6 Bases during the Cold War The bipolar base race Before 1940, the U.S. basing structure had been restricted to a small number of

colonial possessions and satraps, in Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines, Hawaii,

Wake Island and the Panama Canal Zone. The Lend-Lease Act added a string of

bases in British and Canadian territories along the U.S. Atlantic littoral, in

Labrador, Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Antigua, Trinidad and British

Guyana. Then at the start of World War II, the U.S. established forward access

in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, Mexico (Acapulco) and Ecuador (the Galapa-

gos Islands). By the end of the conflict the U.S. had access to a near-global

network of facilities in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, had basing access only within its contiguous

Eurasian empire, added to by the war’s end by access all over Eastern Europe

and in Mongolia. Britain, France and the Netherlands – also to a lesser degree

World War II neutrals Spain and Portugal – regained control over colonial

empires and related basing access after the war, only to see them gradually

wither with the decolonization process between 1945 and around 1970. Japan

and Germany lost everything they had.

By the late 1940s, the U.S. and the USSR were fully engaged in what would

become a global struggle for influence and access, in which access to bases was

to play a pivotal role, given the expectation of an inevitable “World War III.”

That competition accelerated after 1955, outside the bounds of the contiguous

Soviet empire and, importantly, had several features, but which were altered

across several identifiable, if not neatly bounded, phases of this competition.

They were:

• The importance of Western, mostly British, colonial possessions for U.S.

basing access in the early Cold War period, gradually fading in importance

over time up to around 1970.

• The increasing importance of alliances, ideological ties and security assis-

tance in determining the patterns of U.S. and Soviet basing access.

• The spatial configuration of “heartland” vs. “rimland” as depictive of the

U.S.–Soviet “base race,” with the U.S. establishing a ring of bases around

the Sino-Soviet Eurasian heartland, and the Soviets gradually leapfrogging

the rimland via ideological client states and arms transfers. The configuration İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 2

was gradually altered towards a more inter-penetrated basis, with rivals’

bases in proximity in various regions.

• The increasing importance in the “base race” of technical or C3I or “ISR”

facilities, as supplementary to “traditional” naval and air bases: communica-

tions, space-related, ballistic missile defense, maritime detection, nuclear

detection, signals and photoreconnaissance intelligence etc.

• A reduction in the number of bases required by superpowers as a result of

technological development, i.e., longer-range aircraft, tanker refueling, the

increased amount of firepower packed into planes and ships, nuclear ship

propulsion etc.

• Towards the end of the Cold War and previewing the new world after 1991,

a newer geopolitical focus on the Persian Gulf and the “arc of crisis”

running from the East African Horn to Central and South Asia.

• A two-layered situation in which the bipolar rivals required basing access

for nuclear deterrence and for conventional power projection, but with these

functions often being combined in given basing facilities.

In the period immediately following the end of World War II, the U.S. was

faced with decisions about how far down to draw the enormous basing network

it had developed during World War II. At least one major article in Foreign

Affairs during this period pointed out the history of American weakness in this

area before World War II, and advocated that in line with its new powers and

responsibilities that the U.S. should retain a global basing structure after the

war.1 Of course, not all the countries that had hosted U.S. bases during the

war were willing to continue to do so; Brazil, for instance, insisted on U.S.

withdrawal in consonance with the altered conditions.

During the immediate postwar period, however, before the main thrust of

decolonization acquired full force, the U.S. was able to rely on the bases pro-

vided primarily by the British, but also the French, Dutch and Portuguese

empires.2 These empires unraveled only gradually over a 25-year or so period.

This provided the U.S. access to a plethora of air and naval bases: Gibraltar,

Malta, Cyprus, the Suez Canal Zone, Aden, Libya (Wheelus Air Force Base),

Gan in the Maldives Islands, Mombasa, Simonstown in South Africa, Freetown,

Singapore, Hong Kong, etc., added to by access to other facilities in Canada and

Australia. France’s remnant empire allowed for some U.S. access as well,

particularly important in the 1950s, regarding bomber bases and communica-

tions facilities in Morocco. During the period after 1945, of course, the U.S.

occupied Germany and Japan, and had free access to bases all over occupied

Europe, in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece and Turkey. In the

Central Pacific, the U.S. took over the former Japanese League of Nations man-

dates in the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall Islands, with few restrictions on

their use for bases.

In the early 1950s there was the full onset of the Cold War, the Korean War,

and NSC-68 as the formalization of the containment policy. Importantly, there

was also the construction by the U.S. of a network of formal alliances, both

Bases during the Cold War 95 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 3

multilateral and bilateral, that formed a physical barrier around what had come

to be called the Sino-Soviet bloc after 1949, a barrier extending around Eurasia

from Ireland and Norway around to Japan. There was NATO, CENTO (the

Baghdad Pact) and SEATO, the first two hinged on Turkey, the latter two on

Pakistan, abetted by ANZUS and the bilateral defense pacts with Japan, South

Korea (after 1950) and Taiwan (after 1950).3 Arms transfers and other forms of

security and economic assistance underpinned all of these alliances, and with

them went a very permissive and comprehensive basing structure for the U.S., in

effect in exchange for security against the perceived menace of Soviet and

Chinese expansionism, both in terms of possible military attack and internal sub-

version. The physical structure of this basing network was neatly reflective of a

rimland defense posture around Eurasia à la the geopolitical formulations of

Mahan and Spykman.

Functions of the U.S. Cold War basing system As the Cold War evolved in the 1950s and 1960s, the functions of the U.S.

global basing structure came to be divided along the lines of nuclear deterrence

and conventional deterrence and power projection. The latter category further

subsumed the use of bases for direct military interventions, arms resupply during

conflict, coercive diplomacy (“gunboat diplomacy”) and “presence” (showing

the flag).4

The initial use of forward bases came with the stationing of B-29 bombers in

the U.K. in the late 1940s. Following that was the stationing, in the 1950s, of B-

47 “Reflex Force” bombers in the U.K., Spain and Morocco.5 Shortly after that,

the B-52 bombers were introduced as the backbone of SAC, and they were all

based along the northern rim of the continental U.S., in Maine, New Hampshire,

upstate New York and Michigan. But, they required tanker refueling, bases for

which were established in Greenland (Thule), Canada (Gander), Iceland

(Keflavik) and in the U.K. Additionally, numerous bases in Europe and else-

where were designated as recovery bases for the bombers should they exit the

USSR after a bombing raid.

Later in the Gulf War, forward based tactical aircraft (FBS) – F-4s, F-16s,

and F-15s – were configured for nuclear weapons, based mostly in Germany, but

able to mount missions from other bases in Europe, in Iceland, the Netherlands,

Italy and Turkey.6 Additionally, F-111E bombers based in the U.K. were

deployed as nuclear attack aircraft that could reach into the Soviet Union.

Nuclear armed attack aircraft were also based in South Korea and the Philip-

pines, capable of reaching the USSR and China. Tanker aircraft based on Guam,

Okinawa, Japan and the Philippines could also serve in relation to nuclear-armed

aircraft.

In the late 1950s, in response to the “missile scare,” i.e., the looming threat of

Soviet ICBM deployments ahead of similar U.S. deployments, the U.S. based

medium-range ballistic missiles, Thor and Jupiter, in the U.K., Italy and Turkey.

In Asia, Matador and Mace land-based missiles were deployed in Okinawa and

96 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 4

Taiwan as a deterrent vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Far East.7 And then, in the

1980s, the U.S. forward deployed Pershing II and ground-launched cruise mis-

siles (GLCMs) in several Western European states – Germany, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Italy, U.K. – to counter the menace of Soviet SS-20s being targeted

on Western Europe, which deployments were drawn down after the signing of

the INF Treaty with the USSR.

Nuclear-armed U.S. naval forces also made extensive use of overseas facili-

ties. American “boomers,” submarines mounting long-range SLBMs, were long

based at Holy Loch, Scotland and Rota, Spain, in addition to Guam. These

forward deployments allowed the U.S. to negotiate a SALT II Treaty with the

USSR that gave the latter a larger number of SSBNs, somewhat balanced out by

the U.S. having those overseas facilities that allowed for keeping relatively more

SSBNs “on station” at a given time. Finally, nuclear armed SSNs, attack sub-

marines, whose main intended function was to hunt Soviet SSBNs, were based

overseas at Faslane, Scotland, La Maddalena on Italy’s Sardinia and Sasebo in

Japan in proximity to known major transit routes for Soviet submarines. And,

lastly, U.S. carriers (CVNs) with nuclear armed aircraft and other surface ships

carrying nuclear weapons made frequent stops for replenishing at numerous

overseas ports, though that was sometimes a political problem in nuclear-phobic

Japan. U.S. nuclear-armed CVNs operated out of Yokosuka in Japan, Subic Bay

in the Philippines and Naples, Italy.

Electronic intelligence aircraft prowled along the Soviet borders and coasts to

“tickle” Soviet radars and to plan possible routes for U.S. bombers. U-2 and SR-

71 surveillance aircraft were used, particularly in the case of the former up to

1960, to monitor Soviet construction of ICBM missile silos and nuclear test

sites. The U-2s earlier were based at Mildenhall in the U.K., Bodo in Norway,

Wiesbaden in West Germany, Incirlik in Turkey, Peshawar in Pakistan and

Atsugi in Japan; the SR-71s mostly in the U.K., but deployable to other bases.8

Some other air and naval basing functions also related to nuclear deterrence.

The U.S. had an elaborate network of P-3 Orion naval air bases in relation both to

surface and sub-surface detection of Soviet ships, with a focus on ASW.9 Around

the Indian Ocean littoral, P-3s were flown out of Masirah in Oman, for instance,

Mogadishu in Somalia (after 1978), Singapore and Australia’s west coast.

Sigonella in Sicily was used as a major P-3 base for monitoring the movements of

Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. Other P-3 bases have been Embelzebil/

Nairobi (Kenya), Tahkli (Thailand), Djibouti, earlier in the Seychelles and Bandar

Abbas in Iran during the Shah’s reign, Misawa and Iwakuni in Japan, Cubi Point

in the Philippines and Dakar in Senegal. Then, TACAMO aircraft based in, among

other places, Bermuda, were utilized to trawl communications wires through the

ocean to communicate with U.S. nuclear submarines.10

Regarding conventional power projection capability, the U.S. also utilized a

massive network of overseas bases, again for purposes of conventional deter-

rence (tripwires), arms resupply, coercive diplomacy and presence. Sometimes

but not always, these deployments involved co-location at bases utilized in rela-

tion to nuclear deterrence.

Bases during the Cold War 97 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 5

First and foremost was the long-term, stable deployment of ground forces in

Europe and Asia, primarily in Germany, South Korea and Japan, but also in Italy

and Belgium. That involved barracks, training grounds, maintenance depots,

hospitals, etc., in relation to large-unit deployments of corps and divisions; like-

wise, the deployment of protective surface-to-air missiles to defend these instal-

lations. The largest was with the Seventh Army in Germany, amounting at its

peak to some 330,000 troops, mostly in Bavaria, Hesse, Baden Wurtemberg and

Rhineland Pfaltz, reduced to below 100,000 after the end of the Cold War. In

Italy, a combat brigade was long deployed near Vicenza to bolster the Italian

army and in relation to a possible Soviet thrust through Austria into Italy.

In the Far East, the U.S., after the end of the Korean War, long deployed

around 40,000 troops in South Korea, mostly along the DMZ and around the

capital city, Seoul. There was a threat by the Carter Administration to reduce or

eliminate these deployments, which did not eventuate, in response to the

growing disparity in economic might between the two Koreas. In Japan, more

than 40,000 troops were long deployed, mostly Army and Marine units on the

island of Okinawa, co-located with extensive deployment of combat aircraft,

tankers and transports. Later, after the end of the Cold War, this deployment

became a hot issue within Japan, and consideration was given to moving the

troops to the Japanese mainland.

U.S. Navy surface fleet bases11 The U.S. Navy, throughout the Cold War, utilized a number of major and minor

bases for its surface fleets, most importantly, for aircraft carrier battlegroups.

Several British ports were regularly used. Before France’s withdrawal from

NATO’s military structure in the 1960s, Villefranche was a frequent port of call

for U.S. ships, as were Barcelona, Livorno, Rota, Piraeus, Souda Bay on Crete

and Izmir in Turkey, the latter a regional naval headquarters. Naples and nearby

Gaeta provided a homeport and headquarters for the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the

Mediterranean Sea.

In the Persian Gulf, even well before the Iran–Iraq and Desert Storm con-

flicts, the U.S. homeported a small flotilla and had a headquarters for its

MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain. Naval deployments in and around the Persian Gulf

were upgraded in the late 1980s. Mombasa in Kenya and Djibouti then became

ports used frequently by the U.S. Navy.

In the Far East, Yokosuka in the Tokyo Bay was long a hub of the U.S.

Seventh Fleet, with its extensive drydocking capacity that could handle large

nuclear-powered carriers. Sasebo on the Sea of Japan also hosted USN surface

vessels as well as attack submarines. And up to the end of the Cold War, Subic

Bay in the Philippines was another U.S. Navy main base, which was used to

support operations in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Then, during

the 1980s, the Philippines began to eliminate U.S. use of its long-held naval and

air bases. The U.S. considered replacement bases variously at Guam, Taiwan,

Thailand and Australia, finally settling on extensive utilization of Singapore’s

98 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 6

Bases during the Cold War 99 Table 2 Main and secondary surface-ship and submarine operating bases of the U.S.

Navy, as of late 1980s

Host nation and base Description

For surface ships

Japan

Yokosuka

Major navy base, HQ for U.S. Naval Forces

Japan and homeport for aircraft carrier Midway

and about ten other 7th Fleet ships, available for contingencies in West Pacific; also used by

nuclear attack submarines; extensive dock

facilities, naval munitions maintenance and

storage, naval hospital, ship repairs including

largest USN drydock west of CONUS; supply

depot.

Sasebo

Base used jointly with Japan; naval ordnance facility, docking storage facilities for 7th Fleet;

homeport for a nuclear attack submarine, drydock

capacity for aircraft carriers, large-scale naval

fuel storage, munitions storage for USMC.

White Beach (Okinawa)

Berthing and storage for 7th Fleet ships,

occasional use by SSNs. Taiwan

Kaohsiung

Occasional port use by U.S. ships.

Guam (U.S. overseas possession)

Apra

Major naval base; ship repairs, logistics wharf,

explosives and fuel storage; formerly Polaris

homeport for eight SSBNs; patrol boats and mine flotilla based here.

Philippines

Subic Bay

Major USN base, HQ for U.S. Naval Forces,

Philippines, major ship repair facility with four

floating drydocks which can accommodate all but

largest aircraft carriers; piers and other support

facilities – support 7th Fleet operations throughout West Pacific and Indian Ocean; 60

percent of all 7th Fleet repairs performed here.

Australia

Cockburn Sound

Australian base, can accommodate four

submarines and four destroyers; possible

expansion to accommodate carriers; U.S.

considered homeporting a destroyer here; mostly

potential U.S. base, offered earlier as such by

hosts; port calls at Hobart, Melbourne, Sydney,

Brisbane, Darwin.

Thailand Sattahip

Military port constructed by U.S.; major port of

entry for military supplies to U.S. bases in

Thailand; peaked at end of Vietnam War.

Hong Kong

Periodic port calls.

Singapore

Sembawang Some overhauls, reprovisioning for USN ships,

potential for expanded use. İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 7

100 Bases during the Cold War Table 2 continued

Host nation and base

Description

Sri Lanka

Colombo

Alleged use by U.S. for R&R.

Trincomalee Port calls.

Djibouti

Port calls by U.S. Indian Ocean task force;

refueling and reprovisioning, no shore leave; U.S.

leases fuel storage for own use.

Reunion

Port calls. Somalia

Berbera

Some use by U.S. Indian Ocean task force;

possible storage of matériel for rapid deployment

force.

Mogadiscio

U.S. improved facilities, port visits; possible

storage of equipment and supplies for Central Command.

Oman

Muscat

(Mina Qaboos)

Restricted USN use by Indian Ocean task force;

contingent use for Central Command in Persian

Gulf crisis.

Mina Raysutt Restricted U.S. use.

Masirah

Port calls.

Bahrain

Al Jufair

U.S. took over British facilities in 1949; now

homeport for “Mideast Force” of four destroyers, communications, storage, barracks, berth,

hangars, co-use of adjacent airfield; resupply of

Indian Ocean task force; low-key use because of

political problems; quiet access for greatly

expanded U.S. presence in 1987.

Kenya

Mombasa

U.S. port visits; possible pre-positioning of matériel for use in Southwest Asia.

Diego Garcia

U.S. naval support facilities; berths Central

Command’s matériel storage ships; lagoon

dredged to create sufficient anchorage for a

carrier battle group.

Mauritius Rumored USN port visits; R&R and

reprovisioning.

Azores (Portugal)

Ponta Delgada

Fuel storage; breakwaters; frequent visits by

NATO warships.

Spain

Rota

Major naval base; also airfield and

communications station; major repair

capabilities; can berth aircraft carriers; former

Polaris SSBN base; fuel depot; weather station;

naval hospital. İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 8

Bases during the Cold War 101 Table 2 continued

Host nation and base Description

Italy

Naples

Major support complex for U.S. 6th feet; HQ for

attack submarines; homeport for destroyer tender,

communications centre.

Gaeta

Main base; homeport for flagship of U.S. 6th fleet, refueling facilities.

Greece

Souda Bay

NATO naval base; anchorage large enough for

entire 6th fleet; extensive underground fuel and

munitions storage.

Athens//Piraeus

U.S. use of commercial port facilities increasingly in jeopardy during Papandreou

regime.

Turkey

Istanbul

USN port visits.

Izmir

USN port visits. Antalya

USN port visits.

Portugal

Lisbon

USN port visits.

Israel

Haifa

Periodic USN port visits. Tunisia

Tunis

USN port visits.

Egypt

Alexandria

USN port visits, periodically.

Sudan

Port Sudan USN port visits.

Cuba

Guantanamo Bay

USN port visits, training and exercises; naval air

station, drydock, sheltered anchorage; naval

hospital; in reality mostly a political bargaining

chip. Panama

Rodman Naval Station

Fleet support, logistics, small craft training

facility.

Balboa

Naval ship repair facility.

For submarines

United Kingdom Holy Loch

SSBN forward base, homeport for ten

Poseidon’s; submarine tender permanently

berthed; large floating drydock.

Japan

Yokosuka, Sasebo

(See previous mention.) Italy

La Maddalena

Homeport for submarine tender; base for patrols

by SSNs in Mediterranean. Source: Compiled from SIPRI data and the many references cited for this chapter.

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 9

Sembawang facility, which provided the U.S. Navy with extensive drydocking

capability as well as a good location in relation to possible flashpoints both in

East Asia and the Persian Gulf area. Elsewhere in Asia, during the bulk of the

Cold War, the U.S. Navy made use of Australian ports on both coasts, visited

ports in Indonesia and (earlier on) Taiwan, and made extensive use of the Thai

port at Sattahip during the Vietnam War, during which the South Vietnamese

port of DaNang was frequently used. The accompanying table details the USN’s

basing net as of the mid-to-late 1980s.

U.S. Air Force bases12 In relation to possible theaters of combat, throughout the bulk of the Cold War,

the U.S. Air Force (USAF) made extensive use of a network of permanent and

standby bases, most of them in Western Europe and the Far East in proximity to

major ground force deployments.

In Germany, that long involved the major air bases at Bitburg, Ramstein,

Spangdahlem, Zweibrucken, Sembach et al., at which were deployed the USAFs

frontline fighters, earlier on the F-4s, later on the F-15s and F-16s. Additionally

in Europe there were the major air bases at Keflavik in Iceland, Sosterberg in the

Netherlands, Aviano in Italy, Torrejon, Zaragoza and Moron in Spain, and Incir-

lik in Turkey. Additionally, the USAF had deployed during the latter part of the

Cold War some 290 combat aircraft in the U.K. In addition to the 150 F111E/Fs

deployed as a nuclear strike force, that involved EF-111 Raven electronic

warfare aircraft, A-10s, RF-46 reconnaissance aircraft at several sites: Laken-

heath, Alconbury, Upper Heyford, Woodbridge and Bentwaters. Finally, tactical

aircraft were routinely rotated forward to bases in Italy and Turkey, while a host

of other bases in NATO were designated as co-located host bases available for

crises, coercive diplomacy or outright war – there were several of these in

eastern Turkey in proximity to Middle Eastern danger zones.

In Asia, the USAF had forward fighter bases in Japan, the Philippines and

South Korea. F-15s, F-16s and RF-4Cs were based at main bases at Yokota and

Misawa, Marine Corps Harriers at Iwakuni. There were F-4 E/G deployments at

Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. In South Korea, F-4Es, RF-43s, F-16s

and A-10s were stationed at the major air bases at Osan, Kunsan and Taegu.

In relation to conventional as well as nuclear scenarios, the USAF permanently

stationed KC-135 A/Q and KC-10A tankers in a number of places to deal with

interventions or arms resupply operations: in the U.K. (Mildenhall, Fairford),

Spain (Zaragoza), the Philippines (Clark AFB), Okinawa (Kadena), Diego Garcia,

Iceland (Keflavik) and Guam. Thule in Greenland and Goose Bay and Harmon in

Canada were used for similar purposes. Still earlier, up to 1963, SAC’s KC-97s

were based in Canada at Namao, Churchill, Cold Lake and Frobischer – some of

these later were designated for dispersal and refueling operations.

The USAF has also made extensive use of overseas bases for transport air-

craft, often times ad hoc in relation either to routine staging of personnel or

matériel or to crises.

102 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 10

Most of the primary U.S. aircraft for long-range lift operations – C-141s, C-

5A/B, more latterly C-17s – have been based in the U.S., though they way be

dispersed for contingencies. But the USAF also long had numerous squadrons of

C-130s designated for tactical purposes (i.e., with shorter ranges and able to

utilize shorter runways). Some were based overseas at Rhein-Main (West

Germany), Howard AFB (Panama), Mildenhall (U.K.), Clark AFB (the Philip-

pines), Yokota (Japan) and Kadena (Okinawa). Sometimes these aircraft may

have used overseas facilities for tactical purposes – the Iran hostage raid was

conducted by C-130s based in Egypt.

In 1973, U.S. transport aircraft engaged in the arms resupply effort on behalf

of Israel made critical use of the Lajes air base in the Portuguese-owned Azores

Islands. In 1990–1991, USAF transport aircraft had extensive access to airfields

along routes to the Middle East both via the Atlantic and Europe, and via the

Pacific and Southeast Asia, where that access became domestic political issues

in Thailand and India. In the post-9/11 conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. transport

aircraft were staged via Eastern Europe and utilized bases in the former Soviet

Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kyrghizstan. We shall

return to the link here with aircraft overflight rights.

During the latter part of the Cold War, the U.S. utilized some overseas bases

for its Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), a battle management

aircraft often used for coercive diplomacy as a modern form of “gunboat diplo-

macy.” Earlier in the Cold War, indeed, it had deployed overseas other elec-

tronic warfare aircraft (ECM and ECCM), for instance, RC-135 CONVENT/

ELINT aircraft for monitoring radars and telemetry had been based at RAF

Mildenhall, Hellenikon in Greece and Kadena in Okinawa. The EC-135, a modi-

fied KC-135 Stratotanker, was used as a radio and telemetry intercept aircraft,

and four of these “Silk Purse” planes were based at Mildenhall. In the latter part

of the Cold War, USAF EF-111 Ravens were based in Spain and Turkey

(Diyarbakir).

The AWACS themselves were home-based well back from potential lines of

confrontation, so as to mitigate the chances of preemptive strike. Some were

based at Keflavik in Iceland in relation to the crucial G-I-UK Gap, others at

Geilenkirchen in Germany, and several in Japan. Also used as forward AWACS

operating bases were Trapani in Italy, Konya in Turkey and Oerland in Norway.

A NATO command center at Maisieres in Belgium controlled NATO AWACS

and British Nimrod early warning systems. Still other AWACS were sold to

Saudi Arabia but operated there with U.S. crews.

Aircraft overflights13 One of the less visible forms of foreign military presence, also one which

involves movable and transitory presences, is that of aircraft overflight privi-

leges. It is a form of external access.

This occasionally crucial matter of aircraft overflight privileges involves a

complex range of practices and traditions, some of which were, in an overall

Bases during the Cold War 103 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 11

sense, altered by time in an era of increasingly “total” warfare, diplomacy and

ideological rivalries. In parallel with – and closely bound up with – what has

been wrought by nations’ increasing insistence upon extension of sovereign

control further outward from coastlines (now more or less institutionalized by

200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones – EEZs), the trend here during the Cold

War was towards tightened restrictions on overflights.

In the past – and in some cases continuing to the present – some nations have

allowed others more or less full, unhindered and continuous overflight rights

(perhaps involving only pro forma short-term notices, i.e., filing of flight plans).

In other cases, however, where political relations are weaker or not based on

alliances, ad hoc, formal applications for permission to overfly must be made

well ahead of time, which may or may not be granted depending upon the

purpose and situation, be it routine or crisis.

It is to be stressed that the day-to-day diplomacy of overflight rights is a very

closed and obscure matter, albeit of often crucial importance. We have little data

– the subject periodically emerges to prominence during crises such as the 1986

U.S. raid on Libya. Of course, it is precisely when urgent military operations are

involved that the subject acquires the most importance.

Nowadays, of course, well past the introduction of radar and its widespread

global distribution, few overflights can be made on a covert basis, as was

common before World War II, when detection depended primarily on visual

observation from the ground. Not only “host nation” radar, but now also the

superpowers’ satellite reconnaissance makes such “covert” activities almost

impossible, particularly if a small nation has access to information from one of

the superpowers, be it on a regular or ad hoc basis. This in turn may have had

important ramifications for intra-Third World rivalries, specifically, regarding

the balance of diplomatic leverage involved. Nations inclined, for instance, to

provide overflight rights in connection with a U.S. airlift to Israel knew that

Soviet satellite reconnaissance would provide information about that to Arab

governments. That was a powerful deterrent.

Some overflights were made without permission (as with the respective use

by the United States and the USSR of U-2 and MiG-25 reconnaissance flights),

overtly or with a tacit or resigned wink by the overflown nation. Often a nation

whose airspace is violated will not openly complain for fear of international or

domestic embarrassment over its impotence, or untoward diplomatic repercus-

sions with a strong power. Hence, the USSR is thought to have overflown Egypt

and Sudan, among others, without permission in supplying arms to Ethiopia

during the 1977–1978 Horn War, earlier, its MiG-25 and Tu-95 reconnaissance

aircraft apparently flew with impunity over Iran’s airspace. The United States is

thought to have threatened overflights in some places for future arms resupply of

Israel, if it should be utterly necessary.

More recently during the Gulf War, and the Afghan and Iraq wars, this

became a big issue in numerous places. During the Gulf War, the U.S. and its

allies were allowed overhead access almost everywhere, including ex-Warsaw

Pact states in Eastern Europe. In the Afghan war, the U.S. had good overhead

104 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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access all over Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia and in and around the

Persian Gulf excepting, of course, Iraq and Iran. Pakistan, politically cross-

pressured, allowed U.S. overflights by bombers coming from Diego Garcia and

from aircraft carriers stationed in the Arabian Sea. During the Iraq war,

however, the U.S. did have some problems with Switzerland, Syria and Iran.

Nuclear-related bases14 The utilization of overseas facilities in connection with the superpowers’ nuclear

competition began immediately after the close of World War II. During the late

1940s, prior to the Soviet Union’s development of a deployed nuclear military

capability, the U.S. forward-based some nuclear-armed B-29 aircraft in the U.K.

in an effort to deter feared Soviet advances in Europe. By 1950, B-29s were

based at Brize Norton, Upper Heyford, Mildenhall, Lakenheath, Fairford,

Chelveston and Sculthorpe. There were also reserve B-29 bases at other British

bases. There were related depots at Burtonwood and Alconbury, and also related

LORAN navigational facilities at Angle, Pembrokeshire and in the Hebrides.

That provided a clear first-strike deterrent capability for the U.S. well into the

1950s.

During the 1950s, the B-47 bombers became the backbone of SAC, and while

their effective ranges were greatly extended by the aerial-refueling techniques

then emerging, the U.S. then determined on forward deployment to enhance its

chances for penetration and to lessen its vulnerability to a Soviet first-strike.

This so-called “reflex force” rotated between U.S. home bases and those in the

U.K. (Fairford, Upper Heyford), Morocco (Sidi Slimane, Benguerir, Ben

Slimane, Nouasseur), Spain (Torrejon, Zaragoza, Moron de la Frontera), Green-

land (Thule) and Goose Bay, Labrador. (F-84 fighters used as bomber escorts

were also based at Nouasseur until U.S. access to Morocco was lost in 1963.)

Related U.S. tankers (then mostly KC-97s) were based primarily at Thule,

Greenland and Goose Bay, Labrador, and also at several other Canadian bases:

Namao, Churchill, Harmon, Cold Lake and Frobischer. Though the subse-

quently deployed B-52s which began entering inventories in 1955 did not

require forward main basing, they too utilized trans-Arctic tanker facilities

(including one at Sondestrom in Greenland) as well as contingency recovery

bases in Spain and elsewhere.

The Soviet Union did not utilize forward strategic-bomber facilities during

this period. Indeed, early Soviet bombers, such as the 4500-km range Tu-4,

could only reach the U.S. Pacific northwest from Siberia and, even then, by con-

ceding several hours’ warning time because of U.S. radar coverage in Alaska.

During this period, and for a long time thereafter, the U.S. also relied on

foreign access for strategic defense, primarily in Canada, Greenland and Iceland

– that involved the DEW Line, Mid-Canada and Pinetree Line strings of elec-

tronic listening posts, all under the U.S. Air Defense Command, which worked

closely with SAC. In addition, some U.S. interceptor aircraft were deployed at

Canadian bases such as Goose Bay, and at bases in Greenland and Iceland, for

Bases during the Cold War 105 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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perimeter early defense, well forward of the large-scale interceptor deployments

around major U.S. urban areas.

By the late-1950s, Soviet missile developments had rendered somewhat

obsolete the three-layered radar early-warning system across the Canadian

Arctic, which had been constructed to provide several hours’ warning of bomber

attacks. To cope with the missile threat, the U.S. built, beginning around 1958,

the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), the three hinges of

which were in Fairbanks (Alaska), Thule (Greenland) and Fylingdales Moor

(Yorkshire, U.K.).

In the mid- to late-1950s, the U.S. underwent its famed “missile-gap scare,”

following the Soviet Union’s initial testing of IRBMs and ICBMs, and the

launching of the first “Sputnik” satellite. Coming before the deployments of

Atlas, Titan and Minuteman ICBMs and Polaris SLBMs, this created a per-

ceived “window of vulnerability” which, in turn, impelled the short-term solu-

tion of U.S. installation of IRBMs in Europe adjacent to the Soviet Union.

Specifically, this involved emplacements in 1958 of 60 2400-km range Thor

missiles in the U.K. at 20 bases, with headquarters at Great Driffield, North

Luffenham, Hemswell and Feltwell, 30 Jupiter missiles in Italy (at Gioia del

Colle) and 15 Jupiters in Turkey, installed in 1961 at Cigli Air Base (these were

removed as part of the deal in which the USSR removed IRBMs and also IL-28

aircraft from Cuba, after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 – though the

orders for their removal had apparently been given earlier).

Late in 1960 the U.S. deployed its first Polaris submarines and then its long-

range, counter-value Atlas and Titan ICBMs, thus quickly defusing the missile-

gap scare – though the forward-based IRBMs were to remain in place for an

additional two to three years.

Complementary to BMEWS, the U.S. developed early warning satellites

under the MIDAS satellite program. This involved combined use of infrared

sensors and telephoto lenses for immediate detection of missile-launching tracks

and transmission of this information to U.S. decision-makers. Launched by

Atlas/Agena D missiles, advanced MIDAS satellites deployed in 1969 could be

“parked” in synchronous orbits, allowing for continuous coverage of the western

USSR and the China-Siberia region as well as areas where Soviet submarines

lurked in firing positions. This involved the critical data down-link in Australia

at Nurrungar, a related control facility in Guam and an underwater cable termi-

nal near Vancouver in Canada.

One other key element of the strategic deterrence system came to depend

upon overseas access: long-distance and protracted deployment of the Polaris

nuclear-submarine force. The Polaris submarines were initially deployed early in

the Kennedy Administration. The proportion of that fleet which the U.S. was

able to deploy at any given time was enhanced by replenishment and repair

facilities at Holy Loch, Scotland; Rota, Spain and at Guam. Indeed, the asymme-

tries which these facilities created vis-à-vis subsequent Soviet SSBN deploy-

ment allowed the U.S. to negotiate that part of the SALT I Treaty which gave

the USSR a 62 to 44 advantage in strategic submarines, but which was claimed

106 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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to be counterbalanced by the efficiencies accruing to the U.S. from its overseas

replenishment facilities.

In the early 1960s, after the brief U.S. missile-gap scare, the Soviet Union

underwent a scare period of its own, as several U.S. strategic programs were

phased in. To compensate, Moscow gambled with the introduction in 1962 of

some 40 MRBMs into Cuba at several installations, precipitating the Cuban

Missile Crisis. (One recent report claims that these missiles were not accompan-

ied by nuclear warheads.) The history of that crisis bears no repeating here, but

it is worth noting that only by the early 1960s did the Cuban revolution avail the

USSR of its first valuable overseas assets applicable to the strategic nuclear

equation. Henceforth, Cuba would become a very valuable Soviet base, its prox-

imity to the U.S. providing irreplaceable assets related to intelligence, communi-

cations, naval replenishment and so on, along with contingent bomber recovery

bases in the event of a major war.

During the early postwar period, the U.S. made use of numerous nuclear-

related intelligence and communications facilities around the Eurasian periphery

– directed against the USSR, China and North Korea – mostly in the SIGINT

(ELINT and COMINT) categories. Earlier, both U-2 and other aircraft such as

the RB-47 were flown from bases in Europe and Asia to “tickle” Soviet early-

warning radars and, in the case of the U-2s, to test radars well inside the USSR

which might be of different types than the peripheral early-warning systems. By

so doing, U.S. planners might ascertain weaknesses and ranges, and scan pat-

terns in the Soviet radar network which could be valuable for planning the pene-

tration routes for a nuclear-bomber attack.

These exercises in low-level brinkmanship – apparently involving some

mock raids mounted by U.S. units in Turkey and elsewhere – resulted in some

serious incidents in which U.S. ferret aircraft were shot down and their crews

killed or captured. Some flights originating at Brize Norton in the U.K. appar-

ently traversed the entire Soviet Arctic coastline, emerging at the Barents Sea.

The area between the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov was also apparently a

focal point of U.S. surveillance missions utilizing Turkish and Iranian airspace,

some staged originally from West Germany and Cyprus.

U.S. use of ground-based SIGINT stations, obviously crucial to various

aspects of nuclear deterrence, dates well back into the postwar period. One

source reported that this had earlier involved some 40 stations in at least 14

countries, ranging from small, mobile field units to sprawling complexes such as

the Air Force Security Headquarters in West Germany. These were said to have

involved some 30,000 personnel, with a minimum of 4000 radio-interception

consoles operated in such varied locales as northern Japan, the Khyber Pass in

Pakistan and an island in the Yellow Sea off the coast of Korea.

Further, these COMINT land stations had to be supplemented by numerous

airborne and seaborne radio-interception facilities, particularly after Soviet and

aligned nations’ military forces switched to VHF radios during the 1950s, after

which adequate coverage demanded getting closer to transmitters and overcom-

ing terrain features such as mountains. At any time, several dozen airborne

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listening posts were said to have been in intermittent operation, flying out of

such bases as Kimpo Airfield in Korea, Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines,

and many others. Added to these were some 12 to 15 spy ships, such as the ill-

fated Pueblo and Liberty, which also presumably required access to foreign

ports for replenishment.

Strategic nuclear forces: missile launchers and platforms15 Generally speaking, the late Cold War period saw the U.S. and the USSR left

with only minimal dependence on foreign facilities – Soviet dependence was

relatively less for their strategic nuclear launchers, involving the familiar triad of

ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers. Of course, this is not to ignore the

fact, particularly as it pertained to U.S. forces, that some launchers designated as

theater weapons could serve strategic purposes in that their warheads could have

been delivered into the Soviet Union.

All of the U.S. ICBMs (450 Minuteman IIs, 550 Minuteman IIIs and a few

remnant Titan IIs which were phased out as the new MX-Peacekeeper was

phased in) were housed in silos within the continental U.S. – they represented

over 2100 accurate warheads. Similarly, the Soviet ICBM forces (448 SS-11s,

60 SS-13s, 150 SS-17s, 308 SS-18s, 360 SS-19s, 72 SS-25s), of some 1398

ICBMs with some 6354 warheads, were sited entirely within the USSR.

The Soviet SSBN forces (983 SLBMs in 77 submarines, of which 944

SLBMs and 62 submarines were under the SALT Treaty; and 39 SLBMs on 15

submarines were outside it) were based entirely at Soviet homeland bases, in the

Kola Peninsula area at Polyarny and Severomorsk, and at Petropavlovsk and

Vladivostok in the Far East. No foreign bases were used for refueling, mainte-

nance or crew changes. By contrast to the U.S. only some 15–20 Soviet sub-

marines were normally away from their bases; perhaps 10–12 on station at any

given time.

The U.S. SSBN force, which earlier made extensive use of facilities at Holy

Loch (Scotland), Rota (Spain) and at U.S.-owned Guam, utilized only the first-

named of these, with its other three main bases in the continental U.S. at Kings

Bay (Georgia), Bangor (Washington) and Charleston (South Carolina). The

development of the longer-range Poseidon and Trident missiles (with ranges of

4000 miles) allowed for utilization of firing stations nearer U.S. bases and

further from the USSR, hence reducing requirements for firing stations in the

western Pacific (Guam) and in the Mediterranean (Rota).

Little was publicly known about where these submarines patrolled, but they

are thought to have transited to firing stations in the Arctic, North Atlantic and

North Pacific oceans and in the Mediterranean Sea, with about 30 percent of the

force on station on day-to-day alert, and a roughly equal proportion in transit or

on training missions. The use of Holy Loch as a forward base (for submarines

homeported at Groton, Connecticut) allowed more to be on station than other-

wise would have been feasible, and it is also to be noted that 400 Poseidon war-

heads deployed on submarines operating out of Holy Loch were designated for

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NATO targeting, presumably either for theater targeting or for battlefield use

along the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) in central Germany.

At the strategic level, the U.S. deployed some 260 long-range bombers (some

20 B-1Bs and some 240 B-52G/Hs) and some 55 medium-range FB-111A

bombers. Most of the B-52s carried up to 20 ALCMs; others carried a similar

number of short-range attack missiles (SRAMs); and some, armed with Harpoon

missiles, were operational in a conventional mode.

This bomber force, which carried over 5000 nuclear warheads, was main-

based at 19 air bases in 13 states and at Andersen AFB in Guam, but numerous

dispersal (pre-attack or crisis) and recovery (post-attack) bases, or forward oper-

ating bases were involved. Some of these were outside the U.S., for instance in

Canada at Cold Lake (Alberta), Goose Bay (Labrador), Namao (Alberta) and

Whitehorse (Yukon); in Greenland at Sondestrom; in the U.K. at Brize Norton,

Marham and Fairford; in Spain at Moron and Zaragoza. But numerous others, on

the basis of ad hoc contingency planning could have been used in connection

with numerous tanker bases – or their dispersal bases – at some of the above-

mentioned Canadian bases at Namao and Goose Bay; at Mildenhall and Fairford

in the U.K.; Zaragoza in Spain; Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines; Kadena

in Okinawa; Diego Garcia; Keflavik (Iceland); Guam; Thule (Greenland) and

so on.

The U.S. forward-based some 156 of the nuclear-armed F-111E/Fs in the

U.K., which were actually tactical fighter bombers designated for missions in

Central Europe. These were stationed at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath, which

hosted some 72 and 84 aircraft respectively, involving in each case the storage

of some 300 nuclear bombs.

By comparison, the Soviet Union made little use of external facilities for its

long-range strategic bomber force, which consisted of some 160 aircraft: 140

Tu-95 Bear A/B/C/G/Hs armed either with ALCMs or air-to-surface missiles,

and 20 Mya-4 Bisons (these were superseded by the Blackjack strategic

bomber). The same was true of the some 230 Backfire, Badger and Blinder

Bombers – some of the former were assigned to Soviet long-range aviation.

These strategic bombers utilized five northern staging and dispersal bases within

the USSR from which attacks could be mounted on the U.S.

Regarding forward emplacement of U.S. nuclear weapons, primarily in

Europe, there were several distinct types of circumstance in which they were

based, involving the issues of dual control or the two-key system, and the poli-

tics of nuclear basing on other nations’ soil. First, there was the actual forward

basing of U.S. aircraft, missiles or artillery – fully manned by U.S. personnel

involving organic U.S. military units but based on foreign soil and in circum-

stances in which ad hoc permission for actual combat would have been required.

Next, there were the numerous circumstances in which other nations – West

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Greece etc. – deployed

nuclear weapons on aircraft, missiles, howitzers and so on, but where the stric-

tures of the nuclear non-proliferation regime dictated a U.S. custodial presence

and the use of a two-key system, further implying a veto on actual use by either

Bases during the Cold War 109 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 17

the U.S. or its nuclear partner. Some of these situations involved Allied nuclear

systems based within the host nations’ borders as, for example, in Turkey or

Germany, as with Belgium or Dutch nuclear-armed artillery. Some nations, such

as Norway and Denmark, did not allow nuclear weapons or foreign military

bases on their soil during peacetime. Others, such as Iceland, did not allow

nuclear weapons on their soil, but had contingency provisions for forward-

basing of nuclear weapons for “wartime ASW operations.”

The primary land-based U.S. theater weapons were the Pershing II and

ground-launched cruise missiles later eliminated in connection with the INF

Treaty. These were, of course, all foreign-based, involving the 108 Pershing

(plus 12 spares) at several sites in West Germany (Heilbronn, Waldeide,

Neckars-Ulm, Schwabisch-Gmund), and the already deployed and planned

GLCMs there (at Woescheim), and in the U.K. (Greenham Common,

Molesworth), Belgium (Florennes), the Netherlands (Woendsrecht) and Sicily

(Comiso). Additionally, launcher repair facilities were identified at EMC

Hansen, Frankfurt (West Germany) and at SABCA, Gossens, Belgium, and a

missile storage site at Weilerbach in West Germany. Originally, this called for

464 GLCMs overall, based on 116 launchers, with perhaps nearly double that

number of warheads, though by the time of the 1987 INF Treaty only some 309

missiles and 109 launchers had been deployed. The Pershing missiles with

ranges capable of reaching well into the USSR, indeed, as far as Moscow, may

have been perceived as having “strategic” implications, albeit based outside the

U.S. Additionally, there were the remnant German Pershings under U.S. custo-

dian control (with two warheads per launcher), with shorter reaches well short of

being able to target the USSR proper (these too were eliminated under the INF

accord).

Otherwise, the U.S. based a considerable number of nuclear-capable aircraft

forward in Western Europe, that is, those manned directly by USAF personnel,

which involved the forward deployment of some 1700 nuclear bombs. These

were, obviously, usable for tactical purposes along or directly behind the FLOT,

but – particularly with the aid of aerial refueling – also capable of deep interdic-

tion missions throughout Eastern Europe and well into the Soviet Union proper.

Some 72 F-16 fighter-attack aircraft and some 140 nuclear bombs were stored at

both Hahn and Ramstein air bases; at Spangdahlem, a similar number of F-16s

with some 140 weapons were stored. At Aviano in Italy, some 200 weapons

were said to have been stored in connection with nuclear-capable F-16s, previ-

ously rotated forward from Spain but later based in Italy. In Turkey, the base at

Incirlik supported some 36 nuclear capable F-4s or F-16s which could be loaded

with the weapons on quick-reaction alert after being rotated forward, while

another base at Cigli, Izmir acted as a dispersal base for nuclear-capable aircraft.

Of course, land-based aircraft were not the only forward-based U.S. nuclear-

armed aircraft. There were also U.S. aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea

and the Atlantic Ocean. Typically, there were two carriers on station in the

Mediterranean – utilizing ports such as Naples, Souda Bay, Rota – which could

launch A-6E, A-7 and F/A-18 aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, with

110 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 18

respective ranges of 3200, 2800 and 1000km. With the capability to strike the

Soviet homeland if within range, each carrier deployed over 100 nuclear

bombs.

As well as nuclear-armed aircraft, there were the numerous U.S. and other

NATO nations’ ASW aircraft, involving the U.S. P-3C Orions and the British

Nimrods. In a conflict, these would have been vital to NATO efforts at securing

North Atlantic SLOCs against interdiction by Soviet attack submarines. U.S.

and Dutch P-3Cs and British Nimrods were based at or staged through British

bases at St. Mawgan and Machrihanish (the latter in the Strathclyde area of

Scotland) – some 63 U.S. nuclear depth bombs were stored at each base. Addi-

tional U.S.-manned and operated P-3Cs with forward-stored nuclear depth

charges were based at Keflavik, Iceland (48 bombs), Sigonella on Sicily (63

bombs) and Rota, Spain (32 bombs). Other U.S. P-3Cs were rotated through

Andaya and Bodo in Norway, Souda Bay on Crete and Montigo, Portugal, while

some 32 nuclear depth bombs were stored at Lajes in the Azores for wartime

operations.

Soviet forward-based nuclear-capable aircraft16 According to the IISS, the USSR had several types of land-based strike aircraft

capable of being configured with nuclear weapons, each of which could carry

two nuclear bombs. These were the Su-7 Fitter A (80), the MiG-21 Fishbed L

(135), the MiG-27 Flogger D/J (810), the Su-17 Fitter D/H (900) and the Su-24

Fencer (700) – a total of 2625 such aircraft. Of the 700 Fencers, 450 fell under

the control of Strategic Aviation. Over 1000 Soviet tactical fighter aircraft were

forward-based at a large number of facilities in the GDR, Czechoslovakia,

Poland and Hungary.

Nuclear-capable Su-24 Fencers were stationed at Szprotawa AB and Zagan

AB in Poland, at Debrecen in Hungary and at Brand-Briesen AB in the GDR, in

each case involving associated nuclear storage sites (the latter base was said to

have been converted from Su-7s in 1982). In the GDR, nuclear-capable MiG-27

Flogger D/J regiments and nuclear-bomb storage sites were at Finsterwalde AB

and Mirow-Rechlin Larz AB; Su-17 Fitter D regiments were located at Grossen-

hain AB, Neuruppin AB and Templin-Gross Dolln AB.

Several of the non-Soviet WTO nations also forward deployed nuclear-

capable aircraft, perhaps involving something like a two-key system, under

Soviet custodianship. Czechoslovakia (50) and Poland (40) had Su-7 Fitters;

Poland (40) Su-20 Fitter Cs and Bulgaria (45), Czechoslovakia (40) and the

GDR (24) MiG-23 Flogger F/As. The IISS noted that the total actually available

as nuclear-strike aircraft may have been lower than the figures shown. It is pos-

sible that the Soviet air force could itself have used these aircraft in a nuclear

mode if war erupted.

Outside the WTO area, the USSR also deployed some 16 Tu-16 Badger

bombers in Vietnam, which were capable of nuclear missions, perhaps against

China or the U.S. basing structure in the Philippines.

Bases during the Cold War 111 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 19

The USSR also utilized several external bases for nuclear-capable ASW air-

craft. Bear-F aircraft, for instance, utilized Cuban bases at San Antonio de los

Banos and Havana’s Jose Marti airport. Nuclear-capable IL-38 May ASW air-

craft regularly operated out of Aden and Al Anad in South Yemen, Asmara in

Ethiopia, Okba ben Nafi in Libya and Tiyas in Syria.

Overseas “technical” facilities: intelligence, space and

communications17 In a relative sense, and increasingly, the U.S.-Soviet global competition for

basing access was centered on a variety of what, for want of a better term might

be characterized as “technical” facilities, that is, those outside the traditional cat-

egories of air and naval bases and land-army garrisons and encampments. Most

of these facilities may be subsumed under the broad headings of communica-

tions, intelligence and space-related activities. They include such disparate func-

tions as satellite tracking, command and control; signals interception of rivals’

communications, radar signals, missile telemetry, and so on; underwater detec-

tion of submarines, accurate positioning of missile-firing submarines; space-

based ocean surveillance; nuclear-explosion detection; and a bewildering variety

of functionally specific communications systems running along the entire spec-

trum from extra-low to ultra-high frequencies. The increasing importance of all

these systems paralleled the extension of contemporary military activity to an

increasingly integrated, three-dimensional game involving outer space, land and

sea surfaces and the global undersea realms – submarines communicate via

satellite with land-based headquarters; satellites and land-based SIGINT stations

locate surface fleets by intercepting their radar emissions; satellite early warning

is transmitted, variously, by ground terminals, underwater cables, via other satel-

lites and so on.

This advent of the importance of technical facilities gradually picked up

speed before and after World War I. Before World War I, Britain developed an

elaborate and unrivalled global network of underseas telegraph cables – by far

the most important early precursor to modern “tech” facilities. At that time all of

the key British overseas possessions were linked together by that network, pro-

viding advantages in early warning and command and control of naval forces,

and in the ability to control and influence news broadcasting, an earlier form of

“public diplomacy” used as an instrument of competition.

Britain was not, of course, alone in constructing an elaborate underseas cable

network, nor in its efforts at securing the required access points. According to

one source, the United States in 1898 annexed Guam and Midway for the spe-

cific purpose of providing cable stations en route to the Philippines, decades

before those islands would become important U.S. air bases.18 France and

Germany also made efforts towards building global systems, but before World

War I the latter came to rely more on wireless systems, despite the vulnerability

of their communications to interception if decoded. By 1914 the Germans had

wireless stations in Togoland, southwest Africa, Tanganyika, Kiung-chow, Yap,

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Page 20

Rabaul, Nauru and Samoa, to abet what they knew would be a very vulnerable

cable network should war break out.19

At the outset of World War I, Britain was able rapidly to sever all of the

German underseas cables, while losing only a couple of its own cable stations

temporarily, at Cocos and Fanning Islands.20 The redundancy built into Britain’s

global system, abetted in 1914 by that of France, provided a strong strategic

advantage throughout World War I, still one more result of “invisible” global

naval superiority. Later, in 1919, the German cables were divided as war spoils

among the allies as part of the Versailles settlement.

Beyond World War I and up to World War II, increased importance was

attached to technical facilities. Long-range radio communications developed

apace and with them came the development by major powers of networks of

transmitters, receivers, relay stations and so on. With that came the early devel-

opment of radio interception facilities – before World War II, the U.S. worried

about German acquisition of interception facilities in the politically unstable

Caribbean area, for instance, in Haiti or Colombia.21 The U.S. breaking of the

Japanese code before World War II (which provided what should have been a

decisive, timely early warning about Pearl Harbor) serves as an additional pre-

cursor of subsequent intelligence activities, now far more institutionalized in

organizations such as the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Japan, mean-

while, in violation of the Washington Naval Agreement, built covert communi-

cations facilities on some of its Central Pacific, League of Nations Mandate

islands, providing an early problem of arms control verification.22 On the eve of

World War II, the U.S. was beginning to install early warning radars in some of

the bases acquired from the U.K. as part of the Lend-Lease Agreement.23 Gradu-

ally, one could see movement towards the central importance of C3I today –

towards quick if not real-time communications and early warning, and the

diminishing of human intelligence (HUMINT) as the core of intelligence

collection.

U.S. communications24 The U.S. used a variety of communications systems and modes, stretching

across the frequency spectrum from extremely-low frequency (ELF) to super-

high frequency (SHF); these variously utilized satellites, ground terminals,

shipboard and submarine terminals and so on.25 These various frequencies

involved trade-offs among a number of variables related to rate of data trans-

mission, vulnerability to jamming, size of transmitter, distance capability, etc.,

and tended to be broadly specific for certain functions, that is, land-based tac-

tical communications, those with submerged submarines, etc. The utilization

of various communications modes changed constantly in response to new

technological developments; correspondingly, the requirements for FMP

access also changed.

As ably outlined by Arkin and Fieldhouse, “In the field of electronic commu-

nications, each medium and frequency has advantages and disadvantages.”

Bases during the Cold War 113 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 21

Varying by wavelength and hence frequency, a number of different paths for the

four lowest frequency bands travel what are called “groundwaves” and they are

useful for communications with ships far from land. Extremely-low frequency

(ELF) waves (below 300 hertz) can penetrate water to hundreds of feet (perfect

for submarine communications), while extremely-high frequencies (EHF)

(above 30 gigahertz) have difficulty penetrating even a heavy rainstorm.26

Other than the medium (i.e., water or air), still other conditions determine the

most suitable frequency to use. Size of transmitter is important – “for frequen-

cies below the HF band, antennas are too large for ships or aircraft” – the ELF

antennas or transmitters considered for emplacement in the northern U.S. were

many miles long.27 Then, the higher the frequency the higher the data rate. The

amount of power required also varies with frequency. For these reasons ELF is

not suitable for large-volume commercial communications. There is another

variable – reliability – in connection with possible interference, jamming or

fasing.28

High frequency (HF) is widely used by the military – it is long-range, cheap,

low-power, small and portable, but requires constant adjustments in specific fre-

quencies to deal with atmospheric conditions,29 that is, shifting in the ionos-

pheric layers and natural events such as solar flares. This can vary by day,

season, location and so on, so that frequencies must be chosen to best suit the

prevailing conditions. For these reasons and others – reliability, “crowding” of

the frequency spectrum and the advent of computers and satellites (which

operate at higher frequencies and data rates) – recent decades have seen a shift

away from HF for military purposes. But, the vulnerability of satellites has led

to renewed interest, particularly in connection with new technology, that is,

“sounders,” solid-state transmitters and microprocessors which can allow for

shifting frequencies in response to environmental changes. That interest is

underscored by the fact that HF uses the ionosphere for transmission, a medium

difficult to permanently interrupt. Finally, in the context of military anxieties

about nuclear “black-out” caused by nuclear blasts during war, mobile or prolif-

erated HF systems are considered one of the more robust types of communica-

tions.30 Among the HF systems used during the Cold War were SAC’s Giant

Talk/Scope Signal III for strategic bombers, the air/ground/air Global Command

and Control System network, the Mystic Star Presidential/VIP network and the

Defense Communications System (DCS) “entry sites.”

Very-low frequency (VLF) and low frequency (LF) are also considered relat-

ively reliable in a nuclear environment and can penetrate sea water as well.31

Hence, for the U.S., a key system was GWEN (Ground Wave Emergency

System), a grid of unmanned relay stations with LF transmitters and receivers

hardened to withstand electromagnetic pulse (EMP).32 When fully proliferated, it

used a system of “automatic diverse routing” so as to maximize imperviousness

to interference even by a full-scale nuclear attack. Yet another robust system

was “meteor burst communications,” using billions of ionized meteor trails to

reflect very-high frequency (VHF) signals.33 This system would apparently

benefit from the increased ionization caused by nuclear war.

114 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 22

As an example of what was involved, we may look at some of the earlier

global networks utilized by the U.S. for communicating with underwater sub-

marines.

Throughout most of the 1970s, the U.S. had eight Omega VLF facilities

located overseas. Some of these were phased out beginning in the late 1970s and

some were retained, despite their obsolescence, as backup systems. They were

located at: Reunion (Mafate), operated by the French Navy; Trinidad and

Tobago; Liberia (Paynesword); Australia (Woodside); Argentina (Golfo Nuevo,

Trelev): Japan (Tsushima Island); and Norway (Bratland).34

Then there was the far larger global network of LORAN-D/C radio-

navigation systems, which were also utilized in connection with aircraft naviga-

tion. And as a sub-set, this further involved the Clarinet Pilgrim system in the

Pacific, a shore-to-submarine network (four sites in Japan and one on Yap

Island) that worked by superimposing data on the waves transmitted by

LORAN-C. Some of these were operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, to a degree

reflective of the mixed civilian and military navigation aid functions of the

LORAN network (still earlier there were some systems designated as LORAN-

A). And, as in the case of Omega, some were jointly operated with host-nation

personnel. Among the numerous LORAN-C/D transmitters and monitoring sta-

tions overseas (there were many others in the U.S., including Alaska and

Hawaii) were those shown in the table.

In the latter part of the Cold War, as a replacement for Omega and LORAN-

C, the U.S. installed its new satellite-based NAVSTAR global positioning

system for submarines, which among other things, apparently involved the capa-

bility to provide SLBMs with corrective guidance after they surfaced.

NAVSTAR’s control segment consisted of five monitor stations to “track

passively all satellites in view and accumulate ranging data from the navigation

signals.” That information was transmitted to the NAVSTAR Master Control

Station at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The other stations used for

tracking, telemetry, control and passive monitoring were at Ascension, Diego

Garcia, Kwajalein and Guam, notably all islands controlled by the U.S. or

the U.K.

Whereas most communications with submarines are conducted along the LF

spectrum, combatants will usually use HF (the corresponding intelligence inter-

ception facilities are HF direction finders, that is HF/DF). The U.S. had a con-

siderable number of naval HF transmitters and receivers scattered about the

globe, most of them near major naval facilities or near bodies of water heavily

traversed by U.S. fleet units. They included those shown in Table 4.

Regarding SAC “fail-safe” systems, involving “positive control,” meaning

the bombers went ahead in a crisis only if given “executive instructions,” there

was a global system of HF communications called “Giant Talk/Scope Signal

III,” 14 stations giving flexible approach routes towards the USSR by B-52s or

other aircraft with standoff ALCMs. These are shown in Table 5.

The Air Force also had its AFSATCOM UHF network devoted particularly to

strategic nuclear-related purposes. That utilized several foreign facilities, at

Bases during the Cold War 115 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 23

116 Bases during the Cold War Table 3 Location of known Loran-C/D transmitters and monitoring stations overseas

Country

Location Bermuda

Witney’s Bay

Canada

Cape Race (Newfoundland), Fox Harbor

(Labrador), Montagu (Prince Edward Island), Port

Handy (British Columbia), St. Anthony (New

Brunswick), Sandspit (British Columbia),

Williams Lake (British Columbia) Denmark

Ejde (Faeroe Islands)

Greenland

Angissoq

Iceland

Keflavik, Sandur

Italy

Crotone, Lampedusa, Sellia Marina Japan

Gesaski (Okinawa), Iwo Jima, Marcus Island,

Tokachibuto (Hokkaido), Yokota AFB

Johnson Atoll (U.S. owned)

Norway

Jan Mayen Island

South Korea Changsan

Spain

Estartit

Turkey

Kargabarun

U.K.

Sullum Voe (Shetland Islands)

FR Germany Sylt

Micronesia

Yap Island

Guam (U.S. owned)

Anderson AFB Source: SIPRI data, Harkavy, Bases Abroad, p. 161.

Table 4 U.S. overseas HF receivers and transmitters

Country

Location Bermuda

South Hampton

Diego Garcia

Greece

Nea Makri and Kato Souli

Guam

Barrigada and Finnegayan

Iceland Grindavik and Sandgerdhi

Italy

Naples (a master station) and Licola

Japan

Iruma, Kamiseya, and Totsuka

Panama

Summit Philippines

Capas Tarlac and St. Miguel

Portugal (Azores)

Cinco Pincos (Terceira) and Vila Nova

Puerto Rico

Sebana Seca, Isabella, and Aguada

Spain

Guardemar del Segura and Rota U.K.

Edzell and Thurso Source: SIPRI Data.

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 24

Landstuhl in Germany, Clark AFB in the Philippines, on Guam and at Bagnoli

in Italy and Diego Garcia. The Navajo FLTSATCOM system consisted of seven

satellites parked in geosynchronous orbit all around the equator and provided

worldwide coverage, except in the polar regions. These provided mostly for the

U.S. Navy, communications by digitalized voice, teleprinter and other tech-

niques, and operated at UHF. These satellites were also important hosts for

AFSATCOM transponders. Indeed, according to one report, each host for

AFSATCOM satellites had 23 channels, ten of which were allotted to the Navy

for command of its air, ground and sea force, 12 to AFSATCOM for nuclear-

related communications, and one reserved for the National Command

Authorities.35

One particularly important function for FLTSATCOM – along with the

DSC’s satellites – was the relaying of data from SOSUS and SURTASS (sur-

veillance towed array) hydrophone systems to the Central Shore Station or

Acoustic Research Center at Moffett Field, California, “where it is integrated

with data from other sources and processed by the ILLIAC 4 computer complex

to provide a real-time submarine monitoring capability.”36 There is also real-

time transmission of data and displays from ocean-surveillance satellites pro-

vided to U.S. surface and submarine fleets.

FLTSATCOM utilized control or receiver sites. There were several in the

U.S. at Norfolk, Wahiawa (Hawaii), Stockton, California and another at

Finnegayan in Guam. Overseas, there were additional stations at Bagnoli, Italy

and at Diego Garcia and an AN/MSC-61 system located at Exmouth, Northwest

Cape, Australia.37

According to the U.S. Defense Communications Agency, the European AU-

TOSEVOCOM system consisted of about 225 wideband subscriber terminals

homed on four AN/FTC-31 switches and 16 SECORDS providing secure voice

service. Another 85 subscribers were provided worldwide secure voice access

Bases during the Cold War 117 Table 5 Giant Talk/Scope Signal III stations

Country

Location

Ascension

Azores

Lajes, Cinco Pincos

Greenland Thule

Guam

Anderson AFB, Barrigada, Nimitz Hill

Japan

Owada, Tokorozawa, Yokota

Okinawa

Kadena

Panama Howard and Albrook AFBs

Philippines

Clark AFB, Cubi Point, Camp O’Donnell

Spain

Torrejon

Turkey

Incirlik

U.K. RAF Croughton, Mildenhall, Barford St. John Source: SIPRI data, Harkavy, Bases Abroad, p. 164.

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 25

through 10 AUTOVON switches.38 Locations of the main switching center for

the AUTOVON network are listed in Table 6.

One of the major U.S. uses of overseas theater communications was that

involved in the highly proliferated microwave/troposcatter systems used to link

U.S. and other allied forces within the European and Pacific theaters. This in

turn involved a number of sub-systems, perhaps the best known of which was

the NATO ACE HIGH system within Europe. According to Jane’s:

ACE HIGH is an 80-voice-channel trophospheric scatter/microwave link

system which dates back to 1956 when SHAPE developed a plan for an

exclusive communications system which would comprise the minimum

essential circuits of early warning and alert and implementation of the trip-

wire retaliation strike plan. The network extends from northern Norway and

through Central Europe to Eastern Turkey.39

All of the U.S. NATO allies hosted numerous troposcatter relay links – there

were some 40 in West Germany, six in Belgium, eight in Greece, 16 in Italy, 15

in Turkey, and so on. (Earlier there were some 30 such links in France.)40 These

types of link also ran from the continental U.S. via Greenland, Iceland, the

Faeroes and the U.K. to Europe; indeed, they were originally designed as one

link in the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWs). In Iceland, it is

reported that each such North Atlantic Relay System (NARS) installation con-

sisted of four large “billboard” troposcatter antennas.41 Parts of the troposcatter

network were modernized as the Digital European Backbone System (DEBS).

The transmission, relay and reception of strictly military and diplomatic mes-

sages does not exhaust the uses to which overseas facilities were put within the

broad domain of communications. Basing diplomacy also entered the news in

connection with broadcast communications. This took any of several forms, for

instance, the major powers’ use of foreign territories for clandestine radio

118 Bases during the Cold War Table 6 Location of the main switching centers for the AUTOVON network Country

Location

Japan

Fuchu, AS, Camp Drake (moved to Yokota)

Okinawa

Grass Mountain or Ft Buckner

Philippines

Clark AFB Panama

Corozal

Spain

Humosa

U.K.

Martlesham Heath, Hilingdon, RAF Croughton

FDR Germany

Schoenfield; Fieldberg, Donnersberg, Pirmasens, Langerkopf

Italy

Coltano, Mt. Vergine

Guam

Finnegayan Source: Defense Communications Agency, “Defense Communications System/European Communi-

cation Systems: Interoperability Baseline,” Washington, DC, 1 February 1981; and Jane’s Military

Communications (Macdonald: London, 1981).

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 26

transmitters, particularly adjacent to rivals’ territories or those where civil wars

were in progress. (In the 1987 U.S. Congressional Iran/“Contragate” hearings,

information emerged about the CIA-run clandestine transmitters in Central

America and in the Caribbean directed against Nicaragua and Cuba.) On a more

overt basis, this involved, at least as pertained to the U.S. side, the global trans-

mission network of the government’s Voice of America (VOA). There were

Soviet, French and British counterparts.

Access for VOA transmitters, even despite the absence of obvious military

implications, was not always a simple matter. Soviet and other nations’ sensitiv-

ities to radio-broadcast intrusion were such that a nation hosting a VOA facility

risked a degree of displeasure.42

For its short-wave broadcasts, the VOA had six main 500-kilowatt transmitters;

additionally, a variety of some 100 antennas and relay stations in Asia, Africa and

Central America. The VOA had overseas radio stations in Antigua, Thailand,

Botswana, Greece (two), West Germany, the Philippines (two), Costa Rica, Sri

Lanka, Morocco, Belize and the U.K. (and later in Israel). In 1984–1985, as the

Central American crisis intensified, it was reported that Costa Rica and Belize had

agreed to host VOA broadcast relay stations – in addition, VOA had obtained

agreements to construct relay stations in Sri Lanka, Israel, Morocco and Thailand.

Intelligence43 During the Cold War the U.S. relied on a variety of technical methods for intelli-

gence collection (i.e., other than HUMINT) which involved the use of overseas

facilities. These involved the domains of imaging or photographic reconnais-

sance, signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, space surveillance and nuclear

detonation and monitoring.44 Variously, cutting across these categories, this

involved fixed land-based facilities, air bases and naval facilities. In some cases,

the utilization of foreign facilities for specific purposes was well-known, as

for instance in the cases of large strategic radars or air bases used to stage

Bases during the Cold War 119 Table 7 Interconnections between ACE HIGH and DCS

DCS

ACE HIGH

Mormond Hill (U.K.) Mormond Hill (U.K.)

Cold Blow Lane (U.K.)

Maidstone (U.K.)

SHAPE (Belgium)

Costeau (Belgium)

Bonn (FRG)

Kindsbach (FRG)

Aviano (Italy) Aviano (Italy)

Naples (Bagnoli, Italy)

Bagnoli (Italy)

Izmir (Turkey

Izmir (Turkey)

Incirlik (Turkey)

Adana (Turkey) Sources: Defense Communications Agency, “Defense Communications System/European Commu-

nication Systems; Interoperability Baseline,” Washington, DC, 1 February 1981; and Jane’s Military

Communications (Macdonald: London, 1981).

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 27

photoreconnaissance flights. In others, however, data were more limited – this

was particularly true regarding the relay of data from satellites to major head-

quarters in the U.S. homeland.

The U.S., during the Cold War and beyond, made important use of reconnais-

sance satellites which conducted area surveillance, close-look and real-time sur-

veillance. Crucially, this involved the Keyhole series, KH-9 (Big Bird) devoted

to area-surveillance and KH-8 (Close Look), later superseded (in 1976) by the

KH-11 and later by the KH-12 (Ikon). Mostly, these satellites appear to have

functioned without the help of overseas downlinks.

The U-2 and SR-71 strategic reconnaissance aircraft were usable for a variety

of nuclear and non-nuclear related missions. The latter can fly at a speed of Mach

4 (about 4160km per hour), at a height of over 25,000 meters, can track SAM mis-

siles, has radar detectors, a variety of ECMs, and a synthetic-aperture radar for

high altitude night imaging. Some 15–19 SR-71s were utilized, co-located at some

of the same bases as the U-2s, at Mildenhall in the U.K., Kadena on Okinawa and

Akrotiri on Cyprus (the U-2s also utilized Incirlik, Peshawar, Clark AFB, Atsugi

and Wiesbaden). The still newer TR-1A reconnaissance aircraft, of which some 14

were deployed, also utilized some of these bases.

Other satellites and also land-based facilities were used for SIGINT, an

acronym that subsumes several categories of intelligence collection, i.e.,

COMINT (communications intelligence), ELINT (electronic intelligence),

TELINT (telemetry intelligence) and FISINT (foreign instrumentation signals

intelligence). The major Cold War SIGINT satellite systems–Chalet, Rhyolite

(targeted against telemetry, radar, communications, extending across the VHF,

UHF and microwave frequencies), Ferret, Magnum/Aquacade (low orbiting

ferret satellites used to map Soviet and Chinese radars) apparently made little

use of overseas downlinks.

But, the U.S. long made use of a plethora of ground-based SIGINT stations,

as identified in Table 8.

Although there were diverse types and mixes of these facilities, a few widely

deployed types were notable. One involved a combination of AN/FLR-9 HF and

VHF interception and direction-finding system (DF) with CDAA (Circularly

Disposed Antenna Array) known as an “elephant cage.” Another involved

telemetry interception capability with combined VHF-UHF-SHF receivers, used

to monitor missile launches.45 Then there were FPS-17 detection radars and

FPS-79 tracking radars also used in connection with missile launches. There

were also a considerable number of AN/FLR-15 antennas.46

The identifiable land-based SIGINT facilities included those shown in the

accompanying table. In some of these cases – Canada, the U.K., Turkey and

perhaps Japan – SIGINT stations were jointly operated with host personnel, and

the data intake shared to one degree or another, no doubt negotiated on a case-

by-case basis and subject to periodic renewal; hence, a function of the state of

political relationships and associated reciprocal leverage.

120 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 28

Ocean surface surveillance47 The U.S. had a number of systems – satellites, aircraft, ground stations and ships

– for observing the world’s ocean surfaces, that is, for tracking Soviet warships,

auxiliary intelligence ships, merchant and fishing vessels etc. Operationally, the

goal was to know the location of all Soviet ships at any time. In normal con-

ditions, one major purpose was to track the itineraries of Soviet ships carrying

arms to clients – this was a key item of intelligence. In crises or, hypothetically,

at the outset of a major war, the hair-trigger, preemptive nature of modern naval

warfare – nuclear or non-nuclear – would have put a premium on real-time loca-

tion and targeting of rival fleets, in all weathers. Contrariwise, both sides would

have worked hard to devise methods for eluding detection, again, particularly

during wartime conditions.

Bases during the Cold War 121 Table 8 Land-based SIGINT facilities

Country

Location/comments

Australia

Northwest Cape

The Azores

Villa Nova Canada

Massett, Argentia, Whitehorse, Leetrim

China

Korla, Qtai

Cuba

Guantanamo

Cyprus Five Stations

Denmark

Bornholm

Diego Garcia

Honduras

Palmerola

Kwajalein

Midway FDR Germany

Augsburg, Hof, a network called La Faire Vite to monitor WTO

communications, and others

U.K.

Cheltenham, Wincombe, Morwenstow, Kirknewton

Greece

Iraklion and Nea Makri Iceland

Keflavik, Stockknes

Italy

San Vito, Vicenza, Treviso

Japan

Misawa, Camp Zama, Hakata, Sakata, Wakkanei, Kamiseya

South Korea

Yonchon, Camp Humphreys, Pyongtaek, Sinsan-ni, Kangwha Morocco

Kenitrar

Norway

Varda, Vadso, Viksofjellet

Oman

Al Khasab, Umm Al-Ranam Island

Panama

Corozol, Fort Clayton, Galeta Island Pakistan

Bada Bien

Philippines

San Miguel, Clark AB, John May Camp

Okinawa

Tori, Hanza, Sobe, Omna Point

Spain Rota, El Casar del Talamanca

Taiwan

Shou Lin Kou, Tapeh, Nan Szu Pu

Turkey

Sinop, Dyarbakir, Samsun, Karamursel, Antalya, Agri, Kars,

Edirne, Ankara Source: SIPRI data, and J.T. Richelson and D. Ball, The Ties That Bind (Allen and Unwin: Boston,

1985), appendix 1.

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 29 Overseas facilities played a major role here. The U.S. utilized its White

Cloud satellite system, part of its larger Classic Wizard system, for ocean sur-

veillance, involving a variety of ELINT functions as well as use of interferome-

try techniques to locate Soviet or other vessels. This system comprised four

satellites. The U.S. Naval Security Group operated ground stations which were

part of this system at Diego Garcia and Edzell, Scotland, as well as at Guam,

Adak and Winter Harbor, Maine.

The P3C Orion, known mostly for its ASW role, was also utilized for ocean

surveillance. It had access to bases throughout the world: Clark AFB (the Philip-

pines), Misawa (Japan), Kadena (Okinawa), Keflavik (Iceland), Rota (Spain),

Sigonella (Italy), Ascension and Diego Garcia islands, Cocos Islands (Aus-

tralia), Masirah (Oman), Mogadiscu (Somalia) and several others.

For land-based ocean surveillance, considerable use was made of HF/DF

systems, which were also mounted on ships which, again, utilized various over-

seas port-facilities. Among the land-based HF/DF locales were those at Diego

Garcia, Rota (Spain), Edzell (Scotland), Keflavik (Iceland), Brawdy (Wales),

Japan and Guam. Those in Scotland, Wales and Iceland were located near the

crucial GIUK–Gap chokepoint, which would presumably have been a major

point of contention at the outset of a major war in relation to North Atlantic sea

lines of communication and the Soviet submarine bastions near the Kola Penin-

sula. Richelson and Ball actually reported on some 40–50 HF/DF sites for ocean

surveillance said to have been operated by the combined assets of the U.S.,

U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Space surveillance48 During the Cold War, the proliferation of satellites and other man-made “space

objects” made their tracking and identification more vital. The U.S. had an

extensive program intended to detect and track its own satellites, but also Soviet

and other nations’ space vehicles.

In the security realm this had a number of dimensions. Of course, both sides

wished to mask some of their ground activities from surveillance and therefore

sought the capacity to operate during gaps in surveillance. By detecting and

tracking Soviet satellites, the U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Advance Notice

(SATRAN) System allowed the U.S. to avoid Soviet coverage of U.S. military

activities. As expectations mounted about a future which might have seen

large-scale militarization of space, both sides increasingly perceived an interest

in real-time surveillance of each others’ satellites, in the context of possible later

hair-trigger preemptive situations as applied to mutual interdiction of satellites.

Of course, both sides desired maximally effective intelligence on the others’

various military activities conducted from space: communications, ocean sur-

veillance, SIGINT, nuclear detection, etc. In summary, as stated by Richelson:

space surveillance helps provide the United States with intelligence on the

characteristics and capabilities of Soviet space systems and their contribu-

122 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 30

tions to overall Soviet military capabilities ... Such data aid the United

States in developing counter-measures to Soviet systems, provide a data-

base for U.S. ASAT targeting and allow the United States to assess the

threat represented by Soviet ASAT systems.

For many years the heart of the dedicated sensor system was a group of Baker-

Nunn optical cameras, huge cameras which, according to one source, could

“photograph, at night, a lighted object the size of a basketball over 20,000 miles

in space.” In addition to the two in California and New Mexico, these cameras

were located outside the U.S. in New Zealand (Mt. John), South Korea (Pul-

mosan), Canada (St. Margarets, New Brunswick) and Italy (San Vito). Earlier

there were others on Johnston Island, in Alaska, and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,

Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, South Africa, Upper Volta and Curacao in the Lesser

Artilles, among others. Because of its limitations – slowness in data acquisition,

processing and response time, absence of all-weather capability and inflexible

tracking capability – this system was replaced by the Ground-based Electro-

Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system.

GEODSS, also with five locations, overcame several of the Baker-Nunn

system’s shortcomings by allowing real-time data, better search capability and

more rapid coverage of larger areas of space – but was still limited by adverse

atmospheric conditions. It was actually a system of three linked telescopes at

each site, providing variable coverage by altitude. The five locations were in

Hawaii (Maui) and New Mexico (White Sands), within the U.S. and externally

in South Korea (Taegu), Diego Garcia and Portugal.

Systems used primarily for early warning – BMEWS, FSS-7, PAVE PAWS,

Enhanced Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System

(EPARCS) and FPS-85 radars – were usable as collateral space-tracking

sensors. Of these, BMEWS – based at Thule (Greenland), Fylingdales (U.K.)

and Clear (Alaska) – involved extensive use of foreign access. Additionally,

COBRA DANE (Shemya Island, Aleutians – 120 arc, 46,000-km range against

space targets) and also the AN/FPS-79 (Pincirlik/Diyarbakir, Turkey) radar were

usable in a space-surveillance role, as supplementary to the primary missions of

monitoring missile-test re-entry trajectories.

Numerous other foreign facilities were used as part of the U.S. Satellite

Tracking and Data Acquisition Network (STADAN) network of installations

used to track and monitor U.S. space activities, including the down-range

course of launches. Among these were facilities in: Australia (Orooral Valley,

Toowoomba), the U.K. (Winkfield), Ascension, Bermuda, the Canaries (Tener-

ife), Spain (Madrid), Brazil (Fernando de Noronha) and Antigua, in connection

with space surveillance and under the heading of “miscellaneous radars.”

Earlier STADAN tracking facilities were operated, among other places, in

Chile, Ecuador, the Malagasy Republic, Grand Turk Islands, South Africa and

Zaire.

Bases during the Cold War 123 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 31

Satellite control stations49 One of the most secret or classified areas of overseas bases was that of satellite

control stations. Ford, in his work on command and control, in analyzing the

vulnerable and non-redundant nature of the U.S. early-warning system involving

the DSP East satellite, its down-link facility in Australia and the communica-

tions link from there to the satellite control facility in Sunnyvale, California,

provided some indication of what was involved. Thus, according to him:

There are several dozen U.S. defense satellites now in orbit – providing

communications, photoreconnaissance, electronic intelligence, navigational,

meteorological, and other data-and they require contact with the Sunnyvale

ground control station and its seven substations around the globe in order to

remain functional. A great deal of fine-tuning, for example, is needed to

steer the satellites in precise orbits and to keep their sensors, and antennas

aimed properly. . . . A catastrophic loss of this control center would result in

a major disruption of communications, tracking, and control of its space

systems . . .

And, further:

Other officials are less optimistic. “We lose the SCF and the satellites basi-

cally go haywire,” a Pentagon expert who has studied this subject told me.

“The communications satellites drift off to Pluto.” Certain intelligence-

gathering satellites in low-earth orbit would be in especially bad shape, he

said, since the Sunnyvale facility has to “feed them” with instructions every

time they complete an orbit. “You should see them scrambling when one of

their satellites comes within range.” Desmond Ball estimated that the

typical U.S. defense satellite might be able to remain in operation for three

to four days without the Sunnyvale SCF; the most critical satellites, such as

DSP East, which require a great deal of caretaking attention from the

ground, could go out of service within hours.

The seven sub-stations linked to Sunnyvale comprised three within the U.S. –

at Manchester AF Station in New Hampshire, Kaena Point in Hawaii and Van-

denberg Air Force Base (AFB) in California. Others outside the U.S. were at

Thule, Greenland – collocated with various other technical facilities as well as a

bomber and tanker base – at Guam at Andersen AFB, at Oakhanger in the U.K.

and at Mahe in the Seychelles. Mahe had long hosted a U.S. satellite control

facility (SCF) collocated with a DSCS ground terminal. This facility was appar-

ently important in relation to reconnaissance satellites and for monitoring injec-

tion into orbit of satellites launched from Cape Canaveral. Earlier, up to 1975,

the U.S. also had what apparently was an SCF at Majunga in the Malagasy

Republic, one also used to monitor satellites launched from Cape Canaveral.

U.S. access to this facility was then lost at a time when Tananarive shifted

124 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 32

towards an arms-supply relationship with the USSR. Still earlier the U.S. appar-

ently had a similar SCF on Zanzibar Island, within Tanzania.

Strategic early warning50 One of the most obviously critical areas of intelligence involving foreign bases

is strategic early warning, that is, warning of impending or unfolding nuclear

attack. Here, as in so many areas of military endeavor, the U.S. was asymmetri-

cally dependent on foreign access, and crucially so. Indeed, it was long the case,

even before the advent of intercontinental missilery, that the U.S. relied on

radars in Canada and Greenland for warning of approaching bombers at a time

when such warning could provide several hours of response time. The asymme-

tries were partly because of the larger relative size of the USSR and partly

because of the location of critical foreign terrain – Canada, Greenland, Iceland –

between the U.S. and the trans-Arctic routes that would be traversed by missiles

and bombers across the arctic regions between the superpowers.

Several key U.S. early-warning systems utilized foreign access; ground sta-

tions used to relay data from early-warning satellites; the BMEWS radar system

directed against Soviet ICBMs, the several layers of radar pickets used to detect

bombers en route to the U.S. from the Arctic region; and a variety of other

sensors which might be used in collateral or supplementary roles.

Regarding early-warning satellites, the U.S. relied primarily on what have

become known as DSP East and DSP West (earlier these were called MIDAS

satellites). The former had the primary task of watching for ICBM launches, the

latter for SLBM launches in the Atlantic.

The Code 647 Defense Support Program satellite – DSP East – sat some

23,000 miles above the Indian Ocean in geosynchronous orbit, monitoring the

eastern hemisphere. It contained an infrared telescope equipped with thousands

of tiny lead-sulphide detectors designed to pick up the hot exhaust flame pro-

duced by large rocket engines during the boost phase of their flights. It had full

coverage of Soviet missile fields from an orbit more or less above the equator

and, in the case of mass launchings, could tell what kinds of missiles had been

launched and from where. Hence, DSP East could also provide valuable

information about what kind of attack had been launched, that is, the likely tar-

geting mix. That would in turn have guided the targeting of a U.S. counterforce

response.

The principal and necessary link between DSP East and NORAD was the

down-link facility at Nurrungar, Australia (there were also control and tracking

functions at Pine Gap and on Guam) described as a highly vulnerable set of

antennas, transmitters and computational facilities. This “readout station” in turn

would relay data to NORAD, variously by underseas cable, by HF radio links or

via the Defense Satellite Communications System, and in turn via a switching

station in Hawaii. These various alternative communications links between Nur-

rungar and Buckley AFB in Colorado involved foreign access to New Zealand,

Fiji, Norfolk Island and Canada’s British Columbia at Port Alberni. In recent

Bases during the Cold War 125 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 33

years, however, another down-link for DSP East (called the Simplified Process-

ing Station) had been made operational at Kapaun, FDR Germany.

A second major U.S. strategic warning system used to monitor ICBM

launches was BMEWS, which comprised three major radars (located at Clear,

Alaska, Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales Moor, U.K.). These radars became

operational in 1950 and had 4800-km ranges. The BMEWS facility included

four AN FPS-50 detection radars and an AN/FPS-49 tracking radar – these also

acted as contributing sensors for the SPADATS system. Altogether, there were

12 radars with ranges of 4800 km.

Finally, the U.S. had long relied – primarily for warning of the approach of

bombers – on the series of radar picket lines across the Arctic known as the

Distant Early Warning (DEW) and Continental Air Defense Integration North

(CADIN) Pinetree lines. These had been located across Alaska, Canada and

Greenland, with a few additional outposts in Iceland and the Faeroe Islands (the

126 Bases during the Cold War Table 9 Location of DEW Line and CADIN Pinetree Line radar sites in Canada and

Greenland, 1985

DEW Lines

Pinetree Line

Canada

Broughton Island

Alaska

Byron Bay

Armstrong

Cambridge Bay

Baldy Hughes Cape Dyer

Barrington

Cape Hooper

Beausejour

Cape Perry

Beaver Lodge

Cape Young

Chibougamau Clinon Point

Dana

Dewar Lakes

Falconbridge

Gladman Point

Gander Air Base

Hall Beach Goose Bay AB

Jenny Lind Island

Gypsumville

Komakuk Beach

Holberg

Lady Franklin Point

Kamloops

Longstaff Bluff Lac St. Denis

Macker Inlet

Moisie

Nicholson Peninsula

Montapica

Pelly Bay

Moosonee

Shepherd Bay Ramore

Shingle Point

Senneterre

Tuktoyaktuk

Sioux Lookout

Yorkton

Greenland Easterly

Kulusuk Island (Dye 4)

Quiquatoqoq (Holsteinberg-Dye-1)

Westerly Source: W.M. Arkin and R.W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race

(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985), appendix A.

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 34

locations of the sites in Canada and Greenland are listed in Table 9 above). The

DEW Line had 31 radars, some 21 of which were in Canada and four in Green-

land (several also were used as relays for troposcatter communications relays);

in the 1950s submarines on the surface filled gaps in the DEW Line – they could

submerge after reporting incoming aircraft.

The CADIN Pinetree Line of air surveillance radars in Canada had consti-

tuted a second line of warning behind the DEW Line and comprised some 22

stations operated by Canadian personnel for NORAD.

The upgrading of the almost 30-year old DEW Line was impelled by cruise-

missile developments and by new Soviet Backfire bombers capable of penet-

rating the old barrier; and it preceded the advent of the Strategic Defense

Initiative (SDI). The new system involved a network of 52 new long- and short-

range radar stations overlapping Alaska, Canada and Greenland, and was called

the North Warning System. It utilized many of the hub facilities of the DEW

Line, but with upgraded modern radars and independent power systems.

Later, around 2005, the U.S. became involved in the upgrading of the facility

at Fylingdales for theater missile defense and, possibly, for the stationing of

actual theater defense missiles.

Anti-submarine warfare51 During the Cold War, as well as afterwards, the U.S. had perhaps the world’s

most extensive and effective global ASW capability, which required access to

land facilities around the world: staging bases for aircraft, and processing

stations for acoustic and electronic data. Regarding acoustic data, it relied

heavily on its SOSUS networks, often alternatively referred to as Caesar. These,

going way back to 1954, involved networks of hydrophonic arrays which sent

oceanographic and acoustic data to shore processing facilities, that is, large com-

puter analysis centers. These data and others were correlated at regional process-

ing centers (including those in Hawaii, Wales, Newfoundland and Iceland) and

then forwarded to a main processing center at Moffett Field, California, via

FLTSATCOM and DSCS satellites.52

SOSUS, though augmented by other systems noted below, was the backbone

of the U.S. ASW detection capability. It has been described by SIPRI as follows:

Each SOSUS installation consists of an array of hundreds of hydrophones

laid out on the sea floor, or moored at depths most conducive to sound prop-

agation, and connected by submarine cables for transmission of telemetry.

In such an array a sound wave arriving from a distant submarine will be

successively detected by different hydrophones according to their geometric

relationship to the direction from which the wave arrives. This direction can

be determined by noting the order in which the wave is detected at the dif-

ferent hydrophones. In practice the sensitivity of the array is enhanced many

times by adding the signals from several individual hydrophones after intro-

ducing appropriate time delays between them. The result is a listening

Bases during the Cold War 127 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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“beam” that can be “steered” in various directions towards various sectors

of the ocean by varying the pattern of time delays. The distance from the

array to the sound source can be calculated by measuring the divergence of

the sound rays within the array or by triangulating from adjacent arrays.

The first SOSUS systems were completed on the continental shelf off the east

coast of the U.S. in 1954.53 Others were later installed off both U.S. shores and

at Brawdy, Wales – the Pacific Coast system came to be known by the code-

name of Colossus.54 A jointly operated U.S.–Canadian array came to be centered

at Argentia, Newfoundland, others at Hawaii, the Bahamas and the Azores.55

By 1974 it was stated that there were 22 SOSUS installations located along

the east and west coasts of the U.S. and near various chokepoints around the

world – another 14 were identified by Richelson and others.56 Foreign-based

SOSUS installations were located at Ascension, in the Azores (Santa Maria), the

Bahamas (Andros Island), Barbados, Bermuda, Canada (Argentia), Denmark,

Diego Garcia, Gibraltar, Guam (Ratidian Point), Iceland (Keflavik), Italy, Japan

(sonar chains across the Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits), Norway, Panama

(Galeta), the Philippines, the Ryukyus, Turkey, the U.K. (Scatsa, Shetland and

Brawdy, Wales). Others have at times been operated on Grand Turk Island,

Antigua, Bahamas (Eleuthera) and Barbados; and maybe on the Canary Islands

at Punta de Tero. And the U.S. may possibly also have operated still other

barrier sonars, for instance, in the central Mediterranean from Lampedusa and/or

Pantelleria Islands, and on Midway Island in the central Pacific Ocean.

Burrows described as follows the basic geometry of the U.S. SOSUS network

which monitors Soviet egress from the Eurasion bastion:

There are actually two SOSUS arrays moored across the approaches to Pol-

yarnyy; one between Norway and Bear Island, and the other linking northern

Scotland, Iceland, and Greenland. Submarines whose home port is

Petropavlovsk are monitored by hydrophones strung from the southeastern tip

of Hokkaido, along a line parallel to the Kuriles, and then up toward the

northeast, off the Aleutian coast. Still others stretch from southern Japan to

the Philippines, covering the approaches to China and Indochina. And there

are also SOSUS installations on the Atlantic side of Gibraltar, others about

halfway between Italy and Corsica and still others at the mouth of the

Bosporus, off Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and not so far from Hawaii.

The Navy keeps the precise locations of its SOSUS equipment a closely

guarded secret, since interfering with it would be a logical Soviet subject.57

Nuclear detection58 One important, but seldom commented upon aspect of the overall U.S. intelli-

gence effort, was that connected with the detection of nuclear explosions. This

involved several separate lines of activity.

First, there was the matter of verification of existing arms control treaties,

128 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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that is, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which bans atmospheric testing,

and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, never ratified by the U.S. Senate

(but tacitly adhered to in the manner of SALT II), which barred underground

testing of nuclear devices of over 150 kilotons. Second, there was the monitor-

ing of the horizontal nuclear proliferation activities of hitherto non-nuclear

states, as well as of the non-signatory but nuclear states, China and France.

Third there was the contingency of protracted nuclear war during which the U.S.

would have wanted to determine the locations and frequencies of nuclear deto-

nations on both sides and to assess resultant damage, among other reasons, to

aid subsequent targeting decisions.

Several interrelated systems were used to pursue the above ends, involving

satellites, aircraft and ground stations. Use of satellites, in connection with

bases, raised the question of external facilities for data down-links and command

and control; that of aircraft involved, obviously, bases as well.

According to Richelson, the U.S. space-based nuclear-detection system

involved, variously, the various components of the VELA satellite program begun

in the early 1960s, the previously mentioned DSP satellites primarily intended for

early warning of missile launches, and the NAVSTAR global positioning system.59

Numerous aircraft types were used to detect airborne atomic debris left in the

wake of explosions (if only the venting of imperfectly conducted underground

blasts). One source said that these included the U-2, P-3C, C-135, B-52 and also

an HC-130 configured as a sea-water sampler to monitor underwater nuclear tests

(monitoring of plutonion-239 separation via kryption-85 analysis was presumably

also similarly conducted). For instance, SAC’s U-2s apparently operated out of

Australian facilities at Sale and Laverton, gathering radionuclides as part of a High

Altitude Sampling Program. These aircraft were operated by the Air Force Tech-

nical Application Center (AFTAC) and could presumably have availed themselves

of virtually all the airfields normally open to U.S. use throughout the world. Some

of these operations no doubt involved ad hoc staging through facilities after an

“event,” and the diplomacy of access involved was obscure. But, as there was a

general convergence of overall interest by most nations with regard to monitoring

others’ nuclear tests, access in these cases was likely to have been permissive.

The Soviet Cold War naval basing structure60 Before World War II, the USSR had had only very limited access to external

facilities, perhaps solely with the forward deployment of some combat aircraft in

Czechoslovakia in the 1930s. In parallel, Moscow was then only a small factor

in the international arms trade, so it was not able to bank either on security assis-

tance or ideological ties and alliances to establish forward bases. That situation

changed dramatically after World War II, with an additional quantum jump in

the late 1950s and on up to 1970s.

Directly after the war, of course, Moscow established control over Eastern

Europe (earlier also in Mongolia), and these dominated areas became the sites

for a massive network of Soviet air, naval and ground facilities, with a heavy

Bases during the Cold War 129 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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concentration in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia as an

obvious correlate to Soviet political control over these countries and as a defen-

sive glacis or possible springboard for offensive operations vis-à-vis NATO

Western Europe. Again, the basis for basing access was simply brute conquest

and imperial control.

For some ten years after the end of the Cold War, the USSR had no basing

access outside of its huge contiguous Eurasian empire. Indeed, it also had virtu-

ally no arms transfer or security assistance relationships outside this area during

a period in which the U.S. established its elaborate structure of alliances and

arms transfer relationships all around the Eurasian rimland.

That all changed around 1955 with the beginning of the Soviet weapons

transfers to Egypt and Syria. But then too in the late 1950s and early 1960s,

numerous nations in the wake of decolonization and the creation of nominally

Marxist regimes, became Soviet arms client states. Along with that, sometimes

with a time lag, came the provision of basing access at a time, also, when

Moscow was beginning to build a “blue-water navy.” And, some of the new

arms recipients and basing hosts involved a “leapfrogging” of the containment

rim around the huge Sino-Soviet Eurasian domain. Among the basing hosts

developed in addition to Egypt and Syria were Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Congo-

Brazzaville, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, both Yemens, Iraq, Cuba and

Vietnam (Indonesia and India were both major Soviet arms clients by 1965, but

provided no significant access to bases).

Gradually, the Soviet navy developed an external presence as the Cold War

progressed, involving the build-up of a significant blue-water navy, the acquisi-

tion of bases and available ports of call, and the compilation of “ship-days” in

the major oceans and seas matching that of the U.S. Navy. As recently as the

late 1950s, the Soviet navy had had little of “blue-water,” long-range power pro-

jection capability nor basing access. Indeed, the early postwar exceptions were

use of a Chinese base at Port Arthur, one at Porkalla in Finland, and a three-year

interregnum (1958–1961) when Soviet submarines were granted access to

Albanian bases in the Mediterranean.

After that came the large-scale naval build-up through the late 1980s under

the aegis of Admiral Gorshkov, a build-up that produced a navy that, measured

by major surface combatants and submarines, was larger than that of the U.S.

The Soviet Navy fielded some 269 principal surface combatants (including

four Kiev carriers), two ASW helicopter carriers, some 36 cruisers of which two

(Kirov-class) were nuclear, 61 destroyers (of which 33 were specialized for

ASW) and 167 escorts including 100 corvettes.61 In addition, there were some

762 minor surface combatants: vast numbers of missile patrol boats, fast attack

craft, 372 principal auxiliary ships (replenishment, tankers, missile support,

supply, cargo, submarine tenders, repair, hospital, submarine rescue, salvage/

rescue, training ships, etc.). There were some 62 intelligence collection vessels

(AGI), 456 naval research vessels, 74 tankers, 298 support ships, 1900 merchant

ships, and numerous civilian oceanographic, fishery, space-associated and

hydrographic research vessels.62

130 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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The Soviet submarine fleet was equally formidable, comprising some 360

vessels. It fielded 63 SSBNs and 14 non nuclear-powered ballistic-missile sub-

marines (SSNs), with a total of 983 submarine-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBMs) – 39 SLBMs and 15 submarines were outside the SALT limits – some

214 attack submarines of which 70 were nuclear-powered, and 63 cruise-missile

submarines, 48 of which were nuclear (SSGNs).63

That Cold War Soviet navy was, obviously huge. But its more limited (rela-

tive to the U.S.) external basing network required an outsized force of auxiliary

ships to compensate for the shortage of land bases. The same was true for AGIs,

fishing and oceanographic vessels, and SIGINT, communications relay, space-

tracking, ships etc.

In the Mediterranean, the important Soviet presence in Syria included naval

access to the port of Tartus, which was the primary maintenance facility for

Soviet submarines operating in the area. A Soviet submarine tender, a yard oiler

and a water tender were stationed there.

Over the years, there had also been varied degrees of naval access to Algeria,

Libya and Yugoslavia. Soviet submarines were reported serviced at Annaba in

Algeria, and its ships were refueled and maintained at a couple of Yugoslav

ports on the Adriatic, at Tivat and Sibenik.64

In Guinea, despite some curtailment of long-maintained access for Soviet

Bear reconnaissance aircraft, the USSR routinely used Conakry harbor as a

facility for its West African patrol.65 But Luanda in Angola became the most

important port for Moscow’s West African naval units – since 1982 that had

involved an 8500-ton floating drydock capable of handling most major Soviet

naval combatants.66 In Ethiopia, the installation at Dahlak Archipelago was the

maintenance facility and supply depot for Soviet naval combatants operating in

the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, normally ranging from 20–25 units, including

surface ships, attack and cruise-missile submarines and auxiliaries. This facility

included an 8500-ton floating drydock, floating piers, helipads, fuel and water

storage, a submarine tender and other repair ships. Guided-missile cruisers and

nuclear-powered submarines regularly called at Dahlak for repair and supplies.67

In Cuba, in addition to enjoying access for port visits, maintenance, and so

on, Moscow permanently based a submarine tender at Cienfuegos, used primar-

ily, if not solely, for servicing attack submarines – access for SSBNs might have

been construed as a violation of the agreements emerging out of the Cuban

Missile Crisis.68

At another level, Soviet access to Peruvian ports provided logistics support

and maintenance for some 200 fishing vessels that operated off the coast of

South America. This involved, among other things, extensive rotation of mer-

chant seamen and fishermen.69

Table 10 details the Soviet overseas naval basing structure which, it is import-

ant to note, had experienced some major changes in the late Cold War period as

reflective of the vicissitudes of external political alignments. Several external main

operating bases were crucial to Soviet naval deployments: Cam Ranh Bay

(Vietnam) in the Far East/Pacific area; Aden and Socotra (South Yemen) and the

Bases during the Cold War 131 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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132 Bases during the Cold War Table 10 Main and secondary surface-ship operating bases of the Soviet Navy

Host nation base

Description

Vietnam

Cam Ranh Bay

Main external Soviet naval base in Far East – guided-

missile cruisers, frigates and minesweepers based here; also, attack submarines; on average, deployment

was four submarines, two to four combat vessels, ten

auxiliaries.

Cambodia

Kampong Som (Sihanoukville)

Reported access for Soviet warships, i.e., replenishment,

refueling, etc.

North Korea Najin

Some port access, earlier reports of submarine base.

India

Vishakhapatnam

Indian naval base built with Soviet assistance, some

Soviet port calls, refueling, etc.

Cochin Port calls, refueling, etc. reported.

Iraq

Umm Quasr

Soviet assistance in improving facilities here, earlier

reported accessible to Soviet warships; access, limited

during Iraq–Iran War.

Az Zubayr

Earlier reported used by Soviet submarines and SIGINT vessels.

Al Fao

Iraqi port, reported availed to Soviet Union after 1974

agreement.

South Yemen

Aden

Soviet main base for Indian Ocean operations; fuel tanks, replenishment, reports of submarine pens

alongside berthing for major surface ships.

Socotra Island

Anchorage used by Soviet ships, possible shore

facilities.

Ethiopia

Dahlak Archipelago

Large anchorage for Soviet Indian Ocean naval squadron.

Assab

Important Soviet naval facility; floating dry dock

formerly moored at Berbera.

Massawa

Port access, routine.

Perim Island

Former British facility, reportedly improved by Soviet Union.

Mauritius

Reported port calls (note concurrently reported U.S.

access).

Mozambique

Nacala

Periodic port calls. Maputo

Periodic port calls.

Tanzania

Zanzibar

Available, port calls.

Angola

Luanda

Was main Soviet naval base on West African coast,

having replaced Conakry; guided-missile destroyer

and several accompanying craft stationed here. İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 40

Bases during the Cold War 133 Table 10 continued

Host nation base Description

Madagascar

Diego Suarez

Available, port calls.

Tanative

Available, port calls.

Benin

Cotonou Periodic port calls.

Guinea

Conakry

Formerly hosted small West African flotilla; use later

curtailed, if not eliminated.

Congo

Ponte Noir

Reported occasional port calls. Guinea Bissau

Geba Estuary

Port calls.

Algeria

Mers El Kebir

Port calls.

Annaba Soviet repair ships deployed. Submarine repair

capabilities reported.

Libya

Tripoli

Regular access, Soviet Mediterranean squadron.

Benghazi

Regular access, Soviet Mediterranean squadron.

Bardia Soviet Union reported constructing naval base here.

Syria

Latakia

Main base for Soviet Mediterranean squadron; fuel,

replenishment, etc.

Tartus

Regular access, maintenance facility for attack

submarines, oiler, tender. Ras Shamra

Soviet submarine base alleged under construction.

Yugoslavia

Tivat

Repair of Soviet ships and submarines.

Rijeka

Port calls. Pula

Port calls.

Sibenik

Port calls.

Split

Port calls.

Greece

Siros Island Ship repairs, commercial, at Neorian shipyard.

Cuba

Cienfuegos

Replenishment base for Soviet attack submarines,

mooring of submarine tender occasionally rumoured.

Mariel

Port calls. Nipe Bay

Port calls, Gulf-class submarines, intelligence

collectors.

Havana

Access for Soviet surface ships.

Santiago de Cuba

Access for Soviet surface ships.

Peru

Calleo

Occasional ship visits since Soviet–Peruvian arms

deal.

Romania

Mangalia

Reported Soviet submarine base on Black Sea. Sulina

Forward supply base for Soviet Danube flotilla. Source: Compiled from SIPRI data.

İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 41

Dahlak Archipelago (Ethiopia) in the western Indian Ocean/Horn of Africa area;

Luanda (Angola) in the South Atlantic; Latakia and Tartus (Syria) in the Mediter-

ranean; and Havana, Cienfuegos and Mariel (Cuba) in the western North Atlantic.

Beyond that, the Soviet Navy had acquired degrees of access – secondary bases,

minor facilities, port visits etc. – in numerous other locales (often the subject of

debate over facts and interpretations). These included Cambodia, India, Iraq, Mau-

ritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, Angola, Congo, Sao Tome and

Principe, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Benin, Guinea, Algeria, Libya, Yugoslavia,

Spain (Canary Islands), Nicaragua and Peru. That may not have been a truly

global basing structure, but it was something well beyond what would have

accorded with a strictly defensive, coastal defense navy, or with the assumptions

and expectations of a generation earlier.

Soviet air bases70 Numerically speaking, the Cold War Soviet Air Force was huge, comprising – in

varying degrees of readiness – some 4000 combat aircraft. More than half of these

were primarily configured as interceptors, that is, they were for strategic and/or

tactical defense; the remainder were configured mostly as ground-attack craft. Still

others had as their primary functions reconnaissance and electronic countermea-

sures; 540 and 30 craft, respectively. In its strategic forces, the USSR had some

165 long-range, 567 medium-range, and 450 short-range bombers, 68 long-range

reconnaissance craft, some 100 ECM machines and (here deficient relative to the

U.S.) a then growing force of some 50 Bison and Badger tankers.

In line with the facts of Soviet ground and naval deployments, most perman-

ent external deployments of aircraft were in the immediately contiguous areas of

Eastern Europe within the WTO, Mongolia and Afghanistan. Otherwise,

however, the Cold War years saw the Soviet Air Force break out of the confines

of Eurasia to establish more or less permanent bases in Vietnam, South Yemen,

Angola and Cuba.

The USSR had some 2000 tactical aircraft deployed in Eastern Europe. The

MiG-23 Flogger was by far the most numerous fighter-interceptor; followed by

late-model MiG-21 Fishbeds and older Su-15 Flagons. Other less numerous

fighter-interceptors included the Foxbat, Firebar, Fiddler and the then new MiG-

31 Foxhound and MiG-29 Fulcrum.

Among the ground-attack aircraft, the most common were the Su-17 Fitter

and MiG-27 Flogger, though reportedly the best interdiction aircraft in the

Soviet inventory was the Su-24 Fencer. Other units were comprised of MiG-23

Floggers, the then new Su-24 Frogfoot and older MiG-21 Fishbed and Su-7

Fitter As. Reconnaissance aircraft deployed in Eastern Europe included MiG-21

Fishbeds, Su-17 Fitters, MiG-25 Foxbats and Yak-28 Brewers.

In East Germany, there were large numbers of attack and interceptor fighters,

a total of 685 combat aircraft, comprising 315 attack aircraft (Su-17s, Su-24s,

Su-25s, MiG-27s), 300 fighter interceptors (MiG-21/25/27s), 50 reconnaissance

craft (Su-17s, MiG-25s), plus 20 ECM and 40 light transport aircraft. These

134 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 42

were forward-based at some 17 bases; quantitatively speaking, there were both

more aircraft and bases than were fielded by the U.S. and British counterparts in

West Germany. These were at: Zossen-Wiesdorf, Stralsund, Peenemunde,

Parchim (Hind-24 helicopters and long-range transports for troop exchanges),

Finow, Werneuchen, Oranienburg, Wittstock, Neuruppin, Zerbst (MiG-25

reconnaissance aircraft), Juterborg, Kothen, Welzow, Finsterwalde (Su-20 Fitter

B fighter regiment), Merseburg, Grossenhein and Alternburg.

In Czechoslovakia, the USSR regularly deployed some 105 combat aircraft,

located mostly in the Bohemian region along the German border and in the area

northwest of Prague. There were some 45 MiG-27 Flogger D/Js, 45 Flogger Bs

and 14 Su-17 reconnaissance craft. Among the some 30 military airfields in

Czechoslovakia, Soviet combat aircraft were reported stationed at Prague’s

Ruzyne airport, Milovice, Cheb/Horni Dvory, Dobrany, Karlovy Vary, Zatec,

Mimon, Tchorovice and Panensky Tynec.

In Hungary, the Soviet Air Force had six major air bases in addition to joint

use of some Hungarian bases and also some dispersal strips. There were about

240 combat aircraft deployed, including Su-17 Fitter and Su-24 Fencer attack

craft, MiG-23 interceptors and Su-17 reconnaissance aircraft. Tokol in

Budapest, a major Soviet base used jointly with Hungary, deployed fighters,

bombers, transports and helicopters and was also the headquarters for the Soviet

Air Force in Hungary. Other important bases were at Kaposvar, Papa,

Veszprem, Debrecen, Mezokovesd, Pecs and Szombathely. There was joint use

of other installations at Kalocsa, Szolnok, Kecskemet, Sarmellek and Szeged.

In strategically located (relative to the main potential theater of operations

along the West German frontier) Poland, the USSR earlier based combat aircraft

at Legnica, Gniezno, Pucza Bolimowska, Gdansk (naval air Backfires), Zagan,

Brzeg, Opole, Szczecin, Kolobrzeg, Szczecinek and Koszalin. The bases at

Zagan and Szprotawa hosted Su-24 Fencer aircraft.

In the Far East, again associated with a major ground force deployment, there

were in Mongolia about six squadrons of Soviet combat aircraft, including MiG-

21/23/25/27s. They were at Choybalsan northeast, Ulan Bator southwest,

Nalayh, Bayan Suma and two facilities around Sayn Shand which fielded MiG-

23s. These were large deployments comparable to those in Eastern Europe,

reflecting the size of the Soviet presence vis-à-vis China during the period of

tension between the two communist giants. In addition, some 30 MiG-23s were

based on Eterofu Island in the Kuriles (disputed with Japan), along with

8000–10,000 troops.

During the war in Afghanistan the Soviet Air Force established a major pres-

ence in at least five air bases. These was at Kabul, Kandahar (important for

airlift and for naval reconnaissance over the Indian Ocean), Bagram (MiG-23

base and reported Tu-95 Bear bomber deployment), Shindand (a squadron each

of MiG-21s and MiG-23s, two squadrons of Su-20 fighters and 60 Mi-6 heli-

copters) and Jalalabad near Pakistan and the Khyber Pass, where 100-plus

Soviet helicopters were reported stationed. These bases were later used by the

U.S. after the fall of 2001.

Bases during the Cold War 135 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 43

Outside of the old (Western-imposed) Eurasian containment rim (or “out of

area” relative to the USSR), the Soviet Air Force established bases, ad hoc facil-

ities and staging rights in virtually all of the world’s major regions. Concerning

the “permanent” or continuous deployment of aircraft (or sporadic deployments

approaching that status), this involved most importantly both combat and naval

reconnaissance aircraft. The major deployments were, as one might expect, co-

located with the major naval facilities in some of the Soviet Union’s closest

allies in the Third World, such as Vietnam, South Yemen, Cuba, Syria, Libya

and Angola. Still, relative to USAF access overseas, the paucity of permanent

deployment of combat aircraft stood out. Perhaps of greater significance was the

considerable access for Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft.

In Vietnam, alongside the major naval deployments at Cam Ranh Bay, the

Soviet Union deployed some 24 reconnaissance or combat aircraft, 8 Tu-95

Bears and 16 Tu-16 Badgers D/K, ten of the latter having strike capabilities.71

The Badgers’ ranges extended the Soviet strike capability over the entire

Southeast Asian region, notably including the U.S. bases in the Philippines,

but also over Guam and the other U.S. facilities in the islands of the Central

Pacific.72

In the Southwest Asia/Indian Ocean area, the Soviet Union, after 1978, was

provided access to Yemen’s Aden International Airport and to a military airfield

at Al-Anad, for IL-38/May naval reconnaissance aircraft, the Soviet equivalent

to the U.S. P-3C.73 (These were transited further south to Ethiopia and Mozam-

bique.) In the Mediterranean, there was similar access for IL-38s in Libya after

1981, at Okba ben Nafi, the former U.S. Wheelus Air Force Base. Additionally,

there were a large number of Soviet Air Force advisers and maintenance person-

nel in Libya, whose air force comprised MiG-25s, MiG-23s, MiG-21s, Su-22s

and Mi-24 Hind helicopters – as well as Tu-22 Blinder bombers and IL-76

Candid and AN-26 Curl transports.74

Soviet ground force bases75 During the peak of the Cold War, the USSR deployed a massive land army and

associated facilities in Eastern Europe. At the peak, that involved some 565,000

troops, organized for combat into 30 divisions (16 tank and 14 motorized rifle),

plus attached artillery units. The deployments were as follows:

1 GDR: 380,000 troops; one Group and five Army headquarters; ten tank and

nine motorized rifle divisions; one artillery division; one air assault divi-

sion; five attack helicopter regiments with some 500 Mi-8 Hip and 420

Hind attack helicopters.

2 Czechoslovakia: 80,000 troops; one Group and one Army HQ; two tank and

three motorized rifle divisions; one air assault battalion; one artillery

brigade, 2 attack helicopter regiments with 100 Mi-8 Hip and Mi-24 Hind

helicopters.

3 Poland: 40,000 troops; one Group and one Army headquarters; two tank

136 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 44

divisions, one attack helicopter regiment with 120 Mi-8 and Mi-24 heli-

copters.

4 Hungary: 65,000 troops; one Group and one Army HQ; two tank and two

motorized rifle-divisions; one air assault brigade with 65 Mi-8 and Mi-24

helicopters.76

Outside Europe, the only permanent major (peacetime) Soviet ground-force

deployment in an allied country was in Mongolia. There, the Red Army

deployed two tank and three motorized rifle divisions, 65,000 troops in all

(earlier there were 75,000) vis-à-vis China.77 These forces filled a gap in the

Sino-Soviet confrontation line amid a much larger overall Soviet deployment in

the Far Eastern theatre of some 53 regular divisions (seven tank, 45 motorized

rifle, one airborne), abetted by four artillery divisions and two air assault

brigades.

The Soviet Union’s other main external ground force was, of course, the

large army of some 118,000 troops engaged in combat in Afghanistan, which

included 10,000 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Committee of State

Security (KGB) troops. That force remained, numerically speaking, at a fairly

constant level from the initiation of hostilities in 1979, to its conclusion in 1989.

There are several other locales where clusters of Soviet-bloc advisers and

military technicians were significant beyond the “norm” for standard military

missions. These were in Algeria (1000), Cuba (8000), Ethiopia (1500), Libya

(2000), North Yemen (500), South Yemen, (2500), Syria (4000) and Vietnam

(2500), with small numbers in India, Iraq, Cambodia, Laos, Mali, Mozambique,

Nicaragua and Peru. Each was a major recipient of Soviet arms. The much-

argued “Cuban brigade” – whether defined as a combat formation or as a collec-

tion of support troops – achieved some notoriety in 1979 when publicity over its

presence (and arguments about whether it represented a violation of agreements

made at the close of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis) was important to the aborting

of the SALT II Treaty by opposition in the U.S. Senate. Soviet forces in Syria

were important in the wake of the latter’s debacle in the 1982 war with Israel –

they manned the some 48 long-range SA-5s which could have contested Israeli

air control even over the Mediterranean in the event of renewed hostilities.

Earlier, prior to 1972, there was a large force of Soviet troops – some 20,000 –

deployed in Egypt’s Suez Canal area, mostly to man air defense installations. In

1977–1978, some Soviet forces aided Ethiopia in its war against Somalia.

Soviet technical facilities abroad78 During the Cold War, the USSR made – relative to the U.S. – much less use of

foreign facilities for technical functions – communications, space-related, anti-

submarine warfare, nuclear detection etc. This was variously due to much

greater utilization of shipboard facilities; the larger (relative to the U.S.) Soviet

land mass in relation to the major focus of the superpower competition along the

Eurasian rim, which allowed many functions to be performed within the USSR;

Bases during the Cold War 137 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 45 the lesser number of aligned client states available to the Soviet Union in the

Third World; the practice of utilizing a larger numbers of satellites with shorter

lives; and the more open nature of Western societies which reduced the (rela-

tive) Soviet requirements for proliferated intelligence facilities.

The USSR had nothing, for instance, comparable to the U.S. SOSUS network

for tracking submarines, though there was a report in 1978 of a Soviet

hydrophone apparatus washed ashore in Iceland. The Soviets relied more on

surface ships and perhaps also submarines and aircraft-sown sonabuoys for

detection of U.S. submarines. It maintained about 50 auxiliary intelligence ships

for ASW work, which maintained a constant presence near important contin-

ental U.S. bases such as Charleston, South Carolina; Kings Bay, Georgia;

Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; and Bangor, Washington; as well as at

Holy Loch, Scotland.

And, unlike the U.S., the USSR apparently made no use of external commu-

nications and/or navigation facilities in connection with submarines on patrol.

Several sources reported that communications with submarines stationed at great

distances from the USSR were handled by a network of some 26 VLF and LF

transmitters within the USSR itself, apparently sufficient to cover the patrol

areas of Soviet SSBNs and SSNs; in the former case, most were kept close to

home in the “bastions,” or on stations in the Atlantic or Pacific oceans within

range of the home communications stations. Ford referred to six long-range

radio transmitters (at Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok, Dikson Ostrov, Kaliningrad,

Matochin Shar and Arkhangelsk) that gave orders to Soviet submarines. In addi-

tion, Arkin and Fieldhouse reported a three-station network of “Omega-type”

VLF transmitters at Krasnodar, Komsomolsk and Rostov. They also detailed a

considerable number of LORAN-C type “Pulsed Phase Radio Navigation

System” stations, organized by chains along the western and eastern littorals of

the USSR, used to position submarines.

Soviet submarines apparently also received communications from satellites

during brief surfacing. And, one source indicated the possibility of Soviet use of

command and control submarines for relaying communications to other under-

seas craft within communications distance.

The Soviet global ground network of space-tracking and satellite control

facilities was, of course, far less extensive than that of the U.S. Again, this was a

function of the far more extensive use of ship-borne facilities as well as of the

lesser external needs dictated by the larger land mass of the USSR, particularly

in relation to many satellite orbits which allowed direct transmission to the

USSR.

At the core of the Soviet space-surveillance system was a network of at least

12 sites within the USSR claimed to be “equipped with receivers to measure

Doppler shifts in radio signals, tracking radars, and photo theodolites and which

transmit data to a central computation center.” Additionally, radars associated

with anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) – Pushkino, Hen House, Try Add and Dog

House – are said to have had space-tracking capabilities, along with the contro-

versial (in the context of ABM treaty verification) radar at Abalakova.

138 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 46

Outside the USSR, there were a number of tracking stations in foreign coun-

tries. These were reported in Egypt (Helwan and Aswan) before the Egypto–

Soviet break, Mali, Guinea, Cuba and Chad, as well as in Czechoslovakia and

Poland. At Santiago de Cuba, for instance, there was an Interkosmos laser radar

and also a KIM-3 tracking camera, presumably functionally equivalent to the

U.S. Baker-Nunn or GEODSS systems. Perhaps overlapping this grouping, there

were reports of an Interkosmos laser tracking program (using a laser

rangefinder) involving facilities in Egypt, Bolivia, India and Cuba. It is believed

that tracking was carried out at Khartoum in the Sudan and Afgoi in Somalia.

But just because the Soviet Union was reluctant to become too dependent on

foreign land-based stations, it placed considerable emphasis upon shipborne

space-tracking (and also missile-tracking) systems. This involved more than ten

ships – a Soviet source noted that even despite the nation’s large land mass,

space vehicles were within direct visibility from Soviet territory only for about

nine hours out of 24.

In the field of communications too, the Soviet Union was far less dependent on

foreign land bases than the U.S.; correspondingly, far more reliant on ship-borne

systems (an exception, of course was the VLF facilities used to communicate with

submarines, perhaps too large to be placed aboard ships). As it is, however, rela-

tive to what was known about the U.S., there was scant information on how the

USSR utilized the whole of the frequency spectrum for various purposes, how it

tried to circumvent countermeasures by redundancy, and so forth.

For the most part, Soviet use of overseas communications facilities focused

on the downlinks for the Molniya communications satellites, of which there

were some 40 aloft at a given time.

A U.S. government report provided some information (and a map) on the

general locations of Soviet tracking ships and, hence, of the locales where they

might have sought port access or at least mooring buoys. Among them, off Sable

Island, Nova Scotia; in the western Mediterranean near Gibraltar; the Gulf of

Guinea; off Mozambique and Madagascar; off Honduras, east of the Philippines;

and north of New Zealand. Large tracking ships apparently moored at Havana

and/or Santiago while tracking some flights; Trinidad was also mentioned in this

context. Some of the other locations provided rationales for periodic access to

Conakry or Maputo, maybe also to Nicaragua, as well as providing further indi-

cations of the Soviet need for access somewhere in the South Pacific. (The U.S.

government report stated that three large Soviet ships took turns serving in the

Caribbean area to extend Soviet deep-space coverage.)

The USSR depended considerably less on land-based SIGINT collection sta-

tions than the U.S., though, it utilized a variety of means; satellites, surface ships

and submarines, aircraft, equipment based in embassies and so on. And again,

similar to the situation with respect to space tracking and early warning, one had

to be aware of the sometimes only indirect importance of external access; for

instance, for fueling ships used in lieu of land facilities.

The USSR was reported to have had major SIGINT facilities at Lourdes,

Cuba; Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam; Ethiopia (two); South Yemen; Syria; and

Bases during the Cold War 139 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 47

Afghanistan. That at Lourdes was reported to be devoted to interpretation of

satellite communications. There may have been additional ground stations in

Libya and Iraq, though the fate of the latter might be questioned since Moscow

had given only modest support to Iraq in its war with Iran, particularly in the

early stages, in part because of the cross-pressures from its relationship with

Libya.

The Lourdes facility was a large one, operated by some 2000 Soviet person-

nel; it became a prominent issue in 1979 at the time of the imbroglio in the U.S.

over the Soviet “Cuban brigade” amid the SALT II confirmation hearings. The

facility of 50 buildings housed an antenna field, satellite receiver and so on, and

targeted U.S. civilian and military communications, that is, B-52 communica-

tions, Fort Benning and Cape Canaveral, the naval headquarters at Norfolk, etc.

According to Richelson, the Lourdes facility, complemented by a similar one in

the USSR, “gave complete coverage of the global beams of all U.S. geosynchro-

nous communications satellites.”

At Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet Union had an important facility from which to

monitor both land and ocean-based emissions – there were two HF/DF sites used

to gain locational data on U.S. fleet units in the Pacific. The U.S. bases in the

Philippines were obvious targets.

The four sites in Afghanistan aided collection, variously, vis-à-vis China,

Pakistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf area. And, of course, these sites

merely added to the capabilities of hundreds of SIGINT sites located within the

USSR.

The Soviet Union had some other land-based intelligence-interception facili-

ties located outside the USSR. In Laos, there was an air-surveillance radar, obvi-

ously directed against China. According to the IISS, there was a Soviet

monitoring station (elsewhere identified as a radar site) in Sao Tome and

Principe. In Cuba, along with the Lourdes facility, there were also air-defense

surveillance radars, the Tall King system, apparently operated by Soviet person-

nel. In East Germany, there were HF-finding antennas used in connection with

jamming operations, in Poland, a SIGINT station and HF direction-finder at

Sinajscie, and at Bierdzany a receiver site for a Soviet OTH radar transmitter

located at Kiev. Throughout Eastern Europe, there were large numbers of air-

surveillance radars equivalent to the NATO NADGE system – in Hungary, for

instance, some 130 sites manned by Soviet personnel were reported.

The Soviet AGIs had near global patrolling areas. There was a concentrated

effort to monitor off the southeastern coast of the U.S. (where U.S. surface and

submarine units were concentrated), in the English Channel, the Norwegian Sea

and off Holy Loch. In the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, Western naval

movements were monitored, particularly near the straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz

and Bab El Mandeb, and the Suez Canal. In the Pacific Ocean, there was corre-

sponding emphasis off the coasts of China, Japan, Guam and in the waters

around Vietnam.

The dependence of these “spy ships” on provisioning from foreign ports was

difficult to gauge, but must certainly have been considerable. As noted by one

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Page 48

source, the Soviet Union had chosen “not to build an auxiliary fleet of the size

necessary to reduce out-of-area base support to a manageable minimum . . . Ship

designs, both for ease of maintenance and for reasons of habitability, still are

notoriously poor . . . Unlike U.S. ships, most Soviet ships cannot distill enough

fresh water and are dependent upon water tankers.”

This situation necessitated frequent operational port visits by auxiliaries to

take on food and fresh water, which were then transferred to combatants, pre-

sumably also AGIs, at roadsteads or at sea. This presumably further directed

attention to the main Soviet basing hosts and clients – Cuba, Angola, Syria,

Vietnam, South Yemen etc. – as critical to fueling and otherwise provisioning

the Soviet Union’s global AGI effort.

Soviet forward-based missiles79 By the mid-1980s, of course, both the U.S./NATO and the USSR deployed large

numbers of externally based, nuclear-armed missiles in Europe, constituting a

massive and critical forward presence. Centrally, this involved Soviet deploy-

ment of short-range theater weapons and tactical weapons in Eastern Europe

(SS-12/22s, SS-23s and SS-7 “Frogs”) and a countervailing U.S. deployment of

Pershings, cruise missiles and Lance battlefield weapons.

The Soviet SS-20 theater missiles which were at the center of the INF negoti-

ations were first deployed in 1977. These missiles, carrying three nuclear war-

heads with ranges of 3400 miles (5000km), were phased in to replace the older

SS-4s. The latter were first deployed in 1959, with a single warhead platform

and a range of 1120 miles.

By 1987, it was typically reported that over 300 SS-20s were deployed

against NATO west of the Ural Mountains, with another 100 or so in Soviet

Asia, for a total of 441. None of these were based outside the USSR (nor were

any of the 112 reported SS-4s which were still deployed in the western USSR).

They were based in several fields in the western Soviet Union and near the

Caspian Sea. The SS-20s threatened the entirety of NATO-Europe with their

5000-km ranges, as well as many other important targets – the Azores, Green-

land, Philippines, Guam, Okinawa, etc.

Other nations’ external basing: Britain and France80 Somewhat in the face of historical nostrums associated with Mahan and others,

it is apparent that the Cold War competition – if that is what it was – for over-

seas naval access was largely a two-nation game. In that sense at least, bipolarity

unquestionably reigned. There were, nonetheless, a few not altogether insignifi-

cant instances of naval basing retained by – or recently acquired by – some other

nations: France, Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and maybe others. Of course,

almost all navies conduct periodic port visits abroad, variously involving “pres-

ence,” solidification of political friendships, broadening of horizons for naval

personnel, and so on.

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Page 49

France had the most significant external naval presence besides the super-

powers, most notably represented by its Indian Ocean Flotilla (Alindien) of five

frigates, three minor combatants, two amphibious and four support ships (also a

small naval marine detachment). That force was deployed out of Djibouti (hence

was within combat range of the Persian Gulf), also making extensive use of

bases at Reunion and Mayotte (Mozambique Channel), both French overseas

possessions (earlier, up to 1973, France had extensive access to Diego Suarez in

Madagascar). There was also a significant naval presence in the Pacific: five

frigates, five minor combatants, seven amphibious and 12 support ships. That

force operated out of Noumea, New Caledonia and also patrolled via Tahiti

(Papeete), Muroroa and other French dependencies in the southwest Pacific.

Two small ships were also normally rotated about between the Antilles (Port

Lewis, Guadeloupe) and Guyana. The French Navy also made extensive use of a

number of other ports, mostly in closely aligned African nations: most notably

Dakar (Senegal), Abidjan (Ivory Coast) and Libreville (Gabon). During the

events of 1987, France’s access to Djibouti allowed for a significant naval pres-

ence in the Gulf of Oman, outside the Straits of Hormuz. That presence was

reported as consisting of three minesweepers, three escorts, one anti-submarine

ship, the aircraft carrier Clemenceau and two frigates.

Great Britain’s once near astonishing network of overseas naval bases and

access had by 1985 dwindled to a very small remnant, aside from still extensive

routine port calls by the Royal Navy. Small naval forces were still permanently

deployed in Belize, Gibraltar and Hong Kong. A relatively large force, including

an ASW carrier, an SSN and several escorts and auxiliaries remained in the

Falklands in the wake of that (not wholly resolved) dispute. A small naval

detachment (one or two destroyers or frigates and a couple of support ships)

moved about the Indian Ocean, making use of Diego Garcia, Singapore, Perth

and so on, and had quietly been used to escort ships in the Persian Gulf. That

presence, which apparently utilized access to Bahrain, was reported in 1987 to

consist of two warships, one fleet tanker, four minesweepers and a supply ship.

Otherwise, within NATO, only the Netherlands permanently deployed a tiny

naval presence outside Europe – the Dutch retained a small presence at Curacao

in the Caribbean. (Spain was reported to have established a small “fishing” pres-

ence in Equatorial Guinea after the expansion of the Soviet Navy from Luba.)

As in so many other ways, the matter of external basing of aircraft remained

during the Cold War primarily a two-nation game, reflective of the tenacious

hold of bipolarity which had characterized global basing networks in the post-

colonial era. Earlier, of course, the primary colonial powers – Britain, France,

Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain – all had had extensive networks of air

bases closely associated with colonial garrisons and with colonial rivalries

among the European powers themselves. In the 15–20 years after 1945, these

assets gradually dwindled, and in the process the number of bases available to

the U.S. and, more generally, to the Atlantic alliance contracted. But there were

still some remnants, and in the case of France at least, even the hint of a slight

expansion of an overseas air power presence.

142 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 50

Of course, there was some intra-NATO alliance forward basing of aircraft in

West Germany; again, associated for obvious reasons with land-force deploy-

ments and, indeed, located immediately to the rear, westward of those forces.

The British Army of the Rhine was backed up by significant forward Royal Air

Force (RAF) deployments, involving 12 aircraft and two helicopter squadrons,

six deploying nuclear-capable Tornado strike aircraft (co-developed in a consor-

tium with the FRG and Italy), one of Jaguar reconnaissance aircraft and two of

Phantom fighters; also among these were two squadrons of Harrier jump jets

(nuclear-capable) and one of Pembroke communications aircraft. These aircraft

were stationed at several main air bases in northern Germany: Laarbruch,

Bruggen, Wildenrath and Gutersloh. Canada’s contribution, further south in

Baden Wurtemberg, consisted of forward deployment of three squadrons of 36

CF-18s at a base at Baden Sollingen, supported by liaison aircraft and 2700 per-

sonnel. In addition, the West German Luftwaffe had training and some support

facilities in Portugal, the U.S., the U.K. and Canada, and had permanently based

18 Alpha jets at Beja in Portugal, mostly in connection with training activities.

Elsewhere, overseas, some remnants of what obviously once was a much

larger RAF presence remained. There were some aircraft or helicopters perman-

ently stationed at the Falkland Islands, Ascension, Belize, Brunei, Cyprus,

Gibraltar and Hong Kong. Of these, the RAF maintained only helicopters and/or

utility aircraft in Brunei, Cyprus (Akrotiri) and Hong Kong, though Phantoms

and Lightning fighters were sometimes deployed to Cyprus. There were appar-

ently Victor bomber and Hercules C-18 tanker detachments on Ascension, in the

late 1980s, no doubt to provide the wherewithal for another logistics operation

to the Falklands, if that should have been necessary. There was a helicopter

squadron at Hong Kong, as the latter’s reversion to China loomed. In Belize, a

lingering point of tension in connection with Guatemalan irredentist aims, the

supporting British force included four Harriers and also four Puma and four

Gazelle helicopters. Gibraltar still saw occasional deployments of Jaguar fighter

aircraft. In the Falklands themselves, the U.K. – to deter another invasion which

could have seen an enhanced Argentinian air assault – maintained on station a

full squadron of nine Phantoms and Harrier vertical take-off and landing

(VTOL) aircraft, Hercules tactical transports and several Sea King and Chinook

helicopter detachments. This was almost, quixotically, the largest RAF presence

outside of Europe. Overall, the RAF had some 17,000 personnel stationed

abroad.

The U.K. also deployed some ASW aircraft at overseas bases, supplementing

the near-global presence of the large U.S. force of P-3C Orions. The British

equivalent was the nuclear-capable Nimrod MR2 aircraft. These were periodi-

cally deployed at Wideawake Airfield on Ascension; Kindley Naval Air Station,

Bermuda; Akrotiri, Cyprus; Stanley Airfield in the Falklands; Gibraltar;

Keflavik, Iceland; Sigonella, Sicily and perhaps also Konya Air Base, Turkey.

The French Air Force, again in direct association with army detachments,

maintained a fairly significant presence in several African states. These forces

had been directly engaged in some local wars where, even in small numbers,

Bases during the Cold War 143 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 51

they could be decisive or at least telling because of an absence of counter-

weights, at least so long as Soviet or Cuban pilots were not directly engaged. At

minimum, they acted as tripwire deterrents – for several Francophone regimes –

against local aggression or external involvement.

The main points of deployment were in Djibouti, the Central African Repub-

lic, Chad, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Senegal. Jaguar fighter-bombers (co-

developed with the U.K.) were deployed in the Central African Republic, Chad

and Gabon; Mirage F-1C aircraft were also deployed to Chad. Djibouti had a

squadron of ten Mirage IIIs. Alouette and Puma helicopter were stationed in all

of these countries, in the Ivory Coast they constituted the only French Air Force

presence. There were C-160 Noratlas transport aircraft deployed to the Central

African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon and Senegal. In the latter case, France

had based at Dakar and also at Djibouti Breguet Atlantique maritime-

surveillance aircraft in areas not far from frequent Soviet naval deployments in

West Africa and the Indian Ocean. The Noratlases provided for speedy move-

ment of French or other surrogate forces in case of crisis or conflict.

Aircraft based in Chad were earlier military engaged, as were those based in

Senegal, which flew missions on behalf of Mauritania and Morocco earlier on

during the Western Sahara war. Outside of Africa, France had no permanently

stationed combat aircraft, though helicopters and utility aircraft were deployed

in Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Polynesia, Reunion and the Mozambique

Channel Islands.

Otherwise, one can point merely to a few scattered external deployments of

aircraft represented by still other members of the Western alliance. The Nether-

lands had deployed some P-3Cs through Keflavik, Iceland and through British

air bases at St. Mawgan and Machrihanish. Australia had kept two squadrons of

Mirages in Malaysia as its contribution to the defense of Southeast Asia. New

Zealand up to 1982 had also had a small air presence in Singapore.

Concerning technical facilities, the U.K., which deployed SSBNs and SSNs

in the eastern Atlantic, had LF transmitters at Bermuda and Gibraltar; the latter

was capable of reaching across the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (until

1976 the U.K. had naval communications facilities at Mauritius and Singapore,

when it also still maintained a naval presence east of Suez). It had another at

Port Stanley in the Falklands, which would obviously have been of value in case

of resumption of hostilities in that area. It also deployed an RAF/UKADGE

early-warning radar at Sornfelli in the Danish-controlled Faeroe Islands.

Britain also fielded some additional, scattered C3I assets overseas. It had a

major SIGINT site on Cyprus at Pergamos/Dhekelia. Elsewhere, on Cyprus, the

U.K. had a troposcatter communications relay, a Skynet satellite-communications

terminal and an OTH radar in the Troodos Mountains capable of monitoring

missile tests within the USSR. There were reported Government Communica-

tions Headquarters (GCHQ) SIGINT stations on Ascension (Two Boats) and St.

Helena islands; also at Darwin, Australia (earlier, there were others in Botswana,

Aden, Bahrain, Malta, Mauritius, Singapore and on Oman’s Masirah Island).

There was a COMINT and HF/DF facility at Gibraltar. Two other SIGINT

144 Bases during the Cold War İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

Page 52

stations were located at Hong Kong, a major one at Diepholz in West Germany,

along with other signals units at Teufelsberg, Jever, Celle, Dornenberg and Gor-

leben. A former U.S.-run nuclear-detection site at Pearce, Australia was oper-

ated by the British Atomic Energy Authority. Earlier, there was a

communications relay facility on Mauritius.

Britain also contributed to the overall Western intelligence effort via some

jointly operated facilities. In conjunction with Australia, it operated an ocean-

surveillance radar at Hong Kong, once directed against the People’s Republic of

China, used to monitor Soviet fleet movements in the SLOCs between Siberia

and Vietnam. (Australia and New Zealand jointly operated a similar facility at

Singapore.) The U.S. and U.K. jointly operated such a facility at Diego Garcia.

These and other such facilities – an Australian installation at Darwin, U.S.-

operated bases at Edzell, Scotland and Brawdy, Wales, constituted a global

system codenamed Bullseye for direction-finding interception of ships at sea.

These and related activities were discussed by Richelson and Ball in the context

of the multilateral U.K./U.S. arrangement entered into by the U.S., U.K.,

Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1947 in the aftermath of World War II.

Summary – Cold War basing patterns The 45-year long Cold War presented in some cases patterns that were reminis-

cent of previous periods, but others that were entirely new, pertaining both to

politics and technologies.

Reminiscent of the past was the geopolitical heartland/rimland structure of a

bipolar struggle. The U.S. rimland basing structure, increasingly leapfrogged as

the period progressed, was similar by degree with the earlier Portuguese, Dutch

and British basing networks, calling to mind Thompson’s thesis about system

leader lineage patterns.

But, the ideological nature of the bipolar conflict (earlier, only the religious

divide between Islam and Christianity provides a partial analog) resulted in

fairly stable alliance and alignment/clientship patterns over several decades.

That translated also into stable, long-term basing relationships between sover-

eign states that had no discernible historical precedent.

The basis for basing in this period was also historically unique, increasingly so

as the period progressed. As previous imperial control over much of the world by

the European powers collapsed, so too collapsed basing access networks based on

that imperial control. In its place, both the U.S. and USSR, largely previously

bereft of overseas empires, acquired and maintained access to bases largely via a

combination of the provision of security to regional states against the rival super-

power and its regional clients and with that, the provision of security assistance in

the form of arms transfers, training, economic assistance etc.

During the Cold War period, the proliferation of new types of basing access

was driven by rapid and profound technological change. Up to the interwar

period, the story for bases had mostly to do with surface naval bases and related

“forts” or ground force deployments utilized mostly for colonial control. By the

Bases during the Cold War 145 İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavy

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1930s, air bases and those for submarines had become important, so too some

initial “technical facilities,” such as those for communications and communica-

tions intercepts, early-on radars, terminals for underwater communications

cables etc. But later in the Cold War, particularly paced by developments in

satellites, there was developed a whole range of new basing requirements:

various form of communications, satellite downlinks and control stations, satel-

lite surveillance, sonar submarine tracking networks, early warning for ballistic

missile attacks, elaborate networks of radars, nuclear detection facilities and

many more. Technologically speaking, military operations and the bases that

support them had moved into several dimensions and the relations between

them, i.e., naval and land surfaces, the underseas, the airspace and outer space.

That is, there were many, many new types of bases in addition to traditional

naval bases and army installations.

Early on in the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet basing networks tended to be

separate and demarcated, but also rivalrous. As the Soviets leapfrogged the

rimland alliance structure set up by the U.S. in the 1950s – Syria, Egypt, Libya,

Algeria, China, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, India,

Cuba, Vietnam – the rival basing points came more to be cheek-by-jowl, inter-

penetrated. Scenarios for “protracted conventional phase” warfare came to dwell

on possible rival efforts to “pick off” the enemy’s bases and, hence, to tilt the

balance of power in global conflict. But, that never came to pass, in part because

the dangers of escalation of conflict to the nuclear level precluded a more

modern version of conflict “beyond the line,” i.e., outside Europe, that was an

earlier tradition. The two superpowers eyed each others’ bases, engaged in a

cold war of nerves, but never directly attacked their rivals’ bases