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ALALADE & ANOR v. STATE
CITATION: (2018) LPELR-45304(CA)
In the Court of AppealIn the Lagos Judicial Division
Holden at Lagos
ON THURSDAY, 5TH JULY, 2018Suit No: CA/L/442C/2017
Before Their Lordships:
TIJJANI ABUBAKAR Justice, Court of AppealUGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU Justice, Court of AppealABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO Justice, Court of Appeal
Between1. BARRISTER OLUSEGUN ALALADE2. BABASANJO ALALADE - Appellant(s)
AndTHE STATE OF LAGOS - Respondent(s)
RATIO DECIDENDI1. APPEAL - INTERFERENCE WITH THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION: Attitude of appellate courts to the exercise of discretion made
by a trial Court"The Appellants also seem to be contending that the Lower Court, by favoring the authorities cited by the Respondent exhibited bias.This line of argument is completely sterile and lacks footing in law. The records have clearly shown that the Appellants were not over-reached or disadvantaged, the Lower Court merely exercised discretion which in my view is proper, and the settled position of the lawhas been that in matters of exercise of discretion an appellate Court will not normally interfere with such exercise of discretion unlessthere is sufficient reason in law which does not include that the Appellate Court would have exercised that discretion differently. InOYEGUN Vs. NZERIBE [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt.1220) 568 SC; (2010) LPELR-9276 (SC) Pg.11, paras. A - B, the Supreme Court of Nigeriaheld that: "It is also settled that the exercise of discretion, is a matter exclusively for the Court to do after weighing all thecircumstances of the case in the interest of justice..." See also 7-UP BOTTLING CO. LTD Vs. ABIOLA & SONS NIG. LTD [1995] 3 NWLR(Pt.383) 257; (1995) LPELR-2 (SC) Pg.17, Paras. C - D and LAFFERI NIGERIA LIMITED & ANOR VS. NAL MERCHANT BANK PLC & ANOR(2015) LPELR-24726 (SC) Pg. 26-27, Paras. E - B where the Supreme Court also held that:"...It is the duty of an appellant who appeals against the exercise of discretion by the Lower Court to satisfy the appellate Court thatthe Lower Court did not exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously..."Per ABUBAKAR, J.C.A. (Pp. 42-43, Paras. D-E) - read in context
(201
8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - POWER(S) OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: Whether the powers of the Attorney General to institutecriminal proceedings against any person can be reviewed by Courts"...Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides for the powers of the AttorneyGeneral with respect to initiating, taking over and discontinuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person, the sectionprovides as follows:"The Attorney-General of a State shall have power -a. to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any Court of law in Nigeria other than a Court-martial inrespect of any offence created by or under any law of the House of Assembly;b. ....."In EZEA VS THE STATE (2014) LPELR 23565 (CA) PG.21-24, PARAS E-C.This Court held as follows:"The Attorney-General in law has the power and an absolute discretion to file any charge that in his opinion is supported by the proofof evidence before him. When the Attorney-General based on the proof of evidence decide to file a charge, the Police in law have nopower to stop the Attorney-General... The only check on his power at that stage is public interest, the interest of justice and the needto prevent abuse at legal process... He has an exclusive and unfettered discretion to institute or commence criminal proceedings..." InONYUIKE Vs. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE & ORS (2013) LPELR-24809 (CA) Pg. 84 - 89, Paras. D - D this Court stated that "...thedecision to prosecute or not to prosecute is at the discretion of the A-G of a State. This Court therefore cannot question the authorityof the AG of the State on how or when the A-G will exercise the discretion...". See also SARAKI vs. FRN (2016) LPELR-40013 (SC) Pg. 69-to, paras. C-A. Section 211 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) empowers the Attorney Generalof the State to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any Court in Nigeria other than a Court martialin respect of any offence created by law.Our Court have since held the view that the Attorney General of the State by the provisions of Section 211 of the Constitution hasabsolute powers and total responsibility to control and manage the conduct of criminal prosecution within the limits set out in theConstitution see: COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF NIGERIAN PRISONS SERVICE Vs. ADEKANYE (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt.790) 318, andEMEAKAYI Vs. COP (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt.862) 158. I think the provision of Section 211 of the Constitution simply means that the AttorneyGeneral of the State has very wide discretion to take a decision on whether it is in the best interest of the public to prosecute or not,the Courts cannot therefore as it stands question the authority of the Attorney General on how and when to exercise his discretion,see: THE QUEEN Vs. MINISTER OF LANDS & SURVEY (1953) All NLR 564, and FAWEHINMI Vs. AKILU (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 797, the lawis therefore well settled beyond any doubt that the power to institute criminal proceedings is absolutely at the discretion of theAttorney-General of the State pursuant to Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The Courts have no business settingout the procedure to be followed by the Attorney General of the State in the exercise of his discretion.With regards to the allegation of breach of fundamental rights; I am of the view that this allegation is baseless, frivolous and utterlyvexatious. The Appellants who have been charged to Court have the opportunity to defend themselves, allegation of breach offundamental right is therefore premature. Sections 35 and 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) cannot in any way be applied torestrict the powers of the Attorney-General under Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). As rightly submitted by learnedCounsel for the Respondent the Attorney General is not a Court of Law, Administrative panel or Tribunal and has no duty to confrontthe Appellants with the facts at his disposal before arraignment. The Attorney-General has no duty to hear the Appellants beforeissuing a Legal Advice and filing Information against them. The right to fair hearing has to do with hearing of the information againstthe Appellants in Court. The law places the determination of relevant facts material to the initiation of prosecution at the discretion ofthe Attorney General, it will be totally unwise to engage the Accused at the stage of assembling materials for trial, certainly when theaccused is arraigned in Court all facts constituting the allegations against him must be made available to him for the purpose ofdesigning and erecting his defense, that is when the right of the accused to be heard becomes activated."Per ABUBAKAR, J.C.A. (Pp.26-29, Paras. A-F) - read in context
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - POWER(S) OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: Whether the Attorney General is subject to any control whiledischarging his constitutional responsibilities"It is important to underscore that the powers of the Attorney-General of a State under Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution are verywide and the Courts cannot question the manner in which the Attorney General exercises his authority in exercise of discretion underthe said Section. See EZEA vs. THE STATE (2014) LPELR - 23565 (CA) and ONYUIKE vs. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2013) LPELR -28809 (CA)."Per OGAKWU, J.C.A. (P. 45, Paras. A-B) - read in context
4. COURT - BIAS OF COURT: What must be established to prove allegation or likelihood of bias"The law is settled that where a party alleges bias or likelihood of bias on the part of the judge, it must be shown from the records ofthe Court. It is just not enough for a party to make such allegations without substantiating same, the law is trite that cases involvingallegations of bias or real likelihood of bias, the person making allegations must provide cogent and reasonable evidence to satisfy theCourt, mere vague suspicion of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people should not be made to constitute proof, see:MOHAMMED OTADAPO OJENGBEDE Vs. M. O. ESAN (LOJA-OKE) & ANOR (2001) LPELR- 23729 SC."Per ABUBAKAR, J.C.A. (Pp. 39-40,Paras. E-B) - read in context
5. COURT - BIAS OF COURT: What must be established to prove allegation or likelihood of bias"The Appellants made blanket, generalized and sweeping allegations of bias against the learned trial Judge without particularizing andor substantiating the allegation, apparently the allegations are figments of Appellants imagination, certainly not arising from therecords of the Court. In NJC & ORS Vs. SENLONG & ORS (2010) LPELR-4582 (CA) Pg. 52-53, Paras. F - A, this Court held that: "Anallegation of bias or likelihood of bias on the port of a judge other than on the basis of pecuniary interest must be supported bysubstantial and unequivocal evidence. It is not enough that the evidence relied on creates suspicion". In my opinion and inconsideration of the facts and records herein, there is no shred of evidence before this Court to justify any slight allegation of bias onthe part of the learned trial Judge."Per ABUBAKAR, J.C.A. (Pp. 43-44, Paras. E-C) - read in context
6. COURT - BIAS OF COURT: What an accuser must establish in order to succeed in proving an allegation of judicial bias"Furthermore, allegation of bias against a judex is a very serious matter which must be backed up by solid evidence substantiatingthe same: ECOBANK (NIG) LTD vs. ANCHORAGE LEISURES LTD (2018) LPELR - 44667 (CA). There is no cogent and reasonableevidence on which the Appellants premised their allegation of bias against the judex, thus showing that the allegation is frivolous."PerOGAKWU, J.C.A. (P. 45, Paras. C-D) - read in context
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304(
CA)
7. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - ABUSE OF COURT/JUDICIAL PROCESS(ES): Whether the filing of an information at the High Courtby the Attorney General while a charge is still pending against the same defendants at the Magistrates Court is an abuse of Courtprocess"The law is very well settled that the Attorney-General of a State has the power to institute, take over and/or discontinue legalproceedings against an accused person(s), as clearly set out in Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria1999 as amended. The section provides as follows:"The Attorney-General of a State shall have powera. to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any Court of law in Nigeria other than a court-martial inrespect of any offence created by or under any law of the House of Assembly;b. to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that may have been instituted by any other authority or person: andc. to discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or anyother authority or person."The Attorney-General in the instant case discontinued the prosecution against the defendants in Charge No:MIK/E/34/2015(Commissioner of Police Vs. Barrister Olusegun Alalade & Ors) at the Ikeja Magistrates Court and instituted the instant suit vide theInformation dated 7th November, 2016 as contained at page 1 - 34 of the Records of Appeal. There is no abuse of Court process inthis circumstance because the Attorney-General simply exercised his discretionary powers under Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution(as amended). As submitted by the Respondent, Charge No:MIK/E/34/2015 had been technically extinguished as contained in theproceedings of 25th April, 2016 at page 77 of the Records of Appeal. Filing of an information at the High Court while a charge is stillpending against the same defendants at the Magistrates Court is not an abuse of Court process: see: ISHMAEL AMAEFULE & ANOR Vs.THE STATE [1988] NWIR (Pt.75) 238; (1988) LPELR-450 (SC) Pg. 35-37, Paras. F - D the Supreme Court per OPUTA JSC (of blessedmemory).The Appellants filed suit No: ID/1043GCM/2015 (Olusegun Alalade & Anor v Attorney General of Lagos State and Ors) challenging thepowers of the Attorney-General under Sections 211 of the Constitution. On the pendency of civil suit filed by the Appellants, the LowerCourt held as follows "The case before Dabiri J is a civil matter. This is a criminal matter and the Objection is clearly answered inSection 74(2) of the ACLJ".The pendency of the civil proceedings in suit No:ID/1043GCM/2016 does not in any way make the Information in this Suit an abuse ofCourt process. The civil proceedings in suit No: ID/1043GCM/2016) are challenging the powers of the Attorney-General under Section211. See:SOCIETY BIC SA & ORS Vs. CHARZIN INDUSTRIES LTD (2014) LPELR-22256 (SC) P9.57, Paras. E - G where the Supreme Courtof Nigeria held as follows:"...what would amount to multiplicity of suits must be shown to exist and that is that the two suits or more are on the same subjectmatter and issues and the parties are same. All these components must co-exist for the ingredients that would qualify the particularsuit as abuse of Court process based on multiplicity of suits."This Court in CONOIL PLC Vs. DUTSE (2016) LPELR-40236 (CA) Pg. 12 -13, Paras. C - A held that: "where there is multiplicity of suits onthe same subject-matter, it constitutes on abuse of Court process. ...abuse of Court process simply in practical sense denotes asituation where a party has instituted a multiplicity of suits against the same opponent in respect of the same subject matter and onthe same issues...". Without any doubt whatsoever, the instant criminal proceedings against the Appellants border on entirelydifferent subject matter, from the civil suit filed by the Appellants against the Attorney- General and other Respondents.The Appellants raised storm over the decision by the Attorney General to take over the prosecution of the case against them followinglegal advice, and initiation of proceedings against them, the Appellants also complained that they had already challenged the legaladvice in Court, and that the legal advice giving rise to their arraignment is a subject of litigation in Court. The Attorney General doesnot need to obtain any input from the Police in the exercise of his powers under Section 211 of the Constitution, it must also beunderstood that by virtue of Section 74(7) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State, the Attorney General is notbound to offer legal advice before he sets out to arraign an accused person, he may in the exercise of his Constitutional powersproceed to initiate criminal prosecution against an accused person without rendering legal advice once he is of the view that bringingthe accused to trial is in the best interest of the public. In NDI OKEREKE ONYUIKE Vs. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS (Supra), the extent of thepowers of the Attorney General of Lagos State came before us for consideration, and in my modest contribution to the lead Judgment Isaid as follows:"...By the combined effect Section 211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Section 74(7) of the Administration ofCriminal Justice Law of Lagos State, the Attorney General armed with sufficient materials at his disposal needs not engage theservices of the Police before he initiates criminal charge against a defendant.Nnamani JSC (of blessed memory) while contributing in AMAEFULE & 7 OTHER Vs. THE STATE (1988) NWLR (Pt.75) at 238 on theinterpretation of powers of the Attorney General under Section 191 of the 1979 Constitution which is impari materia with Section211(1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution quoted Esho, JSC (of blessed memory) in the following words:"The pre-eminent and incontestable position of the Attorney General under common law as the Chief law officer of the State eithergenerally as a legal adviser or specifically in all Court proceedings to which the State is a party has long been recognized by theCourts.In regard to these powers, and subject only to ultimate control by public opinion, and that of the parliament, or the legislature, theAttorney General has of common law, been a master unto himself, law unto himself, and under no control whatsoever judicial orotherwise vis-a-vis his powers of instituting or discontinuing criminal proceedings."The extensive and unfettered powers enjoyed by the Attorney General under Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution to institute criminalproceedings cannot be subordinated to Section 4 of the Police Act, moreover Section 74 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Lawmakes the Attorney General theultimate authority and custodian of the powers of the State to prosecute.Failure to conduct police investigation before initiating criminal prosecution cannot vitiate the process as long as there are materialssufficient in the judgment of the Attorney General to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant to Section 74(7) of the law".The law has clearly made the Attorney General of the State the master of the game when it comes to initiating charge against anaccused person, his authority, decision and mode of exercising his powers under Section 211 of the Constitution of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria 1999 cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny, he is always riding on the back of public interest, he cannot becalled upon to offer explanation on how he arrives at a decision to prosecute. The appropriate venue for the Appellants to ventilatetheir grievance is at the trial Court and certainly during trial.?I find no slightest evidence of abuse of process, the learned trial Judge is therefore right in coming to the conclusion that there is noabuse of process, challenge to legal advice issued by the Respondent cannot constitute good grounds to stop prosecution, as I statedearlier the Attorney General is not bound to render legal advice, he has the right to proceed to initiate information against an accusedperson based on the materials available to him, and the materials need not emanate from the Police. I therefore hold the view thatthe information filed against the Appellants does not constitute an abuse of Court process."Per ABUBAKAR, J.C.A. (Pp. 32-38, Paras. A-F) - read in context
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304(
CA)
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TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading
Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of the
High Court of Lagos State sitting in the Ikeja Division,
delivered by J. E. Oyefeso (Mrs.) J. on the 9th day of March,
2017 in Charge No: ID/3661C/2016. The ruling is contained
at pages 266 - 269 of the Records of Appeal wherein the
Appellant's Notice of Preliminary Objection contained at
pages 35 – 45 was heard, determined and dismissed.
The Respondent herein filed information against the
Appellants at the trial Court, the Appellants filed Notice of
Preliminary Objection on the grounds that, the charge
constitutes an abuse of Court process because there is civil
proceedings in suit No: ID/1043GCM/2016 challenging the
powers of the Attorney-General under Section 211 of the
1999 Constitution and that Charge No: MIK/E/34/2015
(Commissioner of Police v. Barrister Olusegun Alalade &
Ors) was pending at the Ikeja Magistrate Court against the
Appellants. The Lower Court heard the Application and in
its Ruling dismissed the Appellants' Objection to the suit.
It is important to briefly state the facts grounding this
appeal.
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The Appellants and two other persons were jointly charged
for conspiracy to commit a felony, assault occasioning
harm, unlawful assault, and engaging in a fight in a public
place. During the pendency of the charge, the Attorney
General of the State through the office of the Director of
Public Prosecutions rendered legal advice and took over
the prosecution of the case and went ahead to file
information against the Appellants, so doing did not
obviously go down well with the Appellants who went
ahead to challenge the propriety of the legal advice by way
of taking out originating summons. At the trial Court
therefore the Appellants raised preliminary objection
alleging abuse of process. The Lower Court held the view
that the civil suit filed by the Appellants had no bearing
with the information filed against the Appellants. The
Appellants became aggrieved by this decision and therefore
filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on the 7th day of April,
2017 containing seven (7) grounds of Appeal.
The Appellant's Brief of Argument was filed by the 1st
Appellant himself a legal Practitioner on the 7th day of
April, 2017. The Respondent's Brief on the other hand was
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filed by learned Counsel Oshoala Esq. on the 10th day of
November, 2011. The Respondent also filed a Notice of
Preliminary Objection on the 11th day of November, 2016.
The Amended Notice of Appeal and the Briefs by the
respective counsel for the parties were all deemed as
properly filed and served on the 10th day of April, 2017.
Learned counsel for the Appellants nominated (five) issues
for determination, the issues are as set out below:
1. Whether the rights of the Appellants under
Sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999 were breached when the
Attorney General of the Respondent received a
petition targeted at them from the Co-Defendants in
Charge No:MIK/E/34/2015 (Commissioner of Police v.
Barrister Olusegun Alalade & Ors) pending before the
Ikeja Magistrate Court, investigated the said petition
without giving them (Appellants) any chance to be
heard thereon and proceeded on the basis of that one
sided evaluation to issue his Legal Advice dated 11th
March 2016?
2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative,
whether the learned trial judge of the Lower Court
came to the right conclusion to hold that the
3
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power of the Attorney General of the Respondent
under Section 211 of the Constitution of the Federal
R e p u b l i c o f N i g e r i a i s “ A N A B S O L U T E
ONE" (unchallengeable) which by extension override
the competing guaranteed constitutional rights of the
Appellants to fair hearing and trial under Sections 6,
35 and 36 of the same constitution?
3. Whether the learned trial judge of the Lower Court
came to a just and proper conclusion in holding that
the Respondent did not abuse judicial process when it
filed the information in the Court below when Charge
No: MIK/E/34/2015 (Commissioner of Police v.
Barrister Olusegun Alalade & Ors) at the Ikeja
Magistrate Court and suit No: ID/1043GCM/2016
(Olusegun Alqlode & Anor v Attorney General of
Lagos State and Ors) were still subsisting and
pending on the subject matter and substratum of the
said information in this case?
4. Whether the Learned trial judge interpreted the
law correctly when she held that -
"The Defendants have submitted that they filed a suit
challenging the Legal Advice issued by the Attorney
General in this matter before Dabiri J. the case before
Dabiri J. is a civil matter.
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The criminal matter and the objection is clearly
answered in Section 74(2) of the ACJL.
That is, whether the learned trial judge of the Court
interpreted the law correctly by concluding that the
civil suit filed by the Appellants before Dabiri J. to
challenge the infraction of their guaranteed
Constitutional Rights in the process of the Attorney
General's action under Section 74 of the ACJL is
incapable of availing them or providing them any
protective relief?
5. Whether the learned trial judge of the Lower Court
did not exhibit likelihood of bias in the light of the
way she conducted the proceedings ab initio,
reviewed submissions of learned counsel of parties on
appellants notice of preliminary objection and
delivered her ruling thereon on the 9th of March
2017?
The Respondent on the other crafted 3 (three) issues for
determination, they are also reproduced as follows:
1. Whether the Appellants' Notice of Appeal filed 10th
March, 2017 constitutes a competent, valid and
proper notice of appeal known to law and susceptible
for amendment in the Amended Notice of Appeal filed
7th April, 2017?
2. Whether the powers conferred on the
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Attorney- General under Section 211 of the 1999
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as
amended) to institute and undertake criminal
proceedings to wit: filing of an information must be
dependent on the provisions of Sections 35 and 36 of
the CFRN.
3. Whether the filing of information to prosecute the
appellant during the pendency of charge no:
MIK/E/34/2015 (Commissioner of Police V. Barrister
O l u s e g u n A l a l a d e & O r s ) a n d S u i t
No:ID/1043GCM/2016 (Olusegun Alalade & Anor V.
Attorney General of Lagos State and Ors) amount to
an abuse of Court Process?
SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS
ISSUE ONE
Learned counsel for the Appellants referred to Sections 6,
35, 36 and 211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria 1999;ADEWOLE Vs. JAKANDE [1981] NCLR
HC Lagos; ATTORNEY GENERAL (BENDEL STATE)
Vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL (FEDERATION) [1981] 10
SC 1 and ADEGBENRO VS. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE FEDERATION & ORS [1962] WNLR 130 to submit
that the Attorney General has a constitutional duty to give
audience to the Appellants after he received a petition
written against them by their co-defendants
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in a criminal charge before taking a decision to take over
the prosecution of the said petition and thereafter
purporting to issue a legal advice on that basis. Counsel
argued that the Attorney General has a duty to ensure that
he follows the procedure permitted by law when invoking
and exercising his powers under Sections 211 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
Learned counsel for the Appellants further submitted that
any exercise of powers by the Attorney General pursuant to
Section 211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 which fails to comply with the Administration
of Criminal Justice Law passed pursuant to Section 35(1)
(c) of the same Constitution can be challenged in Court by
virtue of Section 5 of the same Constitution. Counsel
submitted that the power of the Attorney General under
Sections 211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 is not absolute and unchallengeable;
reference was made to ELIKE Vs. NWAKWOALA [1984]
12 SC 301 and ABACHA Vs. THE STATE [2002] 7 SC
(Pt.1) Pg.1 at 11.
Learned counsel further referred to D.P.P. Vs. OBI
CHIKE
7
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CA)
[1961] 1 All NLR (Pt. 2) 186; OKITIPUPA OIL PALM
CO Vs. JEGEDE [1982] 3 NCLR 494 HC Ondo;
WILLIAMS KPOBIMOH Vs. THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, WESTERN IJOH TRAINING COLLEGE
[1966] NMLR 130 and LEGAL PRACTITIONERS
DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE Vs. FAWEHINMI [1985]
7 SC 178. Counsel argued that the issuance of legal advice
by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under
Section 211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 is cognizable and controlled by Section 36 (1)
of the same Constitution on the competing rights of a
citizen to fair hearing. Counsel referred to the Petition
written against the Appellants by the co-defendants before
the Magistrate Court and the proceedings before the
Magistrate Court on 13th January, 2016; 3rd February,
2016; 7th and 8th of March, 2016. Counsel further referred
to pages 74 and 75 of the Records of Appeal; as well as
paragraphs of 22 - 27 of the 1st Appellant's depositions in
suit No:ID/1043GCM/2016.
Learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that the
Attorney General was working clandestinely with the
defendants before the Lower Court in a partial manner to
subvert the fundamental rights of the Appellants. Counsel
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submitted that the Attorney General is expected to act
without partiality and bias so as to avoid infringing on the
fundamental rights of the Appellants but that in the instant
case, the Attorney General exhibited bias and partiality
even before issuing his legal advice and that his conduct
was propelled by the Petition written by the 3rd and 4th
Defendants in MIK/E/34/2015. Learned counsel argued that
the Attorney General investigated and acted on the said
Petition without giving the Appellants who were the target
of the Petition any chance to be heard.
Learned counsel for the Appellants argued that the Legal
Advice purportedly issued by the Attorney General is void
and of no effect in law because the Attorney General turned
himself into an investigator, accuser and a judge on the
petition he received contrary to the rules of natural justice
and the provisions of Section 36 of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Counsel argued that the
said Legal Advice at pages 71 - 73 of the Records of Appeal
is tainted with bias because there is no nexus between the
alleged infamous conduct in professional respect and the
fight amongst siblings and
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members of the same family and that there is no
justification for the conclusion that the 3rd and 4th
Defendants were just defending themselves.
Learned counsel submitted that the power of the Attorney
General does not give him license to violate the
constitutional rights of the Appellants in the process. He
argued that Section 211 is not superior to Sections 6, 35
and 36 of the Constitution and that Section 211 (3) of the
Constitution provides that the Attorney General shall have
regard to public interest, the interest of justice and the
need to prevent abuse of legal process. Counsel referred to
LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
Vs. FAWEHINMI (Supra) and ABACHA Vs. THE STATE
[2002] 7 SC (Pt. 1) Pg. 1 at 11 - 12 to submit that the
Respondent through the Attorney General infringed on the
constitutional rights of the Appellants with the way and
manner he handled the petition written against the
Appellants by the co Defendants and the modus operandi
adopted when the Attorney General issued the Legal Advice
which gave rise to the Information upon which the instant
case is founded. Learned Counsel therefore urged this
Court to resolve this issue in favor of the Appellants.
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ISSUE TWO
Submitting on the second issue for determination, learned
counsel submitted that the Appellants have a right to
approach the Court for relief once their fundamental rights
under Sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution have been
infringed by the Attorney General and that the power of the
Attorney General under Sections 211 of the Constitution is
not absolute and unchallengeable and cannot bar the
Appellants from enforcing their constitutional rights.
Counsel further submitted that legislation like Section 74 of
the ACJL cannot inhibit the Appellants rights under
Sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution; he relied on
ARCHBISHOP OKOGIE Vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
LAGOS STATE [1981] 2 NCLR 218; ARIORI Vs.
ELEMO (MURAINO) [1983] 1 SC 13; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FEDERATION Vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
BENDEL [1981] 10 SC 1; MINISTER OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS Vs. SHUGABA [1982] 3 NCLR 915; UDO Vs.
STATE [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt.82) Pg.315 at 333;
OZULONYE Vs. STATE NCLR 204.
Learned counsel for the Appellants further referred to
AFEGBAI Vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL
STATE [1984] 5 NCLR 503 at 508 and ASEMOTA Vs.
YSUFU [1982]
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3 NCLR 419 to submit that by the provisions of Section
211(3) of the Constitution the powers of the Attorney
General are constrained and shown not to be absolute.
Counsel cited SOFEKUN Vs. AKINYEMI [1980] 5-7 SC 1
at 20-21 to submit that the Lower Court was wrong to
have concluded that the power of the Attorney General
under Section 211 of the Constitution is absolute,
unchallengeable, and not amenable to the jurisdiction of
the Court where allegation of infringement of fundamental
right of the Appellants is in issue. Learned counsel urged
this Court to set aside the ruling of the Lower Court and to
grant the prayer in the Appellants' Notice of Preliminary
Objection.
ISSUE THREE
On the third issue, learned counsel for the Appellants
submitted that the learned trial judge erred when he
overruled the Appellants' Notice of Preliminary Objection
on the ground that the Respondent did not commit any
abuse of judicial process when it filed the Information in
this case while the proceedings in MIK/E/34/2015 and suit
No:ID/1043GCM/2016 were contemporaneously subsisting
and ongoing. Counsel referred to pages 77- 187 of the
Records of Appeal and submitted that the Appellants by
12
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
their Notice of Preliminary Objection referred the Lower
Court to the pending proceedings which make the instant
suit an abuse of Court process but that in its Ruling, the
Lower Court rejected the arguments of the Appellants and
proceeded to hold that the case before Dabiri J. is a civil
matter.
Learned counsel referred to ISHMAEL AMAEFULE &
ANOR Vs. THE STATE [1988] 2 NWLR 156 at 117 and
argued that from the totality of the facts of this case, it
cannot be said that the Attorney General acted bona fide,
lawfully and procedurally as a chief law officer of the State
and that the Lower Court did not act correctly, judicially
and judiciously when it ruled that the case pending before
Dabiri J. is a civil matter whose relevance has been
answered by Section 74(2) ACJL. Counsel argued that the
Respondent herein who is also the Respondent in the suit
pending before Dabiri J. has a duty under the Constitution,
in equity, fairness and justice not to proceed to file the
Information before this Court. Learned counsel relied on
EDET Vs. THE STATE [1988] 12 SC (Pt.1) 103 and
C.A. BANJO & ORS vs. ETERNAL SCARED ORDER OF
CHERUBIM AND
13
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8) LP
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304(
CA)
SERAPHIM [1975] 3 SC 37 at 42 and submitted that the
filing of Information at the Lower Court by the Respondent
who has filed pleadings in Charge No: MIK/E/34/2015 at
the Ikeja Magistrate Court and suit No: ID/1043GCM/2016
clearly proves some element of deliberate acts.
Further on this issue, the learned counsel for the
Appellants argued that the only valid means by which the
Appellants could have ventilated their grievance on the
violation of their fundamental rights is through a civil
proceeding as they did against the Respondent Attorney
General who issued the Legal Advice. Counsel referred to
Sections 6, 35, 36, 46 and 272 of the Constitution; RE:
(G.M) BOYO [1970] 1 All NLR III; SOFEKUN Vs.
AKINYEMI (Supra) and ALABOH Vs. BOYES [1984] 5
NCLR 830 to submit that there is no formal way for
invocation of power to prevent breach of constitutional
rights and that it may be canvassed at any stage of the
proceedings. Learned counsel argued that the case of
EDET Vs. THE STATE (Supra) which the Lower Court
herein relied upon is distinguishable from the instant case
and therefore the Lower Court was wrong to conclude that
the filing of the Information before it in the circumstance
does not
14
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
tantamount to abuse of legal process. Counsel urged this
Court to set aside the Ruling of the Lower Court and
resolve this issue in favor of the Appellants.
ISSUE FOUR
On issue number four, learned counsel submitted that the
learned trial Judge grossly misinterpreted the law and
inevitably came to a wrong conclusion. Learned counsel
adopted the arguments under issue No. 3 and in addition
referred to Section 36(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to further argue that
Section 74(2) of the ACJL is a law which makes the
administrative power conferred on the Attorney General
with respect to the issuance of Legal Advice a conclusive
power; and therefore it is void for its inconsistency with
Section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution. Counsel further
submitted that Section 74(2) of the ACJL can only be
administratively conclusive between the Attorney General
and the Police to which it was addressed and cannot
operate to bar the Appellants from instituting an action
against the infringement of their fundamental rights by the
process the Attorney General adopted in issuing the Legal
Advice. Counsel concluded that the Lower
15
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
Court came to a wrong and unconstitutional conclusion
when it held that Section 74(2) of the ACJL is a complete
answer to the Appellants action pending before Dabiri J. of
the same Court. Learned Counsel therefore urged this
Court to resolve this issue in favor of the Appellants.
ISSUE FIVE
On issue number five, learned counsel submitted that the
learned trial Judge in the instant case had by his Ruling on
the Appellants' Preliminary Objection exhibited a likelihood
of bias and should for that reason be barred from further
adjudicating on the case. Counsel referred to the
proceedings before the Lower Court on the 10th day of
January, 2017 where the trial Court adjourned to the 14th
of February, 2017 for arraignment and/or hearing of the
pending application. Learned counsel argued that the trial
Court ought to have adjourned only for the hearing of the
Notice of Preliminary Objection which was already before
the Court as at the 10th day of January, 2017 and not for
any other reason especially as it was on record that the
Information was yet to be served on the Appellants as at
the said date.
Learned counsel argued that the Lower Court had
16
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
already made up its mind to dismiss the Appellants'
Preliminary Objection ever before it was heard. Counsel
referred to the Written Addresses of parties on the
Preliminary Objection of the Appellants before the Lower
Court and submitted that the Appellants argued and relied
on the decision inABACHA Vs. THE STATE (Supra)
which is binding on the Lower Court but was ignored by
the Lower Court who instead preferred the authorities
cited by the Respondent. Learned counsel argued that the
decision of the Lower Court leaves room for doubts and
suspicions. Counsel referred to DAHIRU & ANOR vs. APC
& 2 ORS [2016] 12 SC (Pt.VI) Pg. 1 at 10-11 and urged
this Court to allow this appeal, set aside the Ruling of the
Lower Court and grant the reliefs sought in the Appellants'
Notice of Preliminary Objection.
SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
ISSUE ONE
The learned counsel for the Respondent argued that a
Notice of Appeal is a condition precedent to an appeal; that
where a Notice of Appeal is defective, the Court of Appeal
lacks the competence to entertain the appeal since the
Notice of Appeal is a nullity; and that the absence of a
17
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
competent Notice of Appeal simply translates to the non-
existence of an appeal. In support of these arguments,
counsel relied on AKPAN Vs. BOB [2010] 17 NWLR
(Pt.1224) 421; GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. vs. AKANDE
[2010] 18 NWLR (Pt.1225) pg.596; CLEV JOSH LTD
vs. TOKIMI [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt.1104)] pg.422;
ODUNZE Vs. NWOSU [2007] 13 NWLR (Pt.1050) pg.
1; IBETO Vs. AMINU [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt.1028)
pg.446; DANMUSA Vs. INUWA [2007] 17 NWLR
(Pt.1063) pg. 391 and OLOWOKERE Vs. AFRICAN
NEWSPAPERS OF NIG. LTD [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 295)
Pg. 583 at 586.
Learned counsel further contended that for a Notice of
Appeal to be competent, the grounds of appeal contained
therein must be competent and that a ground of appeal can
only be competent if the grounds are not argumentative,
vague or general in terms; if the particulars and the nature
of the alleged misdirection are clearly stated in the said
grounds of appeal; and if it discloses a reasonable
complaint against a ratio decidendi in the decision. Relying
on EGBE Vs. ALHAJI [1990] 1 NWLR (Pt.128) Pg. 545;
A.G. OYO STATE Vs. FAIRLAKES HOTELS [1988] 5
NWLR (Pt.92) pg.1; M.C.S. (NIG.) LTD./GTE Vs.
18
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
ADEOKIN RECORDS [2007] All FWLR (Pt.391]
pg.1624 at 1535, para E - F (SC) and OLORUNTOBA-
OJU Vs. ABDUL-RAHEEM [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157)
Pg. 83 SC, learned counsel submitted that the two grounds
of appeal contained in the Appellants' Notice of Appeal filed
on the 10th day of March, 2017 are argumentative and
vague and the particulars are prolix, unwieldy and
unnecessarily argumentative.
Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the
particulars of a ground of appeal are expected to highlight
briefly the misdirection or error in law complained of but
that in the instant case, the Appellants have copiously
argued the merit of the appeal in the guise of supplying
particulars of error. Counsel referred to F.H.A. Vs.
KALEJAIYE [2010] 19 NWLR (Pt.1226) 147 and
MILITARY ADMINISTARTOR OF BENUE STATE Vs.
ULEGEDE [2001] 17 NWLR (Pt.741) Pg. 194 at
212-213, Para G - H to submit that the Respondent is
misled as to the contents of the grounds of appeal in the
Notice of Appeal of the 10th day of March, 2017. Learned
counsel further argued that where a Notice of Appeal is
defective because there is no valid and competent ground
of appeal in it, it cannot be cured
19
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
by amended grounds of appeal filed out of time. Citing
Order 7, Rule 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016 and
H.R.H. EZE DR. FRANK ADELE EKE Vs. MR.
GODFREY CHIZIEZE OGBONDA (2006) LPELR-1075
(SC) the Respondent's counsel contended and urged this
Court to hold that the Notice of Appeal dated 10th day of
March, 2017 and the two incompetent grounds of appeal
therein are liable to be struck out. He so urged this Court.
ISSUE TWO
On the second issue, learned counsel for the Respondent
referred to Section 36 (1) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution
(as amended) to submit that whenever any person is
charged with any criminal offence in any Court or tribunal
established by law, he shall, unless the charge is
withdrawn, be entitled to a fair hearing in public within a
reasonable time. Counsel submitted that the Attorney-
General in the exercise of his constitutional powers
pursuant to Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution (as
amended) is not obliged to adhere to the principles of Audi
alteram partem because the Attorney-General is not a
Court and is therefore at liberty to select who to prosecute
in respect of what offence.
Learned counsel referred to AKPA Vs. STATE [2008] 14
20
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
NWLR (Pt.1106) 72 and AMAEFULE & ANOR vs. THE
STATE [1988] 2 NWLR (Pt.75) 238 Pg. 16-17, Paras. D
- E to submit that the onus on the Attorney-General is to
comply with the procedure laid down in Administration of
Criminal Justice Law with respect to the issuance of Legal
Advice and filing of an Information in respect of indictable
offences. Counsel submitted that a person is only entitled
to fair hearing under Section 36 (1) and (4) of the 1999
Constitution (as amended) where there is need to
determine his rights before a Court or other tribunal
established by law. Learned counsel argued that the
functions exercised by the Attorney-General are not in any
way to determine the rights of any offender but strictly to
institute and prosecute offenders in Court established by
law. Counsel referred to Section 74 (1), (2) and (3) of the
ACJL and A.G. LAGOS STATE Vs. KEITA (2016)
LPELR-40163 (CA) to submit that the Legal Advice issued
by the Attorney-General in respect of indictable offences is
conclusive. Counsel therefore urged this Court to resolve
this issue in favor of the Respondent.
ISSUE THREE
On issue number three, learned counsel for the
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8) LP
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304(
CA)
Respondent submitted that abuse of Court process simply
means that the process of the Court must been used bona
fide and properly and must not be abused. Counsel referred
to AMAEFULE & ANOR Vs. THE STATE (Supra) at 117
to submit that the Appellants have a duty to establish how
the filing of the Information in the instant suit during the
pendency of Charge No: MIK/E/34/20L5 (Commissioner of
Police v. Barrister Olusegun Alalade & Ors) at the Ikeja
Magistrate Court and the civil proceedings in suit No:
ID/1043GCM/2016 constitutes malicious and improper use
of Court process without bono fide.
Learned counsel referred to Section 211 of the 1999
Constitution (as amended) to submit that the Attorney-
General of the State has power to institute and undertake
criminal proceedings against any person before any Court
of law with exception of a Court martial and to take over
and continue such proceedings that may have been
instituted by any other authority or person at any stage.
Counsel further submitted that the Attorney-General is at
liberty to file an Information against the Appellants
irrespective of any pending civil suit. Learned counsel
22
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
contended that Charge No: MIK/E/34/2015 at the
Magistrates Court had been technically extinguished upon
the receipt of the DPP's Legal Advice as contained in the
proceedings of 25th April, 2016 at page 77 of the Records
of Appeal; and that it cannot be said that the criminal
charge at the Magistrate Court was subsisting at the time
of filing the Information in the instant suit.
Learned counsel referred to the charges against the
Appellants at pages 5 - 6 of the Records of Appeal and
relied on EDET Vs. THE STATE [1988] 2 SC (Pt. 1] 103
to submit that the Attorney-General has the power to
discontinue or terminate any criminal trial before
judgment. Counsel also referred to Section 74(7) of the
ACJL, 2011 to submit that with or without a legal advice,
the Attorney-General of the State is empowered to institute
criminal proceedings against any person and that in the
instant case, the Attorney-General acted bono fide, lawfully
and procedurally. Learned counsel urged this Court to
resolve this issue in favor of the Respondent dismiss the
appeal and affirm the Ruling delivered by the Lower Court.
23
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8) LP
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304(
CA)
RESOLUTION
ISSUES ONE & TWO
The Appellants' issue No. one is: "Whether the rights of
the Appellants under Sections 35 and 36 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
were breached when the Attorney General of the
Respondent received a petition targeted at them from
the Co-Defendants in Charge No: MIK/E/34/2015
(Commissioner of Police v. Barrister Olusegun
Alalade & Ors) pending before the Ikeja Magistrate
Court, investigated the said petition without giving
them (Appellants) any chance to be heard thereon
and proceeded on the basis of that one sided
evaluation to issue his Legal Advice dated 17th March
2016?' while the second issue is: "If the answer to
question 1 is in the affirmative, whether the learned
trial judge of the Lower Court came to the right
conclusion to hold that the power of the Attorney
General of the Respondent under Section 211 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is "AN
ABSOLUTE ONE" (unchallengeable) which by
extension override the competing guaranteed
constitutional rights of the Appellants to fair hearing
and trial under Sections 6, 35 and 36 of the same
constitution?"
The grouse of the Appellants under issues No. 1 and 2 is
24
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
that the Attorney General violated their fundamental rights
under Sections 6, 35 and 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as
amended) because the Respondent Attorney-General
received petitions written against the Appellants by their
Co-Defendants in Charge No: MIK/E/34/2015
(Commissioner of Police v. Barrister Olusegun Alalade &
Ors) pending before the Ikeja Magistrates Court;
investigated the said petition without giving them
(Appellants) any opportunity to be heard and consequently
went ahead to issue a Legal Advice dated 11th March, 2016
to file information against the Appellants.
The Respondent's contention is that the powers of the
Attorney-General to institute and undertake criminal
proceedings under Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution (as
amended) is not subject to the rules of audi alteram partem
because the Attorney General is not a Court and that the
Attorney-General is at liberty to select who to prosecute in
respect of what offence. The Respondent further added that
the powers exercised by the Attorney-General are not in
any way to determine the rights of an offender but to
institute and prosecute such offender in a Court established
by law.
25
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides for the
powers of the Attorney General with respect to initiating,
taking over and discontinuance of criminal proceedings
against an accused person, the section provides as follows:
"The Attorney-General of a State shall have power -
a. to institute and undertake criminal proceedings
against any person before any Court of law in Nigeria
other than a Court-martial in respect of any offence
created by or under any law of the House of Assembly;
b. …..”
In EZEA VS THE STATE (2014) LPELR 23565 (CA)
PG.21-24, PARAS E-C.
This Court held as follows:
"The Attorney-General in law has the power and an
absolute discretion to file any charge that in his
opinion is supported by the proof of evidence before
him. When the Attorney-General based on the proof of
evidence decide to file a charge, the Police in law
have no power to stop the Attorney-General... The
only check on his power at that stage is public
interest, the interest of justice and the need to
prevent abuse at legal process… He has an exclusive
and unfettered discret ion to inst i tute or
commence criminal proceedings..."
26
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
In ONYUIKE Vs. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE &
ORS (2013) LPELR-24809 (CA) Pg. 84 - 89, Paras. D -
D this Court stated that "…the decision to prosecute or
not to prosecute is at the discretion of the A-G of a
State. This Court therefore cannot question the
authority of the AG of the State on how or when the A-
G will exercise the discretion...". See also SARAKI vs.
FRN (2016) LPELR-40013 (SC) Pg. 69 -70, paras. C-A.
Section 211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 (as amended) empowers the Attorney General
of the State to institute and undertake criminal proceedings
against any person before any Court in Nigeria other than a
Court martial in respect of any offence created by law.
Our Court have since held the view that the Attorney
General of the State by the provisions of Section 211 of the
Constitution has absolute powers and total responsibility to
control and manage the conduct of criminal prosecution
within the limits set out in the Constitution see:
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF NIGERIAN PRISONS
SERVICE Vs. ADEKANYE (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt.790)
318, and EMEAKAYI Vs. COP (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt.862)
158.
27
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
I think the provision of Section 211 of the Constitution
simply means that the Attorney General of the State has
very wide discretion to take a decision on whether it is in
the best interest of the public to prosecute or not, the
Courts cannot therefore as it stands question the authority
of the Attorney General on how and when to exercise his
discretion, see: THE QUEEN Vs. MINISTER OF LANDS
& SURVEY (1953) All NLR 564, and FAWEHINMI Vs.
AKILU (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.67) 797, the law is therefore
well settled beyond any doubt that the power to institute
criminal proceedings is absolutely at the discretion of the
Attorney-General of the State pursuant to Section 211 of
the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The Courts have no
business setting out the procedure to be followed by the
Attorney General of the State in the exercise of his
discretion.
With regards to the allegation of breach of fundamental
rights; I am of the view that this allegation is baseless,
frivolous and utterly vexatious. The Appellants who have
been charged to Court have the opportunity to defend
themselves, allegation of breach of fundamental right is
therefore premature. Sections 35 and 36
28
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) cannot in any way
be applied to restrict the powers of the Attorney-General
under Section 211 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
As rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the Respondent
the Attorney General is not a Court of Law, Administrative
panel or Tribunal and has no duty to confront the
Appellants with the facts at his disposal before
arraignment. The Attorney-General has no duty to hear the
Appellants before issuing a Legal Advice and filing
Information against them. The right to fair hearing has to
do with hearing of the information against the Appellants in
Court. The law places the determination of relevant facts
material to the initiation of prosecution at the discretion of
the Attorney General, it will be totally unwise to engage the
Accused at the stage of assembling materials for trial,
certainly when the accused is arraigned in Court all facts
constituting the allegations against him must be made
available to him for the purpose of designing and erecting
his defense, that is when the right of the accused to be
heard becomes activated. I think the Appellants need to
29
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
take the materials constituting the trial documents and
proffer their answer in defense if they so wish.
Issues 1 and 2 are resolved in favor of the Respondent
against the Appellants.
ISSUES THREE and FOUR
The Appellants issues three and four are: "Whether the
learned trial judge of the Lower Court came to a just and
proper conclusion in holding that the Respondent did not
abuse judicial process when it filed the information in the
Court below when Charge No: MIK/E/34/2015
(Commissioner of Police v. Barrister Olusegun Alalade &
Ors) at the Ikeja Magistrate Court and suit No:
ID/1043GCM/2016 (Olusegun Alalade & Anor v Attorney
General of Lagos State and Ors) were still subsisting and
pending on the subject matter and substratum of the said
information in this case?" while issue No. 4 is: "Whether
the Learned trial judge interpreted the law correctly when
she held that - "The Defendants have submitted that they
filed a suit challenging the Legal Advice issued by the
Attorney General in this matter before Dabiri J. the case
before Dabiri J. is a civil matter. The criminal matter and
the objection is clearly answered in Section 74(2) of the
30
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
ACJL” - That is, whether the learned trial judge of the Court
interpreted the law correctly by concluding that the civil
suit filed by the Appellants before Dabiri J. to challenge the
infraction of their guaranteed Constitutional Rights in the
process of the Attorney General's action under Section 74
of the ACJL is incapable of availing them or providing them
any protective relief?"
The fulcrum of the Appellants' contention under these
issues is that the instant suit constitutes an abuse of Court
p r o c e s s . T h e A p p e l l a n t s r e f e r r e d t o s u i t
No:ID/1043GCM/2016 (Olusegun Alalade & Anor v Attorney
General of Lagos State and Ors) which was filed by the
Appellants challenging the power of the Attorney- General
to issue the Legal Advice dated 11th March, 2016 in
Charge No:MIK/E/34/2015 (Commissioner of Police vs.
Barrister Olusegun Alalade & Ors) at the Ikeja Magistrate
Court. The Appellants also argued that Charge
No:MIK/E/34/2015 (Commissioner of Police vs. Barrister
Olusegun Alalade & Ors) is still pending at the Ikeja
Magistrate Court. The Appellants submitted that the Lower
Court refused to uphold their preliminary objection against
the charge.
31
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
The law is very well settled that the Attorney-General of a
State has the power to institute, take over and/or
discontinue legal proceedings against an accused
person(s), as clearly set out in Section 211 of the 1999
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as
amended. The section provides as follows:
"The Attorney-General of a State shall have power
a. to institute and undertake criminal proceedings
against any person before any Court of law in Nigeria
other than a court-martial in respect of any offence
created by or under any law of the House of Assembly;
b. to take over and continue any such criminal
proceedings that may have been instituted by any
other authority or person: and
c. to discontinue at any stage before judgment is
delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or
undertaken by him or any other authority or person."
The Attorney-General in the instant case discontinued the
prosecution against the defendants in Charge
No:MIK/E/34/2015 (Commissioner of Police Vs. Barrister
Olusegun Alalade & Ors) at the Ikeja Magistrates Court and
instituted the instant suit vide the Information dated 7th
32
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
November, 2016 as contained at page 1 - 34 of the Records
of Appeal. There is no abuse of Court process in this
circumstance because the Attorney-General simply
exercised his discretionary powers under Section 211 of the
1999 Constitution (as amended). As submitted by the
Respondent, Charge No:MIK/E/34/2015 had been
technically extinguished as contained in the proceedings of
25th April, 2016 at page 77 of the Records of Appeal. Filing
of an information at the High Court while a charge is still
pending against the same defendants at the Magistrates
Court is not an abuse of Court process: see: ISHMAEL
AMAEFULE & ANOR Vs. THE STATE [1988] NWIR
(Pt.75) 238; (1988) LPELR-450 (SC) Pg. 35-37, Paras.
F - D the Supreme Court per OPUTA JSC (of blessed
memory).
The Appellants filed suit No: ID/1043GCM/2015 (Olusegun
Alalade & Anor v Attorney General of Lagos State and Ors)
challenging the powers of the Attorney-General under
Sections 211 of the Constitution. On the pendency of civil
suit filed by the Appellants, the Lower Court held as follows
"The case before Dabiri J is a civil matter. This is a
criminal matter and the Objection is clearly answered
in Section 74(2) of the ACJL".
33
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
The pendency of the c iv i l proceedings in sui t
No:ID/1043GCM/2016 does not in any way make the
Information in this Suit an abuse of Court process. The civil
proceedings in suit No: ID/1043GCM/2016) are challenging
the powers of the Attorney-General under Section 211.
See :SOCIETY BIC SA & ORS Vs . CHARZIN
INDUSTRIES LTD (2014) LPELR-22256 (SC) P9.57,
Paras. E - G where the Supreme Court of Nigeria held as
follows:
"…what would amount to multiplicity of suits must be
shown to exist and that is that the two suits or more
are on the same subject matter and issues and the
parties are same. All these components must co-exist
for the ingredients that would qualify the particular
suit as abuse of Court process based on multiplicity of
suits."
This Court in CONOIL PLC Vs. DUTSE (2016)
LPELR-40236 (CA) Pg. 12 -13, Paras. C - A held that:
"where there is multiplicity of suits on the same
subject-matter, it constitutes on abuse of Court
process. …abuse of Court process simply in practical
sense denotes a situation where a party has instituted
a multiplicity of suits against the same opponent in
respect of the
34
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
same subject matter and on the same issues...".
Without any doubt whatsoever, the instant criminal
proceedings against the Appellants border on entirely
different subject matter, from the civil suit filed by the
Appellants against the Attorney- General and other
Respondents.
The Appellants raised storm over the decision by the
Attorney General to take over the prosecution of the case
against them following legal advice, and initiation of
proceedings against them, the Appellants also complained
that they had already challenged the legal advice in Court,
and that the legal advice giving rise to their arraignment is
a subject of litigation in Court. The Attorney General does
not need to obtain any input from the Police in the exercise
of his powers under Section 211 of the Constitution, it must
also be understood that by virtue of Section 74(7) of the
Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Lagos State, the
Attorney General is not bound to offer legal advice before
he sets out to arraign an accused person, he may in the
exercise of his Constitutional powers proceed to initiate
criminal prosecution against an accused person without
rendering legal advice once he is of
35
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8) LP
ELR-45
304(
CA)
the view that bringing the accused to trial is in the best
interest of the public. In NDI OKEREKE ONYUIKE Vs.
THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS (Supra), the extent of the
powers of the Attorney General of Lagos State came before
us for consideration, and in my modest contribution to the
lead Judgment I said as follows:
"…By the combined effect Section 211 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
Section 74(7) of the Administration of Criminal
Justice Law of Lagos State, the Attorney General
armed with sufficient materials at his disposal needs
not engage the services of the Police before he
initiates criminal charge against a defendant.
Nnamani JSC (of blessed memory) while contributing
in AMAEFULE & 7 OTHER Vs. THE STATE (1988)
NWLR (Pt.75) at 238 on the interpretation of powers
of the Attorney General under Section 191 of the
1979 Constitution which is impari materia with
Section 211(1) (b) of the 1999 Constitutionquoted
Eso, JSC (of blessed memory) in the following words:
"The pre-eminent and incontestable position of the
Attorney General under common law as the Chief law
officer of the State either generally as a legal
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adviser or specifically in all Court proceedings to
which the State is a party has long been recognized
by the Courts.
In regard to these powers, and subject only to
ultimate control by public opinion, and that of the
parliament, or the legislature, the Attorney General
has of common law, been a master unto himself, law
unto himself, and under no control whatsoever
judicial or otherwise vis-a-vis his powers of instituting
or discontinuing criminal proceedings."
The extensive and unfettered powers enjoyed by the
Attorney General underSection 211 of the 1999
Constitution to institute criminal proceedings cannot
be subordinated to Section 4 of the Police Act,
moreover Section 74 of the Administration of
Criminal Justice Law makes the Attorney General the
ultimate authority and custodian of the powers of the
State to prosecute.
Failure to conduct police investigation before
initiating criminal prosecution cannot vitiate the
process as long as there are materials sufficient in
the judgment of the Attorney General to initiate
criminal proceedings pursuant to Section 74(7) of the
Law".
The law has clearly made the Attorney General of
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the State the master of the game when it comes to
initiating charge against an accused person, his authority,
decision and mode of exercising his powers under Section
211 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
1999 cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny, he is always
riding on the back of public interest, he cannot be called
upon to offer explanation on how he arrives at a decision to
prosecute. The appropriate venue for the Appellants to
ventilate their grievance is at the trial Court and certainly
during trial.
I find no slightest evidence of abuse of process, the learned
trial Judge is therefore right in coming to the conclusion
that there is no abuse of process, challenge to legal advice
issued by the Respondent cannot constitute good grounds
to stop prosecution, as I stated earlier the Attorney General
is not bound to render legal advice, he has the right to
proceed to initiate information against an accused person
based on the materials available to him, and the materials
need not emanate from the Police. I therefore hold the view
that the information filed against the Appellants does not
constitute an abuse of Court process.
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Issues No. 3 and 4 are therefore resolved against the
Appellants in favor of the Respondent.
ISSUE FIVE
On this last issue, the Appellants contended that the
learned trial Judge exhibited a likelihood of bias; and that
the learned trial judge should for that reason be barred
from further adjudicating on the case. The Appellant
further contended that at the proceedings of the 10th day
of January, 2017, the trial Court adjourned to the 14th of
February, 2017 for arraignment and/or hearing of the
pending application instead of adjourning solely for the
hearing of the Notice of Preliminary Objection which was
already before the Court as at the said date 10th day of
January, 2017. The Appellants also submitted that the trial
Court favored the authorities cited by the Respondent
against those cited by the Appellants. The Respondents did
not address this issue.
The law is settled that where a party alleges bias or
likelihood of bias on the part of the judge, it must be shown
from the records of the Court. It is just not enough for a
party to make such allegations without substantiating
same, the law is trite that cases involving allegations of
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bias or real likelihood of bias, the person making
allegations must provide cogent and reasonable evidence to
satisfy the Court, mere vague suspicion of whimsical,
capricious and unreasonable people should not be made to
constitute proof, see: MOHAMMED OTADAPO
OJENGBEDE Vs. M. O. ESAN (LOJA-OKE) & ANOR
(2001) LPELR- 2372 SC.
The Appellants herein apparently misconceived the facts or
became oblivious of the purport of the proceedings of the
10th day of January, 2017. The proceedings of that day are
contained at pages 249 - 250 of the Records of Appeal. The
proceedings at page 240 are reproduced below:
OSOALA: The Defendant is not in Court. A Notice of
Preliminary Objection was served on us which we have
responded to. We filed a Counter-Affidavit dated
6/1/2017. We have served. He may have abandoned
the application.
THE COURT: I need to set the Application down for
hearing. This is the first time this matter is coming
up.
OSOALA: We are aware there is an information before
the Court. He has to be present. I apply for a Bench
Warrant.
THE COURT: The matter is adjourned to 14/2/2017
for arraignment and/or hearing of the application.
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The Appellants were absent and unrepresented on the said
day; the Prosecution (Respondent) Counsel acknowledged
having been served with the Appellants' Notice of
Preliminary Objection and added that the Appellant may
have abandoned the 'application'. At that stage, the only
application before the Court apart from the Information
was the Appellants' Notice of Preliminary Objection and the
Lower Court stated despite the Prosecution (Respondent)
Counsel's oral application for a Bench Warrant, the Lower
Court adjourned the matter to the 14th day of February,
2017 "for arraignment and/or hearing of the pending
application."
Therefore, the contention of the Appellants that the trial
Court ought to have adjourned solely for the hearing of the
Notice of Preliminary Objection is in my considered view
baseless, frivolous and just a deliberate attempt to raise
dust and topple the due administration of justice. What
more? The trial Court having been told by the Prosecution's
(Respondent) Counsel that the Appellants may have
abandoned their Application/Notice of Preliminary
Objection; the Lower Court was therefore right
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to have adjourned for arraignment and/or hearing of the
pending application.
It was either the arraignment goes on or the Notice of
Preliminary Objection is heard on the next date, that is,
14th of February, 2017; and the records of proceedings of
14th of February, 2017 contained at pages 262-263 also
show clearly that even though the Appellants were again
absent, they were represented by counsel and the only
business attended to by the Lower Court was the hearing of
the Notice of Preliminary objection which was adjourned to
9th of March, 2017 for Ruling.
The Appellants also seem to be contending that the Lower
Court, by favoring the authorities cited by the Respondent
exhibited bias. This line of argument is completely sterile
and lacks footing in law. The records have clearly shown
that the Appel lants were not over-reached or
disadvantaged, the Lower Court merely exercised
discretion which in my view is proper, and the settled
position of the law has been that in matters of exercise of
discretion an appellate Court will not normally interfere
with such exercise of discretion unless there is sufficient
reason in law which does not include that the Appellate
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Court would have exercised that discretion differently. In
OYEGUN Vs. NZERIBE [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt.1220) 568
SC; (2010) LPELR-9276 (SC) Pg.11, paras. A - B, the
Supreme Court of Nigeria held that: “It is also settled
that the exercise of discretion, is a matter exclusively
for the Court to do after weighing al l the
circumstances of the case in the interest of
justice..." See also 7-UP BOTTLING CO. LTD Vs.
ABIOLA & SONS NIG. LTD [1995] 3 NWLR (Pt.383)
257; (1995) LPELR-2 (SC) Pg.17, Paras. C – D and
LAFFERI NIGERIA LIMITED & ANOR VS. NAL
MERCHANT BANK PLC & ANOR(2015) LPELR-24726
(SC) Pg. 26-27, Paras. E - B where the Supreme Court
also held that:
“...It is the duty of an appellant who appeals against
the exercise of discretion by the Lower Court to
satisfy the appellate Court that the Lower Court did
not exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously..."
The Appellants made blanket, generalized and sweeping
allegations of bias against the learned trial Judge without
particularizing and or substantiating the allegation,
apparently the allegations are figments of Appellants
imagination, certainly not arising from the
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records of the Court. In NJC & ORS Vs. SENLONG &
ORS (2010) LPELR-4582 (CA) Pg. 52-53, Paras. F - A,
this Court held that: "An allegation of bias or likelihood
of bios on the port of a judge other than on the basis
of pecuniary interest must be supported by
substantial and unequivocal evidence. It is not
enough that the evidence relied on creates suspicion".
In my opinion and in consideration of the facts and records
herein, there is no shred of evidence before this Court to
justify any slight allegation of bias on the part of the
learned trial Judge. This issue is therefore resolved against
the Appellants.
On the whole therefore this appeal is bereft of merit and
therefore deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The
Ruling of the Lower Court delivered on the 9th day of
March, 2017 by OYEFESO J in Charge No: ID/3661C/2016
is hereby affirmed.
UGOCHUKWU ANTHONY OGAKWU, J.C.A.: I read in
draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, Tijjani
Abubakar, JCA, which has just been delivered. The
reasoning and conclusion therein are in accord with my
views and I agree with the same.
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It is important to underscore that the powers of the
Attorney-General of a State under Section 211 of the 1999
Constitution are very wide and the Courts cannot question
the manner in which the Attorney General exercises his
authority in exercise of discretion under the said Section.
See EZEA vs. THE STATE (2014) LPELR - 23565 (CA)
and ONYUIKE vs. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE
(2013) LPELR – 24809 (CA).
Furthermore, allegation of bias against a judex is a very
serious matter which must be backed up by solid evidence
substantiating the same: ECOBANK (NIG) LTD vs.
ANCHORAGE LEISURES LTD (2018) LPELR - 44667
(CA). There is no cogent and reasonable evidence on which
the Appellants premised their allegation of bias against the
judex, thus showing that the allegation is frivolous.
It is for the foregoing reasons and the more detailed
reasoning and conclusion in the leading judgment that I
also dismiss this appeal for being devoid of merit.
ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A.: I
have had the benefit of reading in draft, the judgment of my
learned brother, TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, JCA, just delivered. I
am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion
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that the appeal is bereft of merit and deserves to be
dismissed.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed and the
Ruling of the Lower Court delivered 9th March, 2017 is
hereby affirmed.
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Appearances:
Rotimi Ogunjobi with him, M. O. AwayewasemereFor Appellant(s)
Y. G. Oshoala with him, Y. A. Sule and T. M.Ashafa For Respondent(s)
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