A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe - Cato Institute

O n March 29, 2008, Zimbabwe will hold presiden-tial and parliamentary elections. Few peoplebelieve that they will be free and fair or that Robert

Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front party will fail to return to office.

That is a tragedy, because Mugabe and his cronies arechiefly responsible for an economic meltdown that hasturned one of Africa’s most prosperous countries into acountry with one of the lowest life expectancies in theworld. Since 1994, the average life expectancy in Zimbabwehas fallen from 57 years to 34 years for women and from 54years to 37 years for men. Some 3,500 Zimbabweans dieevery week from the combined effects of HIV/AIDS, pover-ty, and malnutrition. Half a million Zimbabweans mayhave died already. There is no freedom of speech or assem-bly in Zimbabwe, and the state has used violence to intimi-date and murder its opponents.

At the root of Zimbabwe’s problems is a corrupt politicalelite that has, with considerable international support,behaved with utter impunity for some two decades. Thiselite is determined to hang on to power no matter what theconsequences, lest it be held to account for the genocide inMatabeleland in the early 1980s and the wholesale lootingof Zimbabwe that followed the mismanaged land reform in2000.

When change comes to Zimbabwe, the nation will haveto rediscover the rule of law and the sanctity of persons andproperty. The public discourse and the economy will haveto be reopened. The new government will have to embracea more limited idea of government and rescind legislationthat makes the operation of the private sector next toimpossible. Moreover, the new government will have tofind a way for the people of Zimbabwe to heal the woundscaused by decades of political violence.

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M a r c h 2 4 , 2 0 0 8 � n o . 5

A Decade of Suffering in ZimbabweEconomic Collapse and Political Repression under Robert Mugabe

by David Coltart

David Coltart is a member of the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Affiliated with the Movement for Democratic Change,he represents the Bulawayo South Constituency and serves as the shadow justice minister.

Executive Summary

Snapshot of an EconomicCollapse

The economic decline of Zimbabwe, whichstarted in 1997, has been startling (see Figure1). For example, if not for remittances fromrelatives abroad, the 2007 purchasing powerof the average Zimbabwean would have fallento levels last seen in the 1950s. In terms ofphysical output, about 35 years of economicprogress have been undone in a decade. Grossdomestic product (GDP) declined by about43 percent between 2000 and 2007.1

Not surprisingly, every sector of the for-merly diverse Zimbabwean economy wasaffected. The mainstay of the economy, agri-culture, was all but destroyed by the politicallyexpedient and often violent land reform pro-gram initiated by Robert Mugabe’s ZimbabweAfrican National Union–Patriotic Front gov-ernment in 2000. For example, annual wheatproduction has plummeted from a high ofover 300,000 tons in 1990 to less than 50,000in 2007 (see Figure 2).

The tobacco industry, which was Zimbab-

we’s single largest generator of foreign ex-change and accounted for almost a third ofZimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings in2000, has almost completely collapsed. Thecrop that earned some US$600 million in2000 generated less than US$125 million in2007 (see Figure 3).

The government’s failure to keep spendingin line with the requirements of the EconomicStructural Adjustment Program that wasadministered by the International MonetaryFund meant that the government had to bor-row domestically—thus driving up the rate ofinterest and with it also the cost of borrowingfor manufacturers. The manufacturing sectorhas shrunk by more than 47 percent between1998 and 2006, which carried output levelsback to figures recorded in 1972(see Figure 4).2

Foreign aid that Zimbabwe received as partof the ESAP strengthened the Zimbabweandollar and increased imports. Local manufac-turers, therefore, found themselves under pres-sure from the rapid increases in local costs, par-ticularly interest rates, and the decreasingdemand for their goods as competition fromimports increased.3

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*200

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Severe drought years

Land reform

Figure 1Annual GDP Growth in Zimbabwe, 1980–2007

Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.* Estimate.

Yea

r-on

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Figure 2Annual Wheat Production, 1975–2007

Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for ZimbabweanStatistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.

Figure 3Annual Earnings from Tobacco, 2001–2007


Tons

Pro

duce

dU

S$ (

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ions

)

Since 2005, government policies have fur-ther hurt the manufacturing sector. Particu-larly damaging is a law that requires exportersto sell up to 30 percent of their foreign ex-change earnings to Zimbabwe’s Reserve Bankat an artificial exchange rate that is a fractionof the real market rate. Members of the rulingregime and their associates have become richby buying up foreign currency at the officialexchange rate and then selling it at the black-market rate, pocketing the difference.

The final blow to the manufacturing sectorhas come from the government’s price controlpolicy announced at the end of June 2007. Inan effort to stem runaway inflation, the gov-ernment announced halving all prices. In thesix months that followed, manufacturing out-put fell by more than 50 percent and, unlessthey could export their goods, many manufac-turing firms had to shut down.4

Blessed with some of the best mineral re-serves in the world, Zimbabwe has vastdeposits of iron, nickel, platinum, coal,chrome, asbestos, diamonds, tantalite, coal-

bed methane, and gold. Yet mining, whichshould have boomed over the last decadebecause of global economic expansion ingeneral and China’s hunger for natural re-sources in particular, has, with the notableexception of platinum, all but collapsed.

Gold is a good example. Zimbabwe hasvast reserves of gold still stuck beneath itssoil. More than 90 percent of those depositsare located in the granite-greenstone terrainthat covers about 60 percent of the country.Zimbabwe has more than 6,000 recordeddeposits and the capacity to produce at least25 tons of gold annually. World gold priceshave steadily increased over the last decade.Despite that price increase, gold productionin Zimbabwe has plummeted in the lastdecade. In 2006, Zimbabwe suffered its low-est annual output since 1907 (see Figure 5).

As was the case with the manufacturingsector, the government’s decision to force themining companies to exchange some of theirearnings at the official exchange rate under-mined gold production. As a result, the sec-

4

At the root ofZimbabwe’s

problems is acorrupt political

elite.

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Figure 4Manufacturing Performance, 1996–2006


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tor has become unviable. Virtually every oth-er type of mining in Zimbabwe was similarlyaffected. In 2006, for example, coal produc-tion dropped to its lowest level since 1946.5

Zimbabwe is a country blessed with naturalbeauty. In addition to the magnificent VictoriaFalls, Zimbabwe also has some of the bestgame reserves in Africa, stunning mountain-ous areas, and a wonderful climate. Unfortun-ately, because of the racist hate speech directedagainst white people by the ZANU-PF govern-ment and the oppressive and often violentpolitical atmosphere, most foreign airlineshave stopped flying into the country andtourist arrivals have plummeted. Consequent-ly, annual foreign earnings from tourism in2006 were less than one-tenth of what theywere a decade ago (see Figure 6).

The informal sector of the economy hasnot been immune from the government’s pre-dations. In May 2005, the government em-barked on what it termed “Operation Mur-ambatsvina”—roughly translated as “cleanout the filth”—aimed at the urban poor. Inthe course of two months, the army and thepolice drove some 700,000 of Zimbabwe’s

poorest urban-based people out of theirhomes, depriving them of their livelihoods inthe process. As a consequence, the UnitedNations condemned the government of Zim-babwe.6

According to the UN, the informal econo-my in 1980 was relatively small, accountingfor less than 10 percent of the labor force. Itssize was partly attributable to various lawsand bylaws that prohibited the movement ofindigenous people, especially from rural tourban areas. With liberalization of travel, andsubsequent economic stagnation and even-tual decline after independence, the informalsector share of employment grew to about 20percent in 1986 and to an estimated 40 per-cent in 2004. The informal economy hadeffectively become the main source of incomefor the majority of Zimbabweans by 2005when Operation Murambatsvina took place.7

In June 2005, nearly 3 million Zimbabweansearned their living through informal-sectoremployment, supporting another 5 millionpeople, while the formal sector employed onlyabout 1.3 million people.8 Although OperationMurambatsvina was directed against poor peo-

5

About 35 years of economicprogress havebeen undone in a decade.

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Lowest since 1907

Figure 5Gold Production, 1997–2006

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Figure 6Annual Earnings from Tourism, 1997–2006


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Figure 7Formal-Sector Employment, 1991–2005


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ple, its effect on the formal economy was alsosevere. The informal sector of the economy hasnot yet recovered. Remaining employment inthe formal sector is also dropping rapidly (seeFigure 7).

Humanitarian Catastrophe

Zimbabwe’s economy is now in a free fall.Inflation, according to official (and thus veryconservative) government figures, now exceeds8,000 percent a year. Respected economistsbelieve that inflation is probably in excess of150,000 percent a year.9 To put this figure inperspective, the country with the next-highestinflation rate, Iraq, has a rate of 53 percent ayear.10

The human cost of Zimbabwe’s economiccrisis has been catastrophic. Millions of Zim-babweans have left the country, with 3 millionfleeing to South Africa alone.11 Over 80 per-cent of Zimbabweans remaining in the coun-try are now unemployed. The estimated pro-portion of the population living below theofficial poverty line has more than doubledsince the mid-1990s and is now over 80 per-cent.12 Zimbabwe’s human development indi-cators rank 151st of 177 countries surveyed.13

In 2006, the World Health Organizationreported that people living in Zimbabwe haveone of the lowest life expectancies in the world.Since 1994, the average life expectancy forwomen in Zimbabwe has fallen from 57 yearsto 34 years and for men from 54 years to 37years. The WHO believes that life expectancyrates will continue to fall.14

The WHO estimates that some 3,500 Zim-babweans die every week through the deadlycombination of HIV/AIDS, poverty, and mal-nutrition.15 The estimates of the humanitariancatastrophe in Zimbabwe vary. Richard Wil-liam Johnson, South African academic and for-mer head of the Helen Suzman Foundation,suggests that between 2 million and 6 millionpeople may have died because of the calamitouseconomic situation in Zimbabwe since the late1990s.16 To put that estimate in a global con-text, in April 2007, the UN estimated that some

450,000 people may have died as a result of theconflict in Darfur that started in 2003.17

Johnson’s estimate is in line with the mas-sive discrepancy in the numbers reported bythe last two censuses in Zimbabwe. The 1992census estimated that by the time of the 2002census, 14 million people should have livedin Zimbabwe. But the August 2002 censusfound only 11 million in the country—andthat finding was before the exodus of Zim-babweans that has occurred since 2002.

Precise data are difficult to gather in a dic-tatorship suffering from chaos and economiccollapse. However, I have been a member ofZimbabwe’s parliament since 2000 and haveparticipated in the debates concerning theeconomic and humanitarian situation in thecountry. I have had access to information that,because of pervasive censorship in Zimbabwe,is not easily available to others. Consequently,in addition to all the people who have left thecountry, I am persuaded that at least half amillion Zimbabweans have died because ofZimbabwe’s economic collapse.

According to findings released in July 2006by the Zimbabwe Demographic Health Survey,the health of Zimbabwean children has deteri-orated dramatically. For example, in 70 percentof Zimbabwe’s provinces, more children sufferfrom stunted growth now than previously. Inone province, stunted growth among childrenincreased by 38 percent between 1999 and2006. The number of children receiving all ofthe recommended vaccinations dropped by 21percent between 1999 and 2006. Over the sameperiod, the percentage of children receiving novaccinations at all rose to 21 percent. The situ-ation has become graver since 2006 because offurther economic decline in Zimbabwe. Oper-ation Murambatsvina has no doubt con-tributed to the increase in general mortalityrates. According to the Zimbabwe Departmentof Health Services preliminary report, a greatnumber of those displaced under that opera-tion were children.18

Another problem that Zimbabwe faces isHIV/AIDS. In a report released in June 2006,the UN stated that Zimbabwe has one of thehighest incidences of HIV/AIDS in the world.

7

Inflation is inexcess of 150,000percent a year.

People living inZimbabwe have

one of the lowestlife expectancies

in the world.

8

Southern Africa is the epicenter of the globalHIV/AIDS pandemic. Nine of the 10 coun-tries with the highest levels of HIV/AIDSinfection in the world are in southern Africa.Zimbabwe is one of them.19

What makes HIV/AIDS particularly seri-ous in Zimbabwe is that the government hasdedicated the bulk of its dwindling resourcesto maintaining its hold on power, leaving littleor no money for HIV/AIDS prevention andprovision of antiretroviral drugs. Unfortun-ately, only a tiny fraction of those sufferingfrom HIV/AIDS appears to be on regularcourses of medication.20

Nevertheless, the ZANU-PF governmentprefers to spend money on keeping its ownpeople at bay. In the 2006 budget, for example,it earmarked an amount equivalent to 12.5percent of the total allocation for publichealth for the Central Intelligence Organi-zation, Zimbabwe’s equivalent of the East Ger-man Stasi. A subsequent announcement thatthe government would import new militaryaircraft from China underscored the govern-ment’s priorities, even though the country isnot at war and is surrounded by friendlystates.

Zimbabwe suffers from high levels of mal-nutrition exacerbated by the government’srefusal to acknowledge the extent of theproblem. In December 2007, for example, theWorld Food Program warned that Zimbabwewas one of seven “hotspots” and suggestedthat some 4.1 million Zimbabweans will needfood aid before April 2008.21 In August 2007,the Famine Early Warning Systems Net-work22 stated the following:

Protracted economic decline, exacerbat-ed by a poor 2006/07 harvest as well ascurrent and potential future disrup-tions of food supply due to recent pricecontrols and eminent restrictions onbasic commodity imports have caused asignificant decrease in Zimbabwe’s foodsecurity, especially in the southwest andin urban areas. This year’s cereal pro-duction is expected to meet only 55 per-cent of Zimbabwe’s requirements,

according to the UN’s Food and Agri-culture Organization and World FoodProgramme. . . . [The] WFP [World FoodProgram] and C-SAFE [Consortium forSouthern Africa Food Security Emerg-ency] tentatively plan to import about352,000 MT [metric tons] of food aid tofeed 4.1 million people. While it is con-ceivable that corn import requirementscould be met, the GMB’s [Grain Mar-keting Board’s] ability to distributemaize [corn] is a serious concern, as, inthe past, GMB distributions have beenerratic, and local shortages are com-mon.23

Human rights organizations within Zim-babwe believe that the figure of 4 million inneed of food aid is an underestimate becauseof the effect of poverty on so many Zimbab-weans who are nominally employed at best.People who previously would have been ableto buy food for themselves are no longer ableto do so, and millions of urban poor are visiblylosing weight. Those people are not includedin WFP estimates, however, because of their“nominal” employment.

The Zimbabwean government has deliber-ately downplayed the extent of the crisis overthe last few years. The administration has triedto control the supply of food because by doingso it is able to use food as a political weapon.In that way, it can coerce desperate people,especially in the rural areas, into voting for theruling ZANU-PF party.

Moreover, acknowledging the full extentof the food shortages would be tantamountto the government’s admitting the shortagesdirectly result from its chaotic and corruptland reform program rather than from badweather as the government likes to claim.That land reform policy resulted in highlyproductive farms being rendered unproduc-tive by the government ministers, party oper-atives, army commanders, and judges whohave taken them over.24

The government consistently refuses toadmit the gravity of the problem, and on vari-ous occasions in the last few years it has delib-

At least half a millionZimbabweanshave died becauseof Zimbabwe’seconomic collapse.

9

erately obstructed the WFP and other human-itarian agencies, preventing them from operat-ing freely in Zimbabwe. In a television inter-view that he gave in 2004, for example, Mugabesaid that Zimbabweans did not want to“choke” on international food aid, which theydid not need.25 The ZANU-PF barred the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from dis-tributing food. The government insisted oncontrolling all food distribution, a policy thatthe ZANU-PF continued until it won whatwas, according to most observers, a riggedMarch 2005 general election.

Because of the government’s policies overthe last few years, millions of Zimbabweanshave been deprived of access to the food sup-plied by international agencies. Given thatthe ZANU-PF has now announced that it willhold a general election on March 29, 2008,the party will likely use similar tactics to con-trol the supply of food to desperate people.

Never before has one country seen such aconvergence of severe economic collapse, highlevels of HIV/AIDS infection, and chronicmalnutrition. Zimbabweans are sufferingfrom the consequences of the fastest econom-ic contraction anywhere in the world and highAIDS/HIV morbidity exacerbated by thescarcity and widespread shortages of medicineand food.

Limited InternationalInterest in Zimbabwe

Despite the gravity of the crisis, interna-tional interest in Zimbabwe’s agony seemslimited. That lack of interest is attributableto a number of factors. First, although morepeople are dying in Zimbabwe than in Iraq,Afghanistan, and Darfur, Zimbabwe’s men-tion in the international media is dispropor-tionately smaller—in part because storiesabout Zimbabwe are more difficult to filmand write. The country offers very few starkimages likely to capture the world’s atten-tion. A casual visitor to Zimbabwe will notsee blood flowing or many children withkwashiorkor bellies.26 No car bombs explode.

People who die through a combination ofHIV/AIDS, poverty, and malnutrition diequietly—they literally fade away. The only wayto appreciate the extent of the catastrophe isto visit morgues and cemeteries, which areoverflowing. The most poignant evidence ofthe calamity is found in the dates inscribedon the headstones and plaques in the ceme-teries: the vast majority of those being buriedare young people and children.

Second, although the foreign media isallowed into Darfur, Afghanistan, and Iraq, ithas been generally barred from operating inZimbabwe. Draconian laws forbid foreignjournalists from working in Zimbabwe with-out permission, which is rarely given. The gov-ernment routinely detains and prosecutesjournalists, and the laws relating to the mediaprescribe prison terms for those who infringelegal stipulations. Unless the world’s mediaput the catastrophe at the top of their agen-das, however, governments elsewhere will re-ceive little public pressure to take up Zimbab-we as a political cause.

Third, because Zimbabwe has no oil andvery few strategic mineral resources, no obvi-ous strategic reason exists why world powersshould want to focus their attention on thatcountry’s problems. Although Zimbabwedoes have large reserves of platinum, those arenot in sufficiently short supply globally towarrant special attention from the interna-tional community. Tragically for Zimbab-weans, the only interest that the country’splatinum has aroused internationally is thatof the Chinese, who have proved to be quiteready to prop up Mugabe’s regime to secureprivileged access to the mineral.

Fourth, the response of most southernAfrican governments and the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community to the catastropheunfolding on their doorstep is best described asa state of denial or paralysis. Until the Africangovernments act, the rest of the internationalcommunity can do little to help Zimbabwe.

The humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe hasspiraled out of control and there does notappear to be any international political will todeal with it decisively and urgently. Many gov-

ernments, including some southern Africangovernments, simply do not know what to doand are exasperated by the seemingly intract-able problem. To provide an effective prescrip-tion for Zimbabwe’s humanitarian and eco-nomic ills, however, one must appreciate theroot causes of the disaster.

Political Roots of the Current Crisis

Zimbabwe’s humanitarian and economiccrises are rooted in politics. The ZANU-PFgovernment has been at pains to blame eco-nomic collapse on the combination of West-ern sanctions and drought. Neither of thosewas the main cause of the problems that thecountry faces. Targeted sanctions imposed ontop government officials by the West onlycame into effect in 2002—some five years afterZimbabwe’s economic collapse began.

Zimbabweans have had to endure sanctionsbefore. The UN imposed an international tradeembargo on the white minority government ofRhodesia in 1966. Fourteen years later, theZimbabwean economy emerged from the sanc-tions with one of the largest economies inAfrica and a currency that was stronger thanthe U.S. dollar—even though the sanctionswere far more comprehensive in scope thanthose currently in place. Although the U.S.Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recov-ery Act, for example, obliges the U.S. govern-ment to vote against the extension of any loansby international financial institutions toZimbabwe, no general trade sanctions are cur-rently in place, nor are any likely in the foresee-able future.

Likewise, as Professor Craig J. Richardsonof Salem College pointed out, the historicallyclose relationship between rainfall and GDPgrowth ended in 2000—the first year of theland reforms. The years after 2000 showedabove-average or average rainfall even as theeconomy continued to plummet.27 Thus, thegovernment cannot credibly blame bad weath-er for the country’s dismal economic situa-tion.

The root of Zimbabwe’s woes is the absenceof liberal democracy. In Poverty and Famines: AnEssay on Entitlement and Deprivation, the NobelPrize–winning economist Amartya Sen stress-es the connection between political freedomand the absence of famine.28 He makes thepoint that no country with a free press has everhad a famine in its recorded history, and heclaims that a free press and an active opposi-tion constitute the best early warning system acountry threatened by famine can have. Thesituation in Zimbabwe supports Sen’s analy-sis.

Undermining Political Freedom(1980–97)

Three pivotal historical issues are directlyresponsible for the failure of Zimbabwe’sdemocratic institutions and its calamitousconsequences.

First, consider the constitution agreed to atthe Lancaster House conference that paved theway for Zimbabwean independence in 1980. Itwas a compromise document, primarily de-signed to put an end to a bloody civil war. Itperpetuated many oppressive aspects of whiteminority rule—including tight state controlover the media. Crucially, it reinforced exces-sive executive power and resulted in a relativelyweak legislature and judiciary. Although racialdiscrimination was abolished, in many otherrespects the new Zimbabwe African NationalUnion government from the very beginningexercised the same authoritarian powers as hadits predecessor, the white Rhodesian Front.The ZANU exercised those powers withWestern knowledge and support. Thus, theLancaster House constitution created the tem-plate for authoritarian rule and allowed RobertMugabe and the ZANU-PF to consolidate andlater to monopolize power.

In addition, the Lancaster House agree-ment did not address the fact that atrocitieshad been committed by both the Rhodesiansecurity forces and the guerillas of the twoBlack Nationalist armies during the liberationstruggle waged from 1973 to the end of 1979.It also did not adequately address the humanrights abuses, including racial discrimination

10

Only a tiny fraction of those

suffering fromHIV/AIDS

appear to be onregular courses of

medication.

suffered by black Zimbabweans under succes-sive white minority governments.

Unlike the agreement that brought anend to apartheid in South Africa in 1994, theLancaster House agreement did not attemptto address issues of reconciliation and jus-tice. Although no peace deal is perfect, theomission of reconciliation and justice meantthat many of those responsible for serioushuman rights violations on both sides of the1970s conflict remained in the armed forcesand have been responsible for genocide,crimes against humanity, and other humanrights violations perpetrated in the 1980sand, again, since 2000.

Second, consider the “Gukurahundi” epi-sode. Soon after taking power in April 1980,Mugabe had engaged in secret negotiationswith the North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung tocreate an army unit specifically designed to dealwith “internal dissent.” Those negotiations cul-minated in an agreement under whose termsthe North Koreans would train and arm a newbrigade to deal with domestic “malcontents.”The new brigade came to be known as the 5thBrigade or “Gukurahundi Brigade.”29

In January 1983 Mugabe’s government sentthe Gukurahundi into Matabeleland, wherethe soldiers proceeded to murder approximate-ly 20,000 civilians. Nationalist leader and latervice president of Zimbabwe Joshua Nkomofirst used this figure in 1984. Human rightsorganizations accepted it as being, if anything,conservative.30

By March 1983, Western governmentsand NGOs were aware of the grave humanrights abuses and crimes against humanityperpetrated by the ZANU government underthe leadership of Mugabe, if not the fullextent of the genocide.31 Despite the knowl-edge of those grave crimes, the West turned ablind eye. In fact, Western governments con-tinued to send aid to Zimbabwe, and Westernuniversities continued to award Mugabehonorary degrees. Adding insult to injury,the British government knighted Mugabe in1994.

The failure of the West to act against theZANU and later the ZANU-PF government, or

even to condemn the atrocities, created a senseof impunity in the minds of the ZANU-PFleadership. That sense of impunity had adirect bearing on the events of the last fewyears. The ZANU-PF regime not only got awaywith genocide in the 1980s but also was actu-ally rewarded in the years that followedthrough the continued infusion of substantialaid and other awards. In that context, theZANU-PF leadership not surprisingly believedthat it could act with complete freedom whenit commenced its violent land reform programin 2000.

Similarly, although its policies are indefen-sible, the ZANU-PF perception of the West’sreaction to its policies since 2000 as racist isunderstandable. As the ZANU-PF appa-ratchiks see it, the West ignored the massacreof thousands of black Zimbabweans in the1980s but imposed sanctions on Zimbabwefollowing the killing of a handful of whitefarmers and a few hundred opposition activistssince 2000.

Tragically, the Gukurahundi episode stillhaunts the entire nation and is pivotal tounderstanding what motivates the ZANU-PFgovernment and Mugabe today. Mugabe is inpossession of two critically important pieces ofintelligence that undoubtedly influence histhinking. First, only he and his immediate cir-cle, including the current military comman-ders, know precisely what their role inGukurahundi was. They also know that the lossof power will follow the full revelation of theirinvolvement and culpability. Second, becauseof their unique access to present streams ofintelligence through the all-pervasive CentralIntelligence Organization, Mugabe and his mil-itary commanders know the depth of anger stillsimmering just beneath the surface in the com-munities that suffered under Gukurahundi.

Moreover, Mugabe is undoubtedly awareof how Charles Taylor of Liberia and otherdespots have been treated in recent yearsafter they lost power. He must be fully awarethat the moment he loses power and with ithis presidential immunity from prosecution,people will push to have him and the respon-sible military commanders and politicians

11

The ZANU-PFgovernmentprefers to spendmoney on keeping its ownpeople at bay.

indicted for crimes against humanity orgenocide.

Because of that threat to his personal free-dom, his loss of power is anathema not only toMugabe personally but also, importantly, to akey circle of military and political leaders whoare equally culpable for Gukurahundi. In theirminds, they cannot compromise because theconsequences of the loss of power are un-thinkable. To understand the Zimbabweancrisis, then, one must assume that Mugabeand his inner circle will do whatever is neces-sary to retain power.

Furthermore, that common fear acts as apowerful bond uniting all those responsiblefor Gukurahundi. Thus, the Zimbabwean cri-sis must be distinguished from, for example,the final years in power of Daniel arap Moi ofKenya. In many countries throughout theworld, the trappings of office become addic-tive and politicians have to be prized awayfrom office. But Moi never feared ending up inthe International Court of Justice in theHague and so, although he lost the trappingsof office, he had nothing else to fear. WhileMugabe undoubtedly enjoys the trappings ofhis office, the biggest obstacle to change is thecollective fear felt by the ruling elite of the con-sequences of losing political power.

Third, consider the failure of the EconomicStructural Adjustment Program. The collapseof the Soviet bloc and the end of apartheid inthe early 1990s saw the ZANU-PF lose some ofits leverage over the West. The need to keepZimbabwe out of the Soviet sphere of influ-ence and the need to use the Zimbabwean “rec-onciliation” experience to allay white SouthAfrican fears regarding postapartheid SouthAfrica no doubt greatly influenced Westernforeign policy toward Zimbabwe in the 1980s—especially with regard to ignoring Gukura-hundi and the ZANU-PF’s authoritarian incli-nations.

With those Western fears removed, how-ever, the ZANU-PF became more vulnerableto Western criticism and declining Westernaid. At the same time, the Zimbabwean econ-omy was faltering and with the postindepen-dence honeymoon definitively over, the

ZANU-PF government faced growing oppo-sition from trade unions and student organi-zations. The Zimbabwean government hadto do something to bolster the economy.

In that context, the ZANU-PF governmentembraced the International Monetary Fund’sEconomic Structural Adjustment Program. In1992, the IMF made the first disbursement ofUS$216 million. Further amounts of US$65million, US$76 million, and US$75 million fol-lowed in 1993, 1994, and 1995.32 The stated goalof those loans was the liberalization of theZimbabwean economy, which I saw as a possibleprelude to political liberalization in the country:

Economic liberalization and politi-cal protectionism are incompatible.

It goes without saying that trade lib-eralization and structural adjustmentcannot work in a vacuum. The experi-ence of the world is that genuinedemocracies have the strongest econ-omies. Economic liberalization will notwork in Zimbabwe unless governmentabandons its policy of political protec-tionism. I need to stress that I am notsaying that economic liberalization willnot work in Zimbabwe. I am simply say-ing that unless government is encour-aged to bring about genuine democracyin Zimbabwe and liberalize the politicalenvironment, the long-term economicoutlook for Zimbabwe will be bleak. . . .Without the free flow of information,even if controls in the economy arerelaxed corruption will continue toflourish. Corruption can only be stifledif there is a free flow of information,through ongoing investigative report-ing which exposes corruption. I believethat corruption is an epidemic which ifallowed to continue will undermine theentire economy, and it is thereforeimperative, if trade liberalization is towork, that it be brought under control.. . . The history of Africa and other devel-oping countries shows that undemocra-tic Governments are inevitably followedby increased corruption, increased infla-

12

The administra-tion has tried to

control the supply of food

because by doingso it is able to usefood as a political

weapon.

tion and eventual economic decline.The only people who flourish are theGovernment Ministers, the externallybased shareholders of multi-nationalsand the privileged few Chief Executivesof locally based companies who havemanaged to illegally obtain foreign cur-rency. Because of this I believe that if weare genuinely interested in a future inZimbabwe and a sound economic out-look we need to take a serious long termview and consider what we as businesspeople can do to ensure that economicliberalization is accompanied by politi-cal liberalization. . . . I believe that unlessthese points are seriously considered . . .a bright economic future in Zimbabwewill at the least be severely retarded ifnot reversed completely.33

The initial moves toward liberalization ofthe Zimbabwean economy in the 1990s werereversed to the point where Zimbabwe today isthe least free of the 141 economies around theworld measured by the Fraser Institute’sEconomic Freedom of the World report. The polit-ical atmosphere in the country has alsobecome progressively more repressive. Thefunds it received from the international finan-cial institutions partly enabled the ZANU-PFto consolidate power. Furthermore, the for-eign aid money that flowed to the politicaland business elite created a more obvious eco-nomic gulf between the ruling elite and itssupporters—in particular the veterans of theRhodesian civil war. The creation of that gulfwas to have serious repercussions.

1997: The Point of No ReturnIn 1997, three events occurred that set the

stage for the current crisis. First, the war veter-ans loyal to the ZANU-PF became increasinglydisgruntled with the widening wealth gapbetween themselves and the ruling elite. In aneffort to placate them, Mugabe agreed to payhuge pensions and other benefits. Second, in aneffort to protect mining investments made bythe members of the Zimbabwean ruling elite inthe Democratic Republic of Congo, Mugabe

ordered the costly deployment of thousands ofZimbabwean troops to the DRC to prop up theregime of Laurent Kabila. Third, toward theend of the year, the government finally movedon its threat to acquire vast tracts of land heldby white commercial farmers.

The combination of those three events ledto the dramatic crash of the Zimbabwean dol-lar in November 1997 and to the beginning ofthe Zimbabwean economy’s downward spiral.That, in turn, spurred trade unions and civilsociety to create a broad-based political oppo-sition that culminated in the formation of theMovement for Democratic Change in Septem-ber 1999. For the first time since the demise ofNkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union inDecember 1987, the ZANU-PF faced real polit-ical opposition.

The ZANU-PF government had built up anelaborate façade of democracy over manyyears. Moreover, much of the internationalcommunity saw Mugabe as an icon of libera-tion. The façade of democracy and Mugabe’sstature came crashing down in the aftermathof a 2000 referendum on a new constitutionthat Mugabe proposed and lost. Appearing onnational television shortly after the result wasannounced, Mugabe said he would accept theresult, but he was clearly shocked and apoplec-tic. He soon turned on his opponents.

The benefit of hindsight has now clarifiedthat the ZANU-PF dramatically underestimat-ed the civic body that coordinated the “No”vote—the National Constitutional Assembly.The government assumed that the NCA onlyheld sway in the country’s urban areas, wherea minority of the electorate resided. TheZANU-PF was shocked to realize that some500,000 commercial agricultural laborers hadoverwhelmingly voted “No.” With a generalelection scheduled for April 2000, the ZANU-PF was suddenly thrown into disarray becauseit faced the real prospect of losing that electionand its power. Furthermore, the success of theNCA in winning the vote gave a huge boost tothe newly formed MDC.

The ZANU-PF Turns on Its EnemiesSince the 2000 referendum, the ZANU-PF

13

The response of most Africangovernments isbest described asa state of denialor paralysis.

has systematically torn down the elaboratefaçade of democracy that it carefully con-structed in the first two decades of its rule. Indirect response to its sense of vulnerability, theZANU-PF began to erode civil liberties in Zim-babwe. In doing so, the ZANU-PF has reactedrather than acting in accordance with a delib-erate, well-calculated plan. The only underly-ing goal of the new policies was to hold ontopower. The ZANU-PF has achieved that goalwith two broad tactics. First, it attacked what-ever institution it deemed to support theopposition. Second, it maintained its coresupport through the confiscation and redis-tribution of privately owned assets.

The ZANU-PF set out to break the oppo-sition’s ability to organize and mobilize thehuge swing vote of the commercial agricul-tural workers. Recognizing that the urbanvote was a lost cause, the party felt it couldstill win elections if all rural voters supportedit because the majority of voters were in therural areas. However, in the referendum, farmworkers and agricultural employers hadjoined forces to vote against the government.If they were allowed to do so in the parlia-mentary elections, they would tip the balancein favor of the opposition.

Accordingly, Mugabe postponed the elec-tions scheduled for April 2000, and theZANU-PF began to systematically disrupt theopposition’s ability to organize in commercialfarming areas. Almost overnight, the ZANU-PF supporters—spearheaded by war veteransand coordinated by the military—startedinvading privately held farms. Initially, theZANU-PF harassed the farm workers, butwhen that action failed to break the opposi-tion’s ability to organize, Mugabe’s forcesgradually notched up the violence against theopposition. In early April 2000, Mugabe’sthugs killed the first opposition activists andlater that month they killed the first whitefarmers. The first two murders of white farm-ers, chillingly well and gruesomely executed,struck fear into the hearts and minds of thefarming community. By the time the electionwas finally held in June 2000, support hadwaned for the opposition in the rural areas.

Although the opposition swept the board inthe urban areas, on average obtaining over 75percent of the vote, the ZANU-PF narrowlywon the election, securing 62 of the 120 seatscontested.

In the latter half of 2000, both the opposi-tion and the Commercial Farmers Unionturned to the courts for redress. The opposi-tion filed more than 30 electoral challenges toseats won by the ZANU-PF. The CFU obtaineda landmark judgment in the Supreme Courtthat challenged the legality of the govern-ment’s land reform program. In 2001, the gov-ernment responded by turning its attention tothe judiciary. By mid-2001, Chief JusticeAntony Gubbay, who was threatened withphysical violence, resigned. Mugabe replacedhim with a judge sympathetic to the govern-ment. The original judgment obtained by theCFU was reversed, and the newly constitutedSupreme Court rubber-stamped the govern-ment’s blatantly unlawful land reform pro-gram. During the same period, parliamentpassed two laws—the Rural Land Occupiers(Protection from Eviction) Act and the LandAcquisition Amendment Act—giving “legal”cover to illegal occupation of farms.34

During 2001, the ZANU-PF systematicallyundermined the independence of the judicia-ry. That activity led to a delay in the adjudica-tion of the electoral challenges brought by theopposition and ensured that the ZANU-PFcandidates, who had won illegally, did not losetheir seats. In the immediate run-up to the2002 presidential election, the ZANU-PFturned its attention back to the oppositionMDC. In November 2001, police detained sev-eral MDC leaders and activists on trumped-upcharges. The government passed three newparliamentary acts immediately before theMarch 2002 presidential election. The PublicOrder and Security Act hindered the opposi-tion’s ability to organize meetings, and theGeneral Laws Amendment Act facilitated rig-ging of the election. The Access to Infor-mation and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)intimidated the independent print media,enabling the government to shut it down ifnecessary.35

14

Mugabe’s government sent

soldiers intoMatabeleland,

where they proceeded to

murder approxi-mately 20,000

civilians.

At the same time, the government broughtin senior army officers to manage the electoralprocess. Shortly before the election, the seniorarmy officers held a press conference sayingthat they would not serve under the opposi-tion presidential candidate Morgan Tsvan-girai. Finally, a few weeks before the election,the government arrested Tsvangirai on trea-son charges.

According to the official results, Mugabewon the 2002 poll by 418,809 votes. The elec-tion was marred by numerous irregularitiesand condemned by a wide variety of interna-tional organizations and governments. Asubsequent audit of the electoral materialsrevealed massive irregularities and pointed toMugabe’s having lost the election—albeit by anarrow margin.36

Just as the 2000 referendum result came asa shock to the ZANU-PF, so did the 2002 pres-idential election result. For two years prior tothe presidential election, the repressive appara-tus of the state had murdered, tortured, andintimidated the opposition. The governmentdisrupted the commercial farm workers’ orga-nization and intimidated the farm owners intowithdrawing their support for the MDC.Nevertheless, the opposition’s support had re-mained strong. Significantly, although somefarmers had been summarily evicted from theirfarms, the majority of white commercial farm-ers were still in possession of their farms andproducing.

At that juncture the ZANU-PF decided itneeded to do more to remain in power. Al-though no serious political commentator woulddispute the obvious historical inequities in land-holdings and the need to redress them, it isdoubtful that the ZANU-PF initially intended todestroy commercial agriculture. In statementsmade between the 1980s and 2001, the ZANU-PF spoke about acquiring 8 million hectares ofsome 14 million hectares owned by white com-mercial farmers in 2000. During parliamentarydebates regarding the Land Acquisition Actamendments, government ministers repeatedlydenied that their intention was to ethnicallycleanse Zimbabwe of white commercial farmers.Immediately after the 2002 election, however, the

ZANU-PF realized that as long as a significantnumber of white commercial farmers remainedon the land, the slide in the party’s rural supportwould continue.

In April 2002, the government started sys-tematically to evict farmers throughout thecountry. A new amendment to the LandAcquisition Act rendered farm owners’ contin-ued occupation of farms illegal.37 In August2002, the government ordered the police toarrest farmers who still occupied their landand allocated the most productive farms inthe country to cabinet ministers, judges, armycommanders, and other members of theZANU-PF elite. Mugabe swept aside any pre-tence that the land reform program wasmeant predominantly to address the plight oflandless peasants. The ruling elite started cher-ry-picking the best farms, going as far as todisplace the war veterans and peasants whohad occupied the farms earlier.

The government’s attack on the opposi-tion MDC continued in the courts. Much ofthe focus against the opposition centered onthe treason trials involving Tsvangirai andthe MDC secretary general Welshman Ncubethat ultimately culminated in their acquittalin November 2004. A March 2004 reportshowed that 90 percent of the MDC mem-bers of parliament (MPs) elected in June 2000had suffered some human rights violation;24 percent survived murder attempts and 42percent had been tortured. State agents mur-dered three MDC MPs.38 At the same time,the systematic killings, torture, and deten-tion of MDC supporters continued. By theend of 2004, more than 600 MDC supportershad been murdered—often by known stateagents. Thousands more had been tortured,assaulted, or otherwise harmed. Since 2000,not a single suspect has been tried let aloneconvicted for any of those crimes.

In 2003, Mugabe used the AIPPA to elimi-nate the last remnants of Zimbabwe’s free press.In 2001, a bomb destroyed the printing press ofan independent newspaper called the DailyNews. Remarkably, the newspaper managed tocontinue publishing. In September 2003, how-ever, the government used the AIPPA to revoke

15

The moment heloses powerMugabe will beindicted forcrimes againsthumanity.

the license that the paper needed to continueoperating.

Using Food Aid as a WeaponIn the course of 2003 and 2004, the gov-

ernment started to use another weapon—theselective distribution of food. Corn is the sta-ple diet of most Zimbabweans. Farmers ofsmall-scale communal plots who kept mostof their crop for their own consumption grewmost of the corn in Zimbabwe. Until theywere dispossessed under the land reform pro-gram, large-scale commercial farmers pro-duced the bulk of the corn marketed throughthe state-run Grain Marketing Board. Since2001, Zimbabwe has had to import about amillion tons of corn every year to make up forthe shortfall (see Figure 8).39

As the large-scale growers’ operations wereclosed down, the loss of business affected themany service suppliers, warehouses, distribu-tors, and workshops that used to operate fromall the small farming-area towns. Because mostof those businesses were forced to close, theloss of their services has severely affected thesmall-scale communal farmers as well. The

same business decline undermined all theefforts to make successful farmers of all thosewho were allocated land under the land reformprogram.

In 2004, with shortages of the staple foodbecoming the norm, the ZANU-PF imposedtight controls on the sale and distribution ofcorn, effectively giving itself control over thedistribution of the increasingly scarce com-modity. That proved to be a particularly effec-tive political weapon in the run-up to the 2005parliamentary general election.40

Although a few token changes were madeto the electoral laws before the 2005 poll, allthe main legislative components that enabledthe manipulation of the electoral process weremaintained. Not surprisingly, whereas theopposition retained all but one of the contest-ed urban seats, it lost ground in the ruralareas. Because of the failure of the judicialprocess following the 2000 and 2002 elections,the opposition did not mount any seriouslegal challenge to the results.

Despite the government’s many attacks onthe opposition, the MDC retained effective con-trol of every urban center after the 2005 election.

16

Zimbabwe today is the least

free of the 141economies

around the worldmeasured by the

Economic Freedomof the World

report.

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007


Land reform

Figure 8Corn Production, 1975–2007


Tons

Pro

duce

d

Reacting to that election result, the governmentlaunched Operation Murambatsvina againstthe urban poor who formed the core of theopposition’s support base. As previously men-tioned, the operation rendered some 700,000people jobless or homeless. In doing so, it dealtthe economy another devastating blow.

In August 2005 the government sealed thefate of white commercial farmers with the pas-sage of Constitutional Amendment no. 17,which removed any remaining right of thecommercial farmers to have the courts adjudi-cate the confiscation of their properties.

Mugabe’s New Enemy: The Economy

The government has compromised theindependence of the judiciary, destroyed theproductivity of the white commercial farm-ing sector, and weakened the opposition, butnow it has a new enemy—the falling econo-my. Zimbabwe faces skyrocketing inflationand rapidly rising government domestic

debt. Because the precipitous fall in econom-ic activity during recent years has limited taxrevenue, the budget deficit seems certain torise well above the already unacceptable levelof 60 percent of GDP.41 Similarly, Figure 9shows the recent explosion of the govern-ment’s domestic debt in nominal terms.

Because of the worsening economic situa-tion, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zim-babwe, Gideon Gono, proposed a solution in theform of a new “social contract.” His intentionwas to achieve an agreement among business,labor, and government to hold prices, wages, andgovernment spending constant. They reachedagreement on June 1, 2007, but a mere two weekslater a huge spike in inflation caused the agree-ment to fall apart (see Figure 10).

The government’s reaction was to accusethe business sector of being part of a “regimechange” agenda sponsored by the West. Thegovernment ordered a 50 percent cut in theprices of basic commodities and, backed bymilitia groups, police launched raids on busi-nesses to ensure that they were complyingwith the order. Thousands of managers were

17

The funds itreceived from the internationalfinancial institutions partly enabledthe ZANU-PF to consolidate power.

0

1,000,000,000

2,000,000,000

3,000,000,000

4,000,000,000

5,000,000,000

6,000,000,000

7,000,000,000

8,000,000,000

9,000,000,000

January6, 2006

July 6,2007

Interest on treasury billsTreasury bills issue

Figure 9Government Domestic Debt, January 6, 2006–July 6, 2007


Zim

babw

e D

olla

rs '0

00

detained countrywide. At the same time, in apractice reminiscent of the farm invasions,the army, police, and ZANU-PF supportersstormed shops and availed themselves ofgoods worth billions of Zimbabwean dollars.Inevitably, supplies have dried up,42 rapidlyexacerbating the humanitarian crisis withfood becoming scarcer than ever.

In November 2007, the parliament passedan Indigenization Bill. Ostensibly, that bill isdesigned to rectify—27 years after indepen-dence—the injustices caused by white colonialrule. The bill, yet to be signed into law byMugabe, obliges every business to be con-trolled through a majority shareholding by“indigenous” or nonwhite Zimbabweans. Thenet effect of this measure will be to ensure thatno white person can ever own a business inZimbabwe again. It will also ensure that noforeign investor can ever control a business inZimbabwe again.

The bill should be viewed as a measuredesigned to ensure that largely urban-basedbusinesses, which have generally supportedthe opposition, are transferred into the con-

trol of people more sympathetic to the gov-ernment. If the land reform program is anyindication, the ZANU-PF will also use theIndigenization Bill to reward its supporters.Just as the main beneficiaries of the landreform program have been the ruling elite,lucrative white and foreign-controlled busi-nesses are likely to end up in the hands of theruling elite. Moreover, one can reasonablyassume that the new owners of those busi-nesses will run them down as badly as theydid the formerly highly productive farmsthey have destroyed over the last seven years.

The Way Forward

The world has rightly laid most of the blamefor the Zimbabwean catastrophe at the door ofMugabe and his ZANU-PF government. How-ever, the international community must acceptthat it is complicit in one respect. Internationalfinancial institutions and Western aid agenciespoured billions of U.S. dollars into Zimbabwe.There is very little to show for all that money in

18

By the end of 2004, more

than 600 MDC supporters had

been murdered—often by known

state agents.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Figure 10Inflation, 2000–2007


Cha

nge

on S

ame

Mon

th P

revi

ous

Yea

r, %

Zimbabwe today. The truth is that the ZANU-PF used much of that money to consolidatepower and to suppress its subjects. At the sametime, the international community, especiallyother African countries, ignored very seriousdeficiencies in governance and in so doingassisted in the perpetuation of the culture ofimpunity and violence that has plaguedZimbabwean society for so long.

The humanitarian and economic crises areso severe now that a danger exists that the inter-national community will again act expedientlywithout helping Zimbabweans address the rootcauses of Zimbabwe’s malaise. As calamitous asthe situation is, Zimbabwe remains a countrywith enormous potential, but she will neverreach that potential unless Zimbabweans makesome difficult decisions and agree to respectcertain fundamental principles.

Any political settlement brokered by theinternational community, South Africa inparticular, must have certain essential ingre-dients.

At the root of Zimbabwe’s problems is itshighly deficient constitution. In particular, thevast disparity of power between the executive,on the one hand, and the legislature and thejudiciary, on the other hand, has contributed tothe gross abuses that have destroyed Zimbab-we. A new democratic constitution must beagreed to through a process embraced by allZimbabweans. That constitution must balancepower among the three arms of governmentand ensure that the independence of the mediais greatly strengthened. It must also create newinstitutions to support democracy, such as anindependent electoral commission. When thenew constitution has been legislated and theinstitutions mentioned have been established,any international aid should help strengthenthose institutions.

The current constitution has enabled theZimbabwean government to become all-perva-sive. Its tentacles extend into every aspect of soci-ety and indeed the notion of a large governmentthat meddles in every aspect of Zimbabweans’lives has become a part of Zimbabwean culture.As has been vividly demonstrated in the last fewmonths in the context of the price controls, gov-

ernment’s involvement in the operation of everybusiness, school, university, and sporting insti-tution has had deleterious consequences for theZimbabwean economy. Any new constitutionmust support Zimbabwe’s need for limited gov-ernment. Outside aid and advice should focuson helping Zimbabwe create a legal and regula-tory framework in which the private sector canflourish without unnecessary impediments.

The vast majority of Zimbabweans live inreservoirs of poverty known as communalareas. The people living there have no title totheir land, and their material circumstanceshave greatly deteriorated during the 27 yearsof the ZANU-PF rule. That arrangement hashelped the ruling elite keep those ruralZimbabweans subservient to the government.As Moeletsi Mbeki, the South African com-mentator, has observed, the fundamentalproblem facing Africa’s development is theenormous power imbalance between the polit-ical elite and key private-sector producers.Until the structural powerlessness of produc-ers is addressed, no meaningful developmentwill occur in sub-Saharan Africa. As Mbekiputs it, “It is therefore necessary that peasants,who constitute the core of the private sector insub-Saharan Africa, become the real owners oftheir primary asset—land.”43 Zimbabwe is nodifferent. A commitment, therefore, must bemade to respect existing title and to extendtitle to the vast majority of Zimbabweans liv-ing in communal areas.

Zimbabwe cannot move forward withoutaddressing its past. Although the fear thatMugabe and the ZANU-PF ruling elite have offuture prosecution may be the single biggestobstacle to securing a peaceful transition todemocracy, future stability in Zimbabwe willnot be assured until the ghosts of the past havebeen laid to rest. The first necessary step in thisprocess will be the establishment of a TruthCommission that will provide an opportunityfor victims to explain what has happened tothem over the last several decades. Such a com-mission must also allow them to say what mea-sures they believe are necessary to achieve mean-ingful justice and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. Itis important that such a Truth Commission go

19

Any new constitution must supportZimbabwe’s need for limited government.

back to 1965, when Ian Smith’s RhodesianFront announced its unilateral declaration ofindependence from Great Britain. Going backthat far is necessary, because the deepest roots ofZimbabwe’s current problems go back to thetime when the intransigence of the white minor-ity government radicalized the Black Nationalistmovement, which, in turn, set the stage for thebitter liberation struggle waged in the 1970s.

The sine qua non for the restoration ofZimbabwe’s economy and institutions is thereturn to Zimbabwe of the millions of skilledand educated Zimbabweans who have left thecountry over the last three decades. Withouttheir skills, the Zimbabwean economy cannotgrow to full potential. International humani-tarian organizations could help fund the returnof these expatriates to Zimbabwe.

Notes1. John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,”Robertson Economic Information Services forZimbabwean Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw. Most government statistics in Zimbabwe areeither unavailable or unreliable; however, theauthor greatly benefited from the exceptional helpreceived from John Robertson during the prepara-tion of this paper. He is a widely recognized author-ity on the Zimbabwean economy.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Anna Kajamula Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope andImpact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN SpecialEnvoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe,United Nations, July 18, 2005, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/zimbabwe/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. See following text for census figures andpopulation estimates for Zimbabwe.

9. Shakeman Mugari, “Zimbabwe: IMF EstimatesInflation at 150 000 Percent,” allAfrica.com, Jan-uary 18, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200801180772.html.

10. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact-book—Iraq, February 2008, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html.

11. See following text for census figures and pop-ulation estimates for Zimbabwe.

12. Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper.”

13. United Nations Development Program, HumanDevelopment Report 2007/2008 (New York: UnitedNations, 2007).

14. World Health Organization, World Health Report2006: Working Together for Health (Geneva: WHO,2006), Annex Table 1, http://www.who.int/whr/2006/annex/06_annex1_en.pdf.

15. Chris McGreal, “Mr Njini Lived to 45. He Wasan Old Man,” Guardian (London), July 17, 2007,http://www.guardian.co.uk/insideafrica/story/0,,2210214,00.html; Daniel Howden, “Zimbabwe’sBad Practice: 3,500 Dead Each Week as MeltdownLooms,” Independent (London), December 1, 2006,http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article2029300.ece.

16. R.W. Johnson, “In Time of Famine,” LondonReview of Books, February 22, 2007, pp. 32–33.

17. Associated Press, “Hundreds Killed in Attacksin Eastern Chad: U.N. Agency Says SudaneseMilitia Destroyed Villages,” quoted in WashingtonPost, April 11, 2007, p. A10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/10/AR2007041001775.html.

18. Central Statistical Office of the Governmentof Zimbabwe, “Zimbabwe Demographic andHealth Survey 2005–2006: Preliminary Report,”July 2006, http://harare.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/ErYMhCdkkmrjnsEXXPytlA/Zimbabwe_Preliminary-A4_paper.pdf.

19. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2006 Report on the Global Aids Epidemic(Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS, 2006), http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/Default.asp.

20. This conclusion is based on (1) the relativelysmall budget figure for health; (2) the direct evi-dence the author has seen in Zimbabwean hospi-tals, together with numerous reports received fromgovernment doctors; (3) the numerous reports inthe press over the last few years; (4) the evidencefrom constituents who report a total lack of accessto medication; and (5) a report made to the authorby a Médecins Sans Frontières doctor 18 monthsago, who estimated that only some 6,000 people

20

A commitmentmust be made to

respect existingtitle and to extend

title to the vastmajority of

Zimbabweans.

were on full-time courses of antiretroviral drugscountrywide.

21. World Food Programme, “Zimbabwe: FoodSecurity Overview,” http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=716.

22. The Famine Early Warning Systems Networkpredicts and responds to famines in sub-SaharanAfrica. It has been funded by the U.S. Agency forInternational Development since FEWSNET’screation in 1986.

23. Famine Early Warning Systems Network,“Economic Decline, Poor Harvest Cause Signifi-cant Decrease in Food Insecurity,” August 9, 2007,http://v4.fews.net/docs/Publications/1001381.pdf.

24. See Craig J. Richardson, “The Loss of PropertyRights and the Collapse of Zimbabwe,” CatoJournal 25, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 541–65

25. “Interview with Robert Mugabe,” Sky Television,May 24, 2004, http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,15410-1136554,00.html.

26. Kwashiorkor is a type of malnutrition believedto be caused by insufficient protein intake. Ittends to affect children between one and fouryears of age.

27. Richardson, “The Loss of Property Rights andthe Collapse of Zimbabwe.”

28. Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay onEntitlement and Deprivation (Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversity Press, 1983).

29. Gukurahundi is a Shona-language expressionmeaning “the rain that washes away the chaffbefore the spring rains.”

30. Joshua Nkomo, The Story of My Life (London:Methuen Press, 1984), p. 237. See also CatholicCommission for Justice and Peace and the LegalResources Foundation, Breaking the Silence, BuildingTrue Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabele-land and the Midlands, 1980–1988 (Harare, Zimbab-we: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace andthe Legal Resources Foundation, 1999), http://www.sokwanele.com/pdfs/BTS.pdf.

31. Judith Garfield Todd, Through the Darkness (CapeTown, South Africa: Zebra Press, 2007), pp. 83–84.

32. “IMF Facilities to Zimbabwe,” The New AfricanMagazine 465 (2007): 123.

33. David Coltart, “Economic Liberalisation:Political Protectionism?” (presentation at KPMGPeat Marwick seminar, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, May

1991). The full speech can be read at www.david-coltart.com in the May 1991 archives.

34. Act 13 of 2001; Act 14 of 2001.

35. Act 1 of 2002; Act 2 of 2002; Act 5 of 2002.

36. “Inspection and Analysis of the Voting ResiduePertaining to the 2002 Presidential Elections,”Movement for Democratic Change Legal AffairsDepartment, January 2006.

37. Act 6 of 2002.

38. Playing with Fire: Personal Accounts of HumanRights Abuses Experienced by 50 Opposition Members ofParliament in Zimbabwe, and 28 Opposition ElectionCandidates (Johannesburg: Zimbabwe Institute,March 2004), http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/reports/playing_with_fire.pdf.

39. The ZANU-PF has a long history of using food asa political weapon. During the Gukurahundi, forexample, the government imposed a curfew on theMatabeleland South Province, which at that time wassuffering from drought. The government literallystarved the people into submission. See CatholicCommission for Justice and Peace and the LegalResources Foundation, Breaking the Silence, BuildingTrue Peace, p. 56. Also in 2002, in a by-election inMatabeleland South, the ZANU-PF deliberatelythreatened to withhold food from the population ifthey voted for the opposition. See “Zimbabwe Augustto October 2002: Voting ZANU for Food: RuralDistrict Council and Insiza Elections,” Physicians forHuman Rights, Denmark, November 20, 2002,http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/non-phr/report-zanufood-2002 .doc.

40. Since 2005, the ZANU-PF has imposed militarydiscipline on the farmers in specified intensive-con-servation and irrigated-land areas. The NationalArmy directs “Operation Maguta,” or full stom-achs, and the Department of Prison Services assistswith labor. They have been directed to cultivate 1.25million hectares for the 2008 crops. The operationhas been an unmitigated disaster.

41. John Robertson, Robertson Economic Infor-mation Services for Zimbabwean Statistics, personalcommunication with author, January 2008.

42. On August 31, 2007, Mugabe used the con-troversial Presidential Powers Act to legislate fur-ther price, wage, and fee controls in another des-perate measure to stem inflation.

43. Moeletsi Mbeki, “Underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the Private Sector andPolitical Elites,” Cato Institute Foreign PolicyBriefing no. 85, April 15, 2005, p. 9.

21

STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES

613. The Grass Is Not Always Greener: A Look at National Health Care Systems Around the World by Michael Tanner (March 18, 2008)

612. Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification: Franz Kafka’s Solution to Illegal Immigration by Jim Harper (March 5, 2008)

611. Parting with Illusions: Developing a Realistic Approach to Relations with Russia by Nikolas Gvosdev (February 29, 2008)

610. Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq by Benjamin H. Friedman, Harvey M. Sapolsky, and Christopher Preble (February 13, 2008)

609. What to Do about Climate Change by Indur M. Goklany (February 5, 2008)

608. Cracks in the Foundation: NATO’s New Troubles by Stanley Kober (January 15, 2008)

607. The Connection between Wage Growth and Social Security’s FinancialCondition by Jagadeesh Gokhale (December 10, 2007)

606. The Planning Tax: The Case against Regional Growth-Management Planning by Randal O’Toole (December 6, 2007)

605. The Public Education Tax Credit by Adam B. Schaeffer (December 5, 2007)

604. A Gift of Life Deserves Compensation: How to Increase Living KidneyDonation with Realistic Incentives by Arthur J. Matas (November 7, 2007)

603. What Can the United States Learn from the Nordic Model? by Daniel J. Mitchell (November 5, 2007)

602. Do You Know the Way to L.A.? San Jose Shows How to Turn an UrbanArea into Los Angeles in Three Stressful Decades by Randal O’Toole (October 17, 2007)

601. The Freedom to Spend Your Own Money on Medical Care: A Common Casualty of Universal Coverage by Kent Masterson Brown (October 15, 2007)

600. Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War by Justin Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter (September 13, 2007)

599. End It, Don’t Mend It: What to Do with No Child Left Behind by Neal McCluskey and Andrew J. Coulson (September 5, 2007)

598. Don’t Increase Federal Gasoline Taxes—Abolish Them by Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren (August 7, 2007)

597. Medicaid’s Soaring Cost: Time to Step on the Brakes by Jagadeesh Gokhale (July 19, 2007)

596. Debunking Portland: The City That Doesn’t Work by Randal O’Toole (July 9, 2007)

595. The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly by David A. Hyman (June 28, 2007)

594. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policiesby Bryan Caplan (May 29, 2007)

593. Federal Aid to the States: Historical Cause of Government Growth and Bureaucracy by Chris Edwards (May 22, 2007)

592. The Corporate Welfare State: How the Federal Government Subsidizes U.S. Businesses by Stephen Slivinski (May 14, 2007)

591. The Perfect Firestorm: Bringing Forest Service Wildfire Costs under Control by Randal O’Toole (April 30, 2007)

590. In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It Imply for Policy? by Will Wilkinson (April 11, 2007)

589. Energy Alarmism: The Myths That Make Americans Worry about Oil by Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (April 5, 2007)

588. Escaping the Trap: Why the United States Must Leave Iraq by Ted Galen Carpenter (February 14, 2007)

587. Why We Fight: How Public Schools Cause Social Conflict by Neal McCluskey (January 23, 2007)

586. Has U.S. Income Inequality Really Increased? by Alan Reynolds (January 8, 2007)

585. The Cato Education Market Index by Andrew J. Coulson with advisers James Gwartney, Neal McCluskey, John Merrifield, David Salisbury, and Richard Vedder (December 14, 2006)

ANNE APPLEBAUMWASHINGTON POST

GURCHARAN DASFORMER CEO, PROCTER

& GAMBLE, INDIA

ARNOLD HARBERGERUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

AT LOS ANGELES

FRED HUGOLDMAN SACHS, ASIA

PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKIFORMER PRIME MINISTER OF PERU

DEEPAK LALUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

AT LOS ANGELES

JOSÉ PIÑERAFORMER MINISTER OF LABOR AND

SOCIAL SECURITY, CHILE

T he Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity was established to promotea better understanding around the world of the benefits of market-lib-eral solutions to some of the most pressing problems faced by develop-

ing nations. In particular, the center seeks to advance policies that protect humanrights, extend the range of personal choice, and support the central role of eco-nomic freedom in ending poverty. Scholars in the center address a range of economic development issues, including economic growth, international finan-cial crises, the informal economy, policy reform, the effectiveness of official aid agencies, public pension privatization, the transition from socialism to the mar-ket, and globalization.

For more information on the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, visit www.cato.org/economicliberty/.

Nothing in this Development Policy Analysis should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the

Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity or the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of

any bill before Congress. Contact the Cato Institute for reprint permission. Additional copies of Development

Policy Analysis are $6 each ($3 for five or more). To order, contact the Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts

Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC, 20001, (202) 842-0200, fax (202) 842-3490, www.cato.org.

OTHER STUDIES ON DEVELOPMENT FROM THE CATO INSTITUTE

BOARD OF ADVISERS

“Fifteen Years of Transformation in the Post-Communist World: Rapid Reformers OutperformedGradualists” by Oleh Havrylyshyn, Development Policy Analysis no. 4 (November 9, 2007)

“Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap Forward for Stability and Growth” by ZhuKeliang and Roy Prosterman, Development Policy Analysis no. 3 (October 15, 2007)

“Troubling Signs for South African Democracy under the ANC” by Marian L. Tupy, DevelopmentPolicy Briefing Paper no. 3 (April 25, 2007)

“Kenya’s Fight against Corruption: An Uneven Path to Political Accountability” by John Githongo,Development Policy Briefing Paper no. 2 (March 15, 2007)

“A Second Look at Microfinance: The Sequence of Growth and Credit in Economic History” byThomas Dichter, Development Policy Briefing Paper no. 1 (February 15, 2007)

“Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela” by GustavoCoronel, Development Policy Analysis no. 2 (November 27, 2006)

“The Rise of Populist Parties in Central Europe: Big Government, Corruption, and the Threat toLiberalism” by Marian L. Tupy, Development Policy Analysis no. 1 (November 8, 2006)

“Foreign Aid and the Weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda” by Andrew Mwenda,Foreign Policy Briefing no. 88 (July 12, 2006)

Documents

A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe - Cato Institute