1st Assign of Cases -7 & RA 7691

7/28/2019 1st Assign of Cases -7 & RA 7691

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Republic Act No. 7691 March 25, 1994AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIALCOURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA,BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: :Section 1.Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980",is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.

"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interesttherein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos(P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal TrialCourts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds Onehundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceedsTwo hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estateexceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or bodyexercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions;"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of aJuvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided bylaw; and"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceedsOne hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where thedemand exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos(P200,000.00)."

Section 2.Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts inCriminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courtsand of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit TrialCourts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committedwithin their respective territorial jurisdiction; and"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding

six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory orother penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offensesinvolving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive originaljurisdiction thereof."

Section 3.Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts inCivil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shallexercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate andintestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of thepersonal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred 8thousandpesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of thedemand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest,damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of whichmust be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,

litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided,further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or differentparties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of theclaims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of thesame or different transactions;"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings andthe question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issueof ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, realproperty, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein doesnot exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
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assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damagesof whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of landnot declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by theassessed value of the adjacent lots."

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hearand determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or

opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos(P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of therespective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the realproperty. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of theRegional Trial Courts."

Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3),(4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundredthousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further toThree hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, theabovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Fourhundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered amended ormodified accordingly.

Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage.However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by theprovisions of this Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of theappropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases affected by theredefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)national newspapers of general circulation.

1. [Manchester dev. Corp vs CA 149 SCRA 562] G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987GANCAYCO, J.:Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and anothermotion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motionto refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amendedcomplaint cite the case ofMagaspi vs. Ramolete. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing feeshould be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that

1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land withdamages.While the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer fortemporary restraining order, etc.

2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to theproperty, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the paymentof actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts specifiedtherein. However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunctionduring the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by theplaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy anyjudgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and saleof the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointlyand severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts asmaybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price ofplaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages

sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millionas damages suffered by plaintiff.

3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in theMagaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of aparcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of onlyP60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid.In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of thecomplaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docketfee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one forspecific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous.Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the


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Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when thecorrect and proper docket fee has not been paid.On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the RegionalTrial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayerfor the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent asdeclared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as CivilCase No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby asadditional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayerin the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of thecomplaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel toraise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding oversaid case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned todifferent branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessmentof docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court withthe directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil CaseNo. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directingthe judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. TheResolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants werelikewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned,issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid byprivate respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.

On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, anamended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.

Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption intooffice on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerkof Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. OnJanuary 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of"not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said secondamended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in

the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and statingtherein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereofshould be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk ofCourt based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judie Asunciondated January 24, 1986.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven monthsafter filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks annulment ofthe order(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereofquestioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Courtto reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount ofP25,401,707.00.

Hence, the instant petition.During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, privaterespondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.


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The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquirejurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee.Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docketfee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended andsupplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent isP257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissedand all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling ofthe Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, as follows:

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement isoverturned and reversed.

On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchestercannot apply retroactively to Civil CaseNo. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchesterruling as yet. Further,private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein thisCourt held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.

The contention that Manchestercannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating theprocedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of theirpassage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is anindispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of thepeace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice ofappeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within thereglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additionalP8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this courtheld that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal wasnot thereby perfected.

In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending itthrough registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration wasnot filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before thefiling of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration ofintention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.

In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petitionfor quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk ofthe Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. However,

the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that thedate of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when itwas mailed.Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will acton a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probateof several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each will but instead he mayhave other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same court.

Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimitand Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon paymentof the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery ofownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon thepayment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of thedefendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom theproper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount

of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.

The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to which anopposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docketfee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trialcourt ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In theprayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayermerely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of theaction. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amendedcomplaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional


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docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the totaldocket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amendedcomplaint.The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if thedocketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only uponthe payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint;that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as theaction appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is

also one, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in theamended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in theoriginal complaint.

However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchesterinvolves an action for torts anddamages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayerin said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the actionagainst the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property inquestion, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may berendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase andsale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed thatthe defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages aswell as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trialcourt to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes ofpayment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayeralthough the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.

Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on thenature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation.However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as well as its designation that the action was one fordamages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket feecomputed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in theprayer of the complaint.

Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint on September 12,1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body ofthe complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.

On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and other cases thatwere investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint bystating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint theamount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in theprayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.

Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless ofthe actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case bypayment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdictionupon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken bythe trial court were declared null and void.

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which wereinvestigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similartoManchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of thepremium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 waspaid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayerit is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body ofthe complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint wasadmitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer ofnot less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paidan additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during thependency of this petition, and after the promulgation ofManchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid anadditional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount ofP182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplementalcomplaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee ofP257,810.49.


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The principle in Manchestercould very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraudthe government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in thefiling of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was decided by this Courton May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that thecourt a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have beenadmitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees asrequired. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on privaterespondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change ofstance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amountof the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk orclerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the privaterespondent to pay the same.Thus, the Court rules as follows:1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribeddocket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filingof the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the feewithin a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not beconsidered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of saidfee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment ofthe prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specifiedthe same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on thejudgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien andassess and collect the additional fee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructedto reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the totalamount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from theallegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, withoutpronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

3. [Fedman Dev. Corp v . Agcaoile GR 165025 Aug 31 2011]BERSAMIN, J.:The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleadingfails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing feesassessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdictionover the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.

Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) appeals the decision promulgated on August 20, 2004, whereby the Courtof Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 28, 1998 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150,Makati City, in favor of the respondent.

AntecedentsFDC was the owner and developer of a condominium project known as Fedman Suites Building (FSB) located onSalcedo Street, Legazpi Village, Makati City. On June 18, 1975, Interchem Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem)purchased FSBs Unit 411 under a contract to sell. On March 31, 1977, FDC executed a Master Deed withDeclaration of Restrictions,3 and formed the Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) to manage FSB and

hold title over its common areas.

On October 10, 1980, Interchem, with FDCs consent, transferred all its rights in Unit 411 to respondent FedericoAgcaoili (Agcaoili), a practicing attorney who was then also a member of the Provincial Board of QuezonProvince. As consideration for the transfer, Agcaoili agreed: (a) to pay Interchem 150,000.00 upon signing of thedeed of transfer; (b) to update the account by paying to FDC the amount of 15,473.17 through a 90 day-postdatedcheck; and (c) to deliver to FDC the balance of 137,286.83 in 135 equal monthly installments of 1,857.24effective October 1980, inclusive of 12% interest per annum on the diminishing balance. The obligations Agcaoiliassumed totaled 302,760.00.In December 1983, the centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down. On January 3, 1984,Agcaoili, being thereby adversely affected, wrote to Eduardo X. Genato (Genato), vice-president and board memberof FSCC, demanding the repair of the air-conditioning unit. Not getting any immediate response, Agcaoili sent
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follow-up letters to FSCC reiterating the demand, but the letters went unheeded. He then informed FDC and FSCCthat he was suspending the payment of his condominium dues and monthly amortizations.

On August 30, 1984, FDC cancelled the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and cut off the electric supply to the unit.Agcaoili was thus prompted to sue FDC and FSCC in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144 for injunction anddamages. The parties later executed a compromise agreement that the RTC approved through its decision ofAugust 26, 1985. As stipulated in the compromise agreement, Agcaoili paid FDC the sum of 39,002.04 asamortizations for the period from November 1983 to July 1985; and also paid FSCC an amount of 17,858.37 for

accrued condominium dues, realty taxes, electric bills, and surcharges as of March 1985. As a result, FDC reinstatedthe contract to sell and allowed Agcaoili to temporarily install two window-type air-conditioners in Unit 411.

On April 22, 1986, FDC again disconnected the electric supply of Unit 411. Agcaoili thus moved for the execution ofthe RTC decision dated August 26, 1985. On July 17, 1986, the RTC issued an order temporarily allowing Agcaoili toobtain his electric supply from the other units in the fourth floor of FSB until the main meter was restored.

On March 6, 1987, Agcaoili lodged a complaint for damages against FDC and FSCC in the RTC, which was raffled toBranch 150 in Makati City. He alleged that the disconnection of the electric supply of Unit 411 on April 22, 1986 hadunjustly deprived him of the use and enjoyment of the unit; that the disconnection had seriously affected his lawpractice and had caused him sufferings, inconvenience and embarrassment; that FDC and FSCC violated thecompromise agreement; that he was entitled to actual damages amounting to 21,626.60, as well as to moral andexemplary damages, and attorneys fees as might be proven during the trial; that the payment of interest soughtby FDC and FSCC under the contract to sell was illegal; and that FDC and FSCC were one and the same corporation.He also prayed that FDC and FSCC be directed to return the excessive amounts collected for real estate taxes.

In its answer, FDC contended that it had a personality separate from that of FSCC; that it had no obligation orliability in favor of Agcaoili; that FSCC, being the manager of FSB and the title-holder over its common areas, was incharge of maintaining all central and appurtenant equipment and installations for utility services (like air-conditioning unit, elevator, light and others); that Agcaoili failed to comply with the terms of the contract to sell;that despite demands, Agcaoili did not pay the amortizations due from November 1983 to March 1985 and thesurcharges, the total amount of which was 376,539.09; that due to the non-payment, FDC cancelled the contractto sell and forfeited the amount of 219,063.97 paid by Agcaoili, applying the amount to the payment of liquidateddamages, agents commission, and interest; that it demanded that Agcaoili vacate Unit 411, but its demand wasnot heeded; that Agcaoili did not pay his monthly amortizations of 1,883.84 from October 1985 to May 1986,resulting in FSCC being unable to pay the electric bills on time to the Manila Electric Company resulting in thedisconnection of the electric supply of FSB; that it allowed Agcaoili to obtain electric supply from other unitsbecause Agcaoili promised to settle his accounts but he reneged on his promise; that Agcaoilis total obligation was55,106.40; that Agcaoilis complaint for damages was baseless and was intended to cover up his delinquencies;that the interest increase from 12% to 24% per annum was authorized under the contract to sell in view of theadverse economic conditions then prevailing in the country; and that the complaint for damages was barred by theprinciple of res judicata because the issues raised therein were covered by the RTC decision dated August 26, 1985.

As compulsory counterclaim, FDC prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages each amounting to1,000,000.00, attorneys fees amounting to 100,000.00 and costs of suit.

On its part, FSCC filed an answer, admitting that the electric supply of Unit 411 was disconnected for the secondtime on April 22, 1986, but averring that the disconnection was justified because of Agcaoilis failure to pay themonthly amortizations and condominium dues despite repeated demands. It averred that it did not repair the air-conditioning unit because of dwindling collections caused by the failure of some unit holders to pay their obligationson time; that the unit holders were notified of the electricity disconnection; and that the electric supply of Unit 411could not be restored until Agcaoili paid his condominium dues totaling 14,701.16 as of April 1987.By way of counterclaim, FSCC sought moral damages and attorneys fees of 100,000.00 and 50,000.00,respectively, and cost of suit.

On August 28, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Agcaoili, holding that his complaint for damages wasnot barred by res judicata; that he was justified in suspending the payment of his monthly amortizations; that FDCscancellation of the contract to sell was improper; that FDC and FSCC had no separate personalities; and thatAgcaoili was entitled to damages. The RTC disposed thus wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and as against both defendants, declaring theincreased rates sought by defendants to be illegal, and ordering defendant FDC/FSCC to reinstate the contract tosell, as well as to provide/restore the air-conditioning services/electric supply to plaintiffs unit. Both defendants arelikewise ordered to pay plaintiff:

a. The amount of 21,626.60 as actual damages;b. 500,000.00 as moral damages;c. 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; andd. 50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.

and to return to plaintiff the excess amount collected from him for real estate taxes.SO ORDERED.


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FDC appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC.20Hence, FDC comes to us on further appeal.

IssuesFDC claims that there was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein because the complaint did notspecify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees; that the payment of theprescribed docket fee by Agcaoili was necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case; and that,consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over this case.FDC also claims that the proceedings in the RTC were void because the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

action pertained to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); and that both the RTC and the CA erred inruling: (a) that Agcaoili had the right to suspend payment of his monthly amortizations; (b) that FDC had no right tocancel the contract to sell; and (c) that FDC and FSCC were one and same corporation, and as such were solidarilyliable to Agcaoili for damages.

RulingThe petition has no merit.IThe filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee are the actsthat vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim.23 In an action where the reliefs sought are purely for sums ofmoney and damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount being claimed. Ideally,therefore, the complaint or similar pleading must specify the sums of money to be recovered and the damagesbeing sought in order that the clerk of court may be put in a position to compute the correct amount of docket fees.

If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought, the clerk of court or hisduly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be requiredto pay the deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest the trial courtof its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the Government on the part ofthe plaintiff.

The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial court stillacquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barringprescription.27 The "prescriptive period" that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which aspecific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptiveperiod, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, TitleV, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions.

In Rivera v. Del Rosario, the Court, resolving the issue of the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees due tothe inadequate assessment by the clerk of court, ruled that jurisdiction over the complaint was still validly acquiredupon the full payment of the docket fees assessed by the Clerk of Court. Relying on Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,(SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court opined that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and thepayment of the prescribed docket fees vested a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim, and although the docketfees paid were insufficient in relation to the amount of the claim, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy

retained the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the party filing the action could be required topay the deficiency, without jurisdiction being automatically lost.

Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment, and the deficiency is not paid as a result, thetrial court nonetheless continues to have jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraudin that regard, considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien within the contemplation of Section2, Rule 141 (as revised by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC) The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerkof court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith.

Herein, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the complaint did not specify theamounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoilipaid the assessed docket fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government. Nonetheless,Agcaoili must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTCs clerk of court.

IIFDC is now barred from asserting that the HLURB, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. As already stated,

Agcaoili filed a complaint against FDC in the RTC on February 28, 1985 after FDC disconnected the electric supplyof Unit 411. Agcaoili and FDC executed a compromise agreement on August 16, 1985. The RTC approved thecompromise agreement through its decision of August 26, 1985. In all that time, FDC never challenged the RTCsjurisdiction nor invoked the HLURBs authority. On the contrary, FDC apparently recognized the RTCs jurisdiction byits voluntary submission of the compromise agreement to the RTC for approval. Also, FDC did not assert theHLURBs jurisdiction in its answer to Agcaoilis second complaint (filed on March 6, 1987). Instead, it even averredin that answer that the decision of August 26, 1985 approving the compromise agreement already barred Agcaoilifrom filing the second complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. FDC also thereby sought affirmative relief fromthe RTC through its counterclaim.
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FDC invoked HLURBs authority only on September 10, 1990, or more than five years from the time the prior casewas commenced on February 28, 1985, and after the RTC granted Agcaoilis motion to enjoin FDC from cancellingthe contract to sell.

The principle of estoppel, which is based on equity and public policy, dictates that FDCs active participation in bothRTC proceedings and its seeking therein affirmative reliefs now precluded it from denying the RTCs jurisdiction. Itsacknowledgment of the RTCs jurisdiction and its subsequent denial of such jurisdiction only after an unfavorablejudgment were inappropriate and intolerable. The Court abhors the practice of any litigant of submitting a case for

decision in the trial court, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking the judgment for lack ofjurisdiction if it is not.

IIIIn upholding Agcaoilis right to suspend the payment of his monthly amortizations due to the increased interestrates imposed by FDC, and because he found FDCs cancellation of the contract to sell as improper, the CA foundand ruled as follows:It is the contention of the appellee that he has the right to suspend payments since the increase in interest rateimposed by defendant-appellant FDC is not valid and therefore cannot be given legal effect. Although Section II,paragraph d of the Contract to Sell entered into by the parties states that, "should there be an increase in bankinterest rate for loans and/or other financial accommodations, the rate of interest provided for in this contract shallbe automatically amended to equal the said increased bank interest rate, the date of said amendment to coincidewith the date of said increase in interest rate," the said increase still needs to [be] accompanied by valid proofs andnot one of the parties must unilaterally alter what was originally agreed upon. However, FDC failed to substantiatethe alleged increase with sufficient proof, thus we quote with approval the findings of the lower court, to wit:

"In the instant case, defendant FDC failed to show by evidence that it incurred loans and /or other financialaccommodations to pay interest for its loans in developing the property. Thus, the increased interest rates saiddefendant is imposing on plaintiff is not justified, and to allow the same is tantamount to unilaterally altering theterms of the contract which the law proscribes. Article 1308 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 1308 The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will ofone of them."For this reason, the court sees no valid reason for defendant FDC to cancel the contract to sell on ground of defaultor non-payment of monthly amortizations." (RTC rollo, pp. 79-80)

It was also grave error on the part of the FDC to cancel the contract to sell for non-payment of the monthlyamortizations without taking into consideration Republic Act 6552, otherwise known as the Maceda Law. The policyof law, as embodied in its title, is "to provide protection to buyers of real estate on installment payments." Asclearly specified in Section 3, the declared public policy espoused by Republic Act No. 6552 is "to protect buyers ofreal estate on installment payments against onerous and oppressive conditions." Thus, in order for FDC to havevalidly cancelled the existing contract to sell, it must have first complied with Section 3 (b) of RA 6552. FDC shouldhave refund the appellee the cash surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to fifty percent ofthe total payments made. At this point, we, find no error on the part of the lower court when it ruled that:

"There is nothing in the record to show that the aforementioned requisites for a valid cancellation of a contractwhere complied with by defendant FDC. Hence, the contract to sell which defendant FDC cancelled as per its letterdated August 17, 1987 remains valid and subsisting. Defendant FDC cannot by its own forfeit the payments alreadymade by the plaintiff which as of the same date amounts to 263,637.73."(RTC rollo, p. 81)

We sustain the aforequoted findings and ruling of the CA, which were supported by the records and relevant laws,and were consistent with the findings and ruling of the RTC. Factual findings and rulings of the CA are binding andconclusive upon this Court if they are supported by the records and coincided with those made by the trial court.FDCs claim that it was distinct in personality from FSCC is unworthy of consideration due to its being a question offact that cannot be reviewed under Rule 45.

Among the obligations of FDC and FSCC to the unit owners or purchasers of FSBs units was the duty to provide acentralized air-conditioning unit, lighting, electricity, and water; and to maintain adequate fire exit, elevators, andcleanliness in each floor of the common areas of FSB. But FDC and FSCC failed to repair the centralized air-conditioning unit of the fourth floor of FSB despite repeated demands from Agcaoili. To alleviate the physicaldiscomfort and adverse effects on his work as a practicing attorney brought about by the breakdown of the air-

conditioning unit, he installed two window-type air-conditioners at his own expense. Also, FDC and FSCC failed toprovide water supply to the comfort room and to clean the corridors. The fire exit and elevator were alsodefective. These defects, among other circumstances, rightly compelled Agcaoili to suspend the payment of hismonthly amortizations and condominium dues. Instead of addressing his valid complaints, FDC disconnected theelectric supply of his Unit 411 and unilaterally increased the interest rate without justification.

Clearly, FDC was liable for damages. Article 1171 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance oftheir obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenorthereof are liable for damages.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review; AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals; and DIRECT the Clerk ofCourt of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, or his duly authorized deputy to assess and collect the


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additional docket fees from the respondent as fees in lien in accordance with Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules ofCourt.SO ORDERED.

4). [Tappa, GR 181303, Sept. 17 2009]CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders1 dated 4 May 2007, 30 May2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which

dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria DanaoAccorda, Evelyn Danao, Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, against respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna,Saturnino Cambri, Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil Case No. 6868.

Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages againstrespondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that theyare the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937 situated inTuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao(Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), whowas married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio andConsuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.

Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the subject property evenafter her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned thatrespondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitionersdemanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.

Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan Westfor conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject propertyand presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.

According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving thelatters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title tothe property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from theirtitle. Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in theamount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latters baseless claim over the subject property that did not actuallybelong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Petitioners likewise prayed for anaward against respondents for exemplary damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in badfaith and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked torecover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, because the latters refusal to vacate the propertyconstrained petitioners to engage the services of a lawyer.

Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners

Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691, amending BatasPambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC withjurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found thatthe subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same wasoutside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order that:The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property with assessed valueless than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice.Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint. Theyargued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely toenable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed,since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court 13 states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of theRTC.

In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an actionto quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercisesexclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does not exceedP20,000.00. Since

the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving thesame was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument thatSection 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction ofthe RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting oftitle and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez. And even if the two causes of actioncould not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for thedismissal of their Complaint.
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The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion. It clarified that their Complaint wasdismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissectedSection 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, orwhose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmentalregulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court todetermine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or toconsolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Thefirst paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The secondparagraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property.The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction overreal actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manilaand P20,000.00 in all other places. The dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the RTC reads:This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the assessedvalue of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action.In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.

Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of:IWHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THECOMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO.Petitioners statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only challenging the fact that theirComplaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the instantPetition, however, the Court determines that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committedgrave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.The Court rules in the negative.An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or otherwritten instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the writteninstrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinctionbetween the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which aperson may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a

statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach orviolation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of constructionor validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63may be brought before the appropriate RTC.Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or toconsolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for thereformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title,authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar todeclaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without theneed of execution to carry the judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,as amended.It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action toquiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" that an action for quieting of title "may bebrought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratoryrelief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statutedenotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.


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In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall"and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title toor possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in CivilCases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or anyinterest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand

pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousandpesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs:x x x (Emphasis ours.)

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 isonly P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within theexclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instrumentsinvolved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure anauthoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for theirguidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an allegedbreach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to whichit refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reachedthe state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will setcontroversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission ofwrongs.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, thecourts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over anaction for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of theaction.In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded andrespondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the lattersexpress claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge topetitioners title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property,the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case fordeclaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrenceof the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suitthat has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action

would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued onlyatP410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, didnot commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868for lack of jurisdiction.

As for the RTC dismissing petitioners Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of the CourtinLaresma v. Abellana proves instructive:It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the materialallegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over thesubject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which,otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the courtover an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by expressconsent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex meromotu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot

be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a courtor tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same wasperformed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse ofdiscretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal toperform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in anarbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. No such circumstances exist herein as tojustify the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No.6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case tothe Municipal Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.
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SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that accion publiciana was the civil action involving title to orpossession of real property referred to in Section 33 of BP 129, as amended. Petitioner also claimed respondent wasalready estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC because of respondents participation in all theproceedings in the MeTC coupled with respondents failure to timely object to the jurisdiction of the MeTC.In her comment, respondent reasoned that while Section 33 of BP 129, as amended, explicitly qualified the courtsjurisdiction depending on the assessed value of the real property, accion publiciana conferred jurisdiction on

regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property. Respondent further argued that lack of jurisdictioncould be raised anytime.Upon the RTCs denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petitionfor review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court contending that the RTC erred in ruling that the MeTC had nojurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. Petitioner maintained respondent was already estopped from questioningthe jurisdiction of the MeTC. In her comment, respondent stressed that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accionpubliciana cases. Respondent reiterated the argument that lack of jurisdiction could be raised anytime. In itsreply, petitioner cited Refugia v. Court of Appeals in claiming that the MeTC had limited original jurisdiction in civilactions involving title to or possession of real property depending on the propertys assessed value.

The Ruling of the Court of AppealsIn its 28 July 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review holding that appeal from adecision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction should be by way of a notice of appeal.The Court of Appeals ruled that appeal by way of petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court could beresorted to only when what was appealed from was a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellatejurisdiction. In its 5 July 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Hence, the instant petition for review.

The IssuesThe issues for resolution are (1) whether a petition for review under Rule 42 is the proper mode of appeal from adecision of the RTC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and (2) whether the RTC correctly ruled that the MeTChas no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases.

The Courts RulingThe petition is meritorious.Petitioner posits that even if the RTC rendered the judgment in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Court ofAppeals still erred in dismissing the petition for review because a petition for review contains all the requisites of anotice of appeal. Petitioner argues the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review on technicalitywithout considering the merits of the case. Petitioner maintains the MeTC has jurisdiction since the assessed valueof the lot subject ofaccion publiciana is only P48,000.00.Respondent counters that the decision of the RTC was rendered in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,unmistakably an original action. Respondent maintains that a petition for review cannot be treated as a form of anotice of appeal because of the inextendible nature of the latter. Respondent further argues that the RTC correctly

ruled the MeTC has no jurisdiction in accion publiciana cases. Respondent claims she is not estopped fromquestioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC.Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court inthe exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court whichrendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. xx x(b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court inthe exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.(Emphasis supplied)x x x x

The Rule is clear. In cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal to the Court ofAppeals is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise ofitsappellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review under Rule 42.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary

restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from further proceeding has been issued against the publicrespondent. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without a doubt, an original action.Since the decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was rendered in the exercise of its originaljurisdiction, appeal from the said RTC decision to the Court of Appeals should have been made by filing a notice ofappeal, not a petition for review under Rule 42.

However, in numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve thedemands of substantial justice. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. It is better toexcuse a technical lapse rather than dispose of a case on technicality, giving a false impression of speedy disposalof cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 37 In the present case, a dismissal on atechnicality would only mean a new round of litigation between the same parties for the same cause of action, over
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the same subject matter. Thus, notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the Court of Appeals should nothave so easily dismissed the petition.

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the plenary actionofaccion publiciana must be brought before regional trial courts.38With the modifications introduced by RepublicAct No. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial courts has been limited to real actions where the assessed valueexceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the action is filed in Metro Manila. If the assessed value is below the saidamounts, the action must be brought before first level courts. As so amended, BP 129 now provides:

Sec. 33.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in CivilCases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or anyinterest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twentythousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does notexceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,litigation expenses, and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of suchproperty shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis supplied)

Under BP 129, as amended, jurisdiction even in accion publiciana cases is determined by the assessed value of theproperty. The Court recently explained in Spouses Alcantara v. Nido that assessed value is the worth or value of theproperty as fixed by the taxing authorities for the purpose of determining the applicable tax rate. The assessedvalue does not necessarily represent the true or market value of the property.In the present case, the complaint, which was filed after the enactment of R.A. 7691, contained a statement that,based on the tax declaration filed in the Office of the Assessor, the lot subject of the accion publiciana has anassessed value of P48,000.00. A copy of the tax declaration was attached as Annex "B" of the complaint. Thesubject lot, with an assessed value below the jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila, comes within theexclusive original jurisdiction of the MeTC under BP 129, as amended. Thus, the RTC erred in holding that the MeTChad no jurisdiction in this case.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated 28 July 2005 and 5 July 2006 of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88995. We REINSTATE the 25 April 2003 Decision and the 20 June 2003 Orderof the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 77) of Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 11868.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

6) [Alcantara v. Nido GR 165133] April 19, 2010CARPIO, J.:The CaseSpouses Antonio and Joselina Alcantara and Spouses Josefino and Annie Rubi (petitioners) filed this Petition forReview assailing the Court of Appeals (appellate court) Decision2 dated 10 June 2004 as well as theResolution3dated 17 August 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78215. In the assailed decision, the appellate court reversed

the 17 June 2002 Decision4 of Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal (RTC) by dismissing thecase for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary injunction filed by Brigida L. Nido (respondent), inher capacity as administrator and attorney-in-fact of Revelen N. Srivastava (Revelen).

The FactsRevelen, who is respondents daughter and of legal age, is the owner of an unregistered land with an area of 1,939square meters located in Cardona, Rizal. Sometime in March 1984, respondent accepted the offer of petitioners topurchase a 200-square meter portion of Revelens lot (lot) at P200 per square meter. Petitioners paid P3,000 asdownpayment and the balance was payable on installment. Petitioners constructed their houses in 1985. In 1986,with respondents consent, petitioners occupied an additional 150 square meters of the lot. By 1987, petitionershad already paid P17,500 before petitioners defaulted on their installment payments.On 11 May 1994, respondent, acting as administrator and attorney-in-fact of Revelen, filed a complaint for recoveryof possession with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioners with the RTC.

The RTCs RulingThe RTC stated that based on the evidence presented, Revelen owns the lot and respondent was verbally

authorized to sell 200 square meters to petitioners. The RTC ruled that since respondents authority to sell the landwas not in writing, the sale was void under Article 1874 of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled that rescission is the properremedy.On 17 June 2002, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, by -

1. Declaring the contract to sell orally agreed by the plaintiff Brigida Nido, in her capacity asrepresentative or agent of her daughter Revelen Nido Srivastava, VOID and UNENFORCEABLE.2. Ordering the parties, upon finality of this judgment, to have mutual restitution the defendants and allpersons claiming under them to peacefully vacate and surrender to the plaintiff the possession of thesubject lot covered by TD No. 09-0742 and its derivative Tax Declarations, together with all permanentimprovements introduced thereon, and all improvements built or constructed during the pendency of thisaction, in bad faith; and the plaintiff, to return the sum of P17,500.00, the total amount of the installment
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on the land paid by defendant; the fruits and interests during the pendency of the condition shall bedeemed to have been mutually compensated.3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus P15,000.00 asactual litigation expenses, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The Appellate Courts RulingOn 5 January 2004, petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision to the appellate court. In its decision dated 10

June 2004, the appellate court reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the civil case.The appellate court explained that this is an unlawful detainer case. The prayer in the complaint and amendedcomplaint was for recovery of possession and the case was filed within one year from the last demand letter. Evenif the complaint involves a question of ownership, it does not deprive the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of itsjurisdiction over the ejectment case. Petitioners raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in their Motion to Dismiss andAnswer before the RTC.11 The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and assumed jurisdiction over the case because theissues pertain to a determination of the real agreement between the parties and rescission of the contract to sellthe property.

The appellate court added that even if respondents complaint is for recovery of possession or accion publiciana,the RTC still has no jurisdiction to decide the case. The appellate court explained:Note again that the complaint was filed on 11 May 1994. By that time, Republic Act No. 7691 was already in effect.Said law took effect on 15 April 1994, fifteen days after its publication in the Malaya and in the Time Journal on 30March 1994 pursuant to Sec. 8 of Republic Act No. 7691.

Accordingly, Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa 129 was amended by Republic Act No. 7691 giving the Municipal TrialCourt the exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, or anyinterest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000 or, in civilactions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50,000, exclusive of interest, damages ofwhatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs.At bench, the complaint alleges that the whole 1,939- square meter lot of Revelen N. Srivastava is covered by TaxDeclaration No. 09-0742 (Exh. "B", p. 100, Records) which gives its assessed value of the whole lot of P4,890.00.Such assessed value falls within the exclusive original prerogative or jurisdiction of the first level court and,therefore, the Regional Trial Court a quo has no jurisdiction to try and decided the same.

The appellate court also held that respondent, as Revelens agent, did not have a written authority to enter intosuch contract of sale; hence, the contract entered into between petitioners and respondent is void. A void contractcreates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations. Ther

Documents

1st Assign of Cases -7 & RA 7691