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99 Luftballons
Monetary Policy and the House Price Boom Across U.S. States
Marco Del Negro, Christopher Otrok∗
October, 2006
Abstract
We use a dynamic factor model estimated via Bayesian methods to disentangle the
relative importance of the common component in OFHEO house price movements from
state- or region-specific shocks, estimated on quarterly state-level data from 1986 to
2005. We find that historically movements in house prices have mainly been driven
by the local (state- or region-specific) component. The recent period (2001-2005) has
been different, however: “Local bubbles” have been important in some states, but
overall the increase in house prices is a national phenomenon. We then use a VAR
to investigate the extent to which expansionary monetary policy is responsible for the
common component in house price movements. We find the impact of policy shocks
on house prices to be small in comparison with the magnitude of fluctuations in the
recent period .
KEY WORDS: Housing, Monetary Policy, Bayesian Analysis
∗Marco Del Negro: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, e-mail: [email protected]; Christopher
Otrok: University of Virginia, Department of Economics, e-mail: [email protected]. We thank an anony-
mous referee and the editor, Marty Eichenbaum, for extensive suggestions. We also thank Bob Eisenbeis,
Scott Frame, and Dan Waggoner for helpful conversations, and seminar participants at the Atlanta Fed,
Bank of England, ECB, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors for comments. Otrok thanks the
Bankard Fund for Political Economy for financial support The views expressed in this papers are solely our
own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, or the Federal Reserve
System.
1
“We don’t perceive that there is a national [housing] bubble but it’s hard not to
see ... that there are a lot of local bubbles.”
Chairman Alan Greenspan (Economic Club of New York, May 20, 2005; CNN Money)
1 Introduction
In some U.S. metropolitan areas house prices increased dramatically during the last few
years. The increase in house prices is substantial even if one looks at the average state-level
price, which smooths out the differences across local markets within each state. The dark
bars in Figure 1 show the annualized average growth rates from the first quarter of 2001
to the last quarter of 2005 in the OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight)
house price indexes, deflated by the core PCE inflation, for the forty-eight contiguous U.S.
states. In this five-year period house price indexes increased more then ten percent per
year in several states on both the East and the West Coasts, notably California, Florida,
Nevada, Maryland, Rhode Island, New Jersey and Virginia. The rise in house prices has
been very uneven across the nation, with some states, like Texas and Ohio, growing at two
percent per year. If we compare the growth in house prices in the last five years with the
average growth since 1986, we find that states like Florida have grown two and half times
their average, while other states, like Michigan, have grown twenty-five percent less than
average.
From the perspective of the current debate, an important question is whether the
widespread, but not homogeneous, increase in house prices reflects a national phenomenon
or rather, in the words of Chairman Greenspan, a collection of “local bubbles.” The an-
swer to this question has important policy implications. “Local bubbles” are most likely
attributable to local factors, i.e., circumstances that are specific to each geographic market,
rather than to monetary policy, which is the same across the nation. On the contrary, if
the boom in house prices is a national phenomenon, monetary policy may well be a likely
suspect.
To address the issue of a potential national housing cycle we estimate a dynamic factor
model in the spirit of Geweke (1977), Sargent and Sims (1977), and Stock and Watson (1989),
on state-level OFHEO house price indexes from the mid-eighties to the end of 2005. We then
use the factor model to disentangle the component of the increase in the value of housing
that is common to all states from the component that is idiosyncratic, i.e. specific to each
2
state. The latter component is meant to capture the “local bubbles” Chairman Greenspan
refers to, while the former captures co-movement across all states, and therefore, potentially,
what has been referred to as a “national bubble.” We find that historically movements in
house prices have mainly been driven by the local (state- or region-specific) component.
Indeed, growth rates in OFHEO house price index are far less synchronized across states
than are the growth rates in real per capita income, which are a measure of the business
cycle at the state level.
However, the recent period has been different in this regard. While for a number of
states local factors are still very important, for many states that experienced large increases
in house prices a substantial fraction of these increases is attributable to the national factor.
How can we reconcile this finding with the fact that increases in house prices have been
uneven across states? Of course, part of the cross-state heterogeneity is due to local factors.
But about sixty percent of the heterogeneity is due to the fact that states have different
exposures to the common cycle: Some states, like Iowa, Nebraska, or Oklahoma, are barely
affected by the common cycle, while others, for instance most states in the North-east, are
strongly affected.
Since in the recent period the common component of the growth in house prices across
states has been sizable, we ask to what extent monetary policy is behind this co-movement.
Of course there are many other potential causes of the house price boom, such as mortgage
market innovations for instance, but here we focus on one of them only: monetary policy.
We follow Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and estimate a VAR where the common factor
in house prices is one of the variables, while the other variables measure the stance of
monetary policy (the federal funds interest rate, money supply), aggregate U.S. inflation and
output, and the thirty-year mortgage rate. We identify monetary policy shocks using sign
restrictions á la Uhlig (2005) and Canova and De Nicoló (2002). Perhaps not surprisingly,
we find that monetary policy has been expansionary in the recent period, in the sense
that more deviations from the implied policy rule have been on the side of “loose” rather
than “tight” monetary policy. The analysis of impulse responses shows that expansionary
monetary policy shocks lead to increase in the housing factor. We then perform the following
counterfactual thought experiment: What would have been the alternative path of the
housing factor had there not been any monetary policy shocks from the first quarter of
2001 onward? And, in turn, what would have been the counterfactual growth in house
prices across states? The results from this counterfactual experiment indicate that the
impact of monetary policy shocks on house prices is non-negligible, but overall fairly small
3
in comparison with the magnitude of the price increase over the last five years. Therefore,
our analysis suggests that expansionary monetary policy is not behind the recent boom
in house prices. It is important to stress the following limitation of our findings. We do
not conclude that the low interest rate environment experienced by the US economy is not
responsible for the housing boom. Here, we only consider the component of the low interest
rate that is attributable to policy shocks – that is, to the Fed deviating from its historical
policy rule in an expansionary way. Had the Fed followed a different rule, the results might
have been different. But this is a much more difficult question that goes beyond the scope
of this paper.
While there are established literatures studying the effect of housing on asset pricing,
portfolio choice, business cycles and consumption, the literature on the relationship between
housing prices and monetary policy is fairly limited. Chirinko et. al. (2004) study the
interrelationship between stock prices, house prices, and real activity in a thirteen country
sample. Their primary focus is in determining the role asset prices play in formulating
monetary policy. Iacoviello and Minetti (2005) document the role that the housing market
plays in creating a credit channel for monetary policy. Their empirical analysis uses a sample
of four countries that does not include the U.S. As in this paper, Iacoviello (2005) estimates a
VAR to assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on housing prices. Iacoviello estimates a
VAR in interest rates, inflation, and detrended output and house prices using quartely data
from 1974 to 2003. He then identifies monetary policy shocks using a Choleski decomposition
with the interest rate ordered first, and finds that policy shocks have a significant effect on
house prices. Our VAR results complement those of Iacoviello, as we consider different
datasets and identification approaches. In addition, we provide evidence on the impact of
policy shocks at the state level, with particular emphasis on the recent boom.
Perhaps the closest study to ours is Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) who study the effects
of monetary policy on regions in the U.S. from 1966-1998. They find that the response of
housing investment to monetary policy varies by region. Our paper differs from the previous
literature both in terms of methodology and of focus. In terms of methodology, we use a
factor model to extract the common cycle in house price fluctuations. In terms of focus, like
Fratantoni and Schuh – and unlike Chirinko et. al. (2004), Iacoviello and Minetti (2005),
and Iacoviello (2005)– we are interested in the regional differences in the response of house
prices to policy shocks. Differently from all these papers, we are particularly interested in
the role of monetary policy in the latest housing boom.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic factor model;
4
section 3 describes the data, section 4 the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Our approach consists of two steps. In the first step we use a purely statistical model to
distinguish the common component of fluctuations from state or region-specific fluctuations.
In this step we avoid making too many a-priori assumptions on the drivers of common
fluctuations – that is, we let the common factor be latent instead of pre-specifying a number
of regressors. Once we have obtained an estimate of the common factor from the statistical
model, in the next step we investigate what lies behind it – and in particular, we focus on
the role of monetary policy shocks.
Our statistical model is a dynamic factor model estimated via Bayesian methods, as
in Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2005). The model is used to differentiate movements in
house price levels that are common across all states from those that are region- or state-
specific. The model postulates that the observable variables (yn,t, n = 1, .., N , t = 1, .., T ),
the growth rates in state-level house price indexes, depend on a number of latent factors,
which capture comovement at the national (f0t ) or at the regional (frt ) level, as well as on
state-specific shocks �n,t. Specifically, the model is:
yn,t = µn + β0n f0t +
R∑r=1
βrn frt + �n,t, (1)
where µn is the average growth rate, which is allowed to differ across states, and βrn represents
the exposure of state n to factor r. The estimates µn may be of interest in themselves, as
they reflect historical trends in terms of state-level demographics, economic growth, etc
cetera, but are not the focus of this paper. This paper focuses on the deviations from the
historical mean, and in particular on the decomposition of these deviations in the recent
period. We impose the natural restriction that βrn = 0 if state n does not belong to region
r. Section 3 discusses the definition of regions.
The law of motions for the factors is given by an AR(q) process:
frt = φr1f
rt−1 + .. + φ
rqf
rt−q + u
rt , u
rt N(0, 1), r = 0, .., R., (2)
where the variance of the innovations urt is normalized to one. An alternative normalization
assumption would be to set one of the β0n loadings to one. We choose the former approach to
avoid the arbitrariness with the latter. In particular, a bad choice for the normalizing state
5
n under the second approach (the state for which β0n is set to one) may lead to very imprecise
posterior estimates of the factor.1 One drawback of the first approach is that the magnitude
of the movements in the factor itself does not have a direct economic interpretation. For
much of the paper this is not a problem, because the quantity of interest is β0nf0t , which
is directly interpretable in economic terms as the component of growth in house prices in
state n attributable to the national factor, regardless of the normalization. The issue arises
only when we report f0t by itself. In order to address this issue, we exploit the fact that
the formula used by OFHEO to compute the growth in the aggregate US index can be very
well approximated by yUS,t =∑
n wnyn,t, where the weights wn are the fraction of detached
single-family homes in state n. This implies from equation (1) that the impact of a one
percent movement in the factor on the aggregate OFHEO index is approximately∑
n wnβ0n,
since:
∑n
wnyn,t =∑
n
wnµn +
(∑n
wnβ0n
)f0t +
∑n
wn
(R∑
r=1
βrn frt + �n,t
). (3)
Therefore, in the remainder of the paper any time we show plots of f0t , or compute impulse
responses, we multiply it by the posterior median of the quantity∑
n wnβ0n, so that move-
ments in the factor can be directly mapped into movements in the aggregate OFHEO price
index.
The law of motions for the state-specific shocks is given by an AR(pn) process:
�n,t = φn,1�n,t−1 + .. + φn,p�n,t−p + un,t, un,t N(0, σ2n). (4)
A key identification assumption which allows us to disentangle the factors from one
another and from the state-specific shocks is that all innovations are mutually independent.
Intuitively, the factor model disentangles “co-movement” (the fts) and “idiosyncratic fluc-
tuations” (the �n,ts) apart. In order for this decomposition to be meaningful the innovations
to these different components need to be orthogonal:
IE[urt , un,t] = 0 all r, n, t; IE[um,t, un,t] = 0 all m,n, t. (5)
If the innovation to the idiosyncratic components were correlated across series, or with the
factors, they would cease to be “idiosyncratic”. The attempt to satisfy this assumption is
one reason why we include regional factors in the analysis – that is, to explicitly capture1There is here an analogy with the identified VAR literature. There, the choice is between setting the
variance of the identified innovations to one, or setting the diagonal elements of the impact matrix to one.
Waggoner and Zha (2000) argue in favor of the first approach when using Bayesian methods.
6
possible sources of comovements across states. Of course, to the extent that we are omitting
other important sources of comovements our results may not be robust.2 Likewise, we
assume that the innovations across factors are also orthogonal:
IE[urt , ust ] = 0 all r, s, t, (6)
otherwise the distinction between national and regional factors would again lose its meaning.
An important question for this paper is: What is the difference between the national
factor and the U.S. OFHEO price index? To what extent does the latter already correctly
capture co-movements in house prices across U.S. states, thereby making our approach re-
dundant? Doesn’t the fact that the U.S. price index grew so much in the last two years
provide by itself evidence that the increase in house prices is a national phenomenon? Equa-
tion (3) shows that national factor and the aggregate OFHEO price index are perfectly cor-
related only under the assumption that the term∑
n wn
( ∑Rr=1 β
rn f
rt + �n,t
)is zero.
This condition is met ex ante only if the weights on each single state or region are negligible,
so that the law of large numbers applies and both idiosyncratic and regional shocks average
out. In practice this condition is not met: California alone is 10 percent of the OFHEO in-
dex for instance. As a consequence, movements in the aggregate OFHEO price index could
be driven by either movement in the common component (f0t ) or by large movements in
those states or regions that have large weight in the index. This makes it hard to solve the
“local versus national factors” question just by staring at the U.S. OFHEO price index. The
factor model is designed to address this identification problem. The model tries to extract
the common component of fluctuations across states, without having any information on
the relative weight of each state: ex ante, all states weight the same in the factor model.
The paper will decompose movements in yn,t into fluctuations due to each of the three
components: national, regional, and state-specific component. The statistic vn(t0, t1) com-
putes the variance of fluctuations due to the national factor as the fraction of the sum of
the variance of all three components over the sub-sample (t0, t1):
vn(t0, t1) =
∑t1t=t0
(β0n f0t )
2∑t1t=t0
(β0n f0t )2 +∑t1
t=t0(βrn frt )2 +
∑t1t=t0
�2n,t. (7)
2The literature has also considered “approximate” factor models, that is, models where the idiosyncratic
shocks can be cross-sectionally correlated. Doz, Giannone and Reichlin (2006) show that even in this
situation maximum likelihood delivers consistent estimates of the factors. While this result is in principle
important for us since we effectively use maximum likelihood techniques, in practice some of the conditions
underlying their result are not met here. In particular, the size of the cross-section is far from infinity.
7
This variance decomposition is computed for each state n for the entire sample, as well as
for sub-periods of interest, notably the last four years.
The Bayesian procedure used to obtain the posterior distribution of the parameters
of interest, the Gibbs sampler, is straightforward for this model. We now give a brief
description of it. The Gibbs sampler is a zig-zag procedure where a set of parameters is
drawn conditional on another set of parameters, and vice-versa, exploiting the fact that
the conditional posterior distributions have a known form, even if the joint posterior does
not. The Gibbs sampler for this problem has two step. In the first step we condition on
the factors and draw all other parameters. Conditional on the factors, each equation (1) is
a regression model with AR(pn) errors. The procedure developed by Chib and Greenberg
(1994) makes it possible to draw µn, βrn,t, φn,j , σ2n (see Otrok and Whiteman 1998). Since
the errors are independent across n, the procedure can be applied equation by equation.
The same procedure is applied to the parameters φrj of the law of motion of the factors (2).
In the second step we draw the factors, conditional on all other parameters. The model
is already written in state-space form, equation (1) being the measurement equation, and
equations (2) and (4) being the transition equation for the unobserved states, which include
both the factors and the idiosyncratic shocks. We can then use the algorithm developed by
Carter and Kohn (1994) (see Kim and Nelson 1999, Cogley and Sargent 2002, and Primiceri
2005) to obtain draws of the states. This approach leads to a curse of dimensionality
however, as the number of states grows proportionally with the cross-sectional dimension
N . A solution to this curse of dimensionality is to pre-whiten the data, that is, to pre-
multiply each measurement equation by 1 −∑p
j=1 φn,jLj , so to get rid of the dynamics in
the state-specific shocks (see Kim and Nelson 1999, and Quah and Sargent 1993), obtaining:
(1−p∑
j=1
φn,jLj)yn,t = (1−
p∑j=1
φn,j)µn +R∑
r=0
βrn (1−p∑
j=1
φn,jLj)frt + un,t. (8)
To our knowledge, the literature that followed this path has in general conditioned on the
initial p observations (yn,1, . . . , yn,p). We use the full sample instead. The extra step required
to do this amounts to computing the expectation of the first p realizations of the factors
conditional on the initial observations.
The priors used in this paper are quite standard, and similar to those used in Kose,
Otrok, and Whiteman (2005). Importantly, we use identical prior for both the house price
and the real income data sets, obtaining very different results in terms of the national/local
factor decomposition, as we will see. This is indirect evidence that the priors do not drive
the main results of the paper. The prior for constant µn is normal with 2 and precision
8
(the inverse of the variance) 1. The prior for the loadings βrn is fairly loose: it is Gaussian
with zero mean and precision equal to 1/250. We have experimented with different degrees
of tightness and found that the results of the paper are qualitatively unchanged. The prior
for the idiosyncratic innovation variance σ2n is an inverted gamma with parameters 4 and
0.1. The priors for the parameters of the AR polynomial are Normal with mean zero and
precision equal to 1 for the first lag, and then increasing geometrically at rate .75 for the
subsequent lags. We choose a lag length equal to q = 3 for the factors and p = 2 for the
idiosyncratic shocks. All priors are mutually independent.
3 The Data
Most of the data were obtained from Haver Analytics (Haver mnemonics are in italics). The
Housing Price Index (HPI; HPI@REGIONAL) is published by the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and captures changes in the value of single-family homes.
The HPI is a weighted repeat sales index: It measures average price changes in repeat
sales or refinancings on the same properties and weights them (see Calhoun, 1996, for an
in-depth description of how the HPI is constructed). The price information is obtained
from repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties whose mortgages have been
purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since January 1975.3 While the
housing price data has been criticized for its construction, to our knowledge it is the best
data available to the public at the state (or more disaggregated) level.4 Additionally, we
will be working with growth rates of the housing price data so issues related to bias in
the level estimates are not relevant. Also, while we use state level data other levels of
aggregation (e.g. Metropolitan Statistical Area) are available. We find that the state level
3An alternative measure that is available at the state level at quarterly frequency is the Conventional
Mortgage Home Price Index (CMHPI), published by Freddie Mac. This measure is roughly based on the
same data on which the OFHEO HPI is constructed. Indeed, we find that the correlation between the
growth rates in the two price indexes is above .9 over the entire sample period.4Some authors, notably Peach and McCarthy (2004), have emphasized the differences between the
OFHEO house price and the constant quality house price index produced by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
They argue that home renovations and improvements lead to an overstatement of the average growth in the
OFHEO house prices. The constant quality house price index is simply not available at the disaggregated
level. We are aware that the potential mis-measurement of quality can lead to an upward bias in our esti-
mated mean growth rate. However, the average growth rate in house prices is not the focus of the paper.
The focus is on comovements in state-level house prices, especially during the recent boom. From this
perspective, we think that taking home renovations and improvements into account makes little difference
for our analysis.
9
data is disaggregated enough to establish our main conclusions, and yet the cross-section
is small enough for our computational approach to be feasible. We compute growth rates
using annualized log-differences, in percent. The HPI data are nominal. We deflate the data
using core PCE inflation (JCXFEBM@USECON), which measures inflation in the personal
consumption expenditure basket less food and energy.
While the HPI data are available from 1975, we use in our estimation only data beginning
in the first quarter of 1986. In the working paper version (Del Negro and Otrok, 2005) we
document that state-level HPI data are extremely noisy for a number of states before the
mid-eighties, with sharp appreciations immediately followed by sharp depreciations. From
the perspective of the dynamic factor model, the noise in the series is not necessarily a
problem in terms of estimation, as it is captured by the idiosyncratic component. However,
our methodology cannot deal with very large time variation in the importance of the noise
component, particularly when the time variation is very large as it is for the HPI data. The
noise abates considerably for most states after the mid-eighties. We choose the first quarter
of 1986 as the starting date for our analysis. Large structural changes in the credit market,
such as the end of regulation Q, provide another reason for leaving the first part of the
sample out of the analysis. Additionally, these sample gives us a period with one monetary
policy regime, which is convenient for the identification of monetary policy shocks. The
sample ends in the last quarter of 2005.5 In summary, we have 20 years (80 quarters) of
data for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. We have checked for the robustness of our results to
moving the start date to the first quarter of 1985, and found that the results to be robust.
The real per capita personal income data (YPPHQ@PIQR) are computed by deflating the
nominal per capita income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis using PCE inflation.
The regional factors are defined by the geography. Our baseline specification includes
five regions. The first three regions follow the Census definition. These are the North-
East Region, which includes the New England and Middle Atlantic Divisions; the Mid-West
Region, which includes the East- and West-North-Central Divisions (the former includes the
Great Lakes regions, while the latter includes the Plains); the West Region, which includes
the Mountains and the Pacific Divisions. We split the South Region, which includes the
South Atlantic, the East-South-Central, and the West-South-Central Divisions, into two
separate regions: South Atlantic and the East-South-Central (i.e., Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Tennessee) on one side, and the West-South-Central division (Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), which includes a number of oil-producing states, on the other.
5The working paper version shows that the results are robust to the exclusion of the last four quarters.
10
We have also tried a specification with nine regions, the nine Census Divisions, and obtained
very similar results. The only difference is that for some of the Divisions with few states the
regional factors were not well identified, hence we preferred the five regions specification.
The data used in the VAR include two measures of monetary policy, total reserves (in
results not reported here we use non-borrowed reserves as a robustness check) and the federal
funds rate, inflation as measured by the GDP deflator and real output growth as measured
by the growth in real GDP. All data were taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
database (FRED). The FRED mnemonics are BOGNONBR, TOTRESNS, FEDFUNDS,
GDPDEF, and GDPC1, respectively. The 30 year mortgage rate is obtained from Haver
Analytics (FCM@USECON). All data are quarterly, and the time-period coincides with that
used in the factor model.
4 Empirical Results
We have three sets of empirical results. The first set of results provides evidence on the
relative importance of national versus regional or state-specific shocks in driving movements
in house prices across US states over the past twenty years. We document that there is a
large degree of heterogeneity across states in regard to relative importance of the national
factors. Overall, however, we find that historically movements in housing prices are mainly
driven by local factors, either regional or state-specific. The second set of results argues
that the recent period has been different in this regard. While local factors have remained
important, the increase in house prices that occurred in several states in the last four years
is mainly driven by the national factor. Given the importance of the national factor, in
the third sub-section we ask whether or not expansionary monetary policy lies behind the
recent national housing boom. Specifically, we identify monetary policy shocks using a VAR
with sign restriction, and investigate their impact on house prices. We find the impact of
monetary policy on the housing boom to be non-negligible but small relative to the size of
the housing boom.
4.1 House price fluctuations and business cycles across US states
We first want to establish the degree of comovement in housing prices across states. Figure 2
contains three charts. The top charts shows the data – the growth rate in house price
indexes for the forty-eight contiguous states from QI-1986 to QIV-2005. The other two charts
11
decompose movements in the growth rates into national and local factors. By national factor
(middle chart) we mean the impact of national shocks on state n, that is, the component
β0n f0t of equation (1). All lines in the middle chart are perfectly correlated by construction,
with the different amplitudes of fluctuations reflecting the size of the exposure β0n to national
shocks. By local factors (bottom chart) we mean the joint impact of regional and state
specific shocks, that is, the βrn frt + �n,t component of equation (1). The data show two
periods of relatively high volatility in the growth rates. The first coincides with the early
part of the sample – from 1986 to the early 1990s. The second coincides with the most
recent period. A difference between these two episodes is in the role played by local factors,
as shown by the bottom chart. In the first episode local factors are behind most of the
volatility.6 Simply eyeballing the data (top chart) it is very hard to tell whether there is
a common component of house price movements in the late eighties and early nineties, for
any co-movement is shadowed by the importance of local factors. In contrast, in the recent
episode the common component is quite apparent. Except for two states – notably Nevada
and California– the volatility in local factors in the 2001-2004 period is no higher than it
had been in the previous four years. In the last two quarters of 2005, toward the very end
of the boom, state-specific volatility rises slightly, yet not to levels comparable with the first
part of the sample.
We have performed the same decomposition for state-level growth rate in real per capita
income. Real per capita income can be seen as a proxy for state-level business cycles (output
is not available at the quarterly level). The model used on the real income data is the same,
including the specification of all the priors, as that used on the house price data.The data
sets however are quite different, and so are the results of the decomposition, which we show
in Figure 4 of the working paper version and briefly summarize here. First, state-level real
income growth rates are less volatile than the house price data, with some exceptions for
rural states like North Dakota. Second, state-level business cycles appear to move more in
step than fluctuations in house prices. Local factors are important, but appear to be largely
short frequency deviations from the common component. Finally, for the income data there
is no evidence of the two high volatility episodes that characterize the house price data. In
particular, not much is happening toward the end of the sample.
The top panel of Figure 3 quantifies the relative importance of the national factor for
the house price and the income data over the entire sample. In particular, for each state the6Some of the local factors are correlated across subsets of states, as they represent regional shocks to the
South West and Mid West regions.
12
figure shows the magnitude vn(1, T ) (see equation (7)), that is, the variance of fluctuations
due to the national factor as a fraction of the variance of all components, for housing on
the horizontal axis and for income on the vertical axis. For all states that are above the
45 degree line the common component of fluctuations is more important for income than
it is for house prices. About seventy percent of states are above the 45 degree line. For
the median state the national factor explains only a quarter of the variance of house price
movements. This is in contrast with state-level business cycles. For the median state the
national factor explains about fifty percent of the variance in real per-capita income growth.
One should bear in mind that these figures include the housing boom years. If we drop
the last five years, the fraction of states for which the national factor is more important for
income than for housing rises to about ninety percent.
Recent literature (see for instance McCarthy and Peach, 2004) tries to explain the recent
increase in house prices by means of an affordability index, which measures the extent to
which current house prices are “affordable” given the level of income and of mortgage interest
rates. The underlying idea is that as income grows and interest rates decline, households
bid up house prices because they simply can afford them (that is, the mortgage payments
remain constant as a fraction of income). This theory posits a tight relationship between
income and house prices. The state-level evidence presented here presents a challenge to
this theory, as it shows that local factors dominate fluctuations in house prices, at least in
the first part of the sample, but not in per-capita income. An interesting hypothesis, which
we do not investigate further in this paper, is that segmentation in the mortgage markets
up until the mid-nineties lies in part behind the importance of the local factors.
4.2 The recent housing price boom
Figure 4 plots the posterior median of estimated national housing factor f0t (black, scale on
the left axis), the ninety percent bands (dotted lines), as well as the OFHEO U.S. price index
(gray dash-and-dotted, right axis). The figure shows that the recent period, particularly the
last two years, has been one of unprecedented volatility at the national level. The questions
we try to address in this section are twofold. First, are shocks at the national level, or local
factors, behind the recent increase in house prices across many U.S. states? Quantitatively,
what is the relative importance of the two? Second, to what extent can different exposures
to national shocks explain the heterogeneity across states in the house price increases?
Figure 4 also shows that the estimated national factor and the OFHEO U.S. price index
13
are very correlated, particularly in the second part of the sample. As discussed in section 2,
movements in the OFHEO U.S. price index could either be driven by movements in the
common component (f0t ) or by large shocks in states or regions that have large weight in
the index. Indeed, a key issue in the debate is whether the increase in the national index
reflects a national phenomenon, or local phenomena in a number of very highly populated
(and therefore highly weighted) states, like Florida or California. The fact that the estimated
national factor and the OFHEO U.S. price index move in sync in the last five years suggests
that the recent housing boom is a national phenomenon.
In order to quantify the importance of national shocks relative to local factors in the re-
cent period we plot for each state the the magnitude vn(t0, t1) for the sub-sample 2001-2005
on the vertical axis, and 1986-2000 on the horizontal axis in the bottom panel of Figure 3.
Again, vn(., .) represents the variance of house prices fluctuations in state n due to the na-
tional factor as a fraction of the variance of all components. For all states that are above
the 45 degree line the common component of fluctuations is more important in the recent
period than in the remainder of the sample. Figure 3 shows only the median of the posterior
distribution of vn(QI-1986,QIV-2000) and vn(QI-2001,QIV-2005), but in general these magni-
tudes are tightly estimated: The difference vn(QI-1986,QIV-2000)− vn(QI-2001,QIV-2005) is
almost always statistically significant. Between 2001 and 2005 the relative importance of
national shocks has increased for all states. For the median state the explanatory power of
the national factor in terms of the variance of house price movements has increased three-
fold, from 11 to 34 percent. Overall the figure provides evidence that the recent period is
different from the rest of the sample, in that the relative importance of national shocks has
increased substantially. Even in the recent period, heterogeneity across states is large – for
a number of South-western and Mid-western states the importance of the national factor
remains negligible even in the last four years. For many states local factors are still the
dominant source of fluctuations. However, we now proceed to show that for many of the
states that witnessed large increases in house prices, the national factor lies behind such
increases.
The gray bars in Figure 1 represent the component of the average annualized growth
rates in the OFHEO house price index for the 2001-2005 period that can be attributed to
the national factor. Specifically, for each state the figure shows the median of the posterior
for the quantity∑QIV-2005
t=QI-2001(µn + β0nf
0t )/20.
7 The dark bars represent the total annualized
7To avoid cluttering the picture we do not show the ninety percent bands for the component attributable
to the national factor: Taking estimation uncertainty into account does not alter the conclusions. The figure
14
growth rates, as discussed in the introduction. The figure shows that a substantial fraction
of the cross-state heterogeneity in the recent housing price boom is attributable to the
fact that states have different exposures to the national factor. Indeed, the cross-sectional
variance in the component of house price growth explained by the common factor (gray bars)
amounts to fifty-seven percent of the cross-sectional variance in average house price growth
(dark bars). Heterogeneity in the mean growth rates over the whole sample (µn) plays
virtually no role in driving this result: the fraction of the cross-sectional variance explained
by different exposures to the national factor is still fifty-seven percent using demeaned data.
Of course, local factors – shown by the distance between the dark and the light gray bars
– are still important, especially for states like California and Nevada. But it is certainly
not the case that all cross-state heterogeneity in the house price boom is driven by “local
bubbles”.8
4.3 Expansionary monetary policy and the housing price boom
We have so far made a case that the national factor has been important in the 2001-2005
period. What economic forces are behind the common factor? The answer must lie in a
common set of shocks or changes to the housing market. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to analyze all possible explanations for the house price boom. Here, we focus on one
of the most likely potential culprits, monetary policy shocks. By most accounts, including
the Fed’s own FOMC statements, monetary policy has been expansionary in recent history.
In the press, the boom in house prices has often been associated with loose monetary policy.
This section uses a VAR to investigate the importance of monetary policy shocks in driving
the common component of house price increases in the recent period.
The VAR includes standard macroeconomic data, as well as our estimates of the common
house price factor. We use some newly developed VAR identification techniques that require
minimal assumptions to identify and extract monetary shocks. We then use the identified
shocks in a counterfactual experiment where we eliminate these shocks from QI-2001 on
to create a counterfactual housing price factor. Next, we are able to identify the effects of
is available from the authors upon request.8What state-specific characteristics drive the differences in exposures to the common factor is an inter-
esting question which we leave for further research. We observe that the size of the light gray bars (that is,
the magnitude of the exposures) has a clear geographical pattern: It is generally large for states on both
the East and the West coasts – states where fluctuations in residential land prices are likely to be larger
(see Davis and Heathcote 2004), possibly because of zoning and other land use controls (see Glaeser and
Gyourko, 2002), and small for states in the center.
15
this shock on each state-level house price index via its factor loading or sensitivity to the
national cycle. These calculations give us an idea on the magnitude of the importance of
expansionary monetary policy on housing prices.
The virtue of our approach is that we can combine of a small number of national level
variables and with a wide selection of regional variables capturing local economic conditions
without loosing too many degrees of freedom (see Bernanke and Boivin 2003). The factor-
augmented-VAR thus yields a parsimonious model that allows us to study the effects of
national shocks on regional economies. A similar approach was developed by Otrok and
Terrones (2004) to study the effects of US monetary policy shocks on global house prices.
The reduced form VAR is given by:
Yt = A(L)Yt−1 + et, et N(0,Σ), (9)
where Yt is an m× 1 vector that includes observable data as well as the housing factor and
A(L) is a matrix lag polynomial. Ideally, one would estimate the VAR coefficients as part
of the MCMC algorithm and allow the uncertainty in the estimates of the factors to be
captured in the uncertainty in the VAR parameters and the impulse response functions (see
Bernanke, Boivin, Eliasz 2005) . However, since estimating the dynamic factor model itself
is computationally costly, combining this with estimating and identifying the VAR at each
step of the MCMC algorithm would be computationally very costly.9 Given how tightly the
latent factor is estimated (see Figure 4), we believe this to be a relatively minor issue.
The identification of monetary shocks is controversial. We identify monetary shocks
using a sign restrictions approach introduced by Faust (1998) and further developed by
Uhlig (2005) (see also Canova and DeNicoló 2002). Under this approach identification is
achieved by placing restrictions on the sign of the impulse responses with respect to the
shock(s) of interest for some variables for a number of periods in the future. For example,
after a contractionary monetary policy shock we restrict the impulse response function of
reserves to be non-positive, and that of interest rates to be non-negative. One advantage
of Uhlig’s procedure is that it allows one to identify only the innovation of interest (here as
in Uhlig’s work, monetary policy shocks), without making assumptions on the remainder of
the system. A second advantage is that by changing the set of variables that are subject
to the sign restrictions one can analyze the outcome of a variety of different identification9Our identification procedure, described below, is based on sign restrictions. This procedure requires
many draws of potential impulse response functions and is also computationally intensive procedure. It is
the combination of this procedure with the dynamic factor model that is infeasible.
16
approaches. We exploit this feature by exploring a number of them, which we describe
below. We then pick the identification that gives the largest impact of monetary policy
shocks on the house factor, thereby showing an upper bound on the importance of policy
shocks.
Our VAR consists of six variables: the house factor, total reserves, CPI inflation, GDP
growth, the thirty-year mortgage rate and the Federal Funds rate. The VAR is estimated
using quarterly data from QI-1986 to QIV-2005 and has four lags. We use a Litterman prior
for the VAR coefficients, taking into account that it applies to variables in differences rather
than levels. 10 The first four variables are in growth rates while the fed funds rate and
mortgage rate are first differenced.11 We then identify the (contractionary) monetary shock
as the shock that results in a set of impulse response functions consistent with 1) a increase
in the Fed Funds rate, 2) a non-positive change in growth of total reserves, 3) a non-positive
change in CPI growth, 4) a non-positive change in GDP growth. These restrictions hold for
three quarters after the shock. We leave the responses to the house factor and the mortgage
rate unrestricted. The restriction on the response of CPI inflation and GDP growth to
be non-positive in response to a contractionary monetary shock is not without controversy.
Indeed, the former is at the center of the ‘price-puzzle’ debate while the latter has generated
controversy in the literature (Uhlig 2005). Among the alternatives identification schemes
we study are: i) leaving CPI and GDP unrestricted, ii) constraining the impact on the
mortgage rate to be non-negative, and iii) changing the number of quarters for which the
restrictions have to hold to two. We also considered alternative model specifications, where
we include non-borrowed reserves in place of total reserves, or alternatively include both
measures of reserves. In another specification we use both the Fed Funds rate and mortgage
rates in levels. Finally, we increased the lag lengths for the VAR to five and six lags. For
none of these alternative identification schemes/model specifications is the impact of policy
shocks on the house factor is larger than reported.
Figure 5 displays the impulse response function of all of the variables to the mone-
tary policy shock, along with the 68 percent posterior coverage intervals.12 The house10This implies that the prior on the first lag is centered at zero rather than one.11From a Bayesian perspective it would be natural to estimate the model in levels (e.g. Uhlig 1994). For
space consideration we do not report the results for a model in levels but the affects of monetary policy are
smaller in that specification. We choose to focus on the results with first differences since the factor model
requires stationarity and hence the factor is the common factor in the growth rate of housing prices. To
maintain symmetry in the model we also work with differences or growth rates of the other variables12The coverage interval reflects the uncertainty in the posterior distribution of both the VAR rotation
matrix and the VAR parameters.
17
factor shows a significant and persistent drop following the contractionary monetary shock.
This result confirms that monetary policy shocks can impact housing prices, as found in
Iacoviello (2005). The mortgage rate increases after the shock, although the uncertainty
surrounding the size of the impact is large, and the posterior coverage intervals include
zero. For all other variables the responses are constrained, at least for the first three period
after impact, so little interpretation need be given to the sign of these responses. From a
quantitative standpoint, the effect of the monetary shock on housing prices is considerably
larger then the impact on the inflation rate, consistent with Iacoviello’s findings. The size
of both impulse responses are also roughly in line with his. Two remarks are in order. First,
in our sample period house prices have been much more volatile than inflation. Hence it
is not too surprising to find that the impulse responses to monetary shocks are larger for
housing prices than for inflation. Second, we deliberately search among all possible “reason-
able” identification procedures, and VAR specifications, for the one that deliver the largest
impact of monetary policy on house prices, in order to find an upper bound. The reader
should bear in mind that there are other reasonable specifications/identification strategies
that deliver a lower impact of monetary policy on house prices.
The forecast error variance decomposition presented in Table 1 provides some additional
evidence on the quantitative impact of the monetary shocks. Monetary shocks explain about
13 percent of housing price movements (corresponding to the median IRFs) on impact of the
shock, with a slow decline to about 8 percent at longer horizons. We interpret this number
as a sizable fraction – given that housing prices should be affected by many other shocks
such as income and mortgage market innovations. At the same time monetary shocks seem
to account for a trivial amount of inflation volatility at short horizons and a more sizable
15 percent at longer horizons. The monetary shock also explains little of GDP volatility
at any horizon. While the former result is consistent with that of Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), the latter result is at odds with their conclusion that monetary shocks
explain a large amount of GDP volatility at longer horizons. The difference is likely due to
the fact that we study a period of relative stability often labeled the “great moderation”
while the work of CEE includes the more volatile 1970s and ends in 1995.
Perhaps of greater interest than the shape and significance of the impulse response
function for housing prices to the monetary shock is the quantitative importance of the
recent policy choices on the housing price boom. To answer this question we construct
a counterfactual where we create a new set of “data” for all variables in our VAR after
setting the structural monetary shocks from QI-2001 on equal to zero. This experiment
18
is in the same spirit of Uhlig (2001) who constructs a counterfactual to identify whether
or not markets were surprised by the decline in interest rates. That is, he backs out the
structural shocks to determine whether or not policy differed from the past in this period.
Here we back out the monetary shocks to determine their effect on housing prices. The two
left panels of Figure 6 show the actual (solid line) and the counterfactual (dash-and-dotted
line) paths for the Fed Funds rate and the housing factor from this procedure. The two
right panels of Figure 6 show the difference between actual and counterfactual for the Fed
Funds rate and the housing factor (cumulated), respectively.
The difference between the actual and the counterfactual Fed Funds rate is not very
large, but is not negligible either. Toward the end of 2004, the counterfactual Fed Funds
rate is 80 basis points higher than the actual fed funds rate. Other multivariate models used
in policy analysis that are estimated using a different sample and different variables, such
as the Atlanta Fed BVAR for instance (see Zha 1998), produce a counterfactual Fed Funds
rate that is not very different from the one shown here. Consistent with the results for the
impulse response functions, the counterfactual housing factor is generally below the actual
one. At the end of the sample the cumulated difference between the two is 1.2 percent. In
absolute terms this is not a negligible number. Relatively to the overall growth in house
prices in the recent period the number is quite small, as evidenced from the fact that in the
bottom left panel the difference between the actual and the counterfactual is hardly visible.
The size of the state-level response to monetary policy shocks varies according to each
state’s exposure to the common cycle. States with larger exposure to the common factor
will have a stronger response to the monetary shock than those with smaller factor loadings.
Figure 7 shows the impact of policy shocks across the forty-eight states, relative to the overall
impact of the national housing factor. Specifically, the gray bars in Figure 7 represent the
component of the average growth rates in the 2001-2005 period that can be attributed to the
national factor, namely the quantities∑QIV-2005
t=QI-2001 β0nf
0t /20 that were also shown in Figure 1
(except that in Figure 1 we include the sample mean µn for each state, while here we
exclude it). The white bars quantify the impact of policy shocks. For each state they show
the quantity∑QIV-2005
t=QI-2001 β0n (f
0t − f̃0t )/20, where by f̃0t we denote the counterfactual factor.
In other words, the white bars show how smaller growth in house prices would have been
in absence of policy shocks in state n. Figure 7 shows that the impact of monetary policy
shocks has been small: always less than one percentage point in terms of average growth,
consistently with the aggregate numbers reported in Figure 6. Again, these figures are an
upper bound among all the specifications/identification schemes we considered.
19
The impulse response functions and the counterfactual seem to tell a different story
about the effects of monetary policy. The IRF in Figure 5 shows a potentially large role
for monetary policy shocks on housing prices while the counterfactual reveals a limited role
for monetary shocks in driving the recent house price boom. The answer is twofold. First,
while in absolute terms the impact of policy shocks on the house factor is sizable, relatively
to magnitude of fluctuations in house prices observed in the last five years it is fairly small.
Second, the evidence points to a limited role for monetary policy shocks in the post 2001
sample period. While there were more expansionary then contractionary shocks over this
period, the cumulated impact of the shocks on interest rates and house prices is not large,
as shown in Figure 6.
In summary, this section’s findings are: i) the Fed, while following a slightly more
expansionary policy than in the past did not deviate substantially from “business as usual”
in the recent period; and ii) to the extent that the Fed did pursue an overly accommodative
policy, the impact of this policy on house prices has been small relative to the overall housing
price increase of the last five years. Given that in the popular press loose monetary policy
is sometimes blamed for the housing bubble, our findings may be relevant to the current
debate. Our result that the impact of monetary policy shocks on house prices was small in
the recent period does not of course imply that the low interest rate environment experienced
by the US economy is not responsible for the housing boom. Here, we only consider the
component of the low interest rate that is attributable to policy shocks – that is, to the
Fed deviating from its historical policy rule in an expansionary way. Had the Fed reacted
differently to the environment – had it followed a different rule – the results might have been
quite different. This is a much more difficult question that (because of the Lucas’ critique)
goes beyond the scope of this paper.
4.4 Alternative identification schemes
The identification scheme we use here is not without controversy. A more conventional
approach to take is to use the recursive procedure first used in Sims (1980). This approach
imposes a contemporaneous ordering of the shocks. For example, if GDP is ordered before
the federal funds rate then the fed funds rate can respond to GDP shocks but not vice
versa. We have implemented such a strategy for our dataset to assess the robustness of
our identification approach. We order the house factor first, followed by GDP, inflation,
mortgage rates, reserves and the federal funds rate last, consistently with the approach
used in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The results from the impulses response
20
functions show that the house factor moves positively, but statistically insignificantly in
response to a contractionary federal funds rate shock. In response to a contractionary shock
reserves the house factor falls, but again the response is not statistically significant.13 The
response to the reserve shock is consistent with our intuition and previous results. The
response to the funds rate shock is a bit puzzling, but in these IRFs inflation also does not
fall in response contractionary policy shock and the responses of most variables in the VAR
are not statistically significant. The avoidance of the so called price puzzle is one of the
reasons we choose to use the sign restriction approach in the first place. Our identification
scheme takes into account that a monetary shock simultaneously affects both the federal
funds rate and the reserve market, hence we are more comfortable with that identification
approach. The main point for us is that the more conventional identification approach will
not lead to a large role for monetary policy shocks in driving house process.
Iacoviello (2005) also uses a recursive identification procedure on a four variable VAR
of house price, interest rates, inflation and output. With the federal funds rate ordered first
and the houses and output ordered last he finds that contractionary monetary shocks lead
to a reduction in house prices. This is consistent with the results we report with the sign
identification. The difference between his result and our recursive scheme is probably due
to both sample period (Iacoviello start in 1974 and ends in 2003) and variables in the VAR.
However, our sign restriction impulse response functions are quantitatively similar to his
recursive estimation procedure in both sign and magnitude.
5 Conclusions
We use a dynamic factor model estimated via Bayesian methods to disentangle the relative
importance of the common component in OFHEO house price movements from state- or
region-specific shocks. Our sample consists of quarterly data from 1986 to 2005. We find
that historically fluctuations in house prices have mainly been driven by the local (state-
or region-specific) component. Indeed, growth rates in OFHEO house price index are less
synchronized across states than are the growth rates in real per capita income, which are a
measure of the business cycle at the state level. In the recent (2001-2005) period, however,
“local bubbles” have been important in some states, but that overall the increase in house
prices is a national phenomenon. We then use a VAR to investigate the extent to which13Due to space constraints we do not report these impulse responses, but the results are available from
the authors upon request.
21
expansionary monetary policy is responsible for the common component in house price
movements. We find the impact of policy shocks on house prices to be small relative to the
size of the recent housing price increase.
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Table 1: Forecast Error Variance due to Monetary Shocks
House Reserves GDP Inflation Fed Funds Mortgage
horizon
1 13.46 0.11 6.68 2.73 26.08 18.38
2 11.41 62.35 5.17 4.75 8.75 18.61
3 8.91 0.46 1.89 7.79 3.08 32.54
4 9.27 22.51 2.93 5.02 0.31 21.11
5 9.15 9.46 2.17 7.35 1.48 22.26
6 9.23 15.26 0.88 10.47 6.90 10.25
7 9.10 9.92 0.89 12.34 9.61 6.35
8 9.09 9.67 0.91 13.62 9.80 6.66
9 9.03 8.07 0.92 14.65 8.71 6.29
10 8.89 8.82 0.92 14.68 7.82 7.74
Notes: The figure displays for all of the variables included in the VAR the percent of the variance in the reduced
form innovation at horizons 1 through 10 attributable to monetary policy shocks. The VAR is estimated with
quarterly data from QI-2006 to QIV-2005.
25
Figure 1: Cross-state Heterogeneity in the Recent House Price Boom: The
Role of the National Factor
CT ME MA NH RI VT NJ NY PA IL IN MI OH WI IA KS MN MO NE ND SD DE FL GA MD NC SC VA WV AL KY MS TN AR LA OK TX AZ CO ID MT NV NM UT WY CA OR WA 0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Notes: The figure shows for each of the forty-eight contiguous states the annualized average growth rates in real
OFHEO house price index (dark gray bars) for the 2001-2005 period:∑QIV-2005
t=QI-2001(yn,t−)/20. The light gray barrepresents the component of the average growth rates for the same period that can be attributed to the national
factor:∑QIV-2005
t=QI-2001(µn + β0nf
0t )/20.
26
Figure 2: State-level Real House Price Growth: National and Local Factors
1986−1 1988−1 1990−1 1992−1 1994−1 1996−1 1998−1 2000−1 2002−1 2004−1
−20
0
20
40
Data
1986−1 1988−1 1990−1 1992−1 1994−1 1996−1 1998−1 2000−1 2002−1 2004−1−30
−20
−10
010
20
30
4050
National Factor
1986−1 1988−1 1990−1 1992−1 1994−1 1996−1 1998−1 2000−1 2002−1 2004−1−30
−20
−10
010
20
30
4050
Local Factors
Notes: The top chart shows the growth rates in OFHEO house price indexes for the forty-eight contiguous U.S.
states from QI-1986 to QIV-2005. The nominal house price indexes are deflated using the core PCE inflation. The
middle chart (national factor) shows the impact of national shocks on state n, that is, the component β0n f0t of
equation (1). The bottom chart (local factors) shows the joint impact of regional and state specific shocks, that
is, the βrn frt + �n,t component of equation (1). For all estimated quantities we show the median of the posterior
distribution. See section 3 for a description of the data.
27
Figure 3: State-level Variance Decompositions
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ALAZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FLGA
ID
ILIN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MDMA
MIMN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NVNH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VTVA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Housing
Inco
me
Housing vs Income
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
AL AZAR
CA
CO
CTDE
FLGA
ID
IL
INIA
KSKY
LA
MEMD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NVNH
NJ
NM
NY
NCND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
1985−2000
20
01
−2
00
5
Housing: 1986−2000 vs 2001−2005
Notes: The top panel shows for each state the variance of fluctuations due to the national factor as a fraction of
the variance of all components (referred to in the paper as vn(1, T ), see equation (7)) for housing on the horizontal
axis and for income on the vertical axis. The sample period is QI-1986 to QIV-2005. The panel shows the the
median of the posterior distribution of vn(1, T ). The bottom panel plots for each state the magnitude vn(t0, t1)
for the house price data in the sub-sample 2001-2005 on the vertical axis, and 1986-2000 on the horizontal axis.
Again, vn(., .) represents the variance of house prices fluctuations in state n due to the national factor as a fraction
of the variance of all components. The figure shows the median of the posterior distribution of vn(t0, t1) obtained
from estimating the model over the entire sample period.
28
Figure 4: The National House Price Factor and the U.S. OFHEO House Price
Index
1986−1 1988−1 1990−1 1992−1 1994−1 1996−1 1998−1 2000−1 2002−1 2004−1−10
−5
0
5
10
15
1986−1 1988−1 1990−1 1992−1 1994−1 1996−1 1998−1 2000−1 2002−1 2004−1−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Notes: The figure plots the national housing factor f0t (black, scale on the left axis), the ninety percent bands
(dotted lines), as well as the OFHEO U.S. price index (gray, right axis). f0t is the median posterior estimate of
the factor from equation (1).
29
Figure 5: Housing and Monetary Policy: Impulse Responses
2 4 6 8 10−1.4
−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0House Factor
2 4 6 8 10−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2Reserves
2 4 6 8 10−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05GDP
2 4 6 8 10−0.07
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0GDP Deflator
2 4 6 8 10−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3Fed funds rate
2 4 6 8 10−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3Mortgage Rate
Notes: The figure displays the impulse response function of all of the variables to the monetary policy shock,
along with the 68 percent posterior coverage intervals. The VAR is estimated with quarterly data from QI-2006 to
QIV-2005.
30
Figure 6: Actual and Counterfactual Interest Rate and Housing Factor
2000−4 2001−4 2002−4 2003−4 2004−4 2005−40
2
4
6
8
10
12Housing Factor: Actual and Counterfactual
2000−4 2001−4 2002−4 2003−4 2004−4 2005−40
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4Housing Factor: Actual − Counterfactual, Cumulative
2000−4 2001−4 2002−4 2003−4 2004−4 2005−40
1
2
3
4
5
6
7Interest Rate: Actual and Counterfactual
2000−4 2001−4 2002−4 2003−4 2004−4 2005−4−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2Interest Rate: Actual − Counterfactual
Notes: The figure shows the actual (solid line) and the counterfactual (dash-and-dotted line) paths for the Fed
Funds rate and the housing factor. The counterfactual paths are obtained by shutting down monetary policy
shocks from QI-2001 to the end of the sample.
31
Figure 7: Cross-state Heterogeneity in the Recent House Price Boom: Assess-
ing The Role of Monetary Policy Shocks
CT ME MA NH RI VT NJ NY PA IL IN MI OH WI IA KS MN MO NE ND SD DE FL GA MD NC SC VA WV AL KY MS TN AR LA OK TX AZ CO ID MT NV NM UT WY CA OR WA 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes: The gray bars in the figure represent the component of the average growth rates in the 2001-1004 period
that can be attributed to the national factor, namely the quantities∑QIV-2005
t=QI-2001 β0nf
0t /20, for each of the forty-eight
contiguous states. These are the same quantities also shown in Figure 1. The white bars quantify the impact of
policy shocks. For each state the figure shows the quantity∑QIV-2005
t=QI-2001 β0n (f
0t − f̃
0t )/20, where by f̃
0t we denote
the counterfactual factor.