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A Critical Look at Major Bus Improvements in Latin America and Asia: Case Studies of Hitches, Hic-Ups and Areas for Improvement; Synthesis of Lessons Learned

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A CRITICAL LOOK AT MAJOR BUS IMPROVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA: CASE STUDIES OF HITCHES, HIC-UPS AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT;

SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED

DARIO HIDALGO1 PAULO CUSTODIO2

PIERRE GRAFTIEAUX3

ABSTRACT

This study provides a review of planning, implementation, and operation of bus system’s improvements in eleven cities in Latin America and Asia, with a focus on problems and shortcomings. Cities selected in this review improved transport conditions either through citywide bus reorganizations (Sao Paulo, Santiago) or improvements in selected corridors and areas of the city (Curitiba, Quito, Bogotá, León, México, Pereira, Guayaquil, Jakarta and Beijing). Both citywide reorganizations and corridor improvements include the introduction of Bus Rapid Transit elements. The reviewed systems improved the transport conditions for the commuters served and had other benefits -mainly pollution and accident reductions. The BRT corridors implemented show high performance (3,000-45,000 passengers/hour/direction) and are generally well received by the users, with relatively low capital investments (USD 1.4 million/km - USD 8.2 million/km) and small or no operational subsidies. Nevertheless, many things could have been done differently: implementation was generally rushed, financial and institutional sustainability was not necessarily assured, and, most of the times, the integration with the rest of the transport system and among some components was incomplete. There were also some problems with pavement and segregation devices and unsolved bottlenecks and conflicts with the general traffic. User education was also an issue, especially at systems initial operation and in large scale expansions. Most implementation problems have been gradually solved. The study incorporates detailed case studies based on site visits and interviews with stakeholders and provides specific recommendations for each system as well as general recommendations for planners and decision makers, especially in developing cities.

1 Transport Consultant, Bogotá, Colombia, [email protected] 2 Transport Consultant, Sao Paulo, Brasil, [email protected] 3 Madagascar and Mauritius Transport Cluster Leader, The World Bank, [email protected]


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INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to synthesize information from some developing cities that have implemented bus system improvements. Cities selected for this review are Curitiba, Sao Paulo, Quito, Guayaquil, Bogotá, Pereira, León, México, Santiago in Latin America and Jakarta and Beijing in Asia. These cities greatly differ in size and socio-economic characteristics; nevertheless, they all have substantial participation of buses in the total trips. The cities either have long term recognition of their transport and land use practices (Curitiba) or have completed bus systems improvements over the last 12 years, including the introduction of Bus Rapid Transit elements. The main focuses of this review are the problems and shortcomings of their planning, implementation and operation processes, in an attempt to help planners and decision makers to avoid or mitigate them when introducing this type of initiatives. This main report summarizes transversal issues elicited from case studies. These case studies are presented in separate documents and are the result of the review of available material, site visits and interviews with stakeholders, especially with members of implementation teams and operators. The main purpose of the interviews was to identify the problems faced, their origin, how they could have been avoided and how they were solved or will be addressed. This report is divided in three sections. The first section presents a general background of transit provision in the cities and technical, financial and performance information about the bus systems. The second section discusses transversal issues in planning, implementation and operation. In a final section conclusions and recommendations are provided. The study has been produced with the financial assistance of a grant from TRISP, a partnership between the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank, for learning and sharing of knowledge in the fields of transport and rural infrastructure services. BACKGROUND Previous to project implementation transport conditions in all cities were considered appalling. Most cities had total or major private provision of bus services under permits or concessions granted by the authorities. Except in Brazil and China, the traditional arrangement was semi-deregulated: fares, routes and types of buses were authorized by government agencies but planning, enforcement and control was weak. This traditional arrangement resulted in low cost services with ample coverage, but also led to an oversupply of buses, inadequate vehicle size, high average age of the fleet, long routes with inefficient operation, lack of vehicle and infrastructure maintenance, high levels of accidents and emissions, and very low speeds. The most salient characteristic of traditional transit services prior to project implementation in the


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reviewed cities was individual competition of vehicles for passengers known as “war of the penny” -- competition on the street (or competition in-the-market as transport economists usually refer to). Brazil, on the other hand, developed strong institutions and regulations to plan and manage the bus transit services at the local level, but still under private provision. China, in contrast, keeps transit provision under local public agencies. Services in Sao Paulo and Beijing were thought to be of poor quality: crowded, slow, and unreliable. Bus systems improvements reviewed here were aimed to change “business-as-usual” by the demonstration of something much better in small scale pilot corridors, in some cases aimed towards gradual implementation citywide and in others through large scale reorganizations (Sao Paulo, Santiago). All the systems reviewed here use the various elements of Bus Rapid Transit –BRT- to different degrees. In this study BRT is understood as the systematic combination of infrastructure (busways, stations, terminals), with organized operations and intelligent technologies to provide a higher quality experience than possible with traditional bus operation (Diaz, et. al, 2004). The precise mix of the BRT elements depended on the local market, the operational and physical application environment and available resources. Table 1 presents summary information of the selected bus systems. The main indicators for systems performance and costs are summarized Figures 1 to 9. The systems range from a total demand of 8.6 Million passengers per weekday -Interligado, Sao Paulo- to relatively small corridors in Quito -Ecovía, 81,000 passengers per weekday- and Beijing -Beijing BRT, 80,000 passengers per weekday (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Selected Demand Figures (2006)

1,200,000

246,000

81,000

120,000

1,220,000

8,565,000

220,000

260,000

110,000

80,000

155,000

96,000

4,280,000

0 1,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000 4,000,000 5,000,000 6,000,000 7,000,000 8,000,000 9,000,000

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito

TransMilenio, Bogota

Interligado, Sao Paulo

SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira

Metrovía, Guayaquil

Transantiago

Demand (pax/weekday)

Note: Transantiago, Expected February 2007


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Table 1 Summary Information of Selected Bus Systems (2007)

City Project

(initial year) General Description

Supply/ Demand

Comments

Curitiba RIT (1973)

Citywide integrated system with five BRT corridors (65 Km median busways), 139 stations, 26 terminals: 340 Km of feeder routes, 185 Km of inter-district circular routes, 250 Km of ‘rapid buses” routes; 340 bus lines, 1,100 km of bus route

1,677 units, 114 bi-articulated diesel, articulated, conventional, small buses, special buses; electronic fare collection, 1.2 million pax/day

7 private operators under agreements with a public authority New BRT corridor under construction (22 km)

Quito Metrobus-Q (1995)

Three BRT corridors (37 Km median busways); 68 stations, 9 terminals; integrated feeder services; centralized control (each corridor)

189 articulated buses (113 trolley buses); 185 feeder buses; coin based fare collection; 440,000 pax/day

Public operator/ owner (Trole, Ecovía); Private Operator (North); no fare integration among corridors Discussion to replace Trole by a LRT

Bogotá TransMilenio (2000)

High capacity BRT system with 84 Km median busways; 104 stations; 10 integration points, integrated feeder services; advanced centralized control

841 articulated buses; 344 feeder buses; electronic fare collection system; 1,220,000 pax/day

Five private groups partially formed by some traditional operators - 7 trunk, 6 feeder zone concession contracts Three new corridors (27 km) being developed

Sao Paulo Interligado (2002)

Integrated system under single fare with BRT treatments in some corridors (Passa-Rapido) 104 km median busways; preferential bus lanes 327 transfer stations; 24 terminals

13,711 buses: Articulated 1,073; Padron 5,599; Conventional 2,423; Microbus 3,063; Minibus 1,553; Electronic fare collection system 5,761,000 pax/day

Private operators under concession contracts with the public agency SPTrans

León SIT-Optibús (2003)

Three BRT trunk corridors with 25 Km median busways (60% segregated); three terminals; 51 stations; integrated feeder services; centralized control

52 articulated buses; 500 auxiliary and feeder buses; electronic fare collection system; 220,000 pax/day

13 historic private concessionaries formed 4 new operators for trunk-ways and continue the operation of feeder services

México City Metrobús Insurgentes (2005)

One BRT Line 20 Km median busway; 34 stations, 2 terminals; centralized control using IT

84 articulated buses; electronic fare collection system; 260,000 pax/day

Two operators, one private, one public; physical integration with regional buses and Metro.


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Table 1 Summary Information of Selected Bus Systems (2007)

City Project

(initial year) General Description

Supply/ Demand

Comments

Jakarta Transjakarta (2004)

Three BRT trunk corridors with 37 km median busway, 4 terminals, 63 stations, poor integrated feeder, centralized control

162 12 m buses Electronic fare collection 110,000 pax/day

Two private operators, physical integration with commuter train and local buses

Beijing Beijing BRT (2005)

One BRT trunk corridor with 16 km median busway, one terminal, 19 stations, centralized control

60 articulated low floor buses Electronic fae collection 80,000 pax/day

One private operator Physical integration with metro

Pereira Megabus (2006)

27 km exclusive median busways (left side on one way streets in downtown), 38 stations, 2 terminals Centralized Control

51 Articulated Buses, 81 Small Feeder Buses, Electronic Fare Collection and Control 155,000 pax/day

2 private operators of buses, 1 fare collection concessionaire

Guayaquil Metrovía (2006)

15.5 km exclusive buslanes on the median or left side on one way streets, 36 stations, 2 terminals Centralized control

40 articulated buses and 10 conventional buses for trunk operations, 44 feeder buses Electronic fare collection system 96,000 pax/day

One private concessionaire of bus operations; one fare collector and technology provider System under expansion in 2007

Santiago Transantiago (2007)

18.8 km of segregated corridors, 4.6 km of new road connections, 62.7 km of improvements in road geometry and pavements (in seven corridors), 70 large bus shelters along the main corridors, and 2 intermodal stations 45 km expansion of Metro network

1,200 new low floor articulated buses, 1,500 conventional trunk buses (to be gradually replaced by new low floor buses), and 2,300 feeder buses. Integrated Electronic Fare Collection System.

Buses privately operated through 14 concession contracts. One private operator for financial management. One private operator for systems integration (control and user information) One public operator (Metro)

Sources: Curitiba: www.curitiba.pr.gov.br; Quito: http://www.quito.gov.ec/DMT/direccion.htm; Bogotá: http://www.transmilenio.gov.co; Sao Paulo Interligado, O Plano do Transporte Público em Implantacao na Gestao de 2001-04. Prefeitura do Municipio de Sao Paulo, 2004; “Sistema Integrado de Transporte Optibús”, Dirección General de Transporte, Municipalidad de León; Centro de Desarrollo Sustentable, “Metrobús: Bienvenidos a Bordo”, Movilidad Amable, Centro de Desarrollo Sustentable, México D.F., Septiembre de 2005; Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, “Making Transjakarta a World Class BRT System”, Final Recommendations, June 2005; Beijing Transportation Research Center, “BRT Demonstration Project BRT in South-Middle Corridor in Beijing”, Brief Report on Feasibility Study, September, 2003; Pereira: http://www.megabus.gov.co/megabus.html; Guayaquil: http://www.metrovia-gye.com/start.htm; Santiago; www.transantiago.cl; complemented with interviews 2006, 2007.


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Top corridor performance has been observed in Bogotá, with 45,000 passengers per hour per direction. Other high capacity corridors are the Passa-Rapido in Sao Paulo, and the Alameda in Santiago (around 20,000 passengers per hour per direction). High capacity systems have overtaking lanes at stations. Other corridors are between 3,000 and 13,000 passengers per hour per direction, with single lanes (Figure 2). Average commercial speeds are between 14 km/hour –Quito, Trolebús- and 26 km/hour -Bogotá, TransMilenio (Figure 3). Higher speeds are achieved as more BRT components are applied -segregated busways, enclosed stations, level boarding, prepayment, larger buses, express services, centralized control. Highest operational productivities4 have been observed in Quito (Trolebús and Ecovía) and México (Metrobús) which are reported to be above 10 passenger boardings per bus-km (Figure 4). Lowest productivities have been reported in Jakarta, Beijing and Bogotá (around 5 passenger boardings per bus-km. Still these relatively low figures are 5 times those observed in traditional systems operating in mixed traffic. Systems with high operational productivity also exhibit high capital productivity 5 . Mexico’s Metrobús reports more than 3,000 passengers per bus per weekday and Quito´s Trolebús and Ecovía report figures around 2,000 passengers per bus per weekday (Figure 5). Lowest capital productivity has been reported in Sao Paulo (Interligado) with 625 passengers per bus per day. Total capital costs vary from 1.35 million per km (Jakarta) to 8.2 million per kilometer (Bogotá) as shown in Figure 6. Systems with minor physical improvements to the roadway were in the range of USD 1.35 – 3.50 million/km. Systems with major reconstruction of corridor roadways and two lanes per direction (at least at stations) or special buses required more capital investment: USD 4.8 – 8.2 million/km. The infrastructure to support system operations was built through local agencies with local and external (state or national government) funds. León, México, also attracted private capital through concession contracts to implement intermediate stations and bus stops. Quito (Trolebús and Ecovía), Jakarta and Beijing purchased the buses with public funds and the México City municipality acquired 20% of the fleet for the public operator RTP. Quito and México also procured the fare collection equipment with public funds. Other systems have privately provided equipment, paid back with user fares.

4 The operational productivity is defined here as the units of output (passenger boardings) per unit of operational input (bus kilometers). There are external factors to the operational productivity: corridor density trip length, availability and characteristics of transport alternatives; as well as internal factors such as the way routes are programmed (radial/diametric, short/long, local/express, minimum headways, occupancy factors, etc.). 5 The capital productivity is defined here as the units of output (passenger boardings per day) per unit of capital investment (number of buses). In addition to the factors that affect operational productivity (external, internal), capital productivity is also affected by the intensity of the peak (as fleet is calculated based on the maximum load section).


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Figure 2 Peak Loads (2006)

13,000

9,000

5,000

45,000

20,000

3,000

8,000

3,200

7,000

6,900

5,000

22,000

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito



SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira


Transantiago

Peak Load (pax/hour/direction)


Figure 3

Commercial Speeds (2006)

19

14.5

18

23

26

18

18

19

17

25

20

22

18

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito



SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira


Transantiago

Commercial Speed (km/hour)



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Figure 4 Operational Productivity – Passengers Boardings per Bus-km (2006)

10,6

11,1

7,5

5,3

10,0

10,0

5,1

5,2

6,0

8,0

6,4

0,0 2,0 4,0 6,0 8,0 10,0 12,0

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito



SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira


Transantiago

Passenger boardings per bus-km

Figure 5 Capital Productivity – Average Daily Passengers per Bus (2006)

716

2.181

1.928

1.450

625

3.095

680

1.300

1.920

2.418

- 500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 3.000 3.500

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito



SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira


Transantiago

Passenger boardings per bus per day


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Figure 6 Capital Costs per km (2006)

2,40

5,90

2,00

3,00

8,20

3,50

1,80

2,80

1,35

4,80

2,89

1,56

- 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 9,00

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito



SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira


Transantiago

Total Cost per Kilometer (Infrastructure + Equipment, USD Million/km)

Note: Transit Only Infrastructure

Figure 7

Annualized Total Capital Costs per Passenger (2006)

0,38

0,23

0,35

0,38

0,14

0,14

0,44

0,65

0,30

0,30

- 0,10 0,20 0,30 0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito



SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira


Transantiago

Total Cost per Passenger (Infrastructure + Equipment, USD/pax)

Note: To calculate this figure total capital costs are transformed into an annual equivalent using a 12 year horizon and a 12% rate of return. Annualized costs are then divided by the total passengers per year to calculate the capital cost per passenger.


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Fares in all systems were below USD 1.05 per trip (Figure 8). Most systems with fares below USD 0.40 are either receiving subsidies or under financial stress. Guayaquil has been able to operate the new system Metrovía with USD 0.25 and without subsidies, due to its very high productivity (8 passenger boardings per bus-km, 1,920 passenger boardings per bus per weekday) , Supervision and planning agencies are, in general, funded with the general budget of the municipality.

Figure 8 User Fares (2006)

0,80

0,25

0,25

0,25

0,51

1,05

0,50

0,35

0,39

0,25

0,48

0,25

0,70

- 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20

RIT, Curitiba

Trolebus, Quito

Ecovia, Quito

North, Quito



SIT-Optibús, León

Metrobús, México

Transjakarta

Beijing BRT

Megabus, Pereira


Transantiago

User Fare (USD/pax)


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SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS: LESSONS LEARNED Planning Issues Providing sufficient resources for planning has not been a high priority in the reviewed cities at least until a leading decision maker had endorsed project implementation. No city started from scratch, but project preparation was at a very early stage when the decision to proceed was initially made. For example, in the cases of Bogotá and México, ideas on where to implement high capacity corridors had been proposed for decades, but there were not feasibility studies before the cities initiated the TransMilenio and Metrobus projects, respectively. Planning activities depended on the ideas and expectations of key decision makers. When there was clear vision by the Mayor or other political leader (e.g. Curitiba, Bogotá, Guayaquil, Jakarta), planning for implementation received priority and development cycles were short, at least for the initial phases of project implementation. When high-level decisions were not clear (e.g. León, Santiago), planning did not receive much priority and project implementation took several years. As funding for planning was scarce, cities needed to rely on donations, budget allocations from the national governments and loans. The process of applying for such funds took several months as well as approval of project activities by sponsoring institutions. As a result valuable time was required to get the required approvals at the beginning of the processes, reducing the time window for project implementation. Once decisions were made, planning became secondary to implementation. Fast design was possible when experienced consultants were retained and the cities formed capable planning teams. Lack of familiarity with high capacity BRT applications by local staff, some consultants and international supporting organizations made planning difficult. Technical discussions on the locations and design of busways (median/curbside), type of platform (high/low), corridor capacity, propulsion technology (CNG, Diesel), type of payment (on board/prepayment), were extensive. Most effort was dedicated to transport planning issues (to estimate demand and supply) and engineering (physical design), with less effort on key institutional, legal and financial issues. Another key planning aspect has been definition of target fare levels by the relevant public regulatory authority. The decision makers are tempted to set fares as low as possible for everyone. In systems with competitive bidding (e.g. Bogotá, Pereira, Santiago) final fares were the result of the bidding process itself; in other systems fares were defined by the political authority and did not necessarily reflect actual system costs. México City currently is about breaking even, and Quito’s Trolleybuses and Ecovía Buses are not paid by user fares. Jakarta and Beijing are not financially sustainable.


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One repetitive feature has been that the planning and implementation teams were outside the existing public structures to overcome the burden of business-as-usual in existing agencies. Most cities reviewed created ad-hoc “task forces” that were later transformed in new institutions. Decision Process Two types of decision processes were observed considering the origin of the initiatives: top-down: ideas of the decision makers (e.g. elected officials, cabinet level authorities), and bottom-up: ideas of the staff at the planning or implementation agencies or resulting from comprehensive long term planning processes. Top-down approaches were observed in Curitiba, Bogotá, Quito, Guayaquil, Sao Paulo, Jakarta and Beijing, and bottom-up approaches in Leon, México, and Santiago6. Top-down processes took less time and reduced conflicts between agencies. Nevertheless, some interagency conflicts and difficulties with stakeholders emerged later in the process, with the systems under operation. Bottom-up approaches, on the other hand, may have more ownership, public participation, technical soundness and concern with user’s needs. The creation of an adequate regulatory framework seems to be as important as solving all the technical details. All cities reviewed required changes in the regulations or the definition of authority or created new institutions to develop the projects. For example, Sao Paulo passed a new city transportation law that made possible the changes for the Interligado System, including the integrated fare system (“Bilhete Unico”); in Quito and León transport regulatory authority was transferred from the National/State Level to the Local Level, and Bogotá, México and Guayaquil, created new institutions for system development and oversight. Providing adequate levels of funding for infrastructure was challenging, despite the fact that most projects were relatively low cost. New mechanisms to provide funding (taxes, privatizations, and use of extraordinary surplus) and intergovernmental grants have been required to spark project implementation. Implementation Approach The preferred approach in the reviewed cities was to keep operations in private hands but to transform existing operators, either through limited bidding process or direct negotiation. Strong authorities such as the Major of Bogotá were able to bid project operations; this resulted in protests by incumbent operators, but made it possible to get the most from the bidders. Other authorities, directly negotiated terms and conditions with all the existing operators, which resulted in easier implementation (no stand-offs), but also in higher costs and softer contractual conditions.

6 Despite the fact that Transantiago was a commitment of Ricardo Lagos as a presidential candidate, the project did not have full support of the top government officials and many key decisions were delayed or changed through the planning and implementation process.


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The projects reviewed are very diverse in scope and level of integration. There are projects for a single corridor without fare integration with feeders or other transport modes (México City, Beijing); projects with sequential implementation of non-integrated corridors (Quito, Jakarta); gradual implementation of integrated corridors (Bogotá, Guayaquil); and extended route reorganizations (Sao Paulo, Santiago, León). From the results in the reviewed cities, it appears preferable to have sequential implementation with clear integration rather than developing isolated corridors and attempting integration later in the process. Large scale route reorganizations (Santiago; Sao Paulo) seem to be the best conceptual approach, as optimization in all system components can be undertaken. Nevertheless, this approach faces significant opposition from incumbent operators and can be risky due to institutional or financial overreaching. Difficulties during Implementation Most of the systems reviewed had rushed commissioning; that is, they started operations without all the elements in place (Table 3). This has been caused by the need to commission the project before the end of term of the elected officials (e.g., Mexico City, Bogotá, León, Guayaquil). As a result, the systems reviewed had problems at the beginning of operations, most of them solved within the first months of operation. In general, infrastructure and fare collection systems were delayed due to inherent implementation problems (short lead times; contractual problems; delays in approvals by different authorities, etc.). In some cases, there was little time between bus delivery and start of operations, and drivers’ training was incomplete (León, México). User education has been neglected as an important activity prior to system implementation. Lack of adequate user education and contingent plans can cause severe problems, as it was the case in México City and León during the first weeks of operation, or in Bogotá’s Phase II expansion. Protests by affected transport operators were observed in Quito and Bogotá, and during an early phase in Santiago (Metrobus bidding process). Strict enforcement of the laws to restore public order and sometimes repression was required. Fear of protests has caused cities to seek to prevent unrest by involving existing operators either through direct negotiations (México, León, Jakarta), or extra points to incumbents/ entry barriers to outsiders in the bidding processes (Bogotá, Pereira, Guayaquil, Sao Paulo). Santiago choose to have an open bidding process, which proved successful in fomenting competition for the benefit of the system users, but generated some barriers in the implementation process.


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Table 3 Condition of System Elements when Projects were Commissioned

Infrastructure Buses Fare Collection Control User Education Observations

Curitiba RIT

Gradually improved over several years

Operators reluctant to buy new buses – initially bought by the municipality

Coin based for three decades - electronic ticketing in 2006

Manual on platforms – based on schedules prepared by URBS, not dynamic

Part of the city life and development

Negotiated agreements between traditional operators and the municipality (URBS)

Quito Trolebus

No rehabilitation of pavements

Insufficient for initial demand – required special programming

Coin based – fare cards abandoned

Manual on platforms and selected points

Scarce Large protests by existing operators

Quito Ecovía

Ready long before buses were available

Delayed due to lack of finance – bought by the municipality

Coin based without problems


Scarce – but users knew Trolebus

Difficulties to get existing operators on board

Quito Central Norte

Very Incomplete – no terminal – low quality stations

Insufficient – traditional buses not completely retired

No fare collection system – large evasion opportunities


Non existent – large discontented-ness

No single image – low quality temporary structures

Bogotá TransMilenio Phase I

Incomplete – gradually introduced

Insufficient due to financial difficulties of operators

Electronic system not ready - gradually introduced – unreliable

Started with manual control –systems gradually introduced

Abundant – system was well received

Protests by existing operators – early pavement deterioration

Bogotá TransMilenio Phase II

Incomplete – gradually introduced

Gradually introduced as infrastructure was completed

Not prepared for expansion – run out of fare cards

Vehicles not equipped with AVL, manually controled

Scarce – large changes in route structure

Changes in route structure caused problems, user protests

Sao Paulo Interligado

Passa-Rapido corridors gradually introduced

Gradually replaced over a three year time span

Problems with distribution of the farecards – too many transactions to process

Not centralized control – AVL and telematics used in terminals for user information not operational actions

Large promotion of the changes and the use of the farecards – difficulties in reaching the users

Operations did not improved dramatically – only passa-rapdio corridors with median lanes

León SIT Optibus

Incomplete stations and access to one terminal

Delivered shortly prior to implementation – non trained drivers

Implemented long before high capacity corridors – successful


Abundant - initial quality felt short of expectations

Lengthily feeder bus trips – some traditional routes reintroduced


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Table 3 Condition of System Elements when Projects were Commissioned

Infrastructure Buses Fare Collection Control User Education Observations

México Metrobus Insurgentes

Incomplete stations

Delivered few days prior to implementation – non trained drivers

Started with paper tickets – gradually replaced by electronic farecards

AVL introduced three months late

Scarce – there was big confusion during the first days

Expected speeds not achieved – problems at intersections and with driver training

Jakarta Trans-Jakarta

Small stations and inefficient terminal

Initial fleet not sufficient; 12m buses too small with only one door

Delayed implementation, technical problems

No communication with the buses

Scarce, there is not a focus on the user

Performance below expectations

Beijing Beijing BRT

Small and non comfortable stations

Initial fleet too small; low floor buses lose capacity to wheel wells and steps: poor internal circulation

Implemented months after initial operation

Good control but still deficient operation

Scarce, there is not a focus on the user

Very low fares (no subsidies allowed); Peak period crowding due to reduced bus capacity

Pereira Megabús

Incomplete corridors – provisional terminals

Feeder bus fleet insufficient due to route extensions

Insufficient number of fare cards – manual control

Not ready for initial operation, gradually introduced

Large campaign, but scarce focus on system operation – initial confusion

Delays in infrastructure due to lengthy decision process for the relocation of utilities

Guayaquil Metrovía

Most elements in place for corridor 1

Insufficient fleet – use of small buses for trunk operations

Started manually – gradual implementation of farecards

Not ready for initial operation, gradually introduced

Scarce, difficulties in the initial days of operation

Did not achieved the expected speeds

Santiago Transantiago

Planned bus shelters were not completed on time – insufficient infrastructure

Only a fraction of the contracted fleet was available – operational difficulties made it necessary to increase bus and metro fleet

The fare collection system was not fully operational - a full week free of charge services were provided

Buses were not fully equipped and centralized oversight was not operational

Extensive campaign was not enough for particular needs of most users

Very large scale implementation had several problems - Transition phase using new buses on the old route system proved chaotic

Sources: Interviews with stakeholders, information provided by managing agencies and news reviews


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Difficulties during Operation The reviewed systems greatly improved travel conditions and most of them receive good ratings by the users, nevertheless all could benefit from continuous improvements. Table 4 summarizes the main reported concerns. A common concern is bus overcrowding during peak periods. Pavement maintenance has been also an issue, either due to the use of inadequate pavement structure design (no initial replacement) or faulty construction. Segregation devices in some cities (e.g. León and México) also had early deterioration and required replacement. Advanced fare collection systems have been difficult to implement. These systems may reduce fare evasion, allow for faster passenger loading and generate data for operational planning, but implementation times for adapting software applications to local conditions have been too short, resulting in insufficient testing and quality assurance. Furthermore, fare collection systems are not integrated with other components of public transport or between corridors in some cases (Quito, Jakarta). Structural Problems None of the systems is facing problems of such a magnitude that it would require a complete overhaul of the newly-implemented structure. The most important outcome achieved by most systems is that they are providing higher quality, higher performance services than the traditional bus system they replaced. Nevertheless, there are aspects that challenge system sustainability and quality of service. Table 5 summarizes structural problems. The most critical challenge is to maintain the systems operational quality at an affordable fare. Financial sustainability in several systems is not clear as they depend on fares defined by political authorities, which not necessarily adopt them as a result of technical calculations. To keep fares low and the systems accessible to users of all incomes some cities have resorted to subsidies of some system components (on top of the ubiquitous capital subsidy for infrastructure): Quito (Trolebús, Ecovía) and Jakarta bought the vehicles for their systems and not necessarily cover these costs with user fares; México bought the buses and did not pay full cost of operations during the first year for the public operator RTP; Sao Paulo has direct budget assignments for special users (“gratuidades”); and Santiago Metro received grants from the National Government for rail cars. In the case of Beijing, subsidies are not allowed and low fares are generating financial difficulties to the private operator. Funding for expansions and maintenance is also very limited. Systems need to compete with general funding for road maintenance and confront risks of not receiving timely attention. Expansion is also limited in some cases (Bogotá, México) by the resistance to change from existing operators. In Bogotá, existing operators have organized themselves to put pressure on the local government not to continue system expansion. The Municipality has announced larger democratization of capital ownership of the private operators of TransMilenio, to involve small operators in Phase III.


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The financial sustainability of many of the systems is also being challenged by renegotiation of agreements between authorities and private operators. This is most common in directly assigned contracts (México, León, Quito Corridor Central Norte, Jakarta), but also happens in contracts resulting from open bidding processes (Bogotá) to adjust conditions as systems evolve. From a technical point of view, there are different needs specific to each system, as indicated in Table 5. To be solved, most of the technical problems require a political decision and some type of funding. Probably the largest challenges are in Santiago, Quito, Bogotá and Jakarta. In Santiago, after a critical start up of the system that even resulted in extended user protests, government is taking action to introduce enclosed interchange facilities and exclusive bus-lanes, is extending the bus and metro fleet, and is providing stronger mechanisms of oversight. In Quito, Corredor Central Norte infrastructure has not been completed yet, and the capacity of the Trolleybus has been exceeded, sparking interest in a LRT alternative. Discussion of the LRT proposal to replace Quito Trolebús has involved several professionals throughout the world7; nevertheless the current debate has been abstract (i.e. advantages/disadvantages of rail and buses), without a specific comprehensive alternatives analysis for the corridor. In Bogotá level of service in the initial corridors have declined, and several measures are underway, such as the revision of routes, construction of new connections among corridors and intermediate return points, reduction of parallel routes of traditional buses and expansion of the bus fleet. There is also a project underway to integrate the organized services of TransMilenio with traditional services citywide. In Jakarta, facilities and buses need upgrades (larger stations, larger buses with more doors). Jakarta is not currently able to integrate fares between corridors as different operators and fare collection applications are used. As a result, a card from one corridor is not read by validation devices in the other corridor.

7 Letters to the Mayor of Quito subscribed by SUSTRAN-LAC – Sustainable Transport for Latin America and the Caribbean, involving several NGOs, practitioners and academics, and by Dr. Vukan Vuchic, with a review supported by several academics and practitioners.


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Table 4

Main Concerns of Selected Systems Curitiba RIT - Operating close to capacity in some sections of the structural corridors

- Large number of transfers required - Insufficient service in peak hours and excessive service off-peak - Not flexible operations – not clear balance between supply and demand

Quito Trolebús - On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods - Not integrated corridor - Buses were subsidized – no funding for replacement - No clear vision (proposed replacement by LRT)

Quito Ecovía - On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods - Not integrated corridor - System planned to be handed over to historic private operations of the corridor

Quito Central Norte

- Large waiting and travel times in feeder buses - Not integrated corridor - Demand below expectations may cause financial problems to private operators - Feeder buses remain under traditional operation

Bogotá TransMilenio Phase I

- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods; delays in accessing feeder buses - Rest of the city has very poor transport conditions

Bogotá TransMilenio Phase II

- On-board vehlce crowding during peak periods;delays in accessing feeder buses - Funding for system expansion is lacking - Organization of public transport in the rest of the city is poor


- Long dwell times and “bunching” in critical sections - Invasion of bus lanes, specially those located on the curb-side - Low travel speeds outside the passa-rapido corridors

León Optibús

- Some feeder routes with reverse commuting (long travel times) - Invasion of the bus lanes by general traffic (sometimes encouraged by the traffic authorities) - On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods


- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods - Isolated corridor - Financially stressed – needs fare increase - Permanent negotiation of conditions with private operators


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Table 4 Main Concerns of Selected Systems

Jakarta Transjakarta

- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods - Difficult integration - Currently subsidized - Difficult negotiations with the private operators

Beijing BRT - On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods - Isolated corridor - Needs subsidy (faces possibility of bankruptcy of bus operator) - Mixed traffic operations reduce reliability - Requires new stations

Pereira Megabús

- Insufficient temporary terminal facilities - Poor reorganization of the remaining bus routes - Flexibility of buses not fully used in operations to improve service in critical sections

Guayaquil Metrovía

- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods - High temperature and humidity – buses not equipped with air conditioning - User fare defined by a national political authority (US 0.25 per trip) with reduced fare for students and the handicapped.

Santiago Transantigo

- Insufficient infrastructure to support operations (integration points - segregated bus lanes) - Expected commercial speeds not achieved; hence, an increase in bus fleet is required - Lack of adequate oversight allowed for non compliance of some contractors regarding the minimum level of service established - Benefits of increased efficiency not perceived by the users (fares are similar to those without the system)

Sources: Interviews with stakeholders and information provided by managing agencies


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Table 5 Some Structural Problems of Selected Systems

Financial Sustainability Technical Design

Quito Trolebus, Ecovía, Central Norte

Not clear – fares politically defined - depends on ability of public administrators – subsidized buses – no earmarked funds for maintenance - ambiguous conditions to hand over operations to private sector (Ecovía) - real demand probably below expectations (Corredor Central Norte)

Trolebús corridor currently operating over capacity – needs overhaul and expansion (station length, operation of bus platoons) – LRT being proposed Corridor Central Norte operating with temporary facilities (terminals) and incomplete implementation (route reorganization)

Bogotá TransMilenio Phases I and II

Clear – fares established in contracts – expansion limited by pressure by existing operators and lack of funds – no earmarked funds for maintenance (existing funds dedicated to system expansion)

Decline in Level of Service requires construction of special infrastructure, revision of routes, and fleet expansion (limited due to its impact to user fares) TransMilenio is not integrated with other services.


Growing pressure for free or reduced fare services (“gratuidades”) over public budget - High fare not consistent with service for the poor

On board validation generates long dwell times at stations - some stations are too short – needs faster replacement of curb lanes for median lanes

León SIT Optibus Clear - Negotiated fares with all operators – no earmarked funds for maintenance

Bus lanes easily invaded – geometric improvements: left turns and Av. Alemán


Not clear – fares politically defined – permanent negotiation with private operators – currently subsidized – no earmarked funds for maintenance

Limited capacity – easily expanded with expansion of stations and bus platooning– intersections easily blocked – geometric improvements (Insurgentes roundabout)

Jakarta Transjakarta

Not clear – fare defined as social policy – currently subsidized

Limited capacity - can be expanded with larger 18 m four door+ buses, larger stations and shorter traffic lights cycles

Beijing BRT Not clear – fare defined below system costs – operator may face bankruptcy

Limited capacity – can be easily expanded with a larger fleet and operational improvements; could change stations and fleet to high platform/high floor

Pereira Megabús

Not Clear – fares established in contracts but traditional services are not integrated and the system faces competition - no earmarked funds for maintenance

Needs completion of terminals and connection to Cuba (Av. San Mateo) - excessive transfers, probably mitigated with dual operation (feeders that continue on the trunk corridor)

Guayaquil Metrovía

Not Clear – fares defined by a national authority (US 0.25) with reduced fares to special groups

Limited capacity in corridor 1 - Corridor 2 designed for larger capacity with passing lanes at stations

Santiago Transantiago

Clear – fares established in contracts – additional investments funded with government funds

Trunk-feeder scheme increased transfers – route design resulted in longer walking times – requires infrastructure to enhance bus operations and integration

Sources: Interviews with stakeholders and information provided by managing agencies


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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Most systems reviewed have greatly improved the travel conditions and the quality and performance of public transport where they have been implemented. The main achievement has been travel time savings as well as enhanced reliability. As efficiency has improved, systems have also reduced energy consumption and emissions. Urban enhancements are also evident in Curitiba, Sao Paulo (Passa-Rapido), Bogotá, Quito Trolebús, Pereira and Guayaquil where the appalling conditions of the corridors prior to systems implementation have dramatically improved. Nevertheless, there have been several planning, implementation and operational issues that deserve attention. These issues are identified in the specific case studies and the summary tables in the previous sections. Key lessons learnt result in the following general recommendations: • Planning

o Combine financial, legal/institutional and environmental aspects with engineering.

o After the decision to proceed is made (hopefully on the basis of good information) plan/design with in a pragmatic/results oriented way, focusing on the specific implementation and operations issues of the proposed corridor/system.

o Dedicate enough resources (time, money) to good preparation. o Use experience from other cities as a reference, but adapt system

components and characteristics to local conditions. o Try to create special purpose teams for system planning and implementation,

not affected by day-to-day responsibilities.

• Decision Process

o Get approval of high level decision makers early on in the process (top-down approaches are faster and help solving inter-agency conflicts).

o Pay top-attention to regulatory/institutional issues, adapting regulatory framework if required.

o Try to create a special purpose agency to plan, oversee and control system development, and provide adequate coordination mechanisms.

o Be creative in funding project development, using new taxes, loans and non traditional sources –privatizations, special purpose bonds. Funding often conditions project scope.

o Involve existing operators to mitigate conflicts, but go for open bidding processes to reduce user costs through increased competition.


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• Implementation Approach

o Only attempt citywide reorganization of transit services where law enforcement is strong and informality mostly under control and there is large public support.

o Try to go for gradual implementation, adapting the project on the basis of initial “demonstration” experience.

o Make an effort to use existing right-of-way to reduce land acquisition and non-voluntary displacement.

o Use good pavement design and improvements to avoid rapid deterioration.

• Implementation

o Generate a credible time table and manage it to avoid rushed implementation. Commissioning dates usually do not have much opportunity of extension due to end of terms of elected officials.

o Have contingent plans ready if system components are not complete. o Dedicate funds to plan and implement user education programs. o If there are protests, emphasize general benefit over special interests and

apply authority. • Operation

o Use the intrinsic flexibility of buses to match supply and demand. Feeder-trunk operations might not be the answer to all transport conditions.

o Focus on system integration during planning and design (e.g. match vehicle floor and station platform heights)

o Design vehicles (e.g., size, internal configuration, door numbers and configurations) and other physical features for market and service plan.

o Be aware that pavement maintenance is a permanent issue. o Use strong dividers to segregate traffic. o Prefer median lanes and level access platforms with many doors to access

the buses to increase speed and reliability. o Allow time to adapt and implement advanced fare collection systems. o Use advanced transit management systems if operations are complex, and

apply them as tool to control reliability, not just as a means of acquiring operational data.

• Structural issues

o Try to provide mechanisms for technical (automatic) definition of fares without political interference.

o Make a strong effort to stick to operating contracts – permanent renegotiation is often tipped in favor of the operators.


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o Involve other transport initiatives and urban development concepts to enhance positive impacts, reinforce project sustainability and expansion prospects.

o Have a clear vision for system expansion and integration with other transport initiatives and services.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study has been produced with the financial assistance of a grant from TRISP, a partnership between the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank, for learning and sharing of knowledge in the fields of transport and rural infrastructure services. The authors also acknowledge valuable comments by Gerhard Menckhoff, Ramón Muñoz, Jules Flynn, Mauricio Cuéllar and Sam Zimmerman and assistance by Adriana Ortegón. Thanks also to the officials, project operators and consultants that contributed time and information through interviews. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank or the people interviewed. REFERENCES Arias, César. “Plan de Transporte Masivo Urbano Para Guayaquil”, Presentación en la 2da Feria Internacional de Transporte Masivo, TRANSMILENIO S.A., Noviembre 8 y 9 de 2006. http://www.transmilenio.gov.co/transmilenio/feriamasivo/memorias.htm, visited November 2006. Ardila-Gomez, Arturo. “Transit Planning in Curitiba and Bogotá. Roles in Interaction, Risk, and Change” PhD Dissertation 2004. Department of Urban Studies and Planning. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. Beijing Transportation Research Center, “BRT Demonstration Project BRT in South-Middle Corridor in Beijing”, Brief Report on Feasibility Study, September, 2003 Cain, A., G. Darido, M.R. Baltes, P. Rodriguez, and J.C. Barrios. “Applicability of Bogotá’s TransMilenio BRT System to the United States”, National Bus Rapid Transit Institute (NBRTI), Center for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR), University of South Florida, FL-26-7104-01, Tampa, FL, 2006. Centro de Desarrollo Sustentable, “Metrobús: Bienvenidos a Bordo”, Movilidad Amable, Centro de Desarrollo Sustentable, México D.F., Septiembre de 2005. Clodualdo Pinheiro Junior. “Curitiba, una experiencia continua en soluciones de Transporte”, Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano de Curitiba, October 2005 Diaz, R.B. (editor), M. Chang, G. Darido, E. Kim, D. Schneck, M. Hardy, J. Bunch, M.R. Baltes, D. Hinebaugh, L. Wnuk, F. Silver, and S. Zimmerman “Characteristics of BRT for Decision Makers” Publication FTA-VA-26-7222-2004.1, FTA, US Department of Transportation, 2004. DGT León “Sistema Integrado de Transporte Optibús”, Dirección General de Transporte, Municipalidad de León, http://correo.leon.gob.mx/admon03_06/transporte/sitioweb/, Accessed July 21, 2006. DMT Quito, “Descripción General del Sistema de Transporte”, Dirección Metropolitana de Transporte, Alcaldía Metropolitana de Quito, http://www.quito.gov.ec/DMT/direccion.htm, Accessed July 21, 2006.


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Dirección Municipal de Transporte, Municipio de Guayaquil, “Informe Técnico, Plan de Racionalización del Transporte Público Masivo de la Ciudad de Guayaquil – PRTPM”, con apoyo de PNUD y UN-Hábitat, Marzo 2004 Gardner, G., Cornwell, P., Cracknell, J. “The Performance of Busway Transit in Developing Countries” TRRL Research Report 329, Crowthorne, UK, 1991. GDF México “Metrobús Proyecto Insurgentes”, Corredores Estratégicos de Transporte de la Ciudad de México, Gobierno de México D.F, http://www.metrobus.df.gob.mx/metrobus/index6.htm, Accessed July 21, 2006. Graftieaux, Pierre and Serrie, Nicolás. “Transmilenio and Transantiago: Two Different Urban Public Transprot Approaches”, Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Latin America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank, November 2006. GTZ. “Sustainable Transport: A Sourcebook for Policy Makers in Developing Cities”, Eshborn, Germany 2004. Hidalgo, D. “Bogotá and Its Transportation Characteristics”,Presented at the Second International Conference on Urban Transportation Systems: Ensuring Sustainability through Mass Transit” April 14-18, 2002, Alexandria, VA, USA Hidalgo, D. “A High Capacity – Low Cost Bus Rapid Transit System Developed for Bogotá, Colombia” Presented at the CODATU X Conference, November 12th to 15th, 2002. Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Hidalgo, D. & Hermann, G. “The Bogotá Model for Sustainable Transportation; Inspiring Developing Cities throughout the World” Trialog, Germany, August 2004. Hidalgo, D. “Comparing Transit Alternatives After Recent Developments in BRT in Latin America” 85th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C. January 2006. International Seminar on Human Mobility. “Bogotá – Building a New City”. Bogotá, Colombia. Seminar CD-Rom, February 2003 Institute for Transportation and Development Policy, “Making Transjakarta a World Class BRT System”, Final Recommendations, June 2005 Levinson, H., et al. “Bus Rapid Transit: Case Studies in Bus Rapid Transit”. Transit Cooperative Research Program – Report 90. Vol I. Transportation Research Board, National Academies, Washington, D.C, 2003. Lobo, Adriana. “BRT Options and results after six months: applicability anywhere else in Mexico”. Centro de Transporte Sustentable, México, 2006 Malbrán R. Henry. Schwarz S. Daniel. “Sustainable transport for people: Our Vision in Chile”. Secretaria Interministerial de Planificacion de Transporte SECTRA-CHILE, in Transforming Transportation: The Human Side of Making Urban Transport and Planning Work Washington D.C. 26 and 27 January 2006. Menckhoff, Gerhard. “Latin American Experience with Bus Rapid Transit”. Presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Institute of Traffic Engineers, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, August 7-10, 2005. Menckhoff, G. and Zegras, C. “Experiences and issues in urban transport infrastructure” Presented at the International Road Federation Symposium, Hanoi, Vietnam, 1999. http://www.worldbank.org/transport/publicat/twu-38/twu-38.pdf


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Moreno, Enrique. “Optibus - Sistema Integrado de Transporte de León, Guanajuato”. Primer Congreso Internacional de Transporte Sustentable. www.cts-ceiba.org Prefeitura do Municipio de Sao Paulo “O Plano do Transporte Público em Implantacao na Gestao de 2001-04”, Sao Paulo, 2004 Shipper, Lee. “Transforming Transportation: Cleaning up the Buses in Mexico City”, presented in 2006 TRB Annual Meeting, Washington DC, January 2006. Steer Davies Gleave (SDG) “Diseño Operacional del Sistema TransMilenio”, Proyecto de Transporte Urbano para Santa Fe de Bogotá, BIRF 4021-FONDATT-10, Bogotá D.C., 2000. Transantiago - Resumen Ejecutivo, Mayo 2005. Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transporte, Transantiago. Power Point Presentation, 2005. TRANSMILENIO S.A. “Bogotá’s Mass Transportation System”, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, http://www.transmilenio.gov.co/transmilenio/home_english.htm, Accessed July 21, 2006. TRANSMILENIO S.A. “Cinco Años Construyendo Futuro”, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, Febrero de 2005. TRANSMILENIO S.A. “TransMilenio: La Joya de Bogotá”, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, Diciembre de 2003. Vanegas, Mónica, “Experiencia de Pereira y Desquebradas en el Desarrollo de Megabús”; Presentación en Seminario “Experiencias en Operación de Sistemas Integrados de Transporte Masivo”; Ministerio de Transporte, Metrocali; Cali, Colombia, Marzo 2 y 3 de 2006. WEB REFERENCES Curitiba: www.curitiba.pr.gov.br Quito: http://www.quito.gov.ec/DMT/direccion.htm Bogotá: http://www.transmilenio.gov.co Sao Paulo: www.portal.prefeitura.sp.gov.br León: http://correo.leon.gob.mx/admon03_06/transporte/sitioweb/ México: http://www.metrobus.df.gob.mx/metrobus/index6.htm Pereira: www.megabus.gov.co Guayaquil: http://www.metrovia-gye.com/start.htm; Santiago; www.transantiago.cl INTERVIEWS Curtitiba

• Carlos Ceneviva, Consultant • Garrone Reck, Consultant • Antonio Carlos Marchestti, Consultant Quito

• Diego Carrión – Secretario de Desarrollo Territorial – Municipalidad del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito


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• Hidalgo Núñez – Director Metropolitano de Transporte – Municipalidad del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito

• Julio Arteaga, Katyana Rojas, David Llerena, Cecilia Rodríguez, Anabel Hermosa – Dirección Metropolitana de Transporte – Municipalidad del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito

• Coronel (r) Rene López – Director Unidad Operadora del Sistema Trole – Municipalidad del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito

• Enrique Morales, Verónica Varela – Dirección de Operaciones ECOVIA - Unidad Operadora del Sistema Trole – Municipalidad del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito

• Alejandro Lasso – Gerente General; Alberto Viteri – Gerente de Transporte Público – Empresa Metropolitana de Servicio y Adminsitración de Transporte Municipalidad del Distrito Metropolitano de Quito

• Calos Poveda – Gerente Técnico Corredor Central Norte (Fideicomiso Operadores) • Luis Vaca, Luis Barrejo – Miembros del Comité de Administración Corredor Central

Norte (Operadores Privados) • César Arias – Consultor, Ex-director General de Transporte de Quito Bogotá • Angélica Castro – Gerente General; Raúl Roa – Director de Operaciones; Sandra

Ángel – Directora de Planeación, TRANSMILENIO S.A. (2006) • Gustavo Gómez – Gerente General SITM-Ciudad Móvil, Operador del Sistema

(2006) • Mauricio Arciniegas – Director de Operaciones SI99-SI02, Operador del Sistema

(2006) • Edgar Enrique Sandoval – Ex-gerente General de TRANSMILENIO S.A. (1998-

2003) León • Ing. Luis Enrique Moreno Cortes – Director General de Transporte, H. Ayuntamiento

de León, Guanajuato. (Abril 20, 2006) • Ing. Javier Delgadillo – Subdirector de Transporte, Dirección General de Transporte,

H. Ayuntamiento de León, Guanajuato. (Abril 20, 2006) • Ing. Genero Torres Cruz – Director del Sistema Integrado de Transporte, Dirección

General de Transporte, H. Ayuntamiento de León, Guanajuato. (Abril 20, 2006) • Ex-director Coordinadora de Transporte Urbano de la Ciudad S.C. Sr. Leonardo

Ruvalcaba Delgado (Presidente L[inea Centro Bellavista] • Asesor Legal Coordinadora de Transporte Urbano de la Ciudad S.C. • Gerente Línea Centro Garita S.A de C.V. México

• Ing. Guillermo Calderón Aguilera – Director General Metrobús, Gobierno del Distrito Federal. (Abril 17, 2006)


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• Lic. Jesús Padilla Zenteno – Director General Corredor Insurgentes S.A. de C.V. CISA. Empresa Operadora Privada (Abril 18, 2006)

• Sr. Eduardo Oriz Soria – Secretario del Concejo de Administración CISA. Empresa Operadora Privada (Abril 18, 2006)

• Ing. Alejandro Villegas – Program Officer – México, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, NGO (Abril 17, 2006)

• Lic. Luz Helena González Chaves– Directora General Red de Transporte Público del Distrito Federal – RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Lic. Edmundo Valencia – Director Desarrollo Tecnológico y Mantenimiento RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Claudia Lorena Galindo RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Lic. Carlos Oropeza Bailey – Gerente de Mantenimiento RTP, Gobierno del Distrito Federal, Empresa Operadora Pública (Abril 18, 2006)

• Ing. Adriana Lobo – Directora Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS, Organización No Gubernamental (Abril 17, 2006)

• Ing. Diana V. Noriega Navarrete – Coordinadora de Tecnología Ambiental Centro de Transporte Sustentable CTS, Organización No Gubernamental (Abril 17, 2006)

Pereira

• Luis Arturo Arroyave, Director, Area Metropolitana de Centro Occidente AMCO (October 6, 2006)

• Mónica Vanegas, Director Gerente, Megabús S.A. (October 6, 2006) • Luz Piedad Gómez, Asesora, Megabús S.A. (October 6, 2006) • Sebastián Nieto, Subgerente General, Promasivo S.A. (System Operador, October

6, 2006) • Ramón Toro, Gerente, Intégra S.A., (System Operador, October 5, 2006) • Héctor Castaño, Coordinador Ejecutivo ASEMTUR (Trade Union of the 7 private

companies operating in Pereira and seed for Integra S.A., October 5, 2006). • Garrone Reck (Consultant, October 6, 2006) • Gustavo Gallegos, Asesor, Dirección de Infraestructura, Departamento Nacional de

Planeación (September 28 2006). • Lina María Sierra, Alejandro Baquero, Asesores Transporte Masivo, Ministerio de

Transporte (December, 2006). Guayaquil

• Guillermo Argüello Sánchez, Director, Dirección Municipal de Transporte, Municipio de Guayaquil (November 2006)

• Federico von Buchwald, Presidente, Fundación Municipal de Transporte Masivo Urbano de Guayaquil (November 2006)

• David Wong, Director Proyecto Naciones Unidas de Cooperación con Guayaquil (November 2006)


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• Cesar Arias, Transport Consultant, Technical Coordinator Transport Planning in Guayaquil UNDP (November 2006)

Santiago de Chile • Germán Correa – Former Coordinator of Transport for Santiago (2002-2003) and

coordinator of PTUS 2000-2010 preparation (2000), currently advisor for the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.

• Andrés Silva – Transantiago, Ministry of Transport and Communications. • Daniel Shwarz – SECTRA • Gibrán Harcha – Former Leader for Transantiago Project Planning and

Implementation Team (2004-2005), Ministry of Transport and Communications, currently with Inversiones Alsacia-Express de Santiago (trunk operators)

• Alvaro Saavedra - In charged of the final preparation of bidding documents and bidding process for the bus concessions (2004-2005), Ministry of Transport and Communications, currently with Inversiones Alsacia-Express de Santiago (trunk operators).

• Andres Ocampo – Manager of Subus S.A., System Operator • Fabio Zorro – Director of Operations Subus S.A., System Operator • Juan Enrique Coymmans – Professor Transportation Planning – Catholic University

of Chile. Web based contacts (February- March, 2007): • Juan de Dios Ortúzar, Transport Professor, Universidad Católica de Chile • Luis Willumsen, Consultant, Steer Davies Gleave • Lake Sagaris, Director Ciudad Viva, Local NGO • Juan Carlos Muñoz, Transport Professor, Universidad Católica de Chile • M. Munzaga, Urban Planning Professor, Universidad Católica de Chile

Documents

A Critical Look at Major Bus Improvements in Latin America ...siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANTRANSPORT/Resources/Hidalgo... · Curitiba, Sao Paulo, Quito, Guayaquil, Bogotá,