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PEIRCES TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS AND THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCHER

Gary Shank

Duquesne University Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America

11 October 2003 Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

This paper seeks to incorporate two elements that many scholars would consider as

independent of each other. In short, Peirces ten classes of signs will be used to recast

our thinking and understanding of what Kaplan (1964), among others, has called the

logic-in-use of empirical researchers. In particular, the logic-in-use of researchers in the

social sciences will be examined.

First of all, let us briefly review Peirces notion of his ten classes of signs. Peirce held

that all signs could be categorized as belonging to one of ten mutually exclusive

categories. Some of these category names were quite esoteric sounding, including such

entries as rhematic iconic qualisigns and dicent indexical sinsigns, among others (Peirce,

1955, 1992, 1998).

The first problem with Peirces system is the difficulty of his neologistic labels.

Therefore, by examining his work, I have been able to re-label these ten classes with

terms that maintain Peirces semantic intentions while recasting them in ways that

lightens the cognitive load of remembering and using them. Briefly, I have replaced

rheme, dicent, and argument with the notion of open signs, single signs, and general

signs. Icon, index, and symbol have stayed the same. For qualisign, sinsign, and

legisign, I have used Peirces own alternative labels of tone, token, and type.

Using a monotonic eliminative process that starts with the open signs and works

toward general signs, Peirce arrived at the following ten classes of signs, now relabeled

using the newer nomenclature (Shank, in press; 2001, 1998, Shank & Cunningham, April

1996):

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Open iconic tone

Open iconic token

Open iconic type

Open indexical token

Open indexical type

Open symbolic type

Single indexical token

Single indexical type

Single symbolic type

General symbolic type

This leads to the second general issue what use is there of creating such a

categorical system? Peirce, master architectonic thinker that he was, never seemed to

make much more of the system than using it almost as a parlor game to label various

examples from nature using the categorical structure. What do we really learn, for

example, by called a weathercock an indexical dicent sinsign, or even a single indexical

token for that matter?

I came upon the idea of applying Peirces ten classes of signs toward the practice of

empirical research while considering another, seemingly unrelated, problem. How can I,

as a teacher and investigator of empirical methods, bridge the gap between the nice and

neat logic used to explicate research in published articles and monographs, and the quite

different logic-in-use that most researchers actually employ nomenclature (Shank, in

press; 2001, 1998, 1994, 1987; Shank & Cunningham, April 1996)? What was needed

was a systematic treatment of the operation of logic-in-use, from its most basic and

intuitive forms all the way to the rendering of ideas and findings into precise declarative

terms. The field has been quite heavy in the precise direction, with almost nothing except

anecdote and advice guiding the initial, often intuitive, efforts.

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At this point, I realized that Peirces ten classes of signs could be used to capture the

nature and characteristics of logic-in-use. Furthermore, this discovery had a number of

other powerful implications: 1) It created not only a system of logic-in-use, but further

specified a finite number of logical operations in use; 2) It allowed for a way to

incorporate abductive reasoning into our understanding of logic-in-use; and 3) By virtue

of mapping into the structure of the ten classes, new relations among various modes of

logic-in-use were discovered. This paper will proceed with the mapping and then

conclude with a brief discussion of the final implication.

The first major discovery I made was the fact that these modes of reasoning could be

grouped into inductive, deductive, and abductive clusters that correspond to various

sections of the ten classes. That is, any sign process that involved the use of open signs

was abductive, any process using single signs was inductive, and any process using

general signs was deductive. This is not surprising in the least; what is surprising,

however, is that when mapped into the ten classes, we no longer can consider induction

and abduction as unitary processes. Instead, we find that there are six distinct modes of

abduction and three distinct modes of induction. Deduction remains as a unitary process.

In hindsight, this also is not that surprising, since it makes sense that as we move away

from the realm of certainty and formality, the modes of reasoning that we use would have

to be able to accommodate this shift.

Here are the six modes of abduction used by empirical researchers as they conduct

their efforts; that is, here are the six ways that abduction is employed as a logic-in-use in

empirical inquiry, as characterized by describing the end product of that logical effort as

a sign in itself

The first mode of abductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called a

hunch. All hunches are open iconic tones. That is, we have a hunch when we infer the

possibility of a possible resemblance. For example, suppose an archeologist is looking

for a site to dig. She comes upon a bend in the river that creates a low and sheltered

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place. She infers that this sort of terrain feature might be the sort of place that Native

Americans, if they might have been in the area, might have chosen for a camp sight. This

is clearly an inference, albeit an open and tentative and speculative one. But the

archeologist recognizes it as such, and acts upon it anyway to the degree that she might

have confidence in it. That is, she might do a little digging and exploring, but she is

prepared to move on if things do not get more explicit fairly soon.

The second mode of abductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called an

omen. All omens are open iconic tokens. That is, we have an omen when we infer the

possibility that some present resemblance might hearken some future thing or event. For

example, suppose a farmer is thinking about whether or not to plow her field. Dark

clouds are rolling in from the west. She infers that it might possibly rain, and so she

decides not to start plowing. That is, the clouds resemble the sorts of clouds that often

lead to rain, but nothing is certain here. If she infers inaccurately, she has wasted a day.

If she infers accurately, then she avoids a sloppy mess. Like most empirical inferences,

time will tell if she was right or wrong.

The third mode of abductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called a

metaphor. All metaphors are open iconic types. That is, we have a metaphor when we

infer the possibility that some possible resemblance might have a more abstract character

to it. Metaphors are inferential tools often used to compare seemingly disparate

phenomena in order to expand the realm of understanding of at least one of the

phenomena in question. They do not depend on law or convention, however, but upon

resemblance per se. That is why they are iconic and not symbolic in nature. But they are

types, because they emphasize the general and the abstract at the same time.

The fourth mode of abductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called a

clue. All clues are open indexical tokens. That is, we have a clue when we infer the

possibility that some actual thing might possibly be something else in addition to itself. It

might be a sign that something has happened in the past. When a clue is in the present

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tense, it is a symptom. An omen is like a clue, except that its orientation is in the future.

The difference between a clue and an omen is the fact that when you have a clue,

something has indeed happened and the clue may or may not be related. When you have

an omen, it is not certain that anything will actually happen.

The fifth mode of abductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called a

pattern. All patterns are open indexical types. That is, we have a pattern when we infer

the possibility that several things might come together to give us a more abstract

resemblance. For example, suppose we go back to our archeologist. She has been lucky

enough to find several artifacts. But she has not found the sort of artifacts that one would

expect from a campsite, such as remnants of a fire, cooking utensils, animal bones, and

the like. Instead, she finds an abundance of arrowheads. What is this pattern telling her?

Was it a manufacturing site for arrowheads, or the scene of a fierce battle? As she

continues to look, the pattern emerges and changes based on each new artifact and

discovery.

The sixth mode of abductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called an

explanation. All explanations are open symbolic types. That is, we have an explanation

when we infer the possibility that a given resemblance is based on some law or

convention dealing with the goal of resolving meaning. The key to an explanation is the

fact that it is always after the fact. Rather than dismissing these sorts of explanations as

mere deductive fallacies, it is more informative to see them as ways for treating complex

possibilities in a law-like manner. So long as we are willing to abandon them as mere

possibilities in light of further evidence, their ability to help us sort out meaning and

move forward in a coherent manner can be invaluable.

Here are the three modes of induction used by empirical researchers as they conduct

their efforts; that is, here are the three ways that induction is employed as a logic-in-use

in empirical inquiry, as characterized by describing the end product of that logical effort

as a sign in itself

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The first mode of inductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called

reasoning to a fact. All facts are single indexical tokens. When we have a fact, we are

beyond the realm of possibility. We are now in the realm of probability. We are sure

that we have something before us, and we are sure that it can tell us something. We are

now trying to infer just how sure we should be. Note that we can never be totally sure

either way we can never completely reject it or completely accept it. For instance, it is

a fact that we will get hurt if we jump from a ten-story building, even though there is the

highly unlikely chance that we might emerge unhurt. We call that unlikely event a

miracle or a fluke, depending on our belief systems, and move along with our fact still

keeping its status as a fact. Only a predominance of new contrary evidence can de-fact a

fact. All of this is inference, and it is inductive in nature. The support for facts ranges

from flimsy to firm, with all stops in between. It is highly informative for us to consider

this fact judgement process as a form of induction, thereby allowing us to examine it in

both a systematic and relational manner.

The second mode of inductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called

reasoning toward a hypothesis. All hypotheses are single indexical types. A hypothesis

is like a pattern that we are trying to demonstrate as being probable as well a s possible.

One way we bolster that probability status is by building hypotheses around facts instead

of clues. Furthermore, we set a priori probability standards for testing hypotheses.

The third mode of inductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is called

reasoning to a theory. All theories are single symbolic types. They are built on facts and

theories, but they ascribe to a law-like treatment of phenomena. They are also akin to

explanations in that they address broad domains of meaning, but they are also bolstered

by the power of inductive proof within acceptable and specified ranges of probability.

The one and only mode of deductive reasoning within an empirical logic-in-use is

called reasoning with a law. All laws are general symbolic types. As such, they are

necessarily true, and so now we do not reason toward them in the sense of trying to

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complete or refine them, but we reason with them, acknowledging that they final

products that are incapable of leading to error if used properly.

I would like to conclude this paper by considering only one implication. By using

Peirces ten classes of signs, we have equipped empirical researchers with powerful tools

for comparing and contrasting the fruits and efforts of their logics-in-use. These classes

are permeated with the dimensions of open, single, and general, with icon, index, and

symbol, and with tone, token, and type. These dimensions allow us, for example, to

compare and contrast such things as metaphors, theories, and laws along the dimension of

symbolic characteristics. Clues, fact, and omens can be examined as differing modes of

tokens, and how those differing modes play subtle and complex roles in logic-in-use. As

the consummate pragmaticist, Peirce was always interested in the impact of his ideas in

practice as performed on the highest level. I hope my work here reflects the application

of that orientation toward his ten classes of signs.

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REFERENCES

Kaplan, A. (1964). The conduct of inquiry: Methodology for behavioral science. San

Francisco, CA: Chandler Publishing Co..

Peirce, C.S. (1955). Philosophical writings of Peirce. NY: Dover.

Peirce, C. S. (1992). The essential Peirce: Volume 1(1867-1893). N. Houser & C.

Kloesel (Eds.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Peirce, C. S. (1998). The essential Peirce: Volume 2(1893-1913). The Peirce Edition

Project (Eds.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Shank, G. (in press). Praxical reasoning and the logic of field research. To appear in

Handbook of Fieldwork. London: Sage.

Shank, Gary (2001). It's logic in practice, my dear Watson: An imaginary

memoir from beyond the grave [96 paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung /

Forum: Qualitative Social Research [On-line Journal], 2(1). Available at:

http://qualitative-research.net/fqs/fqs-eng.htm

Shank, G. (1998). The extraordinary ordinary powers of abductive reasoning. Theory

and Psychology, 8, 841-860.

Shank, G. (1994) Shaping qualitative research in educational psychology. Contemporary

Educational Psychology, 19, 340-359.

Shank, G. (1987). Abductive strategies in educational research. American Journal of

Semiotics, 5(2), 275-290.

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Shank, G. & Cunningham, D.J. (April, 1996). Modeling the six modes of Peircean

abduction for educational purposes. Paper presented at the Seventh Midwest AI and

Cognitive Science Conference, April 28, 1996, Bloomington, IN. Online proceeding at:

http://www.cs.indiana.edu/event/maics96/Proceedings/shank.html

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PEIRCES CLASSES OF SIGNS AND REASONING

Gary Shank

Duquesne University

11 October 2003

shank@duq.edu

Open Iconic Tone Hunch

Open Iconic Token Omen

Open Iconic Type Metaphor

Open Indexical Token Clue

Open Indexical Type Pattern

Open Symbolic Type Explanation

Single Indexical Token Fact

Single Indexical Type Hypothesis

Single Symbolic Type Theory

General Symbolic Type Law