6- Rational Solidarity and Functional Differentiation

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ACTAOCIOLOGICA000

Rational Solidarity and Functional

Differentiation

Roar HagenDepartment of Sociology, University of Tromso, Norway

ABSTRACTThe article is based on the idea that the problem of unity or integration of modernsociety has not yet been solved in sociological theory. The paper attempts a newsolution based on a creative synthesis of elements from Talcott Parsons* functionalism,rational choice theory, and Niklas Luhmann's new systems theory. The core idea is thatthe state and the political sphere work together as an integrating centre of modernsocieties. Present approaches understand the political allocation of resources either asan exchange process or as solidarity caused by internalized social norms. None of themembodies a concept of collective rationality; therefore they cannot give a dynamicaccount of the public allocation of collective goods. This dichotomy of individualrationality and norm-guided behaviour will be produced and reproduced on the level ofgeneral theory in the discussion on the problem of order or collective action as long associology is founded on the assumption that society is made up of individual humanbeings and their actions. However, by replacing action with Luhmann's concept ofcommunication and rethinking collective action within this new framework, it becomespossible to develop a concept of collective rationality. This new conceptualization is usedto clear up problems and overcome shortcomings in Luhmann's own theory of modernsociety as functionally differentiated. Observed as a consequence of action, function iscollective action. A solution to the problem of collective action or social order is foundwith the emergence of rational solidarity as a medium that symbolizes the differencebetween individual and collective rationality as a unity: one should sacrifice individualopportunities to achieve collective goals and solve problems for the society to which onebelongs.Roar Hagen, Department of Sociology, University ofTromse, N-9037 Tromso, Norway? Scandinavian Sociological Association 2000

The discipline of sociology emerged as a reflec-tion on the unity or integration of modernsociety, often posed directly as the question howis society or social order possible? The ensuingtheoretical debate has been based on theassumption that society consists of individualhuman beings and their actions. Thus, there areonly two possible approaches to the question ofhow society is integrated. If they are taken asthe result of the unintended consequences ofaction, the social scientist must point to somehidden-hand mechanism and explain socialregularities as the outcome of a process ofvariation, selection and stabilization. The alter-

native to an evolutionary perspective is to base atheory of integration in intentional action. But asociological theory that takes the rational actoras its point of departure is confronted with thedouble problematic of complexity and socialorder or collective action. The theoreticalsolution to both of them has been to introducesocial norms into the analysis; society becomespossible only because the individuals within itare already socialized in such a way that theseproblems never arise.However, when empirical society isobserved as a normative order, the sociologistcan only lament the increasing complexity,

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28 ACTASOCIOLOGICA000 VOLUME3

systems differentiation and individualizationtypical of modern society as increasing disin-tegration. Alternatively, one can make a joke ofthis old-fashioned belief in the moral individualthat should carry society as a whole. But thisobserver might represent a sociology with noroom for agency, which actually results in loss ofthe concept of society in one of its mostsignificant meanings, namely as collectivity.What disappears in this dichotomy of socialintegration and system integration is an actorthat is able to observe negative and unintendedeffects of her actions for society and changes herbehaviour accordingly.

My treatment of this problematic is struc-tured by a distinction between a theory ofsociety on one hand and general theory on theother. Concepts developed on the level of generaltheory enable observation and explanation ofsocial phenomena, but they may also prevent ordistort observation and explanation. The argu-ment proceeds in the following manner. First Ipoint out how the conceptual limitationsmentioned above make themselves felt as short-comings in present theories of modern society,taking Niklas Luhmann as the focal point. ThenI show how these limitations are both producedand overcome on the level of general theory.

According to Luhmann, modern society isfunctionally differentiated. Its differentia speci-fied in comparison to earlier societies is thatthere is no central entity coordinating andhierarchizing its subsystems, such as theeconomy, politics, religion, etc. In some sensesthis is an intuitively convincing statement. Oncloser examination, however, it turns out thatLuhmann's analysis is self-contradictory, as hedefines the nature of subsystems on the basis oftheir function in the totality of society. It alsoturns out that at least in some places heassumes that the economic subsystem servesas the integrating medium of society. However,any critique that tries to remedy these weak-nesses by 'bringing men back' into systemstheory raises anew the two problems of com-plexity and collective action.The causes for these deficiencies in theoriesof society are to be found on the level ofsociology taken as general theory. As long asthe discussion on the problem of social order isfounded on the assumption that society is madeup of individual human beings and theiractions, there is only one solution to it: namelythat the individuals are socialized in such a waythat the problem never arises. This approachand its shortcomings are known from discus-

sions on Talcott Parsons, but I will demonstratethat this is the case also with theories that claimto transcend it, such as those developed, forinstance, by Jon Elster and J?rgen Habermas.To establish an alternative to action theorythis author turns to the conceptual toolbox ofLuhmann. By replacing action with Luhmann'sconcept of communication, and rethinkingcollective action within this new framework, itbecomes possible to develop a concept ofcollective rationality. Furthermore, Luhmann'sdistinction between psychic and social systemsallows us to have what sociology as a theory ofaction is denied, namely social order andvolition.

This new concept of collective rationality isused to clear up problems and overcome short-comings in Luhmann's own theory of modernsociety as functionally differentiated. Observedas a consequence of action, function is collectiveaction. By structuring itself as a social dilemmacommunication reduces complexity to that of asingle choice, either individual or collectivelyrational action. A solution to the problem ofcollective action or social order is found with theemergence of rational solidarity as a mediumthat symbolizes the difference between indivi-dual and collective rationality as a unity: oneshould sacrifice individual opportunities toachieve collective goals.According to this description, modernsociety is fragmented in nature (just as Luh-mann says). But (departing from what Luh-mann claims) it is not completely without anintegrating centre, as the (welfare) state and thepolitical sphere can be more widely understoodas a huge subsystem capable of restricting andchannelling the workings of other subsystemswhenever there is a process of communicationthat manifests a willingness to sacrifice indivi-dual interests to solve problems for the society asa whole.

The last section of the article deals with thestatus of such normative statements within asystems theoretical framework.

Functional differentiationAccording to Niklas Luhmann (1997a). modernsociety is functionally differentiated. It consistsof several subsystems, such as the economy,politics, law, religion, art, education, the massmedia, the family, science, sports, social help/security, the medical system, technology, etc.Each of these systems is specialized, fulfilling one



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RationalSolidarityand FunctionalDifferentiation 29

and only one function for society. The economicsystem satisfies present and future needs, thepolitical system provides collectively bindingdecisions, the religious system manages theinevitability of contingencies, etc. There areother important types of social systems, such asinteractions, organizations and protest move-ments, but it is the overarching functionstructure that gives modern society its singlecharacter. Function systems such as the econ-omy, science and the mass media are globalphenomena, and modern society is therefore aworld society, even if subsystems such as thepolitical and legal system seem more reluctantto cross national borders.

Problems particular to modern society areconsequences of its differentiation. Ecologicalthreats emanate from the operations of thevarious function systems, and their solutionrequires a holistic orientation or collectiveaction. But ecological problems have no clearremedy in a society in which subsystems canreact only in accordance with their own codes(Luhmann [1986] 1989). Likewise, the inclu-sion and exclusion of individuals into and fromsociety acquires its particular form due to theworldwide and uneven development of functionsystems (Luhmann 1995a). With functionaldifferentiation the individual becomes depen-dent on participating in most or even allfunction systems, but the uneven process ofglobalization excludes vast numbers from parti-cipation, and falling out of one of system meanslimited or no access to the others.

Moreover, the primacy of functional differ-entiation is not on the decline. Self-descriptionsof society using prefixes like 'late' or 'post' areindications of a modernity only beginning torealize its own diversity. There is no longer acommon standard for deciding what is to countas progress, and not one but many world views.Function systems are not ordered hierarchicallywith political systems at the top, or with theeconomy as an even more important base.Modern society is without an apex or centre; it isa polycontextural lack-of-unity of autonomoussubsystems.Luhmann's theory of modern society is acomprehensive conceptualization. It does notfocus attention on one subsystem, such as theeconomy, politics or daily life, or see one systemas more basic than others, but keeps differentaspects of society simultaneously present in thepicture. It is a totalization (Luhmann 1978)that claims to supersede and integrate thecompeting sociological alternatives into a

more comprehensive scheme, and which shouldtherefore guide theoretical and empiricalresearch. By underlining differentiation andfunction as characteristics of modern society,Luhmann continues and combines long lines ofthought within the social and human sciences.However, as grand theory bringing different andperhaps disparate elements of sociological rea-soning together, problems and shortcomings inthe parts become more visible and evencompounded in the whole. Let us thereforetake a closer look at the basic terms 'differentia-tion' and 'function'.

The origin of the concept of differentiationmay be diffuse, but it was picked up by theemerging sciences in the 19th century. Fromearly on, three different variations in its use canbe identified (Tyrell 1998). The first variantspeaks of a whole that differentiates itself. Themodel is the cell that splits itself, in whichspecialization of parts benefits the whole. Thesecond variant is the economic theory ofdivision of labour. This is foremost a model ofmutual growth and specialization. The whole isno more than relations of exchange betweenparts, each acting in its own self-interest,limited only by competition. The master ofanalysing society as consisting of parts mutuallylimiting each other is Georg Simmel. InSimmel's thought the dual processes of differ-entiation and individuaci?n come to the fore-front of a theory of society. However, the classicsof sociology cannot be placed wholly within anyone of these simplifications. The biologicalmetaphor is strong with Herbert Spencer, butit is combined with the economic idea ofcontractual relations between subsystems.Wilhelm Dilthey is claimed as the founderof the third tradition, which came to dominatethe German-speaking scientific community. Heis the first to signify science, religion and theeconomy as Kultursysteme, an approach whichcontinues with Max Weber's theory of theemergence of cultural or value spheres, as theresult of western rationalization. The issue ofintegration here fades into the background.There is actually nothing that binds thedifferent subsystems together. Likewise, theindividual is no more than the meeting pointof more or less contradictory role expectations.In all three variations the question ofcomplexity is at the centre of theory construc-tion. Because society becomes more diversified,all of its elements cannot be coordinated witheach other. However, the problem is handleddifferently in the three cases. In the last case the



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focus is on autonomous systems or valuespheres. Since integration is no longer aquestion, it is not meaningful to speak ofdifferentiation, and with Weber, not even ofsociety as a whole that is differentiated. In thesecond case integration is negative or external,the operations of systems enabling and limitingeach other. With the German tradition, Luh-mann understands differentiation as fragmen-tation of the social whole, allowing for mutualinfluences between systems, but with no gui-dance from society as an overarching system.But then why does Luhmann hold onto theconcept of function, and what is its significancewithin his discussion?

To maintain that differentiation is func-tional or dysfunctional is, in its original mean-ing, an example of the first variant, theperspective of observing subsystems to be usefulor harmful to the whole system. TalcottParsons' stroke of genius was to use the conceptas a means to combine the motivational andevolutionary understandings of integration intowhat was to become known as structuralfunctionalism. In this endeavour Parsons(1967) was inspired by Emil Durkheim. Durk-heim opposed Spencer's idea of the contract asa sufficient relation between systems with hisown concept of an organic solidarity, whichaimed at reconciling increased division of labourwith the idea of a social whole. According toDurkheim, increased specialization goes to-gether with social unity because the parts arelimiting themselves with respect to the needsof the total system. Parsons modified the solu-tions Durkheim pointed to, placing solidarityin the shape of a collective consciousness insideindividual consciousness as internalized norms.This allowed Parsons to think of norms as asocial structure that could be observed as usefulto the social system or to society in its order-creating capacity. Individuals themselves onlyact out values and norms with no considerationfor the effects of their actions on society. To thistype of sociology, then, belongs a theory, orrather a belief, on how social structures changeand develop as a response to the needs of society.This theoretical construction seemed to becorroborated by the emerging world order. InParsons' (1966, 1971) theory of modernity,differentiation of subsystems is accompanied byadaptive upgrading, inclusion and generaliza-tion of the values that make up the sharedsymbolic order. Sociology after the World War ?was rather optimistic, describing the functionsystems as if they were all pulling at the same

rope to improve the living conditions ofhumanity, as Luhmann (1996) puts it, tocounterpoint his own position.Parsons claimed to have identified fourgeneral problems that any system must solve.The critics, however, pointed out that socialsystems lack clear-cut criteria for survival, as forinstance exists in terms of death for anorganism, that allow a social scientist todistinguish between functional and dysfunc-tional social structures. Jon Elster (1983)maintained that the mechanism connectingaction and structure was not accounted for,and that functionalism implied an impossiblecausal feedback loop where effects became theirown causes. Functional explanation amountedto no more than the tautology that existingsubsystems are in fact functional since theyhave survived together with the whole system ofwhich they are parts.Luhmann's (1970) response to these the-oretical deficiencies was to replace a theory thatwas still reminiscent of an ontology of actionwith a kind of epistemological constructivism.Identifying causal relations as part of anexplanation by functions does not denote realforces. Functions are observations and theattribution of causality is a way of handlingcomplexity. Social systems are entities thatobserve problems and select solutions. Theremay be many, but not an unlimited number, offunctional alternative solutions to the sameproblem, and several, but not an unlimitednumber, of problems with the same solution.Functional analysis now requires sociology toobserve how social systems observe problemsand find solutions, and eventually to uncoveralternatives not observed by these systemsthemselves. Luhmann thus cuts of any connec-tion with Parsons' four-function scheme, but heremains within the overall confines of function-alist thinking: function relates a subsystem tothe whole, and not to other subsystems or toitself. First of all this seems for Luhmann to raisea logical problem: what is, or what is to becomeof society as a whole when it is divided intosubsystems?

The concept of society with Luhmann'stheory of societyTo appreciate Luhmann's theory of functionaldifferentiation one must realize that he intro-duces several different concepts of society. In itsfirst and basic meaning the concept of society



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delimits the social from the non-social. Societyconsists only of communications; all commu-nications take place within society and notoutside of it; and all communications contributeto the autopoiesis of society. Society is the onlysocial system without a social environment. ButLuhmann also defines society as a system interms of attainability, whereby complexity for-bids that all communications connect to eachother and form an all-encompassing network ofmutual influences. As a social system society issimpler than the totality of the elements thatcompose it. In a second sense, therefore, societyis observed as consisting of subsystems ofcommunications of a certain type, of higherdensity and less complexity than the subsys-tem's environment. However, there is alsosociety in a third sense: that which observesits own differentiation and eventually acts as awhole towards its parts. This notion of thesystem as a whole, or 'Gesamtgesellschaft', is,with Luhmann, still a logically necessary butempirically empty phrase. It is what modernsociety is not. It does not have a centre or apex.But if there is no society as a whole, how then toidentify parts or subsystems as functional?Differentiation implies independence.Truth must be separated from religion andpolitics for a system of science to emerge. Butdifferentiation also creates dependencies. Sinceeach of the subsystems is specialized into havingonly one function for society, the operations ofeach are dependent on those of other systems.Science does not produce the economicresources the system needs to decide betweentrue and false; the economy cannot prosperwithout an educated labour force and a stablepolitical environment, which for its part needsthe mass media to observe itself; everybody isconcerned about health and illness, and so onand so forth. What is the mechanism thatrelates the operations of one subsystem to theneeds of other subsystems, and eventually, tothose of society?Luhmann uses three different conceptualapproaches to account for relations betweensocial systems: observation, structural couplingand the distinction between static and dynamic.In fact the relation is nothing; there is nothingliterally between systems. Systems just observeeach other. Logically there are three possibletypes of observations (Luhmann 1981, [1981]1990a, 199 7a:75 7). A subsystem maintains arelation to the whole system to which it belongs,in this case, to society. It also maintainsrelations with the other subsystems in society.

Finally, a subsystem has a relation to itself. Indifferentiated systems the relation of a subsys-tem to the whole is determined by a specificfunction, while relations to the other subsystemscan be designated as performances (Luhmann[1981] 1990a:73). The function for which thepolitical system is differentiated can be charac-terized as supplying the capacity to enforcecollectively binding decisions. Political perfor-mances are found wherever the other functionsystems of society require collectively bindingdecisions (Luhmann [1981] 1990a:74). In thesame way the system of science assumes adouble relationship to society. On the one hand,science fulfils a specific function for society thatonly the system of science can do, and that is theproduction of new knowledge. On the otherhand, the system gives scientific knowledgeaway to other function systems in its societalenvironment, and to everyday life, as perfor-mances (Luhmann 1990b: 3 56).Luhmann's (1997a:745) main point isthat with the transition to functional differen-tiation, society no longer subjects the subsys-tems to a unitary perspective, as, for instance, instratified societies where every subsystem deter-mines its relation to other systems in terms ofrank. In the case of functional differentiation,each subsystem determines its own identity. Theperspective of unity, by which the distinctionbetween system and environment is differen-tiated, is the function that the subsystem fulfilsfor the total system (Luhmann 1997a:746). Butevery function system operates with its ownperspective on society. Society as a whole to itsparts has disappeared. Luhmann still needs thisreference of 'Gesamtsystem1 or society as awhole, but only to describe what is not thecase. For instance, he maintains that the totalsystem has given up every attempt at orderingthe relations between the function systems, orthat society can no longer regulate the rela-tions between its subsystems, and must leavethis to the process of evolution (Luhmann1997a:746).Luhmann does not deal with the distinc-tion between function and performance at anylength in Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft(pp. 757-760). Since observation of the func-tion belongs to the subsystem, the details shouldbe worked out in the monographs dealing withthe different function systems. Luhmann breaksoff the discussion on systems observing othersystems and instead begins to describe relationsbetween function systems as structural couplings.This concept is taken over from Humberto



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Maturana (1982; Maturana & V?rela 1987)together with the concept of autopoiesis. Theconcept of structural coupling is meant toexplain how a system can be both operationallyclosed and dependent on the environment. Theenvironment is not part of the system, but is stillsignificant for the operations of the system.Water and energy are not elements of socialsystems, but are vital to the human bodywithout which no social systems could exist.Through the course of evolution some parts ofthe environment become particularly importantto the system, while others recede into thebackground. Consciousness and communica-tion are two systems coupled by language thathas co-developed through structural drift. Luh-mann applies this vocabulary not only torelations between social and non-social systems,but also maintains that there are structuralcouplings within society, between its subsys-tems. He even alleges that the distinction ofautopoiesis and structural coupling replaces thesearch for forms of integration that convergewith functional integration (1997a:778).Each subsystem has structural couplings tomany others, and I must limit the presentationto a few of Luhmann's examples (1997a). Themain coupling between politics and the econ-omy is established through taxes. It is thepolitical system that makes decisions on publicexpenditures, but, according to Luhmann, thisdoes not change the fact that all payments takeplace within the economic system. However, theuse of money is conditioned politically and is notoriented towards making a profit. The structuralcoupling of law and politics is regulated by theconstitution, that of law and economicsthrough property and contract. Universitiescouple science and education, while expertsmake science available to politics. Interdepen-dence as structural coupling does not have to bepositive, but may just as well be negative: thatbusiness does not get the candidates it needs,that science holds experts to be non-serious,thereby transmitting uncertainty and notauthority, that politicians print their ownmoney and damage the economy. Not manypages of Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft are spenton this theme either, although the introductionto the chapter (4) on differentiation claims thatthat which functions as structural coupling is atthe same time a structure of the comprehensivesystem of society (1997a:601).But again, structural couplings are inthemselves nothing. They are external observa-tions of system-to-system causalities explained

as the outcome of evolution. In other words,structural couplings denote the static asopposed to dynamic relations of performance(1997a:759, n. 313). Coupling does not explainhow one system is 'motivated' to produce forother systems in its environment; it justaccounts for the result. However, when itcomes to pointing out the dynamics of inter-systemic transactions, Luhmann is indeed verybrief, merely stating that the relations ofperformances between systems in modernsociety presents a confusing picture, not to bereduced to principles (for instance, the principleof exchange), even if this (and this the significantsentence, RH) is the mechanism that channels thedynamics of the societal integration of society(1997a:759). So, after all, it is the market andthe economic system that integrates the opera-tions of the other subsystems of society. Theconcept of integration is that of the secondvariation, of systems mutually limiting eachother, each has to adjust to the needs of othersubsystems to solve its own problems, but thereis no regard for the functioning of the system asa whole, of the needs of society. One might stillsay that differentiation both divides and holdstogether, but integration is negative integration,as variation in the limitations of what is possibleatonetime(1997a:760).The last possibility, enabling one system toobserve how it is affected by and affects theoperations of other function systems withinLuhmann's scheme, would be to build this kindof sensitivity into the system's self-observation.Helmut Willke (1994) makes an attempt atutilizing this idea, but such an increase insystems rationality would demand that everysystem became transparent to every other. Itwould overburden each system with complexity,contradicting the idea of differentiation as amechanism that reduces social complexity.

ObjectionsI raise three objections to Luhmann's theory offunctional differentiation. The first is empirical.In Luhmann's account, what has become of thedynamics of the structural coupling of thepolitical and economic systems, the publiceconomy, or the welfare state, which allocateresources both to the different function systemsand to individuals as members of society, andwhich amount to approximately 30 to 50 percent of the GNP of modern states (in OECDcountries (OECD 1998)? Are processes of taxa-



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RationalSolidarityand FunctionalDifferentiation 33?:?SS?K??:;:?^????tion and public goods production also to bereduced to processes of exchange?The second objection has to do withplausibility. It contradicts experience to main-tain that, for instance, the system of sciencetakes into account the usefulness of its opera-tions for society in its own operations. Or thatthe economy, or religion, or art does so. Neitherdoes the opposite standpoint seem plausible:that there is no regard for the forces released byscience and their effects on society. Whenseeking to obtain the necessary resources todo research, there are two alternatives: either tosell the service or the results from research onthe market, or to acquire funding from the state.In the first case only the performances to thereceiving system are taken into account. In thesecond case the function or consequences tosociety are usually addressed, and the applicantpoints out how her scientific projects could solveproblems for society. In both cases the process offinancing may influence the selection of themes,but in none of them is this activity a part ofdoing the research.These critical remarks find some confirma-tion in the reading of the relevant parts ofLuhmann's monographs on law, the economy,politics, art, etc. In particular the idea of asubsystem observing its function becomescrucial with religion, because if religion couldknow its own function it would not have one.1Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend what itis supposed to mean that subsystems observetheir relation to the whole system when thesocial whole does not exist, or only in thenegative as wanting. One could give this ahistorical interpretation when Luhmann claimsthat release of research presupposes the exis-tence of a function system for the appropriationof knowledge that can legitimize itself by its ownfunction (Luhmann 1990b:341). Only whenscience can claim that it benefits society willsociety give up its control of knowledge, andsimilarly for marriage, the allocation ofresources, etc. As a consequence society dis-appears in the process, but then the distinction ofthe whole system and its parts can be placedneither in society nor in 'its' subsystems. Theneed for legitimation disappears; functions are,by now, latent functions.The third objection has to do with the logicof part and whole. Even as existing only in thenegative, as lack of unity, the functionalrelation, i.e. the observation of the system as awhole or 'Gesamtgesellschaft' must be placedwithin society. Since society is without a social

environment, the observation of society mustexist within and not outside of society. Luh-mann 'unfolds' the paradox of the non-existentwhole by claiming that this is his observation.From the vantage point of systems theory as asubsystem of the social sciences within thesubsystem of science, it is possible to observecertain structural similarities between the sub-systems of modern society that can be sub-sumed under the concept of functionaldifferentiation (Luhmann 1997a:43). SinceLuhmann's text is an attempt at communica-tion, and every communication belongs tosociety, he may be justified in his claim thatmodern society observes itself.2But what allows Luhmann to speak of acrisis for society, of functional differentiation ascreating problems for society because it threa-tens both its external and internal environ-ment? Luhmann presupposes a standpoint fromwhich consequences for society of the opera-tions of the subsystems can be identified andevaluated, and thereby contradicts himself. Notonly are there different rationalities of thesubsystems, but there is also the rationality ofsociety, which supplies the standpoint fromwhich to characterize the consequences of theoperations of the subsystems to the wholesystem. This becomes more than a failure oflogic when one reads in the text that lack ofintegration is experienced as increasingly pro-blematic by society. Luhmann's Die Gesellschaftder Gesellschaft has a referent in society. The lackof coordination of the operations of functionsystems is not only encountered by functionsystems mutually irritating each other, but alsoturns into society's self-irritation. Societyobserves itself not only through systems theory,but also has a screen, perhaps a metaphor forthe mass media, wherein these irritationsbecome visible to society (Luhmann 1997a:795). The most important problems listed byLuhmann are environmental problems, over-population, migration and increasing indivi-dualism.3

One could take this re-emergence of societywithin society as an indication of the correct-ness of the claim that it is impossible to speak ofa decomposition of society without implying itsconstitution (Schwinn 1995). While systemsrationality is only about survival (Apel 1996),constitution demands an internal perspectivethat can only be established by an actor's pointof view, which systems theory is lacking. Onlythe values, interests and needs of individualscan be the basis for identifying social problems



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and can substantiate questions of performancesand functions of social systems (Habermas[1985:426ff.] 1987a, 1992:426ff; Schwinn1995). We shall look more closely at whataction theory critics have to offer in terms ofalternatives before we return to the questionsraised above.

Social integration and system integrationDifferent authors point to different subsystemsas provided with a special capacity to direct thecommunications of other function systems.G?nther Teubner (1983, 1985) and HelmutWillke (1992) attempt to account for thesteering capacity of the system of law withtheir own concept of 'reflexive law'. J?rgenHabermas (1992) ascribes to the systems of lawand politics a particular role for regulation andintegration. Organizations in particular arecredited with a capacity for integration. Associal systems they cut across functionaldomains and therefore can take societal needsinto account (Willke 1995). Both suggestionsare closely connected with an idea of individualsas 'carriers of communication', forming asubstratum or common ground for the opera-tions of the different function systems, andwhich therefore supply a basis for inter-systemiccommunication (Stark 1994). Individuals aremembers of several or even all the differentfunction systems, and individuals in contrast tosystems have the cognitive capacity to reflect onthe negative consequences of the operations ofone function system for other function systems,for society and for affected individuals. Thesereflexive processes may take place inside thefunction system as part of a professional role, oroutside the system as non-professional commu-nication in interactions. The results are madeavailable to and influence the system, forinstance, as public criticism. It is maintainedthat persons and organizations act as diplomatswho link and modify the operations of thedifferent function systems. Two unresolvedtheoretical problems remain with this attemptat linking action and system. The first has to dowith information, the other with the problem ofcollective action.

For a sociology that holds that societyconsists of human beings and their actions, thesocial totality must acquire coordinationthrough the individuals. But as society becomesmore complex, the individual cannot foresee allthe consequences of his actions, to himself, to

others and to society. To solve this informationproblem, sociology introduced the distinctionbetween gemeinscahft and gesellschaft, socialintegration and system integration (Lockwood[1964] 1976), or between life world and system(Habermas [1981 vol. 2:179] 1987b). On theleft side of the distinction, sociology assumesindividuals that consciously coordinate theiractions towards a common aim; on the rightside, social order is the result of non-normativeregulation of single decisions only functionallyrelated to each other (ibid.) The archetypalsystem in this sense is the market; actions ofbuyers and sellers are coordinated by the pricemechanism, by forces of supply and demandthat operate as an invisible hand.Within this framework integration can beachieved on the level of either intended orunintended consequences of actions. But how toreconcile the difference of system and life world,as system integration or as social integration?What happens if the operations of subsystemsturn out to be destructive to each other or thelife world? It should be possible to moderatesystem operations if the affected individualsrecognize the unintended and harmful conse-quences of their actions and change theirbehaviour accordingly. But, of course, then theproblem of information reappears.

Furthermore, observed as the result ofactions, functions or dysfunctions have con-sequences for society, that is, for groups ofpeople - they are collective goods or bads.Success in collective action is dependent on thecontribution of several actors, and from thisrelationship emerges the problem of collectiveaction or generally the problem of social order. Itmay pay to co-operate, but it pays even more tofree-ride on the efforts of others. The rationalchoice in collective action is to reap all thebenefits from co-operation without carrying anyof the costs. But when this strategy is general-ized and everybody defects, the collective goodwill not be supplied. The rational actor canforesee this, and to prevent none or under-production of public goods he should co-operate. But he also understands that if heselects the collective strategy, he has noguaranty that the others will follow suit. Asrevealed by game theory, there is a conflictbetween individual and collective rationality(Rapoport 1974). The dominant strategy in aPrisoner's Dilemma Game is to defect becausethis choice leaves the actor best off irrespectiveof the choices of others.

Reflecting on the same constellation of



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actions and choices, but labelled the Hobbesianproblem of order (Parsons [1937] 1968),sociology found a solution in solidarity, whichworks as a counterforce to egoism and holdssociety together. The selfishness of the indivi-dual may be constrained from the outside, aswith Durkheim's collective consciousness. Butsince society consists of individuals, all socialmust in the last resort be found within theindividual. Parsons therefore placed collectiveconsciousness in individual consciousness asinternalized social norms. It is presupposed thatindividuals are socialized in ways that preventthe problem of order from arising. The critics,however, observed that a sociology of normsgave up the concept of choice, or the actor'sperspective, and that its individuals appeared asover-socialized or cultural dopes. Many havesought to overcome this deficiency by ever newattempts at 'bringing men back in', eventuallybasing sociology in rational choice theory. Theproblem of social order then either remainedunsolved (for example, Coleman 1990), or, ifaddressed, re-established the Parsonian solu-tion: collective action is impossible as a rationalchoice, and social norms are the cement ofsociety (Elster 1989).4Habermas ([1981] 1984, 1987a) has triedto avoid both of these alternatives by construct-ing his own concept of communicative rationality.In contrast to strategic action based on therational calculus of utility, communicativeaction raises claims to validity made in theprocess of communication. A communicativerationality addresses whatever problems theactors have in common; communicative actionis therefore also collective action. But if indivi-duals are rational and take the consequences oftheir actions into account, why are they notcaught up in social dilemmas? Answer: com-municative rationality must be insulated fromstrategic considerations. To declare this Haber-mas uses two different strategies. On the onehand, he points to an ideal speech situationwhere individuals have no other interests thanestablishing consensus based on best argu-ments. Here individuals may criticize existingsolidarities and build new ones. Or, he assumes,since this ideal can never be realized, that inempirical situations individuals feel obliged bythe rationality of language taken as a norm inthe Parsonian sense.

This twin set of unresolved theoreticalproblems surfaces again and again in Haber-mas' argumentation. On the one hand, every-day language is too simple to handle complex

societal problems. On the other hand, local lifeworlds institutionalized as public discourses aredriven by inherent universal claims to validitytowards a certainly diffuse understanding of thetotal situation. But this understanding is notan organizing centre. The citizens do take partin the formation of a collective consciousness,'but they cannot act collectively' (Habermas1987a:360), because collective action nowwould have to mean that the state transformedintersubjectively created self-understandinginto self-determination. This possibility is ques-tioned because the state as a function system isconstrained by other function systems, andmoreover is preoccupied by its own systemicneeds and does not address the interests ofsociety or the system as a whole.To sum up so far, the discussion seems tohave reached a dead end. Systems theorypresumes a standpoint in modern society fromwhich to observe the subsystems as useful orharmful, but for which it is unable to accounttheoretically. Action theory is unable to fulfil itsclaim of producing such a foundation, takingindividual human beings as basic elements ofsociety. Actors that are allowed to observeconsequences of their actions are confrontedwith interaction problems, which, within thisframework, can only find a consistent theore-tical solution in assuming normatively inte-grated individuals who are therefore unable torelate to the consequences of their actions.However, even if the solution is stale, thetheoretical problem of order or collective actionas posed within action theory is a fruitfulapproach to the understanding of integration,also for modern society. And by transferring thedouble problematic of information and collec-tive action into the realm of general theory, wemay find the causes for present shortcomingsand ways to overcome them.

Communication and collective action5Luhmann's new systems theory undercuts thedistinction between social integration andsystem integration by replacing action withcommunication as the basic element of socialsystems. This presupposes a transformation ofthe concepts of communication and action.Communication is not a process that conveysinformation or thoughts between people, like apackage from one mind (container) to another(Shanon 1989). Ego can only know whatmotivates alter by way of communication, that



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is, ego must form an expectation as to what isgoing on in the mind of alter, and bases his orher behaviour on this attribution of reasons foraction on behalf of the communication partner.As expectations of expectations, communica-tion constitutes a closed self-referential system.Everything social, that is, that which relates tothe behaviour of others, must find its confirma-tion within this process.The distinction between human indivi-duals and society, which dominates actiontheories, is replaced by the distinction betweenpsychic and social systems. Psychic systems aremade up of consciousness and social systems ofcommunication. Both are self-referential,closed, autopoietic systems that produce theelement they consist of. Individuals as biologicalor psychic systems are not part of and cannotinfluence communication. Individuals onlyenter, or 'come into', social systems when theyare communicated about. And there is no suchthing as 'partly overlapped' or 'semi-autonomy';either social systems are closed networks ofcommunications, or they are not systems.Communication is the unity of threeselections: the selection of information, theselection of an utterance and the selection ofunderstanding. In contrast to mere perception,ego distinguishes the informational contentfrom alter's conveyance - and understands.One reads, for example that tobacco, alcohol,butter and frozen meat are bad for one's health,and one is changed (into someone who shouldknow and observe this) - whether one believes itor not (Luhmann [1984] 1995b:147). Under-standing concludes the communication, saysLuhmann, but there is also a fourth selection.The addressee has to decide between acceptingand rejecting the communicated meaning, as apremise for his own behaviour, and this selec-tion is observed by the system as action. Onemay understand the informational meaning ofthe utterance and still reject it. Understandingdoes not imply agreement, but creates an opensituation, forces the choice of either rejection oracceptance. Whether the communication isaccepted or rejected is observed in the nextcommunication, and irrespective of whether itis accepted or rejected it brings the system fromone operation to the next. Communicationsystems self-check by self-observation. It is onthis basis that Luhmann claims communica-tions are closed and autopoietic social systems.So far I have given a standard presentationof the theory. This section and the next is moremy own reading in which I introduce new

distinctions. Understanding has now acquired adouble meaning. Theoretically we must distin-guish between understanding the informationalcontent of the communication and understand-ing the selection of a response to it. There aretwo forms of contingency experience: uncer-tainty and dependency. Communication about arejected communication may communicateabout either the truth value of the informationor about the interest positions of the involvedcommunication partners. With respect to theaforementioned case of scarce resources, wemay distinguish further between individual andcollective goods. With only two parties involvedthe problem of double contingencies may find asolution through relations of exchange. Whencommunicative success is dependent on thecontribution from several actors, however, thesystem may observe itself as a system ofcollective action. It confronts itself with theproblem of collective action and infers thedistinction between individual and collectiverationality. Lack of success is attributed to theindividuals' unwillingness to act on behalf of theconsequences to the system as a collectivity, andexplained by motives of greed or fear. Theproblem of order or collective action shouldnow be read opposite to the way it is read inaction theory. It does not arise from calculatingselfish individuals. It is the other way around;selfish actors are the creation of communica-tion. In this way communication reducescomplexity and creates social order by con-struction of a particular form of un-order, orconflict.

The distinction of individual and collectiverationality can be further related to that ofprivate and public. All communication onproblems that the actors have in common, asa collectivity, may be addressed in public. Publicdiscussions take place on the collective side ofthe distinction between individual and collectiverationality. One cannot seriously make state-ments like 'we should all defect' or take a 'freeride', etc. in public. Individual rationality isprivate and perhaps secret, and only collectiverationality can be generalized and is valid as apublic choice. Collective rationality refers to thesystem's own operations, while individualrationality belongs to the environment. AUpublic utterances with respect to collectiveaction raise the normative expectation thatone should co-operate to further a common aim.Here, in public, collective rationality can bepraised as the moral stance, and individualrationality is denounced as egoism.



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Public, moral denunciation, however, doesnot solve the problem of collective action. Werecall the distinction between psychic and socialsystems. The psychic system observes thedistinction of collective and individual ration-ality; it has its own opinion and may even optfor egoism or make a totally different interpreta-tion. It is only because we abandoned theDurkheimian/Parsonian/Elsterian solution tothe problem of order - the solution that assumesthe identity of social and psychic systems - thatwe were able to account for the problem as asocial reality in the first place. We must there-fore find mechanism other than internalizationof norms to account for the unity of expecta-tions of collective action raised in public andtheir actual acceptance.6

The medium of solidarityThe specific mechanism that makes the com-municated distinction between collective andindividual rationality have effect on the selec-tion of actions is dependent on the numbers ofindividuals involved. Archaic society, wherecommunication is differentiated along lines ofresidence and kin, comprise relatively fewpeople that communicate face-to-face. Presenceencourages conformity. It is more difficult to sayno in interaction systems, also to proposals ofcollective action. When actors must make achoice between individual and collective strate-gies in the presence of others, they confirm eachother in the rationality of the collective strategy.An attempt at free-riding calls out a similarresponse in the others, so defection becomesvirtually ineffective as an individual strategybecause it is generalized instantly (Hardin1982). The mechanism of observing beingobserved ensures that the selection of a collec-tive action finds positive confirmation in thesimilar choices of the others as a mutuallyreinforcing process. Confronted with external orinternal threats to its unity, as a village or as asystem of kin, the small society establishes itselfat the same time as a system of collective actionand as a present public, and the collectivityeither breaks down or acquires autopoiesis dueto the physical presence of the communicationpartners.This interaction model of collective actionholds a long way for societies differentiated intostrata as well. Class societies are structuredaccording to distinctions of above and below,where those below are confronted with the

power of those above. The upper strata repre-sent the whole of society, and their internalcommunication can be pretty much understoodas an interaction system. The person is tightlycoupled to society's self-observation as a collec-tivity.When communication increases due to thedevelopment of new media of disseminationsuch as writing and printing, more people aredrawn into communication, and the bindingand bonding capacity of the present publicdeteriorates. A public of interacting persons isreplaced by a mass-mediated public opinion.Power is no longer sufficient to ensure com-pliance from those below, since the people havebecome the prime source of power. However, areal or anticipated increase in defection maynow be addressed in communication as a lack ofsocial integration or a failing solidarity. Twomain strategies for handling the problem ofsocial order emerge. A reflection on the conflictbetween individual and collective action maydenounce egoism as unethical and seek tostrengthen social cohesion by appeals to morals.Or one may point out the irrationality of egoismand what the actors would gain by co-opera-tion; it may be rational to sacrifice opportunitiesfor individual action and co-operate to achievecollective goods instead.7 The medium of soli-darity evolves as this generalization that sym-bolizes the difference between collective andindividual rationality as a unity.8In the sociological literature, solidarity isoften associated with pre-modern forms of socialintegration, the main exception being, ofcourse, Durkheim's distinction betweenmechanic and organic solidarity. But whensolidarity is thought of in terms of morals, it isdifficult to align even organic solidarity with thedifferentiation of subsystems and lifestylescharacteristic of modern society, and sociologyafter Durkheim has distanced itself from theconcept (G?bel & Pankoke 1998). But the strongcohesion and uniform behaviour attributed tosmall groups and social movements do notnecessarily indicate the strength of internalizednorms held in common, but rather the system'sinteractional character.9 In a public of presentpersons, communication is experienced asaction, and it is hardly possible to address thepossibility of defection explicitly in the commu-nication. It is only when the public is no longerpresent that (lack of) solidarity becomes atheme. Solidarity, therefore, denotes not parti-cular strong and uniform norms, but thereintroduction of the distinction between indi-



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vidual and collective rationality in the collectiv-ity as a public. One foresees that the actors maynot accept the communicated proposal tocollective action, and tries to motivate accep-tance by addressing both the advantages to theindividual as a member of the group, and his orher obligation towards the group. Solidarity is amodern phenomenon.But still, solidarity does not solve theproblem of collective action; it is only collec-tively and not individually binding. It is themedium of power that makes collective ration-ality apply to private decisions and suspends thesocial dilemma. With power the actor knowsthat she must contribute to the collective action,for instance, to pay her taxes, and that otherswill do the same. With power and solidarityeven mass society may observe a readiness tosacrifice individual benefits for collective goodsthat can be used to address society's problems.Functional specialization makes every sub-system dependent on the operations of otherfunction systems. As Luhmann pointed out, afunction system may acquire the resources itneeds for its own operations by selling productsor services on the market. But it can also getwhat it needs from the state. In the market onlyperformance is taken into account, while thepublic economy distinguishes between perfor-mance and function. Typically, when somesubsystem claims resources from the state, itdoes so by pointing to its performances for othersubsystems and individuals, and thereby to itsfunction for society. For instance, the structuralcoupling between the educational system andother function systems is observed by the public.We see that the education system qualifiespeople to perform roles in other systems,which therefore need its services, and if theseneeds are not gratified it will lead to problemsfor society. The subsystem of education is thusentitled to get from society the resources it takesfor the system to fulfil its function. Likewise, themedical system makes claims to public moneyby pointing to the needs of society and itsmembers. Even sports are presented as useful forsociety and are therefore entitled to acquireeconomic and legal resources from the state.Power is also a collective good - it solvesproblems for society. That is why public moneyand legal resources should be allocated to thisfunction. Thus the welfare state integratessubsystems, but it also furthers the inclusionof individuals.

With functional differentiation the indivi-duals in society become dependent on being

included in most of or all the function systemsfor their own welfare. These interdependenciesare observed by society, which has developedtwo main forms of inclusion to counter exclu-sion at the level of subsystems: (1) legal rights toaccess, more or less backed by economic means,and (2) social policy or social help whenexclusion is not seen as a failure of the system,but is attributed to the affected individual, andwhere some form of personality change isneeded to ensure inclusion.10

Now, I do not assume that function systemscommunicate with each other, as action theorydoes, or that they communicate throughindividuals and organizations acting as inter-mediaries between them. Instead I assert withsystems theory, as a theory of difference, thatwhen the functions of subsystems are commu-nicated about, these subsystems become theenvironment of another system. As a system ofaction this is what I call the public economy thatuses the distinction between function andperformance to communicate about the alloca-tion of resources to function systems and toindividuals as members of society. I hold ontothe idea that one function system cannotdominate, substitute or intervene in the opera-tions of other systems. The public economy is afunction system, among others, and publicmoney cannot replace or substitute for medicalcommunication or for science. The publiceconomy can only irritate or stimulate opera-tions in other function systems, and by thatprocess it stimulates self-regulation of thesystem as a whole. The respective functionsystems determine what society needs in termsof education and medical facilities, but toacquire money from society each subsystemmust address problems that are important tomany, and point out to society how its functionis impeded by lack of resources, and howperformance will improve with larger subsidies.Consequently, the public should be willing tosacrifice individual opportunities. This sacrificeis rationally motivated; they should pay taxes tomake public goods available to a society ofwhich they are members.

Sociology and the society of societyThe conceptual innovations offered here, likecollective rationality and rational solidarity,allow a reformulation of the theory of functionaldifferentiation. According to this new descrip-tion, modern society is not completely without



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an integrating centre. The welfare state and thepolitical sphere can be more widely understoodas a huge subsystem capable of restricting andchannelling the workings of other subsystemswhenever there is a process of communicationthat manifests a willingness to sacrifice indivi-dual interests to solve problems for society.While adhering mostly to the frame of Luh-mann's theory, this reformulation also intro-duces elements that may appear alien to it, allthe more so since it is often claimed that the newsystems theory is without a place for agency andhas no concern for society and its future. Ibelieve, however, that no sociological theory ofsociety can avoid implying an actor's perspec-tive. That this holds also for systems theoryshould be obvious from its concept of commu-nication.

From the standpoint of action theory,Luhmann's statement that not human beings,but only communication, communicates,sounds strange, and as long as the distinctionbetween communication and consciousness istaken as a separation in space it must remainincomprehensible. But a social system does notoperate outside consciousness as a separatething. The material of which communication ismade is consciousness.11 It is the distinctionbetween the social and the psychic as adistinction in consciousness that allows socio-logical theory to have both social order andvolition. This is an option that action theorymust deny itself, because it can only find orderin society by treating the individual as anextension of it. This prop, whether in the form ofsocial unity as internalized social norms or asintersubjectivity, is now replaced by commu-nication understood as a process.

Every communication takes an interest inits future. It expects from its environment ofpsychic systems a particular reaction, namelythat it should be accepted and not rejected. Thatis why the rejection or the no is the reflectionvalue of the communication code. The nodisappoints and leads to a process of attribution:who is to blame? In social systems there are onlytwo ways of processing selections. 12Either theseselections are interpreted as actions, or they aretaken as information about states of the world.In the last case of an experience, the systemmust blame itself and adjust to the environ-ment. Its expectations of a particular nextcommunication were unfounded because theycould not be realized. It is in relation to thisdistinction between experience and action that Iclaim the conceptual innovation of a collective

rationality is valuable because it may turnexperience into possibilities for actions. Whenthe next social event is dependent on severalactors, the (anticipated) rejection may bereflected upon as a problem of collective actionor social order. The distinction between indivi-dual and collective rationality is applied andexpectations of co-operative behaviour emerge.There might be a global warming that hasnatural or social causes, or both. But whennegative effects from the environment are seenas the outcome of selfish behaviour in thesystem, normative expectations arise - oneshould not behave like this.

Sociology as action theory reads the com-munication process in an abridged fashion. Asocial scientist that believes that society consistsof individuals and their actions must accountfor the normative expectations raised in com-munication as qualities in people. Now, this isprecisely what communication does: it raisesnormative expectations for individuals. But onlyfor the moment, in its transition to the nextevent. The shortened understanding of commu-nication is the real basis for a sociology ofinternalized norms as the solution to theproblem of order, and the reason that the socialsciences cannot have a concept of collectiverationality as an emergent phenomenon, sinceone side of the distinction of individual andcollective rationality must be placed within theindividual as something s/he is to explain.But why did Luhmann not work out thepossibilities to transcend this obstacle to ascientific concept of collective action that laydormant in his general theory, and why does theconcept of the actor have such a dubiousstanding with him? I suggest, because systemstheory is too much a negation of what itopposes. Luhmann's endeavour started with acritique of the rational actor, as an actor thatrelates to the consequences of her actions basedon knowledge of the world as it is. Inspired bythe self-doubt generated towards this modelwithin organization theory at the time, Luh-mann ([1968] 1973) replaced rationality withcomplexity as the more fundamental paradigm.There are always more opportunities for experi-ence and action than can be realized at anyonetime, and any order is a selection from thisoverabundance of opportunities - meaning itselfis complexity (Luhmann 1990c). As Luhmannmade his point against J?rgen Habermas: evendiscourses have to limit themselves. All thoseaffected might not be included, and thoseactually participating realize that they cannot



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say all of what they think, but must take intoaccount what the others can understand andwill accept. Discourses are thereby systems asreductions of complexity (Luhmann in Haber-mas & Luhmann 1971; Luhmann 1992). Theresidue of an action-oriented theoretical stancewithin Luhmann's theory is perhaps his under-statement that since one cannot look behind thehorizon of meaning, the actor cannot reallyknow what s/he is doing, and the whole figure isrendered uninteresting.

Rationality is replaced by reflection, andwith Luhmann's theory it is possible to observea system reflecting on and eventually adjustingits own operations. This process can be more orless rational, even if every step in the rightdirection may hold the seeds of a more seriouscrisis in the future. There are no external,absolute criteria for deciding if a system is betteradjusted to its environment, but there areinternal points of observation. Function is oneof them.

When subsystems are observed, a distinc-tion is drawn in society that constitutes a newsystem, which reflects on relations between thesubsystem and society. This is the society ofsociety as communication on society in society.The parts or the subsystems may then be relatedto the whole system in terms of their functionfor it. The concept of function is now cleansed ofits action-theoretical implication of conse-quences literally turning (against the arrow oftime) into their own causes. But Luhmann doesnot supply us with an alternative and dynamictheory on the processes between subsystems,but only a static one in terms of structuralcoupling. To understand social relations asprocesses we need the concept of the actor. Itherefore had to take the critique of actiontheory a step further and reintroduce the actorexplicitly as the outcome of, and a necessaryelement in, communication. The constructionof the collective actor does not imply a multitudeof individuals that literally assess all of theconsequences of their actions before they act. Itreduces complexity by giving it a particularform, namely that of individual and collectiverationality, which enables society to guide itsown operations.Observed as the consequences of action,function is collective action. Expectations ofcollectively rational behaviour normallybecome binding for society through the politicalsystem, which supplies society with the capacityto enforce collectively binding decisions. Butaction theory has problems with giving content

to the concept of collectively binding. When thenormative expectation to sacrifice individualinterests for the collective good is placed in theindividual as a moral capacity, whether asinternalized norms or a communicativelyachieved solidarity, one must ask why some-thing that is already experienced as binding bythe individuals must also be enforced? If powerwas legitimate with those actions to which it is apotential threat, it would not be necessary. Butpower is legitimate only on the collective side ofthe distinction between individual and collectiverationality. Here the function of power to supplysociety with the capacity to enforce collectivelybinding decisions is observed, namely, thatpower makes it individually rational to act forcollective goals.13 From the perspective of indi-vidual rationality, however, power is simply thethreat of using force.

Starting from the other side of the distinc-tion, with homo economicus, we fare no better.According to Habermas, the political allocationof resources is an exchange process: 'The publicadministration exchanges organizational per-formances for taxes (as an input factor), as wellas political decisions (as the output of its ownproducts) for mass loyalty' (1987b:319).14 Thesame mistake of conflating political commu-nication with market operations is made byLuhmann ([1981] 1990a) when he asserts thatclaims to public money are expressions ofinterests, and that interests are subjectivestatements or preferences.16 Resources thatare allocated to functions in the form of taxesare subtracted from the public, which receivesperformances - goods or services - fromfunction systems in return. Both authors seemto believe that since both sides both give andtake, this is a process of exchange based on theself-interested calculation of utility. But thegoods that are transacted are collective andnot individual goods. To acquire collective goodsthe applicant must show that the money spentwill be useful to and solve problems for society.Only then can s/he rationally expect the citizento sacrifice his or her individual interests for thecollective good.The reader perhaps accepts that my con-ceptual innovations could solve some problemsfor sociology, but may object that they would inany case be of no use for society. As scientificconcepts they are forever confined to the socialsciences as a closed, autopoietic system. This isnecessarily true since wherever we find scientificdiscussions they belong to the system of science.From this vantage point, however, it is possible



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to see that not only empirical results, but alsoconcepts and models made up by science,circulate in society, are used to reflect uponsociety and guide selections in the politicalsystem. When science notices that society usesconcepts or models that distort its self-reflection,these concepts or models should be withdrawnfrom circulation and replaced with more fittingones. This devaluation and issuing of scientificproducts is entirely an internal matter.There are, then, mechanisms of integrationin modern society that are overlooked by actiontheory and systems theory alike. Structurallycoupled as national states with substantialpublic economies, it was possible to furtherboth functional differentiation and inclusion ofalmost the total population. To say this does notimply that the same mechanism suffices for thesociety of world society, and that collectiveaction through political organization couldsolve all the problems on Luhmann's list. Butthen collective rationality will guide whatsociety regards as realistic expectations. Oneshould only try to solve such problems as societyhas the means to handle. The rest will be left tothe process of evolution. At least we have turnedthis question regarding the possibility of asociety of world society into an empirical one,and have not excluded it at the level of generaltheory. The problem of collective action shouldbe the centre of attention both for developing anunderstanding of the history of functionaldifferentiation, and for understanding the mod-ern present, and its future. In all cases thewelfare state and public allocations wouldacquire new significance with systems theory.

First version received May 1999Final version accepted August 1999

Notes1In the chapteron the function of religion n DieReligionderGesellschaftLuhmann 1997b). we therefore inda discus-sion on thetopicof who s theobserver.uhmanndecides hat it isthe scientistthat observesand that functions are latent.2 The intended meaning of the title - The Society ofSociety' isto keepan eyeon the paradox hat the textis partofwhat it describes, and therefore changes what it describes(Luhmann 1997a:14). But when he adds 'if it succeeds',heseems to indicate somethingmore than the truismthat everycommunicationchanges society.3 On the one hand, their autonomy threatens the veryexistenceof society:on the other hand, since their operationsare communications, Luhmann (1990b:622) claims that

subsystemsare always adjusted o society.4 However,without references o Parsons' reatmentof theproblem.

5 A more extensive argumentation to the differencebetween collective action treated theoreticallyas action orcommunication s givenin Hagen 1999.6 Luhmann ([1984] 1995b) recognizedthat the normalsociologicalsolutionto the problemoforder makes t disappearas a socialproblemand turns it into an artefactof science,andhe reformulates he problemof social order as one of doublecontingency. The shortcomings of his approach becomeapparent when he claims that double contingency finds asolution in an emergingself-interestas a systemof exchanges.Luhmann ails to see that this solutiondoes not holdif there aremorethan two individuals nvolved Hagen 1999).7 Fora recent discussionof theconcept,seeBayertz1998).This collectionof articlesgivesampleevidence orour thesis thataction theory limits our understandingof collectiveaction andsolidarity,becausesolidarity s explainedby values and normsthat the individualhas in his head,so to speak.8 For the concept of media, see Luhmann (1976, 1982,1997a).9 Evenin primitive ocietyit was possible o eat forbiddenfood and enter into inappropriateand secret types of sexualrelationships.Theproblemwas,ofcourse,thatwhat isprivate na small society easilybecomespublic(Malinowski1926).10Likesociologyin general,systems theory (forexample.Huf 1998) findsa functionwith the welfarestateto the extentthat it furthers nclusionof persons throughsocial policyandthereby upportsdifferentiation, ut it overlooks hesignificanceofthe welfare tateand the publiceconomyfor theintegrationofsubsystems.11See JeanClam'sarticlein this issue on the couplingofoperative evels.12For the argument, see RudolfStichweh'sarticle in thisissue.11Habermas 1992) introduces he conceptcommunicativepower,expressingthe idea that some forms of powerare notrepressive,but an efficientmeans to organizethe realizationofcommon goals. This is at least an implicit admission thatcommunicativerationality is not sufficientand that claims tovaliditydo not alone bind actions.14'From he standpointof the subsystemsof the economyand the state,their nteractionswith the respectively ontiguousspheresof the life worldtake the form of interchangerelationsconnected in parallel.The economicsystem exchanges wagesagainstlabour as an inputfactor)as well as goodsand services(as the output of its own products)againstconsumerdemand.The public administration exchanges organizational perfor-mances for taxes (as an input factor), as well as politicaldecisions(as the output of its own products) or mass loyalty'(Habermas1987b:319).13For nstance,for'hot airdryers n publicrest rooms andpublicharbours orholidaysailors'.16'Whatever t mayhaveconcerned: nterest s somethingthe person nterested an judge onlyhim- or herself (Luhmann[1981] 1990a:38).

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6- Rational Solidarity and Functional Differentiation