2007 Teaching and Learning Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

The Profession

Teaching and Learning Ontology andEpistemology in Political Science

Stephen R. Bates* and Laura Jenkins

*University of EdinburghUniversity of Birmingham

The teaching and learning of ontology and epistemology is an important element of politicalscience, as it helps students to appraise, differentiate and choose between competing philosophies,theories and analytical traditions. Thus, it encourages reflexive learning through the strategies ofinquiry, role taking and benign disruption. However, we argue that there are aspects within themost prominent introductory material on these meta-theoretical issues which may underminethese processes. In particular, definitional inaccuracies and a lack of sustained reflection on thecontested nature of the directional relationship between ontology and epistemology tend towardsa prescriptive path dependency and curtail the possibility of reflexive learning. By subjecting thisreceived knowledge to critical reflection, we hope to overturn these weaknesses and open up adebate on the teaching and learning of ontology and epistemology.

One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil.And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels?

Nietzsche (1961, p. 103).

Introducing complex theories, concepts and issues to students is one of the moredifficult tasks of lecturing and teaching. Theories, concepts and issues must berendered accessible, while at the same time remaining accurate. Thus, the necessaryact of simplification, which enables initial understanding, must maintain the pos-sibility of critical engagement, yet not result in any distortion which would mis-represent positions and confuse subsequent learning processes. Moreover, thesimplified version must remain broad and inclusive so as to allow complexity,nuance and specificity to be reincorporated at a later date. This is especially truewith regard to the meta-theoretical concepts of ontology and epistemology, whichare basic to all research inquiry and in which the complexities are enormous andcontroversial, their definitions1 and relationship disputed and their necessity forpolitical science often not rendered explicit.

In this article, we argue that, despite some very obvious strengths and importantcontributions, the dominant literature on ontology and epistemology within politi-cal science retains some unacknowledged and problematic assumptions. First, defi-nitional and explanatory short cuts have been taken which do not correspondclosely enough with their original form in philosophy. The result of which is an

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inaccuracy which can cause confusion in the minds of both student and teacher.Moreover, it raises the possibility of students having to unlearn some of thisintroductory information if they go on to study these issues in more detail. Second,there is a tendency to present, indeed prescribe, a particular directional relationshipbetween ontology and epistemology as a given, or correct truth, rather than asdissonant and contested students. This can lead to some philosophical traditionsappearing more problematic than others. Thus, a path dependency emerges whichleads to students choosing positions underpinned by that particular directionality.Consequently, reflexive learning and the development of critical analysis, the veryactivities promoted by an understanding and appreciation of ontology and episte-mology, are paradoxically undermined and become stunted at this meta-theoreticallevel. In this article, we aim to provide a corrective to some of these shortcomings,as well as provoke a debate on how best to introduce these complex meta-theoretical issues.

The article is structured in four sections. First, we briefly outline why reflexivelearning is important and provide some reasons why ontology and epistemologyshould be introduced to students of political science in terms of their facilitation ofthis. Second, we introduce the dominant introductory material on ontology andepistemology within political science. Third, we highlight examples of definitionalinaccuracies and inconsistencies before, fourthly, discussing the lack of engagementwith the debate on ontology and epistemologys relationship and the consequentimpact on the ability to foster reflexive learning.

Reflexive learning, critical analysis and ontology andepistemologyWithin literature on stages of intellectual development, a stress is placed on theimportance of the move from instructional surface learning to deep structure, orreflexive, learning and independent, critical analysis (see, for example, Bligh, 1982;Buckler, 2001; Elton, 1992). An instructional surface approach is a regurgitationand memorisation of key isolated facts without reflection or engagement on theideas which inform them (Entwistle, 1997). Moreover, it is informed by the expec-tation on the part of the student/teacher that the role of the authority is to teachthe right answers (Roberts, 2002, p. 2). In contrast, Steve Buckler suggests that areflexive approach to learning involves recognition of the constitutive characterof the conceptual frameworks within which our understandings of the worldsubsist { [L]earning about the world involves an element of construction (2001,p. 73). Taking a reflexive approach to learning is important for two main reasons:learners develop a theoretically informed, innovative and research-oriented dispo-sition; and teachers learn to cultivate conceptual facility and analytical flexibilitywith respect to the presentation of different ideas which figure in their research(Buckler, 2001, p. 75).

As such, teaching and learning within political science should not be about theinstruction and regurgitation of knowledge. Instead, teaching should mean alertingstudents to different ways of thinking. It should provide a non-prescriptive basisfrom which students can reflexively engage with the material in order to uncoverrelationships, connections and underlying patterns and, consequently, partake in

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critical analysis (Entwistle, 1997). Engaging in this critical analysis does not con-stitute an attempt to teach students to be critical theorists, critical realists or aparticular kind of critic, in any theoretical sense. Rather, critical analysis refers tothe crucial capacity to engage with, interrogate and challenge other perspectives.This allows learners to throw up ambiguities and inconsistencies in received knowl-edge; critique, revise and, perhaps, reformulate conceptual claims; and, ultimately,formulate and defend independent arguments.

We believe teaching and learning ontology and epistemology are important inpolitical science for fostering the processes and strategies of inquiry, role taking andbenign disruption, which enable this reflexive learning. Developing a capacity forinquiry the ability to ask questions is crucial if students are to interrogate andchallenge the differences between, the assumptions made, and the knowledgeproduced by, particular theoretical and analytical traditions. This can be cultivatedby invoking ontological questions concerning the nature of social and politicalreality and epistemological questions relating to knowledge and its justification.Together, these form the foundations upon which contending perspectives are built.For instance, reflecting on whether there are universal truths helps students todifferentiate, in part, between behaviouralism and post-structuralism.

In general, role-taking experiences are important for intellectual developmentbecause they enable students to critique their own position from the point of viewof another and, concurrently, allow them to comprehend anothers position. Anappreciation of meta-theoretical principles enables students to achieve these out-comes through preventing students from talking past each other. For example,recognition of the surface realism of rational choice theory by a Marxist allowsthem to realise why rational choice theory does not analyse class differences, while,at the same time, bolstering their understanding of Marxisms focus on structuralinequalities due to an ontology of depth realism.

Finally, benign disruption involves disjunctive experiences that engage a personsattention { [and] provoke him or her to reconsider, reinterpret or reject priorassumptions or beliefs (King and Kitchener, 1994, p. 228). Engaging with ontologyand epistemology can lead to a benign disruption of, for example, a rational choicetheorists belief in the predictive capability of political science through highlightingthe open and contingent nature of the social world, or a malestream politicalscientists assumptions of objectivity through feminist critique.

In summary, the vital movement towards reflexive learning can be facilitatedthrough engaging with ontological and epistemological issues, as it enables under-standing and adjudication between contending theoretical and analytical traditions.Many of the differences and disputes between political scientists are more profoundthan students often assume, based, as they are, on fundamental meta-theoreticaldifferences. Learning and teaching ontology and epistemology discloses these philo-sophical divergences and, thus, can foster reflexive thinking by encouraging stu-dents to confront and justify their own ideas, beliefs and positions.

Introductory literature on ontology and epistemologyProbably the most prominent and influential accounts of ontology and epistemol-ogy in political science, especially at an introductory undergraduate level, can be

ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 57


found within the two editions of Theory and Methods in Political Science (TMPS) editedby David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (1995 and 2002) and Political Analysis by ColinHay (2002). Marsh and Stoker are to be commended for virtually double-handedly introducing the importance of ontological and epistemological reflectionfor political science students. This contribution has been reinforced by Haysendorsement of meta-theoretical engagement. Although not explicit within theirwork, Hay and Marsh and Stoker greatly encourage the development of reflexivelearning by imaginatively highlighting issues of the nature and the study of thepolitical. The significance of these interventions should not be understated, as itallows students to take a far more sophisticated and involved approach to theirwork, as well as providing the premises upon which a pluralistic political sciencecan be built.

However, this prominent literature contains weaknesses. First, there are a number ofinconsistencies and inaccuracies within explanations of ontological and epistemo-logical positions in TMPS. Second, this literature promotes a view of the ontology/epistemology relationship as uncontested and unproblematic. Consequently, thereis, perhaps, a tendency towards intellectual gatekeepingwhich, paradoxically, giventhe benefits of reflecting upon these issues, may hinder critical analysis and reflexivelearning. Overall, there is a lack of inquiry and benign disruption at the meta-theoretical level, which could result in shaping the preferences of students philo-sophical positions and, thus, their choice of theoretical traditions.

Inconsistencies and inaccuraciesOntological and epistemological definitions within TMPS are inconsistent and,consequently, sometimes inaccurate. For example, Stoker and Marsh assert, ontol-ogy is concerned with what we can know about the world and epistemology isconcerned with how we can know it (Stoker and Marsh, 2002, p. 11). Thesedefinitions are, at best, problematic and, at worst, incorrect.2 What exists, which isan ontological concern, is not necessarily the same as what we can know, which isan epistemological concern. Yet, as this is an isolated mistake, it can be put down toa rather glaring and unhelpful editorial error. However, there are more seriousinaccuracies within TMPS which cannot help but confuse.

Perhaps the most prominent of these is the use of the terms foundationalism andanti-foundationalism. In the chapter entitled A Skin not a Sweater, Marsh andPaul Furlong refer to both as ontological concepts. They argue, Positivists adhere toa foundationalist ontology { The realist is also foundationalist in ontological terms(Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 20). Furthermore, referring to the argument thatdifferences between men and women are socially constructed, Marsh and Furlongcontend that this viewpoint reflects a different ontological position that is anti-foundationalism (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18). This terminology continuesthroughout the chapter and highlights the definitional short cuts sometimes takenby political scientists when they borrow from philosophy. Far more precision needsto be shown if students are fully to understand and employ ontology and episte-mology within political research. Here, the good work carried out by Marsh,Furlong and Stoker in introducing these concepts is undermined through theconflation of ontological and epistemological concerns.



Even a cursory glance at philosophical dictionaries and introductory texts tophilosophy of (social) science is enough to discover that foundationalism andanti-foundationalism are epistemological concepts. James Ladyman defines foun-dationalism as:

In epistemology the theory according to which our justified beliefs fall into twocategories, namely basic beliefs, which are justified independently of all otherbeliefs, and non-basic beliefs, which are those that are justified by their inferen-tial relations to basic beliefs (Ladyman, 2002, pp. 265266).

In The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, foundationalism is: The theory that knowl-edge of the world rests on a foundation of indubitable beliefs from which furtherpropositions can be inferred to produce a superstructure of known truths (Jones,1995, p. 289). Consequently, anti-foundationalism is a theory which posits thatthere is no one foundation which grounds beliefs and knowledge claims.

This inclusion of epistemological terms when defining ontological positions can beviewed as part of a broader conflation of ontology/epistemology when Marsh andFurlong delineate their different meta-theoretical positions. For example, they statethat Realism shares an ontological position with positivism, but, in epistemologicalterms, modern realism has more in common with relativism (Marsh and Furlong,2002, p. 30). There are a number of problems with this statement. First, realism isan ontological position. It is the contention that there are aspects of the (social aswell as the natural) world that are independent of our knowledge of them. As such,positivism also has a realist ontology. However, it is a particular type of realism, ashallow, or surface, realism, rather than the depth realism which characterises theposition outlined by Marsh and Furlong. Second, this meta-theory, which can bemost closely associated with critical realism, does not, in epistemological terms,have more in common with relativism. Rather, it is relativist at an epistemologicallevel. Critical realism is underpinned by an epistemic relativity, which asserts thatall beliefs are socially produced, so that all knowledge is transient, and neithertruth-values nor criteria of rationality exist outside historical time (Bhaskar, 1998a,p. 58). Indeed, central to critical realism is its claim to combine and reconcileontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality (Bhaskar,1998b, p. xi).

The directionality of the relationship between ontologyand epistemologyIn addition to these definitional weaknesses, there is the important, but unrecog-nised, issue of the relationship between ontology and epistemology. There appearsto be total agreement on the relationships directionality within these texts. Marshand Furlong argue, Ontological and epistemological positions are related, but needto be separated. To put it crudely, ones ontological position affects, but far fromdetermines, ones epistemological position (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18).Although there are some references to opposing views, Hay also claims:

ontology logically precedes epistemology {we cannot know what we are capableof knowing (epistemology) until such time as we have settled on (a set ofassumptions about) the nature of the context in which that knowledge must beacquired (ontology) (Hay, 2006, p. 8).



We do not wish to argue this directionality is wrong. Instead, we wish to argue thisposition must be explicitly recognised as a contested perspective, rather than agiven. Within other disciplines, the relationship is often perceived quite differently.Steve Smith asserts:

ontological claims {without an epistemological warrant is dogma { epistemologymatters because it determines of what we can have knowledge; moreover, it isnot possible to wish it away, or undermine its importance, by arguing, as isfashionably the case { that ontology is prior to epistemology { I see neitherontology nor epistemology as prior to the other, but instead see the two of themas mutually and inextricably interrelated (1996, p. 18).

Furthermore, Derek Gregory contends, Many scholars would now accept that {ontology is grounded in epistemology (Gregory, 2000, pp. 226227). As DeborahDixon and John Paul Jones III similarly assert, from a post-structuralist perspective:

ontological assumptions put the cart before the horse, for any ontology is itselfgrounded in an epistemology about how we know what the world is like; inother words, the analysis of ontology invariably shows it to rest upon epistemo-logical priors that enable claims about the structure of the real world. Forexample, the ontological divisions between physical and social phenomena, orbetween individual agency and sociospatial structure { [are] the result of anepistemology that segments reality and experience in order to comprehend themboth. But how do we draw the boundaries of nature, or, for that matter, of theindividual? And when and where did these categories emerge? So much ofgeography is predicated upon analyzing variables structured upon such dualisms,and yet the categories and their derivatives are not natural, in any real sense,but are the sociohistorical outcomes of representational processes { analysis mustfirst begin at the epistemological level (Dixon and Jones, 1998, p. 250; see also2004a and 2004b).

Other strands of post-structuralism3 consciously conflate ontology and epistemol-ogy and deny that there are real distinctions between ontology, epistemology, andvalue systems (Shusterman, 1998, pp. 126127). Moreover, while not explicitlydenying ontologys priority, Nietzsches and Foucaults genealogical inquiriesoperate as a challenge to dominant ontologies, developing from a perspectivismwhich suggests that truth is a thing of this world.

There are a number of incommensurable positions on the ontology/epistemologyrelationship. As such, the lack of recognition of, and reflection on, alternativeperspectives by Hay and Marsh and Furlong must be seen as problematic from bothphilosophical and pedagogical viewpoints. As Foucault (1980) contends, the powerto define the parameters, absence or existence of what constitutes significantknowledge is profound and ubiquitous. In their efforts to render accessible thesecomplex meta-theories, Hay and Marsh and Furlong have, perhaps unintentionally,acted as intellectual gatekeepers in allowing themselves the right to decide theanswer, yet concealing the question by excluding or, at least not fully acknowledg-ing, alternative perspectives. Intellectual gatekeepers possess the ability to limitaccess to the knowledge upon which students build. This is in conflict with thepedagogical task of fostering reflexive learning. As Paulo Freire argues:



The fundamental task of the mentor is a liberatory task. It is not to encourage thementors goals and aspirations and dreams to be reproduced in the mentees, thestudents, but to give rise to the possibility that the students become the ownersof their own history { teachers have to transcend their merely instructive taskand to assume the ethical posture of a mentor who truly believes in the totalautonomy, freedom and development of those he or she mentors (Freire, 1997,p. 324).

As this quotation suggests, problems can arise from instructing students thatontology comes first.

This instruction4 may lead to an outcome where students are more prone to supportand defend particular theories, and reject, find contradictions within and fail tounderstand others. As this particular directionality would not be recognised bypost-structuralism for example, it becomes difficult to present theoretical traditionson an even playing field. There is a lack of recognition by Hay and Marsh andFurlong that the directionality they support is a reflection of their own philosophi-cal positions.

Ultimately, there is something prescriptive about current teaching of ontology andepistemology in political science. It puts in place a form of path dependency inwhich it becomes difficult for students to stop being pupils, in the Nietzchean sense,and become independent thinkers. Indeed, Jonathan Grix admits, in reference to afigure adapted from Hay outlining the interrelationship between the building blocksof research, that he may come across as somewhat prescriptive or, in the words ofone reviewer of this article, it may remind readers of old style methods books ofthe 1950s (Grix, 2002, p. 179). If students are encouraged meekly to follow thisdirectional path, then it may constrain their ability fully to engage and reflect uponthe various philosophies and related theories. The advantages of ontological andepistemological reflection for the development of reflexive learning are, paradoxi-cally, undermined by a lack of reflection on their relationship.

At present, students are not given the opportunity to make any directional judge-ments and, as such, their meta-theoretical choices are hindered by the position ofthese teachers. Consequently, there is a potential foreclosure of the plurality withinpolitical science that both Hay and Marsh desire.5

ConclusionDespite some very obvious and important strengths, the dominant literature onontology and epistemology in political science does not encourage the full devel-opment of reflexive learning. This is due to some inaccuracies and a failure topresent the directionality of the ontology/epistemology relationship as a contestedarea of meta-theory.

Ontological and epistemological consideration can facilitate reflexive learning. Forthis to flourish further, we must improve the accuracy of definitions, as well asproviding a framework which renders concepts accessible. Moreover, we need toacknowledge competing perspectives surrounding the directional relationshipbetween ontology and epistemology in addition to acknowledging the competing



positions within meta-theory. Alerting students to this dissension is particularlyimportant because it encourages them to challenge assumptions and premises and,therefore, make up their own minds about what kind of political scientist they are,rather than blindly following the leader.

The development of such an open and inclusive pedagogical strategy on the subjectsof ontology and epistemology is no easy task and the aim of this article is to movetowards this. However, it is crucial to continue pursuing this end if we are todevelop an environment within which students can take greater ownership of theirown learning and repay their teacher by not remaining a pupil.

NotesWe would like to thank Judi Atkins and three anonymous referees for comments on earlier drafts of thisarticle. We would also like to thank various members of the critical geography e-mail list for usefulliterature suggestions.

1 Although recognising the existence of alternative definitions, we employ the popular Blaikie defini-tions. Ontology refers to the claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social inquiry makesabout the nature of social reality claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it upand how these units interact with each other (Blaikie, 1993, p. 6). Epistemology is a theory ofknowledge; it presents a view and justification for what can be regarded as knowledge what can beknown, and what criteria such knowledge must satisfy in order to be called knowledge rather thanbelief (ibid., p. 7).

2 This is also a problem for other authors writing on this topic (see Grix, 2001, p. 27 and 2002, p. 177).

3 Derrida most notably rejects the concept of ontology due to its operation in a binary and thusundecidability (see Norrie, 2005).

4 Hay and Marsh and Furlong do not explicitly argue that this directionality should be taught. However,as the only prominent introductory sources within political science, there is an increased probabilitythat this directionality will become hegemonic.

5 See Marsh and Smith (2001) and Marsh and Savigny (2004). Moreover, Hay states, it is not myintention to hide my preference for certain analytical strategies and perspectives over others (2002,p. 2). In foreclosing the argument on directionality, it could be argued that he goes against thisobjective.

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2007 Teaching and Learning Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science