: Eren yayıncılık, 1998, s. 68 and 74.

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tribes were raiding to each other and constantly levied tributes on caravans who

passed by their territories.

A further effort to improve the provincial security was the strengthening of

the Aleppo-Baghdad route. This route was very important in terms commercial

caravans between the cities; however, it was exposed to the attacks of the tribes. The

fact that west of this route was desert also increased its vulnerability. In 1851, the

local governors proposed the construction of twenty citadels, each with sufficient

number of artilleries and soldiers.265 However, the Sublime Porte found the project

too costly and it was delayed on the ground that the Sixth Army had not matured yet

to supply the required soldiers and munitions for these twenty citadels. Despite the

delay of this project, individual governors contributed to the improvement of security

along the Aleppo-Baghdad route. Among the governors, only Reşid Pasha built more

than ten citadels in Samava, Hindiyya and Sûku’ş-şuyûh.266

265 BOA, İ. MVL, 6719, 27 C 1267 (29 April 1851). 266 On the construction of a citadel in Samava see BOA, İ. MVL, 17924, 10 C 1275 (15 January 1854). For those in Hindiyya and Sûku’ş-şuyûh, see Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 119 and Keiko Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies in the Province of Baghdad, 1831-1881, PhD Thesis, The University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1997, p. 76.

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Map II: The Aleppo-Baghdad Caravan Route with Major Rest Areas Source: Abdullah, Thabit. Merchants, Mamluks and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in the 18th Century Basra, New York: SUNY Press, 2001.

Reşid Pasha also endeavored much for the enhancement of security in the

province. He constructed several citadels along the Euphrates River. Moreover, in

order to cope with tribes, which took shelter in the marshes and swamps (hevr ta‘bîr

olunur göl-âb mahallerde), the pasha built 200 small riverboats and 20 medium-size

boats.267 As it will be discussed in the last chapter, the beginning of the steamer

267 BOA, İ. MVL, 15266, 4 B 1272 (11 March 1856).

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service in Tigris and Euphrates further increased the general security along the river

routes.

Introduction of Kur‘a-i şer‘iyye (Conscription by Ballot)

While the provincial army of Baghdad experienced considerable development and

modernization during Davud Pasha’s governorship, one of the most influential

changes came with the introduction of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye (conscription by ballot). In

accordance with the Tanzimat principles, various regulations between 1843-46 were

issued concerning the conscription system. Accordingly, the kur‘a-i şer‘iyye

(conscription by ballot) replaced the old “ocak usulü”. Ottoman governors in Iraq

had quite difficulty in conscripting local populace, becausonscription was one of the

most striking things that the Bedouin opposed vehemently.

Before the inttroduuction of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in a region, the population had to

be first surveyed. In this population survey (tahrîr-i nüfûs) only male population was

counted and those at the age military service were included into the ballot. Each

district had to provide a certain amount of soldiers and this amount was determined

by a lottery. For instance, in 1279/1863, only 100 persons out of 432 were

conscripted in the city centre of Mosul.268 In another case, out of 3402 males, who

were liable for military service, 414 males were put to the lottery, but only 82 people

were taken to the army.269

268 BOA, İ. DAH. 33867, 5 Ca 1279 (29 October 1863). 269 The abovementioned kur‘a-i şer‘iyye was done in the districts of Kanber Ali, Mehdiyya, Bani Said, Haytaviler, Cedid Hasan Paşa, Haydarhane, Kırkol, Kazgancı, Ağakkapusu, Revvak and Karye başı. See Zewra, No: 15.

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Both the tahrîr-i nüfûs and the kur‘a-i şer‘iyye could not be done in one spot.

It was done gradually and the tribally dominated areas were the most difficult areas.

Therefore, the survey of tribal population was usually delayed. For example, in 1849,

upon the arrival of imperial regulations concerning kur‘a-i şer‘iyye to Baghdad, the

officials began surveying the population of Baghdad, but the survey of nomadic

Muntafiq tribe were delayed for another time.270

When kur‘a-i şer‘iyye began to be implemented in Baghdad, there were

intensive need for clerks and scribes (ketebe ve mukayyyıd).271 Conscription by ballot

continued from its introduction in Baghdad in late the 1840s and early 1850s until

the end of the period under survey. The areas with security problems were

conscripted relatively late. While in Mosul conscription was initially introduced in

the 1840s, it was done in Kirkuk in 1864.272

In Mosul, İncebayraktar Mehmed Pasha commissioned Kasım Bey for the

introduction of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye, but Kasım Bey was killed by the rebels. Upon the

murder of Kasım Bey in 1843, İncebayraktar ordered his soldiers to bombard the

city.273 He also banished some of the city notables to Basra. Consequently, the

people of Mosul inevitably complied with the order of the pasha. Conscription by

ballot was introduced lately in Baghdad. It was Ömer Lütfi Pasha who tried to

introduce kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in Hilla, Karbala, Hindiya, Divaniyah and Şamiya in 1857

and 1858; however, these places did not subdue easily, many soldiers died in the

270 BOA, İ. MVL. 4071, 21 Ra 1265 (3 November 1850). 271 BOA, İ. MVL. 5632, 27 Z 1266 (3 November 1850) and İ. MVL. 18288, 22 L 1275 (3 November 1850) 272 On the introduction of conscription by ballot in Mosul and Kirkuk see respectively BOA, İ. DAH. 10504, 13 Ra 1265 (6 February 1849), and İ. DAH. 35459, 7 Ş 1280 (17 January 1864). 273 Sinan Maruf(oğlu), “Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak Kürtlerinin Sosyal ve Siyasi Konumları”, Türkiye Günlüğü, Sayı: 42, (Eylül-Ekim) 1996, fn. 24.

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conflicts.274 Ömer Lütfi Pasha set the başıbozuks free and wanted to replace them

with regular soldiers. He partly implemented kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in the city of

Baghdad.275 Earlier, in areas including the city of Baghdad, where kur‘a-i şer‘iyye

had not yet been introduced, local people were conscripted by force. In addition, the

deficiencies in the army were complemented by volunteers. However, besides the

volunteer participation, military force was also used (nefs-i Bağdad ile elviye-i

mülhakadan bilâ kur‘a neferât alındığı…).276

The use of force, which sometimes included imprisonment, usually resulted

in disturbance. It was in 1863 that when Namık Pasha tried to conscript the people of

Baghdad, the craftsmen in the city bazaar began to close their shops as a sign of

protest. Namık Pasha immediately sent his officials and made the shops open.277 We

should also note that even by the end of Midhat Pasha’s governorship (1872), tahrîr-i

nüfûs and kur‘a-i şer‘iyye could not be completed throughout the province. This

situation was already stated at the very beginning of first provincial yearbook of

Baghdad (1875).

Midhat Pasha’s governorship witnessed significant developments both in

kur‘a-i şer‘iyye and the general security of the province. Provision of security was

the one of the first things Midhat had to deal with. He knew that security (asâyiş)

was an essential factor for the development (terakkî) and modernization of a country.

In many of his speeches he stressed the dichotomy between (agricultural and

274 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 120-123. 275 BOA, İ. DAH. 27166, askerî lef 1, 3 M 1275 (18 August 1858). 276 Ibid. 277 Ahmed Nuri Sinaplı, Şeyhül Vüzera, Serasker Mehmet Namık Paşa, İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1987, p. 193.

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commercial) potential of the country and the prevailing insecurity.278 Like his

predecessors, the Pasha was sent to Baghdad both as governor of the province and as

the commander of the Sixth Army.279 In fact, one of the reasons for Midhat Pasha’s

appointment to Baghdad governorship was the re-organization of the Sixth Army.280

He first changed the recruitment system of the Sixth Army and dealt with the tribal

rebellions. He introduced the military conscription in the city of Baghdad

effectively.281

In his memoirs Midhat Pasha, with some exaggerations, mentioned that the

kur‘a-yı şer‘iyye was introduced in Mosul and Kirkuk, but it was not even heard

about in Baghdad.282 The fact was that when Midhat Pasha arrived in Baghdad, the

question of military recruitment was one of the urgent affairs in the province.283

Conscription was compulsory for every individual living within the empire, but this

was hard to apply in Baghdad. Governors prior to Midhat Pasha tried gradually to

recruit local people, but they, for the most time, encountered tribal rebellions. Due to

the changes within the Sixth Army, it became necessary for Midhat Pasha to fill the

vacant ranks by recruiting from the population of Baghdad.284 His attempts caused

278 For example, see Zewra, No: 11. 279 İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal, Son Sadrazamlar, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982, p. 323; See also Roderic H. Davison, “Midhat Pasha”, EI2, Vol.6, p.1033. Midhat Pasha, Tabsıra-i İbret, (compiled by Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu), 2 Vols. İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1997, p. 91-94. Before Midhat, Namık Pasha was also given the same authority in 1851. Bâb-ı Âli, for a while, wanted to take the military authorities of Midhat Pasha back; however, as Midhat Pasha bluffed by resignation, he retained his authorities. 280 Midhat Pasha, p. 89. 281 See Zewra, No: 11. 282 See Zewra, No: 9. 283 Ali Haydar Midhat, ‘The Life of Midhat Pasha’, London: John Murray Publishers, 1903, p. 47. 284 When need arose, Turkish elements within the Sixth Army were changing their places. The vacant positions were often filled from ordinary peoples, even sometimes from the prisoners. This, of course, decreased the discipline of the army. Therefore, it became necessary to recruit nearly 300 people from the Baghdad population. See Midhat Paşa, pp. 89-94.

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resentment among the tribes and eventually led to rebellion. Midhat Pasha had to

fight with them and suppress the rebellion.

Midhat Pasha accomplished the kur‘a-i şer‘iyye in Telafer, Sinjar, Kirkuk,

Erbil, Zengibar, Baghdad, Karbala, Samarra, and Divaniyah. But the process was not

easy in all of them. The Bedouins reacted to his initiative with a tribal rebellion.

More than 100 rebels were arrested and punished with kürek cezası (penal servitude)

for ten to fifteen years.285 It is interesting that most of the rebels were older than the

age group suitable for military service. This, I think, indicates that what they were

reacting against was not the nature of conscription, but the process of de-

tribalization, of which conscription by ballot was a significant part. Eventually, the

conscription procedure for Baghdad and its environs was completed in the first six

months of Midhat Pasha’s governorship.286

Midhat Pasha used the provincial newspaper, Zewra, for breaking the

prejudices against conscription. Earlier, it was thought that military service was

obligatory for every young man. The newspaper explained in detail that it was a mere

lottery and the chance of not to be conscripted was much higher than the opposite.287

Another strategy of Zewra was to use a patriotic and religious rhetoric, which

idealized military service. For this end, the editor of the newspaper used verses from

Holy Quran and examples from the tradition (hadith) of the Prophet concerning

martyrs and veterans. Moreover, the newspaper made references to European

285 Zewra, No: 12. Among the rebels, only 10-15 of them were at the age of military service. Most of them were aged between 35 and 50. 286 See Zewra, No: 23 and 24. 287 Approximately 1/200-250 of the total population was conscripted by ballot. This corresponded to the 1/13-25 of the people at the age of military service. Naturally, this ratio change from place to place in accordance with the demographic characteristics of the region in question. See Zewra, No: 11, 53, 57 and 60.

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nationalism and patriotism and underlined that “we are sons of soldier ancestors”

(…Biz ol babaların evlâdı ve o millet-i mu‘azzamanın efrâdıyız ki dînen ve i‘tikâden

halken ve hilkaten asker oğlu asker olup…).288

The length of military service was five to six years. However, Zewra

emphasized the possibility for promotion in the military ranks. After being enlisted,

one could rise from the rank of an ordinary soldier to the rank of müşîr.289 In time,

there appeared soldiers who wanted to continue their careers in army. Midhat Pasha

also modernized and bureaucratized the process of enlistment. Earlier, the medical

examination was done before the lottery. He changed the process, and only the males

determined by the lottery were taken into medical examination.

Reinforcement of the Provincial Army

İt was with the introduction of kur‘a-i şer‘iyye that the deficiencies of the Sixth

Army were filled with the soldiers conscripted and the necessary battalions and

regiments were formed. The insufficiency of the number of soldiers was evident

from the very beginning. Even in its establishment in 1847, the Sixth Army, when

compared to other armies of the empire, was poor. In the late 1840s, it had four

infantry regiments, four tâli‘a (nişancı) battalions, two cavalry regiments and an

artillery regiment. However, these military units were far under their normal

capacity. Especially during the periods of discharge (terhîs), the need for extra

soldiers was quite evident.290 It was not unusual that more than two thousands

soldiers could be discharged at one spot.

288 Zewra, No: 53. 289 Zewra, No: 16. 290 See BOA, İ. DAH. 33410, 20 M 1279 (18 July 1862), for Namık Pasha demand for extra soldiers upon the discharge of soldiers in Mosul.

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The Sixth Army was, from time to time, reinforced in terms of ammunitions,

but it was still not sufficient.291 The enlistment of the tribal populace was very

difficult; therefore, Ottoman officials alternatively tried to increase the number of

soldiers in the Sixth Army. A considerable part of the correspondence between the

Sublime Porte and Baghdad during the third quarter of the century concentrates on

the dispatch of soldiers from Anatolian and Arabian Armies (Anadolu ve Arabistan

Orduları) to the Sixth Army.

The tribal uprisings brought the insufficiency of the provincial army to the

forefront. In 1850, provincial army could not cope with two concomitant revolts in

the province, one in Sulaimaniyah and the other in Hindiyya.292 Until the

consolidation of the Sixth Army, it was militarily supported by the armies of

Anatolia and Arabia. However, it was not always possible for these armies to back

up Baghdad, because these armies had usually their own problems. For example, in

1851 when the troubles of Anaza tribal confederation in Kurdistan were to be dealt

with military encounter, the armies of Anatolia and Arabia could not send military

battalions, because Anatolian Army had some of its units in Persian border and the

Arabian Army was dealing with problems in its own region. As the result of this, the

encounter with Anaza tribal confederation was delayed. It was decided to organize a

special military campaign to Anaza tribe, when the military situations of related

armies become suitable.293

If the tribal uprising was not great, it was dealt locally. A considerable part of

the army was sent to suppress the uprising, and very few remained in Baghdad. This 291 For the dispatch of artillery and other munitions in 1850, see BOA, İ. MVL. 5632, 27 Z 1266 (3 November 1850). 292 BOA, İ. MVL, 6511, lef 2, 2 Za 1266 (9 September 1850). 293 BOA, İ. MVL. 6119, 17 Ra 1267 (20 January 1851).

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however usually risked the general security (asâyiş) of provincial center. Moreover,

the tribal uprising made the officials in Baghdad to give importance to cavalry forces

and in the course of time cavalry forces were increased.

In 1267/1851 the total number of soldiers in hıtta-i Irakiye was 7,680. In his

letter to the Porte Vecihi Pasha demanded 4,500 soldiers from Anatolian Army.294

However, Vecihi Pasha’s demand was partly met. Four months later, İstanbul sent two

battalions consisting of 1,500 soldiers from Anatolian Army to Baghdad.295 Two more

battalions were sent during the governorship of Namık Pasha. Even as late as 1871-72,

Midhat Pasha could make his military campaign to Najd with the coming of soldiers

from Anatolian Army. While these soldiers were positioned in the provincial center of

Baghdad, the remaining battalions went to Najd. It should be noted that the strong

personalities of Namık and Midhat Pasha as the head (müşîr) of the Sixth Army and

governor of the province was quite influential in the growth of that army.

With the coming of the new soldiers, the Sixth Army was not only reinforced,

but also its nature began to change. The number of başıbozuks was lessened, and

they were gradually replaced by nizâmiye soldiers.296 Although this change meant

extra cost for the government, this policy was followed for the rest of the century.

Namık Paşa re-organized the regiments of the Six Army.297 He paid the salaries of

the soldiers (both nizâmiye and başıbozuk) that were for 15 to 20 months ignored. It

is obvious that the payment of salaries increased the enthusiasms of the soldiers in

294 BOA, İ. HRC. 3915, hâriciye lef 3, 9 S 1267 (14 December 1850) and İ. DAH. 13696, dahiliye lef 2, 14 R 1267 (16 February 1851). 295 BOA, İ. DAH. 13943, 11 C 1267 (13 April 1851). “Anadolu ordu-yı hümâyûnundan Bağdad’a gönderilecek iki tabur asâkir-i hazret-i şâhâne ile 1,500 neferât-ı cedîdenin sürat-i irsâli vesâyâsına dâir..”. 296 BOA, İ. MMH. 2059, 21 Ra 1263 (9 March 1847). 297 Sinaplı, p. 121.

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military campaigns. Namık Pasha also accomplished the population survey (tahrîr-i

nüfûs) of Baghdad, which was quite necessary for determining the age groups to be

enlisted for the provincial army.298

Earlier, the ammunitions of Baghdad were being sent from İstanbul, but due

to its remoteness to the imperial center, the cost of transportation was much higher

than that of ammunitions. Hence, Namık Pasha was given authority to produce the

necessary ammunitions locally.299 This enabled the local government to have

ammunitions on time, when need arose. Namık Paşa built an arsenal in Baghdad. The

ammunitions were earlier stored in old houses, but they were not suitable for this

affair. After building an arsenal, he also built a police station (karakol) for the

protection of this arsenal. Furthermore, the Pasha constructed a military barracks in

Baghdad, he also established permanent military base in Ammarah.300 Furthermore,

the prison in Baghdad was not sufficient; therefore, it was widened by Namık Pasha,

but later, during the governorship of Mustafa Nuri Pasha (1860-61) a second prison

was built within the city walls of Baghdad.301

Another development affecting the provincial army in Baghdad was the

outbreak of Crimean War in 1853. The Sublime Porte asked for supplementary

soldiers from provinces, including Baghdad. It is understood that Reşid Pasha, then

governor of Baghdad, and Yazıcı Hasan Agha together sent an army of 4000

298 BOA, I. DAH. 12311, 5 Ca 1266 (19 March 1850), also Sinaplı, p. 127. 299 BOA, İ. MVL. 21996, 21 Z 1279 (9 June 1863). 300 Neccar, p. 57. 301 BOA, İ. MVL. 19487, dâhiliye lef 1, gurre-i Ca, 1277 (15 November 1860) and 22571, 22 B 1280 (2 January 1864).

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soldiers.302 Rassam noted that the provincial security was negatively affected by the

Crimean War between 1853 and 1856.303

Another factor that necessitated the strengthening of the Sixth Army was the

alarming developments in the Ottoman-Iranian border. Occasionally Persia violated

and trespassed the border.304 And from time to time, Persian armies were heaped

along the Ottoman border. On such occasions, the Sixth Army also took measures

and sent sufficient number of soldiers to the border. One such incident took place in

the autumn of 1852. Derviş Paşa, who had been sent by Sublime Porte for fixing the

Turco-Iranian border, warned the central government about the military activities of

Persia. Consequently, necessary military measures were taken by the local

government in Baghdad.305

The border-crossing nomadic tribes were also an important threat to the

security of the province. They not only plundered the properties of the people, but

damaged the telegraph lines and consequently cut the communication for weeks.306

The Zewra newspaper narrated many incidents in which the border-crossing tribes

looted villages and killed local people. However, in most cases they were followed

by Ottoman forces; in the conflicts the gang-leaders were sometimes caught, and the

properties that had been plundered were taken back.307

302 BOA, İ. DAH. 18013, 4 Ra 1270 (5 December 1853). Contribution with an army of 4000 soliders was quiet salient, because it meant more than the half of the Sixth Army. 303 Hormuzd Rassam, Asshur and the Land of Nimrod, New York, 1897, p. 42. 304 İran tarafından hudûda asker sevk olunmakta olduğundan luzumu mikdâr askerin ihtiyâten hudûda gönderilmesine dâir, BOA, İ. HRC, 4374, hariciye lef 1, 28 Za 1268 (13 September 1852) and İ. HRC, 2911, 21 S 1266 (6 January 1850). 305 BOA, İ. HRC, 4374, 28 Za 1268 (13 September 1852). 306 For such an incident of Persian Sincâbî tribes see Zewra, No: 23. 307 See Zewra, No: 13, 38, 51, 59, 64 and 79.

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An important aspect of the provincial army was the lack of military

discipline. For example, when Namık Pasha was mentioning about the soldiers in

Sulaimaniyah, he stated that since most of the soldiers were recruited from the

people of locality, they had almost nothing reminiscent of imperial army (asâkir-i

şâhâne).308 Moreover, most of them had their own occupations engaging in grocery

or agriculture. They lived in their own villages and were brought together when need

arose (icâbı takdirinde toplanıp askere benzetilmekte).309 However, in the course of

time, the soldiers improved much in terms of military discipline. Especially the

governorship of Midhat Pasha was significant in this regard.

Although the nomads were, to a certain extent, inferior to the regular troops in

military equipment and training, they were lighter and more mobile than the regulars.

Moreover, they had the most valuable asset, an intimate knowledge of the country in

which they were fighting. In spite of such advantages, the nomads normally refrained

an open clash with the regular forces of the local government.

The use of modern arms after the 1850s became a deterrent factor for the

Bedouin tribes of Iraq and hence it contributed to the improvement of provincial

security. In terms of military technology the Bedouin tribes lacked the firearms the

Ottomans had. However, they usually compensated this weakness with their mobility

and “hit-and-run” tactics. This “hit-and-run” policy was frequently resorted by the

border-crossing Bedouin tribes. These tribes usually crossed the Persian border and

plundered certain villages. Towards the end of the period under survey, the Baghdad

governorship became more effective against these border-crossing and plundering

tribes. The introduction of modern arms was very significant in this sense. Ottoman

308 Sinaplı, p. 124. 309 Ibid., p. 125.

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officials tried to ensure that the tribes had no modern arms. In August 1860, when

military troops were dispatched against Albu Muhammad tribe, the acquisition of

artillery and military outposts by this tribe was one of the leading reasons for military

dispatch.310

Midhat Pasha took many measures for the sake of providing security in

Baghdad. When he arrived in Baghdad, the zabtiye forces, which numbered more

than 8,000, were irregular and undisciplined (başıbozuk, nizâmsız ve kâidesiz). Even

there were cases that members of the zabtiye forces joined the bandits in the

mountains.311 One of the most important targets of the new provincial law, which

will be explained in detail below, was the provision of security to the provinces. In

this context, every sancak had a battalion (tabur) and they were under the command

of alaybeyi at the center of the province. Midhat Pasha established military

strongholds along the river quays and in places where the tribes concentrated.312 In

Dagharah, after the suppression of the Cubûr and Khazâ‘il tribes, he established a

stronghold with considerable amount of soldiers.313 He also constructed a new

barrack in Baghdad.314 With the abolition of the başıbozuk zabtiyes, Midhat Pasha

established a new zabtiye force, of which 2,400 were cavalry and 4,000 were

infantry.315 These new forces were also given a standard uniform. Furthermore, the

military training (ta‘lîm) improved considerably. There were regular inspections

310 BOA, İ. DAH. 30706, dâhiliye lef 2, 13 M 1277 (1 August 1860). 311 See Zewra, No.8. 312 Zewra, No: 47. 313 See Zewra, No: 22. 314 BOA, İ. DAH. 43045, 9 C 1287 (6 September 1870). 315 Zewra, No. 3 and 6.

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done by the high ranking officials and the governor himself, and in the 1870s real

bullets were used in some of the trainings.316

Midhat Pasha’s expedition to Najd was certainly the most significant military

event of the early 1870s. With this military campaign Ottoman control expanded to

al-Ahsa. Since this military expedition to Najd has already been studied,317 I will not

elaborate on this issue, but this event brought the insufficiency of soldiers in the

Sixth Army to the surface. Midhat Pasha sent to Najd five battalions from the Sixth

Army, which had at that time 7,500-8,000 soldiers. Of these five battalions, at least

two or three were to remain in Najd in order to keep order and security.

Consequently, the Sublime Porte confirmed the creation of the fifth regiment within

the Sixth Army, which was planned several years ago.318

In short, the measures taken by provincial governors resulted in the relative

improvement of order and security. There was even considerable voluntary

participation to the zabtiye forces.319 Moreover, some of the tribes, who fled to Iran,

returned back as they saw the relative improvement in the security and development

of the country.320 The order of things, and the level of security reached were quite

316 Zewra, No: 91. “Merkez-i ordu-yı hümâyûnda bulunan piyâde ve süvâri ve topçu asâkir-i şâhâne hergün alay ta‘lîmleri icrâ etmekde bulundukları misillü geçen Cuma ertesi günü dahi devletlü vâlî paşa ve Kemal Paşa ve Rauf Paşa hazerâtı huzûrlarında bir de ateşli ta‘lîm icrâ olunmuş ve ateşli ta‘lîm sabâh sa‘ât üçte başlayarak beşe kadar iki sa‘ât devâm edip icrâ olunan harb manevraları huzzâr-ı müşârun ileyhimin nazar-ı tahsîn ve aferinlerini celb eylemiştir.” 317 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, ‘Midhat Paşanın Necid ve Havalisi ile ilgili birkaç Layihası’, İÜEF Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, 3, 1972, pp: 149-76; Frederick Fallowfield Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf and the Creation of Kuwait: S. Arabia and Gulf, 1871-1914, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997 (especially Chapter 3); Zekeriya Kurşun, Necid ve Ahsa’da, (especially Chapter 2). 318 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1672, 16 M 1288 (7 April 1871). Earlier, the lacking soldiers was to be dispatched from Aleppo and Diyarbakır; however, it was thought that this might harm the security of these areas. As the result, a new regiment was form in the Sixth Army. A battalion (tabur) and a regiment (alay) had approximately 700-725 and 2,200-2,300 soldiers respectively. 319 Zewra, No. 9. 320 Zewra, No. 8.

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related to the introduction of Tanzimat reforms in Iraq, which we turn in the

following chapters.

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Chapter III

Ottoman Provincial Administration in Baghdad From the very beginning the Ottoman Empire was divided into eyâlets (or

beglerbegiliks), the largest administrative unit to be ruled by a beglerbegi, governor-

general. It must have been only after 1591 that the term eyâlet, designating the

territory of a beglerbegilik, began to be used officially and the latter began to be used

rather for the office of beglerbegi. In the late sixteenth century, beglerbegilik and

vilâyet were used in the Ottoman documents at the same time; while the former was

then the proper term for the administrative division, the latter designated any

governorship, large or small.321 Even in the mid nineteenth century the terms of

eyâlet and vilâyet were used interchangeably. On the other hand, it is argued that the

term eyâlet referred to a territory that was regionally more autonomous than the

sancak or vilâyet.322

The imperial administrative system was also to be implemented in the newly

conquered territories. By 1520 in the eastern parts of the empire there were the

vilâyets of Arab (with 15 sancaks) and Diyarbakır (with 9 sancaks). However, in the

first year of his reign, Süleyman I found it necessary to re-organize the vilâyet of

Arab into beglerbegiliks of Aleppo, Damascus and Egypt.323 It was in 1534 with the

321 İnalcık, “Eyâlet”, El2, 322 Süleyman Oğuz, Osmanlı Vilayet İdaresi ve Doğu Rumeli Vilayeti (1878-1885), İstanbul: Cem Ofset Matbaacılık Sanayii A.Ş, 1987, p. 10. 323 İnalcık, “Eyâlet”, El2,

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conquests of Süleyman I, Baghdad and Shahrizor were organized as

beglerbegiliks.324

Starting from the end of the sixteenth century, the office of the beglerbegi of

important eyâlets, such as Egypt, Budin, Damascus and Baghdad, was bestowed on

holders of the rank of vizier. The vizier was entitled to three tughs, the beglerbegi to

two. Therefore, the beglerbegis with the rank of vizier had larger and more absolute

powers. They had some authority over the neighboring beglerbegis of two tughs.325

Baghdad was the center of hıtta-i Irakiyye326 and it was administratively above the

governorates of Mosul, Shahrizor and Basra. In the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries the governors of these three provinces were appointed upon the advice of

the governor in Baghdad and approval from the Sublime Porte. This was basically

due to the fact that the governor-general of Baghdad was higher in rank than the

governors of neighboring Iraqi provinces.327 Moreover, like Egypt and Budin,

Baghdad’s importance, as an Islamic capital city enabled it several privileges.328

Normally, the sancak-begs (mîrlivâs) were appointed by the Sublime Porte; however,

there was an exception for the outer and important provinces such as Baghdad and

Egypt. In Baghdad, the governor could appoint for sancaks (livâs).329 During the

324 During this period Van, Erzurum, were the other frontier (serhadd) beglerbegiliks. 325 İnalcık, “Eyâlet”, El2; V. L. Menage, “Beglerbegi”, El2, and Mehmet İpşirli, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatı”, in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (ed.) Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi, vol. 1, İstanbul: Feza Gaztecilik A.Ş, 1999, p. 229. 326 The term “hıtta-i Irakiyye” corresponds to Ottoman Iraq, which covers almost the same geography with present-day Iraqi State. “Bağdad şehri sevâd-ı Irak’ın kürsî-i eyâleti olarak …”, “ Bağdat’ın kürsî-i hükûmeti olduğu Irak hıttası…”, see Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, p. 49 and 56. 327 Abdülaziz Süleyman Nevvar, Târîhü’l-Irâq al-Hadîs: Min Nihâyeti Hükmi Davud Paşa ilâ Nihâyeti Hükmi Midhat Paşa, Cairo: Dârü’l-Kâtibü’l-Arabî lit-Tibâah ven-Neşr, 1968, p. 8. 328 “Mîr-i mîrânlarının koçulu kayığa binmek ve yanında solak ve peyk yürütmek ve bir dereceye kadar tevcîhâta mezun olmak gibi bazı imtiyazları vardı” . Al-Bustanî, p.5. 329 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, p. 145.

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Mamluk era the governor had also the right to appoint the defterdâr and Janissary

Agha.330

In the eyâlet system, each eyâlet was to be divided into sancaks (or livas),

each sancak into kazâs and each kazâ into villages. The sancaks and the kazâs were

to be governed by sancak-begi, and kaymakam respectively. Until the nineteenth

century the nâhiyes and villages had no administrative significance. They had no

official administrators, and their importance was only in terms of tax revenue.

However, sancak was the basic unite of Ottoman provincial administration and the

beglerbegi himself was the governor of a sancak called pasha sancağı. The eyâlet

system continued until the proclamation of Vilâyet Law in 1864, the implementation

of which will be analyzed in next chapter.

Tanzimat and its Impacts on Provincial Borders The Tanzimat Period witnessed an overall re-structuring of the provincial

administration, and the strengthening of the center’s control over the periphery was

perhaps the most important aspect of this re-structuring. It was thought that

maladministration in the provinces had been very much related to the autonomous

governors and lack of central supervision.331 Here, I will first dwell upon Tanzimat

reforms’ implication with regard to changes in the provincial borders of Ottoman

Iraq. Also a short look at the Ottoman-Persian frontier will ease our understanding

concerning the changes in the provincial borders. Then, I will focus on fluctuating

autonomy of the provincal governor-generals.

330 BOA, HH. No: 20879; Al-Bustanî, p. 5. 331 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, p. 22.

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Ottoman-Persian frontier

Although the Ottoman-Persian frontier is the oldest of the empire that did not

experience radical change, the undefined nature of the frontier was among the

principle causes of difficulty between the two. The border-crossing Kurdish tribes

constituted the major corcern for two states. As will be discussed in Chapter five,

both Iran and Ottoman Empire tried to gain the loyalty of these tribes.

The first Treaty of Erzurum was signed in 1823. However, it was far from

resolving the problem of border-crossing tribes. The treaty did not solve the frontier

problem between Basra and Chaab (Ka‘b) tribe and the boundary between Shuster

and Basra was still doubtfull. Besides, this treaty had already been violated by

Ottoman occupation of Muhammarah in 1837 and later by the Persian occupation of

Sulaimaniyah. A Persian garrison remained in Sulaimaniyah until the death of Fath

Ali Shah in 1834.332

The negotiations were resumed in 1843 with a joint Ottoman-Persian

Commission. Britain and Russia were also represented in this commission as

mediating powers. As Longrigg pointed out, at the beginning the commission held

sittings at Erzurum during 1843-44, but later due to the alleged intractibility of the

Ottoman commissioner the negotiations continued in Europe.333 As the result of

negotiations, the Second Erzurum Treaty was signed at Erzurum by the

332 Longrigg, p. 249. 333 J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and the Central Arabia, London: Archives Editions, 1986, Vol.1, p. 230.

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commissioners of contracting governments on the 31st May 1847. The Sublime Porte

ratified it on 21st March 1848.334

The treaty dealt with border tribes, Persian pilgrims and navigation. Though

the treaty settled some of the disputed points, it left most matters of detail for future

adjustment. While Iran gave up its claim on Sulaimaniyah, the Ottoman Empire left

Muhammere for Iran. The debatable lands (münâza‘un fîh) were divided between the

litigants, but the division of certain tribes (such as Ka‘b), which situated between the

two countries, continued to be a matter of question. Another issue that was not

resolved with the treaty was the question of Kotur. The Ottoman possession of Kotur

remained a problem for Persian, because it was an important pass and indispensable

to the security of Persia.

Furthermore, the treaty included matters other than border issues. Especially

the Ottoman treatment of Persian subjects in Baghdad was a major concern of the

Persian commissioner. It should be noted that the negotiations started just after the

Ottoman submission of Najaf and Karbala in 1843, which upset Shiite Persia too.

The treaty stipulated that the entire border be surveyed by a mixed

commission.335 A commission (Tahdîd-i Hudûd Komisyonu) was set up in 1848.

While the Ottoman Empire was represented by (Mehmed Emîn) Derviş Pasha, Mirza

Cafer Khan represented Iran.336 The commission was to survey the Ottoman-Persian

border from Bayezid (then a sancak tied to Erzurum) to Basra and this was

334 For the articles of the treaty see Mahmud Mesud Paşa, Muahedât Mecmuası, İstanbul. AH. 1298, Vol. 3. pp.5-8; and Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt (eds.,) British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series B, Vol. 10, University Publication of America, 1984, pp.322-323. 335 Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations”, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol.7, No. 3 (September 2003), p. 117. 336 On the part of England and Russia, Colonel Williams and Tschirikoff participated to the negotiations.

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accomplished in four years, in 1852. The survey of the commission was well

documented by Mehmed Hurşîd Pasha, who was clerk in the Ottoman delegate.337

The commission dissolved in 1852 without any amendment. Due to the

Crimean war the commission stopped surveying. European sources held the

unreasonableness of the Ottoman delegate as the main cause for the break up of the

commission.338 Despite breaks, the survey of the border was finally completed in

1865.339 As the result of survey works, the Ottoman-Persian border was confirmed

by a convention signed in İstanbul in 1869. Yet, even this convention did not change

the status quo and small territories of lands (such as Kazlıgöl and Kotur) continued to

change alliegiance between the two sides.

Provincial Borders in Ottoman Iraq The Tanzimat reforms envisaged changes not only the administrative organization

but also the spatial structure as well. The administrative borders of the provinces

were re-adjusted, and by uniting different sancaks new provinces were created.

Parallel to the centralization policies of the era, the provinces were contracted in size

so as to prevent strong local and de-centralized forces.340

337 Mehmed Hurşîd Paşa, Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, (transcripted by Alâattin Eser), İstanbul: Simurg, 1997. Earlier, Hurşîd Pasha was in the clerical office for the Foreign Affairs (Vilâyet Mektûbi-i Hâriciye Kalemi). 338 Lorimer, p. 230. 339 A detailed account on this survey work can be found in Richard Schofield, The Iran-Iraq Border, 1840-1958, III and IV (Archive Editions, 1989). On the negotiations between the two states, see also Bourne and Watt (eds.,) British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series B, Vol. 10, University Publication of America, 1984, pp.322-329. 340 İlber Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Devri İdari Yapı”, in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (ed.) Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, Vol.1, İstanbul: IRCICA, 1994, pp. 307-308; Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 191; and on the changes of provincial borders in Syria and Palestine see Ma’oz, Ottoman Reform, pp. 31-34.

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The administrative status of cities within the hıtta-i Irakiyye changed

frequently. It should however be noted that this change was not unique to Iraqi

provinces, it could be seen in other parts of the empire too. The changes in the

administrative statuses were rather the result of economic and political developments

in the conjuncture, both imperial and international. The changes in the network of

transport and in the routes of foreign trade in the nineteenth century affected the

centers of production and control. As a corollary of these developments, not only the

provincial borders but also the hierarchy among them changed frequently.341

Furthermore, the changes in provincial borders in hıtta-i Irakiyye had very

much to do with the balance of power between the leading cities of the region.

Baghdad, Basra, Shahrizor (Kirkuk) and Mosul (which have been referred as Iraqi

provinces) were separate provinces in the early eigteenth century. During the early

years of Mamluk rule while Hasan Pasha was the governor of Baghdad, his son

Ahmed Pasha was the governor in Basra. It was with the death of Hasan Pasha in

1723 that Ahmed Pasha came to govern not only Basra but also Baghdad.342 During

the Mamluk Era, in addition to Basra, Shahrizor was also tied to the governor-

general in Baghdad. It was again during the Mamluk rule in Baghdad, particularly

during the reigns of Hasan and Ahmed Pasha that the territory of the pashalık was

extended northward so as to include Mardin and Urfa, besides the Kurdish areas like

Amadiyah, Sulaimaniyah and Köysancak. Mardin was formerly a sub-province of

341 İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri, Ankara: TTK, 2000, p. 29. Ortaylı gives two leading examples: İzmir and Tuna provinces. Formerly Aydın was the provincial headquarter; however, the improvements in transport network and the movement of production centres to Aegean coasts, made İzmir to supersede Aydın. Similarly, the regional conjunctures, especially the nationalist rebellions, in the Balkans were the leading factors for the re-organization of the Tuna province. 342 Ibid., p.5.

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Diyarbakır. However, upon Ahmed Pasha’s request it was given to him as

mâlikâne.343

It was again during the Tanzimat Era that the far-flung command of Mamluk

governors began to be narrowed. Mardin was detached from Baghdad to Diyarbakır

only in 1835 after the disintegration of Kurdish emirates by Ottoman forces.344 As a

matter of fact, the harmony of interest between provincial and central administration

had been very important. If this harmony was not provided, the Sublime Porte tried

to prevent the rise of unified regional powers by keeping different pashalık and

beyliks divided, and did not refrain to play one off against the others.345 In fact, the

administrative borders Iraqi provinces had been fragmented until the mid-nineteenth

century. However, from this time onwards, we see that the governors of Baghdad

were given greater authority and this was reflected in the expansion of provincial

borders so as to include Mosul, Shahrizor and Basra. In fact, the changes in the

administrative divisions in the nineteenth century Ottoman Iraq can be seen as an

approachment to the “Vilâyet System” which Midhat Pasha was to apply.346

Any change or re-organization of the administrative borders of the provinces

was dependent on the confirmation of the Sultan via a fermân.347 The administrative

status of Iraqi provinces changed several times in the nineteenth century. There were

several causes for this administrative change. First of all, the need for political unity

(usûl-i yekcihet ve ittihâd) necessitated the subordination of other Iraqi provinces to

343 BOA, HH. no: 20896. 344 Longrigg, For Centuries, p. 280. 345 Nieuwenhuis, p. 106. 346 Longrigg, For Centuries, p. 280. 347 İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri, pp. 28-29.

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Baghdad.348 As Sluglet pointed out, before the mid-nineteenth century, there was no

particular sense in which the three provinces of Iraq formed geopolitical of economic

unit.349 While Basra looked towards the Guulf and India, Mosul tended to have closer

economic links with Aleppo and Anatolia than with Baghdad. However, this

situation began to change when the imperial center began to penetrate to the Iraqi

provinces and draw them into “what was becoming an increasingly homogenous

imperial system”.350

The multi-ethnic and multi-cultural demographic structure of the region

further strengthened the need for political unity. Since the governor-general in

Baghdad was the supreme ruler of the Ottoman Iraq, any inconveniency in other

Iraqi provinces had been an obstacle for proper administration (emr-i idâreye sekte)

and therefore negated his prestige.351 For example, the recalcitrant attitudes of tribes

in Sinjar and Shahrizor (even if they were not in the constituency of the governor in

Baghdad) were damaging the prestige of governor in Baghdad. Some of the tribal

confederations were dispersed into several provinces of Iraq, which required the

collaboration of the rulers in these provinces. To take an example, the Muntafiq tribal

confederation lived in an area which strected from Basra to Baghdad. As the result of

this, the politics of tribe necessitated the cooperation of rulers in Basra and

348 BOA, İ. MVL, 8892, 3 Za 1268 (19 August 1852). “Şehrizor sancağının Bağdad vâlîliğine merbûtiyetiyle kâffe-i husûsatta tarafına mürâca‘at olunmasını vezîr nezâretinde bulunan mahaller memurlarının tebdîlinde me’zûn olmasını müsted’î Irak ve Hicaz ordu-yu hümâyûnu müşîri devletlu paşa hazretlerinin … istihsâl-i hüsn-i idâre ve mazbûtiyet için usûl-i yekciheti ve ittihâda riâyet eylemeleri vesâyâsıyla…”. 349 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, London: I. B. Tauris, 1990, p. 2. 350 Ibid., p. 3. 351 BOA, İ. MVL, 8892, 3 Za 1268 (19 August 1852). “…Şehrizor sancâğının mukaddemce Bağdad eyâletinden bi’t-tefrîk başkaca idâre olunmakda ise de havâlî-i merkûme ahâlîsinin mizâçları ve mişvârları iktizâsı ve öteden beri görenek olmaması cihetle Bağdadda bulunan vulâtın kesr-i nüfûzlarıyla emr-i idâreye sekte îrâsını mûcib olduğundan livâ-i mezbûrun merbûtiyet-i kadîmesi ibkâ olunarak kâffe-i husûsâtta Bağdad tarafına mürâca‘at olunmasının mahalline iş‘âr buyrulması…”

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Baghdad.352 Moreover, the Iraqi provinces were on the Persian frontier and due to

the border-crossing tribes and disagreements on Ottoman-Persian border the situation

there was very vulnerable and fragile. This flimsy situation required not only

political unity but also military as well.

Besides, in the Ottoman provincial administration there was a tendency that

coveting the revenues of neighboring provinces was an important factor in expanding

the provincial borders. For instance, one of the factors that led Davud Pasha in the

late 1820s to try to expand his rule in Jalili Mosul was his eagerness to seize Mosul’s

annual revenue, which then amounted to 1,000 kese akçe.353 Mosul and Basra were

significant commercial centers and their economic importance played significant role

in their subordination to Baghdad. To give another example, when the Porte’s

intention concerning the dismissal of Davud Pasha became clear, the governors of

Aleppo (Ali Rıza Pasha) and Diyarbakır (Yahya Pasha) were volunteers for the task,

because a successful campaign would bring not only economic gains but also

political prestige. Furthermore, it can also be said that influential pashas were able to

get greater authority in the province. Greater authority meant for the most time either

greater territory to govern or supervision over the neighboring provinces. This was

quite evident in the second half of the nineteenth century, especially during the

governorships of Mehmed Namık Pasha (1851; 1861-1867) and Midhat Pasha (1869-

1872).

As a final point, one should also note that the rebellions and recalcitrant

attitudes of a certain region played significant role in the change of provincial

administrative statuses. For instance, due to the Rewanduz rebellion in 1833, the

Sublime Porte, for the first time since the seventeenth century, appointed a governor

352 BOA, İ. DAH, 13740, 29 R 1267 (3 March 1851). 353 Al-Bustanî, p. 74.

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(İncebayraktar Mehmed Pasha) to Shahrizor.354 It is crystal clear that in so doing, the

Sublime Porte aimed to make the local people to feel the existence of the state more

closely and to suppress any further insurgence. It was again upon this upheaval that

Mardin was detached from Mosul and attached to Diyarbakır. The re-organization of

provincial administrative statuses occurred mostly without problems. However,

occasionally, especially when a certain (tribal) territory was divided among different

provinces, it resulted in great disturbance, as in the case of Bedirhan revolt in

1847.355 The Sublime Porte responded to the revolt by establishing in 1847 a new

province, Kurdistan eyâleti, which retained its status as a separate province until

1867.356 Similarly, upon recalcitrant attitudes of Kurdish Nuri Bey, Hakkari was

made a separate province.357

* * *

Since Baghdad was the center of the region, in the appointments of governors

to neighboring provinces (especially Mosul, Shahrizor and Basra) the opinion of the

governor in Baghdad was taken into consideration. These provinces were subordinate

to Baghdad governorship.358 Uzunçarşılı refers to an imperial decree dated

1112/1700-1701 (Mühimme Defteri, 111, s. 563) by which the Sublime Porte put

Beylerbeyis of Diyarbakır, Şehrizor, Mosul and mutasarrıfs of some sancaks under

the command of governor in Baghdad, when help is needed (especially against the

354 BOA, HH. No: 22346. 355 See previous chapter. 356 See Mehmet Alagöz, Old Habits Die Hard: Bedirhan Rebellion against the Implementation of the Tanzimat, MA Thesis in History, Boğaziçi University, 2004. 357 Ahmed Lutfi Efendi, Lutfi Tarihi, vol: 6-7-8, p. 1269; Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 196. 358 Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 4/1, p. 4; BOA, Mühimme Defteri, No: 111, s. 563.

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tribal rebellions). Furthermore, many archival documents confirm this hierarchical

situation among Iraqi provinces.359

During the nineteenth century these cities were sometimes separate provinces

and sometimes sub-provinces tied to Baghdad. However, even when they were

separate provinces, they were de facto under the influence of Baghdad governorship.

For instance, during the times in which Mosul was a separate eyâlet, its governors

were seeking the political support of the governor-general of Baghdad. To give an

example, in 1825 the people of Mosul sent their complaint petitions (about the

governor in Mosul) not to the Sublime Porte, but to the governor-general in

Baghdad.360 There are also cases in which the governor of Mosul was dismissed or

appointed with the advice of governor-general in Baghdad.361 In fact, if we exclude

Shahrizor, the relations between Mosul, Baghdad and Basra had been very special. In

terms of the interactions, Mosul-Baghdad, and Baghdad-Basra were dyad cities

among themselves. The commercial activities between Mosul and Baghdad, and

Baghdad and Basra confirm these dyadic relations. However, Baghdad kept its

central position among these triad cities.362

One exception to the pivotal role of Baghdad occurred during the Ali Rıza

Pasha’s military campaign to end the Mamluk rule in 1831. Before his movement Ali

Rıza Pasha asked the Sublime Porte to tie Baghdad, at least temporarily, to his own

governorship, namely Aleppo. The Porte found this proposal appropriate and

359 For example see BOA, İ. MVL, 19487, dâhiliye lef 1, gurre-i Ca 1277 (15 November 1860). “… Şehrizor ve Musul ve Sulaimaniyah sancaklarına dahi Bağdadın merkez ittihaz olunması cihetiyle…”. 360 Al-Bustanî, p. 222. For the text of petition see BOA, HH. No: 47937-F. 361 For the dismissal of Mehmed Said Pasha and appointment of İnce Bayraktar Mehmed Pasha in 1834 see Al-Bustanî, p. 229. 362 See Bruce Stanley, “Black Holes, Dead-Ends, Edges and Hubes: Network Characteristics of Middle East City-Systems”, paper presented at Cities in the Middle East: History, Representation and Politics, International Workshop, 6-7 January 2004, Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel, p. 9.

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Baghdad was tied to Aleppo during the military campaign.363 However, it is quite

evident that this incident was not permanent and it did not negate Baghdad’s pivotal

position in the region. And it is also known that after the military campaign Baghdad

did not remain tied to Aleppo; on the contrary, Ali Rıza Pasha became the governor

of Baghdad (1831-1842).

The frequent change in the administrative status of the sancaks and eyâlets in

Iraq make it necessary to concentrate on this issue with a greater focus, because there

is considerable ambiguity on the dates when the sancaks became a separate eyâlet or

when they were subordinated to Baghdad. There are many contradicting data in the

secondary sources. That terms such as eyâlet and vilâyet could sometimes refer to a

specific geography, rather than to a particular administrative unit, was a misleading

factor for the researchers. Hence, the administrative divisions of Ottoman Iraq need

special emphasis in the context of the process that paved the way for the application

of the provincial Law of 1864 in Baghdad. In order to grasp the factors that led to the

changes in the provincial administrative statuses in Ottoman Iraq, it would be better

to look at them separately.

Mosul

As far as Mosul is concerned, we know that the city, which covered the area from

Mardin in the north to Tikrit in the south364, had long been a separate eyâlet of the

empire. At least until the overthrow of the Jalili dynasty in 1834, Mosul kept its

363 BOA, HH. No: 20743. Aleppo was detached from the province of Baghdad in 1833, see Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 26. 364 Before 1831 Mardin was subordinated to Baghdad. In 1835 it was detached from Baghdad and became dependent to Diyarbakır. And in mid 1840s, Mardin was dependent to the province of Mosul as a sub-province. BOA, Mühimme Defteri, no: 256, p. 18.

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status as a province.365 As Nieuwenhuis noted, due to its southeastern trade, Mosul

had always been dependent on the good relations of Baghdad.366 However, in the late

eighteenth and early nineteenth century Mosul began to lose its position in the region

in favor of Baghdad and during the Mamluk rule in Baghdad it maintained its role as

a counter-force against Baghdad.

At the very beginning of the period under survey Mosul was a separate

province and it kept its status until at least 1834.367 However, in many research

Mosul’s administrative status between 1834-1846 is not very clear. Birken for

instance could not determine the administrative status of the city and argued that at

least from 1846 Mosul was a separate province.368 This ambiguity is very much

related to the chaotic conjuncture of the period, which corresponds to the aftermath

of the overthrow of Jalili dynasty.

In 1834, with the recommendation of Ali Rıza Pasha of Baghdad, Mehmed

Said Pasha was replaced with İnce Bayraktar Mehmed Pasha.369 Many sources refer

to İnce Bayraktar Mehmet Pasha’s appointment as Ali Rıza Pasha’s own initiative;

therefore interpret this as Mosul’s administratice subordination to Baghdad.

However, the appointment of a provincial governor by another governor does not

seem logical. This should be interpreted as the recommendation or -in its own

terminology- as an inhâ to the Sublime Porte by Ali Rıza Pasha. Although Ali Rıza

365 Andreas Birken, Die Provinzen des Osmanischen Reiches, Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1976, p. 226. 366 Nieuwenhuis, pp. 104-105. Despite Mosul’s role as a counter-force against Mamluk expansion, its enclosure by the dominant Mamluks often prevented the Jalilis from taking a strong stand against Baghdad. 367 Fazıla Akbal, 1831 Tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İdari Taksimat ve Nüfus”, Belleten, No: 60 (November 1951), p. 627; 368 Birken, p. 203. 369 BOA., HH. No: 20781, 20782 and 20782-A, 5 Ş 1249 (18 December 1833).

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Pasha’s notification for this appointment is important, this is not sufficient to

invalidate Mosul’s administrative status as a separate province; rather it was in fact

the reflection of the authority of the governor in Baghdad over the neighboring

provinces, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The ambiguity in the

secondary sources should actually be filled with the data in Ottoman archival

documents. The archival sources for the period between 1834 and 1850 continue to

mention Mosul as eyâlet (province), and its rulers as vali (governor), which removes

the ambiguity on Mosul’s separate administrative position for the stated period.370

Mosul lost its status as a province in 1850 and became a sancak

(mutasarrıflık) connected to Baghdad.371 As Baghdad came to the forefront with its

geo-political role as a military base against Iran, the balance between Baghdad and

other Iraqi provinces further changed.372 With the establishment of the Sixth Army in

Baghdad in 1847, Baghdad stiffened its central role in the region, and not long after

this, Mosul became a sancak of Baghdad in 1850.

For a short period, Mosul was under the control of governor of Hakkari

province. It is not clear when and how long Mosul remained subordinated to

Hakkari. The archival documents indicate that the issue of whether Mosul should be

governed from Hakkari, Shahrizor or Baghdad was a matter of discussion among the

governors of the region. The creation of Hakkari province in 1849 led to the

contraction of the territories that was formerly within the Mosul province. Then in

1851 Mosul was made a (sub-province) mutasarrıflık tied to Hakkari, but its former

relations/communications with Baghdad were kept unchanged (muhâberece Bağdad 370 For several examples see, BOA, İ. DAH. No: 49, 1269, 2374, 4030, 4604, 5311, 10504, 10847 and İ. MVL. 2981. For the appointment of Mazhar Pasha (who replaced Kamil Pasha) as governor of Mosul in 1850, see BOA, İ. DAH, 12575, 23 Receb 1266 (4 June 1850). 371 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 280. 372 Nieuwenhuis, p. 106.

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ile olan mu‘âmele ve münâsebeti devâm etmek üzere). The Sublime Porte thought

that this arrangement would ease the affairs in the region.373 Accordingly, Mehmed

Hilmi Pasha, with a salary of 20,000 kuruş, became the ruler of the Mosul

mutasarrıflığı.374

However, this arrangement did not bring fruits. The issue was further

discussed in Meclis-i Vâlâ, and the Sublime Porte asked the opinions of governor of

Baghdad and müşir (field Marshal) of the Sixth Army. The reports confirmed the

good administration of Mehmed Hilmi Pasha, and the administrative and financial

affairs were left to him as before. However, a new territorial arrangement was made

and it was concluded in 1268/1852 that the eastern and the mountainous parts of

Mosul (Davudiyah, Akra, Dahok, Zaho, Zibar and Aşâyir-i Arba‘a) were tied to

Hakkari province, but the western and the desert parts were to be governed in

collaboration with the governors in Shahrizor and Baghdad.375 Form the perspective

of Mehmet Namık Pasha, then the governor of Baghdad, the need of this re-

organization was clear: Since Hakkari was a frontier province; it was quite difficult

for the governor of Hakkari (Reşid Pasha) to reach Mosul and rule over the whole

province at the same time. Moreover, the communication between Mosul and

Shahrizor was easier than that of Mosul and Hakkari, because the former two were

373 BOA, A. DVN. 68/84 (27 B 1267/28.05.1851). 374 BOA, A. MKT. NZD. 33/66 (2 B 1267/03.05.1851) ve 34/17 (11 B 1267/12.05.1851). 375 BOA, İ. DAH. 15458, 5 Ca 1268 (26 February 1852). “…Hakkari Eyâleti hudûd-ı İraniyede vâki‘ nazik mahal olup vâlîsi devletlu Reşid Paşa hazretlerinin Musul’a gönderildiği hâlde dâire-i me’mûriyetinin bir ucunda bulanarak sâir mahallerine lâyıkıyla bakılamayıp başkaca bir vezîre ihâlesi dahi heyet ve vâridât-ı hâliyesi ona mütehammil olacağından Musul’un cihet-i şarkı ve cebelîsinde vâki‘ Davudiye ve Akra ve Dahuk ve Zaho kazâlarıyla Zibâr ve Aşâyir-i erbaa ıtlâk olunan tavâifin Hakkari eyâletine ve cânib-i gaibisinde ve çöl tarafında kâin Musul karyeleri ve Tel‘afer ve Sincan kazâlarıyla sâir sahrâ-neşînân olan aşâyirin Şehrizor ve Bağdata şiddet-i irtibât ve münâsebetleri olduğundan Musul eyâletinin umûr-ı mâliye ve mülkiyesi kemâ-kân ibkâ olunarak şark tarafınca müşârun ileyh Reşid Paşa hazretlerine ve garb ve çöl câniblerince Şehrizor vâlîsi devletlu paşa hazretleriyle kendisine bi’l-mürâca‘at icrâsı suhûlet-i idâre ve inzıbâtı müstelzim olacağı irâd ve ihtâr olunmuş olup…”. Also see BOA, A. MKT. UM. 99/100 (3 Ş 1268/23.05.1852) ve 118/23 (8 Ra 1269/20.12.1852).

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using the same postal roads.376 The governors in the region were informed about

these re-arrangements.377 However, this arrangement did not last long too. When

Shahrizor was tied to Baghdad in 1272/1856, the southern Mosul became a part of

Baghdad province. In short, territorially Mosul was divided into two parts (eastern

and western), but its administrative affairs were collaborated between the provinces

of Hakkari, Shahrizor and Baghdad. Between 1855 and 1861 Mosul was a sub-

province connected to Van province.378 In November 1861, Mosul was put under the

control of Mehmed Namık Pasha, the governor-general of Baghdad, in the status of

kaymakamlık.379

Another contradictory data is given pertaining Mosul’s re-organization as a

separate province in the late 1860s. While some secondary sources peculiarly

mention the creation of Mosul vilâyet in 1867 or 1869-70380, none of the Ottoman

yearbooks from 1283 to 1288 (1867-72) indicate Mosul as a separate province. On

the contrary, according to these yearbooks Mosul remained sub-province attached to

Baghdad. The latter years, in particular, correspond to Midhat Pasha’s governorship

in Baghdad. Midhat Pasha was the governor who implemented the 1864 Provincial

376 BOA, İ. DAH. 15458, 5 Ca 1268 (26 February 1852). 377 BOA, A. MKT. MVL, 53/19 (3 Ş 1268/23.05.1852); A. MKT. NZD, 55/5 (3 Ş 1268/23.05.1852) 378 Devlet Salnamesi 1272, p. 68; According to a study based on Ottoman state yearbooks (salnames), Mosul was mistakenly shown to be a sancak of Van province for ten years between 1272-1282 [1855-56/1865-66]. See Asuman Özgen, 1272H/1855-6 ile 1328H/1910 Yılları Arasında Suriye, Bağdat, Basra, Musul, Beyrut, Hicaz ve Yemen Vilayetlerinin İdari Taksimatı, MA Thesis, University of Niğde, Niğde, 2001, p. 54. However, the archival documents are much clearer at this point. The contradictory data within the state yearbooks should have been due to the fact that these yearbooks are not up-to-date. The changes in the provinces were generally not reflected to the yearbooks on time. 379 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1011, 15 R 1278 (20 October 1861). 380 Özgen, 1272H/1855-56 ile 1328H/1910 Yılları Arasında Suriye, Bağdat, Basra, Musul, Beyrut, Hicaz ve Yemen Vilayetlerinin İdari Taksimatı, p. 54 and V. Minorsky [C. E. Bosworth], “Shahrazur”, El2. No other sources mention about the creation of a separate Mosul vilâyet during these years. It is also interesting that the “Mosul” article in El2 gives the date of 1879 for the formation of Mosul as a separate province, but it does not mention about the re-organization of the late 1860s that is mentioned in “Shahrazur” article.

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Law in Baghdad province in 1870. According to his re-organization of Baghdad

province, Mosul was not a separate province, but still a sub-province tied to

Baghdad. It was only after 1879 that Mosul gained its former status as a separate

province381 and remained so until the First World War

Shahrizor (Kirkuk)

When compared to Mosul, Shahrizor’s administrative status was less complex. After

1779 Shahrizor was within the sphere of influence of Mamluks in Baghdad. At the

beginning of the 1840s, as the result of Tanzimat reforms on provincial

administration it lost its eyâlet status and became a sancak of Baghdad.382 In

1266/1850 it became an independent eyâlet. That Baghdad was far from Shahrizor

and the neighbouring districts and that the governorship of Baghdad could not look

after the region properly played significant role. Formerly, Yusuf Ziya Pasha,

governor-general and the commander of the East armies (serasker-i şark), who was

commissioned to prepare a report on the general situation of the region, also stated

that Shahrizor should be ruled separately from Baghdad. The report of the Mehmed

Namık, then commander (müşîr) of the Hijaz and Iraq Army, stressed the same issue

and Shahrizor became a province in 1266/1850.383 Accordingly, it encompassed the

sub-provinces of Sulaimaniyah, Köy, Harir, Rewandüz, Erbil and Kirkuk, the latter

381 Musul-Kerkükle İlgili Ar şiv Belgeleri, 1525-1919, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993, p.4. Some sources give the date as 1879. See E. Honigmann [C. E. Bosworth], “al-Mawsil“, El2. 382 Birken, p. 206. 383 BOA, İ. DAH. 12777, (dahiliye lef 3), 23 C 1266 (6 May 1850). “…Ve Bağdadın ise buralara bu‘diyet mesâfede bulunması cihetle şimdiye kadar Bağdad cânibinden bihakkın bakılamadığı misillü hasbe’l-bu‘diye bundan böyle dahi hakkıyla bakılamayacağına mebnî elviye-i muharrere [Köy ve Harîr ve Revandüz ve Kerkük ve Erbil sancakları] birleştirilerek Bağdad’dan bi’l-ifrâz sâbıkâsı vechle Şehrizor eyâleti nâmıyla müstakil bir eyâlet ittihâz olunmak ve Kerkük kasabası re’s-i eyâlet tahsîs birle vüzerâ-yı izâm-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeden bir zâta ve mâliyesi dahi defterdârlık ünvânı yâhud maâş husûsunda ehveniyet husûliçün mâl müdürlüğü nâmıyla bir bendelerine tevcîh buyrulmak…”

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being headquarter of the province. It should also be noted that this change was very

much related to the destruction of the Baban Emirate and the establishment of

Ottoman control in the region, because Sulaimaniyah was the center of the emirate.

Ferik Ali (Rıza) Pasha, who was governor of Vidin, was summoned to

Istanbul and appointed as governor of Shahrizor.384 However, shortly after he was

taken back to Vidin and Mehmed Selim Pasha replaced him in Shahrizor.385 Until

Selim Pasha’s arrival to Shahrizor the commander of the Hijaz and Irak Army acted

as deputy governor.386

In 1852 (Gözlüklü) Reşid Pasha asked the Sublime Porte to subordinate

Shahrizor to Baghdad, but his demand was not responded positively.387 Though

Shahrizor kept its status as a separate province in 1852, its governor was ordered to

cooperate with Baghdad, and stressed the need for following a unified polity. In its

reply the Sublime Porte emphasized Ali Pasha’s (then governor of Shahrizor) efforts

and good governance. Moreover, it stressed that despite the recent improvement,

Baghdad’s welfare was not in the desired level and the question of Shahrizor’s

subordination to Baghdad should wait for some more time.388 So, it seems clear that

384 BOA, İ. DAH. 12806, 27 N 1266 (6 August 1850). 385 Ali Rıza Pasha’s re-appointment to Vidin was due to the dismissal of Ziya Pasha, governor of Vidin. Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, Tarih, vol. 9, p. 34. 386 BOA, İ. DAH. 13320, 21 m 1267 (26 November 1850). 387 BOA, İ. MVL. 8892, 20 Za 1268. (5 September 1852) 388 BOA, İ. MMAH. 209, 6 S 1272 / 18 October 1855. “…Bağdatın ahvâl-i hâzırası Reşid Paşa hazretlerinin vusûlünden evvelki hâle nisbetle hayli farklı ise de idâre-i matlûbeye henüz hâsıl olamadığından zaten pek vâsi‘ ve vâlîsinin leyl ü nehâr her tarafında eser-i dirâyet ve ikdâmını hissettirmesine muhtâç bulunan ve yoluna girmesi küllî tedâbir-i mütemâdiyeye mevkûf olan bir eyâleti şu hâlde iken bir kat daha tevsî‘ etmek teksîr-i …… mahalle iki tarafın dahi işini bozmak demek olacağından ve Şehrizor vâlîsi bulunan devletlü Ali Paşa hazretleri gayret ve ehliyetli vüzerâ-yı izâmdan olarak sâye-i meal-vâye-i hazret-i mulûkânede orasını güzelce idâre etmekte bulunduğundan Bağdatın matlûb olan hüsn-i idâresi takarrur etmeksizin işbu ilhak hususunun maslahaten ve mülken fâideli bir şey olacağı akıllar kesdiremediği …”

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in issues like enlargement of provincial territories, the priority was given to the

smooth functioning of the local affairs and provincial stability.

Between 1850 and late 1855 Shahrizor remained an independent eyâlet, but

then it became a sancak connected to Baghdad389. Towards the end of 1861

Shahrizor (along with Mosul and Basra) were relagated to the status of kaymakamlık

connected to Baghdad under the governorship of Namık Pasha.390 And during the

implementation of Provincial Law in Baghdad in 1869, Shahrizor kept its status as

sancak under Baghdad governorship. Finally, in 1879, with the creation of Mosul

vilâyet, it was detached from Baghdad and became a sancak of Mosul. However,

even when it was a separate eyâlet, Shahrizor was considered to be part of Ottoman

Iraq (hıtta-i Irakiyyenin bir kıt‘a-i müfrezesi).391 It should also be noted that the terms

used by the archival documents when referring to Shahrizor might be considered to

be confusing, because sometimes these documents refer to the city as eyâlet, though

it was not. As noted earlier, these cases should be interpreted in such a way that

sometimes terms like eyâlet and vilâyet were used for a specific geography rather

than an administrative unity.

389 BOA, İ. DAH. 21500, 17 M 1272 (29 September 1855). “Merbûtiyet-i kadîme ve münâsebet-i mevki‘iyesi cihetiyle Şehrizor eyâletinin kemâ-fi’s-sâbık Bağdad eyâletine ilhâkıyla …”. The relegation from eyâlet to mutasarrıflık was also reflected to the salaries in Shahrizor, see BOA, İ. MMAH. 320, 13 S 1273 (13 October 1856). “… Şehrizor vâliliğinin kırk bin kuruş şehriye ile mutasarrıflığa tahvîl olunması cihetiyle …”. 390 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1011, 15 R 1278 (7 Şubat 1862); A.MKT.NZD 376/62, 1 Ca 1278 (4 November 1861); A.MKT.UM 515/76, 8 Ca 1278 (11 Novermber 1861). 391 BOA, AMKT. UM, 38/60, 6 M 1267 (11 November 1850).

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Basra

From 1704 until the end of the Mamluk rule in 1831, Basra had been dependent to

Baghdad and for long years it did not have even the status of a sancak392. However,

in times of troubles and political vacuum, the local rulers of Basra rebelled against

the governor-general in Baghdad. This was the case in 1749 when the governor-

general of Baghdad, Ahmed Pasha died, Süleyman Pasha, then the governor of

Basra, wanted to benefit from the political vacuum and fought overtly against the

new governor of Baghdad. As the Ottoman administration had no choice other than

recognizing the governorship of Süleyman Pasha, he came to rule over Baghdad and

Basra together. And the situation lasted during the whole Mamluk rule in the

eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Birken argued that at about early 1830s

Basra became from time to time a province again.393 This might have resulted from

the fact that these years correspond to the period in which the Ottoman Sultan,

Mahmud II (1808-1839), decisively ended the local rules of Mamluks in Baghdad,

the Jalîlîs in Mosul and the Kurdish emirates in north Iraq. Therefore, there was no

political stability in the region, and in the mean time, Basra benefiting from the

situation, might have acted as a separate province.

In 1267/1850 Basra became a separate province. Although the reasons for

Basra’s conversion into a separate province are not clear, the archival documents

refer to Basra as an eyâlet.394 It is also interesting that despite Basra’s separate

position as eyâlet, the mutasarrıf (sub-governor) continued to dominate the politics.

In the archival documents, rulers of Basra were referred as muttasarrıf-ı eyâlet-i 392 Birken, p. 226. 393 This data is also confirmed by British archives, see PRO, FO 195/113 No: 26 16 April 1832; No: 56 27 July 1832, No: 65 29 July 1833; No: 67 5 September 1833. 394 For instance see BOA, İ. MVL, 5500, 22 Za 1266 (29 September 1850), “…Basra eyâletinin idâre-i hâzırası ve teferruatına dâir…”.

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Basra.395 Maşuk Pasha, Tufan Pasha, İsmail Pasha, Veysi Pasha, Raşid Pasha,

Mehmed Ali Pasha and Münib Pasha were the foremost mutasarrıfs in the 1850s.

Furthermore, the governor-general in Baghdad continued to be the chief responsible

official about the politics in Basra.396 Basra kept its provincial status until 1861,

when it was connected again to Baghdad in the status of kaymakamlık.

In late 1850s and early 1860s almost all of the Iraqi provinces experienced changes

in their borders. This is very much related to the Sublime Porte’s new arrangements

concerning provincial administration (which will be discussed below) and the

personalities of the governor-general in Baghdad. In the 1860s Mehmed Namık

Pasha’s strong personality enabled him to gain the confidence of the Sublime Porte

and therefore he was given greater authorities. As a corollary of this he came to be in

charge of the whole hıtta-i Irakiyye.

In its largest boundary, the sub-province of Basra included Kuwait and Al-

Ahsa in Najd. In 1871, thanks to Midhat Pasha’s personal efforts, Kuwait became a

kazâ/kaymakamlık connected to Basra. Normally Kuwait had been a district

dependent on Basra; however, due to administrative ignorance its control passed to

the hands of local sheikhs.397 The need for the re-assertion of Ottoman authority in

Kuwait had for long times been stressed by the Ottoman officials in Basra; however,

the insufficiency of the Sixth Army in terms of the number of soldiers prevented any

395 BOA, İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268 (3 May 1852). 396 “…ol havâlînin [Basra’nın] emr u idâresinden vâlî-i müşârun ileyh [Reşid Pasha, then governor-general in Baghdad] hazretleri mes’ûl bulunarak…” (emphasis added), BOA, İ. DAH, 23612, 22 S 1273 (22 October 1856). 397 … mahall-i mezkûrun [Kuwait] memâlik-i mahrûse-i hazret-i pâdişâhîden ve Basra merbûtâtından olduğu hâlde biraz vakitden beri Basra tarafından idâresine lâyıkıyla i‘tinâ olunamadığundan usûl-i idâre ve zâbıtası mahallî meşâyihi yedinde kalmış olup… See Zewra, No: 35.

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military campaign to Kuwait.398 Among the local sheiks Abdullah Al-Sabah was

given in 1871 an Ottoman flag to fly from his residence in order to affirm Kuwait’s

ties to the Ottoman central administration.399 Midhat Pasha did not stop with the

establishment of Ottoman sovereignty in Kuwait; he further extended the

governmental reforms in Najd region, especially in Al-Ahsa.400

As Basra grew territorially, new administrative arrangements became

inevitable. The formation of Basra as a separate province in the last quarter of the

nineteenth century was very much related to the international and regional

developments too. Changes in the geo-politics of the region enabled Basra to come to

the forefront as a port city. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the

importance of river transport decreased and Basra increased its strategic importance

in comparison with Mosul and Baghdad. Basra’s unique feature of being the only port

city of Ottoman Iraq, the improving commercial activities in the Indian Ocean, and its

proximity to Kuwait and al-Ahsa played significant role in its being a separate

province in 1875.401 During these years, Basra included Muntafiq, Kuwait, Al-Ahsa

and Najd. These developments also changed the hierarchy among the Iraqi provinces

in favor of Basra. Although Basra was relegated again to the status of sub-province

398 “Basra eyâletine merbût Kuveyt nâm mahallin kabza-i tasarrufa alınması için ordu-yı hümâyûn-ı mezkûrdan bir alayın irsâli eyâlet-i merkûme mutasarrıfı sa‘âdetli Maşuk Paşa bendeleri cânibinden geçende bazı husûsât-ı sâire ile ma‘an iş‘âr olunmuş … fakat ordu-yı hümâyân-ı mezkûr alaylarının ziyâdece noksân olmasında dolayı talep olunan alayın irsâli mümkün olamayacağı…”, BOA, İ. MVL. 6295, 28 Ra 1267 (31 January 1851). 399 Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, p. 22. Anscombe also states that Midhat Pasha proposed 100 gendarmeries (zabtiye) to be stationed in Kuwait as a symbol of authority. But the gendarmeries were never assigned to Kuwait. Furthermore, Muhammed bin Abdullah El-Adesânî was appointed as local judge, naib; and Midhat Pasha gave imperial document, berât-ı şerîf, to the leaders (imams) of 5 Friday mosques. See Zewra, No: 35. 400 For the advent of Provincial Law of 1864 in al-Ahsa see next chapter. 401 For the modernization of Basra during the nineteenth century, see Ortaylı, “The Port Cities”, pp. 221-232.

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connected to Baghdad for 4 years between 1880 and 1884, it remained as a separate

province until the disintegration of the empire in 1918.402

Restricting and Restoring the Authorities of the Provincial Governors

In the pre-Tanzimat era, many provinces were ruled by governors who considered his

post not as something entrusted to him in order to achive a special task, but as a

personal asset. This view, which Gerber identifies as “atomization of Ottoman

provincial administration” continued until mid-nineteenth century.403 Furthermore,

rulers in the pre-Tanzimat period tried to augment their power and authonomy, rather

than to seek promotion by way of receiving a more important position in another

province.404 Such an expection of promotion would be unthinkable for Davut Pasha,

Ali Rıza Pasha and even to some extent Necip Pasha; however, when we compare

these rulers with governors like Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha the

latters had a more modernized bureaucratic perception.

Since Baghdad was one of the most significant provinces of the empire, its

governors had been selected from among high-ranking officials. This policy was

followed for the whole Ottoman rule in Baghdad. As the number of the viziers

increased in Ottoman central bureaucracy in the late sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, the provincial governorships, such as that of Baghdad, Damascus and

Egypt were given to viziers.405 However, as it was mentioned above, during the

402 However, towards the end of the nineteenth century when Britain made her first attempts to rule Kuwait, Sheikh Muhammed Ibn Sabah recognized British protectorate. See Ibid., pp. 230-1. 403 Haim Gerber, “A New Look at the Tanzimat: The case of the Province of Jerusalem”, in David Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986, p. 35. 404 Ibid., p. 36. 405 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, p. 293.

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Mamluk period in Baghdad Ottoman central administration was almost ineffective in

the appointments of governors to Baghdad. Although the Sublime Porte re-asserted

its control by Ali Rıza Pasha, who put an end to Mamluk rule in Baghdad in 1831,

the consolidation of provincial affairs took at least two decades.

The governors in Baghdad had considerable authorities, but the

implementation of the Tanzimat in the provinces meant a contraction in the

authorities of the governors. The Tanzimat policies pertaining to the administrative

structure were aimed at reducing the great authority of the provincial governors. The

limitation on the formerly autocratic powers of the provincial governors was

accomplished by subdividing the provinces into subordinate units of authority, which

were made autonomous of the governors and dependent directly on the central

government and its agents, in varying degrees at different times during the nineteenth

century.406 The lower official in the provincial hierarchy had also a direct

responsibility to the central government, independent of his immediate superiors.

With Tanzimat not only the provinces became smaller, but also the central

government aimed to prevent the provincial rulers to become too strong and

independent. Only matters of security were to remain in their hands, and the financial

affairs in the provinces were left to muhassıl-ı emvâl, who had wide-ranging power

and was only accountable to ministry of finance in İstanbul.407 These policies aimed

to strengthen the central administration and to tie the provincial governor to the

center more strictly.

The Sublime Porte vested great authority to muhassıls. The muhassıls were

sent to sancaks where Tanzimat reforms were applied. In the sancaks, which was the

406 Shaw, p. 58. 407 İnalcık, Application of the Tanzimat, p.5.

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basic administrative unit of the eyâlet system, the muhassıls administratively

replaced the mütesellims. Therefore, in the sub-provinces they were in charge of not

only administrative but also financial affairs. They were also accompanied by several

scribes from İstanbul so as to survey the population, land and property. Shaw argued

that the establishment of muhassıl collectors in control of finances of the districts

was the basic criterion of the provincial reform and where this actually had taken

place, the Tanzimat was considered to be in force.408 However, Baghdad was not

among the provinces to which a muhassıl was appointed, as the Tanzimat reforms

were inaugurated only with the governorship of Necip Pasha.409 Baghdad was not

among the places where the muhassıllık was instituted.410 Therefore, unlike the case

in many provinces, the governor of Baghdad was not restrained in the financial

affairs of the province. Nevertheless, the Tanzimat Edict curbed the great authority of

the governor in Baghdad, as elsewhere.

The centralist policies of Tanzimat resulted soon in an unbearable

bureaucracy. The provincial governors were to seek the approval of the Sublime

Porte even in small and unimportant affairs and needless to say this situation

paralyzed the provincial affairs. Hence, the authorities and powers of the provincial

rulers were broadened with an imperial fermân dated 1852.411 This fermân gave the

governor more power over his subordinate officials and over the political

subdivisions of the province. The governor was now empowered to appoint and

408 Shaw, p. 59. 409 Neccar, p. 38. 410 For a list of muhassıllıks see Coşkun Çakır, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Maliyesi, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001, pp. 239-247. None of the Arab provinces of the empire was cited in the list of muhassıllıks. 411 Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 1963, p. 137.

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dismiss any subordinate civil officials within his jurisdiction. Accordingly, defterdâr,

mal müdürü, members of the councils, kaymakams and müdirs were put under the

command of the provincial governor. As Ma’oz pointed out, with this fermân the

provincial governor was entitled to inspect the financial accounts and to nominate or

remove members of the council.412 This fermân sought to provide the unity of

authority in the province. The powers of provincial governors were further increased

with a decree in 1858. The governor was re-instituted as the viceroy (saltanat vekili),

in other words, the local representative of all competent offices of the central

government in the province. The new regulation gave the governor further

responsibility for the hierarchy of provincial officials below him.413 Parallel to this

development, the small-size eyâlets and neighboring sancaks were united under

greater eyâlets.

As far as the reflections of aforementioned arrangements on provincial

administration in Baghdad were considered, it can be said that it was only with the

re-institution of provincial authorities of the governors in the 1850s that governors

like Mehmed Reşid Pasha, Mehmed Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha ruled over the

far-flung hıtta-i Irakiyye with great powers. When we consider the eleven different

governors (one governor ruling twice) who served in Baghdad between 1831 and

1872, those who served after the 1850s came to the forefront in that they had more

influence and imprint in the history of Baghdad. The greatness of these governors

lies in their holding of greater authorities and powers (ruhsat-ı kâmile ve me’zûniyet-i

412 Ma’oz, p. 36. 413 Ibid., p. 137; also Bilal Eryılmaz, Tanzimat ve Yönetimde Modernleşme, İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1992, pp. 194-195.

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şâmile). These governors had greater authorities in dismissing provincial officials in

case of corruption and misdeeds.414

As Ma’oz rightly argued the measure of authority the governor could exercise

in his jurisdiction depended mainly on his personality, his intimacy and relations

with the inner circles of the Sublime Porte, and the degree of support he possessed in

Istanbul. A resolute and energetic Pasha with a strong backing in the Sublime Porte

was in a position to counterbalance his opponents, to make them co-operate with

him, or even to overshadow them.415

However, the 1852 and 1858 regulations, which certainly increased the

decentralist tendencies, were sometimes abused by provincial governors in chaotic

times. As Davison noted, Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad (1857-58)

bears instructive illustrations in this sense. Ömer Lütfi Pasha, after commanding the

Ottoman armies in the Crimean War, was appointed to Baghdad, but he had trouble

with corrupt subordinates. Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s tax policy caused tribal revolt, which

led him to arbitrary actions.416 The execution of seven rebellious tribesmen without

trial and without order from the Sublime Porte paved the way for his dismissal from

office. Such arbitrary actions were seriously contradictory to Tanzimat principles and

considered to be intolerable.

414 “… ruhsat-ı kâmile bahsine gelince fi’l-hakîka Bağdadın bu‘diyeti cihetiyle vâlîsi bulunan zâtın dâhil-i eyâlette istihdâm olunan me’mûrînin töhmet ve yolsuz bir hareketi vukû‘unda azl ve tebdîl ile keyfiyeti bu tarafa iş‘âr ve istîzân etmeğe me’zûn bulunması hükûmet ve zâbıtânın kuvvetine medâr olur tedâbirden olarak bu me’zûniyet ise nizâmât-ı mevzû‘a iktizâsınca kâffe-i vülât-ı izâma verilmiş şey olduğundan onun te’kîdi ve cünha-i sahîhası tebeyyün eden me’mûrînin hemen azliyle keyfiyetlerinin bu tarafa inhâsı husûsunun tekrârıyla iktifâ olunarak bundan daha ziyâdesi kavâid-i mer‘iyye-i hükûmete tevâfuk edemeyeceğinden…”, BOA, I. MMAH. 209, 6 S 1272 (18 October 1855). 415 Ma’oz, p. 37. 416 Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, p. 137.

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Rulers of Provincial Periphery: Governor-Generals of Baghdad

(Laz) Ali Rıza Pasha’s term of office (1831-42) is very significant in terms of the re-

assertion of Ottoman direct rule and the overall control of the province. For this end,

the Pasha had to struggle with the leading tribes of the Iraq, among them we can

mention the Muntafiq, Ka‘b, and Shammar. Perhaps it is for this reason that he is

sometimes referred as the “cruel” pasha.417 The struggles with Ka‘b in the south

(Muhammarah) and Kurdish emirates in the northeast led to border disputes with

Iran. Ali Rıza Pasha owed much of his fame to his destruction of Mamluk rule in

Baghdad and some branches of Kurdish emirates. Hence, he is considered to be a

successful military commander. Upon Muhammed Ali’s advance at the expense of

imperial forces, Jeddah was additionally tied to his command, but this was a

temporary and conjunctural task.418

Moreover, since there was almost no co-ordination and dialogue among the

Iraqi provinces before Ali Rıza Pasha’s governorship, one of his primary objects was

to remedy this problem. Therefore, he tried to strengthen Baghdad’s pivotal role by

appointing mütesellims to the neighboring sub-provinces, but his attempts were not

very fruitful.419 Perhaps his only administrative success was the creation of advisory

councils in Baghdad, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

As Ali Rıza Pasha consolidated his position in the province, there appeared a

relaxation in the provincial administration. The pasha married to Selma Hatun,

daughter of Süleyman the Little, former Mamluk governor. His success in his early

417 Mehmet Hurşid Paşa, pp. 90-91. 418 Reşat Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat, Ankara: TTK, 1991, p.339 and 355. 419 Al-Bustanî, p. 375.

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years did not continue in his later years. On the one hand, the soldiers were no longer

disciplined, and their salaries were not paid for more than 10-15 months.420 On the

other hand, his financial measures, especially concerning the coins in the province,

were not successful. Let alone improving the provincial treasury, it further

deteriorated and the pasha is often criticized for his nepotism and corruption. Despite

the fact that he was the governor-general with the longest term of office, he is

perceived to be an unsuccessful ruler. Neccar argues that Ali Rıza Pasha is

remembered as making more damages to Baghdad than the Mamluks.421

Consequently, the allegations of corruption made the Sublime Porte to exchange him

with Necip Pasha of Damascus in 1842.422

Necip Pasha’s appointment to Baghdad was welcomed with great joy,

because, as Ali Rıza Pasha ruled 11 years, the local people had begun to think that

Baghdad was given to Ali Rıza Pasha for his lifetime in return for his successful

campaign against the Mamluks. Besides, pasha’s men, especially Molla Ali el-Hassı,

Es‘ad bin Nâib, Ali Agha El-Yesirci? (tüfenkci başı ve cürüm ağası), and Abdülkadir

Agha (customer officer) and were notorious for their oppression and cruelty.

Therefore, Necip Pasha was regarded as “a light of justice upon the people of

Baghdad”.423

Necip Pasha was of kalemiyye origin and his appointment to Baghdad was

interpreted as an indicator of İstanbul’s closer interest given to the province, because

the pasha belonged to the inner circle of the sultan and had considerable backing in

420 BOA, İ. DAH. 3464, lef 6 and 11, 19 Z 1258 (21 January 1843) and 15 Ş 1258 (21 September 1842) respectively. 421 Neccar, p. 28. 422 BOA, İ. DAH. 2749 and 2958, 24 S 1258 (6 April 1842), 17 R 1258 (28 Mat 1842). 423 Azzawi, Târîh el-Iraq, pp.63-64.

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the capital.424 The first thing that Necip Pasha did was to make an assessment of

provincial situation and investigate the allegations on Ali Rıza Pasha’s deeds. In

order to avoid any disturbance, the Sublime Porte decided to start the investigation

after Ali Rıza Pasha’s appointment to Damascus. Upset by his removal to Damascus

and the developments in Baghdad, Ali Rıza Pasha provoked the local people in

writing petitions in his favor, but such attempts did not alter the Sublime Porte’s

decision.425

Although Necip Pasha had very intimate relations with the inner circles of the

sultan, his conservative and anti-Tanzimat leanings were considered to be a cause for

his removal from Istanbul to Syria. However, during his governorships in Damascus

and Baghdad he came to realize the need for greater centralization.426 He was the

governor who incorporated not only Damascus but also Baghdad into the range of

Tanzimat provinces. The Baban dynasty in Kurdistan and the Iranian-dominated

Karbala were now the targets of Tanzimat centralization, because the autonomous

structure of these regions contradicted with the politics of centralization. Besides,

Necip Pasha’s centralization in Iraq meant at the same time confrontation with tribes.

He strengthened the state control in the province and improved the provincial

treasury.427 His governorship was renewed in 1263 (1847) and he ruled relatively

long in Baghdad.428 Several reasons played role in his removal from office: The

424 Neccar, p. 38. 425 Necip Pasha’s appointment not only upset Ali Rıza Pasha but also İnce Bayraktar Mehmed Pasha of Mosul who expected the governorship of Baghdad as a means of promotion. BOA, İ. DAH. 3110, lef 2, 23 Ca 1258 (2 July 1842). 426 The intervention of the European consuls on domestic affairs were effective in this, see C. E. Farah, “Necip Paşa and the British in Syria”, Archivum Ottomanicum, II, 1970, p. 115. 427 On Müşir Namık Pasha’s report regarding Necip Pasha’s term, see BOA, İ. DAH. 13041, 21 Za 1266 (28 September 1850). 428 BOA, İ. DAH. 7444, 18 Ca 1263 (4 May 1847).

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pasha was considered to have abused the grain monopoly system financially, and

manipulated the grain market in the province.429 Secondly, the Pasha is referred to

have treated some of the (French) Christian millet badly and the complaints of the

(French) consul to the Sublime Porte is said to be influential in his recall to

İstanbul.430

Necip Pasha was replaced in June 1849 by Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, who was

then müşir of the Hijaz and Iraq Army. Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha, nicknamed Abdi

Pasha, was a poet and an able soldier and had part of his education in Vienna. Along

Mütercim Rüşdi Pasha, he was commissioned in the re-arrangement of the Ottoman

Army (tensîkât-ı askeriyye) in 1259 (1 Feb. 1843- 21 Jan. 1844) with which the

creation of Sixth Army was decided.431 And in February 1848, he was appointed as

the müşir of the Sixth Army, where he served approximately 14 months, until his

appointment as the governor of Baghdad in June 1849. Although he was of askerî

origin, his humble and meek character is shown to be unsuitable for the conditions in

Iraq, which requires resolute, hard-working and industrious rulers.432 Moreover, there

were also allegations of corruption against Abdi Pasha.433 Therefore, after serving

1.5 year he was dismissed at the end of 1850. Vecihi Pasha, who was the governor of

Ankara, replaced Abdi Pasha.

429 Hala Fattah, “The Politics of Grain Trade in Iraq 1840-1917”, New Perspectives on Turkey, Fall 1991, No: 5-6, p. 158. 430 Azzawi, Târîh el-Iraq, pp. 98-99. 431 Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir (Yay. Haz. Cavid Baysun), Ankara: TTK, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 9-10; Neccar, p. 41. 432 “…Abdi Paşa hazretleri dirâyet ve iffet-i zâtiyesi cihetiyle dâiresi mütehayyizânının mervî olan irtikâbâtından beri …. ve mesâlih-i me’mûriyesini müstakîmâne hüsn-i ifâya hâheşker bir zât-ı memdûh … ise de mesâlih-i Irakiyye ve ….. kendisi ise hilm ve sukûnet hâlinde bulunmasından dolayı Bağdat için aher bir münâsib vâlî bulunması…”, BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267 (19 December 1850). 433 Ibid.,

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Vecihi Pasha was one of the trivial and trifling rulers of Baghdad. Although

he was the governor who implemented Tanzimat reforms in Mosul (especially the

formation of local councils), his term of office in Baghdad was of less importance.434

During Vecihi Pasha’s governorship Namık Pasha was the müşir of the Sixth Army

and it was Namık Pasha, rather than the governor, who dominated the provincial

politics. Unlike Vecihi Pasha, Namık Pasha was well aware of the provincial

problems. The two pashas had different opinions on the policy to be followed

towards the tribes. Namık Pasha, playing the falcon, advocated military solution,

while Vecihi Pasha favored peaceful solution. The disagreement known as vak‘a-i

verdiyye435 ended, when Namık Pasha was able to find the support of the Sublime

Porte and promised to solve the tribal problems. Upon these developments Vecihi

Pasha asked his resignation and he was replaced by Namık Pasha.436 Mehmet Namık

Pasha was certainly one of the two outstanding rulers of Baghdad during the

Tanzimat period.437 He served twice in Baghdad governorship. His first term of

office was quite short and he was replaced by Mehmed Reşid Pasha. The general

disorder in the province was influential in his appointment to Tophane müşirli ği.

Azzawi, quoting from contemporary sources, asserts that influential ministers in

İstanbul worked for his dismissal from Baghdad.438

434 Vecihi Pasha had earlier served in Aleppo, Ankara and Kurdistan. For Vecihi Pasha’s efforts for the implementation of Tanzimat reforms in Mosul, see BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264 (5 March 1848). 435 It was named after the region known as mukata‘a-i verdiyye, where the rebellious tribes gathered. See Azzawi, Târîh el-Iraq, pp. 88-89. 436 Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, Tarih, vol. 9, p. 24. 437 The second ruler being Midhat Pasha. 438 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 100.

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(Gözlüklü) Mehmed Reşid Pasha, is often referred as one of the outstanding

governors of Baghdad. In his youth he was sent to France for his education, where he

stayed rerlatively long. During his term of office Baghdad witnessed considerable

improvement; hence, he had a good fame in the province. The people of Baghdad

referred him as “Eba menâzır” (the glassed).439 Reşid Pasha appears to have benefited

from the regulations of 1852, which extended the governor’s authority, and worked

well in Baghdad.440 He increased some of the taxes such as ağnâm tax. He

successfully enriched the provincial treasury thorugh the increase in the mukâta‘a

revenues. During the years of Crimean War, with the orders of the Sublime Porte, he

collected donations for the Ottoman army.441 His death (of natural causes) in 1857

was considered to be an unfortunate loss for Baghdad. Until the arrival of the next

governor, defterdâr Mustafa Faik, who was appointed as kaymakam, took care of

provincial affairs. Similarly, Hayri Pasha was to supervise the military affairs of the

province.442

Upon Reşid Pasha’s death, the Sublime Porte was looking for a suitable

governor. Serdâr-ı Ekrem Ömer Lütfü Pasha was willing to be the governor of

Baghdad since the Crimean War, but he had not a good reputation in Sublime Porte.

Ömer Lütfü Pasha was a competent and able soldier, and his military career had

culminated in his commandership during the Crimean War.443 However, he could not

show the same performance in administrative affairs. The central administration was

439 Ibid., p. 102. 440 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Adminsitration of Iraq, p. 25. 441 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 111. 442 Ibid., p. 116. 443 Ömer Lütfü Pasha’s military performance is also questionable. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha mentions about some of his military failures. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, Vol. 2, pp. 34-35 and 275.

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reluctant to give him administrative post. Therefore, the governorship of Baghdad

was first offered to Mehmed Namık Pasha. It was only after Namık Pasha’s rejection

that this post was given to Ömer Lütfü Pasha.444 The Pasha is referred to have abused

the wide authorities given to provincial governor in 1852 and 1858. Azzawi mentions

that the pasha was authorized to rule not only over Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk,

but also Diyarbakır.445 As a high-ranking soldier, the most striking action of the

pasha was his attemtp to give an order to the military forces within the province. For

this purpose he tried to expel the unregular soldiers known as hayta or başıbozuk

from the army. Instead, he attempted to conscript soldiers not only from among

townsmen but also tribesmen. Although he was able to conscript from Hillah, Najaf

and Karbala, he could not prevent the rebellion led by the tribes. He personally

participated in the military campaigns over the tribes of Hindiyyah and Shamiyah to

suppress the rebellion. In the conflicts between the provincial forces and the tribes

there were causalties in both sides. However, the arbitrary actions of the pasha,

which culminated in his execution of rebellious Hamavend tribesmen without trial

and permission from the Sublime Porte, resulted in his dismissal in September 1859

(Safer 1276).446

(Sırkâtibi) Mustafa Nuri Pasha, who served 16 months in Baghdad between

1858-60, was one of the indistinct governors of Baghdad. He was one of the

444 BOA, A. MKT.NZD, 236/23, 23 M 1274 (13 September 1857); A.DVN, 126/50, 23 M 1274 (13 September 1857). Lütfi Efendi also mentiones that before Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s appointment to Baghdad, the Sublime Porte sought the opinion of the leading figures whether Ömer Lütfi Pasha was a proper governor or not. Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, Tarih, vol.9, p. 140. 445 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 116. 446 The executions were investigated by the Sublime Porte in detail. See BOA, İ. DAH. 29737, 16 C 1276 (10 January 1860); İ. MMAH, 675 and 732 12 R 1276 (8 November 1859) and 14 B 1276 (6 February 1860) respectively. After his dismissal from Baghdad, Ömer Lütfü Pasha was appointed as the müşir of Rumeli Army. Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, Vol 4, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996, pp. 1322-23.

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Baghdad governors who was accused of being corrupt, but was acquitted in the

interrogation.447 His kethüdâ (at the same time, his son-in-law), mîr-i mîrân Mehmed

Pasha, is reported to have played a key role in his correpted affairs.448 Beside

corruption, tribal rebellion in Ammarah led by Albu Muhammad was the leading

incidents of his short governorship. He suppressed the rebels and retained the

military forces there. It is for this reason that the place (Ammarah) was also known

as al-Ordî.449

Another indistinguishable ruler was Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, who served only

six months. His early days were spent for the investigation of corruption allegation

against Mustafa Nuri Pasha. No event of considerable importance took place during

his short term of office and he was followed by Namık Pasha.

Namık Pasha’s second term in Baghdad (1861-67) was very important as the

first step for radical change in the province. In this sense, Namık Pasha’s

governorship can be considered to be the harbinger of the Midhat Pasha’s reforms,

because he prepared the necessary background for the extension of Tanzimat

reforms. It is for this reason that Arab sources refer him with the e nickname “el-

kebîr”, the Great.450 Namık Pasha was one of the most enlightened rulers of

nineteenth century Baghdad. He was well educated and knew at least four

languages.451 As the müşir of the Sixth Army, he suppressed the rebellion of

Hindiyah in 1850. When we combined the offices of müşir and governor under his

447 BOA, İ. MMAH, 1174, 29 M 1280 (16 July 1863). 448 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 128 and 132. 449 Ibid., p. 129. 450 Ibid., pp. 89 and 134. 451 On the biography of Namık Pasha, see Şehabeddin Akalın, “Mehmed Namık Paşa”, İÜEF Tarih Dergisi, Vol. 4, No: 7, September 1952, pp. 127-146; Sinaplı, Şeyhül Vüzera and Enver Ziya Karal, “Mehmed Namık Paşa’nın Hal Tercümesi”, Tarih Vesikaları, II, 1942, pp. 220-227.

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control, he went over the Muntafiq region in the south. When his “politics of tribes”

conflicted with that of governor in Basra, Maşuk Pasha, he was called back to

Istanbul.452

Namık Pasha’s appointment for the second time in 1861 gave him greater

authorities.453 With these wide-ranging powers he suppressed tribal uprisings,

improved the provincial treasury, built irrigation canals, roads, bridges, military

barrack, school etc. Due to his successful rule in the province, he was awared not

only by the sultan but also by the Persian Shah; consequently, the Sublime Porte kept

him relatively long.

When, in March 1868, Namık Pasha was promoted with seraskerlik in

İstanbul, Takiyüddin Pasha came to the governorship in Baghdad. Before his

appointment as governor, he served deputy governor in Baghdad, mutasarrıf of

Shahrizor. His distinct feature was that he was the only governor in Baghdad who

came from ilmiye origin. His nickname was müderris-zade. His short governorship

ended when he had diplomatic problems with the French consil in Baghdad.454 When

Midhat Pasha replaced him in 1869, a new period started in the history of Iraq.

452 Financial issues, especially the problem of counterfeiting in Mosul, Baghdad and Shahrizor played a significant rrole in his dismissal. See Akalın, pp. 142-143. 453 BOA, Mühimme Defterleri, No: 261, p. 87 and 93. 454 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 155-156.

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Midhat Pasha in the Historiography of Iraq

It goes without saying that Midhat Pasha455 was one of the most outstanding

figures of second-generation Tanzimat intellectuals. He was one of the most able

bureaucrats that nineteenth century Ottoman bureaucracy produced. Despite his quite

short and unlucky terms of office as grand vizier, Midhat Pasha’s governorships are

exceptional in terms of provincial administration. His service in the provinces of the

empire is full of important achievements, which later become a source of inspiration

for his fellow colleagues. His activities and achievements were to be imitated by

other governors in the empire.

He served in the most difficult provinces of Ottoman Empire: Nish, Tuna

(Danube), Baghdad, Salonica, Syria, and Aydın (Izmir).456 There is no doubt that his

successful provincial administration in different vilâyets played a very important role

in the modernization of Ottoman provinces and Ottoman Empire in general. It is

quite clear that the case of Midhat Pasha throws an interesting light on the whole

question of the role of the provincial governments in the process of modernization.457

Hence, it will not be wrong to state that in the process of Ottoman modernization

Midhat Pasha has a special place. Owing to his successful governorship in the Nish,

Danube, Baghdad and Syria he is also known as the 'Father of Reform' in these

provinces.

455 Actually, Midhat (1822-1884) was not his real name. His name was Ahmed Şefik. Having memorized the Quran at the age of 10, he was called Hafız Şefik. Later, because of his employment in the secretariat of the Imperial Council (Divan), he was given the name of Midhat and in the course of time it replaced his real name. See M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Midhat Paşa”, in İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 8, p.270. 456 Although he served twice as grand vizier, his term of office lasted very short. His first position as grand vizier under Sultan Abdülaziz lasted two months and 21 days, the other under Sultan Abdülhamit II lasted just 49 days. 457 Shimon Shamir, “The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdülhamid”, in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds.) Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1968, p. 352.

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Due to his extraordinary administrative talents Midhat Pasha enjoyed British

support and for the British Midhat was synonymous with Ottoman reform and

enlightened government.458 According to Midhat Pasha, reform had to be carried out

in different areas and simultaneously, because each area influenced the other. For

example, improvements in public security influenced reforms in civil administration

and finance. The strengthening of local government, protection of local interests,

participation of local population to the provincial administration, and co-operation

with local elite were among the principles Midhat Pasha followed during his

governorships in different provinces.

Baghdad, owing not only to its vast extent from Mosul to Basra, but to the

independent minded Kurdish and Arab tribes, was difficult to govern. As far as

Midhat Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad is concerned, like other Tanzimat valis in

Baghdad he belonged to the upper echelons of the Ottoman state bureaucracy, rather

than having a local root. However, it becomes crystal clear that Midhat Pasha has a

distinctive place in the history of Iraq. Midhat Pasha was certainly the most famous

governor of the province. The writers clearly distinguished him from former

governors. A European traveler states that

There is little to tell of the local political history of Iraq during the remainder of nineteenth century [after 1831]. … Almost the only attempt at serious reform was made by Midhat Pasha at the end of the sixties.459

In many studies, the political history of Baghdad before 1869 was either skimmed or

briefly summarized. However, Midhat Pasha’s term was given more place and he has

458 Shimon Shamir, Midhat Pasha and Anti-Turkish Agitation, Middle Eastern Studies, X/2, May 1974, p. 124 459 Seton Lloyd, ‘Twin Rivers: A Brief History of Iraq from the Earliest Times to the Present Day’, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1943, p.190.

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frequently been portrayed as the ‘true reformer’460, modernizer or “first vâlî”461 of

Baghdad. Likewise, Abbas Azzawi, the famous historian of nineteenth century Iraq,

mentioned about the governorship of Midhat Pasha as a new era (‘Ahd-i cedîd ev

ebu’l-ahrâr Midhat Bâshâ fî Bağdâd) in his history of Iraq.462 In a similar fashion,

Neccar considers Midhat Pasha’s governorship as “ahden mütemeyyizen” (distinct

period).463 It is also noted that today the people of Iraq remember Midhat Pasha with

appraisal and appreciation, because his tenure has been regarded as miraculous

days.464 Moreover, the year 1869 (the beginning of Midhat Pasha’s governorship) has

been an important turning point for many studies dealing with nineteenth and early

twentieth century Baghdad.465

Some sources make a clear distinction between the Ottoman rule in Iraq and

the governorship of Midhat Pasha. While the Ottoman rule was disparaged, Midhat

Pasha’s governorship is narrated with praiseful statements, as if he was not an

Ottoman governor. This is quite evident in a recent publication, namely Dawn

Kotapish’s Daily Life in Ancient and Modern Baghdad. The narrative of this book is

important, because this book is written for teaching the children the history of Iraq in

a very simple way. Kotapish depicts the picture of Ottoman rule as follows:

460 Richard F. Nyrop (ed.), Iraq: A Country Study, Washington, The American University, 1979, p. 31. 461 J. G. Lorimer, p. 242. 462 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 159-160. 463 Neccar, pp. 9-10. 464 Abdurrazzak El-Hasenî, Tarîhu’l-Iraq es-Siyasî el-Hadîs, Vol.1, Dâru’ş-Şu’ûn es-Sakafiyye el-‘Âmm, Baghdad, (7th edition) 1989, p. 41. 465 Mohammad Salman Hasan, ‘Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Modern Iraq: 1869-

1939’, PhD Thesis, University of Oxford St. Antony’s College, 1958; Albertine Jwaideh, Municipal Government in Baghdad and Basra from 1869 to 1914’, St. Antonys College, 1953; Abdülaziz Süleyman Nevvar, Tarih el-Irak-il Hadis min Nihayet-i Hükm-ü Davud Paşa ila nihayeti Hükm-ü Midhat Paşa, Dar-ül Katib el-arabi li’t-tebeah ve’n-neşr, 1968; Cemil Musa Neccar, Al-İdâra all-Osmânî fi Vilâyeti Baghdad; Nelida Fuccaro, Communalism and the State in Iraq: The Yazidi Kurds, c.1869-1940, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No.2, 1999, pp.1-26.

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“The sultan taxed people heavily. Tenants had to pay their landlords large sums, which were handed over to the empire. But the taxes were not invested in the city’s industry or used to keep the ancient irrigation system functioning. Instead the Ottoman rulers used the money in other parts of their large empire. Starvation and disease became rampant in Baghdad. The population shrank as some people left the city begin new lives as nomads. …. Mahmud II banned traditional Arabic clothing, including long robes, turbans and headgear. Baghdad’s male residents were forced to wear coats and Turkish fezzes – flat-topped, round hats with tassels.”466

The book allocates only two pages for the Ottoman rule in Iraq, but when it comes to

Midhat Pasha’s governorship, the autor assigns generously two pages for the three-

year service of the pasha and the pattern of narration changes strikingly.

“Midhat made many reforms that improved the lives of Baghdad’s people. He ordered the city’s debris-filled canals to be cleaned and re-opened. Farmers whose land had been dried out or flooded as the canal system disintegrated were once again able to grow food. Midhat established land reform laws that enable people to purchase property. This encouraged the nomadic leaders to opt for a more settled existence. Many exchanged their camel-hair tents for brick houses and replaced their dependence on the camel with a new reliance on commercial trade. Some became powerful landowners. The balance of power shifted from family authority to urban government. Midhat re-organized the government to give people more representation and develop a system of criminal and commercial law. He founded schools, creating secular school system that expanded the existing Islam-based system. European languages began to be taught. Modernization soon arrived in Baghdad. In 1836 Baghdad saw its first steamboat and in 1861 its first telegraph. As a result, Baghdad’s commercial trade improved. Landowners began to export cash crops. Imported goods began flowing into the city in 1869, when the Suez Canal linked the Mediterranean and the Red seas. Under the leadership of this Turkish governor, Baghdad began to move from having a subsistence economy toward being part of an international marketplace. These major economic changes began to raise the standard of living for Baghdad’s people and to change its social and cultural norms as well. Social status had been traditionally linked to one’s noble lineage, fighting prowess, and religious training. A good education and property ownership became new ways for people to climb the social ladder and to acquire wealth”.467

466 Dawn Kotapish, Daily Life in ancient and modern Baghdad, Minnesota: Runestone Press, 2000, pp. 40-41. 467 Ibid., pp. 48-49.

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Although there were many accounts perceiving Midhat Pasha as the

modernizer of Ottoman Baghdad, some authors questioned the historiography on

Midhat Pasha. Scholars like Roger Owen considered these accounts as

exaggerations:

While it is true that he [Midhat Pasha] instituted a more comprehensive series of reforms than any of his predecessors, it is equally true that he failed in almost everything he tried. … Another way in which the importance of Midhat’s policies is usually exaggerated is to contrast them with the lackluster performance of earlier provincial governors.468

It is true that much of the credit for the modernization of Baghdad is given to Midhat

Pasha. What is misleading is the picture depicted by authors like Dawn Kotapish is

that the governors before Midhat Pasha, especially Reşid Pasha and Namık Pasha,

were treated as if they were non-existant. Unfortunately, the Iraqi historiography has

to a great extent ignored the provincial governors before 1869 and focused on Midhat

Pasha’s term of office. It is my contention that the governorship of Midhat Pasha was

the culmination of reform in Baghdad; therefore, it should be read as a whole with its

harbingers in previous governorships.

Despite the difficulties, Midhat Pasha strove for the establishment of a

pattern of administration in which the ruled participates in that administration. In

this sense, he signified the participation of local population in the administration

and this was mainly institutionalized through the local councils (meclises).

***

468 Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993, pp.185-86. Lady Anne Blunt is among the few exceptions who critized Midhat Pasha’s administration in Baghdad. See Lady Anne Blunt, Bedoin Tribes of the Euphrates, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1968, pp.194-97.

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When we look at to the governors in Baghdad, it seems that many of them

served in the neighboring provinces, such as Shahrizor, Mosul and Hakkari, before

their appointment to Baghdad.469 Some of them, like Namık and Ahmet Tevfik

Pashas, served first as the müşîr of the Sixth Army and were then promoted with the

Baghdad governorship470. Among the Baghdad governors, Ali Rıza Pasha, Vecihi

Pasha, Mehmet Reşit (Gözlüklü), Takiyüddin had served in Aleppo, Diyarbakır,

Hakkari and Shahrizor respectively. That these governors were familiar with the

region played significant role. Although this was the usual way that was followed in

the appointments, there were exceptions too. To give an example, Ömer Lütfi Paşa

and Midhat Pasha did not serve in the region at all. While Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s

experience as serdâr-ı ekrem in the Crimean War of 1854, played crucial role in his

appointment, Midhat Pasha’s report on the development of Baghdad province was

considered to be a good chance to apply what was indicated in the report.471

However, the Sublime Porte did not opt to appoint someone from the locality as it

was the case during the Mamluk era. The multi-ethnic structure of the local

population, Baghdad’s importance as a buffer zone in the Persian frontier, its being

the centers of religious (Sunnî and Shiite, as well as Christian) sects were the leading

factors that played an important role in assigning this province to viziers from

Istanbul, not to those coming from the locality.472 The remoteness of Baghdad from

the center was also influential in appointing governors from Istanbul, because if

469 For example, Ali Rıza Pasha, Reşid Pasha and Takiyüddin Pasha were earlier governors in Aleppo, Hakkari and Shahrizor respectively. 470 Namık Pasha is an excellent example for such governors. See Akalın, p. 141. For the previous administrative offices of Baghdad governors, see Appendix I. 471 Mahmud Kemal İnal, Son Sadrazamlar, Vol 1, (4th ed.) İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969, p. 321 and Midhat Paşa, p. 22. 472 BOA, HH, No: 20896; Mühimme Defteri, no: 153, p. 353.

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appointed from the locality, the Sublime Porte might not have a complete control

over the province and this might pave the way for a second Muhammad Ali affair.

Due to its peripheral position, in the classical period Baghdad was regarded as a

banishment place. However, as the communication and transportation facilities

developed in the nineteenth century, this negative connotation was forgotten.

The peripheral status of Baghdad also played an important role in greater

authorities (ruhsat-ı kâmile ve me’zûniyet-i şâmile) of its governors. The governors

in Baghdad complained about the long lasting and time consuming bureaucratic

correspondence between Baghdad and Sublime Porte, which resulted mainly from

the distance of the province. If an expenditure of considerable amount appears, the

governors had to report to and wait for the permission from the Sublime Porte, which

usually took very long time and the works could not be done in time. If the governors

do the work without the permission then they were to be accused for their

irresponsible acts.473 The demand for greater authority was acknowledged, but the

Sublime Porte was careful to restrict the limits of the permission to only repairs and

reform projects and this greater authority was given only to outstanding governors

like Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha for their terms of office in Baghdad. Indeed, the

geo-politics of Ottoman Iraq required strong and courageous governors with great

authorities. They had to consider the balance between implementing the orders of the

central administration and respecting the sentiments and requirements of the locality.

Many of the weak governors found it difficult to carry out the new Tanzimat policies,

which were mostly contradictory to the tribal structure of the region.474 Also it was

473 “…Bağdad eyâleti mesâfe-i ba‘îde olmak hasebiyle fevka’l-‘âde bir masraf vukû‘una luzûm-ı hakîkî göründüğü halde istîzân olunsa vakit geçerek ol mühim maslahat görülmekden kalıp bilâ-istîzân teşebbüs olunsa mûceb-i mes’ûliyet olacağından…, BOA, İ. MVL, 8406, 9 Şaban 1268. 474 Shields, p.38.

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quite common that the improvements achieved by an able governor were nullified

when his successor was an incapable or even an ordinary person.475 This was very

evident especially after the regisnation of Midhat Pasha. The improvements brought

by Midhat Pasha could not be sustained by his successors.

There were also cases in which the Porte rejected to give greater authority to

governors of Baghdad. For example, in 1852 Reşid Pasha wanted the authority to

dismiss and exchange the officers without waiting the permission of the Porte. He

further wanted the province of Shahrizor to be tied to Baghdad and its governor to

consult himself in every matter.476 However, as noted earlier, the Porte rejected his

demand for greater authority.

The special status of Baghdad and the greater authority of its governors were

therefore closely related to its remoteness from the center of the empire. The

peripheral status of the province enabled it to have greater authority in local affairs.

For instance, the governor of Baghdad had to seek no permission of the Sublime

Porte in small amounts of expenditures477.

When compared with the Mamluk governors, in terms of the length of their

term of office the Tanzimat pashas remained shorter in Baghdad governorship. While

the Mamluk rule in Baghdad lasted 82 years (1749-1831) under 9 different

governors, with an average of 9.1 years each, the Tanzimat Pashas ruled for 45 years

(1831-1876) under 14 different governors, with an average of 3.2 years each. The

relatively short terms of offices in the Tanzimat period was to a great extend due to

475 Ma’oz, p. 38. 476 BOA, İ. MVL, 8892, 20 Za 1268 (5 September 1852). 477 See BOA, İ. MVL, 8406, 9 Şaban 1268, “Bağdadın mesâfe-i ba‘îdesinden dolayı mesârif-i cüz’iyyenin bilâ istîzân icrâsı me’zûniyetine dâir” and BOA, İ. MVL, 4052, 10 B 1265 (1 June 1849). “Bağdad ve Sayda gibi mesâfe-i ba‘îdede katl-i nufûs misillü kabahat-ı cesîme ashâbının mahallerinde icrâ-yı mücâzâtına dair” .

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the fact that the governors who were appointed to Baghdad was granted his office in

return for the payment of an agreed amount to the central government as a substitute

(bedel) for the revenue he was expected to raise from the province. For example,

Necip Pasha purchased the office of governorship for an annual payment of 50,000

kese (or kîse, 1 kese = 500 kuruş ).478 In order to secure the greatest profit, the central

government changed governors frequently; and the governors in their turn tried to

recover their outlay as quickly and efficiently as possible, and to acquire the greatest

possible profit for themselves.479 This resulted not infrequently in the oppression and

injustices in the province, which was a sufficient cause for their dismissal. As

Jwaideh stated, the case of Midhat Pasha was an exception in this regard, because

unlike his predecessors, Midhat Pasha was not required to give a bedel or advance

payment when appointed.480

The rotation policy of the central government surely contributed to the central

treasury, but it had also contributed to the general experience of the governors,

because by serving in different places they came to know more about the larger

picture of imperial administration. However, there were other factors that led to

changes in provincial governorship. The inability to suppress the tribal rebellions and

to provide the provincial security played also crucial role for the lack of continuity in

provincial administration. In Iraq, where the tribal rebellions were not infrequent,

this problem caused the dismissal of several governors. We should also note that the

struggle between the political factions of the ‘Men of Tanzimat’ was also reflected in

the dismissal of the provincial governors. For instance, the dismissal of Ömer Lütfi

478 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 64. 479 Albertine Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha and Land System of Lower Iraq”, St. Antony’s Papers, Vol. 16, 1963, p. 112. 480 Ibid., p. 114.

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Pasha and the resignation of Midhat Pasha was the result of political wire-pulling by

rivals in the capital.

Many of the Tanzimat governors in Baghdad served 1 or 1.5 years. An

explanation for the short terms of the governors is pronounced by some scholars.

Albertine Jwaideh, for instance, argued that “since Baghdad was considered a place

of exile, the governors were usually men who were out of favor, and whose tenure of

office was deliberately kept short”.481 However, this account had to be corrected at

least in several aspects. First of all, for the nineteenth century one can not consider

Baghdad as a place of exile. This assertion might be true for the classical period,

because not only the long distant over-land journeys were insecure, but also the

means of communication, such as stable highways, steamers, telegrams and railroad,

were non-existent. Uzunçarşılı’s consideration of Baghdad as a place of banishment

was reiterated by some other scholars, without taking into account that Uzunçarşılı’s

concern was for the classical period. Hence, for the Tanzimat Period, which we are

focusing on, Baghdad cannot be regarded as a place of exile. Secondly, also related

to the first one, there is hardly any governor who was appointed to Baghdad as they

fell out of favor. It is quite difficult to argue that governors like Namık Pasha, Reşid

Pasha and especially Midhat Pasha fell out of favor. On the contrary, when

investigated carefully, one can see that some of the governors were promoted with

quite significant posts after their services in Baghdad. To give an example Namık

Pasha, Ömer Lütfi Pasha and Midhat Pasha were promoted to offices of Tophane

müşirli ği, Rumeli müşirli ği, Grand Vizierate respectively.482 The banishment was to

481 Jwaideh, Midhat Pasha, p. 111. 482 See, Appendix I. Namık Pasha was further promoted with a “Mecidiye Nişanı” and then appointed as Minister of Commerce. Akalın, pp. 142-143.

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some extent valid for low ranking officials/officers.483 Finally, the place of exile and

banishment was quite relative and changed from one to another person. The

homeland and personal background of the individual in question were quite

important in this sense. Therefore, cities like Kastamonu and İzmir were places of

exile for high officials. When we turn to Arab provinces, although it was closer and

more incorporated to the central administration, Syria was more often considered as a

place of exile.484

A final factor that accounts for the short term of provincial rulers was that

especially in the first decades of the Tanzimat Era, failure in the application of the

Tanzimat reforms was a common cause for the frequent dismissal of the

governors.485 Arbitrary actions, especially those contradicting the Tanzimat

principles were not tolerated by the central administration. For example, Ömer Lütfi

Pasha’s use of excessive force and execution of rebels without trial were among the

factors that led to his dismissal. Last but not least, corruption in the local affairs was

another factor that paved the way for the frequent change of provincial governors.

Furthermore, there is direct correlation between the longevity of the term of

the provincial governor and the development and improvement they could gave to

the province. It is not coincidence that it was the relatively long rules of Reşid Pasha,

Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha who are remembered most as the governors who

contributed to the provincial development.

483 For example, the shipyard in Basra had considerable banished soldiers (zabıtân). See BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, bahriye lef 3, 28 Z 1287 (21 March 1871). 484 See Abdülhamit Kırmızı, Rulers of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of the Provinces (1895-1908), PhD Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2005. 485 In the first years of the Tanzimat, the Sublime Porte was very determined to dismiss the provincial governors who did not comply with the Tanzimat principles. In a sense, they were considered to be the scapegoat for the failure in implementing Tanzimat reforms. See Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 192.

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Müşîr-Pashas: Politics and Military in Baghdad

Until 1847, the Ottoman Army was divided into five parts. It was only with the

enactment of a new law on conscription (kur‘â nizâmnâmesi) in 1847 that the Sixth

Army was first created and Baghdad became the center for this army.486 The Sixth

Army, which was referred as Iraq and Hijaz Army, had four infantry regiments, 4

tâli‘a battalions, two cavalry regiments and one artillery regiment.487 From this time

onwards, almost all of the governors, who served in Baghdad in the period under

survey, acted both as the governor-general of the province and müşîr, military

commander of the Iraq and Hijaz Army.488

The Tanzimat reforms envisaged the separation of civil administration and

military authority, which can be regarded as a step towards a modern bureaucracy.

Accordingly, all security and disciplinary matters were commissioned to müşirs in

the provinces and ferîks in the sub-provinces.489 The Tanzimat policy in this sense

was the continuation of the policies followed by Mahmud II. In 1826 the Ottoman

sultan re-organized the provinces as müşiriyyet giving the müşirs (military

commanders) large powers in military as well as financial affairs with a view to

organizing the new army.490 As a corollary of this, during the Tanzimat period müşirs

486 The division of the Ottoman Army was as follows: 1st Army (Hassa Ordusu) in Istanbul, 2nd Army (Dersaadet Ordusu) in Üsküdar, 3rd Army (Rumeli Ordusu) in Manastır, 4th Army (Anadolu Ordusu) in Harput, and 5th Army (Arabistan Ordusu) in Damascus. See Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezâkir, Vol. 1, Ankara: TTK, 1986, pp. 9-10; Necati Tacan, “Tanzimat ve Ordu”, Tanzimat I, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999, p. 183. 487 Later the number of infantry regiments was increased to five. Ibid., p. 135. 488 For the lists of governor-commanders in Baghdad, see Appendix I. 489 İnalcık, Application of the Tanzimat, p. 5. 490 Ahmet Lütfi Efendi, Tarih, vol. v, p. 107 and 172; İnalcık, Centralization and Decentralization, p. 51.

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were appointed to the provinces and these müşirs further appointed rulers in the rank

of ferîk and mîrlivâ to the sub-provinces.491

The re-organization of Tanzimat was significant in that the provincial

governor was now deprived of his former military authorities, relegating him to the

holder of administrative authorities per se.492 This division of administrative and

military powers was soon to result in a duality in provincial administration. In a

frontier province like Baghdad, this duality could cause great troubles, because in

Baghdad political and military affairs were quite interdependent. It became almost

impossible for a governor, who was unable to control provincial army, to go over the

tribal upheavals. This situation required either a good co-ordination between the

müşir and the governor-general (as in the case of governor Abdi Pasha and müşir

Namık Pasha) or the unification of these offices under the command of the latter.

Two cases from the 1840s provide good examples of such duality between

the governor and the müşir . The first one, between Vecihi Pasha and Namık Pasha

(vak‘a-i verdiyye) was already mentioned. The second took place during the

governorship of Necip Pasha. The tribal leaders who were disaffected by Necip

Pasha’s “politics of grain monopoly” made a common cause with the serasker of

Baghdad, who was already engaged in a struggle for power with the governor-

general.493 The serasker even delivered honorary robes to the tribal leaders who

participated to his call. No doubt such cases made it clear that for the sake of

harmony among the provincial officials the Sublime Porte would find a solution to

this duality.

491 Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 191. 492 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devri İdari Yapı, p. 309. 493 PRO, FO 195 / 334 (1849) and Fattah, “The Politics of Grain”, pp. 157-158.

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Starting from the early 1850s, the governors began to hold both

administrative and military powers under their command. As far as Baghdad is

concerned this began with Namık Pasha who combined the commandership and

governorship in Baghdad. However, even before the merge of two offices, it is

known that Abdi Pasha as the governor-general and Namık Pasha as the müşir of the

Sixth Army worked well in collaboration. Therefore, it is hard to say that the

Tanzimat principle on the seperation of administrative and military powers was

applied in Baghdad. The governors in Baghdad continued to hold administrative,

financial as well as military powers. The fact that Baghdad was a frontier province

played a significant role, and for the sake of the provincial security almost of the

governors had the Sixth Army under their command.

The office of the müşir in Baghdad bore outstanding significance not only

because of the border between Baghdad and Persia but also due to frequent tribal

rebellions. Furthermore, the governors in Baghdad had to make the tribes feel their

military might, because there was a direct relationship between the military might as

depicted by the provincial administration and the amount of tax collected.494 A weak

administration meant the refusal of tax payment by the tribes and, hence, less

revenue for the local government. That is to say, since the relations between tribes

and provincial government were to some extent, a mixture of “carrot and stick” play,

military power had vital role in the smooth running of provincial politics. In order to

secure the provincial security and collect regular taxes, the governors did not refrain

using force, when needed. Consequently, the geo-politics of the province

necessitated the submission of the müşirlik under the command of the governor.

494 On the role of military force in carrying out reform in Ottoman Syria, see Ma’oz, p. 13.

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Therefore, when appointing a governor to Baghdad the close relationship

between the office of the governor and that of the müşir was usually taken into

account by the Sublime Porte.495 Even before the merge of the offices of müşir and

the governor in 1851, there were cases in which the müşir was appointed as the

governor of the Baghdad province.496 A natural consequence of this situation was

that all the governors, except one, had an askerî background.497 To go further, both

of two serdâr-ı ekrems (chief commander) of nineteenth century served in

Baghdad.498 In the pre-Tanzimat period, the provinces, which were centers of armies,

had no civil governors. After 1843, military officers were no longer allowed to

undertake civil administrative responsibilities.499 However, this principle was hardly

applied in the provinces with army centers, like Baghdad and Damascus.

In 1851 the offices of the müşir and the governor were amalgamated under

the command of Namık Pasha. The strong personality of the Namık Pasha should

have great role in this merge. Already before 1851, Namık Pasha, as müşîr, acted as

deputy governor to neighboring province of Shahrizor.500 From 1851 unitl 1877, all

the governors in Baghdad were in charge of both offices. However, we should also

495 “Bağdad eyâletinin Irak ve Hicâz ordu-yı hümâyunu müşirli ği ile birlikte bulunduğu melâbesesiyle ol havâlînin ahvâline vâkıf ve umûr-ı askeriyenin edâsına dahi muktedir bir zâtın bulunması iktizâ-yı hâl ve maslahattan göründüğüne…” (emphasis added), BOA, İ. MMAH, 918, 13 B 1277 (25 January 1861). 496 This was the case especially for the governorships of Mehmed Namık Pasha and Ahmed Tevfik Pasha. See, Ibid., and BOA, İ. DAH, 15120, 7 Ra 1268 (31 December 1851). 497 The case of Takiyüddin Pasha was an exception. He came from the learned class (ilmiye) and became governor of Baghdad in 1284/1867. 498 These serdâr-ı ekrems were Abdülkerim Nadir (Abdi) Pasha and Ömer Lütfi Pasha. For these commanders see İnönü (Türkler) Ansiklopedisi, Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1943. 499 “Ba‘dezîn zâbıtan-ı askeriyenin uhdelerine mülkî me’mûriyet ictimâ‘ edemeyeceği”, from a law on conscription, promulgated in 6th September 1843 published in Ed(ouard Philippe) Engelhardt, Türkiye ve Tanzimat, İstanbul: Kaknüs yayınları, 1999, p. 69; Kırmızı, p. 77. 500 BOA, İ. DAH, 13320, 21 M 1267 (26 November 1850). “Hicaz ve Irak Ordusu müş‘îrinin Şehrizor vâlîsi gelene kadar eyâleti idâre etmesine dâir”.

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note that the governor-generals who served in Baghdad between 1831 and 1847 (the

creation of the Sixth Army) held significant military duties too. For example Ali Rıza

Pasha was referred as serasker. Necip Pasha’s only last two years coincided with the

early years of Sixth Army. Though his name is not cited in the list of commanders of

Sixth Army501, he was also referred as müşir .502 But the title “müşir ” here probably

had an administrative connotation, rather than military. Vecihi Pasha’s situation was

perhaps an exception in that he seems to be the only governor-general, who did not

have any military powers at all. And his governorship was followed by Namık Pasha

with whom the commandership and governorship were united. The case of

Takiyüddin Pasha is very interesting. Desite his ilmiye origin; he became heyet-i

ordu-yu hümâyân nâzırı, head of the Sixth Army.503

In a geography like Iraq, without the authority to use military power, it was

almost impossible to solve and reform the problems of the province. Midhat Pasha,

for example, was appointed in 1285/1869 as both the governor Baghdad and the

müşîr of the Sixth Army. He considered the merge of the two offices obligatory and

peculiar to Baghdad. However, when the Sublime Porte, then led by Midhat Pasha’s

rivals, attempted to separate the two offices, he wanted to resign from the post,

because he was well aware of the fact that the duality in the administration (vali as

the head of provincial politics and administration, and müşîr as the commander of

501 Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkânı ve Ricali, İstanbul: İsis Yayınları, 1999, p. 17. 502 BOA, İ. MVL. 2330, 15 L 1263 (26 September 1847). 503 Mehmed Takiyüddin Pasha was the son of Abdurrahman Efendi, who was a learned man (âlim) among the Kilis ulema. After completing his education he became müftü of Aleppo. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, Vol. 5, p. 1622; For his commandership see Kuneralp, p. 17.

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military power) was an obstacle for solving the problems of the region.504 Upon

Midhat Pasha’s short resignation, the Sublime Porte withdrew the initiative.505

The usual practice was to subordinate the office of the müşîr to that of

governor, so that the governor was not only in charge of administrative and political

affairs but also military as well.506 For example, when in 1267/1851 the müşîr of

Sixth Army wanted the combination of Baghdad governorship under his control, but

the reply of the Sublime Porte was negative.507

The amalgamation of the two offices was not a fact that was unique for

Baghdad or the Tanzimat period. Examples of these kinds of governors can even be

seen in the classical period. What makes the case of Baghdad distinct is that unlike

the case in similar provinces, in Baghdad the two offices overlap intensively. A short

comparison with the Fifth Army of Damascus would be beneficial in assessing the

significance müşir ’s office in Baghdad as a frontier province. When we compare

Damascus and Baghdad, it becomes clear that the amalgamation of the two offices

was less frequent in Damascus, which was the centre of the Fifth Army.508 Until

1853 the offices of müşir of 5th Army and the governor of Damascus were separate.

504 BOA, İ. DAH, 41503, 28 R 1286 (7 August 1869). “Altıncı ordu-yu hümâyûnun idâresi Bağdad vilâyeti vâlîsi devletlu [Midhat] paşa hazretlerinin taht-ı nezâretinde ise de emr-i kumanda ve idâre derkâr ve mücerreb olan kifâyetine mebnî bütün bütün ordu-yu hümâyûna mezbûr reis erkânı ferîk saadetlu Samih Paşa hazretleri uhdesine ihâle…. ve maaş-ı hâlîsinin onbeş bin kuruşa iblâğı istîzânına dâir” (emphasis added). 505 Midhat Paşa, pp. 91-93. 506 For example, the archival documents mention this combination as such: “Hicaz ve Irak Ordusu müş‘îrli ği inzimâmıyla Bağdad vâlîliğine Mustafa Nuri Paşa’nın tayini” and “Altıncı Ordu müşirli ğinin Bağdad valiliğine ilavesi...” BOA, İ. MMAH, 659, 26 S 1276 and BOA, İ. DAH, 45442, 25 Ca 1289. 507 BOA, İ. DAH, 14561, 25 Za 1267 (1851). “Irak ve Hicaz ordu-yı hümâyânu müş‘îri devletlu paşa hazretlerinin Bağdat eyâleti umûr-ı mülkiyesinin ordu müş‘îrli ğine ilhâken idâre olunması hakkında bazı mutâla‘asını beyân eylemiş ise de iş‘âr olunduğu üzre vakı‘a böyle bir eyâlet-i cesîme umûr-ı mülkiyesinin mevâdd-ı askeriye ile birden idâresi müşkil olacağından ve müşârun ileyh Vecihi Paşa hazretleri saye-i şevketvaye-i hazret-i şehinşâhîde hüsn-i hizmet eylemekde olup buna dâir bir gûne inhâsı dahi vuku‘ bulmadığından bu iş‘ârın şimdilik hükmü olamayacağına ...”. 508 For the relationship between the governor and the müşir in Damascus see Ma‘oz, pp. 38-43.

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This was the result of Tanzimat policy in this matter, which kept the offices of müşir

and provincial governor separate and deprived the provincial governor from his

military powers. But this resulted in frequent conflicts between the müşir and the

governors of Syrian provinces, namely Damascus, Aleppo and Sidon. In 1853 the

Sublime Porte decided to amalgamate the offices of müşir of Fifth Army and

governor of Damascus; this change was probably the result of the recent extension of

the powers of the provincial governors in 1852.509 Unlike the case in Baghdad, in the

Damascus of 1850s, the two offices were frequently amalgamated and separated

pragmatically according to the personal abilities of the governor: strong and able

governors were given greater maneuver opportunities so as to control military affairs,

while weak governors were denied for such opportunities. Therefore, the case in

Damascus did not show a stable development. Furthermore, after 1853 the command

of the müşir of the Fifth Army was only limited with Damascus, and he had no

authority over Aleppo and Sidon, which was regarded as a decline in the position of

müşir . However, the governor in Baghdad, who was at the same time the müşir of the

Sixth Army, had authority over far-flung Iraqi provinces.

As the müşir of the Sixth Army, the governor in Baghdad was in charge of 8-

10 thousand soldiers. In the early nineteenth century, the Janissary obtained effective

control and constituted ruling castes in Baghdad.510 Davud Pasha, the last Mamluk

governor, had in 1821 a total of 8,000 soldiers at his disposal.511 As Nieuwenhuis

noted, Davud Pasha’s army must have increased considerably after 1826. With the

formal integration of the Janissary in his army in 1826 and the increase of foreign

509 Ibid., pp. 49-41. 510 İnalcık, “Eyalet”, El2. 511 Nieuwenhuis, p. 40.

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instructed soldiers, Davud Pasha’s later military force must have been the strongest

of the Mamluk era; however, it was almost swept away by the plague of 1831”.512

However, the number of soldiers in Baghdad was never sufficient. Therefore,

in many times the Sixth Army’s capability of maneouver against the rebellions

outside Baghdad was very limited, almost non-existent.513 Almost every governor in

Baghdad complained the insufficiency of the number of soldier in the province.

Normally the Kurdistan region was considered to be more suitable for recruitment of

soldiers, because they were not only accostumed with the geographical conditions;

they were also regarded relatively more loyal to the state.514 More important perhaps

was that the fear that the Anatolian Army might not adopt with Iraq’s unbearable hot

summer climate and this might cause seriouse damages in the army. The movement

of Anatolian Army in the harvest period might affect agricultural production too.

However, despite these anxieties, the Kurdish card could not be played for the most

time, because, firstly, the region was not fully incorporated into the direct control of

the Ottoman state until the mid nineteenth century. For example, the Sublime Porte

advised Ali Rıza Pasha to have good relations with Muntafiq tribal confederation and

in return to use them as military forces.515 Secondly, the recruitment of Kurdish

512 Ibid., p. 40. 513 For instance, in 1850 there appeared a rebellion in Sulaimaniyah. There were also other security problems in Hindiyye, Hillah and Muntafiq region. Namık Pasha sent the Sixth Army to Sulaimaniyah, putting the security of the middle and southern Iraq into risk. Therefore, the Sublime Porte was informed that the restoration of the security is dependent upon the reinforcement of the Sixth Army with soldiers from Anatolian Army. See BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267 (19 December 1850). 514 Nieuwenhuis, quoting from Rousseau, narrates that during the Mamluk era Kurdistan was a major source for Baghdad and gets most of its ammunition from this area. The Kurds provided excellent cavalrymen. They often participated in the military campaigns against Arab tribes. Nieuwenhuis, pp. 104-105. 515 Al-Bustanî, pp. 265-267.

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people was not so easy, as it was thought. Hence, the Sixth Army was usually

reinforced with the Anatolian Army.

Provincial Bureaucracy: The Low-Ranking Officials The rule of Mamluks came to an end in 1831, but there were numerous Mamluk

officials still residing in Baghdad and outlying regions of the province. It is also

argued that even before the removal of the last Mamluk governor (Davud Pasha), Ali

Rıza Pasha negotiated with the Mamluks and he promised them a score of

appointments and estates.516 However, it is well-known that after his entry into

Baghdad, Ali Rıza Pasha invited all, including the Mamluks, to the formal reading of

his appointment fermân. After the reading of the fermân, in the words of Longrigg,

A party of Albanians turned suddenly on the Mamluk Aghas, shot the most part with their muskets, smote and slew the rest to the last men. A few were arrested and dispatched elsewhere in the city. …Thereafter, Every Mamluk was sought from within and without the city. … A mere handful contrived by prolonged hiding in distant parts of the Pashaliq to gain a belated pardon.517

Despite this sad incident, remnants of the Mamluks remained in the province, some of

them continued to serve to the local government, but they could not rise in the

bureaucratic ladder. Most of the remaining Mamluks became gangs. The vacancies

opened by the murder of Mamluks were filled with people who were under the

patronage of Ali Rıza Pasha.

The cadre of Ali Rıza Pasha had naturally many officials from Aleppo, the

former governorship of the pasha. Ali Rıza Pasha’s new kethüdâ was a notable of

Aleppo, namely Hacı Yusuf Agha. Similarly, the mütesellim of Basra, Muhammed

516 See Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 275. 517 Ibid., p. 275.

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Agha es-Seyyâf, came with his patronage.518 Ali Rıza Pasha called Abdülgani Cemil

and brought him to the office of müfti of the hanefi school of Islam.519 It was in 1831

that the Sublime Porte sent Arif Efendi as the director of finance (defterdâr) in the

province.520 Mahmud Alûsî (nakîbü’l-eşrâf), Osman Seyfi (clerk in the provincial

council) and Abdülkadir Agha (customer officer) were other prominent figure of

provincial bureaucracy during the 1830s.521 As noted earlier, considerable part of the

pasha’s men, especially Molla Ali el-Hassı, Es‘ad bin Nâib, Ali Agha El-Yesirci?

(tüfenkci başı ve cürüm ağası), and Abdülkadir Agha were notorious for their

oppression and cruelty.

An official, known as kahyâ, served the Pasha as his chief assistant. The office

of kahyâ had its zenith during the Mamluk period. To indicate the importance of

kahyâ’s office, this position was sometimes compared to the office of Grand Vezirate

in İstanbul. However, after the Mamluk period the office of kahyâ was replaced with

that of the kethüdâ. The post-Mamluk period witnessed both the decline of some

offices and the concomitant rise of others. For instance, the office of Bâbü’l-Arab,

which dealt mainly tribal affairs, especially mediation and compromise among tribes,

lost its former prominence. On the other hand, the office of defterdârlık gained quite

significance. Although this office was abrogated in the mid 1840s,522 with the

establishment of meclis-i kebîr it reached its zenith. The defterdâr became not only

518 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 12. 519 He was later appointed to the madrasa al-Kadiriyya as müdarris. See ibid. p. 15. 520 Abdurrahman Urfalı and Esad Naib were the predecessors of Arif Efendi see Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 17. 521 Abdülkadir (bin Ziyade al-Mosulî) Agha came also from Aleppo. 522 BOA, A. MKT. 2/20, 29/8/1262 (1846).

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the chairperson of the provincial council, but also they could act as deputy governor

in thee absence of governor-general.523

The proclamation of Tanzimat in Baghdad was also reflected in the increase

in the number of officials in the provinces. As the Tanzimat reforms, especially the

vilâyet law and Land code, were implemented in Baghdad, the number of provincial

officials gradually increased. The lists of officials, which the provincial yearbooks

and archival documents provide us for the period under survey, reflect the

considerable expansion and diversification, which occurred in government activities

during the Tanzimat period.524 The increase was not only in the number of the

officials but also in their ranks and salaries. The improvement in the conditions of the

officials was a matter underlined in the Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu. In his dispatch to

the Sublime Porte, Necip Pasha notified several issues, of which the promotion in the

ranks and salaries of the some of the provincial officials occupy considerable place.

For the governor, the promotions would encourage the officials and result in more

efficiency in the provincial administration. Most of the officials listed by Necip

Pasha were promoted. Not surprisingly the promoted officials included Necip

Pasha’s son, Ahmed Şükrü Bey, and his relative Sadık Bey, mal müdürü of the

province.525 In the list there were not only administrative and military officials, but

also there were tribal sheikhs too.526

523 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 116. 524 For example, BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 (12 March 1871) is a good indicator of provincial division of labor. 525 BOA, İ. MMH. 2059, 21 Ra 1263 (9 March 1847). 526 Necip Pasha’s wish to promote Vadi Bey and sheikh of the Muntafiq tribe to the rank of mîralây (commander of regiment) was not accepted wholly; instead due to previous inconveniences in similar cases, the Porte sufficed to promote them to the rank of ıstabl-ı âmire. Ibid.

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From these promotions Necip Pasha got his share too. An imperial decree

dated 3 Ca 1264 (7 April 1848) is quite interesting in that the official title of the

governor in Baghdad was exalted and in the official correspondence between the

Porte and the province, the title “devletlu”, instead of “atufetlu”, began to be used.527

Although very much related to the re-arrangement of imperial titulature, this change

was an indicator of the significance of Baghdad governorship, which was assigned to

leading viziers.528 The irade-i seniyye also pointed the distinction of Baghdad from

other governorships by stating that Baghdad cannot be compared with other

provinces (Bağdad eyâleti sâ’ir yerlere kıyâsı kabûl etmeyip…). As a corollary of

this, the governor of Baghdad, Necip Pasha, was awarded with an imperial medal,

nişan-i âlî, which was peculiar to leading ministers (vükelâ-yı fehâm).529 In order to

further increase the prestige and dignity of the governor (tezyîd-i vak‘ ve itibar), the

imperial medal was given with an imperial fermân (fermân-ı âlî).530

Promotions in the ranks naturally meant an increase in the salaries, but the

Sublime Porte was against an untimely expenditure. Since the revenues of Baghdad

were farmed out at the beginning of the financial year (March), an extra payment that

was not cited in the list of provincial expenditures would mean deficit in the 527 BOA, İ. DAH, 9046, 3 Ca 1264 (7 April 1848). 528 Ali Akyıldız, Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004, pp.115-116. 529 BOA, İ. DAH, 9046, 3 Ca 1264 (7 April 1848). “Bağdad vâlîsi atûfetlu Necib Paşa hazretleri[nin] bunca manâsıb-ı mu‘tâde bulunmuş kıdemli bendegân-ı hazret-i şâhâneden olduğuna ve me’mûriyetleri dahi …. bulunduğuna binâen sâ’ir vülât-ı izâmdan imtiyâzları zımnında kendülerine bundan böyle yazılacak tahrirâtta atûfetlu yerine devletlu tahrîr olunarak bu müsâ‘ade-i seniyyenin takvîm-i vekâyi‘a dahi derc olunması ve Bağdad eyâleti sâ’ir yerlere kıyâsı kabûl etmeyip el-hâletü hâzihi vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretlerinin bir takım mevâdd-ı mühimmeye dahi me’mûriyeti olduğundan daha ziyâde nüfûz ve i‘tibârını mucib olmak için şimdiki nişânı bu tarafa celb kılınmak üzere kendisine vükelâ-yı fehâma mahsûs nişân-ı âlîlerden bir kıt‘a nişân-ı zî-şân inâyet u ihsân buyrulması sûretleri münâsib gibi mütâla‘a olunmuş ise de ol bâbda her ne vechle emr u fermân ….”. 530 BOA, İ. DAH, 9087, 20 Ca 1264 / 24 April 1848. “Bağdad vâlîsi devletlu paşa hazretlerine inâyet u ihsân buyrulmuş olan vükelâlık nişân-ı âlîsi tanzîm ve i‘mâl olunarak cânib-i Bâb-ı Âlî’ye gönderilmiş ve vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretlerinin tezyîd-i vak‘ ve i‘tibârı zımnında nişân-ı zî-şân-ı mezkûrun bir fermân-ı âlî ile irsâli münâsib gibi mutâla‘a kılınmış olduğundan ol bâbda…” (This irâde also includes the draft of the imperial decree in its supplement (lef 1).

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provincial budget. Necip Pasha’s offer on the new arrangement in the custom tariffs

for dried and fresh fruits (meyve-i huşk ve ter) as a source of new revenue to meet the

salary expenditures was accepted by the Sublime Porte. Further promotions were

done in September 1847.531

The governors of Baghdad were occasionally warned by the Sublime Porte for

the provision of unity in administration (usûl-ı ittihâd ve itttifâk).532 The Sublime

Porte even made the high-ranking officials responsible for any disunity in this matter.

During the governorship of Abdi Pasha the officials of the province were required to

take oath for the prevention of bribery and corruption.533 Later, in accordance with

the regulations in 1858, officials were admonished to be honest, to protect the people

form misrule, to treat the subjects well and observe their rights, to take special care of

the notables and the council members, to treat everyone equally regardless of religion

or race, and to avoid misrule of all kinds.534

Apart from Muslim (Arab and Turkish) bureaucrats, the province of Baghdad

had considerable officials who belonged to other religions and nationalities. Ömer

Lütfi Pasha used officials of Polish (Lehistan) origin, of whom İskender Pasha was

the most well-known.535 The fact that the pasha was of Hungarian origin, should have

played significant role in this. As will be noted below, the number of such officials

increased with the governorship of Midhat Pasha in 1869.

531 BOA, İ. MVL, 2330, 15 L 1263 (26 September 1847). 532 For such a warning see, BOA, I.MVL. 7043, 24 Ş 1267 (24 June 1851). It should be noted that at this period the offices of müşîr and governor (Namık Pasha and Vecihi Pasha respectively) had not been yet united and the Sublime Porte drew attention to the necessity of collaboration in provincial affairs. 533 BOA, AMKT. UM, 12/46, 27 Ca 1266 (10 April 1850). 534 Shaw, p. 90. 535 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 117.

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Due to its remoteness from the center Baghdad was perceived as a place for

banishment. There were considerable provincial officers, who resigned from their

offices and left Baghdad. The fact that they could not get used to the water and

weather (âb-ı havâsına imtizâc edememek) in Baghdad was the common pretext for

resignation. Therefore, it was difficult to bring talented bureaucrats to Baghdad. Let

alone Baghdad, there was intensive need for qualified personnel in Istanbul as well.

There was no professional cadre to be recruited for the implementation of the reform

in the capital, as well as in the province.

The Tanzimat reforms increased the number of provincial officials

significantly. Following the implementation of the Provincial Law, new officials were

appointed from the center to replace the tribal rulers. Also as in other provinces,

officials such as hükkâm-ı şer‘iyye and merkez kâtibi were sent to Baghdad.536

Similarly, the province of Baghdad had many clerks with language talents, because

the geographical / demographic conditions of the province necessitated officials who

commanded languages such as Persian and Arabic. However, even long after the

proclamation of Tanzimat, the provincial governors were in need of personnel for the

conduct of ordinary affairs.537 The patronage of governors was the most widely used

method in recruiting officials for the provincial bureaucracy.

Despite these difficulties, however, Midhat Pasha had an established cadre,

which he brought to provinces he went. After his appointment to Baghdad, Midhat

Pasha called his cadre to meet in Istanbul. The first group that went to Baghdad with

Midhat Pasha included 104 people. In this group there were leading bureaucrats and

intellectuals like Ahmed Midhat, later the editor of Zewra newspaper, and Osman

536 For appointment of hükkâm-ı şer‘iyye and merkez kâtibi, to provinces, including Baghdad see BOA, I. DAH. 39494, 4 C 1284 (3 October 1867) and İ. DAH. 41397, 8 Ra 1286 (18 June 1869). 537 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 19.

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Hamdi Bey.538 Ahmed Midhat mentions others who came after this first group,

including his big brother Şakir Bey.539 The transfer of qualified officials continued for

long periods. Almost six months after the appointment of Midhat Pasha to Baghdad,

Ahmed Edib, the former teftîş reisi in Tuna, was appointed as assistant mutasarrıf in

Baghdad sancak.540

Among Midhat Pasha’s established cadre, Odian Efendi, Kılıç Vasıf Efendi,

Ahmet Midhat Efendi, İsmail Kemal Bey, (Ahmed) Şakir Bey, and Karol Brzozowski

were the closest ones.541 Karol Brzozowski was of Polish origin and after

participating in the Polish-Hungarian revolution of 1849 he took refuge in Ottoman

Empire. Then he worked with Midhat Pasha in Danube (Tuna) province as engineer

and followed him in Baghdad, acting as the counselor of Midhat Pasha.542 Ahmet

Midhat, who worked with the Pasha in Rusçuk, provincial center of Tuna, also came

with Midhat Pasha to Baghdad.543 Similarly, Osman Hamdi Bey was invited by

Midhat Pasha from Paris and began to work in the office of foreign affairs.544 The

high calibre of provincial bureaucrats paved, from time to time, the way for

538 Ahmed Midhat, p. 139. 539 Ibid., p.139. Şakir Bey was the future Yâver-i Ekrem of Sultan Abdülhamid II. For the appointment of Şakir Bey to merkez mutasarrıflığı and Raif Efendi to vilâyet muavinliği see BOA, İ. DAH. 40912, Lef 1, 13 Za 1285 (25 Februuary 1869). 540 Zewra, No: 26. Similarly, Nuri Efendi, the former chief scribe in the criminal council of Ruscuk, was appointed as the chair of criminal council of Baghdad. 541 Odian and Vasıf Efendis were of Armenian and Croatian origin respectively. Ortaylı, Midhat Paşa'nın, pp.227-8. 542 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 57. 543 Ahmed Midhat stayed in Baghdad almost two years. When his big brother Şakir Bey, then mutasarrıf of Basra, died, he sent his family to İstanbul and stayed 8 months more in Baghdad. When he wanted to leave Baghdad for İstanbul, his first resignation was not accepted by Midhat Pasha, but later he reluctantly allowed him to go. See Ahmed Midhat, pp. 147-148 and 151. 544 For Osman Hamdi’s service in Baghdad see, Eldem, “Osman Hamdi”.

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intellectual discussions.545 When Midhat Pasha arrived Baghdad as the governor of

the city, he was accompanied by Şakir Bey, lieutenant Governor (mutasarrıf) of

Baghdad, Raif Bey, secretary (mu‘âvin), Hamdi Bey attaché (müdür) for foreign

affairs, together with several subordinate officers of different grades.546 Later, the

pasha also appointed his nephew as kaymakam of Hillah district.547

One of the important characteristics of this cadre was that they were sincere in

provincial service. Ahmed Midhat narrates that there was no room around Midhat

Pasha for profit-minded officers who strolled from province to province to make

more money.548 The pasha treated the local population equally, regardless of their

religion, ethnicity, and language. He recruited non-Muslim people, who were of

Armenian, Croat, Polish etc. origins, in his close circle.549 His son, Ali Haydar

Midhat, also informs us that Midhat Pasha recruited Jews in the security affairs.550

Furthermore, Midhat Pasha recruited the local population in the provincial

administration. Besides these, by recruiting more responsible and qualified personnel

(as he could find) he tried to raise the standard of responsibility in public offices.

According to the vilâyet law the provincial officers like defterdâr, kadi, and müşîr

were to be appointed by the related ministers in Istanbul. However, due to the

aforementioned difficulties in recruiting talented bureaucrats, Midhat Pasha was

tolerated by the Sublime Porte in this regard and his recruitment of high ranking

officers was generally approved by the Sublime Porte.

545 Ahmed Midhat, pp. 147-48. 546 FO 195; 949, 26 May 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. 547 Jwaideh, Midhat Pasha, p. 116. 548 Ahmed Midhat, p. 148. 549 Ortaylı, Midhat Paşa'nın, p.227. 550 Ali Haydar Midhat, Hatıralarım (1872-1946), İstanbul: Midhat Akçin Yayını, 1946, p.73.

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Chapter IV

Tanzimat As Applied in Ottoman Baghdad

It is clear that the reform attempts and re-structuring of the empire made the

nineteenth century not only the “longest century”, but at the same time the most

important century. There is no doubt that the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) was very

crucial for the modernization of the Ottoman Empire, since it contained

administrative, financial, social and legal reforms that affected both the center and

the periphery of the empire.551 The reform attempts were not only applied in the

central lands of the empire, but they were also tried to be implemented in the

provinces on the periphery as well.

Most of the studies focusing on the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms

concentrated either on the Balkan or the Anatolian provinces.552 As Ochsenwald

pointed out, while most students of the nineteenth-century Ottoman political history

have concentrated on the central provinces of the empire, students of Arab political

history of the same period have concentrated on anti-Ottoman nationalism centered

551 Although there are different interpretations concerning the end point of the Tanzimat Era, Abdulhamid II’s accession to throne in 1876 is the most commonly accepted turning point. See Coşkun Çakır, “Türk Aydınının Tanzimatla İmtihanı: Tanzimat ve Tanzimat Dönemi Siyasi Tarihi Üzerine Yapılan Çalışmalar”, TALID, Vol. 2, No: 1, 2004, pp. 9-10. 552 Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, Ankara: TTK, 1943; Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu; Meropi Anastassiadou, Salonique, 1830-1912: Une Ville Ottomane à l'âge des Réformes, Leiden; New York: Brill, 1997; Bülent Özdemir, Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Reflections from Salonica, 1830-1850, PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2000; Yonca Köksal, Imperial Center and Local Groups, pp. 107-138 and idem, “Transformation of a Central State: Application of the Reforms in Bulgaria (1839-1878)”, Toplum ve Tarih, Winter 2000.

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in Cairo and Beirut.553 Therefore, the Arab provinces with regard to Tanzimat

reforms were neglected for a long time. The fact that the Tanzimat reforms were

naturally less attractive in the Arab provinces of the empire than the Balkan

provinces might have played a role in this. However, provinces like Syria, Lebanon,

Palestine and Jordan were luckier, because considerable work has recently appeared

concerning these provinces.554 The gap for the Iraqi provinces remains still largely

unfilled. In this sense this chapter attempts to contribute in filling this gap.

In this chapter, I will first focus on the proclamation of the Tanzimat in the

province of Baghdad. The answers for the questions of “What brought Tanzimat to

the province, what were the novelties in provincial administration?” will be sought in

this chapter. Since this chapter will mainly dwell upon administrative reforms in the

province of Baghdad, emphasis will be given on the establishment of provincial

councils and implementation of Provincial Law of 1864.

The introduction of both the provincial law of 1864 and the Land Code of

1858 in Ottoman Iraq was crucial in that they had lasting influences in the

subsequent history of Baghdad. The newly introduced provincial system not only

witnessed the withdrawal of the empire from Iraq during the First World War, but

also it remained substantially the same ever since, under British rule and then in the

independent State of Iraq. On the other hand, the Ottoman Land Code had constant

results for the tribal structure of Iraq. However, as the tribal structure of the country

and the land-people relations are explored in the next chapter, I found it more

appropriate to explain the implementation of the Land Code of 1858 there.

***

553 William L. Ochsenwald, “Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877-1886”, IJMES, 6, (1975), p. 300. 554 For example, see Ma‘oz’s Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine; Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Engin Deniz Akarlı, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920, London: 1993.

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After its proclamation in Gülhâne in 1839, the Tanzimat Edict was published

in the Takvim-i Vekâyi and its copies were sent to every province and district. The

edict was sent to Baghdad with kapucular kethüdâsı Osman Efendi in the beginning

of 1256/1840. Upon the arrival of the edict, a crowd of people was gathered to the

presence of the governor Ali Rıza Pasha. The qadi, the mufti, the ulemâ, eimme-i

hutebâ, the notables, and the inhabitants of the province, including groups from

merchants, manufacturers, artisans and tradesmen, participated in the meeting. The

edict was read in public. In order to provide a wider understanding the edict was read

both in Turksih and Arabic and it was celebrated with shooting of rifles and

cannons.555 Then the edict was further sent to districts and sub-districts of Baghdad.

Similarly, in Mosul, the people were gathered in the saray meydânı (court square),

and the same public ceremony was held here.556

The arrival of the Tanzimat Edict did not, however, mean the opening of a

new period for Baghdad, because it did not go beyond a formal ceremony. Therefore,

nothing had changed until the genuine incorporation of the province into the range of

Tanzimat reforms in March 1260 (March 1844). It seems that in the first years, the

central government limited Tanzimat reforms to certain provinces, which were closer

to the center and therefore had no security problems. It was only with the second

wave of 1844-1845 that outer provinces such as Erzurum, Diyarbakır557, Harput558,

Malatya, Bosnia and Baghdad were put under Tanzimat reforms. It is also of

555 BOA, İ. DAH, 705, lef 5, 9 R 1256 (10 June 1840) and İrade-i Meclis-i Vala, 2981, 29 Ra 1264 (5 March 1848). 556 BOA, İ. DAH, 705, lef 1, 15 S 1256 (18 April 1840). 557 For the application of Tanzimat reforms in Diyarbakır, see İbrahim Yılmazçelik, XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Diyarbakır, Ankara, 1995. 558 For the application of Tanzimat reforms in Harput, see Ahmet Aksın, “Tanzimatın Harput Eyaletinde Uygulanması ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler” Belleten, Vol. LXII, No: 235, 1999, pp. 851-61.

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considerable importance that the provinces that were brought to the range of

Tanzimat with this second wave show significant overlapping with the provinces to

which no muhassıls were appointed. Consequently, Necip Pasha is often referred as

the governor who started the Tanzimat reforms in Baghdad. Nevertheless, Necip

Pasha noted that due to Iraq’s special geo-political conditions the Tanzimat reforms

could only be implemented gradually (…bu havâlînin icâbât-ı mevki‘iyesinden

dolayı usûl-i mehâsin-şumûl-i Tanzimâtın ale’t-tedrîc icrâsına teşebbüsle...).559

In Mosul, it was Vecihi Pasha who inaugurated the Tanzimat reforms in 1848.

Though Mosul was geographically closer to Istanbul, it was incorporated into the

range of Tanzimat relatively late. Similarly, Shahrizor (Kirkuk) was brought into the

range of Tanzimat in 1847. The relatively late incorporation of these places was due

to the fact that these regions were part of Ottoman Iraq (hıtta-i Irakiyye), whose

center was Baghdad. The hierarchical structure among the Iraqi provinces seems to

be the main reason for the delay in the application of the Tanzimat in Mosul and

Shahrizor. As it will be discussed below, it was almost unthinkable for these places

to have Tanzimat institutions before they were put into effect in Baghdad. This was

in fact the reflection of Ottoman centralization and modernization process, which run

from top down and followed a certain hierarchy.

What did the Tanzimat reforms mean for the Iraqi people is a matter of

debate, but several headings come to the forefront. First of all, the pre-Tanzimat

arbitrariness in provincial rule was to be abolished. This arbitrariness included

among other things, oppression, injustice, execution without trial and extortion of

money from the local people either through the mültezims or unjust taxes. It is known

that in many provinces rulers levied arbitrary taxes under various names such as

559 BOA, İ. MMH, 2046, 10 Ş 1262, (3 August 1846).

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“ ikramiye”, “ mübaşiriye”, “ devriye”, “ hediye baha”, “ masarif”, and “cerime”.

Arbitrary levies that were imposed by provincial officials were to be abolished. This

was especially the case when the provincial officials traveled between sub-provinces;

during their journeys they levied their needs on the people of locality. However, after

the proclamation of Tanzimat, the Iraqi people were instructed not to give anything

without payment (ahâlîden meccânen bir şey alınmaması) and to report those who do

not act accordingly.560

Similarly, Necip Pasha instructed provincial officials not to accept gifts and

this order was met by the local people with surprise. Such measures were put into

effect so as to prevent bribery in the provincial administration. However, as the

European travel accounts suggest, the provincial officials continued to take gifts,

because, as Lady Anne Blunt puts it, acceptance of presents by the men in office was

not considered to be a dishonorable idea, rather they hold it to be part of their

salary.561 Despite strict measures, as emphasized in the text of the Gülhane Hatt-ı

Hümayunu, the state was unable to overcome the problem of bribery.

During the governorship of Abdi Pasha the officials of the province were

required to take oath for the prevention of bribery and corruption.562 However,

despite such measures, corruption could not have been prevented. In the period under

study (1831-1872), there were serious corruption allegations not only for the low

level officials but also for the governor-generals too. Ali Rıza Pasha, Necip Pasha,

Ömer Lütfü Pasha, Mustafa Nuri Pasha, and Takiyüddin Pasha were considered to be

560 BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264 (5 March 1848). 561 Lady Anne Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968, Vol. 1, p. 203. 562 BOA, AMKT. UM, 12/46, 27 Ca 1266 (10 April 1850).

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corrupt.563 The cases of Necip Pasha and Mustafa Nuri Pasha were put under

investigation by the central government, but both governors were acquitted.564

Midhat Pasha too had to struggle with the arbitrariness in provincial

bureaucracy, which was deeply rooted in the general political and social state of

affairs and to a great extent intertwined with the interests of the local notables. For

Midhat Pasha, bureaucratic reform should be based on more control, supervision and

better pay.565 Full control over the provincial officials was Midhat’s greatest desire.

One of the striking problems in Baghdad was the interest of the notables that was

deeply rooted in the administrative units. Bribery and special treatment were

ordinary things for these notables. Christoph Herzog, who stresses that corruption

was one of the important factors in the failure of Ottoman modernization,

summarizes the situation clearly:

What were the most frequent acts of corruption reported in connection with upper level administrator in Baghdad? By far the most profitable and easy one seems to have been to charge an extra ‘gift’ for farming out the right to collect taxes. Another seems to have been to blackmail tribal sheikhs for large amounts in cash and kind (especially valuable horses). If the sheikh did not comply, the vali threatened to support a rival. This practice tended to be especially harmful as it easily led to tribal unrest with potentially disastrous economic consequences.566

563 Christoph Herzog, “Corruption and Limit of the State in the Ottoman Province of Baghdad During the Tanzimat”, The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies (MIT-EJMES), Vol. 3, Spring 2003, p. 39. 564 The allegations against Ali Rıza Pahsa was investigated during his governorship in Damascus, but it is not clear whether this investigation covered the allegations regarding his governorship in Baghdad, For these allegations see Al-Bustanî, pp. 356-368. For the investigation against Necip Pasha BOA, İ. DAH. 13041, 21 Za 1266 (28 September 1850); İ. MMAH. 4890, Gurre-i C 1266 (14 April 1850); 5488, 20 Za 1266 (27 September 1850); 12183, 11 C 1270 (1 March 1855). For the investigation against Mustafa Nuri Pasha see BOA, İ. MMAH. 986, 29 M 1278 (6 August 1861) (“Bağdat valisi Mustafa Nuri Paşa’nın muhakemesi keyfiyyetine dair”), 1174, 29 M 1280 (16 July 1863) (“Bağdat valisi Mustafa Nuri Paşa’nın ve mensubatının rivayet olunan ihtilaslarının tahkikine dair”). 565 Davision, “Midhat Pahsa”, EI, p.1032. 566 Cristoph Herzog, Corruption and Limits of the State in the Ottoman Province of Baghdad during the Tanzimat, The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 3, Spring, 2003, p. 40-41. http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/

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Being aware of this situation, Midhat Pasha prohibited the system by which

the sheikhs, when visiting the head quarters of the local administration, were

accustomed to give presents of money, horses etc. to the authorities, which was an

instrument in the hands of the sheikhs of extorting heavy contributions from their

people.567 Hence, better payment was required in order to prevent bribes. Herzog,

examining 11 Tanzimat governors of Baghdad in terms of acts of corruption, states

that there is no information on corruption concerning Midhat Pasha himself;

however, he indicates that there were instances of corruption among high level rulers

during his tenure.568 Midhat Pasha did not tolerate corruption and maladministration;

he dismissed many people for their guilt and they were tried in the courts.569

In Baghdad, it was also announced that the lives, properties and honors of

everyone were put under imperial protection, and there would be no longer any

unjust oppression, coercion, and payment of cerime. The people would no longer be

exposed to beating and swearing. The governor also stated that the tithe tax (öşr)

would be 1/10, as it is literally pronounced. However, for almost two decades, local

people continued to pay tithe tax as high as 2/3 and ½ of the total produce.570 It was

not until the governorship of Midhat Pasha that the tithe tax was partially applied for

certain (industrial) agricultural products.

At the beginning the reduction of the agricultural taxes from 2/3 to 1/10 was

thought to have negative consequences for the provincial treasury, but Midhat

Pasha’s plan was different. As will be explained in detail in the next chapter, the land

567 PRO, FO 195; 949. From Herbert to Constantinople, 15 September 1869. 568 Herzog, “Corruption”, p. 39. 569 For instance, high ranking local officials such as mutasarrıf of Basra, Süleyman Bey, were dismissed and judged in the local court. See Zewra, No: 35. 570 Issues related to land and agricultural taxes will be dealt in the next chapter.

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system was not encouraging the local people to cultivate further to their best. By

giving title deeds, Midhat Pasha expected an increase in agricultural products up to

tenfold. Hence, the 1/10 taxation of tenfold increased production was bigger than the

2/3 of the old amount of agricultural products.571 For instance, he reduced the

taxation for rice cultivation to 1/10 and in the course of just one year the rice

production increased twofold, began to meet the needs of provincial markets. And it

was thought that with this increase, export of rice was even possible for 1871-72.572

Furthermore, by denouncing the misdeeds of the past (mezâlim ve te‘addiyât-ı

sâlife) and putting emphasis on a just rule, the local administration tried to make the

local people feel the advent of a new period. Unlike the autocratic rule of the

previous provincial governors, the rule of law came to be articulated more frequently

(kâffe-i husûsât şer‘-i şerîf ve kânûn-ı münîfe tatbîkan ve usûl-i hakkâniyete tevfîkan

tanzîm ve rü’yet olunmalıdır).573 The governor proclaimed that elders and juniors

were his fathers and sons respectively, and his door would be open to everyone in the

province. With these premises, the proclamation of the Tanzimat in Ottoman Iraq

was certainly welcomed not only by people of the locality but also by the consuls of

the European states, especially Britain and France.574

The introduction of Tanzimat principles had also its reflections in farming out

the revenues of the province. In 1840s the provincial revenues were farmed out to

571 For a detailed calculation of this see Zewra, No: 61. 572 Ibid. 573 BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264 (5 March 1848). 574 “... Necip Paşa merhûmun vâlîliğinde oralarda Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye usûlünün icrâsı ve mezâlim-i sâbıkanın ref‘ ve imhâsı cihetiyle sâye-i şâhânede yine ma‘mûriyete rucû‘ eylediği yerlüleri mu‘teberânından işidilmiştir ve Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye vaz‘ ve icrâsından derecesiz teşekkür etmekte bulunmuş idiler”, “... Necip Paşa merhûmun oralarda Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye usûl-ı ma‘delet-şumûlünü neşretmesi ve fukarâdan cevr ü ezâyı ber-tarâf eylemesi münâsebetiyle sâye-i şâhânede sekenesinin mazhar oldukları asâyiş-i hâl dîde-i sa‘y-i kûşişlerini açup bu kere de kendüleri efvâc-ı harâbiyeti pây-mâl etmeğe başladılar.”, Mehmed Hurşid Paşa, p. 70 and 90.

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Necip Pasha for a period of four years.575 It is understood that for this affair Necip

Pasha had shown two powerful moneylenders as guarantor. When Necip Pasha was

recalled to İstanbul, his term of maktû‘iyet had not been completed and the new

governor, Reşid Pasha, asked how to manage the provincial revenues. As the result

the Sublime Porte ordered the local government to find a solution, which will not

make a loss for both the provincial treasury and Necip Pasha. For Reşid Pasha, there

were two alternatives: the provincial revenues were either to be farmed out as

(maktû‘iyet usûlü) or emânet usûlü. (Bağdad eyâletinin maktû‘an veyahud

mezûniyet-i kâmile itâsıyla emâneten uhdesine ihâlesi).576 Of the two alternatives,

Reşid Pasha wanted the first, as it was applied during Necip Pasha’s governorship.

However, this time the Sublime Porte rejected his demand on the ground that this

policy (maktû‘iyet usûlü) was not compatible with the Tanzimât principles.

Consequently, the provincial revenues were to be managed with emânet usûlü.577

There were considerable provinces in which the Tanzimat reforms were not

welcomed. While some of the resentments resulted from the principle of equality of

all subject whether Muslim or non-Muslim, some others were related to taxation or

corvee.578 During my research I have not come across any rebellious activity caused

by religious sensibilities in Baghdad, which, apart from Christian subjects, had the

second biggest Jewish population of the empire. The non-Muslims were quite

575 BOA, İ. DAH. 7122, 25 Ra 1263 (13 March 1847) and İ. DAH. 11168, 5 Ş 1265 (25 June 1849). 576 BOA, I. MMAH. 209, 6 S 1272 / 18 october 1855. 577 Ibid., “... Vâlî-i müşârun ileyh [Reşid Paşa] hazretlerinin dermiyân ve icrâsını talep eylediği iki şıktan evvelki sûret üzre emvâl ve masârifât-ı eyâletin maktû‘an ihâlesi usûl-i tanzîmiyyeye tevâfuk etmeyeceğinden o sûret kat‘â tecvîz olunamadığından bazı memurların azil ve nasbı yine bu tarafa inhâ olunmak ve taahhüd olunan 25,000 kise fazla-i varidât tenezzül etmemek şartıyla emâneten idâresi husûsunun vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretleri uhdesine ihâlesi..”. 578 For several examples in this regard see Musa Çadırcı, “Tanzimatın Uygulanması ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler (1840-56)”, Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri, Ankara, 1985, p. 97.

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enthusiastic about the modernity brought by the Tanzimat reforms. The Jews of

Baghdad began to don the fez and wore European-style clothing long before their

Muslim neighbors as the demonstration of their approval of the new order.579

In the mid 1840s Henry Layard reported small incidents against British

citizens, instigated by the local qadi in Mosul; however, such incidents were not

against the Tanzimat principles or the non-Muslim existence in the province. Rather,

it was a reaction to the archeological excavations of the foreign travelers.580

Mutinous activities were only seen in the application of reforms that restricted the

former tribal life, such as the application of Land Reform of 1858 and the settlement

of the tribes.

Moreover, the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims were reported to

be exceptionally well. Despite the multi-religious and multi-ethnic characteristic of

the region, the people of the province co-existed peacefully. In the words of James

Felix Jones, who visited Baghdad in mid the 1850s,

Nor, perhaps, can we witness such toleration among the masses as Baghdad exhibits. The Jew and the Christian could always be seen here on horseback; while, in other places, their co-religionists were compelled either to pace on foot, or to bestride an ass, as a mark of inferior condition. They enjoy indeed a rare freedom here, in comparison with other Mahomedan towns.581

The Tanzimat reforms brought new arrangements concerning the non-Muslim

daily lives. The newly constructed millet hierarchies were also reflected in the

province of Baghdad. As a corollary of this, the office of chief rabbi (haham başı)

was imported to Baghdad. As the rabbis in Baghdad reasserted their authority with

579 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 137. 580 Austen Henry Layard, Ninova ve Kalıntıları, İstanbul: Avesta Yayınları, 2000, pp. 38 and 61. 581 James Felix Jones, Memoirs of Baghdad, Kurdistan and Turkish Arabia, 1857, London: Archive Editions, 1998, p. 339.

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the Tanzimat reforms to govern the Jewish community, the office of nasi, which

remained central in the administrative life of Baghdad’s Jews, disappeared. This was

significant in that earlier this office could be occupied by Jewish bankers without the

consent of those he governed.582

The non-Muslims could practice their beliefs freely and they could even build

new worshipping places, especially churches.583 Though the non-Muslims did not

encounter any problem in Baghdad, their lebensraum seems to be more enlarged

after the proclamation of Islahât Fermânı, because the archival documents that

allowed the construction and repair of the worshipping places date after 1856. As

regards the obligations of non-Muslims in the province, we have evidence indicating

the payment of the poll tax, cizye. However, sometimes problems concerning which

authority was to collect the poll tax of certain area were a matter of disagreement

between the rulers of Mosul and Baghdad.584 Another problem pertaining to the

payment of poll tax was that some of the non-Muslims, especially Jews, were

unwilling to pay the tax on the ground that they had lands and therefore had already

been Ottoman subjects (tebe‘a-i Osmaniye).585 However, the government rejected the

assertions of these Jews, who were originally Persian. On the one hand the

acquisition of land and other properties did not alter the citizenship (teba‘iyet) of a

582 Masters, p. 63. 583 On the construction of Armanian and Assyrian (Catholic) churches in Mosul see BOA, İ. HRC. 7563, 14 N 1273, (8 May 1857) and İ. HRC. 9046, 4 Za 1275, (8 May 1857). 584 BOA, A. MKT. 73/14, 3 R 1263 (21 March 1847) gave the right to collect the poll tax of Kirkuk and Erbil to Baghdad, rather than Mosul. 585 BOA, İ. HRC. 2205, 18 Ş 1264 (20 July 1848).

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certain group within the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the poll tax was to be

paid by all non-Muslims whether they were Ottoman subjects of not.586

One of the first things that Necip Pasha did in the context of the application of

Tanzimat was to ask for the copies of laws and regulations concerning the land,

taxation, and provincial councils etc., to be sent to Baghdad. For instance, he

demanded the new regulations concerning the sale of the lands to foreigners, the

ihtisab tax, the peasants and the provincial councils.587 By looking the imperial

regulations and the application of these regulations in other provinces, the Pasha tried

to implement them in Baghdad.

The governorship of Namık Pasha witnessed the extension of Tanzimat in the

province of Baghdad. He strived for the expansion of administrative control towards

the tribal areas. Though Tanzimat was announced in the province, the tribally

dominant areas were almost untouched. For instance, he wanted to incorporate the

Muntafiq region into the Tanzimat principles.588 For this end, Namık Pasha converted

some of the tribal areas into kaymakamlıks. Albu Muhammad and Muntafiq were

among these places. Though Namık Pasha’s attempts in this regard were not totally

successful, he prepared the necessary background for his successors, particularly

Midhat Pasha.

Another means of decreasing tribal dominance was the abolition of tribal law.

Midhat Pasha strived for the abolition of the tribal law and the implementation of

586 It is interesting that contrary to common practice the Persian non-Muslims, who resided temporarily in Baghdad, were required to pay poll-tax. The statuses of Persian Jews were actually ambiguous; they were neither Ottoman citizen nor visitors residing temporarily. 587 BOA, İ. MMH. 2059, lef 4, 21 Ra 1263 (9 March 1847) and İ. MMH, 2046, 10 Ş 1262, (3 August 1846). 588 “… eyâletin her bir mahallinde Tanzimât-ı hayriyye icrâ olunub da bu yerin [Muntafiq] bu hâlde bırakılmasına yüce eşitlik râzı olmayacağı bedîi olduğundan…”, Sinaplı, p. 204.

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imperial law and order.589 Earlier, it was the tribal law, rather than imperial law,

ahkâm-ı şer‘iyye ve kânûniyye, that was implemented in practice and the sheikh was

the only source of authority.590 In this context, the implementation of the Vilâyet

usûlü served to the dissolution of the tribal structure of the province.

The Tanzimat Edict also notified the people for awaiting further orders and

regulations, of which the establishment of local councils, the Provincial Law of 1864

and the Land Code of 1858 were perhaps the most significant ones. Leaving the

application of the Land Code to the next chapter, I will now attempt to explain the

establishment of the provincial councils and the implementation of the Provincial

Law of 1864.

Establishment of Provincial Councils in Ottoman Iraq

Although the Tanzimat Edict contained nothing about representative government, the

participation of people to provincial politics came to be one of the principles of the

Tanzimat Period. There had been a general tendency to start representative

government with the first Ottoman parliament and constitution of 1876. Though this

is true for a well-developed national scheme of representation, the provincial

councils provided the necessary background and culmination for it.591 As Gerber

pointed out, while the pre-Tanzimat administration was characterized, among other

things, by very few contacts with the ordinary citizens, the provincial councils in the

589 For a review of the literature on tribal law see Frank H. Stewart, “Tribal Law in the Arab World: A Review of the Literature”, IJMES, 19, (1987), pp. 473-490. 590 The sheikh could even confiscate the properties of those who opposed his authority. Furthermore, the cases of murder and adultery were not brought to the court, rather there were formerly specified fines for each case, like 500 şâmî for adultery and 1,000 şâmî for murder to be paid to the sheikh. Zewra, No. 11. 591 Roderic H. Davison, The Advent of the Principle of Representation, p. 96.

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Tanzimat era came to fill the gap between the ruler and the ruled.592 It is also quite

interesting that the movement toward representative government did not come from

the center, but it was inaugurated in the provinces.593 As Shaw pointed out,

representative government entered the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire as part of

the process by which the Men of Tanzimat sought to extend the power of the central

government and to limit the powers of provincial governors.594

The provincial councils, which were created in accordance with an imperial

fermân dated 3 Za 1255 (7 February 1840), were the leading units of provincial

administration established by the central government; however, before these councils

many provinces had local divans which met infrequently upon governor’s call. The

fermân of 1840 ordered the establishment of local councils in places where muhassıls

were appointed from the center.595 The purpose for creating these local councils was

not to form representative bodies, but to help the muhassıls, who replaced the

mültezims, in collecting taxes. Hence, the primary motive behind them was to

improve tax collection. As the institution of muhassıllık was abolished in 1842, the

council of the muhassıl was transformed to provincial council named Memleket

Meclisleri, but no radical change was made during this transformation.596 In a

nutshell, in provinces where muhassıllık was instituted, the provincial councils

appeared as a metamorphosis of muhassıl councils.

592 Gerber, “A New Look at the Tanzimat”, p. 35. 593 Ibid., p. 97. 594 Shaw, p. 56. 595 Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 212. 596 Ibid., p. 215.

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Advisory councils in Baghdad As in many provinces, Baghdad had a provincial divân before the establishment of

Tanzimat councils. This divan was comprised of administrative officials such as the

defterdâr (secretary of the divân and chief tax collector), court chamberlain, scribe,

and Bâbü’l-Arab.597 As it was mentioned previously, no muhassıl had ever been sent

to Ottoman Iraq; therefore, no muhassıl council existed at all. But this was

compensated by the advisory councils (şûra meclisleri) in Baghdad. The advisory

councils can be traced back to the pre-Tanzimat period and the main concern of the

state in creating these councils was to assist state officials in military, civil and

religious (şer‘î) matters. This application was implemented in many provinces, but

Baghdad did not have such an advisory council until 1841. Consequently, in Iraq, the

provincial advisory council was not the continuation of the muhassıl council, but the

old institution of advisory councils.

In 1841, the dispatch of Ali Rıza Pasha, then the governor of the far-flung

Baghdad province, to Sublime Porte indicates that a provincial council in Baghdad

was already created by 12 June (12 R 1257) of the same year.598 In his dispatch Ali

Rıza Pasha asked the Sublime Porte to send the regulations (nizâmnâme) concerning

the provincial councils that was earlier sent to other provinces. Accordingly, the

council in Baghdad was comprised of provincial civil and military officials, notables

as well as representatives of Jewish and Christian communities (…Bağdatın

halkından ve erkân ve bazı mute‘ayyinâtından ve oralarda bulunan zâbıtân-ı

askeriyyeden intihâb ve ta‘yîn olunan azâsı...). The Sublime Porte ratified the list of

the members of the provincial council, but it put one condition forward: Since

597 Longrigg, Four Centuries, pp. 250-251. 598 BOA, İ. DAH. 2133, 21 R 1257 (12 June 1841)

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Baghdad was a place of exception; it was required to send monthly detailed reports

to Istanbul regarding the matters on security and provincial affairs.599

The advisory council gathered in the residence of the governor (Ali Rıza

Pasha) three days in a week, namely on Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays. Each day

was allocated for the discussion of specific themes: On Sunday, mîrî, financial,

matters related to Grand Vizierate, and other important affairs; on Tuesday, religious,

administrative and all other legal (both örfî and şer‘î) issues; and on Thursday, topics

pertaining military issues were discussed. And for each of these issues specific

commissions were set up.

The members who met on Sunday were the actual permanent members of the

provincial council. These nine members were enlarged on Tuesdays and Thursdays

with supplementary competent members according to the topics discussed. In this

regard, the permanent members of the council who met on Sundays was comprised

of the following personalities:

- Osman Seyfi Bey (chair of the commission)

- Mîr-i mîrân Osman Paşa

- Süvâri Mîrlivâ İsmail Paşa

- Piyâde Mîrlivâ İbrahim Fethi Paşa

- Abdülkadir Ağa (Custom official of Baghdad)

- Ali Yaver Bey

- İsmail Hakkı Bey

- Hurşid Bey (stamp official, Mühürdâr-ı senâveri)

- İbrahim Besim Efendi (expenditure official)

599 “...meclis-i mezkûr dâhil-i dâire-i Tanzîmât olan mahaller mecâlisi sûretinde vaz‘ olunmuş ise de eyâlet-i mezkûre müstesnâ mahallerden ve her ne ise mesâlih-i memleket ve umûr-ı ibâdın meclis marifeti ve cümle ittifâkıyla rü’yet ve tanzîmi ve husûsuyla vukûât-ı Irakiyyenin beher mâh mazbatalarıyla bu taraf iş‘âr ve terkîmi suhûlet-i idâre ve menfeât-i mülkiyeyi müstelzim olacağı melhûzâttan olduğuna...”, Ibid.,

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The Tuesday commission is attention-grabbing in that the non-permanent members

of the commission were dominated by religious learned men. This is naturally the

result of the topics to be discussed, that is religious, administrative and all other legal

(both örfî and şer‘î) issues. The Tuesday commission was comprised of the following

personalities:

- All permanent members of the council

- The provincial judge (qadı)

- Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, müftü of Baghdad

- Muhammed Said Efendi, Ex-müftü

- Abdullah Efendi, müftü of Şâfiî sect

- Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, nakîb of Baghdad

- İbrahim Paşa-zade Abdülkadir Bey, one of Kurdistan amirs

- Ahmed Ağa, ex-mütesellim of Basra

- Zehîr-zâde Abdüllatif Çelebi, merchant

- Butros, son of İskender, Christian merchant

- Yasef Serkız, Christian merchant

- Yasef Gale, from Jewish community

Finally, the Thursday commission was similarly predominated by the military

personalities. The task of this commission was to discuss military affairs and it

included the following personalities:

- All permanent members of the council

- The provincial judge (qadı)

- Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, müftü of Baghdad

- Muhammed Said Efendi, ex-müftü

- Behram Bey, commander of cavalry regiment

- İsmail Bey, commander of tımariot cavalry

- Osman Bey, commander of 1st infantry regiment

- İsmail Bey, commander of 2nd infantry regiment

- Hüseyin Bey, artillery commander

- Hasan Bey, kaymakam of 2nd infantry regiment

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- Seyyid Mahmud Efendi, official of provincial army

All the meetings of the council were recorded by two scribes, namely Şemsi Efendi

and Mehmed Efendi, of whom the latter attended only on Thursdays. The absence of

governor-general in these lists implies that the council functioned independent of Ali

Rıza Pasha. After the dismissal of Ali Rıza Pasha the council began to meet twice a

week.

The Reform of the Provincial Councils The failure of the muhassıls in collecting provincial taxes, and the decrease in the

provincial revenues triggered the Sublime Porte in 1841 to overhaul provincial

administration and make necessary regulations. The sancaks were the basic unite for

the muhassıl councils. When the muhassıllık institution was abolished in March

1842, the muhassıl councils in the sancaks continued to exist, but they were re-

named as küçük meclisler (small councils). The councils in the provincial centers, on

the other hand, were now called büyük meclis or meclis-i kebîr (great council).600

And the term memleket meclisleri referred to both of small and great councils.

According to the new regulations, which were put into effect in late 1842 and

1843, the provincial governors were ordered to establish provincial administrative

councils (eyâlet idâre meclisleri) as soon as possible.601 This regulation was further

strengthened in September 1844, which made the administrative council on all levels

obligatory for all governors.602

600 Musa Çadırcı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Eyalet ve Sancaklarda Meclislerin Oluşturulması”, in Ord. Prof. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’a Armağan, Ankara: TTK, 1985, p. 268. 601 Shaw, p. 78. 602 Ibid., p. 81

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Moreover, in 1845, the Sublime Porte sent inspection teams to provinces,

which were considered to be critical. In this context, an inspection team led by Ragıp

Pasha was sent to Baghdad in 1847.603 Moreover, the Sublime Porte, again in 1845,

summoned two representatives from each eyâlet, and aimed to learn more about the

problems of provincial administrations.604 However, it is not yet clear whether any

representative of Baghdad province came to the capital for this meeting or not.605

The meetings in İstanbul resulted in the creation of administrative councils, meclis-i

idâre-i eyâlet. These councils were first to be applied in five pilot provinces (three

European and two Asian).606

However, it seems that the implementation of the regulations of the 1840s

could only be extended to the provincial periphery in the early 1850s. As far as the

implications of these regulations for Baghdad were concerned, we see that Necip

Pasha (1842-49) re-organized the old provincial advisory council as part of the

Tanzimat reform program. The previous advisory council was an ad hoc body

controlled by the governor-general, while the new council appeared to be a check on

his authority. Although it was created nominally to assist the local administrations in

provincial affairs (mesâlih-i Irakiyyenin hüsn-i rü’yet ve tesviyesi), the purpose of the

central government was to limit the powers of the provincial governors.

603 Archival documents concerning Ragıp Pasha’s visit to Baghdad can be found in BOA, İ. MVL. 6855, 6947, 6985, 7061, 7068, 7336. Another commission of inspection was sent to Baghdad in 1862, see Neccar, p. 55. 604 Bernard Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2nd Ed.), 1993, p. 112. 605 A special council to discuss the affairs of the province of Baghdad was held in İstanbul. The following figures participated to the meeting: Chief of the staff (Serasker Paşa), governor of Baghdad, head of the Tanzimat Council (Meclis-i Âlî-i Tanzîmât reisi), head of the Meclis-i Vâlâ, Minister of Finance, and Mümtaz Efendi (member of Meclis-i Vâlâ). The council prepared a detailed instruction (ta‘lîmânâme) that focuses on the financial affairs of the province. See BOA, İ. DAH. 25484, 29 M 1274 (19 September 1857). 606 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 5., Ankara: TTK, 1999, (7th print) p. 192; Davison, Reform, p.48.

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At the beginning the council met twice a week, but as the people showed

interest and brought their cases to the council, it began to meet five days a week.

Fridays and Tuesdays were off days.607 As the highest appeal court, the council

settled ordinary personal disputes, commercial disputes and shari‘a court cases. Of

great importance was the farming out provincial mukâtaas with public auctions. As

in the previous advisory council, the meetings were held in the residence of

governor-general and members of the non-Muslim communities were also given

room in the council. Accordingly, in 1846 the council consisted of following

persons:608

Ferîk Paşa, military commander

Evkâf müdürü, head of pious foundations,

Mal müdürü

Mal katibi, Accountant scribe,

Qadi Efendi, Judge

Müftü Mahmud Efendi

Ex-müftü Abdülgani Efendi

Sıbgatullah Efendi, qadi for Shafiî sect

Nakîbü’l-Eşraf Ali Efendi,

Seyyid Ahmed Efendi, of Bursa müderrisîn

Mustafa Bey, dergâh-ı âli kapucubaşısı

Abdülbaki Efendi, dergâh-ı âlî kapucubaşısı

Hacı Ahmed Beyzade Lutfullah Bey

Defterî-zâde İbrahim Efendi

Râvîzade İsmail Çelebi

Kürdî-zâde Kasım Agha

Molla Ali Efendi

Toma, from Assyrian (Süryâni) community

607 In the same period the Damascus Advisory Council was meeting three times a week. This might mean that the council in Baghdad had more intensive agenda. See Thompson, p. 461. 608 BOA, İ.MMH. 2046, lef 3, 10 Ş 1262, (3 August 1846). These members were to sign the documents of the council.

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Naum, from Armenian Catholic community

Yusuf Cibre, from Chaldean (Keldâni) Catholic community

Mıgırdiç, from Armenian community

Yusuf Rahmîn, from Jewish Community

Although the fermân of 1840 envisaged thirteen members (seven ex-officio

and six elected members) for provincial councils, Baghdad’s council had twenty-

three members. The existence of considerably different millets certainly played a

role. As Ortaylı noted, in places where there were many non-Muslim community

leaders, there appeared some exceptions with regard to the number of council

members.609 The fermân of 1840 mentioned only the leader of the Greek Orthodox

community as ex officio member of the provincial councils610; however, as there

were no Greek Orthodoxies of considerable importance in Baghdad, this seat was

filled by members of Assyrian (Süryâni), Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Chaldean

(Keldâni) Catholic and Jewish communities. Nevertheless, when the proportion of

non-Muslims in the total population of Ottoman Iraq is taken into account, the five

non-Muslim membership out of twenty-three seems to be over-representation.

The qadi who represented the local ilmiye class, was one of the ex officio

members. The Muslim community was represented by two müftis: one for Hanefî

and the other for Shafiî school of thought. However, in Baghdad we see other

persons from ilmiye class, like Nakîbü’l-Eşrâf Ali Efendi (representative of Prophet

Mohammad’s descendants), Seyyid Ahmed Efendi, who was from among Bursa

scholars (müderrisîn), and Molla Ali Efendi. At least seven members were of ilmiye

origin and it is also understood that the governors paid attention in selecting

609 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 34. 610 Shaw, p. 61.

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sufficient number of the scholars (ulemâ) for membership.611 Surely, all the members

were from the notables of military, ilmiye and merchant classes.

At the beginning the ferîk pasha was chairperson of the council; however, in

time there appeared changes in the chairmanship and civil bureaucrats, rather than

military, were appointed for this post.612 The regulations in 1843 already prevented

military officers’ access to the civil and administrative posts. The military officers

became an ordinary member of the council, but the military forces under his

command were put at the disposal of council.613 However, we should be aware of the

fact that these regulations and re-arrangements could only be implemented in the

outer provinces several years later. In parallel with the regulations made in mid

1840s, provincial governors were made chairman of the provincial councils, but this

was not obeyed in Baghdad. Again in the administrative council the governor had the

right to put a deputy chair, but usually the chair was selected among relatively high-

ranking and sapient provincial bureaucrats. With the amendments in 1849 the chair

of the provincial councils was to be appointed by the central administration.614

Though this further decreased the role of the governor, we see that the chair for

Baghdad’s council was also appointed from the center.

It is argued that contrary to pre-Tanzimat traditions, local qadis were not

given chairmanship in the provincial councils, which is regarded as a step toward

611 BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267 (19 December 1850) “…orada bir meclis-i kebîr teşkîliyle ona daha rütbeli ve dirâyetli bir reîs ve ulemâdan bir azâ tayîn kılınması…” 612 In the muhassıllık meclises the muhassıl and his vekil were supposed to be the chairman. But in practice, the regulation was not obeyed and the council selected their presidents sometimes from among their own members and sometimes even from the outside. Military commanders such as ferîk pashas and müşir pashas were also appointed for his post. There was, for a while, an unusual case in Damascus, where the leadership of the advisory council seems to have rotated among members every few weeks. So the responsibilities were shared among the council members. See Shaw, p. 71; Thompson, p. 461. 613 Shaw, p. 87. 614 BOA, A. MKT. MHM, 34/91, 29 N 1267 (28 July 1851).

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secularization and modernization in government.615 Though they were not brought to

chairmanship, in Baghdad the qadi had a leading role in the council. As was the case

in Damascus, the opinion of these senior religious and learned men was sought and

highly valued.616 Cabîzâde Mehmed Efendi, ex-qadi of Baghdad and former member

of provincial council of Damascus, was appointed in 1851 as council member with a

monthly salary of 4,000 kuruş.617 However, Cabîzâde Mehmed Efendi was not a

competent person in the eyes of the Sublime Porte and he was dismissed from the

post.618 İstanbul asked Baghdad to inform proper names for membership. Usually the

process in Baghdad was that the governor-general nominated a person for the post

and informed İstanbul about the person in question. Then the Sublime Porte either

ratified it or appointed someone else.

Earlier the Sublime Porte was paying regular salaries to the members in the

muhassıl councils. Besides the appointed members, the elected members were also

paid and there was a hierarchy among the members. Among the elected members,

while mufti received the highest salary, heads of the non-Muslim communities

received the lowest.619 In a similar manner, the small councils were also comprised

of salaried members. However, due to higher expenditures, the small councils in the

counties were abolished in September 1841.620 When the muhassıllık institution was

abolished in 1842, the payment of salary was also ceased. The council members

615 Davison, “The Advent of the Principle of Representation”, p. 96 and İnalcık, “Application of the Tanzimat”, pp. 13-14. 616 For ulemâ’s role in Damascus see Maoz, p. 88 and Thompson, p. 463. 617 BOA, İ. MVL. 7239, 13 L 1267 (11 August 1851) and A. MKT. MVL, 44/55 13 L 1267 (11 August 1851). Neccar argues that the qadi signed the decisions of the council right after the governor. Neccar, p. 227. 618 BOA, A. MKT. NZD, 45/87 15 M 1268 (10 November 1851). 619 Shaw, p. 70. 620 Çadırcı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda, p. 262.

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continued to work without monthly salaries. The Sublime Porte adopted the policy

that no salaries paid for the ex officio positions in provincial councils, because this

was considered to be a part of duties of their regular administrative positions.

Instead, the council members were, from time to time, given special gifts and

payments. For example, in 1858, due to their successful works the members of the

provincial council in Baghdad were rewarded with considerable amount of money

(atiyye-i seniyye), which was obtained from rebellious Anaza tribe.621 It is interesting

that the distribution of money was also in accordance with the hierarchy within the

council: while the qadi and müfti were paid highest, the non-Muslim representatives

were paid the least.622

The members of the provincial councils continued to work without salary

until 1869. According to the British consulate reports, it seems that Midhat Pasha

began to pay council members:

His Excellency [Midhat Pasha] is organizing new councils (meclises) of which the members are to be paid, instead of, as heretofore, working gratuitously with the opportunity of making what they could, a source of corruption and trouble.623 [emphasis added]

Provincial Regulations of 1849 Between 1840 and 1849 there appeared many amendments in the laws concerning

provincial administration and councils. Of these amendments, the regulation of 1849

was perhaps the most outstanding one, because it was in force for 15 years, until the

issuance of 1864 Vilâyet Law. With the new amendments in 1849, memleket

621 For example, in 1858, some of the revenue obtained from the rebellious Anaza tribe was distributed among the members of provincial council. BOA, İ. DAH. 27324, 11 S 1275 (20 September 1858). 622 BOA, İ. DAH, 27324, dahiliye lef 2, 11 S 1275 (20 September 1858). 623 FO 195/949, No: 7, 26 May 1869, From Herbert to H. Eliot.

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meclisleri were re-named as eyâlet meclisleri (provincial councils).624 The new

regulations also required the re-institution of small councils in every sub-province.625

As noted earlier, this amendment suggested the appointment of the council chair

from İstanbul. The regulation of 1849 also revitalized the role of the defterdâr in the

province. The defterdâr was appointed directly by the Sublime Porte and he was

responsible for all provincial revenues and expenditures.626 Moreover, he came to

assume very significant role in the provincial council as will noted below.

In the provincial council of Baghdad re-arrangements were put into effect in

1851.627 Accordingly, two years later after the issuance of related regulation, eyâlet

meclisi or meclis-i kebîr, was formed in Baghdad in 1851.628 During his visit to

İstanbul in the autumn of 1850, the defterdâr (director of finance) of Baghdad had

already articulated the need for the establishment of meclis-i kebîr in Baghdad. The

correspondence between the Sublime Porte and the province had started at the end of

1850 and it was stressed that regardless of the salary to be paid, an able and sapient

person should be selected for the chairmanship of the council.629 The monthly

expenditure of a meclis-i kebîr was calculated to be between 20.000 to 30.000

kuruş.630 The new regulations also coincided with the dismissal of Abdi Pasha and

624 Çadırcı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda, p. 268. 625 Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, p. 215. 626 Musa Çadırcı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Ülke Yönetimi (1839-76)”, IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildirileri (21-25 September 1981), Vol. 2, Ankara: TTK, 1988, p. 1157. 627 For the regulations of 1849 see Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu, pp. 215-219. 628 BOA, A. MKT. UM, 64/49, 23 Ş 1267 (23 June 1851). 629 BOA, İ. DAH. 13448, 14 S 1267 (19 December 1850). 630 BOA, AMKT. UM, 38/60, 6 M 1267 (11 November 1850).

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the appointment of Vecihi Pasha; and during the governorship of Vecihi Pasha the

meclis-i kebîr was formed.631

As the central administration began to put greater emphasis to local councils,

the chairs of the provincial councils, especially of leading provinces like Bursa,

Trabzon, and Baghdad, were appointed by İstanbul.632 Upon Baghdad’s

communication and insistence on the appointment of an able person for the council’s

chairmanship, Salik Efendi, who resigned from defterdârlık of Trabzon, was

appointed to this post. Although Baghdad, due to remoteness of the province and

relatively high prices within the province, demanded a salary of 25,000 kuruş for this

post, the Sublime Porte gave Salik Efendi 17,500 kuruş per month.633

The salary of the chairman was to be paid by the provincial treasury. In

1267/1851 the Sublime Porte made a change: In provinces such as Hüdavendigar,

Trabzon, Yanya, Aleppo and Damascus, where the extra expenditure brought by the

salary of the chairman could be met, the chairmanship was united with the office of

mâl müdürlüğü/defterdârlık.634 The purpose for such a policy was clear: saving

money for the provincial treasury. Although this arrangement excluded Baghdad due

to its special condition, one year later, in February 1852, the post of defterdâr in

Baghdad and that of council chairman were amalgamated and defterdâr Arif Efendi

replaced Salik Efendi.635 However, in the course of the time, the affairs of the

631 Neccar, p. 77; Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 94. 632 Çadırcı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda, p. 276. 633 BOA, İ. DAH. 14192, 9 Ş 1267 (9 June 1851) and İ. MVL. 7472, 23 L 1267 (21 August 1851). The Sublime Porte determined the salary with a comparison of official with similar position. At that time the council chair in Damascus (who was probably superior in rank) had a salary of 20,000 kuruş. Therefore, taking the saving measures into account, Salik Efendi’s salary was determined to be 17,500 kuruş per month. 634 BOA, İ. MVL. 5854, S 1267 and İ. MVL. 7501, 24 Z 1267. 635 BOA, İ. DAH. 15125, 16 R 1268 (8 February 1852) and A. MKT. MVL, 46/48, 20 Z 1267 (16 October 1851). In the same year, such an amalgamation was also seen in Damascus; see Maoz,

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defterdârlık in Baghdad intensified considerably, because the financial affairs of

Mosul and Shahrizor, which were connected to Baghdad as sub-provinces, began to

be administered from Baghdad. Hence, in 1862 Ferid Efendi, who was both defterdâr

and chair of the council, was tolerated not to attend the meetings of the council.

Instead, a post for deputy chair (meclis-i kebîr reis-i sânîliği) was created.636

Like the previous advisory councils, meclis-i kebîr included the high-ranking

officials and the notables of the province. For a short period of time, the sheikh of the

Muntafiq tribal confederation, Mansur Es-Sa‘dun, was also given a seat in the

council in 1863.637 Such appointments from the tribal leaders, which repeated later,

were very much related to the political conjuncture within the province. In these

cases the politics of alliance with the leading tribes should be taken into

consideration. The incorporation of the tribal leaders into the political mechanism

was the actual purpose of the provincial administration.

As far as the functioning of the council was concerned, there is a common

contention that it did not function as it was aimed. Azzawi argued that the council

members were ignorant, unwary and selfish, seeking their personal interests rather

than that of the whole community.638 There were cases in which members of councils

in the sub-provinces collaborated with the local notables and sheiks and embezzled

Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, pp. 36-37. On the resignation of Nafi‘ Efendi, chairperson of the council in 1285/1868-69 and appointment of Yahya Efendi, BOA, İ. DAH. 40023, 4 M 1285 (27 April 1868). 636 BOA, İ. MVL. 21566, 29 Ca 1279 (22 November 1862). “…Bağdad meclis-i kebîrinin mesâlih-i vâkıası kesb-i cesâmet ve ehemmiyet etmesiyle ve meclis-i mezkûr riyâseti kendüye muhavvel olan defterdâr-ı eyâlet saâdetli Ferid Efendi kesret-i mevâdd-ı mâliye ile meşgûl bulunmasıyla mesâlih-i vâkıanın sürat-i rü’yet ve tesviyesi dikkat ve itinâ olunmak üzre meclis-i mezkûr reis-i sânîliğine rütbe-i sâlise ashâbından Kerbela kaymakamı Kurbî Efendinin (12)78 senesi Eylülünden itibâren şehriye 6000 kuruş maâş tahsîsiyle tayîni…”, also in lef 2 of the same document “[Ferid Efendinin] biz-zarûre ve her vakit meclis-i mezkûrda huzûra müdâvemette ma‘zûr idüğünden…”. 637 Neccar, p. 77. 638 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p.131. For a bribery case in which a member of the Mosul council participated, see BOA, İ. MVL. 16277, 4 N 1273 (28 April 1857).

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local revenues.639 Also the council members were mentioned to have signed the

meeting minutes without knowing what they were about.640 It is also argued that

Henry Rawlinson, British Consul-general in Baghdad between 1840-52, had

occasionally participated in the council meetings with his secretary and listened to

the discussions.641 However, during my research I could not confirm this

information. Neccar further argues that the local people could participate the council

meetings; however, this should have been only in legal cases (şer‘î and/or örfî), as

the council acted as authorized recourse for such issues. Otherwise, the local people

were not allowed to attend the council meetings. Kiyotaki asserts that the political

importance of the council in Baghdad declined in time, as the power of the governor-

general gradually increased.642 However, I am not of the same opinion, because the

correspondence between the provincial periphery and the imperial center shows

growing emphasis on provincial council. It is evident that the council could only get

its ideal form during the governorship of Midhat Pasha, with small councils in most

sancaks and kazâs. Also there is no doubt that Midhat Pasha’s introduction of the

Vilâyet Law of 1864 brought seriousness and orderliness to the functioning of the

provincial council. Midhat Pasha began to lead the council meetings. When

compared to earlier governors, we have far more council minutes for Midhat Pasha’s

term of office, which, I think, indicates the regular and orderly functioning of the

council.

Small councils of sub-provinces 639 For such an embezzlement in Divaniyah see, BOA, İ. MMAH. 1591, 19 Z 1286 (12 March 1871). 640 Neccar, p. 77. 641 Ibid., pp. 77-78 642 Kiyotaki, “Ottoman Land Policies”, p. 57.

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It is also quite unfortunate that we do not have a collection of records of provincial

and/or sub-provincial councils. The sealed council records (mazbata) appear in BOA

only as supplements in the correspondence between the province and the center. The

inadequate number of such council records prevents us to make generalizations.

Hence, our information concerning the details of the activities in the council is very

limited. Whether the members of the council were defending the public interest

against those of the government (as it was the case in Damascus) or whether it had a

bargaining power with the central government and how effective it was in the

provincial politics remain open to question.

As far as the small councils (küçük meclises) in the sancaks were concerned,

the limited data on the subject prevent us from making some generalizations. There

are references to small councils in the province of Baghdad; however, the data

derived from the archival documents are quite scanty. It is not clear when and how

many of the sub-provinces had had local councils. The governorship of Namık Pasha

is important in this regard. By early 1860s, counties (kazâs) such as Hankin,

Hindiyye and Samave had their own local councils.643 The list in İrâde-i Meclis-i

Mahsûs, No: 1664, enables us to know the situation by March 1871, as it will be

explained below.

The councils in the counties (kazâs) had 4-5 appointed members. It also

seems that members of the small councils in the sub-provinces were not paid for

reasons that were mentioned above. For instance, when, in 1858, there appeared a

demand to appoint a member with a salary of 3,000 kuruş to the local council in

643 BOA, İ. MVL. 20390, 14 R 1278 (19 October 1861), İ. MVL. 20550, 28 Ca 1278 (1 December 1861), İ. MVL. 21098, 9 Za 1278 (8 May 1862).

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Hillah, it was rejected by the Sublime Porte.644 However, when the Vilâyet Law was

implemented in Baghdad, the council members both in the sancaks and kazâs were

allocated specific salaries. In the kazâ level, the salaries ranged between 600-1000

kuruş, while the chair received 2,000 kuruş. The council members in the sancak

headquarter received relatively higher, 2,000 kuruş.

Among the Iraqi (sub)provinces, Mosul had its provincial council established

at the beginning of 1848. Here, Vecihi Pasha formed the council and communicated

with the heads of the non-Muslim communities so as to suggest trustworthy

representatives. Accordingly, Chaldean, Jacobite and Catholic communities were

represented at the local council of Mosul.645 Upon the completion of council

members, the stamps of the council members were sent to the Sublime Porte for

approval. In its first meeting Vecihi Pasha addressed to the members, emphasizing

the need for unity among members, and the law as the sole source of reference in all

matters (kâffe-i husûsâtın şer‘-i şerîf ve kânûn-ı münîfe tatbîkan ve usûl-i hakkâniyete

tevfîkan tanzîm ve rü’yet olunması).646 He also warned the members against

favorism/nepotism and special treatment for particular people, and wanted them to

act in accordance with justice. The names of the council members in Mosul and

Basra can be found in archival documents.647

It is also understood that in 1850, there were demands for the establishment

of a meclis-i kebîr in Shahrizor. However, the Sublime Porte’s response to this

demand was quite significant in that the Sublime Porte found it improper to establish

644 “...taşralar mecâlisi a‘zâsına maâş itâsı dahi muvâfık-ı emsâl olmayıp…”, BOA, İ. MVL. 17719, dâhiliye lef 1, 14 R 1275 (21 November 1858). 645 BOA, İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264 (5 March 1848). 646 Ibid., 647 For the members of Mosul and Basra councils see respectively, BOA, İ. DAH. 38023 (20 L 1282) and İ. MVL. 22368, mâliye lef 3, 26 Ra 1280.

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a council in Shahrizor before it was instituted in Baghdad. The reason for this was

that although Shahrizor was a separate province at that time it was considered to be

part of the Ottoman Iraq (hıtta-i Irakiyyenin bir kıt‘a-i müfrezesi).648 This fact also

indicates that in the application of the reforms the administrative hierarchy between

Iraqi provinces had been taken into consideration. However, Shahrizor had its own

council at least by the end of 1860. Upon the arrival of telegraph lines to Shahrizor,

the council of Shahrizor stated its thankful gratification with a minute (mazbata).649

In time the councils began to specialize on certain fields. Besides the

administrative council, there appeared several other councils, such as council of the

Sixth Army,650 meclis-i tahkîk (council of investigation), meclis-i imâr (council for

public works), temyîz-i hukuk meclisi (court of appeal), cinâyet meclisi (criminal

council), and meclis-i de‘âvî (claims tribunal). While the temyiz-i hukuk meclisi and

meclis-i cinâyet were in the sancak headquarters, meclis-i de‘âvî was setup in the

kazâ level. The sequence in judicial case was as such: The case was brought to

meclis-i de‘âvî in the county (kazâ); if not resolved it could be brought to the temyîz-i

hukûk meclisi in the sub-province. Dîvân-ı temyîz was the final resort for judicial

cases that could not be resolved in the sub-provinces. Similarly, the cases related to

provincial officials, property and state (mâl ve mîrî) were first dealt within the

administrative council of the county. If not resolved it was brought to administrative

councils in the sub-province and provincial administrative council respectively.651

648 BOA, AMKT. UM, 38/60, 6 M 1267 (11 November 1850). 649 BOA, İ. DAH. 31091, 6 C 1277 (20 December 1860). 650 For an example document on the council of Sixth Army see BOA, İ. DAH. 32174, 12 Ra 1278 (17 September 1861). 651 Likewise, the commercial cases were first brought to the council of commerce. If one of the parties involved was not satisfied, the case could be referred to Divân-ı istînâf. Zewra, No: 58. Beside this council of commerce, there were special courts for commercial disputes (mahkeme-i ticâret). See BOA, İ. MVL, 21129, 25 Ca 1278 (28 November 1861).

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Ordinary cases, such as robbery, hitting and wounding, were managed by the

zabtiyes.

There were, not infrequently, transfer of officials between these councils. The

existence of cinâyet meclisi implies that issues/cases that included murder were dealt

with in a specialized/competent council, not in administrative council. As in other

provinces, meclis-i tahkîk was established in Baghdad in October 1858.652 Later, the

demand of the governor for extra scribes for the council of investigation was denied

by the Sublime Porte on the ground that Baghdad had sufficient scribes.653 The

meclis-i imâr (council for public works) will be detailed in chapter five.

The Introduction of the Provincial (Vilâyet) Law of 1864 in Baghdad

The Provincial (Vilâyet) Law of 1864 can be considered as the culmination of the

provincial reforms, which were tried to be implemented since the Tanzimat Edict.654

Despite previous regulations, the Vilâyet Law of 1864 was the first general law on

provincial administration. The law replaced the old regulations on provincial

administration; and vilâyet, instead of eyâlet, was used to describe the provinces of

the empire. In the old eyâlet system, sancaks were the basic provincial units. All the

financial judicial and administrative affairs were instituted on the sancak level.655

The new vilâyets were somewhat larger than the eyâlets, and they were hierarchically

superior to the sancaks. While there was a general tendency in the first half of the

652 BOA, İ. MVL. 17609, dahiliye lef 2, 4 RA1275 (12 October 1858) and İ. MVL. 19068, dahiliye lef 1, 26 Za 1276 (15 June 1860). 653 BOA, İ. MVL, 19068, 26 Za 1276 (15 June 1860). 654 Here, the Vilâyet Laws of 1864 and 1871 were considered to be complementary to each other. 655 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 61. According to Ortaylı, in the eyâlet system there was no hierarchy between the officials in sancaks and those in the eyâlet headquarter.

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nineteenth century (before and after the Tanzimat Edict) to decrease the provincial

territories in size so as to limit the authority of the governors,656 this trend was

reversed with the provincial law of 1864. This actually meant the widening of the

territory over which the governor was to rule. In 1867, the law, with a few

modifications was applied in a number of provinces, but it was only with the

amendments of 1871 that all parts of the empire were brought under the vilâyet

system.

The literature on Ottoman rule in Baghdad usually credits Midhat Pasha for

the introduction of the new provincial law. Despite Midhat Pasha’s indisputable

achievements in this regard, the first attempts started during Namık Pasha’s

governorship. Çetinsaya has already noted that Namık Pasha tried to apply the new

provincial law in 1867; however, he was not very successful and his attempts were

later accomplished by Midhat Pasha.657 First of all, Namık Pasha united the villages

(karyes), nâhiyes and counties, which had insignificant population and geo-political

position, under counties that are geographically close to them. In so doing, he

established the close relations between population, geo-political position and the

administrative status of an area.658

In his governorship, Namık Pasha tried to recruit graduates of mülkiye

schools and consequently aimed to increase the quality and efficiency of provincial

officials. These arrangements, which were referred as usûl-i cedîde, also envisioned a

656 For example in 1836 the eyâlets were redefined and decreased in size. See Carter V. Findley, “The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed From the Center” in David Kushner (ed.) Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986, p. 5. 657 See Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, p. 30. 658 “… kazâ ve sancak dâirelerinin taksîm ve tahdîdinde elzem olan nisbet-i sahîha bulunmayıp maaşlar dahi her dâire-i idârenin cesâmet ve ehemmiyetine göre olmadığından evvel emrde nüfuzca müstakilen kazâ ittihazına tahammülü ve bir gûna cihet-i ehemmiyeti olmayan nâhiye ve karyelerin bir karârlaştırılmış kâide ve usûl-i coğrafiye üzere civârındaki kazâlara ilhâkiyle müdürlükler adedinin tenzîli …”, Sinaplı, p. 198.

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hierarchy among the counties. Accordingly, the counties were divided into three.

There were several criteria for this division: The size of the county, the geo-politics

of the county (whether it was mountainous or derbent), its position along the frontier,

and the existence of a quay and port. These factors determined the importance of the

county and kaymakam received his salary according to this hierarchy of

importance.659

The new provincial law was fully introduced to the province of Baghdad by

Midhat Pasha in early 1869. Although Baghdad was part of the Ottoman Empire for

centuries, the provincial administrative reforms that were applied in the heartland of

the Empire came to Baghdad relatively late. When the Vilâyet system was extended

to considerable provinces in 1867, Baghdad was regarded as vilâyet; however, no

radical change had been done in its administrative and financial structure until the

governorship of Midhat Pasha.

Midhat Pasha was one of the founders of the Vilâyet Law in 1864, and the

new law was first applied under his governorship in the Danube province, as the pilot

region. Midhat Pasha’s successful governorship in Danube was very influential in the

extension of the law in 1867 and 1871. The implementation of the new provincial

law was one of the first things Midhat Pasha began in Baghdad in 1869, that is, two

years before the final extension of the law throughout the empire. There is no doubt

that the very presence of Midhat Pasha in Baghdad accelerated the implementation of

the law and some of the institutions like municipality and municipal council came

relatively earlier when compared to other Arab provinces.

659 “… kazâlar üç sınıf i’tibâr olunarak birinci sınıfına 1,250, ve ikinci sınıfına 1,500, ve üçüncüsüne 1750 kuruş aylık tahsîs olunması ve mevki‘ce ehemmiyet dahi gözetilerek evvelâ biri kazânın biri ucundan diğer ucu 18 saâtten ziyâde ve sâniyen dağlık ve derbent (kale) ve sâlisen hudûd ve râbi‘an merkez-i idâre olan kasabanın şehribender veyâhud cadde ve çıkış yeri veyâ büyük limân ve işlek iskele bulunması ve müstesnâ bir hâdiseye mebnî politikaca kesb-i itinâ etmesi husûslarına bakılarak zikredilen müdürlüklerin yerine bu şartların her kaçı bulunur ise maaşına ol kadar ikişer yüz ellişer kuruş zam edilmesi…”, Sinaplı, p. 199.

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Midhat Pasha considered the provincial law of 1864 complementary to

Tanzimat reforms.660 One of the pillars of the law was the re-drawing of the

jurisdictional lines. According to the law, each vilâyet was subdivided into a number

of sub-provinces (sancaks or livâs), each sancak into counties (kazâs), and each kazâ

into sub-counties and villages (nâhiyes and kariyes).661 Vâlî, mutasarrıf, kaymakam,

müdîr and muhtâr were the rulers of these administrative units respectively. The

mutasarrıf had no place in the pre-1864 provincial administration. Before 1864, the

kaymakam was the ruler of the sancaks, but now he became the ruler of the kazâ and

responsible to the mutasarrıf of sancak. The vilâyet law set up also a hierarchy of

councils attached to these officials.

Upon Midhat Pasha’s decision to implement the new provincial law, the

mutasarrıfs were respectively called to Baghdad and they were given instructions

(nizâmât ve ta‘lîmât) on the new provincial administration, especially the divisions

and the re-arrangements of the kazâs and nâhiyes.662 There were changes in the

borders of sancaks, kazâs and nâhiyes, but the law did not change the provincial

borders and Baghdad retained its control over the Mosul, Shahrizor and Basra. By

July of 1869, just several months after the appointment of Midhat Pasha, Baghdad,

Shahrizor, Mosul, Basra, Karbala, and Divaniyah (Hillah) were put fully under the

new system.663

In accordance with the law, the province of Baghdad was divided into ten

sub-provinces: Baghdad, Mosul, Shahrizor, Sulaimaniyah, Düleym, Karbala, Hillah,

660 “… Vilâyet usûlu Tanzîmât-ı hayriyenin mükemmilidir”, see, Zewra, No: 11. 661 İlber Ortaylı, “ Midhat Paşa'nın Vilayet Yönetimindeki Kadroları”, Uluslararası Midhat Pasha Semineri: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar (8-10 Mayıs 1984), Ankara: TTK, 1986, p.146. 662 Zewra, No: 5. 663 Ibid., Later the mutasarrıf of Sulaimaniyah was also given instructions about the new provincial law.

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Basra, Ammarah, and Muntafiq.664 The new administrative units can be listed as

follows:

Table IV: Administrative Divisions of Ottoman Iraq by 1871

Sub-provinces Counties Baghdad Horasan, Halis, Hankin Samarra, Kut, Mendelli, Aziziyah,

Kazimiyah, Mosul Mosul, İmadiyah, Sinjar, Zakho, Akra, Dohuk

Basra Basra, Kurna, Ebu’l-Hasleb?

Shahrizor Shahrizor, Zengabâd, Rawanduz, Rabne?, Arbil, Köysancak, Bradost, Salahiyah

Muntafiq Muntafiq665

Ammarah Ammarah, Şatra, Ale’ş-Şarkî

Sulaimaniyah Sulaimaniyah, Karadağ, Baziyan, Merke, Gülanber, Şehr-i Bazar,

Karbala Karbala, Hindiyyah, Necef-i Eşref, Müseyyeb,

Hillah Hillah, Divaniyah, Samave, Şamiye, Midhatiyah

Düleym Düleym, Hît, Anah, Hadyene?

Source: BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 (12 March 1871).

According to the law, the governor-general had a direct supervisory authority

over the mutasarrıfs, kaymakams and müdürs. The law also required the

establishment of administrative tools in every levels of provincial administration,

which Midhat Pasha successfully applied. It was with the amendment on Vilâyet Law

in 1871 that for the first time nâhiyes were incorporated into the provincial

664 Midhat Pasha, p. 90. 665 Although Muntafiq had more than one kazâ, they were not listed in the document. This should be due to the fact that Muntafiq, which had been a tribally dominant area, was made a mutasarrıflık by Midhat Pasha. Therefore, it had no administrative background. The conversion of Muntafiq into mutasarrıflık will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter.

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administration.666 So, civil administration expanded in an unprecedented way into

areas with which it had never dealt before, giving the central government and its

representatives in the provinces a whole range of new duties and activities.

Although there are archival documents concerning the application of the

vilâyet law in Baghdad listed BOA catalogues, only a few of them appear when

requested for research. The 16-page document in İrâde-i Meclis-i Mahsûs catalogue

(No: 1664) provides significant data as to the network of administrative organization

in the province and the salaries of the provincial officials. Furthermore, British

consulate reports in Public Record Office have information on this subject. Midhat

Pasha sent British Consul general in Baghdad a document explaining the application

of the law in Baghdad. The document reads as follows:

“As the vilayet system has been founded and enforced in all other Provinces in the Turkish Dominions, the Baghdad province is likewise now reformed on the same system. Consequently, the mode of administration has been altered. In order to facilitate affairs that may occur I deem it necessary to explain the mode of such administration. Baghdad vilayet is divided into 9 different subordinate governorates (mutasarrıflık).667 The Baghdad province (sancak) is counted as one of these subordinate governments (mutasarrıflık). This place being assigned as head quarter of the Vilayet; therefore, the separate offices of secretariat (muavinlik) and agency (müdürlük) for foreign affairs have been established for conducting the business of government.668

The department for foreign affairs, which was mentioned in the law, did not exist in

all provinces. It was thought for provinces like Danube and Bosnia, where there were

many foreign nationals and therefore, where the relations with Great Powers were

666 Findley, The Evolution, p. 7. 667 Although, here, Midhat Pasha mentioned only 9 sub-provinces, the archival document lists 10 sub-provinces. The omitted sub-province was probably Muntafiq, because Midhat Pasha makes the following explanation in his memoriam: “... Müntefik de bir sancak hükmünde ve o genişlikte olmasına rağmen, hükûmet ve idâresi iltizâm sûretiyle ve maktû‘an Nasır Paşa uhdesinde idi....” Midhat Pasha, p. 90. On the other hand, Nasır Pasha is listed as the mutasarrıf of Muntafiq sancak in BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 (12 March 1871). 668 See PRO, FO 195; 949, 26 May 1869, pp. 59-60, From Herbert to Constantinople.

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intensive.669 In a similar fashion, the province of Baghdad had considerable foreign

nationals and many European consuls. Hence, an official was commissioned for the

transaction of important affairs of the European nationals in Baghdad. Midhat Pasha

further explains the hierarchy among the sub-provinces and how things functioned

within this hierarchy:

In other [sub-]provinces (sancaks) whenever anything may occur, requiring settlement it must be conducted in the same manner as is carried on here (Baghdad). In order to facilitate the business it is necessary that the same should be communicated for settlement to the lieutenant governor (mutasarrıf) on the spot, and in case the affair not being arranged on the spot it may be referred to the head quarters of the vilayet. In conducting business of your subjects with the government, the affair and the claim shall be represented by an official communication, as the case may require either to the sub-governments (mutasarrıflık) or agency (müdürlük) for foreign affairs and if necessary it may be communicated directly to myself and in my absence to the secretariat (muavin). [emphasis added].670

Between these sentences we can read the very principle of the provincial law that the

administrative authority of the governor-general was shared by the rulers of sub-

provinces and counties. A similar explanation concerning the provincial

administrative hierarchy was given in Zewra newspaper671 and the local people were

asked to follow the hierarchy in their affairs with the local government.

Beside the governor-general and director of finance (defterdâr), there were an

assistant governor (vâlî mu‘âvini), and a müdîr for foreign affairs of Baghdad. Unlike

the previous years, the Correspondence Office seems to be well organized. There

were scribes not only in the sub-provinces but also in the counties too. Apart from

correspondence office, offices for provincial archives (vilâyet/livâ evrâk odası) were

669 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 31. 670 Ibid. 671 Zewra, No: 58.

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setup. Each sub-province, Baghdad being one of them, was to be ruled by a

lieutenant governor (mutasarrıf). It would also house a mutasarrıf, his assistant

(mutasarrıf mu‘âvini), a treasurer (mal müdürü), a shari‘a court judge (na‘ib), a

doctor, a prison guard, a court of appeal (temyiz-i hukûk) and an administrative

council (meclis-i idâre). At the county level, each kaymakam also had a treasurer, an

account officer (sandık emîni), a naib, a meclis-i idâre, an Arabic, and if necessary, a

Turkish secretary (tahrîrât kâtibi), and a meclis-i de‘âvî.672 The nâhiye institution

was also implemented and the nâhiye müdürs were paid from the provincial treasury.

Moreover, the provincial government was divided into six departments,

namely umûr-ı dâhiliye (domestic affairs), umûr-ı mâliye (financial affairs), umûr-ı

şer‘iyye (religious affairs), umûr-ı ticâret (commercial affairs), umûr-ı ma‘ârif

(education) and umûr-ı nâfi‘a (public works). The heads of these departments were

appointed from İstanbul by related ministries, but they were directly supervised by

the provincial governor.673 While Baghdad and Shahrizor sancaks had all the six

departments, other sancaks had three to five departments. For instance, the

department of education was instituted only in three sancaks that had rüşdiye

schools.674 These departments also make it clear that the scope of provincial

administration included areas such as population and land registration,

communications, economic development, public works (construction of roads,

telegraph, irrigation canals, bridges etc.), education, public health (quarantine) and

more.

672 Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, p. 49. 673 Keiko Kiyotaki, “The Implementation of the Administrative Law of 1864 in the Province of Baghdad”, paper presented at CIEPO 1998, p. 215. 674 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 (12 March 1871).

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The administrative picture of Ottoman Iraq that we have drawn mainly from

an Ottoman archival document, (İrâde-i Meclis-i Mahsûs, No 1664) dated 1871, was

further improved and extended later throughout the province. Especially the tribally

dominant areas such as Muntafiq and Najd were incorporated into the Vilâyet order

during Midhat Pasha’s last months. Towards the end of his governorship Midhat

Pasha extended Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait and Najd (al-Ahsa). Normally

Kuwait had been a district dependent on Basra; however, due to administrative

ignorance its control passed to the hands of local sheikhs.675 Among these local

sheiks Abdullah Al-Sabah was appointed as the kaymakam of Kuwait and given an

Ottoman flag to fly from his residence in order to affirm Kuwait’s ties to the

empire.676 Midhat Pasha did not stop with the establishment of Ottoman claim in

Kuwait, he further extended the vilâyet reform in Najd region, especially in al-Ahsa.

The Pasha created four counties centered on al-Ahsa (Hufuf), Qatif, Mubarraz and

Qatar. These places constituted the new sub-province (sancak) of Najd, of which

Hufuf would be the administrative seat.677

The Vilâyet Law of 1871 required also the establishment of the general

assembly of the province (meclis-i umûmî) and the extension of administrative

councils in every sub-province and county. According to article 25-27 of the law, the

general assembly of the province was to consist of two Muslim and two non-Muslim

675 … mahall-i mezkûrun [Kuwait] memâlik-i mahrûse-i hazret-i pâdişâhîden ve Basra merbûtâtından olduğu hâlde biraz vakitden beri Basra tarafından idâresine lâyıkıyla itinâ olunamadığundan usûl-i idâre ve zâbıtası mahallî meşâyih yedinde kalmış olup… See Zewra, No: 35. 676 Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, p. 22. Anscombe also states that Midhat Pasha proposed 100 gendarmes (zabtiye) to be stationed in Kuwait as a symbol of authority. But the gendarmes were never assigned to Kuwait. Furthermore, Muhammed bin Abdullah El-Adesânî was appointed as local judge, naib; Midhat Pasha also gave imperial document, berât-ı şerîf, to the leaders (imams) of 5 Friday mosques. See Zewra, No: 35. 677 BOA, İ. DAH, 44930, 29 L 1288 (1 January 1872); Zekeriya Kurşun, Basra Körfezinde Osmanlı İngiliz Çekişmesi: Katar’da Osmanlılar, Ankara: TTK, 2004, pp. 58-59; Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, p. 49.

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members elected from each sub-province. The assembly was to meet once a year in

the provincial capital for not more than forty days.678 As for Baghdad; however, I

could not find any hint implying the meeting of general assembly.

Though the provincial council was renamed in the Vilâyet law of 1864 as

meclis-i idâre (administrative council), its functions and tasks did not change. As far

as councils in the lower administrative units were considered, among the sub-

provinces of Baghdad only Düleym had not had an administrative council by 1871.

At the county level; however, there were considerable counties that had not formed

its council by 1871. The reason for this was that the extension of such administrative

reforms to tribal areas took longer times. According to the law, in addition to the

appointed members, the administrative council was to have four elected members.

Only the council of Shahrizor had five elected members. The salaries paid for these

council members ranged between 600-4,000 kuruş; while those in the provincial

administrative council received the highest, those in the counties received the lowest

in accordance with the hierarchy of administrative echelons.679

According to the regulation concerning administrative councils in the

provinces, the ex officio members were comprised of the qadi (now müfettiş-i

hükkâm-ı vilâyet), defterdâr, mektubcu and umûr-ı ecnebiye müdürü (official for

foreign affairs). However, in Baghdad, taking the conditions of the province into

consideration, the permanent members differed a little bit. As a corollary of this, the

ex officio members in Baghdad council consisted of qadi, müfti, nakîbü’l-eşrâf,

defterdâr, and mektubcu.680 Occasionally evkâf dâiresi muhâsibi (accountant for the

678 Findley, The Evolution, p. 12 679 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 (12 March 1871). 680 Neccar, p. 227. After the creation of vâlî mu‘âvinliği the assistant governor became also a member of the council.

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office of pious foundations) and mutasarrıf of Baghdad city became permanent

members in the council. The presence of the head of pious foundations (evkâf

müdürü) among the council members implies that the council had also a check

mechanism for pious foundations.

It is also understood from the minutes of the council that while until 1870 the

council was led by defterdâr as chairperson (or in his absence by the deputy chair),

after 1870 the provincial governor (Midhat Pasha) personally led the council

meetings as chairperson. For the pre-1870 period, I have not found any hint implying

the attendance of the governor to the provincial council. In this respect, the Baghdad

council in the pre-1870 period resembled the Syrian case, where the governor

attended rarely. However, Midhat Pasha’s term of office is more reminiscent of the

Egyptian case, where the governor had a tight control over the council.681

Midhat Pasha paid quite considerable attention to the sound elections in

provinces, sancaks, kazâs and even villages. Because he thought that as the local

people participate in the administration, this would contribute to the general security

and welfare in the province.682

Before the introduction of the Vilâyet Law there were eighteen members in

the council, but after the law they were reduced to fourteen. For instance, after 1870

we no longer see deputy chair (reis-i sânî-i meclis, Yusuf Mazhar) in the council

meetings. The müfti for the Shafii sect (Abdulgafur el-Haydârî) was also absent in

681 Thompson, p. 473 and fn. 24.

682 Ortaylı, Midhat Paşa'nın, p. 230.

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the council meetings. Furthermore, the minutes after signed by the members were

sealed by council seal and a separate number was given for each minute.683

By the end of the period under survey in this dissertation (1287/1872), the

administrative council in Baghdad was comprised of the following members:684

Vâlî-i vilâyet-i Bağdad, Midhat Pasha Müfettiş-i hükkâm-i vilâyet, Abdullah Zeynel Abidin Mu‘âvin, Raif Efendi Defterdâr, Abdi Efendi Müfti, Muhammed Feyzi Nakîb, Es-seyyid Ali el-Kâdirî Mektûbî, Saib Efendi Müdîr-i umûr-ı ecnebiye, Hamdi Müdîr-i Evkâf, Muhammed Derviş el-Haydârî Azâ, Mansur es-Sa‘dun Azâ, Fehd es-Sa‘dun Azâ, Mehmed Sa‘îd Azâ, Abdurrezzâk el-Kâdirî Azâ, Fethullah

*** The Tanzimat period was in many aspects a period of transition. Centuries old

institutions could not be replaced in a short period of time. The reforms were

introduced in a “trial and error” method. There is a general contention that the

Tanzimat reforms in its first decade were unsuccessful. Similarly, though Baghdad

was taken into the range of Tanzimat reforms in 1844, true reforms could only be

introduced in the 1850s. By the early 1850s, by putting an end to the autonomous

dynasties, the province was tied more strictly to the central administration and

substantial improvement in provincial security was achieved. This was quite

essential, because the issue of security was heavily emphasized in the Tanzimat Edict

683 The seal of the council reads as follows: “Meclis-i Kebîr-i Eyâlet-i Bağdad”. But not all of the council minutes were sealed. For an example of sealed and numbered council minute see BOA, İ. MVL, 24933, adliye lef 4 and 5 dated 19 N 1286 (23 December 1869) and 19 Z 1281 (15 May 1865) respectively. 684 BOA, İ. DAH, 43534, lef 3, 5 R 1287 (5 July 1870).

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and the absence of security had long been the foremost reason for the previous

decline of the Baghdad province.

The inadequacies in the regulations were tried to be perfected with

amendments. Likewise, the regulations pertaining to provincial councils were

strengthened in time and these efforts culminated in the Provincial Laws of 1864 and

1871. As noted by Neumann, the Tanzimat reforms integrated local notables (both

Muslim and non-Muslim) in regional and local administration.685 The institution

created to this end was that of the meclis. The provincial council, which was one of

the most typical reforms of the Tanzimat era, was re-organized in the early 1850s and

in the course of time the quality of its functioning was also improved. The creation of

new administrative units and the extension of the hierarchical administrative

organization throughout the Iraqi territories indicate the development of a more

modernized working of the administration. The reform process was certainly gradual

and the peak point of this process was Midhat Pasha’s governorship in Baghdad

between 1869-72. Therefore, in many respects Midhat Pasha’s service in Baghdad is

very important, which needs further detail in the following chapters.

685 Neumann, p. 143.

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Chapter V

The Land and the Tribes

The political and socio-economic structure of nineteenth century Iraq has been

dominated by tribalism that existed in the country. As noted earlier, the Bedouins

constituted approximately half of the total population. Most of the Arab tribes of Iraq

were migrant tribes. The migrations from the Arabian Peninsula had started during

the Muslim conquest of the country and continued till early nineteenth century.

However, it is quite clear that the Bedouin tribes of Iraq underwent quite significant

societal transformation during the nineteenth century.

The tribal structure in Iraq had a certain hierarchy. In descending order, these

were: the qabîla or confederation (under the leadership of a paramount sheikh in

Arab areas, or a beg in Kurdish areas), the ‘ashîra or tribe (under a sheikh or agha),

the fakhd or clan, and the bayt or ‘âila house/family.686 Due to the lack of security

and intertribal conflicts the Iraqi tribes lived in the form of confederation, which

referred to a group of tribes united through kinship or proximity led by one

paramount tribal sheikh. The tribal confederations of Khazâ‘il (in Middle Euphrates /

Hillah-Divaniyah), Albu Muhammad and Bani Lâm (in Ammarah), and Muntafiq (in

the south) were the largest tribal organizations.

Differences among the tribesmen were quite important. Within the tribal

confederation, being either from superior or inferior lineage played a very significant

role. The superiority and honor of a tribe was quite related to its long traceable

686 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, p. 167.

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lineage. As it will be noted below, part of the distinction among the tribal

confederations was that the true Bedouins bred camels, rode horses, and ruled the

tribes, whereas the lesser Bedouins bred sheep or cows, rode donkeys and worked as

cultivators.687 In the province of Baghdad there were, small and big, hundreds of

tribes.688 These tribes were divided into filih , peasants; ma‘dan, marshdwellers;

shawiyah, people of the sheep; and ahl-il-ibl , people of the camel. The latter formed,

in effect, the tribal aristocracy.689 The agriculturalist tribes and the city dwellers were

looked down by nomadic tribes.690 As noted by Salman, tribal power impinged on

the settled areas by virtue of the fact that farmers (fellâhîn) were often related to the

tribes by blood or clientage and thus were themselves, in many areas, part of the

tribal system.691 Military strength and political power was quite important in the

hierarchical ranking of the Bedouin tribes.

The powerful Bedouin tribes collected brotherhood money (khuwwah) from

weaker tribes. In return for a specified annual payment the stronger tribe promised

not to attack a particular village or weaker tribe as well as protecting them against

raids from other tribes. Commercial caravans that passed through the dirah of a tribe

had to pay the khuwwah as well. Evidently, the payment of khuwwah was little more

than extortion, because the tribe hardly ever offered effective protection.

Each ashîrah had a tribal sheikh (chieftain) and it was these tribal sheikhs

who chose the paramount sheikh (şeyhü’l-meşâyih). In many cases, there was a

687 Kamal Abdal-Rahman Salman, The Ottoman and British Policies toward Iraqi tribes: 1831 to 1920, PhD Thesis, The University of Utah, 1992, p. 23. 688 The most outstanding study on the Iraqi tribes is obviously Azzawi’s Aşair al-Iraq, Baghdad: İntişarat-ı Şerif er-Radi, 1937. 689 See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 16. 690 The Cubur, the Albu Hamad, and Albu Abbas were among the leading agriculturalist tribes. 691 Salman, p.3.

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particular family which produced the paramount sheikh. However, as will be detailed

below, from time to time the Ottoman governors were directly involved in the

process of tribal succession and appointed one of the tribal sheiks as paramount

sheikh. Needless to say, the paramount sheikh had usually a highly esteemed

ancestor. An esteemed ancestor, long-traceable lineage and tribal charisma were

quite important in controlling the tribes. Otherwise, the task of the paramount sheikh

would be very difficult.

The rivalry for paramount sheikhship of Shammar Jarba tells us much about

the general nature of tribal concerns for leadership. When Sufuk, paramount sheikh

of Shammar Jarba was assassinated in 1847 by the Ottoman governor in Baghdad,

Ferhan and Abdülkerim came to the fore for the meşîhat. However, from the

perspectives of tribesmen there were at least two questions: which chieftain could

provide the greatest opportunity for profitable raiding and which leader could prevent

the central government from intervening tribal affairs.692 Besides these questions,

bravery in the battlefield and eloquence and mastery of Arabic language were also

very significant for tribal leadership.

Taking these concerns into account, Abdülkerim seemed to have greater

potential for the meşîhat, because it was he, not Ferhan, who could realize the

tribesmen’s expectations. Furthermore, Ferhan was believed to acquire “a taste for

certain aspect of Ottoman culture”, because he had sent several years in his youth in

İstanbul. This certainly alienated some of his tribesmen. Ferhan’s mother, contrary to

Bedouin custom, was from Baghdad. However, despite the expectations of tribesmen

Namık Pasha appointed Ferhan as paramount sheikh, because he was more likely to

co-operate with the local government.

692 John Frederick Williamson, A Political History of Shammar Jarba Tribe of Al-Jazirah: 1800-1975, PhD Thesis, Indiana University, 1975, p. 81.

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Politics of Tribe

Ottoman centralization in Iraq aimed to de-construct the tribal structure of the

country. However, the issue of how to control the disruptive tribes plagued every

governor in Baghdad. While small tribes were relatively easy to manage, the control

of tribal confederations, like Shammar, Khazâ‘il and Muntafiq was far more

complicated. Ottoman governors have been frequently criticized for having no

consistent policy towards the Iraqi tribes. The criticism for the ambivalent and

unsystematic tribal policy excludes the governorship of Midhat Pasha. As in many

other fields, Midhat Pasha is credited to start a new tribal policy. However, to put all

the governors before Midhat Pasha into the same basket would not be fair. As it will

be discussed below, at least governors such as Reşid Pasha and Namık Pasha can be

distinguished.

In Ottoman Iraq there had been a tradition that when a new governor was

appointed to the province of Baghdad, the heads of the tribes or their representatives

visited the new governor. Some of them sent only gifts without making a visit. All these

meant the allegiance of the tribe in the local government. If a specific tribe did not visit

and welcome the new governor, this was interpreted as a sign of uneasy relations with

that tribe. As Çetinsaya pointed out, the paramount sheiks of confederations or begs

served as mediators between tribes and the government. They were usually appointed or

recognized by the government, in accordance with tribal customs; however, in

appointing them, the government usually sought certain assurances as to their loyalty,

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guarantees for the full payment of tax revenues, and for the maintenance of law and

order within their tribal areas.693

Map III: tribal map of Ottoman Iraq

The harmony of interests between the local government and the tribes was very

important and it was this harmony which determined Ottoman approach to a particular

tribe. For example, Sufuk’s raid on the camp of Muhammad Ali Mirza, son of

Kirmanshah governor Fath Ali Pasha, was very significant in Ottoman’s recognition of 693 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, pp. 167–168.

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his sheikhship in Shammar tribal confederation.694 Sufuk was also appointed as Bâbü’l-

Arab in 1830s. The office of Bâbü’l-Arab dates at least back to the Mamluk period.695

The policies followed by Ottoman governors against the Iraqi tribes varied

considerably from granting favors to certain tribes, creating inter-tribal friction,

recognizing a rival chieftain within a given tribe, the use of military force,

incorporation of the tribal structures into the provincial political mechanism, and

settlement of the tribal confederations.696 The use of military force came usually

when all other methods of “politics of tribe” failed.

a.) Playing off one tribe against another

During the early decades of Ottoman centralization the central policy to break the

power of the tribal confederations was impeded by the lack of a powerful army. The

insufficient number of soldiers in the provincial army prevented the local

government to encounter the tribal confederations militarily. Therefore, as Çetinsaya

had ably pointed out,

Ottoman tribal policy mainly relied on the principle of “divide and rule”, fostering or using rivalries within the ruling families of the confederations, or between shaikhs of constituent tribes, or between the latter and the ruling families, or, ignoring the sheiks altogether and dealing directly with the chiefs of tribal sections.697

694 Layard, p. 80. 695 It was the title given to the member of the pasha’s advisory council chosen to represent tribal views and did not denote an administrative department of government. It was also very important in the mediation between the tribes. During the Mamluk period, all those on whom the title was bestowed happened to be members of the al-Shâwî family. Nieuwenhuis, p. 17. 696 The Mamluk Pashas, differing from the Tanzimat governors, used “starving the tribes” as a means of subduing the disobedient tribes. As the nomadic tribes had to purchase grain for their survival, the Mamluk Pasha tried to subdue them by closing the grain markets at Mosul, Baghdad, Tikrit and Basra. See Williamson, p.46. 697 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, p. 169.

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The method of “playing off one tribe against another”; or in other words,

principle of “divide and rule” constituted the major criticism addressed to Ottoman

governors in Baghdad. Before the restoration of Ottoman authority in 1831, the

Mamluk Pasha resorted to this method. Davud Pasha is well-known to have used

Kurdish emirates against the Baban emirate. Decreasing the Persian influence in

northern Iraq was Davud Pasha’s main purpose for this.698 The notorious governor in

this sense was Ali Rıza Pasha. Longrigg summarized Ali Rıza Pasha’s tribal policy:

Ali Rıza was content to see the ancient methods continued. He frequently changed the Shaikh of Muntafiq, set up a rival to Sufuk [of Shammar], employed Wadi as lieutenant and tax-gatherer. His mishandling of the tribal elements brought Baghdad more than once to a state of blockade. Anizah, Shammar, and Zubaid ranged outside its walls, disgusted at the Pasha’s inconsistency and eager for all that his weakness might yield them.699

The use of tribe against another tribe had certain advantages for the local

government. As noted by Ma’oz, it kept the tribes in government pay obedient.

Secondly, the countryside was defended against nomad raids from the desert. And

finally, the Bedouin tribes could be set against each other, thus weakening all of

them.700 However, it is quite questionable, how much of these aims were realized.

The politics of tribe was also very much influenced by the rivalry between the

rulers of Iraqi provinces. For instance, in 1833 the tense relations and rivalry between

Ali Rıza Pasha of Baghdad and Yahya Pasha of Mosul led the former to play for

Anaza against Shammar which was supporting the pasha of Mosul.701

The use of tribal mercenaries had a long tradition in the history of Baghdad.

The Uqayl tribe especially was famous for their military support to Baghdad 698 Al-Bustanî, p. 232. 699 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 290; Neccar, p. 28. 700 Ma’oz, p. 136. 701 Al-Bustanî, p. 225.

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governors. Mamluks used Uqayli forces in numerous encounters against dissident

tribesmen. The nomadic as well as semi-nomadic tribes were quite significant as

sources of auxiliary force. They were also effective, because of their preoccupation

with acquiring booty. The military support of the tribes, Arab and Kurdish, was very

salient, but it was not always guaranteed. The Ottoman use of racial strife between

the Arabs and the Kurds was perceived by some scholars as a ploy.702

b.) Carrot or Stick?

Though the destruction of Mamluk rule in Baghdad was eased with the support of

Shammar Jarba of Sufuk and Uqayl of Süleyman Ganam,703 the increasing central

control after the 1830s in the Ottoman Iraq upset some of the leading Iraqi tribes. While

some of them opted to cooperate with the local government some of them such as

Shammar Jarba reacted bitterly.

As Williamson pointed out, there were practical considerations in the

cooperative attitudes of the paramount sheikhs. First of all, the paramount sheikh

received a monthly government subsidy, which helped retain the loyalty of various

clans. The government subsidy was usually accompanied with some grain and food

stuff (ta‘yînât), and the robe of investiture (hil‘at ), which further strengthened his

prestige among his tribesmen. Secondly, the paramount sheikh could use his

prestigious position to augment his rather limited leadership appeal.704 There is no

doubt that the grant of official support and honorific titles stemmed from inherent

702 Salman, p. 18. 703 Al-Bustanî, pp. 93-94. 704 Williamson, p. 89.

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military weakness. The governmental subsidies were also given to the local notables

who contributed to the struggles against raiding Bedouins.

Although the Ottoman policy of managing the tribes through government

subsidies and robes of investiture ceased in many places of the empire, it continued

in Baghdad. When, in 1267/1851, the central government asked Baghdad whether it

would be proper to stop government subsidies to the Iraqi tribes, Vecihi Pasha

emphasized the need to continue this policy due to the ongoing tribal uprisings.705

The Sublime Porte complied with the local necessities, but asked the provincial

treasurer (defterdâr) to keep the necessary registers. Later, probably due to the

financial concerns, the Sublime Porte tried to limit the governmental subsidies as

much as possible.706

Some of the governors in Baghdad behaved very generously in the delivery of

salaries and subsidies. Azzawi refers to Ömer Lütfi Pasha who tried to control the

province by delivering salaries to the notables.707 Financing the tribal notables had a

certain cost. For instance, the governors of Baghdad, when need arose, put some of

the tribal leaders or their relatives under custody in Baghdad. This was an old policy

used not infrequently during the Mamluk period. Members of different tribes resided

in Baghdad, as hostages or to represent their tribe’s interests there.708 The tribal

notables who were under custody were not only accompanied with their attendants

705 “... böyle şeyler sâir mahallerden kaldırılmış ise de hıtta-i Irakiyyede henüz icrâ olunmakda olmasıyla ve’l-hâletü hâzihi meydânda olan şûriş ve ihtilâl münâsebetiyle aşâyir-i merkûmeden bazılarının taltîf ve te’mînleri icâb-ı hâlden görünüp bu dahi bir müddetçik daha bu makûle alışmış oldukları şeylerin icrâsıyla hâsıl olacağı meâl-i iş‘ârdan anlaşılmasıyla...”, BOA, İ. MVL, 7094, 4 N 1267 (3 July 1851). 706 BOA, İ. MVL, 12215, 16 C 1270 (16 March 1854) and İ. DAH, 23701, 15 S 1273 (15 October 1856). 707 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 119. 708 See Nieuwenhuis, p.41.

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and horses etc, but also they were paid in cash and in kind. Hence, the economic

burden of the issue was not insignificant.

The delivery of monthly salaries and robes of investiture were used in two

occasions. Firstly, as mentioned above, this policy was used in managing the tribal

sheikhs. Secondly, there was a tradition that during the changes of officials such as

mutasarrıf and vâlî, or after the appointment of new officials (tebeddül-i memûrîn

vukû‘unda) the tribal notables used to give the officials gifts such as horse or mare.

In return, the officials used to give shawl or robes of investiture (hil‘at ve şal).709 The

annual expenses paid for these shawls and robes were met by the Sublime Porte.

However, sometimes the officials tried to meet this by selling the horses and mares

given by the tribal sheikhs.710

The call for restricting this policy was reiterated several times during the

1850s; however, despite these efforts governmental subsidies, especially of the first

kind, continued for decades, because it was an effective method in managing the

tribes. It seems clear that the delivery of robes and monthly subsidies were very

much related to the general security affairs in the province. While during the periods

of turmoil, the local government opted to continue delivering robes and subsidies in

order to control and pacify the tribes, in the periods of relative security it was freer in

following this policy.

Another policy of the local government concerning the Iraqi tribes was the

delivery of certain honorary titles and imperial medals (mecidiye nişanı) to tribal

709 BOA, İ. MVL. 16338, 9 L 1273 (2 June 1857). For the transcripted text of this document see Appendix. 710 For instance the cost of hil‘ats delivered to the sheikhs of Muntafiq, Beni Lam, Anaza and Rebî‘a for the period of one and a half year was 84,255.5 kuruş. The amount received from the sale of the animals was approximately 65,000 kuruş, and the remaining 19,000 kuruş were met by the Sublime Porte. See BOA, İ. MVL. 24401, dâhiliye lef 1, 25 C 1282 (15 November 1865).

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sheikhs. Titles and ranks such as kaymakam and mîralay were bestowed to the tribal

notables.711

A significant turning point in tribal politics came with Reşid Pasha, when he

signed an agreement with Shammar Jarba in 1857. The Pasha persuaded Farhan, the

paramount sheikh of Shammar Jarba, and convinced him to sign a written agreement,

which included reciprocal responsibilities between the tribal confederation and the

local government. Accordingly,

This agreement called for a force of five hundred matchlock riflemen to be placed under the control of the paramount Shammar chieftain. These troops although paid and supplied by the Ottomans would reside with the Shammar. In exchange for government troops Farhan agreed to control indiscriminate Shammar raiding. The new responsibility meant that Farhan had to stop collecting khuwah, forego village tribute and begin recovering plundered property. Realizing that the cessation of khuwah collection and ghazw [Bedouin raiding] would result in an abatement in Shammar revenue, Reshid Pasha increased the monthly salary of sheikh Farhan.712

It is also understood that with this agreement Shammar Jarba became also

responsible for providing the security of the Mosul’s desert side.713 The number of

government soldiers was at the beginning 100, but as they were proved to be

insufficient the number was increased gradually.714 These soldiers were quite

effective in re-taking the properties that were looted by tribes.

When the paramount sheikhs tried to benefit from the military weakness of

the local government and demanded further concessions, the relations between

paramount sheikhs and the governor deteriorated. When the governors did not

711 For the delivery of the mecîdiye nişânı and the rank of mîralaylık to Muntafiq sheikh Nasır see BOA, İ. DAH. 44294, telfîfât lef 1, gurre-i Ca 1287 (30 July 1870) and İ. DAH. 38942, 22 L 1283 (27 February 1867). 712 Williamson, p. 94. 713 BOA, İ. MVL, 16279, 5 N 1273 (29 April 1857). 714 For instance, in 1859 the number of Ukayl soldiers were increased to 400. BOA, İ. DAH. 25 Za 1275 (26 June 1859).

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comply with the requests of the sheikhs they looked for means to weaken the tribal

unity. This was usually done by withdrawing the official recognition of the

paramount sheikh and then by appointing a rival for the tribal chieftain. If the

provincial army was strong enough to chasten the uncompromising sheikh, military

encounter was also a solution resorted not infrequently.

The stick came more frequently in at least two occasions. When the sheikhs

refused to pay the promised amount of taxes and when they plundered the caravans

and settled population, the governors usually responded with military action. These

two factors were the main reason for the battle against Albu Muhammed tribe in

summer of 1860.715 Military campaign was also made when the sheikhs made

arbitrary deeds, such as killing and persecuting innocent people. To take an example,

in September 1864, the sheikh of Khazâ‘il tribal confederation, named Mutlak,

committed serious crimes, including murder and torture (adam katl etmek ve göz ve

kulak kesmek). When Hafız Pasha, head of the provincial soldiers, and Şibli Pasha,

kaymakam of Divaniyah, marched militarily, the sheikh of Khazâ‘il fled. Namık

Pasha decided to appoint someone else for the meşîhat of Hazâ‘il, but Mutlak

apologized and agree to act obediently.716

The properties of disobedient sheikhs were usually confiscated by military

force and they were sometimes sold by auction. For instance, in 1855/56 Reşid Pasha

sold 600 camels of Nasır, sheikh of Muntafiq, and the money obtained were used in

the construction of security boat in the Euphrates.717 Similarly, in March 1863, upon

the plunder of Shammar tribe, Namık Pasha had taken the same amount of property

715 BOA, İ. DAH. 30706, dâhiliye lef 2, 13 M 1277 (1 August 1860). 716 BOA, İ. DAH. 36587, 19 R 1281 (21 September 1864) and BOA, İ. DAH. 36605, 28 R 1281 (20 September 1864). 717 BOA, İ. MVL, 15266, 4 B 1272 (11 March 1856).

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from the tribe. From these properties, the camels and the sheeps were given back to

their owners, but the horses and mares were given to provincial cavalry units.718

There were also cases in which the properties that were taken from the tribes were

recorded for the provincial treasury as revenue.719 Occasionally, as stated above,

such revenues were also distributed among the members of provincial council.

The cases of Sufuk and Abdülkerim in Shammar tribal confederation were

perhaps the most ruthless examples of stick. Sufuk’s popularity had long been in

decline and he was in open rivalry with Najris, who was supported by the governor

in Baghdad, Necip Pasha. In 1847, Sufuk tried to get the meşîhat by killing Najris

while he was in his tent as guest. This murder ended the hospitality of Shammar’s

tent and this was a great embarrassment for the tribe. This despicable murder further

exacerbated Sufuk’s situation within the tribe and soon after Necip Pasha made him

killed through his soldiers.720

Abdülkerim’s case, approximately thirty years later, was more ruthlessly

resolved. Abdülkerim, who was the paramount sheikh of Shammar tribal

confederation in early 1870s, had long been in a state of overt rebellion. He wanted

to benefit from Midhat Pasha’s military mobilization towards Najd, and marched

toward the outskirts of Baghdad. Thanks to the Nasır Pasha, who was then both the

sheikh and mutasarrıf of Nasıriyah, Abdülkerim was arrested. After his trial in the

council of appeal (meclis-i temyîz) in Baghdad, he was decapitated with the

confirmation of the Sublime Porte.721 In a nutshell, it was not rare that the

718 BOA, İ. MVL, 21886, 4 L 1279 (25 March 1863). 719 BOA, İ. DAH. 27461, 2 Ra 1275 (9 November 1858). 720 PRO / FO, 195 / 272, Baghdad, Rawlinson to Canning, No: 19, 27/10/1847. The was also narrated by Layard in detail, see Layard, pp. 90-92. 721 Midhat Paşa, pp. 133-135.

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recalcitrant sheikhs were punished by the local government. While the relations

between the local government and the Shammar tribal confederation remained for the

most time uneasy, the relations with Muntafiq turned into collaboration and cordial

alliance.722 By the end of our period, and especially during the governorship of

Midhat Pasha the relations with Muntafiq sheikh, Nasır, were very positive and co-

operative.

c.) Incorporation into the provincial political mechanism

Another significant way of managing the tribes was to incorporate them into the

provincial political mechanism. This was done in several ways. First of all, tribal

sheikhs were employed in the provincial councils. As it was mentioned in previous

chapter, members of leading tribal confederations such as Fahd and Mansur es-

Sa‘dun were employed in the council of Baghdad.

The principal purpose of the local government in Baghdad was to expand the

governmental territories at the expanse of tribal areas. The local government of

Baghdad used a policy of dividing the tribal areas into a number of tax-farming units.

This policy not only served to the process of de-tribalization but also to drastic

increase in the tax revenues paid by the tribal sheikh-tax farmers.723 While military

forces were, from time to time, used for the incorporation of tribal areas, changes in

tribal leadership/paramount sheikhship were golden opportunities for this end. For

example, during the rivalry for the meşîhat of Muntafiq in the early 1850s, the

governor of Baghdad could obtain, among other things, a small piece of tribal land in

722 Despite occasional disobedient attitudes of Muntafiq, there were positive factors, which facilitated the alliance. Muntafiq’s march in 1795 and 1797 over Wahhabi menace played important role in this. Williamson, p. 31. 723 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 84.

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favor of local government (…meşîhate râci‘ olan mukâta‘âttan bir de küçük

mukâta‘a cânib-i mîrîye terk ettirilip…).724

A second, perhaps more important, way for the co-optation of the tribal

sheikhs was to make them rulers of their own region. In this way, they became

representatives of the local government. This method was part of the de-tribalization

policy. The office of kaymakamlık was the post used for this end. Parallel to the

improvements of the provincial law, tribal areas in Iraq were gradually transformed

into kaymakamlıks. The extension of Ottoman administrative presence in the form of

kaymakamlıks meant the contraction of tribal areas. In some areas the mechanism of

kaymakamlık was instituted in order to lessen the powers of the tribes, in some other

areas the tribal sheikhs were appointed as kaymakam. The creation of Derbend

kaymakamlığı was an example of first kind. The local populace of Derbend in

Shahrizor was frequently exposed to the oppression of Shammar tribal

confederation.725 To prevent the Shammar threat, Derbend was turned into a

kaymakamlık.

The appointment of tribal sheikhs as kaymakam was not new. Necip Pasha

had, for the first time, implemented a policy of appointing tribal sheikhs and military

commanders as kaymakam-mültezim.726 The case of Muntafiq provides good

examples for the transformation of a tribal confederation into a kaymakamlık. During

the early 1850s, the turmoil that resulted from the rivalry for the meşîhat of

Muntafiq, made Namık Pasha think for alternative solutions. Namık Pasha suggested

the management of Muntafiq tribal confederation through a kaymakam appointed by

724 BOA, İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268 (3 May 1852). 725 BOA, İ. MVL. 23471, 5 B 1281 (5 January 1865). 726 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policy, p. 85.

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the governor-general in Baghdad.727 It seems that for a short period the kaymakamlık

of Muntafiq was abolished;728 however, it was later restored. Ahmed Tevfik Pasha

appointed sheikh Bender as kaymakam.

It was in late 1850s that Ömer Lütfi Pasha dismissed almost all military

commanders and tribal sheikhs from district governor because of their incompetence

and corruption in collecting taxes from tribal areas.729 Ömer Pasha replaced them

with civil officials as kaymakams and müdirs. As Kiyotaki ably pointed out,

The district governor was prohibited from acquiring the right of tax-farming, while the tribal sheikh was in charge of collecting taxes in his domain. Appointing the district governor and his administrative staff from among government officials, Ömer Pasha attempted to exercise direct political control of the tribesmen and make the tribal sheiks directly subordinate to the Baghdad government.730

Ömer Pasha tried to incorporate the tribes into the administrative system through the

re-organization of the Divaniyah disctrict:

Ömer Pasha appointed the colonel of the troops stationed in the district, Şibli Pasha as the new governor, with a salary paid by the Baghdad treasury. The tribal areas in the Middle Euphrates – Diwaniya, Ufak, Dughara, Shamiya, Khazâ‘il ans Haska – were re-organized into nnew administrative units (müdirlik) and placed under the larger unit of administration, the sancak of Diwaniya, with its center in Diwaniya.731

It appears that similar re-organizations were done in other districts such as

Bani Lam and Muntafiq. In Muntafiq, there were frequent changes in the office of

kaymakamlık. The fact that the Muntafiq kaymakams were at the same time

727 BOA, İ .DAH. 15339, 8 C 1268 (30 March 1852). 728 “1274 senesinden i‘tibâren lağv olunan Müntefik aşîreti kaymakamlığı ve mâl kâtibi…”, BOA, İ. MVL. 18268, 22 L 1275 (25 May 1859). 729 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 78. 730 Ibid., pp. 78-80. 731 Ibid., p. 80.

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mültezim, was quite effective in this (Müntefik dîresi mukâta‘âtı minel kadîm

hükûmetiyle berâber kaim-makâmlık tarzında iltizâm ve ihâle olunmakta olması ve

bunu der‘uhde edenlerin türlü mezâlim ve ta‘addiyâta cür’et etmesi). The dismissed

kaymakams had usually problems regarding the tax payments. To take an example,

sheikh Bender was brought to trial, because he was accused of hiding and

embezzling tax revenues. It was for this reason that Sheikh Bender was replaced by

Sheikh Mansur.732

In 1864, the kaymakamlık of Muntafiq experienced significant reform.

Twenty two mukâta‘as from the tribal lands of Muntafiq were appropriated on behalf

of the state and were tied to Basra and Aziziye. The remaining mukâtaas formed a

separate kaymakamlık for which Mansur Bey was appointed kaymakam with 30,000

kuruş salary. When a new kaymakamlık was created, certain officials were also

appointed to that place. Accordingly, an muhâsebeci (accountant), mâl kâtibi, Arabic

and Turkish clerks and sandık emini were appointed.733

As Charles Tripp rightly observed, the co-optation of the sheikhs into

provincial administration, either through kaymakamlık/mutasarrıflık or membership

in the provincial councils, ensured a remarkable absence of rural disturbance in the

province of Baghdad during the latter half of the nineteenth century.734

732 BOA, İ. MVL. 20409, 21 R 1278 (26 October 1861). 733 “…Aşiretten [Müntefik] Basra ve Aziziye kaymakamlıklarına kurbiyet ve münâsebet-i mevki‘iyesi olan yirmi iki kalem mukâta‘âtın bi’l-ifrâz livâîn-i mezkûrîne ilhâkı ve mâadâsının dahi bir kaymakâmlık ittihâzı ile Bağdad meclis-i azâsından Müntefik kaymakamı sâbık izzetlü Mansur Beyin zâtına mahsûs olan 5,000 kuruş ma‘âşı üzerine 25,000 kuruş zammıyla 30,000 kuruş ma‘âşla Müntefik kaymakâmlığına ve 5,000 kuruş aylıkla Hankin kaymakamı Süleyman Beyin muhasebeciliğe ve 1,500 kuruş ma‘âşla Horasan mâl kâtibi sâbık Hacı Saîd Efendinin mâl kitâbetine ve biner kuruş ma‘âş ile Atî Efendinin arabî ve Ragıb Beyin türkî tahrirât kitâbetlerine ve 500 kuruşla İshakın sandık emînliğine ve şehriye 2,000 kuruşla Hüsameddin Efendinin Kurna müdürlüğüne (ta‘yîni)…”, BOA, İ. MVL, 22666, 22 Ş 1280 (1 February 1864). 734 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2002, p. 18.

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d.) Appointing and dismissing the paramount sheikh

The process of tribal succession was closely watched by Ottoman officials, because

the death of a paramount sheikh could easily turn into a conflict among the possible

candidates for the position of paramount sheikh. The process of sheikhly succession

is important in that the local government could benefit from the conjuncture. If the

relations between a particular tribe and the government were problematic, then the

government could opt for weakening the tribe by playing off the rival sheikhs against

each other.

However, if the aim was not to weaken a particular tribe, then the Ottomans

usually followed certain criteria for the election of a paramount sheikh. What were

these criteria? The events following the death of Fahd, paramount sheikh of Muntafiq

tribal confederation (late 1840s and early 1850s), tells us about these criteria.735

When Fahd died in 1848, Sheikh Faris and Mansur began to struggle for the post,

meşîhat. It seems that the local officials were quite effective in the sheikhly

succession, because it was Maşuk Pasha, mutasarrıf of Basra, who first appointed

Faris for the meşîhat. When the problem of succession was not solved then

provincial governor and müşir of the Sixth Army intervened.

Faris accepted to pay the unpaid compound taxes and agreed to increase the

amount of tax levied on Muntafiq; hence, he was brought by Maşuk Pasha to the

meşîhat.736 Discontent with the appointment of Faris, Mansur assured the support of

several tribes, of which Zafîr and Zubaid tribes took the lead. Then, Mansur marched

over Faris and after a short conflict he was able to depose him from meşîhat and

735 The events that followed the death of Fahd is narrated in BOA, İ. MVL, 6511, 22 Ca 1267 (15 April 1849). The transcription of this document can be seen in Appendix. 736 BOA, İ. DAH. 14399, 19 L 1267 (17 August 1851).

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proclaimed himself paramount sheikh.737 This time Faris began to secure the support

of leading tribal confederations of Iraq, such as Anaza and Shammar tribal

confederations. The conflict was about to turn into a battle among the leading tribal

confederations of the country. Abdi Pasha thought that such an inter-tribal conflict

would mean the devastation of the local people by the Bedouins.

As the result of correspondence between the Sublime Porte, the mutasarrıf of

Basra (Maşuk Pasha) and the governor of Baghdad (Abdi Pasha), it was decided that

Faris was to be called to Baghdad and upon his arrival, he would be arrested and kept

in Baghdad. Although at the beginning Faris was declared to be the paramount

sheikh; however, his unruly and disobedient behaviors made it clear that he would

not fulfill his promises. Playing for Mansur, as Abdi Pasha suggested, seemed more

suitable for the Sublime Porte. However, Mansur was not reliable figure too. Upon

his arrival to Suku’s-şuyûh, the political and commercial center of the Muntafiq, he

demanded from Maşuk Pasha to send a robe of investiture (hil‘at ), which would

mean the official confirmation of his paramount sheikhship.738 To go further,

Mansur’s brother, Nasır, gathered 5000 tribesmen and stayed approximately fifty

days in Basra, enforcing Maşuk Pasha to confirm his paramount sheikhship. During

these days the tribesmen pillaged local and foreign merchants and the route between

Baghdad and Basra was almost cut.

Maşuk Pasha told Nasır that it was not the mutasarrıf of Basra, but the

governor-general in Baghdad, that would confirm the meşîhat. Upon these

developments, for the sake of preventing the growing unrest, Maşuk Pasha appointed

Mansur reluctantly (and probably temporarily) as paramount sheikh. However, in the

737 BOA, İ. DAH. 13592, 15 Ra 1267 (18 January 1851). 738 BOA, İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268 (3 May 1852).

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meantime, while the struggle was continuing between Faris and Mansur, Salih al-İyâ,

who was one of the sheikhs of the tribe, was called to Baghdad by Namık Pasha.

Namık Pasha appointed Salih as paramount sheikh to Muntafiq and sent him to his

tribe. The sheikh was accompanied with provincial soldiers and Ukayl tribe. In order

to reinforce the paramount sheikhship of Salih, the governor also sent two ships to

Basra. Upon Salih’s arrival to Suku’ş-şuyûh, Maşuk announced that since Mansur

obtained the meşîhat by illegal means (by force), his sheikhship was not valid.

Maşuk Pasha continued that the paramount sheikhship of Salih al-İya was confirmed

by governor-general in Baghdad.739 On the other hand, seeing the coming of Salih

with provincial soldiers, Mansur had no choice other than escaping to the desert. It is

quite interesting that Salih’s meşîhat did not last a bit more than one year, because he

was dismissed and replaced by Mansur again.740 Mansur was given a sword and

bestowed robe of investiture. The reason for Salih’s dismissal was that he paid the

annual payment incomplete. Salih was arrested and he was kept in Baghdad.

The dispute over the meşîhat of Muntafiq was eventually resolved. However,

the whole struggle, which continued almost four years, bears significant clues for

Ottoman politics of tribe. There were several points which Ottoman officials took

into consideration during the appointment and dismissal of paramount sheikhs. First

of all, military strength was quite vital both in dismissing or reinforcing a sheikh.

Secondly, the periods of harvest was also paid utmost attention. Even if the sheikh

was recalcitrant, no military action was taken for the sake of collecting the harvest.

739 BOA, İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268 (3 May 1852). 740 BOA. İ. DAH. 17606, 4 Ca 1269 (13 February 1853) and İ. MVL. 11635, 25 S 1270 (27 November 1853).

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In 1267, the governor Baghdad considered dismissing Faris, but he could not dare,

because he was to pay the unpaid taxes of two years (iki yıllık müterâkim vergi).741

Furthermore, when, for a while, the Sublime Porte could not determine which

side to support in the rivalry between the candidates, Abdi Pasha underlined the

important criteria of appointing a paramount sheikh in Muntafiq. Abdi Pasha drew

the attentions to the responsibilities of the sheikh, rather than his personal

characteristics. Accordingly, the issue was not whom to select, but who can fulfill the

responsibilities against the local government in Muntafiq. In general, the paramount

sheikh should be someone who co-operate with the local government and assure the

reform (ıslâhât) of the region. The Sublime Porte emphasized the continuity of

earlier responsibilities and promises of the tribe. Especially, the sheikh should repair

and renovate the river walls without resorting to the Ottoman subsidy.742

The paramount sheikh was recognized by the provincial government under

the term of fixed tributes (called mâl-ı mîrî) determined upon the acknowledgement

of his sheikhship.743 The candidate sheikh should also assure an increase in the

payment of this tribute to the local government. In this context, the rivalry for

meşîhat gave the Ottoman Empire the golden opportunity to increase the taxes levied

on the tribe. During the abovementioned rivalry between Faris and Mansur the yearly

tax levied on Muntafiq tribal confederation was increased to 250,000 şâmî. In time, it

appears that the meşîhat of the tribe was tax farmed with auction for certain, usually

741 BOA, İ. DAH. 14508, askeri lef 3, gurre-i L 1267 (30 July 1851) and İ. DAH. 15714, dâhiliye lef 1, 13 B 1268 (3 May 1852). 742 “... bunda asıl aranılacak mesele oraların ıslâhâtıyla beraber şu sedlerin icâbât-ı mevki‘iye mülâhazasıyla şeyh bulunacak adama yaptırılması ve vergilerinin zamâyim-i müte‘ahhidesiyle istihsâli kaziyyesi olduğundan ... hangisi meşîhat-i merkûmede istihdâm kılınacak ise ta‘ahhüdâtı sâbıkanın fesh olmaması ve bu sırada havâlî-i mezbûrenin ber vefk-i dil-hâh-ı âlî istikrâr-ı asâyiş ve hüsn-i idâresine ikdâm ve gayret olunması ...”, BOA, İ. MVL. 6511, lef 2, 8 Ca 1265 (1 April 1849). 743 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 62.

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there years, period. The change in the tribal leadership of Muntafiq at the beginning

of 1868 gives illustrative example. Upon the termination of Fahd al-Alî’s meşîhat,

Fahd and Nasır es-Sa‘dun, who was among the tribal notables, were brought

Baghdad for auction. When Nasır increased the annual tribal tax one-third, Fahd

gave up the auction and the meşîhat was given to Nasır.744 However, it should also be

noted that the highest bid was not enough for gaining the meşîhat, the sheikh should,

at the same time, strive for the provisioning of general security in the region.

e.) Settling of the Tribes

Settling the tribes was probably the most important phase of Ottoman politics of

tribe. This method was closely associated with the incorporation of the tribal notables

into the provincial political mechanism. Settling the tribe was quite instrumental in

restraining Bedouins and incorporating them into the provincial politics. In this

sense, the settlement policy was certainly among the Tanzimat policies.745 Like in

Damascus, at the beginning there was no central policy of settling the nomadic Iraqi

tribes.746 This endeavor came to be felt more overtly in late 1840s and early 1850s,

more specifically after Namık Pasha’s governorship, and continued until the end of

the Ottoman rule in Iraq. The central policy required the allocation of certain parts of

744 “Bağdad eyâleti dâhilinde kâin Müntefik dîresinin müddet-i ihâlesi münkaziyye olmakdan nâşî tecdîd-i meşîhat zımnında şeyh-i sâbık Fehd el-Alî Bağdada celb olunarak mu‘teberân-ı hamûleden Nasır es-Sa‘dun ile müzâedeye tutuşup dîre-i mezkûrenin üç seneliği bedelât-ı sâbıkasını sülüs mikdârı zamâyimle mûmâ ileyh Nasır es-Sa‘dun üzerinde takarrur ederek… ”, BOA, İ. DAH. 38942, lef 1, 3 N 1283 (9 January 1867). 745 “… levâzım-ı Tanzîmât ve te’minât kemâ hiye hakkuhâ ifâ olunarak ber beyân-ı bâlâ târik-i hıyâm ikâmet ve âzim-i sahrâ-yı vahşet olan ahâlînin yakında bulunanları bi-hamdihi te‘âlâ mücerred nufusu meyâsin-me’nûs-ı hazret-i pâdişâhî âsar-ı celîlesi olmak üzre mahallerine gelmeğe başlamış ve mâ‘adâlarının dahi bir tarafdan celbleriyle mahallerine iskan olunacağı derkar bulunmuştur…”, BOA. İ. MVL. 2981, 29 Ra 1264 (5 March 1848). For the Ottoman policy concerning the settlement of the tribes in the pre-Tanzimat period, see Cengiz Orhunlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskanı, İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1987. 746 See Ma‘oz, p. 142.

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the country for the nomadic tribes to settle, build houses and form new villages. It is

not infrequent that even the tools required for agriculture were given by the local

government in Baghdad.

Tribesmen have been known throughout history to shift occasionally from

nomadic to sedentary or semi-sedentary life or vice versa, and the interconnection

between agricultural communities and the desert societies adjacent to them can

therefore be quite close.747 In this context, it can be said that while the city centers

were settled by urban population, the level of nomadism increased as one gets far

from the urban centers. Accordingly, the immediate surroundings of the cities were

populated by semi-nomads and agriculturalists.

The central and southern Arabs were more nomadic when compared to the

Kurds of the north. Though the Kurds were not as mobile as the southern Arabs, the

existing insecurity (not only in the region but also within the emirates) prevented

their conversion into mere cultivators. Bruinessen, quoting from Rich, explained this

situation as follows:

“Rivalries in the ruling family, combined with Ottoman and Persian intrigues, caused sudden changes; and as a new mîr came to power, he brought new officials. This uncertainty of office resulted in over-exploitation, never moderated by patronage relations. It was one of the ugliest features that the emirate had in common with the empire at large. A tribe agha told Rich that this insecurity was the main reason why the tribes did not settle to agriculture (which might improve their lot): why should they sow if they did not know whether they could ever mow? Instead, the tribesmen aggravated the burden of the subject peasantry (guran), from which they took whatever they could, without regard for the legal stipulations.748

Despite this insecurity the solution of the British officials was to deprive the ‘restless

and turbulent’ Kurds of their arms and take away their tents:

747 Salman, p. 3. 748 Bruinessen, p. 173.

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Perhaps the surest way to convert these restless and turbulent Koords into peaceable cultivators of soil would be to deprive them of their arms and to take away entirely their tents. The first measure would prevent their being otherwise than peaceable, and the last would check effectually their wandering and oblige them to inhabit villages…. The sultan’s government would then be doubly strengthened by the increase of revenue and by the conversion of a rebellious unproductive population into an orderly and productive class of subjects. In short, both Europe and the sultan would derive incalculable benefits from the matter being brought to a successful issue.749

As one shifts from north to south, it is seen that the politics of settling the

nomadic tribes was far more extensive in the southern Iraq. The procedure was

usually as follows: The governor-general allocated a particular region of the

settlement of a certain tribes. According to the size of the tribe, the region was

usually transformed into a kaymakamlık or sancak. For instance, in 1862 Namık

Pasha was able to settle the Albu Muhammad tribe. However, it was before 1862,

that as the result of de-tribalization process and ‘divide and rule’ method, the Albu

Muhammad tribe was separated from Bani Lâm district in 1859.750 Therefore, the

Albu Muhammad tribe was already weakened and Namık Pasha made the last move

in 1862. He created a new sancak and built a military barrack, a government house

and a mosque.751

It was again during the governorship of Namık Pasha that he had attempted to

settle the Muntafiq tribal confederation in a sancak. When he was opposed by the

tribe, he divided the northern and southern parts of the sheikhdom, and tied the

northern part to Divaniyah in the sancak of Hillah.752 The southern part centered in

749 FO. 195 / 113 “Memorandum Regarding the Koords” (no date). 750 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 81. After this separation the provincial government could receive larger amounts of tax revenues from the Albu Muhammad tribe. 751 Namık Pasha also honored the persons who afforded for the construction and improvement of the sancak. See BOA. İ. DAH. 33727, 21 Ra 1279 (16 September 1862). 752 Neccar, p. 56.

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Basra. Then in 1863, Namık Pasha tried to deconstruct and turn the sheikhdom into

an administrative sancak, centered in Sûku’ş-şuyûh. He had appointed the paramount

sheikh, Mansur Es-Sa‘dun, who had been a member of the administrative council of

Baghdad for two years, as mutasarrıf of Sûku’ş-şuyûh. Namık Pasha also sent

several administrative officials, including accountant and clerks.753 However, his

attempts in Muntafiq lasted only two months, because some of the sheikhs/tribes

rejected submission to the Ottoman central authority. Consequently, the status-quo

was retained until the governorship of Midhat Pasha.

Though Namık Pasha’s efforts were a break when compared to former

politics of tribes, his efforts were not as successful as Midhat Pasha’s. In pursuance

of the introduction of the vilâyet system, Midhat Pasha paid considerable attention to

the settlement of nomadic tribes.754 The new approach towards tribes under Namık

Pasha and Midhat Pasha differed from the former policies in that these governors

sought deliberately an alternative to the use of ‘stick and carrot’ and ‘divide and

rule’. The alternative was to settle in a particular region and cultivate the land.

Midhat Pasha started where Namık Pasha left. He took steps with the view to

converting the Muntafiq territory into a sancak/mutasarrıflık and inducing the tribe

to become settled in one spot.755 Formerly the Muntafiq region was given as tax-farm

to the sheikh of the tribe, but this was not suitable to the new vilâyet system. Midhat

Pasha called Nasır Pasha, sheikh of the Muntafiq, to Baghdad for consultation. Upon

the compromise between Muntafiq sheikh and the governor, a new town was

753 BOA, İ. MVL, 22666, 22 Ş 1280 (1 February 1864). 754 The Vilâyet Law envisaged also changes in the economic structure of the province, but the economic modernization will be explained in the related section. 755 See Zewra, no: 11.

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established and made sancak.756 Midhat Pasha settled the Muntafiq in this new town,

called Nasıriyah after the name of the sheikh of the tribe. Nasır Pasha, became the

mutasarrıf of the sancak and the tax-farming system in Muntafiq was abolished. In

his return to his tribe, Nasır Pasha was accompanied by three Turkish officials to

assist him in introducing the proposed reforms and 200 foot of the newly organized

police, as a model force.757 It was among the principles of the new vilâyet law that

each sancak was given a military battalion.758

It was proposed that the Muntafiq paramount sheikh should endeavor to

induce his tribesmen to build a city on the banks of Tigris. For this end, he was

supplied with a plan of the proposed town, and Midhat Pasha notified that those who

build and occupy houses shall be exempted in perpetuity from capitation tax of 50

piasters per annum, while it shall continue to be levied on those dwelling in tents.

The British consulate reports also indicate that no objection was shown to the

settlement project and that all went on quietly in Muntafiq.759

Similarly, due to their uncontrolled behaviors and plunders, Midhat Pasha

wanted to settle the Shammar tribe gradually along the Tigris River, between Tikrit

and Mosul. He encouraged the tribe for doing agriculture and promised to take

nothing except the tithe tax (öşr). He also wanted to give title deeds (tapu) to the

members of the tribe. In his letter to the Sublime Porte Midhat Pasha stated that if the

756“… Mutasarrıflık merkezine sâlih bir Sûku’ş-şuyûh kasabası var ise de ânın dahi derkâr olan vehâmet-i havasına mebnî orası merkez ittihâz olunamayacağından onun öte tarafında havası mu‘tedil bir mahalle sokakları 25 arşın vüs‘atinde olmak ve cemi‘ ezikkâsı vasat-ı memlekette bulunacak bağçeye mevsûl olmak şartıyla ve Nasıriye nâmıyla yeniden bir kasaba yapılması kararlaştırılarak inşâ olunacak hükümet konağı ve câmi-‘i şerîf ve sâir ebniye-i lâzimenin inşâsı için iktizâ-yı hâlin icrâsına teşebbüs kılınmış ve livâ-i mezkûr şimdiye kadar adeta bedeviyet sûretiyle idâre olunageldiği cihetiyle medeniyete dâir bir esâs olmayup bir sancağın sancak olması için ne olmak ve yapılmak lâzım ise bundan böyle yapılıp tanzîm olunacağından …”. Zewra, No: 11. 757 FO 195/949. From Herbert to Constantinople, 15 September 1869. 758 Zewra, No: 2. 759 FO 195/949. From Herbert to Constantinople, 15 September 1869.

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pilot settlement is successfully accomplished, then he wanted to settle the whole

Shammar tribal confederation under a new sancak, called Shammar, like that of

Muntafiq in Nasıriya. The sheikh of the tribe, Ferhan Pasha, had no alternatives but

to accept Midhat Pasha’s offer for settlement. Due to the famine the year before,

many of the tribe’s animals perished and it resulted also in the rise of the prices.

Hence, Ferhan Pasha felt himself obliged to accept with the offer.

Upon his acceptance he was given a buyruldu that made him the mutasarrıf of

the new sancak of Shammar.760 It seems that Midhat Pasha, after long period of

persuasion, used some kind of force or threat for persuading the Shammar leader.761

However, there is no doubt that the establishment of new towns had a visible effect

on the sedenterization of neighboring nomads.

Consequently, in his relatively short period of tenure Midhat Pasha made

considerable achievements in settling the nomadic tribes. This was very crucial in

dissolving the tribal structure of the province. The settlement of nomadic and semi-

nomadic tribes contributed very much to the security of the province. The Land Code

of 1858, the implementation of which in Baghdad will be explained below, also

aimed to curb the power of the sheiks and notables and to bring the individual fellahs

to the forefront762. It stressed the individual rights of the fellahs as opposed to the

tribal authority of the sheikh. Midhat Pasha was very successful in drawing the tribal

sheikhs into a political game.

There is no doubt that the late nineteenth century witnessed the decline of

great tribal confederations and this was reflected to the general welfare, prosperity

760 The Arabic buyruldı can be seen in the supplements of BOA, İ. DAH, 41930. 761 “… Bu yolu kendülere kabul ettirmek için biraz da icbâr edilmeleri zamanı gelmiş olduğundan…” BAO, İ. DAH, 43847, 29 M 1288 (20 April 1871). 762 See Zewra, No: 11.

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and security of the province. For instance, the marshlands of southern Iraq, and date-

palm culture, became more prosperous with pacifization and settlement. It is crystal

clear that the tendency in the second half of the nineteenth century was

sedentarization of the nomadic tribes in Baghdad. The percentage of nomadic groups

in Iraq’s population was 35 % in late 1860s, but it declined to 17 % in 1905.763 This

trend was also confirmed by the European travelers and residents, who in 1900

reported a notable improvement in the settlement and security since 1865.764 The

settlement of the nomadic tribes made them have a closer connection with the land, a

subject to which we shall turn now.

Land Holding Patterns in Baghdad and the Implementation of Land Reforms

The land system of Iraq was the most important problem that needed to be reformed.

Most of the problems, especially those related to security issues, originated from the

crooked nature of the land system, because the tribal structure of the region was

based on the land. Hence, the modernization of Baghdad was very much related to

the land problems of the province. Therefore, the implementation of the Ottoman

Land Code of 1858 was of great importance. Before passing to the land holding

patterns in Baghdad, it would be proper to summarize the basic characteristics of

Ottoman land laws, which culminated in the Land Code of 1858.

Ottoman Land Code of 1858 The Land Code of 1858 was certainly one of the most important Tanzimat reforms. It

was with the proclamation of the Tanzimat that the iltizam (tax-farming) system, as

the land system of the empire for centuries, was abolished and tax farmers were

763 Hasan, “Growth and Structure”, p. 352. 764 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 305.

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replaced by regular officials (muhassıls) to collect the provincial taxes, including

land taxes. Although the institution of muhassıllık did not survive long, the Tanzimat

period witnessed significant regulations concerning the land regime of the empire. In

this context, the Land reform of 1858 was a revolutionary step in the Ottoman

Empire, which was basically agrarian in nature.

Before passing to the application of the Land Code in Baghdad, it will be

beneficial to remember the basic characteristics of Ottoman land system and the

modifications that the code brought. The first article of the code, which was

comprised of 132 articles, divided Ottoman land into five main categories: 1.)

Mülk765 Land, 2.) Mîrî766 Land, 3.) Waqf Land, 4.) Metrûka767 Land, 5.) Mevât768

Land. However, mîrî and mülk lands were the most significant of these five

categories, because the others were in some way included under these two types of

land. For instance, the mevât land can be included within the mîrî category.769 If

someone brings the mevât land into cultivation, s/he obtains the usufructory rights,

tasarruf hakkı, transforming the land into miri770 In the Ottoman agrarian laws, land

ownership comprises two rights: the raqaba, the right of absolute ownership, and the

tasarruf, the usufruct right of the land. In mülk land both of these rights belong to the

765 Land in absolute freehold. 766 The word miri actually comes from ‘emiriyye’, meaning princely. Miri land is commonly translated as state land. But as Gerber pointed out, it does not correspond to the state land in modern sense. State land is land that the state wishes to keep out the individual use, such as forestland. However, such legal category did not exist in the Ottoman Empire. See Gerber, The Social Origins, p. 68. 767 The land reserved for the public use, which includes roads, rivers, market places, public buildings or village threshing floors etc. 768 State lands such as desert or empty lands. 769 See Ömer Lütfi Barkan, Türkiye‘de Toprak Meselesi, İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980, p. 335. 770 For further details on the transformation of mevât land into mîrî lands, see Halil İnalcık, “The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlord and Tenants”, in Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds.) Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.

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individual, whereas in the mîrî land the absolute ownership belongs to the state, but

the usufruct belongs to the individual. In the mîrî land, the raqaba was always vested

in the state, which meant in practice that it was the state that had the right to tax the

occupier of the land or exact labor from them.771 However, this did not imply any

control over the use of land, or any degree of responsibility for its cultivation. In this

context, the basic premise of the code was the reassertion of the state’s right of

raqaba and its right to grant out tasarruf to the lessees.772

The Land Code of 1858 heralded the opening of a new period in the Ottoman

Empire. Many scholars tend to regard the Land Code as a revolutionary reform in the

empire, sometimes overemphasizing the articles concerning private property (Article

38). However, the Code should be put in its historical perspective properly. It should

be considered as the codification of the whole Ottoman land system. As Gerber

clearly remarked,

The law was no more and no less than a re-enactment of classical fifteenth and sixteenth-century Ottoman kanuns relating to agrarian matters, with some minor modifications….Thus, there was historical and legal continuity between the old agrarian laws and the 1858 land law.773

To show the legal continuity in the agrarian reforms, the following examples will be

useful. The Land Code of 1858 had an article on the equal inheritance right of both

male and female offspring without any payment of tapu.774 In fact, this was already

specified by the amendments made first in 7 Cemâziye’l Ûlâ 1263 (1847) and later in

771 Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 67. 772 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure in Central and Southern Iraq, 1870-1958”, IJMES, 15, 1983, p. 493. 773 Gerber, The Social Origins, pp. 68-69. 774 Ibid., p. 69.

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23 Rebîu’l Evvel 1265 (1849).775 Furthermore, a similar application of delivery of

title deed (tapu sanadi), which was the most important feature of the 1858 land code,

was implemented a decade ago. In accordance with the Tapu Law of 1847, it was

announced that a document given by the governmental authorities would be required

for all changes of land tenure.776 Last but not least, just a few months before the

announcement of Land Code of 1858, an amendment concerning the extension of

hereditary rights from the son to other kin was accepted. This meant that the central

authority recognized larger and larger rights of use, and the miri lands assumed a de

facto quasi-mülk nature.777

It is crystal clear that the most important novelty that the land code brought in

was the obligation for every landowner to register his/her (miri) land and receive a

title deed (tapu sanadi). According to the Article 78, on the one hand, the peasants

who occupied certain land for ten consecutive years could register without any

payment.778 On the other hand, unclaimed vacant lands could by now be registered

with the payment of necessary amount of money. Moreover, the Code also required

continuity in agriculture: Should the lands be left uncultivated for three or more

years, the government had the right to transfer it to third persons.

Article 38 of the code, which is interpreted by many scholars as paving the

way for private property in the Ottoman Empire for the first time, states that ‘a

775 Barkan, pp. 323-26. 776 Halil İnalcık, “Land Problems in Turkish History”, The Muslim World, 45, 1955, p.225. 777 For detailed information on the extension of hereditary rights to other kins see Barkan, pp. 328-30. 778 Gerber argues that the condition of a ten-year possession period was rarely met. The nomadic tribes were frequently changing their farms and grazing lands. As Doreen Warriner remarked, the cultivators were mobile, because cultivation was not the only occupation and livestock grazing remained as an important alternative. See Warriner, Land Reform, p. 67. The fertility of soil, climate, irrigation system and salination were among the reasons for the movement of tribes. Therefore, acquisition of title deeds meant buying vacant land, which approves the contentions that the main concern of the land code was to raise revenues. See Gerber, The Social Origins, pp. 74-75.

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possessor by title-deed of State land can … transfer it to another, by way of gift, or

for a fixed price’.779 In fact, two terms of the land code have sometimes

misinterpreted, namely title deed (tapu) and purchase (satış).780 These terms have

been interpreted in such a way that they implied private ownership. However, one

should not forget that the delivery of the title deed does not mean that the land for

which title was given, is absolutely a private land; on the contrary, it is very well-

known that the central government delivered title deeds not for the absolute

ownership, but for the usufructory right of the state (mîrî) lands. As a corollary of

this, what was being sold was not the absolute ownership (raqaba) of the land, but

only usufruct right (tasarruf) of it. That the state retained the ownership of the land

prevented the development of private property rights in the Ottoman Empire. Until

1926, the state kept the absolute ownership of the state land in its hands. It would be

more proper to interpret the extension of the usufructory rights in the mid nineteenth

century as leading to “quasi-ownership”, rather than absolute private property

right.781

Between the Tribes and the Local Government: The Land in Ottoman Iraq The land of Ottoman Iraq was mainly comprised of harâcîye and öşriye lands (arâzi-

i harâciye and arâzi-i öşriye).782 It was during the caliphate of Omar that after its

conquest, the land of Iraq was considered to be arâzi-i harâciye and accordingly

779 For the text of Land Code of 1858, see Kanunnâme-i Arâzî, Düstur, (birinci tertib), Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1330, Vol. 1, pp. 165-200. 7 Ramazan 1274, and Stanley Fisher, Ottoman Land Laws, London, 1919. 780 See Macit Kenanoğlu, 1858 Arazi Kanunnamesinin Osmanlı Siyasal ve Toplumsal Yapısı Üzerindeki Etkileri (1858-1876), PhD Thesis, Ankara University, 2002. 781 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 17. 782 “… hıtta-i Irakiyye arâzîsi harâciye ve öşriye olmak üzere iki kısma münkasem olduğu …”, BOA, İ. MVL. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286.

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Caliph Omar made it an inalienable common property of the Islamic state, rather

distributing it among the Muslim soldiers. Therefore, the status of Iraqi lands took its

institutional form in the first century of Islam. Unlike the mîrî lands, the harâcî lands

were supervised under the şer‘i law and it was exempted from tithe (öşr) payment;

instead, there was land tax known as harâc. Another limitation of Islamic law upon

haracî lands was that their sale was forbidden.783 While the harâciye land dominated

the central and the southern part of the province, the northern region was mainly

öşriye lands.

The legal condition of the land, however, changed in the course of time; the

concept of harâc in effect disappeared and the land was put into the status of mîrî

land.784 Despite its new status as mîrî (state) land; however, the Ottoman claim of

ownership was not effective. Even the government’s right to a share of the produce,

as rent or tax, was not enjoyed by the government directly. The central government

however was not able to determine the choice of tenants, to control the regime of

cultivation, or to weaken the domination of tribal custom.785 Kiyotaki, quoting from

British consular reports, pointed out that the distribution of land tenure as of 1861

was as follows: % 82 state (mîrî) land (including vakıf land), %12 mülk land, and

%6 temlik land.786

783 “Bağdad arâzîsinin arâzi-i harâciyeden olmasıyla bey‘i şer‘an câiz olmadığı…”, BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860); See also Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.,), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 111. 784 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286. “Hıtta-i Irakiyye arâzîsi … takallübât-ı kevniyye ile ahkâmı kadîmîsi mütegayyer ve münkalib ve mutasarrıfları munkariz olmağla ekserîsi arâzî-i emîriyye hükmünü iktisâb eylediğinden bunlar cânib-i mîrîden maktû‘an mültezimlerine ihâle veya emâneten idâre olunmakta ise de…”; Also BOA, İ. MMAH., 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860). “… Eyâlet-i merkûme [Bağdad] arâzisi harâciyeden olup kimesnenin uhdesinde bulunmamak ve ekserisi maktû‘an mîrîyyeden ma‘dûd bulunmak melâsebesiyle…” (emphasis added), BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860). 785 Jwaideh, Midhat Pasha, p. 118. 786 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 94; Quoted from PRO, FO 78/1633, Enclosure No: 4 of dispatch No: 41, 29 August 1861.

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The land of Iraq was different from other lands in terms of legal and practical

aspects.787 Unlike the usual practice throughout of the empire, in Baghdad the

usufructory right (hukûk-ı tasarrufiye) of the land belonged to the state, as it was the

case in state farms (çiftlikât-ı mîriyye). There were only very few lands that were

considered to be private (mülk) lands: these were small orchards and some date

gardens.788 Furthermore, the fertile land was divided in pieces known as mukâta‘â.

Mukâta‘a was the unit of area irrigated by a major irrigation canal. The farmers

(fellâhîn), who were brought to the field, were working as sharecropper, metayer?

(ortakçı) or tenants at will. The seeds were provided by the state and two-third of the

harvest was taken by the government, and the remaining one-third was given to the

peasants.789 The mukâta‘as were auctioned as tax-farming (iltizâm) to tax-farmers

(mültezim).

The patterns of land tenure in the province of Baghdad differed from place to

place. In this context, in accordance with the availability of water (rain or irrigation)

the Iraqi land could be divided into three areas: The northern, central and southern

regions. The availability of water changed the whole patterns of farming, because it

was an important factor affecting not only the kinds of seeds to be sown, but also the

whole procedure of farming. For instance, the winter crops such as wheat, barley,

beans, peas and lentils could be grown with dry-farming. On the other hand, the

better-qualified summer crops (such as rice, millet, maize, sesame, tobacco, and

cotton) could be grown through irrigation, that is to say, in the central and southern

787 Midhat Pasha, p. 102. 788 Zewra, No: 50. 789 Midhat Pasha, p.102

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regions.790 Moreover, the government share for winter grain crops also differed from

dry farming to irrigated areas: While it was 1/10 of the produce in the former, the

share taken for the irrigated fields was 1/5.791 Besides, since the seed and irrigation

expenses could not be afforded by the peasants, the tax farmer provided the seeds as

agricultural partner and made the peasant cultivate summer crops from which he

took a share varying between 5/6 and 8/9 of the produce.792 That is to say, because

of the expenses of seeds, irrigation and land reclamation, the government share in

the south was higher than the north. But this high government share was

compensated by the high fertility of the southern lands.

As the peasants in the northern areas were more attached to the land and

therefore had more control of the land and the produce, the agricultural partnership

was a good measure for the tax farmer in increasing his profits.793 As Moosa pointed

out, while the share of Kurdish chiefs (aghas) from the crop was ten or twenty

percent, the sheikh’s or the sarkal’s share was one-half to two-thirds.794 Unlike the

northern region, in the central and southern region,

Agriculture was performed by semi-settled tribesmen and other agrarian workers using the seeds of the tax farmer, so that the crops were divided among the tax farmer, the tribesmen and the other people entitled in the land, by the proportion of shares determined by local custom. Differing from the partnership arrangements in the northern district, the relationship of the tax farmer with the peasant tribesmen in the central and southern districts was determined by a system of crop-sharing in the field, because the peasant tribesmen neither have the right of possession

790 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 94. 791 Ibid., p. 95. 792 As Kiyotaki pointed out, “when the tax farmer provided crop seeds to the peasants, he obtained both the governmet share and partner’s share, that is, (%10+%45=) %55 of the total produce in dry farming field, and (%20+40=) %60 of the total produce in irrigated field. See Ibid., p. 95 and 102. 793 Ibid., p. 103. 794 Matti I. Moosa, “The Land Policy of Midhat Pasha in Iraq, 1869-1872”, The Islamic Quarterly, vol: 12, No: 3, 1968, p. 147.

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[tasarruf] the land nor any control over crops other than their own shares. The tax farmer was the key man in this system, because he not only provided the seeds for cultivation but also shared political control over the cultivating peasant tribesmen with the government.795 [emphasis added]

Causes for the retreat of Iraqi Lands Though the land of Ottoman Iraq was vast and its population considerably high, the

region could not achieve peace and prosperity for a long time. Despite the high

fertility of the Mesopotamia, most of the lands were left vacant and useless. Many

travelers and governors drew attention to the dichotomy between the agricultural

potential of the land, its former prosperity and the then existing backwardness and

idlenness of the land. This dichotomy was mainly due to the prevailing land regime

in the province and inability of the peasants to use the lands properly and to benefit

from its produce. The unproductive and idle land condition was dated back to

second half of the seventeenth century.796 As many of the governors in Baghdad

emphasized, it was the land regime that led to frequent rebellions and eventually

resulted in the social and economic retreat of the province. Many problems of the

province, especially those of security, tribal settlement, and economic development,

were associated with the land regime in Baghdad.

The most outstanding problem resulting from the land regime was that since

both the absolute ownership and the usufructory right belonged to the state, the

peasants could not develop a sense of belongingness to the land on which they were

working. The peasants were, for long time, using the land without any title deed,

795 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 104. 796 BOA, İ. MMAH., 1641, 27 Ş 1287 (22 November 1870). “…hıtta-i Irakiyyenin bundan 200 sene evvel uğradığı sademât ve takallübât sekeneyi istitâ‘at-i maliye ve ziraat ve felahat iktidarından mahrum eylediğinden…” , but the archival document does not give any explanation on what caused this agricultural retreat.

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which was against the law on title deeds (tapu nizâmnâmesi). Even they were unable

to plant trees, or construct house on the land. Hence, there were no ties between the

cultivator and the land. Since they had nothing (for instance farm, trees, etc.) to lose,

it was easier for the local population to give up cultivation and participate in the

rebellions. The peasants had to be contented with the share they received (hisse-i

fellâhiye), but it was of great probability that even this small share was further

apportioned by the tax-farmer or sheikh.797 Therefore, as Mustafa Nuri Pasha,

governor of Baghdad between 1858-60 remarked in his report to Sublime Porte, “the

fellâhîn did not consider any piece of land as their homeland (vatan) and hence, they

did not have an inclination and affection in agriculture”.798 Midhat Pasha, in

1287/1870, was complaining about the same problem:

Apart from other natural conditions, the improvement and vivification of the land is contingent upon the usufructory rights of its cultivator. Despite this, most of Iraq’s land was administered by tax-farming and it was not committed to the charge of any person. Therefore, the tax-farmers were aiming at increasing their revenues given the limited time of tax-farm, rather than improving the land. Consequently, the desired development in agriculture and peasantry had not been realized.799

Therefore, in the course of time, the fertile soil of the Mesopotamia became infertile

and left barren. To take a more concrete example, Mustafa Nuri Pasha explained the

peasant’s disaffection and reluctance for tilling the lands and thus the decline of

agriculture by giving the following example:

For instance, for a mukâta‘â whose value is 100,000 kuruş in kind, the needed amount of expenditure was twice of its value (200,000 kuruş). Since the tax farmer does not want such a high expenditure for the control of that mukâta‘a only for one year, he does not attempt to clear

797 Midhat Pasha, p. 103. 798 “… fellâhânın dahi hiçbir mahalle vatan nazarıyla bakamadıklarına mebnî zirâ‘at ve hirâsete meyl ü muhabbet görülemediği cihetle vâridât-ı eyâlet sene be sene tenezzül eylemekten nâşî…”, BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 6, 18 Za 1276 (7 June 1860). 799 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286.

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the river (canal) basin flowing to his mukâta‘a and he does not till the land properly.800

Moreover, during the times of natural disasters like flood and drought, or tribal

uprisings against government, there was considerable risk for the tax farmer of

not collecting his share.801 Mustafa Nuri Pasha continues to state:

As a consequence, the value of the mukâta‘a naturally diminishes and the land is left in ruins. For the next year, there appears no one desiring that mukâta‘a; even powerful and wealthy people show no demand for that land piece. Therefore, this land had to be administered by the state itself, and this means that the state had to spent huge money for it. However, the conjuncture is not suitable for this and with the passing of time the canal is filled with mud, making the clearance of the canal more difficult.802

Furthermore, there were cases, in which the tax-farmers could not pay the promised

amount of tax. In such cases, the guarantor of the tax-farmer was required to pay his

debt. If the guarantor was unable to do so, the tax-farmer could be imprisoned and the

mukâta‘a was given to another tax-farmer.803 However, sometimes the local

government, for the sake of raising extra revenue, could cancel the contract and gave

it to those who offered higher prices.

The tribal structure in the province had its share in the prevailing patterns of land

tenure. Tribalism was certainly the most striking obstacle before the Ottoman reforms

800 “Meselen yüz bin kuruş bedel-i aynî ve meblağîsi olan bir mukâta‘aya hafr ve tohum bahâ ile fellâhâna müsâ‘ade verilmek üzre bedel-i mezkûrun iki misli masrafa muhtâc olup şu hâlde mültezim bulunanlar bir senelik idâre için bunca masârifi ihtiyâr etmedikleri cihetle gerek ol mukâta‘ât nehrinin tathîrini ve gerek hirâset ve zirâ‘atini lâyıkıyla icrâ edemediklerinden mukâta‘ât-ı mezkûre bedelâtı bit-tab‘ tenezzül ederek arâzisi dahi harâb olmakda ve ertesi sene ol mukâta‘anın sâbıkıyla tâlibi zuhûr etmemekde olduğu misillü esbâb-ı meşrûhadan dolayı zî-kudret adamlar iltizâma rağbet etmedikleri cihetle ekser cesametli mukata‘alar emânete kalıp cânib-i mîriyyeden idâre ettirilmesine mecbûriyet hâsıl olduğuna ve bunlar dahi külliyetli akçe sarfına muhtac bulunduğuna ve buna dahi vakit müsâ‘id olmadığına binâen murûr-ı zamân ile mukâta‘ât-ı merkûme enhârı çamur ile dolup tathîri kesb-i su‘ûbet eylediğinden…”, BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 6, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860). 801 The risk of loss was greater in the central and southern regions, because of the larger government share or the larger amount of the tax owned to the government. Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies p. 131. 802 BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 6, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860). 803 BOA, İ. MVL. 17719, 14 R 1275 (21 November 1858).

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in the region. As noted earlier, tribal life was more dominant and the tribal ties were

stronger in the countryside. Hence, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the

authority of central administration hardly reached to the tribal countryside. The people

in tribal areas were almost outside the sphere of provincial administration. As a

corollary of this, the government could hardly collect taxes from these areas. For

instance, although the Tapu law was enacted in 1847, there was no tapu official in

Shahrizor by 1862. The nature of the people living in Shahrizor delayed the coming of

a tapu official to this district:

Apart from the fact that the people of the said province [Shahrizor] consist of Kurds and tribes, the tapu (title deed) application is almost forgotten there. Most of its people do not comprehend the laws of the state and they are like savage people. That the man, who is going to be tapu official in this province should know their language and patterns of life, can ease the job there.804

Communal Ownership of the Land

Owing to the strong tribal ties, the land in Baghdad was owned communally. The one

who controlled the land was neither the small landholders nor the large landholders,

but the tribe as a whole. Each tribe of the confederation had its dira805, which included

not only the land actually tilled, but also non-cultivated and marshlands. Dira was the

land over which the tribe exercised sovereign rights rather than that of exclusive

804 “… Eyâlet-i merkûme halkı ise cümleten ekrâd ve aşâyirden ibâret bulunduğundan başka oralarca tapu usûlu mensî hükmüne girmiş olduğu cihetle eyâlet-i merkûmede arâzi me’mûru bulunacak kimesne hakikaten bunların lisân ve mizâclarına vukûflu bulunmak mûceb-i teshîlât ise de…”, “…Ahâlînin ekseri kavânîn-i saltanat-ı seniyyyeyi gayr-i müdrik vahşî kabîlinden bulundukları cihetle…”, BOA, İ. MVL. 21299, selh-i M 1279 (28 July 1862). 805 As Jwaideh pointed out, tribal lands were sometimes referred as al-sakaniye (dwelling) and al-nuzul (habitat), but the term most commonly used was tribal lazma (holding or that which is held of grasped). See Albertine Jwaideh, “Aspects of Land Tenure and Social Change in Lower Iraq During the Late Ottoman Times”, in Tarif Khalidi (ed.) Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East, Lebanon: Press of American University of Beirut, 1984, p. 334.

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ownership. The dira was commonly owned and consisted of mostly land used for

grazing.806

Within the tribal dira the area cultivated was small, and shifted about as canals silted up and land became impoverished by salt and the area cultivated by each peasant shifted also. Individual prescriptive rights to land were known (lazma, nagsha etc.) but these were restricted to a small class in the tribe, in areas permanently cultivated. For the most part there was no individual ownership, since occupancy of a fixed plot of land for a long period was not usual. The cultivators were mobile, cultivation was not their only occupation, and livestock grazing remained the most important alternative.807

According to the tribal customs, the land was divided into shares with the sheikh

taking from one-sixth to one-half and the remainder apportioned equitably among the

sections of tribe.808 The actual cultivators were individual families or household units

who were working on separate parcels.

In fact, communal ownership was not unique to Baghdad. At the time when the

Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was promulgated, most of the lands in the Middle East

were under collective ownership, either in the form of mush’a system as in Palestine,

or in the from of tribal ownership, as in the Baghdad province.809 The code, however,

prohibited the recognition of any form of collective ownership. Indeed, abrogation of

the communal ownership of the land was one of the purposes of the Code:

The whole land of a village or a town can not be granted in its entirety to all of the inhabitants nor to one or two persons chosen from amongst them. Separate pieces are granted to each inhabitant and a title is given to each showing this right of possession.810

806 Sluglett, “The Transformation”, p. 492. 807 Warriner, p. 136. 808 Jwaideh, ‘Aspects of Land Tenure’, p. 336. 809 Gerber, The Social Origins, pp. 73-78. For mush‘a see Martha Mundy, “Village Land and Individual Title: Mush‘a and Ottoman Land Registration in the Ajlun District”, in Eugene Rogen and Tariq Tell (eds.) Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan, London: British Academic Press, 1994, pp.58-79. 810 Article 8 of the Code, quoted from Warriner, p. 69.

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Furthermore, the code recognized a prescriptive right only to individual cultivators

who could prove actual possession and cultivation of a particular plot of land for at

least ten years. These people had the right to take the tapu without any payment. As

Sluglett noted, in Baghdad, however, it was almost impossible for any claimant to

title whether peasant lazma (prescriptive right) holder, or sheikh “to prove that the

origin of his claim was derived from one of the three roots of title recognized in

Ottoman law, namely devolution by inheritance (intikâl), purchase from the

previous owner and grant by competent authority.811 Therefore, the code directly

conflicted with the tribal custom in Ottoman Iraq. It is argued that this was mainly

due to the fact that the code was designed to fit the conditions in Anatolia and

Balkans, where peasant proprietors actually existed. However, here one should not

forget the Code’s purpose to end tribal ownership. Unlike the central lands of the

empire, in Iraq, land was held by the tribe as a whole and landholding depended not

on formal grants by the government but on the continued ability of the tribesmen to

defend what they held against other tribesmen.812

The use of serkârs as the agent of powerful sheikhs and the share of ukr (���)

were other important characteristics of the tribal land tenure in Baghdad. It was

through the serkârs that the sheikhs leased the lands to share-tenants, the fellahin.

Matti Moosa summarizes the role of the serkâr as follows:

These serkals played the role of agents and landlords at the same time. Never a cultivator himself, the serkal usually took part of the crop from both the cultivator and the sheikh. His share from the fellâh was greater than that from the sheikh, reaching in some cases one tenth of the net crop. The fellâh leased the land directly from the sheikh or from the serkal, for which he paid rent of half of his crop or more. The fellâh sometimes provided his labor only, the sheikh providing the seed and

811 Sluglett, ‘The Transformation, p. 494. 812 Ibid., p. 494.

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tools. The fellâh then received a very small share of the crop, called hissat al maghbun (the loser’s share). In some cases the fellâh worked on the land as a laborer and got his wages in cash or as a meager part of the crop. The fellâh who cultivated the land under the burden of debt was always looser.813

The serkâr was usually the chief of the cultivating peasant tribesmen, but

occasionally the village headman could also supervise farming as serkâr.814 The

serkârs gained further importance towards the end of the century.

Changes in the Status Quo and

the Implementation of the Land Code in Baghdad

As the local government began to extend its authority towards the tribal areas, it

began to implement tax-farming and control agriculture in these areas. By

appointing the tribal sheikh as tax-farmer, the government could collect taxes from

the tribesmen. There were many tribal sheikhs who gained the control of mukâta‘as

by means of auctions. However, the close circle of the governors, the ulema, and the

urban notables had also received their share from this pastry. For example, during

Ali Rıza Pasha’s governorship, the right for tax-farm was giving to the relatives of

the governor, high bureaucrats and commanders in the province and local notables.

This nepotism/favorism was not unique to Ali Rıza Pasha, because his successor,

Necip Pasha, had also farmed out mukâta‘as, especially the district of Hindiya, to

his son Ahmed Pasha.815 Such acts of nepotism usually resulted in corruption and

the dismissal of the governor, as in the case of Necip Pasha.

813 See Moosa, p. 147. 814 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 112. 815 Ibid., p. 66.

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Necip Pasha’s term of office witness a novelty concerning the role of the

tribal sheikhs in tax-farming. The tribal sheikhs were for the first time appointed as

district governor (kaymakam) and tax-farmer at the same time.816 Though the

agricultural revenue of the province increased significantly, the tax collection was

very troublesome. The inexperience of tribal sheikhs as tax-farmer and the

oppression of the commanders for increasing the amount of the tax, added by Necip

Pasha’s desire to receive higher revenue than his annual bedel payment, paved the

way for coercive applications in the province.817 All these developments triggered

the tribal uprising, which spread soon throughout the Middle Euphrates and ended

with the dismissal of Necip Pasha in June 1849.818 He was replaced by the

commander in chief (müşir ) of Sixth Army, Abdülkerim Nadir (Abdi) Pasha.

It seems that when compared with Baghdad, the land reforms began to be

implemented earlier in Mosul. The sale of the usufructory right of vacant lands

started just after the enactment of Tapu Law of 1847. In 1848, Vecihi Pasha, then

governor of Mosul, was allowed to grant the usufructory right of the vacant lands to

peasants with title deeds.819 He was well aware of the fact that the people in the

province were not accustomed to the practice of title deed; therefore, he preferred to

explain the benefits of the land registration and then encourage people to own land.

He also foresaw that if some peasants would own lands, then the remaining peasants

would also do so, as they see the benefits of land ownership. Vecihi Pasha should

816 Ibid., p. 85. 817 Ibid., p. 62. 818 Ibid., p. 67. Necip Pasha was also accused for extortion and bribery. The central government set up a commission investigating the allegation and as the result of the investigation he was dismissed. See BOA, İ. DAH, 13041, 21 Za 1266 (28 September 1850); İ. MVL. 4890, Gurre-i C 1266 (14 April 1850); and İ. MVL. 5488, 20 Za 1266 (27 September 1850). 819 BOA, İ. MVL. 3069, 13 Ca 1264 (17 April 1848).

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have been successful in persuading the people of Mosul, because due to the increase

in tapu transactions in Mosul, an additional land official was appointed in 1856.820

Although there were at least several tapu officials in Mosul, the Ottoman

archival documents indicate that by 1862 there was none in Shahrizor. At the same

year, one of the tapu officials in Mosul was replaced by Abdurrahman Vasfi Bey

and his area of responsibility was extended to include Shahrizor, that is to say, the

tapu offices of Mosul and Shahrizor were combined.821 Abdurrahman Vasfi’s

acquaintance with the tribal structure of the area played quite important role in his

appointment to the combined office. The tapu officials were sometimes criticized

for their lack of knowledge relating to the land issues of the region and that they did

not stroll around the lands for which they issued title deeds.822 However, the same

archival document also reveals that before his appointment, the candidate was given

an exam so that he had to prove his knowledge and experience concerning the area

in question and the land issues.823 Furthermore, for his early months in the office, he

was given relatively a high salary, 1,500 kuruş, so as to enable him to stroll around

and gain further proficiency concerning land issues.

One of the leading governors who contributed to the agricultural

developments in Baghdad was Reşid Pasha (1852-57). It was during his term of

office that the practice of land tenure, which had been governed by tribal custom,

regional practices and Ottoman and Islamic laws, began to change, becoming more

820 BOA, İ. MVL. 15709, 7 M 1273 (7 September 1856). 821 BOA, İ. MVL. 21299, selh-i M 1279 (28 July 1862). 822 See for example, Ernest Dowson, An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions, Letchworth, England, 1931, p. 18. 823 “...icrâ kılınan imtihânda kendisinin ehliyeti tebeyyün etmiş...”, BOA, İ. MVL. 21299, selh-i M 1279 (28 July 1862).

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subject to the Ottoman land laws.824 He continued Necip Pasha’s policy of

appointing tribal sheikhs and military commanders as kaymakam-mültezim.825 Reşid

Pasha is frequently referred to as the governor in whose term agricultural production

increased drastically. As Kiyotaki noted, Reşid Pasha attempted to increase

agricultural production by selling the usufructory right of vacant land to private

persons.826 The purchaser was expected to carry out irrigation and land reclamation

in his field. In farming out the deserted land to the tax farmer Reşid Pasha provided

with financial supports such as “a grant-in-aid for the cost of seeds and the cleaning

of irrigation canals and a reduction in the tax owned or in some cases, a tax

exemption for several years”.827 The pasha also encouraged the tribes for

agriculture. In this context, he gave vast lands to tribes. Kiyotaki further mentions

about Reşid Pasha’s failed attempt to give title deeds to tribal sheikhs for their

cultivated lands upon their payment of land’s tapu value, similar to the way that

Vecihi Pasha attempted to sell the land to the Jaf tribe in its winter dwelling places.

However, Reşid Pasha’s endeavor did not bring fruits, because the tapu was sold by

the tribal sheikhs to others, especially Persians and non-Muslims.828

The provincial notables were the primary beneficiaries of the “politics of

grain”. The local merchants, moneylenders, the tribal sheikhs and non-Muslims

(especially the Jewish community) were among the “favored dealers” of the

provincial governors.829 The Jews, who comprised a considerable part of the

824 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 147. 825 Ibid., p. 77. 826 Ibid., p. 132. 827 Ibid., p. 109. 828 Ibid., pp. 150-151. 829 Fattah, “The Politics of Grain Trade”, p. 154.

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monopolies, improved their wealth and prosperity during the governorship of Reşid

Pasha.830 They accumulated wealth by hoarding grain and then selling it with

exorbitant prices. The capital they have also enabled them to act as guarantors for

the mültezims.831 Besides the Jews, Vadi (sheikh of Zubaid) and Mansur (sheikh of

Muntafiq) were other prominent dealers in the politics of grain trade.832

The provincial government of Baghdad usually opted not to interfere in the

relationship between the tribal sheikh and the tribesmen. Earlier, the tribal sheikhs

were appointed as kaymakam/mültezim; that is to say, they were both district

governors and tax-farmers. However, as the tribal sheikhs who were recruited as

kaymakam/mültezim, proved to be corrupt, Ömer Lütfi Pasha dismissed and replaced

them with civil officials. As discussed in previous chapter, while the civil officials

took the administrative responsibility as kaymakam or müdirs, the tribal sheikhs

retained the right to collect taxes in their domains. So, the tribal sheikhs came to be

tax-farmers without administrative responsibility in their domains. The intervention

of the administration into the relations between the tribal sheikh and the tribesmen,

and the closer control over the tribesmen resulted in a considerable increase in the

tax revenue collected by the way of tax farming.833 The increase in the tax revenue

led the provincial government rely on the tribal sheikh / tax farmer for fiscal and

political control of the tribesmen in his domain.834

830 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, pp. 112-113. Salih Daniel and his brothers were the leading figures of these Jewish monopolists. 831 Ibid., p. 114. 832 Fattah, “The Politics of Grain Trade”, p. 154, 833 Kiyotaki clearly pointed out the increase in the amount of taxes. See Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, pp. 82-83. 834 Ibid., p. 86.

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Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, governor of Baghdad in 1860-61, established a

committee comprised of specialists from the central government and local officials

of Baghdad, including the director of agriculture, the director of treasury and

treasury officials.835 This committee was ordered to survey the agricultural situation

in Baghdad and it prepared a report, which included among other things, suggestions

on the transfer of usufructory right. The report was sent to Supreme Council, but due

to Ahmed Tevfik Pasha’s short stay in his office, (only 6 months and 22 days),836 no

effective agricultural policy could be established.

Midhat Pasha, who served in Baghdad as governor between 1869-72, is often

referred as the first governor who implemented the land code in Baghdad.837

However, the archival documents indicate that the land policies were already began

to be introduced before his term of office. Recent studies that are based on Ottoman

archival documents have similarly revealed that the implementation of the land code

of 1858 began during the governorship of Namık Pasha.838 The fact that there are

many title deeds delivered during the governorship of Midhat Pasha led many

scholars to start the enactment of the law with his governorship. Consequently, this

erroneous approach was reiterated by many scholars, who based their researches on

secondary sources rather than consulting the Ottoman archives.

Namık Pasha’s contribution to the agricultural developments in the province

is an undeniable fact. He tried to solve the land problems of the province by taking

835 Ibid., p. 90 and 151. 836 Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Bağdad, (Baghdad Yearbook), 1292/1875, p. 46. 837 Albertine Jwaideh and Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett are the leading scholars who brought Midhat Pasha to the forefront for the application of the new land policies in the province. 838 For the implmentation of the Land Code of 1858 in the province of Baghdad, Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies; for the review of Kiyotaki’s dissertation, see Ebubekir Ceylan, “1858 Toprak Reformunun Bağdatta Uygulanışı”, TALID, Vol. 5, 2005, pp. 829-834.

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into account the reports prepared by previous governors. In 1282/1865, another

commission was formed to investigate the land and to reveal the vacant lands in the

province. The purpose of the committee was to “take over the ownership of private

(mülk; harâc) land, which was not cultivated and vacant”.839 The commission

prepared a report and the report suggested, among other things, the delivery of title

deed to those who get the usufructory right with auction.840 Later, the report was

also ratified by the Supreme Council (Meclis-i Vâlâ), and the Supreme Council sent

it back to the province for implementation. Accordingly, the Sublime Porte

confirmed that for the land plots to be sold in Baghdad, the provincial government

was to give a temporary title deeds, which were to be renewed by the Defterhâne-i

Âmire in İstanbul as the details concerning the land’s borders and its agricultural

capacity/fertility were sent to İstanbul.841 Namık Pasha’s governorship not only

witnessed the reclamation of large tracks of land, but also in 1866 he appointed tapu

officials in Baghdad.

One of Namık Pasha’s reforming acts was that he made a change in the land

tenure, because according to the Islamic law (şer‘) the harac lands could not be sold.

Hence, Namık Pasha changed the deserted private land to mîrî land by “providing a

legal basis for determining ownership over deserted private land”, that is to say, the

deserted private lands came to be considered as state land.842 It seems that in this legal

change the case in Egypt was a source of inspiration (…Bağdad arâzîsinin arâzî-i

harâciyeden olmasıyla bey‘i şer‘an câiz olmadığı gibi mülken dahi mahzûrlu

göründüğünden bu sûretten sarf-ı nazarla istihsâl-i esbâb-ı imârı zımnında yeni bir 839 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 89. 840 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1531, lef 1, 8 Za 1285 (20 February 1869). 841 BOA, İ. MVL. 24815, 6 M 1283 (10 May 1867). 842 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 157.

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tarika gidilmek ve bu dahi Mısır arâzîsi ahvaline tatbik edilmek sureti

olduğundan…).843 However, when someone could prove his ownership of deserted

private land with a valid title deed, he was officially granted the right of ukr and

received an ukr share to the produce.844

This change in land tenure brought the ukr share to the forefront. The ukr lands

were the lands, which were originally private lands, and were for some reasons

uncultivated and fell vacant; and the landowner therefore could not pay the required

tax. The reasons for its desertion may vary from high expenses (such as tax or

irrigation costs), and tribal raids to extinction of ownership in default of inheritance.

To prevent the land desertion and to raise further revenues, these lands (with both

ownership and usufructory rights) were taken from their private owners with their

consent and administered by the local government.845 As the government transferred

the usufructory right of these lands to third persons, who could perform the land

reclamation and cultivate the land, the landowner (the third person) was given an ukr

share ranging from 1/20 to 1/30 of the total produce, depending on the local custom.

However, when the ukr holder dies in default of inheritance, the ukr arrangement is

dissolved by the government.846 It was by means of this change in land tenure that the

Baghdad government could control the deserted lands and put them under the

operation of the Land Code and other related laws.847 Accordingly, if the land is not

cultivated for three years, the government could give it to others willing to cultivate

it. The land can only be transferred to Ottoman subjects and not to foreign nationals,

843 BOA, İ. MVL. 943, lef 1, 10 N 1277 (22 March 1861). 844 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 157. 845 Moosa, p. 154. 846 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 162. 847 Moosa, p. 157.

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and for the transfer the land was first offered to neighbors of the land. These changes

in the land tenure were accompanied by the further extension of the Ottoman control

in the tribal areas. Not only were the tribal areas divided so as to de-construct the

tribal structures, but also the tribal sheikhs were incorporated to the Ottoman

administrative system.

Midhat Pasha and the Land Code

The Land Code began to be introduced during Namık Pasha’s governorship;

however, one cannot deny the role played by Midhat Pasha in the ultimate

application of the land reform in the province. In the course of time, the transfer of

ukr lands became more complicated, which Midhat Pasha attempted to solve. It was

only during Midhat Pasha’s term of office that the land registration was intensively

applied, for which we are now scrutinizing closely.

Many scholars believed that Midhat Pasha was the first governor who fully

understood the conditions of the Iraqi land and made this the basis of his policy.848

For Midhat Pasha, two factors were the sources for all the problems of Baghdad:

Lack of an export outlet and the land problems of the province. All other problems

were derivatives of these two.849 Hence, Midhat Pasha’s endeavors pertaining land

problems of the province should not be separated from the rest of his reform

848 Ibid., pp. 146-159 and Jwaideh, Midhat Pasha, p. 113. Salih Mahdi Haider and Ernest Dowson are among the exceptional few who belittled Midhat Pasha’s efforts on Baghdad’s land problems. 849 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1531, 8 Safer 1285 (31 May 1868). ‘… Bağdad Vilâyetinin tanzîmâtıyla istihsâl ve servet ve ma‘mûriyet husûsunda her nasıl vesâil ve esbâba teşebbüs olunsa cümlesinin esâsı ve menşei ve mevkûfun aleyhi iki mâddedir ki birisi berren ve nehren mesâfesinin taksîr ve teshîliyle mahsûlâtı için mahreç bulunması ve diğeri ahâlî-i vilâyetin memâlik-i sâire sekenesi gibi tasarruf-u emlâk ve arâzi hukûkunun i‘tâsıyla te’min edilmesi kaziyyeleri olup kusûr maddi ve manevi her ne yapılacak ise bu iki esâsın fer‘i ve şu‘besi olduğu muhtâc-ı beyân değildir ’.

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schemes. Indeed, the land policy he was pursuing was clearly inspired by the spirit of

the Tanzimat.850

Midhat Pasha criticized the old practice of land tenure in Baghdad in which

the usufructory right of the land was not given to the peasant cultivators. In this

system the peasants could only get ¼, 1/5 or perhaps less of the total agricultural

production; therefore, the land holding patterns were discouraging the peasant and it

was almost impossible for them to accumulate wealth.851 Furthermore, the practice of

farming out the right to collect the taxes had resulted in the creation of a privileged

group who could enjoy considerable wealth while the actual cultivators were

impoverished.852 Midhat Pasha believed that this system might have had benefits in

the past; however, in a period in which the interests of governments are based on the

welfare of its population, this system of land tenure will produce no fruits. Since in

Baghdad the trade and artisanship were not in the desired improvements, it was only

through agriculture that the peasants could improve their conditions. Therefore, he

enthusiastically encouraged the registration and the sale of the land to the actual

cultivators, which was commenced some time ago. Hence, the implementation and

extension of the Land Code of 1858 was one of the main concerns of Midhat Pasha.

By enforcing the law he also hoped to diminish the influence of the class of the

wealthy intermediaries.

Midhat Pasha’s attempts to reform the land regime and military service arose

resistance amongst the tribal structure of the region. Despite the tribal resistance, he

was keen on extending the land code. He was authorized by the central government

850 Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha”, p. 106. 851 Zewra, No: 50. 852 Jwaideh, ‘Midhat Pasha’, p. 119.

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to proceed with the principles of the land code in Baghdad.853 In order to make the

public aware of the new land regulations, he promulgated them in the official

newspaper of the province, Zewra.854 The Sublime Porte sent Midhat Pasha a copy of

the decree (irâde) that was earlier sent to Namık Pasha and asked him to act in

accordance with that decree. Midhat Pasha appointed a number of officials

responsible for specific tasks, the most important one relating to land policies was

the mudîr al-daftar al khâqanî in charge of land registration.855 Midhat Pasha also

got the necessary permit to issue the title deed in Baghdad. He thought that due to the

remoteness of Baghdad, the issuance of title deed in İstanbul and its dispatch to

Baghdad would be long enough to delay and slow the registration process, and

therefore negate the interest shown for land registration. Normally the tapu law

required the title deed to be prepared and sent by the Defterhâne-i Âmire in İstanbul.

Also the central administration had previously rejected similar demands of Baghdad

governors,856 instead the Sublime Porte sent temporary title deeds, which were to be

renewed (with senedât-ı matbûa ve sahîhaya) as the details of the land that was

registered conveyed to İstanbul.857

In his second year in the governorship, when the affairs concerning the land

registration were intensified and the existing provincial officials came to be

insufficient for the land registration, the pasha demanded from the Porte extra

853 BOA. İ. MMAH. 1531, 13 Safer 1286 (25 May 1869). 854 For instance, in Zewra No:5, Midhat Pasha promulgated the extension of the transfer of the lands with title deeds to relatives other than the son of the tapu holder. 855 BOA. İ. MMAH. 1531, 13 Safer 1286 (25 May 1869). 856 “…vülât tarafından tapu senedi itâsı dahi muvâfık-ı nizâm olamayacağına…”, BOA. İ. MVL. 3069, Gurre-i B 1264 (3 June 1848). 857 BOA, İ. MVL. 3069, Gurre-i B 1264 (3 June 1848) and İ. MVL. 24815, 6 M 1283 (10 May 1867).

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officials.858 One of Midhat Pasha’s leading arrangements was related to the ukr

share. Until Midhat Pasha’s governorship, the private lands were generally taken

from their owners and administered by the government in the name of ukr, which had

already become a problem in the country.

The problem with the ukr lands was that the rights of usufruct and ukr were

managed separately. The holder of the ukr right did not intervene into the usufructory

right and obtained only his ukr share. Despite this, some ukr holders made claims for

the ownership of the land.859 Furthermore, though the ukr holder did not involved in

the land expenses and difficulties, he could transfer his ukr right to whoever he

wanted, even without informing the person who had the usufructory right. Upon

Midhat Pasha’s recommendation, the Supreme Council in İstanbul made the

necessary legal arrangement, which aimed at combining the ukr right and the

usufructory right of the land. The main purpose of this arrangement was to improve

land and increase agricultural production.860 For this sake, he introduced the principle

of preference (hakk-ı rüchân). Accordingly, when the holder of the ukr wanted to

transfer his share, he must first offer it to sâhib-i arz, the person who had the

usufructory right of the land.861 If the sâhib-i arz does not want to buy it, then the ukr

holder must offer it to the neighbors of the land and other people respectively.

Similarly, if the sâhib-i arz wants to transfer his usufructory right, he must first offer

858 ‘Bağdad vilâyeti tapu mesâlihinin günbegün teksîr etmesi cihetiyle mu‘âmelât-ı kalemiyyesini îfâya muktedir iki efendinin daha istihdâmına lüzum göründüğünden ta‘yîn ve irsâli mahallinden iş‘ar olunmuş ve bu hizmete defterhâne-i âmire tahrîrât ve tatbîk odaları hulefâsından Zekai ve Ahmet Bedri Efendiler intihâb edilmiş…’, BOA, İ. DAH, 42557, 28 M 1287 (30 April 1870). 859 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 27 Ş 1287, (22 November 1870). 860 For the sake of providing the continuity in agricultural production, this arrangement also reiterated the principle that if the land is not cultivated for three years without any excuse, then it is to be transferred with auction to others willing to perform cultivation. 861 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 27 Ş 1287 (22 November 1870). The value of the ukr share is calculated by multiplying the annual average in the last three years with 15.

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it to the ukr holder and the peasants in the vicinity (village or town) respectively. If

the land was not sold by then, it could be transferred via public auction. In the

transfer of both the land and the ukr, Midhat Pasha put a sequence to be followed.

This was especially done to exclude the wealthy people and the tribal sheikhs

(ashâb-ı servet) from the transfer and to make the transfer to those who actually till

the land.

Apart from the ukr lands, Midhat Pasha gave special care to some of the date

groves in order to award ownership to those who actually owned the trees.862 In

Basra, where the date cultivation dominated, he revived the jarîb system, which had

been in use in earlier times. Earlier, the tax from date groves was determined on the

basis of estimation (tahmîn), which was based on the number of date trees. The

harrâs, the officials who were doing the estimation, were deciding the value of the

whole date groves and then determined the amount of tax to be paid. However, these

officials were notorious for being corrupt; therefore, the system of estimation was

usually at the expense of both the producer and the provincial treasury. The

cultivation of date was different from that of cereals in that the latter can as a whole

be harvested at once, but the former cannot. Midhat Pasha, when visited Basra, met

with the people who were competent on date cultivation. Instead of the system of

estimation, Midhat Pasha revived the old jarîb system, which was based on the size

of the date farm, rather than the number of date trees. The advantage of the jarîb

system was that the peasants began to make use of every vacant place in the farm by

planting more date trees on the same sized farm. Consequently, the annual revenue of

862 Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy, London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1993, p.186.

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Basra increased from 48 yük kuruş to 70 yük kuruş in two years863 and this jarîb

system continued until the British occupation.

Midhat Pasha introduced the Land Code in Hindiyya, Hilla-Divaniyya,

Samawa, Basra and Muntafiq regions. In Muntafiq he offered Nasır Pasha, the

paramount sheikh of Muntafiq tribal confederation, that “if the tribesmen would

supply the labor force and part of the capital for the construction of a levée (bend)

across the Jazâir marshes in order to restrain the flow of the river to its channel, the

hundreds of fertile acres that would thereby reclaimed should be given gratuitously

by tapu to the tribes assisting in the project”.864 As Jwaideh pointed out, although

Midhat Pasha’s short term in Baghdad did not allow him to see the completion of the

project, he made tapu grants in Muntafiq during his governorship.865

The transfer of the usufructory right of the land was limited, and it differed in

concentration from one area to another. It concentrated mainly in areas surrounding

the cities, and in areas where irrigation was less costly. Where irrigation was costly

the transfer was delayed.866 Although there was no exception for any specific

region/or land in both land code and tapu law, taking the tribal structure of the region

into consideration, priority was given to deserted and vacant (mahlulât) lands, rather

than cultivated areas. Although Şevket Bey, then mal müdürü in Baghdad advised

the otherwise: to sell first the state lands (mukâta‘ât-ı mîrîyye) and then the deserted

and vacant lands. Şevket Bey thought that if the latter is sold first, then the people

863 Midhat Pasha, pp. 121-122. 864 Jwaideh, Midhat Pasha, p. 121. 865 Ibid., p. 121. 866 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, pp. 132-134.

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will be inclined to buy the deserted and vacant lands which will impede the sale of

the other lands.867

The priority given to deserted and vacant lands was significant in the transition

to the new land regime, because it enabled a smooth transition for the implementation of

the Code and avoidance from the tribal resistance. And similarly,

Because of the customary way of farming, land tenure in irrigated and cultivated areas developed differently from the one for which the land code was enforceable… [And] because of the presence of serkâr and various share claimants who were concurrently entitled to take possessions of the land and its use, the land code of 1858 was hardly applicable to cultivated state lands.868

In fact, the governors hoped that as the benefits of the implementation of the land code

in deserted and vacant land will be apparent, the peasants in the irrigated and cultivated

areas would also incline to register their lands. Moreover, as the government extended

its control over the province and began to control greater areas, the agricultural

production increased drastically.

The settlement of the nomadic tribes was one of the most important purposes

of the Land Code and it was at this point that the implementation of the Land Code

bore the most notable fruits in the settlement of the tribes. The nomadic tribes were

expected to settle on land as they realize the benefits of having title deed and fruits of

agriculture.869

867 “…arâzi-i hâliye-i mezkûrenin def‘a-i ûlâda tapu misliyle tefvîzi hâlinde ahâlînin rağbeti çok olacağından ve bu ise diğerinin satılmasını te’hîr ettireceğinden birinci dereceden mukâta‘ât-ı miriyyenin mu‘accele-i mukarreresiyle tâliblerine furuht olunarak ba‘dehu arâzî-i hâliye-i mezkûrenin satılması muvâfık-ı hâl ve maslahat olacağı bedidâr olmasıyla…”, BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860). 868 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, pp. 141 and 145. 869 “…arâzî ahâlî tasarrufunda bulunarak ma‘mûr oldukça sâhiplerinin servet ve kudretlerini istilzâm edeceği misillü ahâlî-i gayr-i meskûnenin felâhata celb ve rağbetiyle emr-i tavattun ve temeddüne dahi medâr olunacağı müsellem idüğünden...“, BOA, İ. MMAH. 1641, 10 Teşrîn-i Evvel 1286.

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The implementation of the Land Code was not far from an interest to increase

the revenue in the provincial as well as central treasury. More than 200,000 kese akçe

mu‘accele, was expected from the implementation of the code in Baghdad. When we

consider that the annual agricultural revenue was approximately 30,000 kese akçe,

the abovementioned mu‘accele was 6-7 times greater than annual agricultural

revenue.870 Azzawi pointed out that the government received more than one hundred

thousand liras as a result of the sale of lands by tapu, mainly in the Muntafiq area.871

Apart from this, the peasant was to continue to pay the öşr, and the revenue obtained

from öşr was estimated to double in the short run, as the people of province grasp the

benefits of agriculture. A further 40,000-50,000 kese akçe was estimated as tapu

revenue.872 In a nutshell, the revenue expected from the implementation of the Land

Code was quite significant in amount.

Some scholars accused Midhat Pasha for trying to implement the Land Code

without grasping the prevailing tribal system in the region. However, as Moosa

noted, they missed the central theme and purpose of Midhat Pasha, which was, first

and foremost, to modify the tribal system through land reform. In other words, land

reform was the means for achieving the final goal – settlement of the tribes on the

land and the deconstruction of the tribal system.873 The process of de-tribalization

was to be achieved after the land had been sold to the cultivator who would then

leave his nomadic life and remain on the land.

Sedentarization was actually what Midhat Pasha trying to achieve for a long

time. He benefited from the conjectural developments to break the tribal structure of

870 BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860). 871 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 252. 872 BOA, İ. MMAH. 943, lef 9, 23 Z 1276 (12 July 1860). 873 Moosa, p. 155.

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the region. He frequently made concessions by reducing the tax burdens, ‘if the

tribesmen would refrain from further uprisings, forsake their nomadic life, build

houses in which to live and settle on plots of land’. In order to make the

sedentarization attractive to the peasants, Midhat Pasha obtained permission from the

Sublime Porte to disregard the clause in the Land Code, which prohibited the

construction of buildings on miri land. As this small modification in the Code

indicated, Midhat Pasha’s intention was to induce the semi-nomadic cultivators to

settle, and this involved their building houses to live in.874

Midhat Pasha also promised that if those who had built houses and cultivated

the land were prepared to take tenancies on their land under the new Land Code, he

would reduce the mîrî share on such lands to one-fifth of the yield and made

promises of a further reduction if the people fulfill certain conditions.875 To take an

example, in Hindiyyah, where the government share of the produce was 2/3, he

reduced it to ½, and promised further reduction to 2/5 and 1/3 respectively, if the

people of Hindiyya continues to live honestly, staying far away from the rebellion.876

These reductions in tax amount did not mean loss for the provincial treasury, because

as the number of people engaging with agriculture increase the treasury gained

actually in sum.

Consequences of the Land Code

The implementation of the Land Code in Baghdad contributed considerably

to the development of agricultural lands and increase in the agricultural production.

874 Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha”, pp. 119-20. 875 Ibid., pp. 119-20. 876 Midhat Pasha, p. 107.

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For the first time the peasants came to consider the land they were working on as

their own lands and in a few years they constructed buildings on it and planted

trees.877 This development had also reflections for provincial security. As the

peasants began to acquire immovable estates and to see the benefits of agriculture,

they avoided participating rebellious activities in the province. For instance, the

refusal of the people of Hindiyya to help the rebels was explained by Midhat Pasha

with their engagement in agriculture.878

It should also be noted that it is quite difficult to assert that the

implementation of the Land Code was perfect or there were no problems and

defection. There is no doubt that to implement a land code, which was basically

designed for the conditions in the heartland of the empire, to a geography that was

dominated by the tribes meant great challenges and difficulties. In this context, the

introduction of the Land Code should be evaluated as a transition to a new system.

Despite the tribal structure and differing land holding patterns, by the end of the

period under survey, the process of de-tribalization had already started and the land

code of 1858 was relatively successfully implemented.

The implementation of the land code meant strengthening the central

Ottoman administration in Baghdad at the expense of sheikhly tribal powers.

However, this brought unexpected results too. While the main intention of the code

was the registration of land nder the name of the actual cultivators, a few provisions

of the code undermined the state-small-state cultivator relations and opened the way

for large landholders. As Quataert pointed out, the Ottoman center generally

preferred small cultivators to the potential dangerous great landholder, but permitted

877 Ibid., p. 106. 878 Ibid., p. 107.

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land aggregation to maintain agricultural production and tax level, if no laternative

means were available.879

Though the governors in Baghdad tried to create from among the tribesmen

of a large number of small landowners, things turned out differently in practice and

the tribal sheikhs emerged as big landowners. There is no doubt that Midhat Pasha,

as the governor of Baghdad province tried his best to introduce the individual

registration of land at the expense of communal ownership, but he achieved little,

because at the end of his tenure most of the lands were registered in the name of

tribal sheikhs.

Besides the tribal sheikhs, the city merchants, who had the necessary capital,

benefited from the reluctance or fear of tribesmen.880 As these people understand the

advantages of having title deeds, most of the lands were registered under their names,

rather than the actual cultivators, the Saduns of Muntafiq district being the most

outstanding example of this. In the district of Muntafiq, the Sadun family realized

that in the tapu sanad system those who held the land controlled the destiny of the

region. Therefore, they showed great interest in registering the land under their

names. However, as the Saduns began to control most of the lands in the district, this

led eventually hostility of the tribesmen towards their leader.881

The export oriented agricultural production made the lands more valuable

than ever before and it increasingly became the crux of the sheikhship. The

commercialization of agriculture led the tribal sheikhs give priority to rich estates,

rather than their tribesmen. Land replaced the manliness, courage, superior strength

879 İnalcık and Quataert (eds.,), p. 857. 880 BOA, Şûrâ-yı Devlet, 1472, 29 Rebîu‘l Evvel 1293. 881 Jwaideh, Midhat Pasha’, pp. 131-32.

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and being warrior as the central ideal of sheikhly culture. In the words of Hanna

Batatu:

In the river valleys a sheikh without land came to mean in effect a sheikh without tribe: a landless sheikh ended by commanding neither the respect nor the obedience of his tribesmen. … Possession of more and more land became, consequently, the highest social value of the tribal chief. Hence, [this led to] his transformation of the communal tribal land into his own property by the simple exertion of his will.882 The result was the emergence of large landholding patterns in the Ottoman

Iraq. As Gerber pointed out, land holding could be said to be individualistic only in

the vicinity of main towns and in the areas irrigated by lift or perennial canals where

the tribes had disintegrated.883 In other words, small-scale landownership developed

on the Middle Euphrates between Hît and Haditha, in the Khalis and Lower Diyala

valleys, around Basra and on the Hindiyyah and Shamiyah rivers.884 However, in

general, fear from being enlisted or conscripted and taxation was the most important

obstacles for individual registration.

The fact that Midhat Pasha did not stay long enough in Baghdad to make the

system operate fully was an important factor in his limited success. More important

than this, the succeeding governors did not work toward individual registration. Being

upset from this unintended result and other abuses, in the late 1870s and early 1880s,

the Ottoman Sultan became active in the land issues in the province of Baghdad.

Abdülhamid II gave special importance to the fertile lands in Iraq and purchased

considerable lands for his personal treasury. Eventually, with the tightening of

administrative procedures to such extend that made further registration extremely

difficult; the Sultan restricted the authority of the Land Commission in Baghdad and

882 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 110. 883 Gerber, The Social Origins, p. 74. 884 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 55.

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took the initiative for the delivery of title deeds in 1881.885 However, despite

bureaucratic difficulties, the registration continued until the 1890s.886

885 See Albertine Jwaideh, “The Sanniya Lands of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in Iraq”, in George Makdisi (ed.), Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of H.A.R. Gibb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 326-336. 886 Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha”, p. 126.

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Chapter VI

Public Woks (Umûr-ı Nâfi‘a) and Modernization in Baghdad

In the classical Ottoman administration, public services (religious, educational, medical

services etc.) were not provided by the central administration; rather they were carried

out mostly by religious foundations, vakfs. Hence, the idea of state as the provider of

public services was almost totally lacking. From the mid 1840s, this opinion started to

change and the state began to assume more active role and responsibility in the provision

of public services. The services that had been done by the vakfs began to be assumed by

the state apparatus. The Tanzimat era in this sense was a period in which the role and the

status of vakfs began to contract. It is for this reason that for many the “Men of

Tanzimat” were enemies of vakfs. In parallel with the Tanzimat policy in this regard,

Namık Pasha considered the abundance of the vakfs in Baghdad as a contradiction to the

Tanzimat principles.887

It is again in this period that the provincial councils started to discuss not only

current affairs and problems, but also measures, which would “improve the state and

benefit the security of the people”.888 Thenceforth, the public works, umûr-ı nâfi‘â, came

to be one the significant topics for provincial administrations. The improvement of the

public works became a subject that was stressed in the appointments of the provincial

governors. When we look at the imperial fermân, which appointed Namık Pasha as the

governor-general of Baghdad province, we see that the improvement of trade and

agriculture, reinforcement of dockyard in Basra, the increase of the vessels in the rivers 887 Sinaplı, p. 129. 888 Shaw, p. 83.

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of Euphrates and Tigris and construction of bridges were among the issues

underlined.889

Map IV: Baghdad in 1849

The provincial laws of 1864 and 1871 also emphasized the need to improve the

public works. Accordingly, the vilâyet umûm meclisi was commissioned to construct and

repair the roads between the villages, sub-provinces and the provincial center, to

889 Sinaplı, p. 189.

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negotiate every construction affair within the province, and to take necessary measures

for the improvement of trade and agriculture.890

The improvement of the public works was an urgent matter for the province

of Baghdad. In 1861, during the governorship of Namık Pasha, a separate council for

public works (meclis-i imâr) was comprised of several provincial officials, including

the mutasarrıf of Basra, Münib Pasha and Ata Bey, the former being the head of the

council.891 Beside a clerk, the council had a sandık emîni and an engineer, who,

among other things, measured the lands. The task of the council was mainly to keep

the rivers open for navigation, repair the river walls, construct new bridges and

barracks, and to dig new canals for irrigation.892 The council was to start its work by

repairing the Hindiyya river walls.893 The salaries and the stationary expenditures of

the council members were met by the Sublime Porte.894

Modernization and Midhat Pasha’s Contributions

It is quite clear that the modernization of Baghdad bore the imprints of Ottoman

patterns of modernization in general. First of all, Ottoman modernization heavily

concentrated in the western regions of the empire that were incorporated into the

(European) world-system. Therefore, when one goes far away from the center, the

level of modernization decreases too. Geography in this sense played a role in the

890 Çadırcı, “Tanzimat Döneminde Osmanlı Ülke Yönetimi”, p. 1160. 891 BOA, İ. DAH. 32588, 2 B 1278, (3 January 1862). Also see Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 139. 892 “... Esbâb-ı ma‘mûriyet denilen şey Şat ve Fırat nehirlerinin bozulmuş olan sed ve bendleri ta‘mîr ve icâb eden mahallere kal‘a ve köprü inşâ olunmak ve dolmuş olan harkler hafr ve tathîr kılınmak gibi mahallince bilinecek ve yapılacak mevâdd olmasıyla ...”, BOA, I. MMAH. 1011, 15 R 1278 (7 Şubat 1852). 893 BOA, AMKT. UM, 508/75, 16 R 1278 (21 October 1861). 894 BOA, İ. MVL. 22519, 25 C 1280 (7 December 1863).

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modernization of the Arab provinces of the empire. For instance, while Ottoman

Syria and Egypt were in the process of modernization, Baghdad experienced this

process relatively late. In this context, there is a close relationship between

modernization of the Ottoman Empire and politics of centralization. Hence, it can be

argued that the fall of the Mamluk rule in 1831 and the centralization that came

afterword accelerated the modernization of Baghdad. With the centralist policies of

Mahmud II, Baghdad was tightly tied to Ottoman central administration, and the

Tanzimat Era (1839-76) witnessed not only the modernization of the empire in

general but also Ottoman Baghdad too. However, the modernization of Baghdad

clearly intensified in the last decade of the Tanzimat Era.

Secondly, in the province of Baghdad the process of modernization also

followed a path from provincial center to the tribal areas. Even among the Iraqi

provinces there was a certain hierarchy. The provincial capital, Baghdad, had priority

over other provincial cities. We have earlier noted, for example, Shahrizor was not

allowed by the Sublime Porte to have local council before it was established in

Baghdad. The same hierarchy can even be seen in the city of Baghdad. It is for this

reasons that the provincial center benefited from the fruits of modernization much

more than the rural countryside. In this sense the process of modernization was

uneven: while certain sectors of the society underwent significant changes, others

were totally skipped.

Finally, Ottoman/Turkish modernization had a top-down character and the

bureaucrats, namely the Men of Tanzimat, were the leading actors of this process.

This character did not change in the Arab provinces. In Baghdad, it was these

Tanzimat intellectuals and statesmen who contributed to the modernization of the

province. The tribal structure of the Arab provinces was regarded as an important

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obstacle for the development of these provinces. The question of bedeviyyet Vs

medeniyyet in Arab provinces became the theme of many studies. It is commonly

accepted that the modernization process in the Arab provinces, especially in

Baghdad, was some kind of carrot-stick nature. When provincial politics were

approved by the local population, they were awarded in some way; but when they

were opposed, the reforms were enforced upon them, even sometimes by means of

military force.

Although the modernization of Baghdad can be traced back to the

governorship of Davud Pasha, nothing much appears to have changed until the late

1840s. It was the governors who served in the 1850s and 1860s, namely Reşid Pasha,

Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha, who made considerable efforts for the

modernization of the province. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Midhat Pasha

surpassed the previous governors in his service for the modernization of Baghdad.

However, it is also not true to establish a relationship between Midhat Pasha and

almost every successful project that was implemented in Baghdad. It is quite

interesting that all of these three governors had a European experience; they either

had their education in Europe or spent considerable years there.

As noted earlier, Midhat Pasha has a distinct place in the modernization of

Ottoman Baghdad. In his first public speech in Baghdad the pasha emphasized the

need for the development and modernization of Baghdad. He drew attention to the

striking dichotomy between the glorious past and the then existing ignorant

condition.895 To close the gap between past and present, Midhat Pasha fervently

895 Zewra, No:1. This dichotomy is the most commonly referred themes of travellers. For this dichotomy of semi-mythical Golden Age of the past and backward, stagnant and ignorant Baghdad, see Rhoads Murphey, ‘The Ottoman Centuries of Iraq: Legacy or Aftermath? A Survey Study of Mesopotamian Hydrology and Ottoman Irrigation Projects’, Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, 1987, p.25.

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stressed the need to catch up with the civilized world, and act in accordance with

time.896 After stating his desire to benefit the country and enrich the people, he

mentioned his wish to introduce many changes and reforms, which at first might not

be approved by the people. However, he believed that the people would appreciate

when they had experienced the advantages that would accrue to them thereupon.897

Midhat Pasha used the provincial newspaper, Zewra, effectively in preaching the

need for modernization. One of the frequently emphasized issues was the permanent

change in the world affairs and the need to catch up and comply with these changes.

It is also clear that the members of the foreign consulates were very

influential in the modernization of Ottoman Baghdad. Especially the material aspects

of this modernization were provided by the European powers by means of these

consulates. The British Consul General at Baghdad needs special emphasis. It is, for

example, reported that he mediated in purchasing the telegraph machines and the

tramlines. These materials were mainly imported from European capitals, especially

London; however, British India was also an important source for such machines.898

The modernization of Baghdad was also in favor of the foreign consulates, because

the commercial activities of the European powers were certainly facilitated with this

modernization.

896 Zewra, No:1. ‘..Zamân gözetilmezse maksad-ı aslî olan terakkiyât ve felâh ve necât mümkün olamayıp cemiyetin emsâlinden geri kalacağında iştibâh yoktur. ... Hükm-i zamâna teb‘iyet ve istihsâl-i esbâbına tevessül etmeyenler ni‘met-i terakkî ve servetten geri kalırlar. ... Zenginlik nakit akçe biriktirmek ve nukûdu sandıkta saklayıp habs etmek olmayup akçe ve meskûkât mu‘amelât-ı halk için bir alet ve vâsıtadır. Asıl zenginlik asrın ve zamânın icâbına muvâfık ma‘lûmât ile zirâat ve ticâretin ve sanat ve hirfetin esâs-ı sahîh üzerine cereyân etmesidir’. 897 PRO, FO 195; 949, 26 May 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. 898 BOA, İ. DAH, 43610, 16 Za 1287 (7 February 1871) mentions about the telegram machines that were imported from India. Midhat Pasha also reports in his memoriam that the horse cars and the lines of the Kazimiye tramline were imported from London. See Midhat Pasha, p. 115.

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Midhat Pasha’s reforms in Ottoman Iraq were very effective, but they needed

some continuity to be provided by his successors and by the Sublime Porte in

İstanbul. It was the unluckiness of Baghdad that the tenure of Midhat Pasha did not

last long. The political conflict between Midhat Pasha and the new grand vizier,

Mahmud Nedim Pasha led to his resignation from the governorship. Let alone

support from the Sublime Porte, the successors of Midhat Pasha endeavored to wipe

out the repercussions of his reforms. Mahmud Nedim Pasha clearly ordered the new

governor in Baghdad to destroy what Midhat Pasha achieved.899 There is no doubt

that the political rivalry among the Men of Tanzimat had negative repercussion on

the Ottoman modernization, both in the imperial center and the provincial periphery.

It should also be noted that the achievements of Midhat Pasha in provincial

reforms became a source of inspiration for Sultan Abdülhamit II. One can easily see

that the types and fields of reforms were almost the same; that is to say, newspapers,

modern schools, vocational training, tramlines, watch towers etc., these can clearly

be seen in the reforms of Abdülhamit II.900

The governors of Baghdad, especially Midhat Pasha, built many schools,

public buildings, prisons, reformatories (ıslahhânes), barracks, tram lines, harbor

works, transportation facilities on rivers, hospitals, works concerning communication

(telegraph lines and postal services) and so on. Obviously, it is impossible to cite

here all the works done by these governors. I will refer some of these public works in

detail.

899 Rauf Pasha, for instance, had taken the title deeds delivered by Midhat Pasha back by force. See Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha”, p. 128. 900 For instance, the similarity between Midhat Pasha’s reforms and Abdülhamid’s project for the modernization of Ottoman Libya is striking. See Deringil, “They Live in a State of Nomadism” pp. 319-22.

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The movement of Basra’s city center on the river bank One of the most important improvements of the 1850s was the movement of Basra

city on the banks of Tigris and construction of new buildings there. The frequent

floods combined with the bad weather and the resulting sanitary problems were the

main reasons for the movement of the city. The irrigation canals were the inevitable

parts of the life in Basra. Although the local rulers had built river walls to prevent the

floods, many times the walls were destroyed by natural causes (especially by strong

floods) and there appeared many small lakes. Furthermore, the river waters were

extended through small irrigation canals (hark) into the inner side of the city, but it

was quite difficult to keep these canals open and clean all the time. Soil and dust

filled the canals frequently. Moreover, the lack of sewer system and the tide

exacerbated the situation. When the water withdrew, the canals began to reek under

the hot weather. The animals dying within the canals further worsened the situation.

Though the officials tried to keep the canal clean and clear, they could not cope with

the problem.

Upon the notification of the kaymakam of Basra, Reşid Pasha, and support of

the local gentry, Namık Pasha brought the issue to the attention of the Sublime

Porte.901 Apart from sanitary relief, the movement of the city on the banks of the

Tigris was to provide several advantages. First of all, Basra’s city center was far

from the quay. Therefore, the commercial goods were landed on the Tigris, and then

they were further carried into the city center with small boats. But this transfer of

goods sometimes took long times and the goods perished in the mean time. It was

assumed that when the city was moved on the bank of the Tigris, not only such losses

would be prevented, but also the custom revenues would increase. Secondly, it was

901 For Reşid Pasha’s report see BOA, İ. DAH, 10434, 7 Ra 1265 (31 January 1849).

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believed that a city on the river bank would attract the merchants. And finally, it was

also expected that the interest of the people to the new town would ease the

settlement of the nomadic tribes. The project of moving the city center included the

construction of a mosque, a custom house, a government house for the kaymakam,

many shops and a bath, whose revenue would belong to the mosque as vakf.

The cost of the project amounted to 3,000 kese akçes, which became an

obstacle for its realization. At the end of the same year (1266) Maşuk Pasha,

kaymakam of Basra, prepared a report, which among other things, underlined the

need for repairing the river walls and keeping the canals clean and other measures,

instead of moving the city on the river bank. The Sublime Porte suggested a midway

solution: accordingly, the imperial treasury met only the cost of custom house and

quarantine house, and the shops were to be built by the local people.902 This offer

also implied the gradual movement of the people toward the bank of the river. It is

understood that the process continued slowly. A government house (hükûmet konağı)

was built and this was followed by civil buildings constructed by local merchants.903

The movement of the city was significant in the sense that Basra became a

“port city” in the true sense. The city, especially in the last quarter of the nineteenth

century, had become an indispensable part of the regional network. This was realized

through not only commercial activities between Iraqi provinces and the Indian

subcontinent, but also the naval communication of steamships which run to Aden,

Suez, Alexandria, İstanbul and London.

902 BOA, İ. MVL. 5500, 22 Za 1266 (29 September 1850). 903 Midhat Pasha, p. 123.

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The Foundation of Provincial Municipality in Baghdad

There is no doubt that Baghdad was one of the earliest provinces that established its

municipal institutions. The Law of Municipality (Belediye Kanunu) was promulgated

in 1877. However, before this law several provinces, especially port cities like

İstanbul and İzmir, began to establish their municipalities. In the Arab provinces of

the empire, the development of municipal institutions seems to have begun promptly

in Jerusalem. As early as 1860s, there existed a municipality in Jerusalem.904 The

municipalities and the municipal councils were regulated by the laws of 1864, 1871

and finally 1877.

There is no doubt that the municipal institutions became indispensable parts

of the provincial administration in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In this

respect, the establishment of the municipality in the province of Baghdad can be

considered as the final stage in the development of a consciousness for public works.

The foundation of the municipal organization is usually started with the governorship

of Midhat Pasha905; however, archival documents indicate that in 1868, during the

governorship Takiyüddin Pasha, there was a municipal council in the province.906

There is no doubt that the Baghdad municipal council had improved its function by

the new arrangements introduced by Midhat Pasha. However, the municipality was

only effective in the center of the province. The outer parts of the province were, to a

great extent, deprived of municipal activities.

Municipalities were one of the new institutions introduced by the Tanzimat

reforms. The European demand for modernization in the Ottoman coastal cities was

904 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 31 and 171. Ruth Kark, “The Jerusalem Municipality at the End of Ottoman Rule”, Asian and African Studies, 14 (1981), pp. 117-141. 905 For instance see Lloyd, p. 191. 906 PRO, FO 195, 949 No: 1 of 1869, Enclosures 1 and 2, From Herbert to Constantinople. For the text of this document see Appendix.

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very influential in the development of municipal organizations in these provinces.

Like many other coastal cities, Baghdad, where members of the European countries

had considerable influence, had its first municipal organization in late 1860s, that is,

long before the Municipal Law of 1877.907 Perhaps the most salient task of the

municipality in Baghdad was the provision of public services; therefore, they had

considerable contribution to the provincial modernization. Gerber considers the

establishment of the municipalities as a revolution in the traditional Ottoman

administrative system, because earlier it was the qadi who was, among other things,

in charge of some of the municipal activities.

The municipality of Baghdad had an independent, though small, budget,

which was to be approved by the provincial administrative council. They had also the

right to levy taxes on the city inhabitants. In January 1869, Takiyüddin Pasha, then

the governor-general of the province, introduced a small municipal tax for the

purpose of raising a fund for the cleaning of the streets in Baghdad.908 There is no

doubt that such applications were important sources for the municipal budget. It is

understood that the British Consul General at Baghdad was quite willing to pay this

tax, although they are exempt from paying such taxes. By paying the tax, the British

Consul wanted to give a good example to the inhabitants of the town, who were

inclined to complain and oppose such reforms. The Consul also thought that if he

pays the tax, he would obtain some voice in enforcing the cleanliness of the city.

907 Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde, p. 31. 908 See PRO, FO 195, 949 No: 1 of 1869, Enclosures 1 and 2, From Herbert to Constantinople.

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Urban Life and Infrastructural Development

Infrastructural improvements comprised a significant part of the public works in

Baghdad. It is clear that the public works in the province of Baghdad gained intensity

during Midhat Pasha's governorship. The construction of bridges and wide roads

(especially in the city center) were among the ordinary affairs he did in every

province he served.909 The infrastructural insufficiency in land transport was one of

the most important problems of the empire in the nineteenth century. The rulers of

the period were fervently insisting on the provincial governors for the construction

and extension of road network.910 In Baghdad, the roads between sub-provinces,

especially those between Sulaimaniyah-Kirkuk, Kirkuk-Mosul-Baghdad, were

among the first to be improved. For this end, engineers were appointed and by means

of dynamites precipitous places were leveled.911

One of the themes that the travelers, both European and Ottoman, frequently

complained about Baghdad was the narrowness of the streets, and its unhealthiness.

The streets of Baghdad were ranging from 1.5- 3 arşın and there was no sidewalk.912

The streets did not allow even the passage of horse carts. Due to the narrow streets,

people could not use horse carts, but animals. As the streets were full of dust in the

hot weathers or mud in the rainy weathers, they were becoming inaccessible for the

people. It was just before the governorship of Midhat Pasha that the ruling governor,

909 For Midhat Pasha’s governorships in different provinces see Tufan Buzpınar, Abdulhamid II, Islam and the Arabs: the Cases of Syria and the Hijaz 1878-1882, PhD Thesis, Manchester University, 1991; Zeki Arıkan, “Midhat Paşa'nın Aydın Valiliği”, Uluslararası Midhat Paşa Semineri: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar, Ankara: TTK, 1986; Nejat Göyünç, “ Midhat Paşa'nın Nish Valiliği Hakkında Notlar ve Belgeler”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, XII, 1981-2, Najib E. Saliba, “The Achievements of Midhat Pasha as Governor of the Province of Syria”, IJMES, Vol. 9, No: 3, (Oct. 1978), pp. 307-323; Yaşar Yücel, “Midhat Paşa'nın Bağdat Vilayetindeki Altyapı Yatırımları”, Uluslararası Midhat Paşa Semineri: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar, Ankara: TTK, 1986. 910 See Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı, p. 29. 911 Zewra, No: 9. 912 Zewra, No: 4. The number of streets with 5-6 arşın length were very few.

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Takiyüddin Pasha, began to apply a municipal tax for the cleaning of the streets in

Baghdad. Midhat Pasha was too concerned with this problem, but the buildings that

were constructed from brick were a major obstacle for the widening of the streets.

Moreover, since the stone was scarce and expensive, Midhat Pasha, from June 1869

onwards, began to use a mixture of pitch and sand for the construction of

sidewalk.913

Furthermore, it was during Necip Pasha’s term of office that a public park

was built near the Azamiya gate of Baghdad. It was named Necibiyya, after the name

of the governor himself.914 The park was later beautified by Midhat Pasha. The pasha

leveled the road to the park and built an approximately 400-500 meter long road.915

Since it was impossible to widen the city within the city walls, Midhat Pasha

opted to take a radical step. One of the most striking, and frequently critisized, urban

activities of Midhat Pasha was his decision to pull down the city walls as a step for

its modernization. Like other Middle Eastern cities, Baghdad was encircled with the

city walls. When the city was founded as the capital of Abbasid Empire by Caliph

Al-Mansur, it was given a round shape with city walls. However, as the city grew in

the course of time, the city walls began to be perceived as an obstacle for the urban

growth. By pulling down the city walls Midhat Pasha hoped to enlarge the city

outward.916

913 Zewra, No: 4. Although there were enough stones in Mosul and Hît, it was not feasible to bring them to Baghdad for the construction of sidewalk. 914 The park was later named Mecidiyye, see Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 84. 915 Zewra: no 43. 916 Davison, “Midhat Pasha”, EI2. However, it seems that this was not achieved as it was supposed. Ali Bey reported that the inhabitants of the Baghdad remained to settle within the (old) city walls. The destruction of the city walls also brought some disadvantages. People began to fear from a possible tribal attack or even a flood, because the city walls were an important obstacle not only for the tribal attacks but also for the natural disasters like floods. Ali Bey, visiting Baghdad in 1885, noted that after the destruction Baghdad only the foundation stones and two gates of the Baghdad citadel were left. See Ali Bey, p. 76.

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Earlier, the Persian threat to the Iraqi provinces led the provincial governors

to repair and renovate the city walls constantly.917 The city walls and its environs had

been protected by soldiers, but later this duty was farmed out to local notables.918

The governors gave the task to the tribal sheikhs in return for their payment of mâl-ı

mîrî.919 As the provincial security improved in the second half of the century, the

work of renovation became redundant.

Having comprehended this, Midhat Pasha wanted to convert this site into a

handsome boulevard.920 It is also argued that Midhat Pasha destroyed them for the

sake of obtaining some additional revenue to the provincial administration.921

According to this allegation, when the provincial treasury was exhausted by his

reforming schemes, Midhat Pasha destroyed the ancient walls and sold the bricks for

building.922 Whatever its reasons were, this act indeed reflects how some provincial

governors differed in their approaches/programs for provincial urbanization.

Settlement in the outer quarters was strongly encouraged, but Midhat Pasha

could not get what he hoped. The most commonly used method for this was to

establish new administrative institutions outside the old city. In Karbala, for instance,

the city center was quite small when compared with its population. In consequence, a

new quarter outside the city of Karbala was founded and the income, which was

917 Raymond, Osmanlı Döneminde, p. 17. 918 BOA, İ. MVL. 20459, 6 C 1278 (9 December 1861).

919 BOA, İ. MVL. 20459, 2 Ca 1278 (5 November 1861). 920 Lloyd, p.190. However, Lloyd, criticizing Midhat Pasha’s act, states that Baghdad lost her walls, and got in return, not a boulevard, but a surrounding ring of enormous ruins. 921 E. S. Stevens, By Tigris and Euphrates, London: Hurst & Blackett Ltd. Paternoster House, E. C. 1923, p. 128. 922 Ibid., p. 128. This narrative also indicates the fact that the bricks and stones were very scarce and expensive.

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obtained from the sales of real estates in the new quarter, was spent for the

modernization of Karbala itself.923

Likewise, with the efforts of mutasarrıf Murad Efendi, Ammarah experience

a similar urbanization. Most of the houses in Ammarah were made of mud, brick and

rush mat. A considerable portion of the people in Ammarah was living in shanty

cabins and the occasional fires caused severe damages. Instead, nearly 500 new

houses (some of them were made up concrete), 3 grain depots, a bath, a mosque and

200 shops were built.924 The nâhiye of Alâ Garbî had its share from this urbanization.

A grain house, twenty shops and a coffee house were constructed in 3-4 months,

converting it to a small town. Upon these developments the neighboring nomadic

tribes began to settle in the area.925

Having realized that there were no public fountains in Baghdad, and that the

inhabitants of the city were meeting their water needs from Tigris by means of sakas,

Midhat Pasha introduced water pumps that was operated with steam.926 This was of

great facility for the city inhabitants.

A considerable part of the public work was related to the religious shrines and

tombs. Needless to say, the province of Baghdad was very rich in terms of both

Sunnite and Shiite visiting places. The repair and renovations of these places was

very important for the social life of Baghdad. The tombs of Hussain (Meşhed-i

Hüseyn) and Imam Azam were the most venerated ones.927 The Sublime Porte sent

923 Zewra, No: 2, 924 Zewra, No. 61. 925 Ibid., 926 Midhat Pasha, p. 114. 927 For the repair of Meşhed-i Hüseyin in 1858, see Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 126.

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regular gifts for these places. However, there appeared some smart people who tried

to get tax exemption through construction of new tombs or shrines.928

One of the leading developments in the urban character of the Baghdad was

the lighting of the streets with gas. Instead of sesame oil that was used in the

provincial offices and streets, the gas that was extracted from Mendelli gas mine

began to be used. With this locally produced gas, the pasha stopped the import of

American gas. Since the newly used gas was cheaper, every sub-province was

decorated with gas lamps.929

Midhat Pasha is credited to have built the only modern bridge the city of

Baghdad possessed before the twentieth century.930 Although there was a bridge over

Tigris that combined the two banks of Baghdad, it was too old and dangerous for

passage. A weak bridge was also an important obstacle for the mobilization of

military troops. As a result, a new bridge, 264 meter in length and 16 zirâ‘ in width,

was opened in November 1870 with a military philharmonic band. In the opening

ceremony, the high-ranking officials crossed the bridge on horseback, and a military

troop and local people followed them. The new bridge was a floating bridge made up

of 24 pontoons, and it could be opened for the passage of keleks and small boats. To

prevent damages, the bridge was opened during the strong floods. The old bridge, on

the other hand, was deconstructed for maintenance and it was planned to be put on

another part of the Tigris. The Sublime Porte met the cost of the construction on the

condition that the revenue to be received from the passage of people and goods will

928 BOA, A. MKT, 76/83, 26 R 1263 (13 April 1847). 929 Ibid, p.114. The Zewra newspaper reports that during the anniversary of the imperial enthronement the state offices were decorated with gas-lamps and the celebration continued till the midnights. See Zewra, No: 3. 930 Davison, “Midhat Pasha”, EI2, p. 1033. There were of course other bridges in other cities of the province, such as Mosul, Divaniyah and Hillah.

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be sent to the central treasury. It was calculated that the cost of the bridge was to be

compensated in several years. Before this bridge, only the bridge in Musayyib

produced revenue, the passage in other bridges in Mosul, Divaniyah and Hillah was

free of charge. However, due to the increasing cost of repair and renovations, it was

decided to levy a reasonable passage tax for these bridges as well.931

Moreover, Midhat Pasha completed the construction of government house

(saray, hükûmet konağı) started by Namık Pasha.932 The saray building was further

improved with the erection of a clock tower. The construction of a clock tower in

Baghdad is meaningful, because Midhat Pasha had frequently complained about the

ignorance of the people and the waste of time in Baghdad. Especially the abundance

of coffee houses in Baghdad and the time wasted here are recurrent themes narrated

in the traveler accounts. The pasha thought and built the clock tower as a means of

signifying the importance of time in the minds of local people. The clock towers

were among the more visible signs of Tanzimat administration and many cities had

clock towers in the city headquarter. It is known that Najaf and Karbala had public

clocks; however, Baghdad had to wait until 1870. A clock that clanged in every

quarter hour was brought from Europe.933 The tower was in a square shape and it had

approximately 23 meter hight.934

931 See BOA, İ. MVL, 21405, 8 Ra 1279 (3 September 1862). The details of this passage tax can be seen in Appendix. 932 Duri, Baghdad, El, p. 906. 933 Zewra, No: 77. 934 Ibid., Also see Süleymen Faruk Göncüoğlu, “Bağdattaki Türk Eserleri”, in Ali Ahmetbeyoğlu, Hayrullah Cengiz and Yahya Başkan (eds.) Irak Dosyası, İsyanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2003, p. 272.

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Telegraph and Railway

It is known that the first telegraph communications in the Ottoman Empire were

introduced during the Crimean War. It was a few years later that a telegraph line

between İstanbul and Basra was planned. In order to fasten the project, it was divided

into three parts: İzmit-Sivas, Sivas-Baghdad and Baghdad-Basra. The latter, it was

suggested, was to be built under the supervision of the governor in Baghdad.935 By

December 1860, the line had reached the Zab River, which was considered to be the

border of Shahrizor.936

The telegraph line between İstanbul and Baghdad had been completed by

1861. However, it was not until the end of 1863 that the gap in the telegraph network

between Baghdad and Basra was closed, and a direct line between İstanbul and Basra

was opened. The Sublime Porte paid special attention not to commission the

construction of telegraph lines between Üsküdar and Basra to foreign companies.937

In spite of this, the telegraph line between Baghdad and Basra was commissioned to

a British engineer938, because at the beginning it was planned to be furnished under

the Tigris River, which required European technology. The British engineers were

competent in constructing underwater telegraph lines, because they were also

constructing such a line between Alexandria and Crete and were planning

constructing another one between India and Basra.

935 BOA, İ. HRC. 8385, 3 Z 1274 (15 July 1858) and İ. HRC. 8297, 11 Za 1274 (23 June 1858). 936 BOA, İ. DAH. 31091, 6 C 1277 (20 December 1860). 937 “…böyle kara hatlarının ecnebî idâresine verilmesi usûlen uyamayacağından Üsküdardan Basraya kadar bir hattın taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden yapılmasına karâr verilmesi…”, BOA, İ. MMAH. 718, selh-i C 1276 (25 December 1859). 938 BOA, İ. HRC. 8999, 14 L 1275 (17 May 1859). This document has in its enclosure the contract between the British engineer and the Ottoman official.

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The idea of constructing the Baghdad-Basra line under the Tigris River was

the result of security concerns. In a region, which was dominated by tribes and

deserts, the preservation of this line was a major problem.939 By furnishing it under

the Tigris, the government thought to resolve the problem. However, it later appeared

that such an underwater line would be too expensive, and difficult to repair in case of

damages. Moreover, the repair of underwater line would last for weeks, which would

impede communication. Hence, the land route was preferred.940

After the accomplishment of direct line between Baghdad and Basra,

considerable efforts were afforded for the widening of the network of telegraph to

other places in the province. The main route was extended in many directions. It was

extended to Hillah in January 1864.941 Fav, Divaniyah, Ammarah and Hankin were

other routes of extension. Telegraph stations were established in these and many

other places. Needless to say, the technical and political arrangements were done

under British auspices. British engineers and workers were provided through British

General Consulate in Baghdad. However, it should also be kept in mind that the

construction and extension of telegraph lines was also important for the British

interest, because these lines enabled Britain to have easier and faster communication

with her greatest colony, namely India.

Thanks to the British, direct communication between Europe and India via

Fav, Baghdad and İstanbul was provided by the mid-1860s.942 The Indian line was

furnished under the Indian Ocean and it was connected with the Anatolian line in

939 For the destruction of telegraph lines between Hillah and Divaniyah see BOA, İ. DAH. 42055, 8 N 1286 (12 December 1869). 940 BOA, İ. HRC. 9766, 24 M 1277 (12 August 1860) and İ. HRC. 9894, 2 B 1277 (14 January 1861). 941 BOA, İ. DAH. 35516, 28 Ş 1280 (7 February 1864). This document also contains the first telegraph sent by governor-general Namık Pasha to the Sublime Porte. 942 Lorimer, p. 239.

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Basra. As the communication between India and Europe was to be done through

these combined lines, it increased the importance of Basra. Therefore, the Sublime

Porte canalized some of its telegraph officials to Basra. These officials were selected

among those who had language skills.943 It is also interesting that some of the

telegraph officials, especially those with higher ranks, were given swords and hil‘ats

in addition to regular salaries.944

Although telegraph was an earlier inception, it did not spread in Ottoman Iraq

as quickly as steam navigation. The attacks of the tribes and their cutting of the

telegraph lines probably delayed its widespread use. However, the Ottoman officials,

who were keen on extending telegraph lines and benefiting from them, put security

forces (çavuş and başçavuş) along the telegraph lines.945

As we know from the Zewra newspaper, at the end of Midhat Pasha's three-

year service in Baghdad, the city had a complete telegraph network.946 It is also

interesting that Midhat Pasha achieved a considerable part of these works with

donations from his bureaucrats and the local inhabitants. The act of donation was

encouraged and promoted through the announcements of the donors in the Zewra

newspaper.947 By donating for such benevolent affairs the officers might have

943 BOA, İ. HRC. 11920, 27 Za 1280 (4 May 1864) and İ. HRC. 12045, 6 R 1281 (20 September 1863). 944 For the delivery of hil‘ats to telegraph officials in Kirkuk see BOA, İ. MVL. 23807, lef 1, 19 Z 1281 (15 April 1865). 945 Between the outskirts of Baghdad and Mosul more than thirty security officers (çavuş) were employed. BOA, İ. HRC. 10769, 19 L 1278 (19 April 1862). For the security forces and their salaries in the Hillah-Divaniyah route see BOA, İ. HRC. 11861, 14 L 1280 (23 March 1864). 946 Yücel, p.182. 947 For example the list of donors for the construction of a hospital, Dârü’ş-şifâ, was given in Zewra no: 14, 24, and 34.

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wanted to win Midhat Pasha’s favor. However, it is also not impossible that Midhat

Pasha covertly made them donate.948

River Steamers and Naval Communication The first attempts to utilize the rivers of Mesopotamia as a steamer route was

planned for the sake of improving and easing the way to British India, because these

rivers were to provide the shortest road to India. The motives behind the British

attempts were both economic and political. J. B. Fraser was commissioned by the

British government to investigate the general conditions in Ottoman Iraq, and he

prepared a report in 1834.949 It was again in this year that the British government was

given a fermân, permitting exploration of naval communication on Euphrates.

Colonel Chesney’s experiment (1835-37), the first of its kind, was done with

a view to the institution of communication between Europe and India by means of

steamers on Euphrates. Sponsored by the British government and the East India

Company, the experiment had also an official permission from the Sublime Porte.

Two river steamers, named “Tigris” and “Euphrates”, were launched upon the upper

Euphrates in the course of 1835-36, but the former sunk in a storm within a few

weeks.950 Therefore, the expedition was stopped and the “Euphrates” was transferred

to the East India Company. Consequently, the first British expedition ended with

disappointing results. Nevertheless, the British attempts to explore Euphrates and

Tigris continued with great energy. Commander Lynch (1837-43), Lieutenant

Campbell (1841-42), Commander Felix Jones (1843-54), Commander Selby (1841-

948 Midhat Pasha’s return from Basra might be a good example of this kind. Midhat Pasha returned from Basra with considerable amount of donations which were later listed in Zewra no: 34. 949 Lorimer, p.212. 950 Ibid., p.212.

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42 and 1855-61) made further investigations in the rivers of Mesopotamia and

Persian Gulf.

The early explorations had shown that the Euphrates was unnavigable for

practical purposes by river vessels. Nevertheless, the first steam navigation on

Euphrates started in 1842 under the Lynch Company. As private (British)

entrepreneurs began to articulate commercial navigation, an imperial permission

(berât) was given in 1846 to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates under British national

flag.951 As the result, “Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company” was

established by Lynch Company and the first steamer for commercial purposes, “City

of London”, began to ply on Tigris in 1861. Until 1862, mails from Baghdad to India

followed the route of Syria, Egypt, Red Sea and India. However, in 1862, a mail

steamer service, with terminal ports in Basra and Bombay, was organized by British

India Steam Navigation Company. One year later, in 1863, a mail steamer service

between Baghdad and Basra was also initiated. According to Lorimer, it is

understood that a French company, asking for equal treatment with the British, had

also applied the Sublime Porte in 1864 for navigation facilities on Euphrates and

Tigris.952

The British interest in the rivers of Mesopotamia triggered the Ottoman

Empire to pay attention to these rivers. When we look at the Ottoman side of the

coin, it was obvious that the governors in Baghdad, especially Ali Rıza and Namık

Pashas, did not welcome the British endeavors in the rivers of Mesopotamia. While

the British argued that steam navigation in the twin rivers of the Mesopotamia would

strengthen Ottoman Empire and Persia against Russia, Ottoman officials thought that

951 Ibid., p.226. 952 Ibid., p.247.

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such improvements under the British flag would reinforce the British existence in the

region and increase their influence over the Iraqi tribes. Notwithstanding the

objections of governors in Baghdad, the Sublime Porte felt obliged to give

concessions to Britain.

Occasionally, the attitudes of the governors in Baghdad became a matter of

resentment for British merchants. For instance, Necip Pasha opposed the passage of

British commercial ships under British flag. However, since the commercial

activities of the British subjects were allowed through the Anglo-Ottoman

Commercial Treaty of 1838, the governors were warned by the Sublime Porte. The

ships were allowed for passage on the condition that they pay the required taxes.953

Furthermore, the role of river steamers in the provision of security against the

recalcitrant tribes and the collection of taxes were also taken into account. At the

beginning the steamers served between Baghdad and Basra and the steamer service

was expected to pacify the Muntafiq tribe in southern Iraq.954 Besides, the steamers

could be used, when needed, for military and civil services. They not only carried

soldiers and munitions, but also commercial cargos and mails. Therefore, the steamer

service not only contributed to the provincial security, but also it paved the way for

the increase in the volume of trade.955

Reşid Pasha, who was one of the foresighted rulers of Baghdad, was the first

governor to order steamships that would operate between Baghdad and Basra. After

953 BOA, İ. HRC, 1555, 27 Ra 1262 (25 March 1846). 954 “... Dicle ve Fıratta bulunan iki kıt‘a vapura üç kıt‘a daha ilâvesiyle rütbe-i kifâyete iblâğı Müntefik urbânı cihetinin terakki-i inzibât ve idârelerine bâdî ve bu takrîb ile vâridât-ı eyâlet derece-i matlûbeye müterakkî olarak ahâlî-i mütevahhişe dahi taht-ı inkiyâda alınacağına mebnî ...”, BOA, İ. DAH. 36943, 9 Ş 1281 (7 January 1865). 955 “... nehr-i Dicle’de posta sûretiyle işlemekte ve icâb ettikçe asâkir ve mühimmât sevk ü nakli hizmetlerinde kullanılmakda olan Bağdad ve Basra nâm vapur-ı hümâyûnların oralarca irâe etmekte olduğu muhsenât ve teshîlât müstağni-i ta‘rîf ve beyân olduğu gibi postaya işlediklerinde ticâret-i külliye vukû‘ bulduğu ...”, BOA, İ. DAH. 34861, bahriye lef 3, (no exact date, but 1863).

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consulting with the notables of the province, he established a company for the

transportation of goods and local people on the rivers of Mesopotamia through

steamships. The role of the provincial notables seems to be quite important, because

they discussed the issue several times with the governor and they collected donations

which amounted to 2,000 kese. This amount was the two-third of the money required

for the purchase of two steamers. The remaining 1,000 kese was provided from the

provincial treasury.956 The two steamships, which were ordered from Belgium, were

named “Baghdad” and “Basra”. However, as Reşid Pasha died in late 1273 (1856),

he could not see their arrival to Baghdad.957 Reşid Pasha also established a factory in

Baghdad for the repair and care of the steamers. Reşid Pasha’s efforts were

continued by his successor, Ömer Lütfi Pasha. Ömer Lütfi Pasha ordered two

steamers and one great vessel. The latter was to operate between Basra and Jeddah

and carry, among other things, grain to Jeddah.958

İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye From the early 1860s onwards, the local government of Baghdad possessed steamers

on the two rivers, and after 1867 they were mainly managed for commercial

purposes under the command of the Ottoman officials, in rivalry with the British

company. It was during Namık Pasha’s term that by ordering three more steamers

(Musul, Fırat and Rasâfa) and establishing İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye (Ottoman-

956 BOA, İ. MVL. 15658, 21 Za 1272 (24 July 1856), İ. DAH. 16932, 21 N 1269 (28 June 1853) and İ. DAH. 24232, dâhiliye lef 3, gurre-i S 1273 (1 October 1856). 957 The steamers are reported to arrive Baghdad during Namık Pasha’s term of office. However, the archival documents refer to the arrival and assembling of these ships in 1859 and 1860, that is to say, before Namık Pasha’s (second) governorship. See BOA, İ. DAH. 28675, 24 N 1275 (27 April 1859) and İ. DAH. 30427, 24 Z 1276 (13 July 1860). 958 BOA, İ. MVL. 16755, bahriye lef 3, 29 Ra 1274 (17 November 1857) and İ.HRC. 8104, hâriciye lef 1, 14 C 1274 (30 January 1858).

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Oman Administration), his initiative became, in a short period of time, a rival for the

English Lynch Corporation.959 It is understood that the merchants of Baghdad and

Basra were desirous for the establishment of İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye and ready

to buy its shares.960 Normally, the privilege of steam service was under the monopoly

of Aziziye kumpanyası, which functioned in the Red Sea. However, the Sublime

Porte decided to establish a separate company. Later, the steamers of Tigris and

Euphrates also worked under İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye.

The three steamers that were ordered by Namık Pasha arrived during the

governorship of Takiyüddin Pasha (1867-1869). Two of these steamers arrived in

Iraq in pieces and they were assembled in Baghdad, but they could not be put into

service until Midhat Pasha’s governorship. Midhat Pasha made the third steamer

assembled in Baghdad and the river steamers, now numbered five, started serving

between Baghdad and Basra.961

Midhat Pasha’s Contribution to Stream Service

The importance given by Midhat Pasha to navigation needs special emphasis,

because his three-year service between 1869 and 1872 was the apex of the river

transportation in the province of Baghdad. Concerning the transportation on rivers,

he made considerable efforts for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Midhat Pasha’s

term of office in Baghdad corresponded with the opening of Suez Canal. The news in

Zewra newspaper indicates that the pasha was well aware of the development in the

959 Yücel, pp. 176-7. 960 BOA, İ. MVL, 23361, 16 Ca 1281 (17 October 1864). 961 Midhat Pasha, p. 109.

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region.962 There is no doubt that with the opening of the Suez Canal the trade of the

Indian Ocean moved from the Gulf to the Red Sea; therefore, the importance of

Basra and Baghdad as centers of trade and commerce declined.963 However, for its

effective use by merchants and entrepreneurs, the Suez Canal needed several years.

In this conjuncture, Midhat Pasha wanted to compensate the disadvantage created by

the new trade routes.

Midhat Pasha was aware of the fact that Iraq transported the bulk of its goods

by river;964 and due to the inadequacy of transportation means the producers were not

able to bring their goods to the port cities. Similarly, importation into inner lands was

either not lucrative or almost impossible. Hence, the improvement of the navigation

system was compulsory for the development of Ottoman Iraq.

By improving the transportation facilities, Midhat Pasha endeavored to open

the province and the Iraqi products to the world market. He knew that there were two

ways to open Iraq to the world: The Basra-Persian Gulf and the Euphrates River.965

Although the Gulf option was easier to conduct, it was far from the Mediterranean

Sea. And the opening of Ottoman Iraq through Basra Gulf would only benefit to

lower Iraq.966 But Midhat Pasha thought that the Euphrates Project, if it is extended

to Birecik (Urfa) and then connected with railway to the Mediterranean, would be

shorter and beneficial for the whole of population. With the latter project, Pasha also

962 Zewra, No. 4. 963 Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, p. 18. 964 Charles Issawi, “Economic Structure and Growth”, in Cyril E. Black and L. Carl Brown (eds.) Modernization in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and Its Afro-Asian Successors, Princeton: The Darwin Press, Inc. 1992, p. 88. Also Midhat Pasha, p. 108. 965 Zewra, No:3. 966 Before Midhat Pasha, Namık Pasha had also worked on the development of Baghdad-Basra route. “…ahâlînin tevsi‘-i ticâreti zımnında Basra caddesinin kemâl-i emniyetle Bağdada bir mahreç aramaktayım…”. See Sinaplı, p. 193.

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hoped to increase the agricultural potential of the areas beneath to Euphrates River

that were ignored so long and were in a state of desert. So, due to its comparable

advantages, the Euphrates project was given greater emphasis.967

The Euphrates Project

The upper part of the Euphrates was not as suitable as the southern part for

navigation of steamers. Due to frequent floods, the buildings along the banks of

Euphrates had been destroyed and they negatively affected navigation, because the

debris reduced the depth of the river and impeded proper navigation. Hence, Midhat

Pasha sent an inspection team led by Şakir Pasha, then nafia müdürü, to investigate

whether the route from Baghdad to Meskene was suitable for navigation.968 Upon the

reports of Şakir Bey, Midhat Pasha ordered the cleaning of the riverbed. Since the

flow of the Euphrates was stronger, Pasha ordered steamers (with four wheels) that

were convenient for strong currents.969 In the mean time, the pasha decided to take

necessary measures to prevent the floods of Euphrates. Although former governors

had built river walls for the prevention of overflows,970 due to lack of maintenance

and the damages of the floods, these walls were broken and they needed repair.

Therefore, Midhat Pasha built the Cezayir walls to prevent the overflow of the

rivers.971

967 Zewra, No:3. 968 Formerly British Colonel Chesney made such an investigation. Upon his positive reports, the British started the initiative. But when a ship sunk accidentally, they stopped the whole initiative. See Midhat Pasha, p.111. 969 Ibid., p.111. This ship was named ‘Meskene’. It was assembled in Baghdad. However, Midhat Pasha, due to his departure from the office, could not see its service. 970 For instance, in 1849 Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha built walls near the Euphrates river. BOA, İ.MVL. 4393, 24 Z 1265 (10 November 1849). 971 Midhat Pasha, p.112 and 145.

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Midhat Pasha was keen to deepen the actual riverbed of Euphrates and to

clean it regularly. For this end, a ship was deputed for Euphrates survey work and a

dredger was ordered.972 At the beginning the dredgers that opened the Suez Canal

were considered for this work, but later Midhat Pasha decided to order the dredger

from Europe.973 The river route toward Mosul was dredged until November of

1869.974 Şakir Bey sent regular letters from places he had investigated reporting the

situation of the Euphrates. These letters were published in Zewra.975 These letters

were not only significant in terms of the data concerning the navigability of the

Euphrates river, but also they included important data concerning tribes and

settlements along the river route.976

The inspection had shown that the route from Baghdad to Meskene was

impeded in some places by the ruins of old bridges, big rocks and nâ‘ûrs. Nâ‘ûr was

a water-wheel that enabled the flow of water to farms. These nâ‘ûrs were affecting

the flow of the river and abraded the banks of the river, filling the riverbed with soil

and rocks. However, Şakir Bey also reported that these obstacles were not difficult to

remove. When the inspection and dredging was completed, Midhat Pasha

inaugurated the opening of a steamship route by passing safely from Tigris to

Euphrates (through the Saklawiyya Canal) and traveling along the Euphrates some

972 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 318. 973 Zewra, No: 55. 974 Zewra, No: 22 and 25. 975 See Zewra, No: 41, 42, and 43. 976 For a separate scholarly work on Şakir Bey’s inspection was written by Michael Ursinus. See Michael Ursinus, “The Ruins of Dura-Europos in the Columns of Zevrâ: Ahmed Şakir Beğ’s Travels Along Euphrates, Published and Annotated by the Ottoman Provincial Gazette of Baghdad”, in Horst Unbehaun (ed.) The Middle Eastern Press as a Forum for Literature, Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 2004, pp. 167-180.

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800 kilometers to the north as far as Meskene.977 The local people welcomed these

accomplishments with great joy.978 Longrigg regarded this enterprise as the apex of

river navigation in Turkish Iraq.979

Apart from cleaning the riverbed, Midhat Pasha’s efforts were also reflected

in the increase in the number of steamboats serving on Euphrates and Tigris. Midhat

Pasha found the İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye inefficient and deteriorating, and

therefore appointed a more competent director. In his three-year service, the Pasha

tripled the number of steamers and made the İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye the leading

company of the region.980 The company lived its heyday during his service. While

some of the steamers (such as Babil, Necid and Asur) were greater in terms of their

engine capacities, some of them had medium capacities (between 12-30 horse

power), and the remaining was of small capacity. The steamers with high engine

capacities were used for long distance shipping. While the medium ones served in

the rivers, the latter ones were used for the mail service, security patrols and the

investigation of river basin.981

Improvement of Basra dockyard and harbour The Ottomans had given priority to river steamers, rather than greater ships to be

used in Basra, because the river steamers were expected to contribute to the

977 Midhat Pasha, pp. 112 and 146. 978 For the bewilderment of a local person see Zewra, No: 47. 979 Longrigg, Four Centuries, p. 318. 980 Yaşar Yücel (pp. 178-179) gives the details of these steamers. It seems also clear that Midhat Pasha’s initiatives on steam service on Euphrates and Tigris worried the British Consul General at Baghdad. Since the profit margin is reduced, the consul suggested to compromise with Midhat Pasha, so that the steamers of both nationality may navigate. See PRO, FO 195; 949, 21 April 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. 981 Yücel, p. 179.

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provision of security in Iraq and the increase in the provincial revenues.982 However,

the introduction and the improvement of the steamer service were accompanied with

new developments in the Basra-Gulf region. The first development was the extension

of steamer service toward outside Iraq. Needless to say, the opening of the Suez

Canal in 1869 triggered these developments. Even before the opening of the Canal,

the rulers, both in the center and in Baghdad, realized that the Suez Canal was to

bring profound changes to the region. In preparation for future developments, the

Ottomans felt the need to reinforce the dockyard in Basra. The benefits of this

reinforcement would not be limited to the Red Sea, but also extend toward Ceziretü’l

Arab as well.983

Even though the corvettes in Basra were carrying passengers and cargos to

Bombay before the 1860s, the lack of maintenance decreased the efficiency of these

corvettes.984 In the course of time, the Basra fleet became idle and some of its ships

had already rusted. The situation for some of its ships was heart-rending. They were

receiving water and the water was being emptied by the soldiers day and night in

turns.985 For some ships repair was impossible and they were destroyed and used for

other purposes. In the mid 1860s the Basra dockyard began to experience

considerable changes. Namık Pasha ordered two new corvettes (named İzmir and

982 For example, in 1864, upon the notification of Namık Pasha, the Sublime Porte decided to purchase two river steamers instead of one bigger ship for the same price. “…nehir vapurlarının celbi bu havâlîde istenen inzibâtı ve mîrî vâridâtı fazlalaştırmaya sebeb olacağından evvel emrde bu nehir vapurlarının celb ile inşâsı emir buyrulan buhar vapurunun dahi sonra tedârikine teşebbüs olunması …”, BOA, İ. DAH. 36724, 6 C 1281 (6 November 1864). 983 “... kuvve-i bahriyenin tezyîdi ve tevkîrinde olan muhsenât ve fevâid yalnız sevâhil-i Bahr-i Ahmere münhasır olmayıp Cezîretü’l-Arab sevâhilinde dahi müşâhede kılınacağına ve husûsuyla Süveyş Kanalının küşâdında inde’l-icâb süfün-i hümâyûnun münâvebeten iyâb ve zehâbı iktisâb-ı suhûletle tersâne-i âmirenin bahr-i mezkûrda bir kuvve-i müfrezesi bulunmuş ....olacağı ...”, BOA, İ. DAH. 36943, 9 Ş 1281 (7 January 1865). 984 BOA, İ. DAH. 30530, 17 M 1277 (5 August 1860). 985 BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, bahriye lef 3, 28 Z 1287 (21 March 1871).

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Bursa), for which the provincial treasury paid 8,000 kese akçe.986 Binbaşı Ahmed

was appointed in charge of these corvettes.987 These corvettes arrived in Baghdad by

passing through Cape of Hope. After serving several years in Basra, İzmir was

moved in 1868 to Jeddah and stayed there. On the other hand, Bursa’s condition

deteriorated in time and this was an important factor in the dismissal of Ahmed Bey

during Midhat Pasha’s governorship.

The need for qualified officials was obvious in the Basra dockyard. As noted

earlier, the bad weather of southern Iraq was the biggest problem. To remedy this,

the Sublime Porte tried, for a while, to limit the period of service for the officers in

the dockyard to one or two years. Furthermore, to fill the gap, one of the corvettes in

the fleet was converted to a school. While the aim was to enroll students from the

local populace, the bad weather of Basra forced the officials to open this school on

the ship.988 The purpose was to increase the level of education and mastery of crafts

and to create the needed qualified officers for the dockyard. 20-25 students were

enrolled and the production of the rope and fabric for sailing boats were taught. The

necessary tools and workbenches were brought from the imperial dockyard (tersâne-i

âmire) in İstanbul.

Thanks to Midhat Pasha’s efforts, the Basra harbor experienced considerable

revival. The casting house (dökümhâne) was shifted into a factory, because apart

from the factory in Baghdad, there was a need for a separate factory in Basra. The

old casting house began to develop an industry of blacksmith. Until Midhat Pasha’s

governorship, the Basra dockyard did not have a pool for the repair of ships. The

986 BOA, İ. DAH. 36943, 9 Ş 1281 (7 January 1865). 987 BOA, İ. DAH. 38144, 6 Z 1282 (22 April 1866). 988 “… ve bir mekteb ve fabrika tanzîmiyle iktizâ eden zâbıtânın refte refte mahallî ahâlîsinden yetiştirilerek …”, BOA, İ. DAH. 34861, 2 Ra 1280 (17 August 1863).

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Pasha notified the Sublime Porte on the need for a pool, maçuna (a large masting

machine), barracks etc. The ebb tide (med-cezir) facilitated the construction of the

pool and the dockyard experienced a considerable renewal.

The spatial improvement of the Basra harbor and its reinforcement in terms

of the number of soldiers and ships were of great significance. By 1871 the Basra

dockyard had more than 800 soldiers; however, there were still problems concerning

unqualified officers.989 During Midhat Pasha’s term 5 more corvettes were ordered

for Basra dockyard. Until this time, Jeddah was the naval base in the Arabian

Peninsula; however, with the extension of steamer service outside Iraq and the

reinforcement of the Basra dockyard, Basra became the leading naval base in the

region.990

The second development was the extension of steamer service outside Iraq.

Thanks to the improvement of the steamer service, regular services from Baghdad to

Basra, Istanbul and even England through Suez Canal were organized. The revenues

obtained from the steamer service were great. Since the ships were carrying not only

ordinary passengers and cargos, but also they carried the pilgrims, grain to Hijaz and

imperial military equipment. Some of the steamers that were bought from England

compensated their expenditures even in their first service. For instance, the ‘Babil’

989 “… Basradaki sefâyün için istihdâm olunmak üzere tertîb olunmuş olan asâkir-i bahriyenin mikdârı ma‘a zâbıtân sekiz yüz bu kadar nüfûsa bâliğ olup … asâkir-i bahriye ise tersâne-i âmireden ekseriyâ sûret-i tard ve teb‘îde çıkarılıp gönderilen zâbıtânın idâresinde olduğundan ahvâl-i nizâmiyeleri gayet yolsuz ve uygunsuz bir sûrette bulunmuş olduğu…”, BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, bahriye lef 3, 28 Z 1287 (21 March 1871). 990 “... işbu donanma-yı mezkûr için tertîb ve merkezi Cidde olmak üzere tasmîm olunduğu hâlde şimdi Bahr-i Muhît sevâhilinde ve Basra körfezinde dahi dolaşacak olduklarından Basra’nın da merkez olmasında ve Cidde de yapılacak havuz ve ona müteferri‘ ebniye-i sâirenin Basra’da inşâsında muhsinât derkâr olduğu (...) vâlî-i müşârun ileyhin inhâsı muvebince Basranın tersânesinde inşâsı muktezî şeylerin bir an evel vucûda getirilmesiyle süfün-i mezkûreye birinci merkez ittihâz olunması...”, BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, 2 Ca 1287 (31 July 1871).

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steamer was purchased for 33,000 lira , but in its first service it carried the pilgrims

and 35,000 lira was obtained.991

As mentioned, the carriage of pilgrims was an important source of revenue

for these steamers. The steamer for pilgrimage pursued the following route: Basra -

Bender-i Buşîr – Bender-i Abbas - Muscat – Aden – Hadîde and Jeddah. While

people were practicing their prayers during the pilgrimage season, the steamer

shuttled between Jeddah and Suez.992 With the end of the pilgrimage season, it took

the pilgrims back to Basra. It is also known that the operation of the steamships

diverted the pilgrims and trade from traditional caravan routes (which had once

ended at Damascus) to port cities.993 Only steamers with high engine capacities (such

as Babil, Ninova and Asur) served for long distances.

Apart from pilgrim voyages, the same steamers sailed to İstanbul and

London. The route toward İstanbul included places such as Jeddah, Suez, Jaffa,

Beirut, Mersin, İzmir and İstanbul. In return, the same steamer could bring the

pilgrims from İstanbul to Jeddah. The voyage to London differed only in Alexandria

(Egypt) and Marseille. The naval communication outside Baghdad was quite

significant in that it put an end to the introverted position of Ottoman Iraq.

Apart from economic contribution of these steamers, they also contributed to

the political existence of Ottomans in the Gulf region, because they operated under

the Ottoman flag.994 The British, French and Dutch (Felemenk) flags were already

waving from Persian Gulf to Suez Canal. The issue of political existence in the

waters of the region was important, because in the absence of Ottoman naval 991 Midhat Pasha, p. 109-110. 992 Zewra, No: 67. 993 Thompson, p. 459. 994 Midhat Pasha, p. 109.

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existence many of the Gulf sheikhdoms were using either their own flags or

European flags. The European flags and patronage enabled them to sail freely and

securely. There is no doubt that such practices weakened the political ties between

these sheikhdoms and the Ottoman Empire. The governors were also aware of the

fact that the lack of Ottoman political presence in the Persian Gulf was quite related

to the idle position of the Ottoman dockyard in Basra. Hence, the waving of the

Ottoman flag had very symbolic importance. Governors like Namık Pasha and

Midhat Pasha strived for increasing the Ottoman political presence.

Midhat Pasha’s naval expedition with two corvettes to Najd and Bahrain had

profound influence over the local sheikhs. Midhat Pasha reports that for two

centuries, no single ship under Ottoman flag visited Bahrain. Pasha’s visit to Bahrain

with two great corvettes pleased the local people. The amîr of Bahrain, Sheikh İsa

showed great esteem and respect to the Ottoman officials and gave some places

(needed for the maintenance affairs and coal storage) in the harbor without any

charge.995

The improvement of the Basra dockyard and harbor was very much related to

the increasing British existence in the region. Besides the conjunctural developments,

foreign intervention in the regional politics was very effective in Basra’s promotion

to the leading naval base of the region. In order to strengthen the Ottoman presence

in the region, the Sublime Porte ordered the local governors to built pools, coal

storages and other necessary buildings in Jeddah, Yemen and Suez for the repair and

maintenance of the ships. The Sublime Porte also ordered the construction of citadels

just opposite of Yerm Island, which was under then British control.996 The governors

995 See Ibid., p. 141. 996 “... ve İngiltere Devletinin zabtında bulunan Yerm Adası karşısındaki sevâhile kal‘alar yaptırılması...”, BOA, İ. MMAH, 1611, 2 Ca 1287 (31 July 1870).

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were also warned about the transfer and sale of the lands from the sheikhs to

foreigners, especially to Persians and the British.

Apart from Basra, Midhat Pasha’s governorship witnessed the re-activation of

the dockyard at Baghdad and the repairs and other needs of the river steamers were

met there. In a nutshell, by dint of the steamers and corvettes the close economy of

Baghdad was opened; and they enabled the public mobilization of Basra and

Baghdad to the Indian Ocean. These developments contributed certainly to the

opening of Iraq into the regional markets and its incorporation into the networks of

‘civilized’ world. Before the accomplishment of these works, Midhat Pasha likened

Baghdad to a box of jewel, which was locked and inaccessible. Thanks to the

steamer services and the Suez Canal, which combined the East and the West, the

province of Baghdad got rid of its former seclusion and became closer to the ‘centers

of civilization’.997 The improvements in the steamer services and the development of

dockyards certainly contributed to the conversion of Basra into a port city.

Irrigation and Canal projects

The clearance and maintenance of the canals was quite vital not only for agriculture

and trade but also for navigation. Starting from Necip Pasha, the governors tried to

benefit from the people of locality for this end. Accordingly, those who cleaned the

canals were exempted from taxes for two to five years.998 The pasha also repaired the

Hindiya barrage in Müseyyib for flood control of the Euphrates River, cleaned the

Abbasiye canal for irrigation and land reclamation, and carried out a number of

997 Zewra, No: 40. 998 BOA, A. MKT, 75/20, 18 R 1263 (5 April 1847) and Sinaplı, p. 122.

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irrigation projects in Hindiyah, Abu Guraib, Mahmudiyah, Rıdwaniyah, and

Iskenderiyah.999

Reşid Pasha’s contribution to the improvement of rivers, irrigation canal and

river navigation was outstanding. Towards the end of the 1853 he personally went to

Saklawiyya and ordered the strengthening of the river walls. In 1854 he opened new

canals, called Haruniyah (in Diyalah), Düceyl (in Samarra), Müşiriyyah and

Veziriyya.1000 Perhaps Reşid Pasha’s most important contribution was the opening of

Kenaniya canal between Falluca and the outskirts of Baghdad, Kazimiyye. This canal

combined the Tigris and Euphrates; and therefore, played very significant role in

facilitating the mobilization of people and goods. The canal was named after Kenan

Agha who had opened the canal. The pasha also ordered the planting of mulberry

trees in both banks of the canal for the purpose of producing silk.1001 As was

mentioned, the improvement of irrigation facilities during the governorship of Reşid

Pasha was also reflected in the opening of new areas to cultivation and therefore

considerable increase in the agricultural production.

The Saklawiyya (Kenaniya) Canal Project

Furthermore, another significant project that was undertaken for the enhancement of

river transport was the re-opening of the Saklawiyya or Kenaniye Canals. The

Euphrates River around Saklawiyya region overflowed very frequently and many

governors had dealt with the issue either by constructing river walls or repairing

999 Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies, p. 66. 1000 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 109. 1001 Ibid., p. 106.

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them.1002 The Saklawiyya Canal had been opened long before the governorship of

Midhat Pasha and the purpose for the opening this canal was to create a channel of

communication between the Euphrates and Tigris and thus making Baghdad

accessible to direct river transport from Anatolia. However, in the course of the time,

as the mouth of the canal enlarged of natural causes, most of the Euphrates water

went to Tigris and Baghdad, rather than flowing to the south. While this new

situation resulted in floods in Baghdad, it also brought drought to the lands of Hillah

and Hindiyye. Hence, Gözlüklü Reşid Pasha, in order to compensate the unexpected

results, filled the canal by spending considerable expenditure.1003

As Murphey pointed out, Saklawiyya’s close proximity to the Baghdad

market made this project an extremely attractive prospect. Therefore, Midhat Pasha

decided to revive the old Saklawiyya Canal and he estimated that the opening of the

canal would provide an additional 20,000 hectares of irrigated land for farming.1004

The re-opening of the canal was relatively easy since the builders could make use of

the dried-out riverbed and the old Kenaniye canal, which ran from Falluja to the

outskirts of Baghdad in Kazimiyya1005. When it was completed, Midhat Pasha

personally opened it and passed to the Euphrates through Saklawiyya canal. Though

the canal revived the Euphrates coastline and even increased the value of lands there,

1002 For some examples of these floods in Saklawiyya and the repairs see BOA, İ. DAH, 10571, 14896, 26974 and İ.MVL. 5637, 12578, 19346 and 19762. 1003 Midhat Pasha, p. 146. 1004 Murphey, p.25. 1005 Ibid., p. 25. The width of the Saklawiya canal was 10 m and it had 4 m depth. See Midhat Pasha, p. 146. Sırrı Pasha was deputed by Midhat Pasha for the re-opening of this canal. PRO, FO 195; 949, No.7, From Herbert to Constantinople, 26 May 1869; Also Midhat Pasha, p. 146.

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it is hard to say that the new canal could overcome all the shortcomings of the old

Saklawiyya canal.1006

The pasha also built a bridge at Saklawiya for which the local population paid

a fee. The Sublime Porte financed the construction expenses on the condition that the

fee received for crossing the bridge would turn to the imperial treasury. A sum of

30,000 to 40,000 kuruş was expected annually from these fees, which could

compensate the construction expenses in 3 to 4 years.1007 When it was accomplished

the bridge began to be used for the mobilization of armies as well.

Transportation and Railroads

Midhat Pasha gave special importance to public transportation in Baghdad. He

encouraged the use of horse carts as a means of transport.1008 The province of

Baghdad was very rich in terms of the holy shrines. The Shiite shrines particularly

had a special place in the social history of the city. Therefore, there were annually

40-50 thousand pilgrims who come to Baghdad from Iran, India and other countries

with Shiite populations, because according to Shiite belief the visit of the shrines in

Nacaf, Karbala and Kazımiya was obligatory (vâcib) for every Shiite individual, at

least once a life. This resulted in an enormous flow of people during the 10th of

Muharram and other religiously significant days. In this context, the tramlines were

of considerable significance for the spread of transportation. Just after 2,5 years the

1006 For the positive consequences of the canal see Zewra, No: 79; for the critique of the canal see Jwaideh, “Midhat Pasha”, p. 127. 1007 BOA, İ. ŞD, 987, 16 Z 1288 (26 February 1872). 1008 Zewra, No: 3.

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advent of tramlines in İstanbul, Midhat Pasha built a tramline between Baghdad and

Kazimiya, where the shrines of seventh and ninth imams of Twelver Shia lie1009.

Kazimiya was an important place for Shiite pilgrims and with the tramway

units, the two cities were united. Most of the inhabitants of Kazimiya were tradesmen

in Baghdad and therefore everyday they shuttled between the two cities. They had to

afford an 1.5 hour journey by mole. Realizing the need to improve the transport

facilities between the two cities Midhat Pasha started feasibility works and charged a

special official for counting the people going back and forth between Kazimiya and

Baghdad. Accordingly, there were 4,000 people doing so.

To remedy this, Midhat Pasha planned to construct a tramline between

Baghdad and Kazimiya. This project was the first joint-stock company in Baghdad.

The total expenditure, which was estimated to be 15,000 lira , was divided into 6,000

shares. Each share was sold at 250 kuruş and a provincial official was charged to

manage the sale of the shares.1010 Only 2,000 shares could be sold before the

beginning of the shuttle; however, as the people saw the service and its success in the

course of time, the sales continued and they were announced in Zewra.1011 The

remaining shares were paid by its revenue. As the project began to profit, the

shareholders were also distributed 3 % of its revenue.

The tramline could carry several thousands people a day. It is also reported

that during Muharram or other times of visits the trams carried more than their usual

number of passengers.1012 The tramway had two floors, the first floor being first class

1009 The picture of this tramway can be seen in Appendix. 1010 Zewra, No: 44. 1011 See Zewra, No: 47. 1012 Stevens, p. 128. The reports written by British General Consul at Baghdad indicates that there were more than 5,000 visitors coming into Baghdad for the Kurban Bayram and more were expected

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and 40 para, the second floor standard fare with 20 para. 50 passengers were

allowed at most. It was led by horses and at the beginning it was first planned to be 6

kilometers, but later, as the project proved its success, it was lengthened 1 more

kilometer. This tramway was in service for sixty years, until the establishment of

Municipal Bus Management in 1938.1013

The Shiites played, directly of indirectly, a very significant role in the

development of public works/buildings in Iraq. For instance, between Baghdad and

Karbala a wide road was constructed.1014 Either the governors improved the public

works on the way to holy shrines, because of the number of visiting Shiite pilgrims;

or the Shiites themselves invested in the pious works in the holy cities such as Najaf,

Karbala and Samarra. With the aforementioned Kazımiye tramline the Shiites

contributed indirectly to the enhancement of the transportation facilities. However,

the construction of irrigation canals and madrasas was examples of second kind.1015

There was considerable convergence between the routes of telegraph lines

and railways. Although railroads came to the Ottoman Iraq much later than

telegraphs, they played a very significant role in the province Baghdad. A few years

after the completion of the Üsküdar-Basra telegraph line, plans concerning a railroad

on the same route began to be discussed in the Sublime Porte.1016 Apart from this

for the 10th Muharrem ceremonies. See PRO, FO 195: 949, 31 March 1869, From Herbert to Constantinople. 1013 Davison, Reform, p.161. The reason for the abolition of this tramline was quite ironic: It did not have a license. 1014 Zewra, No: 96. 1015 For an example of this kind, see Mehmed Hurşid Paşa, pp. 136 and 138. “... Nehrü’l-Hüseyniyye ismiyle şöhret bulmuş bir hark olduğu hâlde, ikiyüz ellidört târîhinde, Ali Rıza Paşa’nın eyyâm-ı hükûmetinde hayrât olarak Acem’den bir çok akçe gelüb ânınla Kerbela’da sâkin Acâm Seyyid Ali el-Kâzım-ür-Rüşdî nâm kimesne ki ol vakit müştehidleri idi. Ânın ma‘rifetiyle Müseyyib karyesinin üst tarafından bede’ ile Kerbela-yı Muallâ kasabasının iki saat mesâfe ötesine kadar sekiz sâat imtidâdında mücedded bir hark har etdirüb el-ân bu harkın yemîn ve yesârında ziraât olunur.” 1016 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1444, 9 Ş 1284 (6 December 1867).

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tramline between Baghdad and Kazımiye, Midhat Pasha also planned the

construction of a railroad in Kenaniye to combine the two rivers, Tigris and

Euphrates.1017 Earlier the pasha planned to build the railroad between Tikrit and Râve

(approximately 160 km) to combine Euphrates and Tigris; however, when it was

realized that this project will cost an enormous sum, it was delayed.1018 Instead, the

pasha preferred to combine the two rivers by railroad between Baghdad and

Mukaddem. This railroad was also supposed to increase the number of pilgrims to

Karbala; hence, Midhat Pasha decided to extend it to this city.

Perhaps more important was the railroad project between Baghdad and

İskenderun. Midhat Pasha considered the routes between Meskene-Aleppo and

Aleppo-İskenderun as an outlet reaching to the international networks. Midhat Pasha

accomplished the steam service up to Meskene. As the roads from Meskene to

Aleppo and İskenderun were improved, the volume of export and import between

Baghdad and these places increased considerably.1019 The railroad project between

İskenderun and Baghdad was ratified by the Sublime Porte, but it is not clear whether

it was finished during Midhat Pasha’s governorship.1020

Education

The general contention concerning the history of education in Ottoman Iraq is that

with the exception of a few French missionary schools confined to the Christian

population, there were no modern schools before the governorship of Midhat

1017 Midhat Pasha himself visited the planned route of the railroad. See Zewra, No: 25. 1018 Zewra, No: 48. 1019 Zewra, No: 54, 58 and 67. 1020 For this railroad project see BOA, İ. MMAH, 1137, 14 Ş 1279 (4 February 1863).

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Pasha.1021 Until mid-nineteenth century, education was given in the elementary

(kuttâb or mullah) schools or in the more advanced madrasas attached to leading

mosques.1022 Education was basically religious in character. However, in the

madrasas both transmitted sciences (‘ulûm-ı nakliyyah) and rational sciences (‘ulûm-

ı aqliyyah) were taught. While the former consisted of theology, jurisprudence,

mysticism, Quranic exegesis, the prophetic traditions and knowledge of the accepted

readings of the Quran, the latter included grammar, syntax, logic, geometry and

astronomy.1023 Although the leading cities of Iraq had madrasas, they mostly

centered in Baghdad. The madrasas were supported by the religious endowments

(vakfs) and at least part of the students received daily allowance.1024

The basic problem in education within the province was that there were no

intermediary educational institutions between the kuttâb schools and the madrasas.

On the one hand, the kuttâb schools admitted children at the age of four or five for a

period of two to four years. The madrasas on the other hand were too advanced and

specialized for the graduates of kuttâb schools. The second half of the nineteenth

century witnessed the opening of modern schools in Iraq.

The kuttâb schools were parts of traditional education in Iraq. The ibtidâiyye

(primary) schools, most of which were opened during the governorship of Namık

Pasha, accepted children no less than 6 years old.1025 Therefore, it would not be

1021 Abdul Wahhab Abbas al-Qaysi, The Impact of Modernization on Iraqi Society During the Ottoman Era: A Study of Intellectual Development in Iraq, 1869-1917, PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, 1958, p. 45. 1022 For a list of places where traditional education were given in Baghdad see Abd al-Razzaq Al-Hilâlî, Tarih al-Ta‘lim fi’l-Iraq fi Ahd al-Uthmânî, 1638-1917, Baghdad: The National Printing and Publishing Company, 1959, pp. 55-56 and 60-61. 1023 Al-Qaysi, p. 15. 1024 Al-Qaysi has already pointed out that the support given to the students fluctuated in time and this affected the number of students coming to the madrasas. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 1025 For instance the ibtidâiyye school in Mosul was opened in 1861. See Al-Hilâlî, p. 153 and 177.

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wrong to say that the ibtidâiyye schools were modern versions of the traditional

kuttab schools. However, as in many other Tanzimat institutions, both schools

continued to exist side by side. After a 4-year study in the ibtidâiyya school, the

student could go to the rüşdiye schools, which were considered to be the first step for

the spread of modern culture in Iraq. Seventeen years after its first opening in

İstanbul in 1847, Ottoman Iraq had its own rüşdiye schools during the governorship

of Namık Pasha.1026 As in many other fields, Namık Pasha acted as the precursor of

modernization in education. Despite Namık Pasha’s quite significant initiative in this

matter, secondary sources usually credit Midhat Pasha for the introduction of rüşdiye

schools to Ottoman Iraq. This is mainly due to the fact that these authors had not

used Ottoman archives; thus, lack an in-depth analysis. Secondly, the fact that

Midhat Pasha’s term witnessed the extension of modern educational institutions was

used retrospectively.

It would however be not wrong to argue that with the governorship of Midhat

Pasha education in the province experienced a considerable jump. In 1869, rüşdiye

schools not only in Baghdad but also in other sub-provinces were being built.1027

Midhat Pasha gave special emphasis to modernization and the spread of education,

because he wholeheartedly believed that education was the solution for every

problem in the province. He considered education as the most important tool for

modernization and development. For this end, he built many schools for different

purposes. This was done by the efforts of benevolent societies which were initiated

by Midhat himself. He endeavored very much to persuade the local people in sending

1026 BOA, İ. MVL. 23072 and 23790, 8 S 1281 (13 July 1864) and 7 Z 1281 (3 May 1865) respectively. 1027 BOA, A.MKT.MHM, 431/69, 28 N 1285 (12 January 1869).

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their sons to the modern schools, because at the beginning there was reluctance by

the local people in that they thought their sons could be degenerated.1028 However, in

a very short period of time the Pasha had won the hearts of the people and the

schools could not meet the demands of the enrollment.

By 1871 there were at least four rüşdiye schools all over the province, one in

Baghdad, one in Sulaimaniyah, one in Mosul and one in Kirkuk.1029 The rüşdiye

school in Mosul should have been opened in 1280/1864. By 1865 it was headed by a

mu‘allim-i sânî and mu‘âvins (assistant teachers), because the mu‘allim-i evvel

(senior teacher) could only be appointed in the second year after establishment.1030 It

is also understood that there were quite many pupils in the school. On the other hand,

thanks to the generous donations of the local people, the rüşdiye of Kirkuk was

opened in May-June 1870. In its first year, 80 students out of 300, who applied to the

school, were enrolled.1031

When opening a new school, special conditions brought by the climate and

geography were also taken into account. The place of the school was carefully

selected so as to find a proper place with good water and weather. Usually the banks

of the Tigris were considered to be a proper place for schools. Likewise, as the result

of climate and local tradition, a serdâb was designed in the basement for avoidance

from unbearable hot weather.1032 Later, with the promulgation of the Maârif-i

1028 Al-Hilâlî, p. 152. 1029 BOA, İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Z 1287 (12 March 1871). 1030 BOA, İ. MVL. 23072 and 23790, 8 S 1281 (13 July 1864) and 7 Z 1281 (3 May 1865) respectively. 1031 The rüşdiye of Kirkuk had a locally elected muallim-i sani (Maruf Efendi) and a bevvâb (caretaker). It has a budget of 1,000 kuruş for its expenditures. See BOA, İ. DAH, 42695, 5 Ra 1287 (5 June 1870); also Zewra, No: 61. 1032 BOA, İ. MVL. 3941, 25 Ra 1265, (18 February 1849).

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Umûmiye Nizâmnâmesi in 1869, the Sublime Porte had more saying over the schools

and the school buildings began to be constructed in accordance with the plans sent

from İstanbul.

The rüşdiye schools admitted only the graduates of ibtidâiyye schools and

during its 3-year study, the students were taught the following courses: Mathematics,

Engineering, Accounting (Hisâb), Geography, History, Basic Health Information,

İlm-i hâl, language, and Calligraphy. It was quite probable that the quality of

education and the diversity of courses changed from region to region. At the

beginning the teachers of the schools, who were recruited mainly among the Turks,

were not sufficient in number, but later Iraqi teachers overwhelmed their Turkish

colleagues.1033 The rüşdiye schools were given quite importance by the local

government. As a reflection of this, the provincial officials closely supervised the

examinations of the students.1034 By 1876 the number of rüşdiye schools in Iraq

reached nine.1035 In time, among the graduates of these rüşdiye schools, there

appeared significant figures. For example, Baban-zâde Ahmed Naim was a graduate

of the Baghdad rüşdiye school, and after his graduation he served in significant

positions in İstanbul.

The Law of Education (Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnâmesi), which was

promulgated in 1869, envisioned the establishment of education councils in the

provincial capitals. It is quite meaningful that by 1872 only two provinces had

1033 Arab sources critize the teaching methodology of these schools in that even the Arabic course was thought by Turkish instructors. See Al-Hilâlî, p. 155. 1034 Zewra, No: 64. 1035 During the Hamidian era 13 rüşdiyes were further opened (7 in Baghdad, 3 in Mosul, and 3 in Basra). See Bayram Kodaman, Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi, (3rd ed.) Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 95 and 103.

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education councils, namely Tuna and Baghdad, where Midhat Pasha had provided

the necessary infrastructure.1036

The development of a modern education system in Baghdad was also

associated with the reorganization of the armed forces. Baghdad was one of the

earliest places in which military rüşdiye and idadiye schools were opened. Needless

to say, Baghdad’s role as the center of the Sixth Army was influential in this, because

the provinces with military centers had priority in this regard. In 1265 (1849) an

attempt was made for the establishment of a mekteb-i idâdî for the Sixth Army.1037

However, the central administration was more interested in the financial aspect

(construction expenditures) of the school, which cost 100.000 kuruş. As the Sublime

Porte advised the governor of Baghdad to find new sources of revenue for the

expenditure, it is understood, the project was put on the shelf.

Again it was during Midhat Pasha’s term of office that a military junior high

school (rüşdiye) was established in Baghdad in 1870. Students who were accepted by

the military rüşdiye were graduates of kuttâb schools. It provided students with a

four-year course of study consisting of Turkish, Arabic, Persian, French, Islamic

history, Ottoman geography, composition, religion, arithmetic, introduction to

engineering, basic health information, gymnastics and calligraphy.1038 The instructors

were Ottoman officers of the Sixth Army of Iraq who taught their subjects in

Turkish. Parts of the students in this school were financially supported by the

government. Later a second military rüşdiye was opened in Sulaimaniyah, which

1036 Ibid., p. 44. 1037 However, we should note that here the term “idâdî” refers to prep class rather than to a senior high school, because even İstanbul had no idâdî school by this time. For the use of the term see Ibid., p. 114. 1038 Al-Hilâlî, p. 162 and Al-Qaysi, p. 46.

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admitted students of the locality.1039 The aim of these military rüşdiyes was to

prepare the students for the military senior high school (askerî idâdi), which was

instituted for the Sixth Army of Baghdad in 1871.

Commander (Binbaşı) Mehmed Vasfi Efendi was the director of the military

senior high school (askerî idadî), which admitted graduates of the junior high

school.1040 As noted by Al-Qaysi,

This [school] was a boarding school with all expenses paid by the government and offering a three-year course consisting of the following subjects in addition to military strategy: Turkish language and literature, French, history, geography, Algebra, trigonometry, geometry, physics, drawing, calligraphy, and religion. Except for the subject of religion, which was taught by an imam, instruction was given in Turkish by army officers. The young men who finished their studies obtained a certificate and were admitted to the Military College in İstanbul.1041

In terms of the number of students graduating from the military senior school,

Ottoman Iraq had the first ranking among the Arab provinces of the empire.1042

Earlier officers of the Sixth Army were recruited from the graduates of the military

academy in İstanbul.1043 However, Midhat Pasha’s purpose in establishing these

schools and enrolling Iraqi pupils was to prepare the local officers for taking over

leadership from the non-Iraqi elements in the army and generally to expand Ottoman

armed forces in the country.1044

The industrial schools have a special role in the history of education in Iraq.

Though Midhat Pasha had a distinct place in the opening and spread of these schools,

1039 Al-Hilâlî, p. 162. 1040 BOA, I. DAH. 44618, 6 N 1288 (19 November 1871).

1041 Al-Qaysi, p. 46. 1042 Al-Hilâlî, p. 165. 1043 For example, in July 1869, 6 graduates of military academy in İstanbul were appointed to the Sixth Army. See Zewra, No: 7. 1044 Al-Qaysi, p. 45.

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Namık Pasha’s inauguration of a school of ship-making can be regarded as the first

attempt in the province of Baghdad. As the Basra dockyard expanded considerably

during the governorship of Namık Pasha, he wanted to open a school for ship-

building. The students were to be educated on one of the warships. This provided the

students with two advantages: First, they could get rid of from the bad weather of

Basra, which would normally impede their schooling. Second, by schooling on the

ship, they could practice what they learned theoretically.1045

Midhat Pasha, who was the founder of the first industrial school in İstanbul,

had also established several industrial schools in Ottoman Iraq. In Baghdad, he

modernized one of the old madrasas of Baghdad, namely madrasatü’l-aliyye, which

was founded by Davud Pasha, the last Mamluk governor. The school, which offered

a four-year course, had 160 students in 1870.1046 Those who donated for this

industrial school were announced in the provincial newspaper.1047 It is known that

Ahmed Midhat wrote his Hâce-i Evvel for the students of this school.1048 In the

curriculum of the school there were courses on ironmongery, printing, carpentry,

tailoring, and shoemaking. For the practical training of the students, masters for these

vocations were appointed. The necessary equipment for these courses was imported

from abroad. The graduates of this school were recruited in the Baghdad dockyard,

print house and so on.1049

1045 BOA, İ. DAH. 36943, 9 Ş 1281 (7 January 1865). For the transcription of the document see Sinaplı, p. 213. 1046 Zewra, No: 55. 1047 Zewra, No: 8 and 9. Among the donators there were even non-Muslims (Jews). 1048 Ahmed Midhat, p. 149. Ahmed Midhat wrote some of his books in Baghdad such as Kıssadan Hisse and Letâif-i Rivâyât, but they were published in İstanbul. 1049 Zewra, No: 4.

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At the very beginning the industrial schools (mekteb-i sanâyi‘) acted as

reformatory schools (ıslâhhâne), because the very purpose of these schools was to

teach orphan and homeless children a profession so that they can earn their own

lives. The basic driving force behind these schools was the fact that one third of the

children in Iraq were either orphan or homeless.1050 Hence, Midhat Pasha put great

emphasis on these schools. In accordance with this social background of the school,

it was predominated by orphans and the poorer strata of the local population, but

later as it gained renown, other families began to send their children for training as

well.1051

It is also known that Midhat Pasha’s governorship witnessed the opening of a

second industrial school in Kirkuk in 1871.1052 The school was opened with the

donations of the local people. A building with 16 rooms, a bath and considerable

garden was purchased for this end. The graduates of this school could also go to the

rüşdiye schools. Among the Iraqi sub-provinces, Basra was surely the most backward

place, which had no primary (ibtidâiyye) schools until 1883, let alone rüşdiye and

idâdi schools.

The “Alliance Israelite Universelle” schools formed a very important aspect

of education in Baghdad. Founded in late 1860s by the Jewish community of

Baghdad, the school excelled in its instruction and training. The representatives of

foreign missions in the province expressed in the highest terms their satisfaction with

the excellent manner in which the school was managed and the instruction was

imparted. Here, the students were taught courses on French, English, Turkish,

1050 Zewra, No: 87. 1051 Al-Qaysi, p. 47. 1052 Zewra, No: 87 and Al-Hilâlî, p. 165.

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history, geography, arithmetic, physics etc. It was the Jewish community who

financed the school.1053 For instance, Abdullah David Sassoon, one of the leading

figures of Baghdad Jewry, and Co. of Bombay, donated in 1872 a sum of 2,000

pounds at the disposal of the school.1054

It is also known that a Christian school was opened in Baghdad in 1287.

Zewra published the names of the provincial gentry who donated for this school.1055

It is quite interesting that the Muslim provincial officials/notables contributed to this

Christian school too. Needless to say, the governor-general (Midhat Pasha) and other

high-ranking bureaucrats took the lead. The encouragement of education regardless

of religious differences, in fact, shows the fervent enthusiasm of provincial rulers for

the improvement of education in the province.

A final mention should be on the Shiite attempts to build madrasas in the

province of Baghdad. Several times during the Tanzimat Era, Shiite notables,

whether of Iranian and Indian origin, applied to Ottoman officials in Baghdad and

İstanbul for permission to build madrasas. These attempts concentrated mainly in the

Holy Cities of Najaf and Karbala. While some of these attempts were allowed, those

in the second half of the century were not permitted. The main reasons for the denial

of these projects were as follows: First, the Iranians had already acquired

considerable lands in the province which alarmed the local government.1056

Secondly, taking the Shiite rebellions of 1840s into account, the Shiites were

perceived as a potential Fifth Column. And lastly, the construction of such buildings

1053 The Times, 25 May 1872. 1054 Ibid. 1055 Zewra, No: 56. 1056 BOA, İ. HRC. 3847, 12 L 1267 (10 August 1851). This document includes the plans of the proposed madrasa as well. Also see İ. MMAH. 859, 10 S 1277 (28 August 1860).

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was used for other purposes, especially tax exemption and claims for being Ottoman

subject (tebe‘a). Though the Hamidian Era (1876-1909) witnessed a more centralized

and systematic efforts for the prevention of Shiism in Iraq, the seeds of this policy

can clearly be found in the period under survey in this dissertation.1057

However, perhaps the most significant reason for the rejection of Shii

madrasas was that the Tanzimat reforms in the field of education aim to modernize

the educational institutions and increase the quality of education. Therefore, rather

than reviving the old traditional institutions (madrasas), it aimed to institute modern

schools. These modern schools followed a Suuni curriculum, aiming the hanefization

of the population.1058 This policy of ‘hanefization’ was certainly a matter of

resentment among the Shii population of the country, but it was part of the

centralization / Ottomanization policy of the government.

There is no doubt that by the end of the Tanzimat era, in the words of

Timothy Mitchell, a ‘discipline of schooling’ was created in the province of

Baghdad.1059 The discipline was not only in the curriculum of the schools, but also a

certain hierarchy was introduced among the schools within the province. Midhat

Pasha’s role in the improvement and spread of education in the province is

undeniable. His administration created a social awareness throughout the country of

the role of the new modern schools in improving the cultural and economic life of the

people.1060 Although education was not paid sufficient attention after Midhat Pasha’s

1057 For the imperial policy on the prevention of Shiism in Iraq see BOA, İ. MVL. 21587, 22 Ca 1279 (15 November 1862) and Sinaplı, p. 196; for the continuation of this policy in the Hamidian Era see Selim Deringil, ‘The Struggle Against Shiism in the Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter Propaganda’, Die Welt des Islams, 30, 1990, pp: 45-62. 1058 Deringil, Well-Protected Domains, p. 48. 1059 Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, Oxford: University of California Press, 1991, p. xi. 1060 Al-Qaysi, p. 52.

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governorship, the support of the Sublime Porte continued with fluctuating

enthusiasm.

Printing houses and Provincial Newspapers

Davud Pasha, the last Mamluk governor of Baghdad, is credited to have established

the first lithographic press in Baghdad and printed a newspaper Jurnâl al-Iraq. The

purpose of the newspaper was to circulate his announcements and regulations.

However, the date for this first printing house is not very clear. While some Arab

historians suggested 1816 for this event, Micheal W. Albin has falsified this date.

Since Davud Pasha was in a struggle of power with Said Pasha, he did not enter

Baghdad until February 1817. Therefore, both the date of 1816 and the publication of

Jurnâl al-Iraq were clearly incorrect.1061 According to Albin, Rasul Havi’s

Dawhatü’l-Vüzerâ was the first printed book of Iraq in 1830-31.1062

Although Davud Pasha introduced the first lithographic press around 1830, it

disappeared in the cataclysmic events which struck Baghdad in 1831-1832.

However, the efforts for printing were continued both by European missionaries and

Muslims in the province. The city of Karbala had the first Muslim printing press in

Iraq in 1856. It was a lithographic press founded by a Persian, Mirza Abbas.1063 The

same Persian is said to have opened a second printing house in Baghdad in 1861.

These printers were used to print prayer booklets and several literary works.

Maqamat of Mahmud Ibn Abdullah al Alusî, (Abu al-Thana) was among the works

of importance published in 1273 / 1856-57by the private press of Mirza Abbas.1064

1061 Micheal W. Albin, “Iraq’s First Printed Book”, International Library Review (Libri, Copenhague), Vol. 31, No: 2, 1981, p. 168. 1062 Ibid., p.173. 1063 Ibid., p.172. 1064 Ibid., p.172.

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The Dominicans contributed to the printing efforts in the province of

Baghdad in late 1850s. Again, producing textbooks for the missionary schools was

the main driving force for the efforts of Dominicans. It was Father Besson of the

Dominican Fathers, who introduced lithography in Mosul in 1856. With the financial

aid of another missionary society, l’oeuvre d’Orient, Msgr. Amantion, the Apostolic

Delegate to Mesopotamia, could purchase a modern printing press in Mosul in

1860.1065 Thanks to this missionary society, Mosul had its modern print ten years

earlier than Baghdad. With the introduction of modern (typographic) printing press,

the lithographic printers lost their importance, because they could not compete

commercially.

On the other hand, the first Hebrew (lithographic) printing house in Baghdad

was established in 1863 by Barukh Moseh Mizrahi. The first product of this Hebrew

press was the periodical Ha-Dover / Dover Mesharim, which was published in 1862-

63.1066 It was a bi-weekly periodical, but Midhat Pasha encouraged the Jews of

Baghdad to publish the newspaper more frequently, because he believed that the

publication and number of newspapers was an important sign of civilization.1067 For

a short period, the publication of Ha-Dover was ceased on the ground that the

periodical lacked the imperial license from the Sublime Porte, but later it resumed its

publication.1068 Thanks to the efforts of Rahamin Ruben Mordecai and his partners

Moshe and Aaron Ben Yesh‘ah Fetaya, the Jews of Baghdad brought the first

1065 Al-Qaysi, p. 108. 1066 In Arabic script the Jewish newspaper is written ( �ر�� (Hâkî’s-Sıdk), which means ( دو���“Narrator of Truth”. See Zewra No: 22 and 33. 1067 Zewra, No: 12. 1068 Zewra, No: 34.

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Hebrew typographic press in 1865-66.1069 Aside from the Jewish newspaper, Midhat

Pasha also encouraged the Armenian inhabitants of Baghdad to publish a newspaper

because they had already a good printing house.1070

After the destruction of Davud Pasha’s printing house, the first Ottoman

printing house was founded by Midhat Pasha. Before his arrival to Baghdad, Ahmed

Midhat was assigned by Midhat Pasha to purchase the necessary equipments for the

printing house in İstanbul. And in his early days in Baghdad Ahmed Midhat strove

for the establishment and organization of the printing house. Here, the first semi-

official provincial newspaper of Baghdad, Zewra, was published.1071 The claims that

argued Jurnâl al-Iraq as the first Iraqi periodical, has been discredited and Zewra has

been considered to be “the first progeny of Iraqi journalism”.1072

Zewra was very important for the enlightenment of the local population. At

the beginning it was published weekly, but after June 1286 it came to be a bi-weekly

newspaper. It was a four-page publication, two pages in Ottoman Turkish and two

pages in Arabic.1073 People could subscribe to the newspaper and it was posted even

to remote sancaks.1074 As was mentioned earlier, Zewra was edited by Ahmed

Midhat.1075 It would not, therefore, be wrong to say that both the print house and the

1069 Albin, p. 168. 1070 Zewra, No: 33. 1071 Zewra is one of the names of Baghdad. 1072 Albin, p. 168. 1073 Between 1908 and 1912 the Young Turk regime dropped the Arabic language edition and Zewra became a Turkish paper. However, due to the protests Arabic edition was resumed in 1913. See Al-Qaysi, p. 115. 1074 Zewra, No: 47. 1075 Although the articles in Zewra did not bear any name at all, the pattern of narration makes it clear that it was written by Ahmed Midhat. The news, especially those concerning international affairs, must have required the examination of many Ottoman and foreign newspapers which can hardly be done by someone except Ahmed Midhat. Besides, Ahmed Midhat had earlier worked for the Tuna

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Zewra newspaper were the product of Ahmed Midhat endeavors.1076 At the

beginning the print house worked in poor conditions. Its physical environment was

far from ideal, the lithography being in the cellar, serdâb. By October 1870 it moved

to a more suitable place, which had nearly ten rooms. The print house not only

changed its place but also renewed its machinery.1077 As a result of this renewal, the

publication capacity of the print house increased and besides the Zewra newspaper

and governmental papers, it began to print pamphlets and books for commercial

purposes. A detailed price tariff for private publications was announced in the Zewra

newspaper.1078

Tanzimat envisioned each province to have a printing press and an official

bulletin. Among the Iraqi provinces, Mosul was the second after Baghdad to have its

own provincial newspaper. In 1299/1882, long after Zewra’s publication, the weekly

Musul was published by provincial print house in Mosul.1079 Similarly, the first issue

of al-Basra was published in 1889.

newspaper, the first provincial newspaper published by Midhat Pasha during his governorship in that province and did the same work. He later mentioned that the edition of each Tuna newspaper took less than three hours. See Ahmed Midhat, pp. 128 and 138. 1076 Ahmed Midhat also mentions that he recruited Can Muattar, a local in the printing house for translation and editing. Can Muattar was not only an intellectual but also a multi-lingual person, speaking Arabic, Persian, Hebrew, English and Indian. See Ibid., pp. 142-145. 1077 Zewra, No: 84. 1078 Zewra, No: 84. 1079 “Musul vilâyetin haftalık cerîde-i resmiyesidir. Çıkaran Musul vilâyeti, Musul Vilâyet Matbaası”. Hasan Duman, İstanbul Kütüphaneleri Arap Harfli Süreli Yayınlar Toplu Kataloğu, 1828-1928, İstanbul : IRCICA, 1986, p. 192.

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Apart from provincial newspaper, the printing house published official

documents of which the provincial yearbooks (Vilâyet Sâlnâmesi) were of great

importance. The first provincial yearbooks published in Baghdad appeared in

1292/1875.1080

It is also known that the printing house published books for educational and

commercial purposes. In 1287, Ahmed Midhat’s 221-page “Hâce-i Evvel”, which

included sections on history, geography, mathematics, natural sciences and theology,

was published.1081 It also had a small chapter on agriculture, artisanship and

commerce. As mentioned earlier, this book is considered to be a textbook for the

students of the industrial school in Baghdad, but it was sold to ordinary people as

well. Apart from textbooks for the new modern schools, books on history of religions

and law were published as well. It is quite interesting that a selection of stories from

Fenelon’s Telemaque had also been published and offered for sale.1082 Military books

and regulations were printed by a special intaglio process also imported by Midhat

Pasha.1083

Since the Zewra is an inevitable source for the study of period under survey

in this work, it needs further emphasis. In parallel with the Tanzimat period

newspapers, the main objective of Zewra was to inform and illuminate the people

about local, national as well as international news. As declared in the 47th issue, the

primary purpose of the newspaper was the announcement of provincial affairs and

guidance for the local people on the way to civilization. The editor of the Zewra,

Ahmed Midhat, considered the newspaper as a teacher who explains difficult matters 1080 See Bağdad Vilâyeti Sâlnâmsi, 1292 (1875), defa 1. 1081 Zewra, No: 54. 1082 Zewra, No: 62. 1083 Al-Qaysi, p. 110.

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in an understandable manner1084. He further believed in the need of simplifying the

process of education1085. Therefore the language and the style he used in Zewra were

very simple and embracing. It is crystal clear that this newspaper had a civilizing

role. It played quite significant role in educating the people of Baghdad. Midhat

Pasha, like Ahmed Midhat, considered the role of newspapers as “true trainer”1086.

This is quite visible in the agricultural issues, in which Zewra taught the people how

to cultivate efficiently.

Another objective of Zewra was to form public opinion on certain issues.

Especially on issues such as agricultural productivity and military conscription the

newspapers tried to win the hearts of local population. For this end, the newspaper

occasionally used the “question and answer” method. For example, for the project of

extending the railway to Karbala, the editor first asked questions as if they were

articulated by an opponent person and then gave persuading answers to these

questions.1087 In doing so, the newspaper aimed to persuade the local people and win

their support for certain issues.

Furthermore, imperial decrees, laws, texts of treaties, regulations, official

announcements and provincial auctions were published in Zewra1088. It is for this

reason that it was considered to be a semi-official newspaper. However, this did not

prevent the newspaper to include literary, cultural and social articles along with

1084 When Ahmed Midhat saw the first newspapers like Takvîm-i Vekâyi‘, Rûznâmçe-i Cerîde-i Havâdis, Tercümân-ı Ahvâl and Tasvîr-i Efkâr, he could not grasp the nature and the purpose of a newspaper. However, later he perceived the functions of newspapers as a teaching activity and wanted to take part in this activity. Ahmed Midhat, p. 156. 1085 Ibid., p. 160. 1086 “…Evrâk-ı Havâdis … insanın âdetâ mürebbi-i hakîkîsidir… Gazateleri âdetâ insanın hâdi-i suveri ve ma‘nevîsidir. … Gazeteler dahi … umama nâsıh olmak için…”. See Zewra, 23. 1087 See Zewra, No: 50. 1088 Zewra, No: 14.

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occasional readers’ letters.1089 The people of Baghdad were required to follow laws

and official announcements. Hence, the local people were indirectly forced to follow

the news either in Turkish or Arabic. And finally it was one of the aims of the

governor to encourage the participation of the local population in the municipal

affairs. In this sense Zewra became a means of communication between the ruler and

the ruled.

There is no doubt that Zewra was a means for the modernization of the

Ottoman Baghdad from above. It was published both in Arabic and Ottoman

Turkish. One of the main characteristics of this newspaper was to include news

regarding not only the internal affairs of the empire but also foreign affairs. With

these features, Zewra was ranked one of the best provincial newspapers throughout

the empire.1090 Despite the obvious benefits of the Zewra for the people of Baghdad,

for some people, Zewra was like a personal diary of Midhat Pasha.

1089 For instance, in its 55th issue the newpaper narrates a love story from France. 1090 This ranking was done by the Asır Gazetesi in İstanbul and it was quoted in Zewra. See Zewra, No: 92.

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Conclusion

Baghdad, as the provincial center of Ottoman Iraq, had a very important place in the

Ottoman imperial mind. Its significance stemmed not only from its being an old

capital, but also from its frontier characteristic. When the abundance of ethnic and

religious elements is considered, it can be said that Ottoman Iraq preserved its

feature as the “microcosm of the Middle East”.

Being in the periphery of the empire, the province of Baghdad was constantly

on guard against the Persian threat. The Persian threat and the tribal structure of the

country required political unity in the provincial administration and this meant the

subordination of other Iraqi provinces (Mosul, Shahrizor and Basra) to Baghdad.

Baghdad had always been the provincial center of Ottoman Iraq, even when the Iraqi

provinces were separate/independent provinces. However, it further strengthened its

position with the amalgamation of the hıtta-ı Irakiyye as one province. The concern

for provincial security can explain the need for strong governors, namely müşîr-vâlîs.

It was quite important that almost all governors in Baghdad acted as the head of the

administrative and military units. This enabled them to cope with the tribal uprisings

effectively and implement policies concerning provincial security. Reinforcement of

the Sixth Army and conscription by ballot (kur‘a-i şer‘iyye) were among the regular

tasks of provincial governors.

Eleven governors (one of them twice) served in the province of Baghdad

between 1831 and 1872. Several of these governors came to the forefront. These

governors were not only given further authority by the Sublime Porte, but they were

also powerful in their characters, decision making processes and enthusiasms. It was

again during the governorships of these Tanzimat pashas that the province of

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Baghdad witnessed real improvement. So far the literature on the subject has

overemphasized Midhat Pasha, shadowing other skillful governors. As underlined

earlier, Midhat Pasha’s successes can be better understood when the contributions of

Reşid Pasha and Namık Pasha are taken into account.

These ‘Men of Tanzimat’ had common denominators: all of them had a

European experience. They spent considerable time in Europe, either for their

education or to widen their horizons. Reşid Pasha, for example, completed his

education in France and remained there for an extended period. Azzawi claimed that

he was regarded as a genius in administrative sciences in the world.1091 On the other

hand, Namık Pasha served many years in Europe in diplomatic missions; besides

Arabic, he knew French and English. Similarly, Midhat Pasha had a clear European

vision. His distinctive personality, strong will and reform mindedness carried the

reforms to their apex. There was a clear continuity in the deeds of these governors

and this was quite significant for the accomplishment of provincial reforms.

The centralist policies of the 1830s required the re-integration of the Iraqi

provinces into the Ottoman center. The concomitant growth of Ottoman military

forces made it difficult for decentralist forces to defend their domains. The Ottoman

military and administrative centralization brought to an end the ‘four pillars of old

order in Iraq’, namely the Mamluks in Baghdad, the Jalilis in Mosul, the Kurdish

amîrs in northern Iraq and the tribal aristocracy.

It was only with the second vawe of Tanzimat that Ottoman Iraq was

incorporated into the range of Tanzimat reforms in 1844. The reforms aimed at

tightening the tie between the province and the center, deconstructing the tribal

structure and improving the agricultural and commercial potential of the province.

1091 Azzawi, Târîkh al-Iraq, p. 112.

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The period studied in this dissertation witnessed the establishment of Sixth Army and

notable improvement of the provincial security. The governor-generals, who acted

both as head of the administrative and militr affairs, played significant role in this

regard. As the authorities of the provincial rulers increased in the 1850s, governors

like Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha and Midhat Pasha came to the forefront with their

service in Baghdad.

The first sings of the new period were seen in the provincial administration.

The administrative councils were reformed in accordance with the new regulations

issued in the late 1840 and early 1850s. The administrative councils reached their

maturity with the introduction of Provincial Law of 1864 (and amendments in 1867

and 1871). The establishment of these councils from provincial center down to the

kazâ level not only enabled the local people to participate in the political mechanism

of the province, but also extension of Ottoman central authority at the expense of

tribal dominions. In this context, leading tribal sheikhs were employed in the

province administrative council. By the early 1870s, not only the sub-provinces but

also most of the kazâs had administrative councils. Moreover, the establishment of a

municipality in Baghdad was also the result of this provincial law. That Baghdad was

one of the first provinces, which had municipal organization, was an important sign

for the success of provincial reforms.

The four decades between 1831 and 1872 witnessed a considerable extension

of provincial administrative units in the province of Baghdad. Many tribal areas were

converted into kaymakamlıks or mutasarrıflıks; therefore, the tribally dominated

areas contracted in the course of time. In many places tribal sheikhs were given

administrative positions so as to co-opt them into the political structure. Perhaps the

case of Muntafiq was the most striking example in this context. The paramount

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sheikh of Muntafiq tribal confederation became not only the mutasarrıf of Nasıriya,

but also a prominent ally of Midhat Pasha.

Among the Tanzimat reforms, the Provincial (Vilâyet) Law of 1864 and the

Land Code of 1858 came to the forefront. While the former aimed at extending the

provincial administrative mechanisms towards the tribal areas, the latter targeted the

tribal sheikhdoms and the improvement of land tenure. The implementation of the

Land Code of 1858 in Ottoman Iraq was quite important, because it contradicted

with the very nature of tribal customs of the country. However, the governors first

made necessary changes in the legal status of the land, and then started to sell the

usufructory right of vacant lands with title deed. The implementation of the Land

Code had slight changes in Baghdad, and the ukr application was especially

important. While the code aimed at creating a class of small landowners through

individual registration of the land, things turned out differently in practice. Fear from

military conscription and taxation resulted in the registration of the land in the name

of tribal sheikhs and consequently, contrary to the initial intent of the code, the tribal

sheikhs emerged as big landowners.

It is clear that the problems of tribalism were nowhere as pervasive as in

Ottoman Baghdad. Despite the side effects of the Land Code, the policies followed in

Iraq during the Tanzimat era resulted in the co-optation of sheikhly powers that

dominated the country for centuries. During the period studied in this dissertation,

the tribal structures in Iraq fragmented significantly where some of the tribal

aristocracies were broken, while others were incorporated into the provincial political

mechanism. This study has shown that when compared to the Mamluk period, the

politics of tribe followed in this period was much wiser and cooperative.

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It is clear that the process of Ottoman centralization in Baghdad meant the

modernization of the province as well. In fact, the two went hand in hand. The

approach toward urbanization/modernization of public places underwent significant

changes during the Tanzimat era. The course of modernization in Baghdad bore the

imprints of Ottoman patterns of modernization in general and the results were most

visible in the public works in the province of Baghdad. Besides the infrastructural

developments, improvements in the communication and transport facilities (steam

navigation, railroad projects and telegraph network) enabled the province to connect

to the international network. Furthermore, the introduction of modern schools, the

print house and the publication of provincial newspaper (Zewra), textbooks and other

books/booklets contributed substantially to the intellectual life in the province.

Finally, significant improvements and modernization that had had been

experienced almost in every sphere of life in the last four decades made the Baghdad

of the 1870s much different from the city of the 1820s. It is clear that by the early

1870s, Ottoman Baghdad reached a significant stage of provincial reform and

modernization. There is well known that many of these public works survived the

British Mandate and after. In this context, this dissertation claims that the origins of

modern Iraq has to be looked in the nineteenth century Ottoman rule in the province,

not elsewhere.

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Appendices

No 1: Governors of Baghdad between 1831 and 1872 Governors Previous

office(s) Term of office in Baghdad

Next Office(s) Origin ♣♣♣♣

(Laz) Ali Rıza Pasha

Governor of Aleppo and Diyarbakır

1831-1842

Governor of Damascus

Mülkiye

Mehmet Necip Pasha

Governor of Damascus

April/May1842-1848

Died two years after his dismissal

Mülkiye

Abdülkerim Nadir (Abdi) Pasha

Müşir of 6th Army

1848-1850 Askerî

Vecihi Pasha Governor of Bosna, Konya Diyarbakır, Aleppo, Belgrad, Mosul, and Ankara

1850-51 Governor of Ankara

Mülkiye

Mehmet Namık Pasha

Müşir of 6th Army

1851-51 Tophane müşiri

Askerî

Mehmet Reşid (Gözlüklü) Pasha

Vizier, Anadolu müşiri, Tophane-i âmire müşiri

1851-57 Died Askerî

Ömer Lütfi Pasha

Chief commander in Crimean War, member of mecâlis-i aliyye

1857-58 Rumeli müşiri Askerî

Mustafa Nuri Pasha

Governor of Salonica, member of mecâlis-i aliyye

1858-60 Âyân in 1877 Askerî

Ahmed Tevfik Pasha

Müşir of 6th Army

1860-61 Governor of Ankara, Konya, Syria, and Diyarbakır

Askerî

Mehmet Namık Pasha

1861-67 Askerî

Takiyüddin Pasha

mutasarrıf of Shahrizor, Bağdad vali kaymakamı

1867-69 Governor of Adana, Konya, Edirne, Sivas

İlmiye

Midhat Pasha Chair of Şûrâ-yı Devlet

1869-72 Grand Vizier Mülkiye

Sources: Sâlnâme-i Vilâyet-i Bağdad, 1292/1875; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999 and Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkânı ve Ricali, İstanbul: ISIS Yayınları, 1999.1092

1092 Where the data in these sources contradict I preferred to rely on the provincial yearbook.

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No 2: Governors of Baghdad and Müşîrs of the Sixth Army

Governors Müşirs of the Sixth Army Ali Rıza Pasha 1831 M. Necip Pasha Mart 1842 A. Nadir Pasha Şubat 1848 A. Nadir Pasha Haziran 1849 M. Namık Pasha Haziran 1849 M. Vecihi Pasha Aralık 1850 M. Namık Pasha M. Namık Pasha Kasım 1851 M. Namık Pasha

M. Reşid Pasha Eylül 1852 M. Reşid Pasha Ağustos 1852

Ömer Lütfü Pasha Ağustos 1857 Ömer Lütfü Pasha Ağustos 1857 Mustafa Nuri Pasha Ağustos 1859 Mustafa Nuri Pasha Ağustos 1859 Ahmed Tevfik Pasha Ocak 1861 Ahmed Tevfik Pasha Ocak 1861

M. Namık Pasha Ağustos 1861 M. Namık Pasha Eylül 1861 M. Takiyüddin Pasha Mayıs 1868 M. Takiyüddin Pasha Nisan 1868 Midhat Pasha Mart 1869 Midhat Pasha Mart 1869

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No 3: The letter of kadı of Baghdad concerning the welcoming of Tanzimat BOA, İ. DAH, 705, 9 R 1256, Lef 5 Der-i devlet-mekîn-i arz-ı dâ‘î-i kemîneleridir ki, Tecdîd-i mülk ü millet ve te’yîd-i dîn ü devlet kaziyye-i merdiyyesi müstelzim zât-ı şevket-simât-ı zıllullâhi idüğü cümlenin ma‘lûmu olduğu vechle bu def‘a müceddeden ba‘zı şerâyit-i mukteziyye ve kavânîn-i lâzime vaz‘ ve te’sîsine ve usûl u furû‘unun bi-tevfîkihî te‘âlâ refte refte icrâ-yı iktizâları husûsuna emr u fermân ma‘delet-nişân-ı hazret-i hilâfet-penâhî müte‘allik ve şeref-sunûh buyrulmuş ve mûcibince muktezâ-yı münîfi saray-ı hümâyûn-ı şahânede vâki‘ olan Gülhâne nâm mahal-i âlîde meclis-i umûm akdiyle bi’l-cümle ulemâ ve vüzerâ ve ricâl ve büyük ve küçük ketebe ve hademe-i Devlet-i Aliyye ve süferâ-yı düvel-i mütehâbbe ve sâir lâzım gelenler hâzır oldukları hâlde resmen kıraât ve evrâk-ı metbû‘a neşriyle Memâlik-i Mahrûse-i pâdişâhânede dahi i‘lân ve işâ‘at olunmuş ve sûret-i irâde-i hayriyet ifâde-i tâcidârâne taşralarda bulunan vüzerâ-yı izâm ve ferîkân-ı kirâm hazretleriyle me’mûrîn-i sâireye bâ-evâmir-i aliyye tenbîh ve iş‘âr buyrulmuş olmağla bu husûsun ber vech-i şerâyid hıtta-i Irakiyye’de icrâ olunmasını âmir-i zât-ı vâlâ-yı sadâret-penâhî kapucular kethüdâsı sa‘âdetlü Osman Efendi yediyle melsûm-ı şifâh-ı ta‘zîm olan bâlâsı hatt-ı şerîf mehâbet-redîf-i pâdişâhiyle müveşşeh bir kıt‘a fermân-ı mehâbet-ünvân-ı cenâb-ı cihân-dârî askerî ve ümerâ ve kâffe-i ahâlî ve cem‘iyyet-i kübrâ ile bi’l-istikbâl Bağdad pîş-gâhında devletlu Ali Rıza Paşa hazretleri huzûrlarında tertîb-i dîvân i‘lân olunarak abd-i dâ‘îleri ve müftî ve sâir ulemâ ve eimme-i hutebâ ve kâffe-i vucûh-ı memleket ve a‘yân ve ahâlî-i vilâyet bi’l-umûm ehl-i ticâret ve erbâb-ı hirfet ve sanâ‘at hâzır oldukları hâlde alâ melei’n-nâs feth u kırâat ve mazmûn-ı merâhim-meşhûn cümleye tefhîm ve işâ‘at olunub meclis-i ma‘kûd-ı mezkûre göre mevcûd olan a‘lâ ve ednâ ve kâffe-i İslâm ve re‘âyâ cümle hakkında bu vechle zuhûra gelen ihsân-ı bî-payân hazret-i pâdişâhînin teşekkürü zımnında ibâdî-i du‘â ve tazarru‘ı merfû‘ı bârgâh-ı Cenâb-ı Kibriyâ ve zemzeme-i âmîn-i icâbet-karîni peyveste-i evc-i a‘lâ etmiş ve kılâ‘ u bekâ‘dan tob ve tüfengler endâhtıyla ızhâr-ı şâdumânı ve meserret ve zîr-i idâre-i müşârun ileyhde kâin kâffe-i kazâ ve kasaba ahâlîsine taraf-ı müşîrîlerinden birer kıt‘a sûretlerinin neşriyle i‘lân ve işâ‘at olunmuş ve cümleden cânib-i seniyyü’l cevânib hazret-i şehinşâhî için ed‘iye-i hayriye isticlâbına sarf-ı nakdîne-i himmet buyurmuş oldukları evvelki vâki‘u’l-hâl pâye-i serîr-i a‘lâya arz u i‘lâm olundu bâkî emr u fermân hazret-i men lehul emrindir. Tahrîren fi’l-yevmi’l-hâmis ve’l-işrîn min şehr-i Zi’l-hicce-i şerîf li-sene hams ve hamsîn ve mieteyn ve elf. 25 Z 1255 El-abdü’d-dâ‘î li’d-devlet-i aliyye-i Osmâniye Yusufçuk-zâde es-seyyid Ahmed Şükrü El-kâdî bi-medîne-i Bağdad

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No. 4: On the improvement of land in Baghdad and the ukr lands. BOA, İ. MMAH, 1641, 27 Ş 1287 /22 November 1870 Bağdad vilâyeti arâzîsinin sûret-i i‘mârına ve ukr nâmıyla tasarruf olunan arâzî hakkında ittihâzı icâb eden tedâbire ve takayyüdâta dâir vilâyet-i mezkûreden vârid olan tahrirât şûra-yı devlete lede’l-havâle ol bâbda dâhiliye dâiresinden kaleme alınmış olan mazbata encümen-i mahsûs-ı meşverette lede’l-kıraât meâlinden müstefâd olduğu vechle bir arzın kâbiliyetine göre i‘mâr ve ihyâsı sâhibinin te’mîn-i tasarrufuna merbût olduğu hâlde hıtta-i Irakiyyenin ekser arâzîsi iltizâm sûretiyle idâre olunup kimesneye bâ-tapu tefvîz edilmemesi cihetiyle mültezimler bi’t-tab‘ müddet-i iltizâmiyelerinden istifâdeye bakıp i’mâr-ı arâzîye mukayyed olmadıklarından emr-i zira‘at ve felâhatca terakkiyât-ı matlûbe hâsıl olamamakta bulunmuş ve bu usûlun netâyic-i muzırrasından olmak üzre hıtta-i Irakiyyede bulunan arâzî-i vesî‘a âsâr-ı umrândan hâlî kalmış olmakla şu hâlin ıslâhı ehemm ü elzem ve iş‘âr-ı mahallî vechle vilâyet-i mezkûre arâzîsinin kıt‘a kıt‘a bâ-tapu tâlibleri uhdelerine ihâlesi takdîrinde arâzî ahâlî tasarrufunda bulunarak ma‘mûr oldukça sâhiblerinin servet ve kudretlerini istilzâm edeceği misillü ahâlî-i gayr-i meskûnenin felâhata celb rağbetiyle emr tavattun ve temeddüne dahi medâr olacağı müsellem idüğünden arâzî-i mezkûrenin ol vechle bâ-tapu tâlibleri uhdelerine ihâlesi ve ukr ile arâzînin birleşmesi hakkında olan iş‘âra gelince hıtta-i Irakiyyenin bundan iki yüz sene evvel uğradığı sademât ve takallübât sekeneyi istitâ‘at-ı mâliye ve zira‘at ve felâhat iktidârından mahrûm eylediğinden hem arâzî zira‘at ve i‘mâr edilmek ve hem de ashâbı müstefîd olmak üzre ol vakit yine ashâbının inzimâm-ı re’y ve muvâfakatlarıyla ekser arâzî cânib-i mîrîye alınıp müzâra‘ası mîrî tarafından idâre ve iltizâm olunarak bundan yirmide yirmibeşte ve otuzda biri ukr nâmıyla ashâbına terk ve tahsîs birle şimdiye kadar arâzî-i mezkûre üzerinde bu mu‘âmele cereyân etmiş ve bunun arâzînin ol esnâda mevcûd olan ashâbı mu’ahharan munkariz olduğundan el-yevm esâsen hakk-ı tasarruf mîrîde olup arz üzerinde yalnız hisse-i ukriye kalmış ve ashâb-ı ukr ise arâzînin bir gûne tasarruf ve temlîkine dahl ve ta‘aruz etmeyip yalnız hisse-i ukriyeleri ne ise onu almakta bulunmuş olup hâlbuki hisse-i ukriye sâhibi bir arzın i‘mâr ve ihyâsına sarf olunan bunca meşâkk u metâ‘ib ve masârife müşterek olmadığı hâlde onun bey‘ ve ferâğında asl arâzîye sâhib olacak ve onu i‘mâr edecek şahsa mürâca‘at etmeksizin ukru istediğine satması ve keyfe-mâ-yeşâ tasarruf etmesi câiz olamayacağından hisse-i ukriyesini satmak murâd edenlerin evvel emrde sâhib-i arzın hakk-ı rüchânına ri‘âyet eylemesi lâzım olduğu gibi sâhib-i arzın dahi uhdesinde bulunan arâzîyi satacak olduğu hâlde o arâzîde hisse-i ukriyesi olan şahsa evvel emrde mürâca‘at etmesi çünkü ukr ve arâzînin mu‘âmelatı sûret-i husûsiyede cereyân ettikçe yani istenildiği hâlde ukrun arâzîden ve arâzînin ukrdan tefrîkiyle müstakıllen be‘y u şirâsı câiz oldukça emr-i ma‘mûriyetin muhtâc olduğu revâbıt-ı ittihâda halel getireceği cihetle ukr ve arâzîye müctemi‘an mutasarrıf olan berruya muktedir kimesnenin ukru arâzîden ifrâza salâhiyeti olmaması ve hükûmetçe mu‘arrız-ı bey‘a konulacak arâzîde hisse-i ukriye var ise evvel emrde bunun ashâbına teklîf olunup tâlib olmadıkları takdîrde ale’l-itlâk tâliblerine ihâlesi arâzînin hâriçten bir takım ashâb-ı servet uhdelerine intikâliyle vukû‘-ı mezâlime ve arâzîye muhtâc olacak fukarâ-yı ahâlînin tazyîk-i ihtiyâcâtına sebeb olacağından ol makûle satılacak arâzînin hisse-i ukriyesi var ise ashâbına mürâca‘at olunduktan sonra ve hisse-i ukriyesi yok ise doğrudan doğruya sekeneyi mahalliyeye tefvîzi teklîf olunup tâlib olanlar haklarında teshîlât-ı mümkine dahi gösterilmesi münâsib olacağına mebnî senedât-ı mu‘tebere ile ukra tasarrufu sâbit

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olanların ashâbı uhdelerinde ibkâsıyla olmayanlara cevâb i‘tâsı ve arâzî-i ukriyenin hîn-i müzâyede ve tefvîzinde hisse-i ukriye sâhibi istediği hâlde ol arzın evvelâ ona, ve istemediği sûrette kasabât ve kurrâ-i mütecâvire ahâlî-i zürrâ‘ına ve bunlardan tâlib bulunmadığı takdîrde başka istekli olanlara verilmesi ve ba‘demâ ashâbı yedinden satılacak arâzî ukra merbût ise ibtidâ sâhib-i arza teklîf olunup, olmadığı hâlde başkasına satılması ve kezâlik bir arzın ukru ashâbı tarafından furuht olunduğu vakit evvelâ hisse-i ukriyenin üç senelik hâsılatına kıyâsen senevîsi neye bâliğ olur ise nihâyet on beş seneliği i‘tibâriyle mutasarrıf-ı arza teklîf edilmesi, olmadığı sûrette âhara furuht olunması ve her hâlde ukr ile arâzî birlikte olarak gerek bir ve gerek müşterek birkaç kişi uhdesinde olsun ukrun başka ve arâzînin başka olarak furuhtunun taht-ı memnû‘iyete alınması ve ukr ferâğ ve intikâlinin dahi vilâyetin defter-i hâkânî müdürlüğü tasdîkiyle yürütülmesi husûslarının kâ‘ide ittihâzıyla ol bâbda bir kıt‘a emr-i âlî ısdârı hakkında şûrâ-yı mezkûrun mutâla‘ât-ı vâkı‘ası yolunda görünüp fakat satılacak arâzî müzâyede olunur ise ashâb-ı servet iştirâya kalkışarak ziyâde bedel verecekleri cihetle sâhib-i ukr veyâhud ahâlî-i mütecâvire almağa muktedir olamayacaklarından arâzî kânûnnâme-i hümâyûnu ahkâmı iktizâsınca arâzî -i mîrîye hakkında hakk-ı tapu ashâbına olunan mu‘âmeleye tevfîkan satılacak arâzî ibtidâ bî-garaz erbâb-ı vukûfun takdîr edeceği bedel misliyle sâhib-i ukra teklîf olunup istemediği hâlde bedel-i mezkûr ile ahâlî-i mütecâvireye arz edilmesi ve onlar dahi kabûl etmezler ise ol hâlde müzâyede olunup tâliblerine verilmesi ve senedât-ı mu‘tebere ile ukra tasarrufları sâbit olanların ashâbı uhdelerinde ibkâsı lâzım geleceği misillü yedinde senedi olmayıp da kırk sene müddet tasarruf eylediği mütehakkık olanlar hakkında dahi senedât-ı mu‘tebere ile mutasarrıf olanlar gibi mu‘âmele edilip mâ‘adâsına cevâb verilmesi muvâfık-ı adl u hakkaniyet olacağından ve bir de sâhib-i ukra veyâhud ahâlî-i mütecâvireye bedel misliyle verilecek arâzî bilâ özr üç sene müddet i‘mâr olunmayıp ta‘tîl edilir ise yedlerinden nez‘ ile bil-müzâyede tâliblerine tefvîz olunacağının i‘lânı mutâbık-ı maslahat idüğünden bu mâddelerin dahi ısdâr olunacak fermân-ı âlîye derci tezekkür ve tensib kılınmış ise de ol bâbda her ne vechle emr u fermân isâbet-beyân hazret-i mülûkâne müte‘allik ve şeref-sudûr buyrulur ise ona göre hareket olunacağı ve mazbata-i merkûme leffen takdîm kılındığı beyânıyla tezkere-i senâverî terkîm olundu efendim.

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No. 5: On Shahrizor’s becoming a sancak of Baghdad and the administration of tax revenues BOA, İ. MMAH, 209, 6 S 1272 / 18 October 1855 Atûfetlü efendim hazretleri, Merbûtiyet-i kadîme ve münâsebet-i mevki‘iyesi cihetiyle Şehrizor eyâletinin ilhâkıyla Bağdad eyâletinin maktû‘an veyâhud me’zûniyet-i kâmile i‘tâsıyla emâneten uhdesine ihâlesi hakkında Irak ve Hicaz ordu-yı hümâyûnu müşîri ve Bağdad vâlîsi devletlu paşa hazretlerinin vukû‘ bulan inhâ ve istid‘âsı keyfiyeti bi’l-mutâla‘a icâbının arz ve istîzân olunması şeref-sudûr buyrulan irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i mülk-dârî iktizâ-yı âlîsinden idüğü resîde-i dest ihlâsı olan tezkere-i behiyyeleri meâl-i vâlâsından müstefâd olup bu husûs için müşârun ileyh hazretleri tarafından bâb-ı âlîye ve cânib-i vâlâ-yı sipeh-salârîye ve mâliye nezâret-i celîlesine dahi iş‘ârât vukû‘ bularak Bağdad mâl müdürü Şevket Efendi dahi mahsûsan i‘zâm olunmuş olmasıyla işbu iş‘ârât ve efendi-i mûmâ ileyh tarafından olunan teblîgât üzerine mutâla‘ât-ı vâkı‘ayı şâmil meclis-i vâlâdan bir kıt‘a mazbata-i mufassala kaleme alınmış olduğundan zikr olunan tezkere-i behiyyeleri ve mazbata geçen gün akd olunan meclis-i mahsûs-ı vükelâda lede’l-kıraât mazbata-i merkûmenin hulâsa-i meâlinden müstebân olduğu vechle meclis-i vâlânın dûş-i müzâkerâtı hıtta-i Bağdad’ın sâye-i şevket-vâye-i hazret-i mülûkânede hâsıl-ı idâre-i hasenesi ve teksîr-i vâridât-ı hâzırası zımnında vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretlerinin dermiyân ve icrâsını taleb eylediği iki şıktan evvelki sûret üzre emvâl ve masârifât-ı eyâletin maktû‘an ihâlesi usûl-i tanzîmiyyeye tevâfuk etmeyeceğinden o sûret kat‘â tecvîz olunamadığından bazı me’mûrların azil ve nasbı yine bu tarafa inhâ olunmak ve ta‘ahhüd olunan yirmibeş bin kîse fazla-i vâridât tenezzül etmemek şartıyla emâneten idâresi husûsunun vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretleri uhdesine ihâlesi ve Şehrizor’un dahi yine Bağdad’a ilhâki merkezinde olup fakat müşârun ileyh hazretlerinin mûmâ ileyh Şevket Efendi’ye muahharan tevârüd eden tahrîrâtında me’zûniyet şıkkı buraca mürecceh görünüyor ise bunun şerâyiti maktû‘iyet hâlinde verilecek şarttan ziyâde ve vâsi‘ olmak ve dersa‘âdetten me’mûr gönderilmemek lâzım geleceği ve ta‘ahhüd olunan menâfiin hâsıl ve i‘tâsı dahi me’zûniyet-i vâsi‘a-i matlûbenin tamâmıyla kabûlüne mevkûf idüğü beyân kılınmış olmağla iktizâ-yı hâl tezekkür ve mülâhaza olunarak vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretlerinin istediği sûretlerden maktû‘iyyet şıkkı meclis-i vâlânın müzâkeresi üzerine devlet-i aliyyenin usûl-i tanzîmiyye ve kâ‘ide-i politikasına muvâfık görünemeyip bu sûret vâkı‘a merhûm Necip Paşa zamânında biraz müddet icrâ olunmuş ise de onun dahi hâlâ pürüzü kesilemediğinden hazîne-i celîle-i mâliye aldığı vâridâttan ziyâde paralar vermeğe mecbûr olmuş olduğundan ve merhûm-ı müşârun ileyh hîn-i ihâlede buraca iki kavî ve mu‘teber sarrâfı ta‘ahhüd göstermiş olup Reşid Paşa hazretlerinin ise öyle ta‘ahhüd eder kimsesi olmayarak kapukethüdâsını irâe eylediğinden şıkk-ı mezkûrdan külliyen sarf-ı nazarla yine emânette bırakılması icâb-ı hâl ve maslahat olarak beyâna hâcet olmadığı vechle Bağdad eyâleti bir hıtta-i vâsi‘a ve münbite olup tamâmıyla emniyet ve ma‘mûriyeti hâsıl olsa devlet-i aliyyeye senevî birkaç yüz bin kîse akçe îrâd vereceği müsellem-i âlemiyân ise de bunun husûlü vehle-i ûlâdâ tezyîd-i vâridat ile olmayıp bi’l-aks bir müddetler bir çok akçeler sarf olunmasıyla ve ma‘lumât-ı sahîha ve sâlime üzerine himmet ve ikdâm kılınmasıyla olacağı ve inşâallahü te‘âlâ sâye-i imâret-vâye-i hazret-i mülûkânede bu matlabe dahi vusûl bulunacağı eltâf-ı ilâhiyeden müsted‘â olup her ne ise vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretlerinin tâlib olduğu ruhsat-ı kâmile bahsine gelince fi’l-hakîka Bağdad’ın baîdeti cihetiyle vâlîsi bulunan zâtın dâhil-i eyâlette istihdâm olunan me’mûrînin töhmet ve yolsuz bir hareketi vukû‘unda azl ve tebdîl ile

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keyfiyeti bu tarafa iş‘âr ve istîzân etmeğe me’zûn bulunması hükûmet ve zâbıtânın kuvvetine medâr olur tedâbirden olarak bu me’zûniyet ise nizâmât-ı mevzû‘a iktizâsınca kâffe-i vülât-ı izâma verilmiş şey olduğundan onun te’kîdi ve cünha-i sahîhası tebeyyün eden me’mûrînin hemen azliyle keyfiyetlerinin bu tarafa inhâsı husûsunun tekrârıyla iktifâ olunarak bundan daha ziyâdesi kavâid-i mer‘iyye-i hükûmete tevâfuk edemeyeceğinden ol bâbda icâb-ı vechle cevâb yazılması ve bazı erbâb-ı vukûfun ifâdesine göre Bağdad’ın o zâbıta ve idâre-i mülkiyesi tamâmıyla yolunda olur ise Şehrizor eyâletinin dahi oraya i‘âde-i mülhakiyeti fâideden hâlî olmayıp ve fi nefsil-emr bu ……… zihne mülâyim görünüp lâkin şu sûret ber vech-i muharrer ötenin … beriden daha iyi gitmesine mevkûf olarak hâlbuki eğerçi Bağdad’ın ahvâl-i hâzırası Reşid Paşa hazretlerinin vusûlünden evvelki hâle nisbetle hayli farklı ise de idâre-i matlûbeye henüz hâsıl olamadığından zaten pek vâsi‘ ve vâlîsinin leyl ü nehâr her tarafında eser-i dirâyet ve ikdâmını hissettirmesine muhtâc bulunan ve yoluna girmesi küllî tedâbir-i mütemâdiyeye mevkûf olan bir eyâleti şu hâlde iken bir kat daha tevsî‘ etmek teksîr-i …… mahalle iki tarafında dahi işini bozmak demek olacağından ve Şehrizor vâlîsi bulunan devletlü Ali Paşa hazretleri gayret ve ehliyetli vüzerâ-yı izâmdan olarak sâye-i meâlî-vâye-i hazret-i mülûkânede orasını güzelce idâre etmekte bulunduğundan Bağdad’ın matlûb olan hüsn-i idâresi takarrur etmeksizin işbu ilhâk husûsunun maslahaten ve mülken fâideli bir şey olacağı akıllar kesdiremediği ve mâlca gösterilen menâfi‘ bu Şehrizor eyâletinin ilhâkından dolayı bit-tab‘ tenkîs olunacak me’mûrîn ma‘âşları ve buna mümâsil bazı masârifât-ı mahalliyeden kalacak mebâliğ demek olup buna vâridât-ı cedide nazarıyla bakılamayacağı ve tenkîsâttan hâsıl olabilecek menâfi‘-i cüziyye-i nakdiye melhûz olan mazarrat-ı mülkiyeye mukâbil gelemeyeceği derkâr olmağla bu mâdde üzerine dahi mübâhasât-ı kesîre cereyânıyla hülâsasında taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden Bağdad ve Şehrizor eyâletlerine evvel emrde râbıtalı ve mevsûk ve mu‘teber bir me’mûr irsâliyle oraların sûret-i idâresine ve şu ilhâk mâddesinin Bağdad’ca matlûb-ı âlî olan ıslahâta hakîkaten medâr olabilip olamayacağına ma‘lumât-ı sahîha ve kâmile kesb edildiğinden sonra iktizâ-yı hâl ve maslahatın icrâsı olup fakat bu sûret haylice vakte muhtâc olarak şu aralık böyle bir me’mûr izâmı dahi vâlî-i müşârun ileyh hazretleri tahkîk-i ahvâli murâd olunduğuna haml ile münkesir? olacağına ve mûmâ ileyh Şevket Efendi hemen avdet etmek lâzım geleceğine binâen me’mûr mâddesi ileriye bırakılarak mûmâ ileyhin i‘âdesi müşârun ileyh hazretlerine bir cevâbnâme yazılıp meâlinde kendisi mu‘temedân-ı bendegân-ı hazret-i padişahîden ve cümle bendegâna sermâye-i sa‘âdet ve muvaffakiyet olan teveccühât-ı kudsiyet âyât-ı cenâb-ı zıllullâhî ise hakkında hemâşî? bir devâm olarak şimdiye kadar eyâlet-i hazret-i mülûkânenin idâre-i umûrunda mesâ‘i-i vâkıası hüsn-i netîceye makrûn olması temşiyâtında bulunulduğundan ve Şehrizor eyâleti dahi taht-ı nezâret-i şâmilesine dahil olup vâlîsi bulunan zâtın lede’l-hâce kendisine mürâca‘atı kaziyesi icâb-ı hâlden bulunduğundan ve Ali Paşa hazretlerine dahi bu yolda vesâyâ-yı lâzime gönderildiğinden ba‘de ezin dahi ifâ-yı hüsn-i hizmete ve ıslâhât-ı matlûbenin bi-avnihi te‘âlâ refte refte kuvveden fi‘ile getirilmesine sa‘y ve himmet eylemesine dâir te’mînât ve ta‘bîrât yazılması ve müşârun ileyh Ali Paşa hazretlerine dahi icâbı vechle te’mîn ve vesâyâ-yı şâmil tahrîrât gönderilmesi sûretleri beyne’l-huzzâr tensîb olunmuş ise de muhâss? isâbet olan emr u fermân kerâmet-ünvân cenâb-ı zıllullâhi yine her ne vechle müte‘allik ve şeref-sunûh buyrulur ise mantûk-ı celîlinin icrâsına mübâderet kılanacağı ve zikr olunan mazbata ve evrâk-ı sâire manzûr-ı meâl-mevfûr-ı hazret-i pâdişâhî buyrulmak için arz ve takdim olunduğu beyânıyla tezkere-i senâverî terkîmine ibtidâr kılındı efendim.

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No. 6. On the provincial council of Baghdad and election of its members BOA, İ. DAH, 2133, 28 C 1257 (1841) Mesâlih-i Irakiyye’nin hüsn-i rü’yet ve tesviyesi zımnında memâlik-i sâirede vaz‘ ve te’sîs olunmuş olduğu misillü Bağdad’da dahi meclis tertîbiyle dâiresi halkından ve Bağdad’ın erkân ve bazı müte‘ayyinâtından ve oralarda bulunan zâbıtân-ı askeriyyeden intihâb ve ta‘yîn olunan a‘zâsının bir kıt‘a defteri gönderilmiş olduğundan ol bâbda ruhsatı ve bazı tenbîhâtı hâvî emr-i âlî ısdâr ve bir kıt‘a lâyiha tisyâr olunması ve Bağdad’da olan İngiltere konsolosuyla baş tercümanına münâsibi vechle bir kıt‘a nişân i‘tâsı husûsunu Bağdad vâlîsi atufetlü Ali Rıza Paşa hazretleri Bâb-ı Âliye ve kapu kethüdâsına mersûl çend kıt‘a şukkasında iltimâs ve iş‘âr etmiş olmağla evrâk-ı merkûme ile defter-i mezkûr manzûr-ı âlî-i şâhâne buyrulmak için irsâl-i savb-ı devletleri kılındı. Eğerçi meclis-i mezkûr dâhil-i dâire-i Tanzîmât olan mahaller mecâlisi sûretinde vaz‘ olunmuş ise de eyâlet-i mezkûre müstesnâ mahallerden ve her ne ise mesâlih-i memleket ve umûr-ı ibâdın meclis ma‘rifeti ve cümle ittifâkıyla rü’yet ve tanzîmi ve husûsuyla vukû‘ât-ı Irakiyye’nin beher mâh mazbatalarıyla bu tarafa iş‘âr ve terkîmi suhûlet-i idâre ve menfe‘at-i mülkiyeyi müstelzim olacağı melhûzattan olduğuna ve müşârun ileyhin sûret-i iş‘ârına nazaran zikr olunan emr-i âlîden sarf-ı nazar olunarak kendisine münâsib vechle cevâbnâme yazılıp meclis tertîbine dâir olan nizâmnâmenin bir kıt‘a sûreti dahi tahrîr ve tesyîr olunması ve konsolos-ı merkûma nişân i‘tâsında .... beis yok ise de tercümanına i‘tâsı münâsib olmayacağına binâen fakat emsâli vechle konsolosa âdî bir nişân i‘mâl ve irsâl kılınması husûslarında ne vechle irâde-i isâbet-âde-i hazret-i pâdişâhî müte‘allik buyrulur ise icrâ-yı iktizâlarına ibtidâr kılınacağı beyânıyla tezkere-i senâverî terkîm kılındı efendim. Ma‘lum-ı âlîleri olduğu üzre memâlik-i hasene-i şâhânenin herbir mahallinde mecâlis-i şûrâ vaz‘ıyla umûr-ı şer‘iyye ve mülkiye ve askeriye ve kâffe-i husûsât-ı vâkı‘anın şer‘-i şerîfe ve kânûnnâme-i münîfe tatbîkan rü’yet ve temşiyeti husûsuna irâde-i hayriyet ifâde-i hazret-i pâdişâhî müte‘allik olarak bu husûs-ı hayriyet-mansûs her tarafda icrâ buyrulmuş ve lillâhi’l-hamd sâye-i merâhim-vâye-i hazret-i mülkdârîde mülk ü millet ve fukarâ-yı ra‘iyyet haklarında semere-i hayriyesi müşâhede olunmuş ve bu kaziyye-i nâfi‘anın hıtta-i İrakıye’de dahi yümn ve ikbâl-i hazret-i şehinşâhiyle icrâsı lâzımeden bulunmuş olduğundan leffen savb-ı devletlerine gönderilmelerine bir kıt‘a defter meâlinden ma‘lûm-ı atufîleri olacağı vechle ma‘iyetimizde bulunan bazı bendegân-ı devlet-i aliyye ve ulemâ ve vucûh-ı ahâlî ve mîrlivâ paşalar ve ümerâ-yı askeriyye ve tüccâr ve yahûdî ve nasârânın muhtârları konağ-ı çâkerîde tahsîs olunan mahall-i mahsûsda haftada üç gün mecâlis-i selâse akdiyle hâzır oldukları hâlde Ehad günü mevâdd-ı mahsûsiyye-i mîriyye ve mesâlih-i saltanat-ı seniyye ve umûr-ı mühimme ve mâliyeyi ve sülesâ günü umûr-ı şer‘iyye ve mülkiye ve kâffe-i hukûk-ı şer‘iyye ve örfiyyeyi ve Hamîs günü mevâdd-ı askeriyye ve mühimmât-ı harbiye ve levâzımât-ı sâire-i askeriyyeyi müzâkere ve derpîş ve şer‘ ve kânûna ve Irak’ın mevki‘ ve muktezâsına ve usûl ü furû‘una tatbîkan fikr u endîş ederek hâtır ve gönüle bakılmayarak ber vech-i hakkâniyet kâffe-i mevâddı ...... lâyıkında rü’yet ve rûz-ı merre vukû‘ bulan mevâdd-ı vâkı‘ayı savb-ı senâverîye ifâde ve dâhilen ve hâricen cüz’î ve küllî vukû‘ bulan keyfiyyet mâh be-mâh bâ-mazbata taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeye takdîm olunmak üzere me’mûrîn-i mûmâ ileyhim tarafından memhûr ve mümzî mazbatasının takdîmi ve bu husûs-ı hayriyet-mansûsun ale’d-devâm icrâ ve mülk ü millet ve fukarâ-yı ra‘iyyetin istihsâl-i refâh hâllerine i‘tinâ olunarak cümleden zât-ı hümâyûn-ı şâhâneye isticlâb

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de‘avât-ı hayriyeye dikkat eylemeleri husûsu me’mûrîn-i mûmâ ileyhim kullarına bi’l-etrâf ifâde ve tefhîm olunarak şimdilik meclis-i mezkûr bâ-buyruldu-i âcizleri i‘lan ve icrâ olunmuş olduğundan işbu defter ve şukkamız Bâb-ı Âliye bi’t-takdîm muvâfık emr u irâde-i hazret-i vekâlet-penâhî olduğu hâlde bir kıt‘a lâyihasıyla sâlifü’z-zikr Irak’ın usûl ü furû‘una ve mevki‘-i muktezâsına göre meclis-i mezkûrun icrâsı husûsunu şâmil senâverlerine ve sâire hitâben bir kıt‘a emr-i şerîf-i âlîşân ısdârıyla irsâline himmet buyrulması ifâdesi vesîle-i ibrâz-ı hulûsum olmuştur. 21 R 1257 Ehad günleri mevâdd-ı mahsûsa-i mîriyye ve mesâlih-i saltanat-ı seniyye ve umûr-ı mühimme ve mâliye müzâkeresi zımnında ale’d-devâm bulunacak bendegânın esâmileri

- Reîs-i meclis me’mûr kılınan rütbe-i sâniye ashâbından dîvân kâtibimiz Osman Seyfi Bey kulları

- Ma‘iyette bulunup a‘zâlığa me’mûr kılınan mîr-i mîrândan Osman Paşa bendeleri

- Süvâri Mîrlivâ İsmail Paşa kulları - Piyâde Mîrlivâ İbrahim Fethi Paşa bendeleri - Rütbe-i sâniye ashâbından Bağdad gümrükçüsü Abdülkadir Ağa kulları - Istabl-ı âmire pâyelülerinden Ali Yaver Bey kulları - Rütbe-i sâlise ashâbından İsmail Hakkı Bey kulları - Rütbe-i sâlise ashâbından mühürdâr-ı senâverî Hurşid Bey kulları

Umûr-ı mülkiye ve mevâdd-ı şer‘iyye ve kâffe-i hukûk-ı şer‘iye ve örfiyeye dâir sülâse günü bulunması lâzım gelen bendegân ve re‘âyânın esâmisi

- Bâlâda muharrer me’mûrîn-i mûmâ ileyhim kulları - Bağdad kadısı efendi dâ’iyeleri - Bağdad müftüsü Seyyid Mahmud Efendi dâ‘iyeleri - Sâbık müftü Muhammed Said Efendi dâ‘iyeleri - Şâfi müftüsü Abdullah Efendi dâ‘iyeleri - Bağdat .....sü Seyyid Mahmud Efendi dâ‘iyeleri - Kürdistan ümerâsından İbrahim Paşa-zâde Abdülkadir Bey kulları - Basra mütesellim-i sâbık Ahmed Ağa kulları - Tüccârdan Zehîr-zâde Abdüllatif Çelebi kulları - Millet-i nasârâ ......lerinden İskender oğlu Budros zımmî - Yine millet-i nasârâ tüccârlarından Yasef Serkız zımmî kulları - Yahûdî tâifesinden Yasef Gale kulları

Mevâdd-ı askeriyye ve mühimmât-ı harbiyye ve levâzımât-ı sâireye dâir Hamîs günü bulunacak zevâtın esâmileri

- Bâlâda muharrer mevâdd-ı mahsûsa zımnında bulunan bendegân-ı mûmâ ileyhim kulları

- Bağdad kadısı efendi dâ‘iyeleri - Bağdad müftüsü efendi-i mûmâ ileyh dâ‘iyeleri

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- Sâbık müftü efendi-i mûmâ ileyh dâ‘iyeleri - Süvâri mîralayı Behram Bey kulları - Tımarlı süvâri mîralayı İsmail Bey kulları - Piyâde birinci alayı mîralayı Osman Bey kulları - Piyâde ikinci alayı mîralayı İsmail Bey kulları - Topçu mîralayı Hüseyin Bey kulları - İkinci Piyâde alayı kaymakamı Hasan Bey kulları - Asâkir-i muntazama-i şâhâne idâresine me’mûr Seyyid Mahmud Efendi

kulları Bâlâda muharrer mecâlis-i mezkûre vukû‘âtının yevmiye muharrir ve mümeyyiz ve mukayyıdları

- Asâkir-i mansûre yoklamacısı Muhammed Efendi kulları, fakat Hamîs günleri

- Dâire müzekkinesinden Şemsi Efendi kulları

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On the application of Tanzimat and the provincial council BOA, İ. MMH, 2046, Lef 2, 10 Ş 1262 Beyândan müstağnî olduğu üzre bu havâlînin icâbât-ı mevki‘iyesinden dolayı usûl-i mehâsin-şumûl-i Tanzîmâtın ale’t-tedrîc icrâsına teşebbüsle sâye-i muvaffakiyet-vâye-i cenâb-ı cihândârîde an be-an ilerlemekte olduğu ve bu sırada bundan mukaddem pusula-i melfûfede muharrerü’l-esâmi vucûh ve ulemâ-yı memleket ve rüesâ-yı milletden mürekkeb olmak ve refte refte yoluna konulmak üzre nefs-i Bağdad’da bir meclis tertîb birle haftada fakat iki gün tecemmü‘ ve mesâlih-i vâkı‘anın rü’yetine teşebbüs olunmakda iken sâye-i seniyye-i cenâb-ı şâhânede erbâb-ı meclis kemâl-i germiyyet ve ahâlîde dahi meclisce rü’yet-i da‘vâya meyl ü rağbet hâsıl olduğuna mebnî haftada fakat Cuma ve Salı günleri ta‘til olup eyyâm-ı sâirenin kâffesinde meclis hâzır olarak mesâlih-i vâkı‘anın cümlesi kemâl-i bî-garaz ve hakkâniyet vechle meclisce rü’yet olunmakda bulunmuş ve şimdiye değin meclise mahsûs bir mahal olmadığından konağ-ı çâkerîde vâsi‘ce bir oda tanzîm ile meclise tahsîs kılınmış olduğundan meclis-i mezkûrun dahi memâlik-i mahrûse-i şâhânenin sâir mahallerinde mevzû‘ mecâlisin usûl ü furû‘una tatbîk olunmak için icâb eden bir kıt‘a ta‘lîmâtın irsâli bâbında emr u fermân hazret-i men lehül emrindir. Mehmed Necib Vâlî-i Eyâlet-i Bağdad Selh-i C 1262 Lef 3

Bağdad meclisinden tanzîm ve takdîm olunacak mazbatayı temhîr edecek zevâtın esâmîlerini mübeyyin pusuladır Ferik Paşa Evkâf müdürü Mâl müdürü Mâl katibi Kadı Efendi Mevâlîden Müftü Mahmud Efendi Esbak müftü Abdülgani Efendi Şafii kadısı Sıbgatullah Efendi Nakîbü’l-eşrâf Ali Efendi Bursa müderrisinden Seyyid Ahmed Efendi Dergâh-ı Âlî kapucubaşılarından Mustafa Bey Dergâh-ı Âli kapucubaşılarından Abdülbaki Efendi Hacı Ahmed Bey-zâde Lutfullah Bey Defterî-zâde İbrahim Efendi Râvî-zâde İsmail Çelebi Kürdî-zâde Kasım Ağa Molla Ali Efendi Süryâni milletinden HocaToma Ermeni Katoliği milletinden Hoca Naum Keldâni katoliği milletinden Hoca Yusuf Cibre Ermeni milletinden Hoca Mıgırdiç Yahûdî milletinden Hoca Yusuf Rahmîn

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On the chairperson of the provincial council BOA, İ. DAH, 14192, 9 Ş 1267 Bağdad eyâletinin müsellem olan mesâlih-i cesîme ve nâzikesi cihetiyle oraya dahi bir meclis-i kebîr teşkîli ve riyâsetine erbâb-ı ehliyetten bir zât intihâb ve ta‘yîn kılınması hakkında mahallinden bi’d-defe‘ât vukû‘ bulan iş‘ârât üzerine icâbının icrâsı müte‘allik buyrulan emr u irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i mülûkâne iktizâ-yı celîlinden olmasıyla münâsibi taharrî olunmakda iken Trabzon defterdârı izzetlü Salik Efendi’nin şimdiki me’mûriyetinden isti‘fâsı vukû‘ bulup kendisinin şimdiye kadar bulunduğu mahallerde iffet ve istikâmeti dahi mücerreb hükmünde bulunduğundan mûmâ ileyhin Bağdad meclisi riyâsetine ta‘yîniyle lâzım gelecek ta‘lîmâtın gönderilmesi ve Trabzon defterdârlığına dahi sâbık Halep mâl müdürü olup bu defa 5,000 kuruş ma‘âş ile meclis-i muhâsabe a‘zalığına ta‘yîn kılınan Hasan Tahsin Efendinin zikr olunan ma‘âşı hazine-mânde edilmek üzre me’mûr buyrulması ve Bağdad riyâseti için mahallinden bi’l-istifsâr tensîb olunacak mikdârda mahalli emvâlinden ma‘âş tahsîsi muvâfık-ı maslahat olacağından bu kaziyyenin dahi Bağdad vâlîsi devletlü paşa ve defterdârı sa‘âdetlü efendi hazerâtından isti‘lâm olunması ve mûmâ ileyh Salik Efendiye Trabzon emvâlinden havâleten 30,000 kuruş harcırâh i‘tâ kılınması münâsib gibi mülâhaza olunmuş ise de ol bâbda her ne vechle irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i pâdişâhî müte‘allik buyrulur ise ona göre hareket olunacağı beyânıyla tezkere-i senâverî terkîmine ibtidâr kılındı efendim.

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Passage Tax for the Bridge at Müseyyib Source, Mehmed Hurşîd, Seyâhatnâme-i Hudûd, pp. 134-135. Cezîre kıt‘asından Şâmiye’ye ve andan Cezîre’ye mürûr ve ubûr içün karye-i mezbûr pîşgâhında, Fırat nehri üzerinde tonbazlu, ahşâb köprü olup Bağdad’dan Kerbelâ-yı Muâllâ ve Necefü’l-Eşref kasabaları tariki buradan olduğundan ve Hille kasabasında olan köprü ile bundan gayri mahalde Fırat nehri boyunun bu civârda âhar köprü olmadığından kesîrü’l-mürûr bir mahaldir. Husûsâ Acem tebe‘ası Necefü’l-Eşref’de olan Meşhed-i Hazret-i Ali kerremallhuvecheh ve Kerbel-yı Muallâ’da kâin merkad-i şerîf-i Hazret-i Hüseyin radiyallü anhümâ makâmeyn-i zinnûreynine varup gelmek içün oradan mürûr ve ubûra mecbûr olduklarından bu köprünün haylice vâridat-ı hasıl olur. Keyfiyye-i tahsîli dahi âtî-üz-zikr vechiledir. Tebe‘a-i İrâniye’den mürûr edenlerin her dört nefer süvârîsinden beşer guruşdan ibâret olan bir kırat akçe alınur ki neher süvârîden ellişer para demekdir. Hamûleleriyle cenâzeleri dahi bu siyâkdadır. Ve ol süvârîler atlu olsun veyâ ester ve merkeb-süvâr bulunsun müsâvîdir. Piyâdelerinden bir şey alınmaz. Tebe‘a-i Devlet-i aliyyeden olan Urban tevâifinden ve ora ahâlîlerinden deve ve esb ve katır ve merkeb makûlesi hayvânâtdan her ne hayvâna binmiş olur ise olsun müsâvât üzre olarak birerçarhî resm-i ubûriye alınur ki beşlik beş guruşa râyic olduğu halde beher çarhî doksan iki buçuk para fî ile tedâvül ederdi. Ve erzâk yüklü beher re’s bârgîr veyâ katırdan üçer ve merkebden birer çarhî alınur. Ve bezzâziye ve attâriye makûlesi tüccâr mâlı hamûleli olan her bir yükden dört kırat ki yiğirmi guruş eder resim alınur. İşbu te‘âmül merhûm Ali Paşa’nın evâhir-i hükümetinden beru böyle tekarrur etmişdir. Selefi Davud Paşa ve eslâfı günlerinde Acemlerin beher cenâzesinden ve atlusından birer kırat alınub, piyâdelerinden bir şey alınmaz imiş. Ve tebe‘a-i Devlet-i aliyyenin boş atlu ve piyâdesinden bir şey alınmayup fakat beher yükden birer kuruş ve bezzâziye ve attâriye makûlesi olan tüccâr malından şimdiki gibi beher yükde yiğirmişer guruş alınurmuş. Bu köprünün tamir ve termîmi vülât-ı izâm hazarâtı taraflarından icrâ olunurmuş. Hâlâ cânib-i hazîne-i celîleden rü’yet olunur.

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On the government policy of delivering subsidies and robe of investitures BOA, İ. MVL, 16338, 9 L 1273 (2 June 1857) Atufetlu Efendim Hazretleri, Şehrizor eyâletinde kâin bazı aşâyir rüesâsına iksâ olunan hil‘atler bahâsı olan iki kalem beşbin üçyüz yirmi kuruşun icrâ-yı mahsûbu ve Şehrizor ve Bağdat eyâletleri gibi aşâyir ve kabâili kesret üzere olan mahallerde dahi böyle şeylerin refte refte taklîliyle önü alınması lâzimeden olduğundan bu makûle aşâyir ve kabâil bey ve ağâlarının tebeddül-i memurîn vukû‘unda esb ve kısrak misillü hediye vermeleri ve memurîn taraflarından dahi hil‘at ve şâl i‘tâsıyla mukâbele olunması oraların âdet-i kadîme ve câriyesinden bulunduğuna binâen bunların tevâhhuşunu mucib olmamak üzere tarafeynden te‘âti olunacak hedâyânın kabûlüyle alınacak esb ve kısrak füruht olunarak esmânı mukâbilinde verilecek hil‘at ve şâl bahâlarına mahsûb olunması ve yalnız te’mîn ve taltîf içün iksâ olunacak hil‘atler cidden ve hakîkaten lüzûm görünmedikçe i‘tâ kılınmaması ve bir tarafdan bi’t-tedrîc taklîl ve imhâsı çâresine bakılması husûslarının mâliye nezâret-i celilesiyle Şehrizor mutasarrıfı sa‘âdetlü paşa hazretlerine bildirilmesi tezekkür kılındığına dâir meclis-i vâlâdan kaleme alınan mazbata evrâk-ı melfûfesiyle berâber meşmûl-i nigâh-ı âli buyrulmak içün arz ve takdim kılınmış olmağla ol bâbda her ne vechle irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i pâdişâhî müte‘allik buyrulur ise ona göre hareket olunacağı beyânıyla tezkere-i senâverî terkîmine ibtidâr kılındı efendim Fi 9 L (12)73

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On the custody of leading tribesmen in Baghdad and their salaries BOA, İ. MVL, 24085, mâliye lef 2, 6 M 1282 Makâm-ı mu‘allâ-yı Sadâret-i uzmâya Ma‘rûz-ı çâker-i Kemîneleridir ki, Müntefiklilerin gâile-i mündefi‘asıyla ordu-yu hümâyûnun hîn-i muâvedetinde Hazâ‘il aşîreti hamûlesinden olup ahz birle Bağdad’a celb olunarak bazı mahzûrât üzerine Bağdad’da ikâmet etmek ve cânib-i hükûmetten ruhsat verilmedikçe aşîretleri tarafına gitmemek üzere kefâlete rabtla sebîlleri tahliye kılınan baş ağa ve Ziyâbü’l-Gânim’in ta‘ayyüşlerine medâr olacak bir gûne nesneleri olmadığı cihetle emr-i idârelerine zarûret çekmekde olduklarından bahisle emsâlleri misillü kendilerine dahi birer mikdâr ma‘âş tahsîsi husûsu ifâde ve istid‘â olunmakdan nâşî meclis-i kebîr-i eyâlete lede’l-havâle bunlar öteden beru aç ve muhtâç adamlar olup burada bulundukları müddetçe kendilerine bir mikdâr şey verilmese dûçâr-ı zarûret olarak bi’z-zarûr savuşmaları melhûz bulunduğuna mebnî sadaka-i ser mihr-efser-i cenâb-ı mülûkâne olmak ve burada bulundukları müddette verilip melhûz olan mehâzîrin indifâ‘ından sonra mahallerine ruhat i‘tâsında kat‘ olunmak üzere emsâli gibi kendilerine dahi işbu seksen bir senesi şehr-i nisânı ibtidâsından i‘tibâren üçer yüz kuruş ma‘âşın muvakkaten tahsîsi münâsib olacağı meclis-i mezkûrdan bâ-mazbata ifâde olunmuş ve vâkı`â bunların bilâ ma`âş tevkîfi lâyık olamayacağı gibi mahallerine i`âdesi dahi mahzûrdan gayr-i sâlim idüğünden ber mûceb-i mazbata-i mütekaddime iktizâsı icrâ kılınmış olmağla re’y-i rezîn cenâb-ı sadâret-penâhîlerine tevâfuk eylediği hâlde irâde-i seniyyenin sû-yı âcizîye ba`s ve isrâsı bâbında ve her hâlde emr u fermân hazret-i men lehül emrindir. (Mühür) Mehmed Namık Müşîr-i ordu-yı sâdis ve vâlî-i Bağdâd Fî 3 Muharrem 1282 ve Fî 19 Mayıs 1281

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On the appointment of (Muntafiq) paramount sheikh BOA, İ. MVL, 6511, meclis-i vâlâ mazbatası, 8 CA 1265 (1 April 1849) Bir kıt‘a tezkere-i hazret-i seraskerî ile meclis-i vâlâya i‘tâ buyrulan Irak ve Hicaz ordu-yı hümâyûnu müşîri devletlu Namık Paşa hazretlerinin tahrîrâtı mealinde mukaddemâ vefât eden Müntefik şeyhi Fehd’in yerine meşîhat-i mezkûre Basra mutasarrıfı sa‘âdetlü Maşuk Paşa bendeleri tarafından Faris’e ihâle olunmuş ve bunun müte‘âkib yine bunlardan Mansur meşîhat iddi‘âsıyla başına bir takım aşâyiri cem‘ ederek varıp Faris’i ref‘ ile kendisi oturmuş ve Faris dahi Rebî‘a urbânı içine gelip imdâdına Aneze ve Şemmer aşâyirini cem‘ eyleyerek tekrâr Mansur’un üzerine gitmek emelinde bulunmuş ve Mansur’un mu‘âvini dahi Zafîr aşîreti olup bunlar meşîhat da‘vâsıylaol havâlîyi bedevî urbânına çiğnetecekleri melhûzâttan görünmüş idüğüne ve mûmâ ileyh Maşuk Paşa tarafından bunların hangisi şeyh nasb ve hangisine mu‘âvenet olunmak lâzım geleceği bir kaç def‘a suâl ile henüz bir cevâb zuhûr etmemiş olduğuna mebnî bu bâbda ne vechle hareket olunmak lâzım geleceğine dâir Bağdad vâlîsi sâbık devletlü Abdi Paşa hazretlerinin tarafından vâki‘ olan iş‘âr üzerine mûmâ ileyh Maşuk Paşa Mansur’u nasb etmiş olduğu hâlde Faris’in husûl-i emeline ümîd verilerek celb olunub Bağdad’a aşırıldığı takdirde Mansur mesned-i meşîhatte takarrur ederek yerleşmiş ve oradan münâza‘a kalkmış demek olacağı dil-hâh-ı âlî vechle hizmet eylemesine Faris elde bir alât bulunacağı ve meşîhati mûmâ ileyh Maşuk Paşanın re’y-i münzam olmayarak tegallübâne zabt edip oturmuş olduğu sûrette ol havâlîyi bedevîlere çiğnetmekten ise Faris’e mikdâr-ı vâfî asâkir katılarak Mansur’un üzerine gönderilmesi lâzım geleceği cevâben yazılmış ve ol vechle mûmâ ileyh Faris’i celb ile nezdinde tevkîf eylediğini muahharan müşârun ileyh Abdi Paşa hazretleri iş‘âr eylemiş ve müte‘âkiben mûmâ ileyh Maşuk Paşa bendeleri tarafından tevârüd eden mektûbda egerçi evvelce mûmâ ileyh Faris şeyh nasb olunmuş ise de serkeşâne davranmış ve ta‘ahhüdâtını dahi icrâ etmeyeceği anlaş(ıl)mış olduğundan Müntefik’in senevî mâl-ı mîrîsini iki yüz elli bin şâmîye iblâğ ile el altından meşîhati Mansur’a tevcîh ederek Faris’in üzerine saldırmış ve Faris’in bir takrîb celbiyle nezdinde tevkîf eylemesini müşârun ileyh Abdi Paşaya yazıp bu bâbda taraflarından dahi tedâbir-i lâzime ile mu‘âvenet-i mukteziyyenin icrâsı iltimâsında bulunmuş olduğu muharrer olmasıyla şimdilik mûmâ ileyh Faris’in icrâ-yı emeline ümîd verilerek Bağdad’a aşırılması takrâr vâlî-i müşârun ileyhe tahrîr olunmuş olmaktan nâşî mutasarrıf-ı mûmâ ilyeh ile bi’l-muhâbere Müntefik havâlîsinin istikrâr-ı asâyişle beraber isticlâb-ı menâfi‘-i seniyyeye elden geldiği mertebe ikdâm ve gayret olunacağı inhâ ve beyân kılınıp mumâ ileyh Faris’in bundan akdem meşîhat-i merkûmeye ta‘yîn olunduğu ve Basra’da ta‘mîr ve tanzîmi muktezî olan sedlerin taraf-ı devlet-i mu‘âvenete muhtâç olmadan ma‘rifetiyle inşâsı ve vergi-yi kadîme ma‘lûmu’l-mikdâr şâmî zam ve ilâvesi bi’t-tav‘ ve’r-rızâ kendüye ta‘ahhüd ettirildiği mevâdd-ı sâire ile ma‘an mûmâ ileyh Maşuk Paşa cânibinden ber tafsîl iş‘âr olunmuş ve ve inhâsı ... tahsîni hâvî kendüye cevâbnâme-i âlîleri tastîr ve tesyîr buyrulmuş ise de şeyh-i mûmâ ileyhin Mansur’a mağlûbiyet ve onun meşîhat-i mezbûreyeme’mûriyetine dâir paşa-yı mûmâ ileyhin henüz bir gûne tahrîrâtı vûrud etmeyerek ma‘a mâfîh müşîr-i müşârun ileyh olan mâru’l-beyân mektûbunda muahharan meşîhat-i merkûmeyi Mansur’a ihâle ettiği bulunmasına nazaran vukû‘-ı mâddede iştibâh olunamayacağı misillü bunda asıl aranılacak mesele oraların ıslâhâtıyla beraber şu sedlerin icâbât-ı mevki‘iye mülâhazasıyla şeyh bulunacak adama yaptırılması ve vergilerinin zamâyim-i müte‘ahhidesiyle istihsâli kaziyyesi olduğundan mûmâ ileyh Faris’in sâye-i

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hümâyûn-ı hazret-i şâhânede Bağdad’da tevkîfiyle mûmâ ilyeh Mansur’un îfâ-yı ta‘ahhüdâtına kuvvet verilmesi hakkında müşârun ileyhin beyân eylediği mülâhaza yolunda göründüğüne binâen mutasarrıf-ı mûmâ ileyhin bâlâda muharrer iş‘ârı müşîr-i müşârun ileyhe hikâye birle Mûmâ ileyhimâdan hangisi meşîhat-i merkûmede istihdâm kılınacak ise ta‘ahhüdâtı sâbıkanın fesh olmaması ve bu sırada havâlî-i mezbûrenin ber vefk-i dil- hâh-ı âlî istikrâr-ı asâyiş ve hüsn-i idâresine ikdâm ve gayret olunması husûslarının yekdiğerle bi’l-muhâbere istishâli çâresi tenbîhâtını şâmil müşîr-i müşâr ve mutasarrıf-ı mûmâ ileyhimâya re’sen ve cevâben tahrîrât-ı sâmiye-i sadâret-penâhîleri tastîr ve tisyâr buyrulması meclis-i vâlâda tezekkür kılınmış ise de ol bâbda ne vechle irâde-i seniyye-i vekâlet-penâhîleri müte‘allik ve şeref-sudûr buyrulur ise ona göre icrâ-yı iktizâsı bâbında emr u fermân hazret-i men lehül emrindir.

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On Baghdad municipal council and tax for the cleaning of streets PRO FO 195/949, No: 1 of 1869 (Enclosure I), From Herbert to H Elliot.

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On British Consul’s reply concerning the tax for the cleaning of streets PRO FO 195/949, No: 1 of 1869 (Enclosure II), From Herbert to H Elliot.

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On the implementation of Vilâyet Law in Baghdad

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OTTOMAN CENTRALIZATION AND

MODERNIZATION IN THE PROVINCE OF BAGHDAD,

1831-1872

Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in History

by Ebubekir Ceylan

Boğaziçi University 2006

ii

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to my advisor Prof. Selim Deringil, for his support and patience;

Prof. Tufan Buzpınar, Prof. Gökhan Çetinsaya and Assoc. Prof. Erol Özvar for

reading and discussing my drafts; Prof. Mehmet İpşirli, Assoc. Prof. Coşkun Çakır,

Assist. Professors Şevket Kamil Akar,Yücel Bulut, Mesut Uyar and Ayla Efe for

their support, enthusiasm and contributions.

My special thanks go to Prof. Ahmet Davudoğlu, who introduced me with the

academe. I also owe debts to my dear friends Abdülhamit Kırmızı and Yunus Uğur,

for their valuable critical comments and encouragements during my work. I am also

grateful to Assist. Prof. Salim Aydüz, Kutlu Akalın, Mehmed Ali Doğan, Haşim Koç

and Gülçin Koç, who provided me sources I needed from abroad. I would also like

to express my gratitude to staff members of the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives

and the İSAM Library of the Diyanet Vakfı in Istanbul. I am also indebted to Martin

Cyr Hicks, Terence Powers and Robert Cardillo for correcting my English. I am also

thankful to American Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT), which contributed to this

study financially and supported my research in British archives.

My special debt is to my wife, her deep understanding and warm support, and

my children, to whom I owe many stolen years. However, I am wholly responsible

for all opinions, errors and omissions in this dissertation written in a hurry.

iv

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: Ebubekir Ceylan

PLACE & DATE OF BIRTH: Essen/Germany, 26 August 1974.

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Boğaziçi University (1999-2006)

The University of Manchester (1997-1998)

Boğaziçi University (1993-1997)

DEGREES AWARDED

2006. Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, Boğaziçi University.

1998. Master of Arts, Department of Government, The University of Manchester.

1997. Bachelor of Arts, Department of History, Boğaziçi University.

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Late Ottoman History , Ottoman Arab Provinces, History of Modern Middle East,

History of Iraq, History of Institutions, Comparative History.

AWARDS

1997 Full Scholarship for MA in Manchester, UK.

2003. Winner of ARIT Scholarship.

2003. Winner of IYEM Scholarship.

PROFESSIONAL

1999-2006. Lecturer, Department of History, Fatih University, İstanbul.

2003-2006. Member, Editorial Board of Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi

(TALİD).

PUBLICATIONS

1999. “Arab Nationalism and the New Picture of the Middle East”, Avrasya Dosyası,

Vol: 6, No: 5-6, pp. 211-223.

v

1999. “Perspektives on Multilateralism”, Divan İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi, No:5, pp.

271-282.

2003. “Dünya-Sistemi Teorisinin Osmanlı Tarihi Çalışmalarına Yansımaları”,

TALID, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 81-95.

Reviews 2005, Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber (eds.) The Empire in the

City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, TALID, Vol. 6,

pp. 759-762.

2005. Keiko Kiyotaki, Ottoman Land Policies in the Province of Baghdad, 1831-

1881, PhD Thesis, The University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1997, TALID, Vol.

5, pp. 829-834.

2004. “The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles and Budgetary Deficits

in Ottoman Politics Under Abdulhamit II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions”,

PhD Thesis by Engin Deniz Akarli, TALID, Vol. 3, pp. 591-596.

2002. Suraiya Faroqhi, Osmanlı Kültürü ve Gündelik Yaşam: Ortaçağ’dan Yirminci

Yüzyıla, Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, (Fall) pp. 233-235.

1999, 'The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929-89', by Peter

Burke, Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi, No:4.

1999. ‘A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and Emergence of Islamism’ by Boby S.

Sayyid, Tezkire, No: 16.

Interview

2005. (with Coşkun Çakır and Faruk Deniz), “On Turkish Urban History: Interview

with Suraiya Faroqhi”, TALID, Vol. 6, pp. 437-455.

Symposium Papers

vi

2004. “Modernization of Ottoman Baghdad during Midhat Pasha’s Governorship”,

Cities in the Middle East: History, Representation, and Politics, Ben-Gurion

University, Beer-Sheva, Israel, January 6th - 7th 2004.

2002. 'Ottoman Millet System', in 'Humanities at the Birth of Third Millenium',

(Organized for the 700th Anniversary of the Birth of Ottoman State, jointly

organized by Fatih University and Binghamton University), Fatih University,

Istanbul, 5-6 June, 2000. Published in the Proceeding of the Symposium,

Fatih University Press.

2000. “Overlapping Spheres of Authorities: The Müfti and His Fetwa in the Court of

Ottoman Qadi”, presented at 19th Annual Conference of the Society for the

Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science at Binghamton University,

Binghamton, New York, 26-29th October 2000.

vii

Abstract

The present study aims to explore Ottoman centralization and modernization

in the province of Baghdad, between 1831 and 1872. The study, which was based

upon a variety of sources, and primarily upon the Ottoman and British archives, is an

attempt to administrative and political history of Ottoman Iraq.

The study is divided into six chapters. After an assessment of the literature

and approaches on studying the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, chapter one

contains a general introduction on the geography, the people, and history of the

Ottoman Iraq. The consequences of Iraq’s geography on agriculture, Iraq’s

peripheral position on the Persian border and its implications for provincial politics

are underlined. In chapter two, the decline and fall of decentralist structures such as

the Mamluks in Baghdad, the Jalilis in Mosul and the Kurdish emirates in northern

Iraq are explained. Parallel to the disintegration of the autonomous entities, the

growing presence of Ottoman state (centralization) is emphasized. Chapter three

attempts to explain changes in the borders among the Iraqi provinces and Baghdad’s

position as the provincial center. Then, the fluctuations in the authority of the

provincial governor are analyzed in relation to the centralist and de-centralist forces.

As opposed to the common tendency in Iraqi historiography which distinguished

Midhat Pasha from the rest of the governors, this study brought Reşid Pasha and

Namık Pasha to the forefront as the harbinger of Midhat Pasha’s reforms. The

increasing Ottoman state control and the improvements in the general security of the

province were also mentioned here.

Chapters four and five seek to consider the extent to which the Tanzimat

reforms were carried out in the Ottoman Iraq. Special importance is given to the

establishment of provincial administrative councils and the implementation of two

viii

significant laws, namely the Provincial Law of 1864 and Ottoman Land Code of

1858 in the region. The Vilâyet Law extended the provincial administrative

mechanism at the expense of tribal dominions. Through several offices (such as the

office of kaymakam/mültezim and membership in the provincial councils) the tribal

sheikhs were incorporated into the provincial administration. Having analyzed

Ottoman politics of tribe, chapter five focuses on the implementation of Land Code

of 1858, which targeted the tribal structure that dominated the province for centuries.

Although the code aimed individual registration of the land, the tribal sheiks and city

merchants emerged as big landowners. However, despite this side effect, there

appeared significant changes in the landholding patterns and agricultural production.

Finally, chapter six analyzed the modernization of various aspects of life in Baghdad.

Special emphasis was given to the introduction of steam navigation, telegraph

communication, modern schools, print houses and publication of provincial

newspaper. There is no doubt that these public works played crucial role in

incorporating Iraq not only to the imperial center but also to the international

networks. In this regard, the Tanzimat centralization and modernization went hand in

hand in Ottoman Baghdad. Therefore, one of the main points of this dissertation is to

explore Ottoman origins of modern Iraq.

Keywords: Ottoman Baghdad, modernization, centralization, Tanzimat, tribes

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ÖZ

Bu çalışma 1831–1872 tarihleri arasında Bağdat eyaletindeki Osmanlı

merkezileşmesi ve modernleşmesini incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Muhtelif

kaynaklara, özellikle de Osmanlı ve İngiliz devlet arşivlerine dayanılarak yapılan bu

çalışma Osmanlı Irak’ının idarî ve siyasi tarihi incelemektedir.

Çalışma altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Literatürün ve Osmanlı Devleti’nin

Arap vilayetlerinin çalışılmasındaki yaklaşımların genel bir değerlendirmesinin

ardından, birinci bölüm Osmanlı Irak’ının coğrafyası, demografik yapısı ve tarihi

hakkında genel bir giriş içermektedir. Bölge coğrafyasının tarım üzerindeki

sonuçları, Irak’ın (İran sınırında) periferik konumu ve bunun vilayet politikalarına

etkilerinin üzerinde durulmuştur. İkinci bölümde, bölgedeki adem-i merkeziyetçi

yapıların (Bağdat’taki Kölemenler, Musul’daki Celililer ve kuzey Irak’taki Kürt

emirliklerinin) düşüş ve yıkılışları açıklanmaktadır. Buna paralel olarak da Osmanlı

Devleti’nin vilayetteki mevcudiyetinin artması (merkezileşme) vurgulanmıştır.

Üçüncü bölüm Irak vilayetleri (Bağdat, Musul, Şehrizor ve Basra) arasındaki sınır

değişiklikleri ve Bağdat’ın hıtta-i Irakiye’nin merkezi olması açıklanmıştır. Daha

sonra Bağdat valisinin yetkilerindeki dalgalanmalar merkez-çevre ilişkileri açısından

analiz edilmiştir. Midhat Paşa’yı, vilayette görev yapan diğer valilerden ayrı tutan

Irak tarih yazımındaki genel eğilimin aksine, bu çalışma Midhat Paşa’nın

başarılarının öncüleri olarak Reşid Paşa ve Namık Paşa dikkat çekmektedir. Osmanlı

Devleti’nin bölgede artan kontrolü ve vilayetin asayiş ve güvenliğindeki ilerlemeler

de bu bölümde incelenmiştir.

Dördüncü ve beşinci bölümler Tanzimat reformlarının Osmanlı Irak’ında ne

kadar uygulandığını tartışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda vilayet meclislerinin kurulması,

1864 Vilayet Kanunu ve 1858 Toprak Nizamnamesinin bölgede uygulanması

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üzerinde durulmuştur. Vilayet Kanunu vilayetteki idari mekanizmayı aşiretlerin

hakim oldukları bölgeler aleyhine genişletmiştir. Kaymakamlık/mültezimlik gibi bazı

görev ve makamlar aracılığıyla aşiret şeyhleri vilayet idaresine eklemlenmişlerdir.

Osmanlı aşiret politikasının analiz edilmesini müteakip, beşinci bölümde asırlardır

vilayette baskın olan aşiret yapısını hedef alan 1858 Toprak Nizamnamesinin

uygulanmasına odaklanmıştır. Nizamname toprağın bireysel olarak kaydını

hedeflediyse de, askerlik ve vergilendirilme korkusu aşiret şeyhleri ve tüccarların

sonuçta büyük toprak sahipleri olmasına neden olmuştur. Fakat bu yan etkisine

rağmen, toprağın elde edilmesi, işlenmesi ve tarımsal üretimde önemli değişiklikler

gözlenmiştir.

Altıncı ve son bölümde ise Bağdat yaşamının muhtelif alanlarında yaşanan

modernleşme incelenmiştir. Bilhassa nehirlerde vapur seferlerinin başlatılması,

demiryolu ve telgrafın vilayette kullanılmaya başlaması, modern okulların ve

matbaaların açılması ve vilayet gazetesinin yayınlanmasına vurgu yapılmıştır.

Şüphesiz bu imar faaliyetleri Irak’ın hem imparatorluk merkezine hem de uluslar

arası ağlara eklemlenmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Bu açıdan Tanzimat

merkezileşmesi ve modernleşme Bağdat’ta eş-zamanlı olarak yürütülmüştür. Bu

bağlamda bu çalışma modern Irak’ın Osmanlı köklerine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bağdat, aşiret, modernleşme, merkezileşme, Tanzimat,

xi

CONTENTS

Chapter Page

INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1-34

Studying Arab Provincial Capitals The Scope of this Study Sources Literature on Ottoman Rule in Iraq Decentralization Vs Centralization: Center-Periphery Relations Tanzimat Centralization: Provincial Law of 1864 and the Land Code of 1858 Land Code of 1858 The Centralization-Modernization Nexus

CHAPTER I: Ottoman Iraq: Geography, People and History.................35-66

Geography Comes First Baghdad: The Eastern Periphery? Population and the People of Baghdad Historical Background Mamluks in Baghdad

CHAPTER II: “Bringing the State Back in”: Re-assertion of Ottoman Direct Rule in Baghdad ………………......... 67-104

The Fall of the Mamluk Regime in Baghdad The end of Mamluks of Baghdad The End of Jalilis in Mosul The Fall of the Kurdish Emirates in northern Iraq

The Rawanduz (Soran) Emirate The Bahdinan Emirate The Baban Emirate The Botan Emirate

The Sacred Cities of Najaf and Karbala Asâyiş ve Emniyet: Provincial Security in Baghdad Introduction of Kur‘a-i şer‘iyye (Conscription by Ballot) Reinforcement of the Provincial Army

xii

CHAPTER III: Ottoman Provincial Administration in B aghdad........105-168

Tanzimat and Its Impacts on Provincial Borders Ottoman-Persian frontier Provincial Borders in Ottoman Iraq Mosul

Shahrizor (Kirkük) Basra

Restricting and Restoring the Authorities of the Provincial Governors Rulers of Provincial Periphery: Governor-Generals of Baghdad Midhat Pasha in the Historiography of Iraq Müşîr-Pashas: Politics and Military in Baghdad Provincial Bureaucracy: The Low-Ranking Officials

CHAPTER IV: Tanzimat As Applied in Ottoman Baghdad..................169-212

Establishment of Provincial Councils in Ottoman Iraq Advisory Councils in Baghdad The Reform of the Provincial Councils Provincial Regulations of 1849 Small Councils of the Sub-provinces

The Introduction of Provincial (Vilayet) Law of 1864 in Baghdad

CHAPTER V: The Land and the Tribes ……………………………….213-274

Politics of Tribe a.) Playing off one tribe against another b.) Carrot or Stick? c.) Incorporation into the Provincial Political Mechanism d.) Appointing and Dismissing the Paramount Sheikh e.) Settling the Tribes

Land Holding Patterns in Baghdad and the Implementation of Land Reforms Ottoman Land Code of 1858 Between the Tribes and the Local Government: The Land in Ottoman Iraq Causes for the Retreat of Iraqi Lands Communal Ownership of the Land Changes in the Status Quo and the Implementation of the Land Code in Baghdad Midhat Pasha and the Land Code Consequences of the Land Code

CHAPTER VI: Public Woks ( Umûr-ı Nâfi‘a) and Modernization in Baghdad …………………….………………………..275-333

Modernization and Midhat Pasha’s Contributions

The movement of Basra’s city center on the river bank

The Foundation of Provincial Municipality in Baghdad

xiii

Urban Life and Infrastructural Development Telegraph and Railway River Steamers and Naval Communication İdâre-i Ummân-ı Osmâniye Midhat Pasha’s Contribution to Stream Service The Euphrates Project Improvement of Basra dockyard and harbor

Irrigation and Canal projects The Saklawiyya (Kenaniya) Canal Project

Transportation and Railroads Education Printing houses and Provincial Newspapers

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………….334-338 BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………….339-354 APPENDICES……………………………………………………… 355-381

xiv

LIST OF MAPS

Map I: Kurdish Emirates………………………………………………………82

Map II: Aleppo-Baghdad Trade Route ………………………………………..90

Map III: Tribal map of Ottoman Iraq ….…………………………………… 217

Map IV: Baghdad in 1849…………………………………………………….276

LIST OF TABLES Table I: Population Estimates for Ottoman Iraq in 1292/1875……………..…46 Table II: Population Estimates for the three province of Ottoman Iraq …..….48 Table III: Population Estimates for the city center of Baghdad inn 1869….….52 Table IV: Administrative Divisions of Ottoman Iraq by 1871 ……………….204 Table V: Governors of Baghdad between 1831 and 1872…………………….355 Table VI: Governors of Baghdad and Müşîrs of the Sixth Army …………….356

xv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. MKT. MHM. Sadaret Mektubî-i Mühimme Kalemi Evrakı BOA. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi DİA Diyanet İslâm Ansiklopedisi HR.SYS. Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım İ.DAH İrâde-i Dâhiliye İ.HAR. İrâde-i Hâriciye İ. MVL. İrâde-i Meclis-i Vâlâ İ. MMAH. İrâde-i Meclis-i Mahsûs İ.MMH. İrâde-i Mesâil-i Mühime İ. ŞD. İrâde-i Şûrâ-yı Devlet TALID Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi TTK Türk Tarih Kurumu M. Muharrem S Safer Ra Rebîulevvel R Rebîulâhir Ca Cemâziyelevvel C Cemâziyelâhir B Receb Ş Şaban N Ramazan L Şevval Za Zilkâde Z Zilhicce