1993-Sociological Inquiry

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Marking

Time *

Judith

A,

Howard and Jocelyn

A.

Hollander

University

of

Washington

The authors argue that temporality is

a

significant dimension of social activity.

The paper reviews the phenomenological experience of temporality, ways of concep-

tualizing time, and ways in which temporality may shape interpretation, and illustrates

these themes through an empirical study in which approximately 80 subjects read and

responded to one

of

two short stories. Themes

of

temporality were explored in the inter-

view transcripts through references to temporal themes, temporality as an influence on

causal and trait attributions, temporal chains, and other forms of interpretive cycles,

as well as ways in which temporality is involved in the definition of other and possible

others. On the basis of these patterns, we conclude that time is a crucial factor in

shaping interpretations

of

social life.

Introduction

Although much thought has been devoted to the concept of time in

disciplines such as philosophy, life sciences, and biological psychology

(McGrath 1988, pp. 9-10), relatively little attention has been paid to the

sociology

of

time. Yet time is a critical dimension

of

social life. Temporality

organizes social lives (Zerubavel 1981), plays a vital role in the understanding

of causal connections (Brickman, Ryan, and Wortman 1975; Kruglanski

1975), and fundamentally structures human experience (McGrath 1988). At

least part of the reason for the empirical neglect is pragmatic: including time

as a research parameter is often difficult and expensive. Moreover, this neglect

is self-perpetuating; because time is rarely considered, neither a methodology

nor a disciplinary consensus on the importance of time has developed.

Other barriers are more conceptual and paradigmatic. Traditional

sociology is dominated by synchronic theory, which deals only with timeless,

static snapshots of entities. This equilibrium-based research paradigm:

. . treats variation, conflict, and change as unintended and undesired

perturbations in what are looked upon as stable, harmonious, and equilibrium-

seeking adaptive systems. This static orientation . . . trivializes the temporal

features of the system under study.

. . .

(McGrath 1988, p. 8). Similarly, a

fundamental assumption of the sociological conception of general linear reality

is that the order of events does not influence their outcomes (Abbott 1988).

KennethJ Gergen (1984) takes this argument one step further, suggesting

Sociolofical Znyuiry, Vol.

63,

No. 4,

November 1993

1993 by the University of Texas

Press P.O.

Box 7819, Austin,

TX

78713


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426 J U D I T H A . H O W A R D A N D J O C E L Y N A . H O L L A N D E R

that both the difficulty of studying the flow of social experience over time and the

presumed superiority of experimental over more naturalistic designs have

created a belief among traditional sociologists in phenomenal immutability.

Researchers have, therefore, focused on events removed from their temporal

context. Gergen contrasts this with a diachronic approach, which considers

the state of an entity across temporal periods.

To

exclude temporality as a

parameter in social analyses is to ignore a crucial dimension of social life.

In this paper the authors seek to demonstrate the importance of temporality

for one form of significant social activity, the interpretation of everyday

interaction. Time is crucial for making meaning. Time “constitute[s] one

of

the major parameters of the context on which the meaning of social acts and

situations depends” (Zerubavel 1981, pp. 101-102). In order to understand

the role of time in interpretation, it is necessary also to understand what time

itself means and how it is experienced.

A

review of relevant if diverse literature

points to the importance of temporality, outlines ways of conceptualizing time,

and suggests particular ways in which temporality may shape interpretation.

Perceiving Time

Dimensions

of

Time

There are at least three general categories of temporal order: the physio-

temporal order, the temporal patterns of the physical world; the biotemporal

order, the temporal patterns of living organisms; and the sociotemporal order,

the patterns of social life (Zerubavel 1981). Social time is largely unrelated to

physiotemporal or biotemporal patterns and cycles. While the physiotemporal

and biotemporal orders are inevitably constrained

b y

nature, according to

Eviatar Zerubavel, the sociotemporal order is ”essentially a socially constructed

artifact which rests upon arbitrary social conventions” (1981, p. xii). Socio-

temporal units are a symbolic system with no intrinsic value. These intrin-

sically meaningless constructions, however, are reified such that their impact

on human life is as real as more physical temporal constraints. The limited

research available on the sociology of time focuses on individuals’ social

constructions of this sociotemporal order, attempting to account for cultural

and individual differences in temporal orientations and perceptions, in the

experience of time and in the allocation and use of time across multiple

activities (McGrath 1988).

There are a variety of dimensions within the sociotemporal order: tem-

poral location or when events take place in time; their duration and the

allocation of time to various activities; their rates of recurrence, rhythm, or

periodicity; temporal scale, the scope of a phenomenon. Micro-level temporal

scale, for example, might include patterns

of

synchronization and sequencing


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MARKING T I M E 427

in interaction (e. g., turntaking in conversation), whereas macro-level temporal

scale might include the temporal sequencing of events within a n organization

or role (e.g., one must pass the bar examination before practicing law, and

these days one is supposed to complete one’s Ph.D. before beginning

a

job as

an assistant professor). Temporal aspects of stages in the life course, or repe-

tition of behavior

or

events over multiple generations represent even broader

temporal scope (McGrath and Kelly 1986; McGrath 1988).

The sequencing of events, the order in which behaviors or events occur,

is a particularly important dimension. Some sequences are inevitable (e.g.,

youth must necessarily precede old age), while others are constructed

or

sym-

bolic (e.g., one claps only after the final movement of a classical symphony-

the dark looks cast at those who clap after a single movement suggests the

normative status of particular sequences). The sequencing of events plays a

critical role in understanding the causal connections between events, and thus

helps us to make sense of the world. A known temporal order, according to

McGrath andKelly, “is essential to draw a causal inference at all”(1986,p. 3).

Events are generally seen to result from a preexisting cause(s) and to be

antecedents to potential subsequent effects. Thus, events located in the past

often draw their meaning as much from their perceived consequences as from

their perceived antecedents (Brickman, Ryan, and Wortman 1975; Kelley 1983).

Another more interpersonal aspect of the sequencing of events is the

necessary synchronization

of

varying rhythms and patterns

of

time within a

single individual, between individuals and groups, or between humans and

the physical world,

a

process which McGrath and Kelly (1986) label “entrain-

ment. Much human behavior at both interpersonal and organizational levels

involves the “mutual entrainment of endogenous rhythms,” which in turn

“become entrained to arbitrary but powerful external cycles” (p. 48) such as

daylnight cycles and work schedules.

The

Social Construction and Manipllation

of ime

George Herbert Mead’s (1929, 1932) theory of the past and present is

one of the most extreme statements of the social construction of time. Mead

conceptualized experience as inherently temporal; the present always establishes

the extent and span of temporal experience. According to Mead, reality is

always the present, and events that constitute the referents of past and future

always belong to the present: “memory and anticipation build on both ends”

of the present (Mead 1932, p. 66). Because the present consists of emergent

events, and the present is thus unique, the future is always insecure. Mead’s

very conception of sociality involves an adjustment process through which

previous presents are aligned with current presents; both continuity and

change occur in the present.


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JUDITH

A .

HOWARD

AND JOCELYN A. H OLLANDER

These reconstructions of time are also fundamentally social: for Mead,

time is not just an abstract category, but is social, political, cultural,

or

eco-

nomic. Time is used in the service of rational collective action and social

control (Strauss 1991).A similar functionalism is implicit in David

R.

Maines,

Noreen M. Sugrue, and Michael Katovich’s (1983) categorization of Mead’s

conception of the past. The symbolically reconstructed past (redefining the

meaning of past events so that they have meaning in and utility for the present),

the social structural past (the contexts of experience made up of sequences of

activities that condition [but do not determine the continuity with the present),

the implied objective past (the actual existence of previous events as implied

by present realities), and the mythical past (symbolic creations used to

manipulate social relationships), all are components

of

reconstructions

designed to create and maintain social advantage.

Other analysts offer more contemporary examples of Mead’s assumption

that time is used in the service of social control. For example, Barry Schwartz

(1

974) presents

an

intriguing empirical analysis of how imperfections in the

interpersonal synchronization of time, more familiar to us as waiting, express

the distribution

of

social power. Schwartz asserts that time

is

one of the many

resources distributed in stratification systems. Zerubavel (1987) makes a

similar point using language rather than behavior

as

a mode of communication

of status. Zerubavel suggests that various dimensions

of

temporality (dura-

tion, speed, frequency, timing) are manipulated as semiotic codes that convey

social messages about priority, importance, commitment, respect, and

intimacy, without having to articulate these messages directly.

It is

important to note that the degree to which time serves such exogenous

purposes varies across events. Arie Kruglanski’s (1975) distinction between

endogenous and exogenous motivations for behavior encodes this variation.

Exogenously motivated behavior is undertaken as a means to an (usually

future) end, distinct from whatever end might follow in the immediate situa-

tion. Endogenously motivated behavior, on the other hand,

is

undertaken as

an end in itself: the behavior is intrinsically rewarding, implying a present

rather than future orientation. In other words, it is only endogenously,

intrinsically motivated behavior that generates what Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi

(1 988) calls “flow”or “optimal experience.” Flow involves focused concentra-

tion, total attention, and a “merging of activity and awareness.” Flow also

produces a distorted sense of time: “the clock no longer serves as a good analog

of

the temporal quality of experience . hours seem to pass by in minutes,

and occasionally a few seconds stretch out into what seems to be an infinity”

(1988,

p .

33).

If time is essentially a social construction, then it is imperative to under-

stand those factors that shape this construction. At a macro level, culture


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MARKING TIME

429

imposes some constraints on the meaning and experience of time. Joseph E.

McGrath and Janice R. Kelly (1986, p. 18) speak of a ”culturally-dominant

conception of time.” Conceptions of the structure of time are culture-specific:

time may be viewed as continuous

or

divisible, as homogeneous

or

epochal

(composed of different periods). Time may be viewed as a single duration

or

as

a

succession of periods of definite length. The flow of time too may be

culture-specific: time may be uniform, composed of fixed-length units as a

watch would suggest, or it may be nonuniform, phasic. It may be linear,

cyclical, or spiral. It may be unidirectional or bidirectional. The ontological

status of time may also be culture-specific: is time objective and absolute,

existing separate from observers and events, or is it subjective and relational?

Even the very validity of concepts and measures of time is at issue. Time may

be viewed as singular; on the other hand, multiple, equally valid times may

coexist.

Examples of culturally-specific conceptions of time are not hard to find.

The dominant temporal paradigm of industrialized Western culture is

Newtonian. From this perspective, the structure of time is divisible, homo-

geneous, and composed of a succession of measurable units. The flow of time

is uniform, unidirectional, linear. In terms of ontological status, time is

perceived as absolute, abstract, objective, singular, and therefore accurately

measurable (McGrath and Kelly 1986). Other cultures conceive of time quite

differently. Some Asian cultures, for example, view time as indivisible,

phasic, reversible, cyclical, illusory, multiple, and relational. For many

American Indian cultures, time is continuous, nonlinear, and circular

(Shanley 1991). Subcultures within a dominant culture may also generate

varying conceptions of time. Frieda Johles Forman and Caoran Sowton

(1989) present a feminist analysis of time, for example, in which they contend

the “aggressively inear” Newtonian conception of time is constructed by men,

whereas women’s time is centered more about cyclical rhythms. To complicate

matters further, multiple, occasionally conflicting, conceptions of time may

coexist within an individual. We can operate simultaneously in multiple,

embedded time frames; one can view time as ultimately linear and directional

yet experience it immediately as cyclical (as weekly schedules imply).

The existence of culturally variant conceptions of time seems inevitable

given the unresolvability of questions about the structure, flow, ontological

status, and validity

of

time. The importance

of

this variation is that these

paradigms have implications

for

individuals’ phenomenological experiences

and behavior. From this perspective, the critiques Zerubavel directs toward

contemporary conceptions of time are culture-specific. According to Zerubavel

(1981), our temporal system is becoming ever more highly rationalized,

mirroring Western culture. Time has become characterized by “mechanical


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JUDITH

A. HOWARD A ND JOCELYN A. HOLLANDER

periodicity” dictated by the schedule, the calendar, and the clock, with pro-

foundly negative consequences for both individuals and society. The coercive

aspects of regularity (e.g., enforced work schedules) allow for exploitation and

oppression. Repetitive routine results in a

loss

of spontaneity and freedom.

As technology becomes more sophisticated, temporal regularity is achieved

through social mechanistic control.

Temporal regularity also encourages the commodification

of

time. We

talk about “using time,” “spending time,” “saving time,” “buying time”: time

is a scarce resource that we count, measure, divide, save, exchange, buy, and

sell. A recent commercial embodies this philosophy: a sequence of customers

drives up to a drive-through fast food menu mike and orders, in turn, “an hour

or S O

a couple of minutes, and

a

few seconds to spare.” This quantitative,

economic-utilitarian philosophy of time has led in modern industrial society

to what Zerubavel (1981, p. 59) terms a “time famine” as we struggle to

include more and more activities in our finite schedules.

Yet this highly rationalized sociotemporal order does perform crucial

functions for social organization and meaning,

at

least in Western culture.

Temporal regularity imbues an otherwise random world with a sense of

orderliness, predictability, and normalcy. Regularity also allows for social

organization and coordination among individuals. The temporal regularity

embodied in scheduling allows for reliable public transportation, efficient

communication via mass media, and the budgeting of money over time, all

crucial features of contemporary Western society. Indeed such regularity has

important social consequences as well; the possibility of intentionally coincid-

ing schedules enhances social solidarity. And, even within the boundaries of

this highly quantified, objectified temporal order, time continues to have

qualitative aspects. The same social action can take on different meanings

depending on when it is performed: during the day, at night, during working

hours, during leisure hours. Temporal boundaries act as separation and

transition between different times, activities, and social roles. Temporal

boundaries often separate the public and private spheres,

or

religious and

secular times. This western sociotemporal order is the backdrop against which

interpretation of social action occurs.

Interpretive Uses of Time

Constructing se2f nd other.

Whatever the prevailing cultural conception,

time is a crucial factor in shaping interpretations. One of the most significant

illustrations of this influence

is

the temporal construction of identity. The

construction of identity occurs over an extended period of time. Kenneth

Gergen and Mary Gergen (1983, 1984) suggest that we construct life narra-

tives, stories that are woven through time and come

to

symbolize particular


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MARKING TIME 43

1

life paths. Micro narratives refer to concrete and particular interactions;

macro narratives are more general and characterize life stages. These narratives

are also directional, that is, progressive, regressive, or stable.

Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius’ (1986) concept of possible selves,

future-oriented components of the self-concept that personalize and give

enduring cognitive form to one’s goals and motives, shows how we use time

as a cognitive marker in constructing current self. This concept suggests also

the continually shifting, yet partially stable, nature of the self. Markus and

Nurius suggest that both past and future possible selves motivate self-initiated

growth and change. Although these authors focus primarily on future selves,

Kathy Charmaz’ (1992) study of perceptions of self among chronically ill

people demonstrates that curtailments of an expected future can lead us to

focus on past selves. Both lines of research demonstrate that time plays

a

crucial role in defining the self. When speaking of a situated self, then, we

indicate that the self is situated in time as well as in relationships.

Stuart Albert (1977) proposes a more formal analysis of the significance

of temporality in defining self, recasting Leon Festinger’s social comparison

theory into a theory of intrapersonal comparisons across time. The following

are key propositions:

1

Humans are motivated to maintain a sense of an enduring self-identity over time and to

evaluate and adjust to perceived changes in aspects of the self over time.

2.

When objective evidence of an enduring self-identity is unavailable, we engage in

internal historical comparisons of present and past self-descriptions.

3 . The tendency to compare a current self with a past self decreasesas the temporal distance

increases. (However, it is noteworthy that the telescoping of memory, which seems to

accompany aging, contradicts this proposition.)

4 A discrepancy between current and past self-descriptions produces a tendency to change

both current and past self-descriptions, and there may be a tendency to change the view

of the past more than the view of the present. To the extent this proves impossible, we

tend to cease comparison with those past self-descriptions.

5

The more relevant a past self-description to an individual self-identity, the greater the

pressure toward uniformity

of

past and present self-descriptions.

6

Temporal comparisons that present evidence of progress or growth will be favored over

those that present evidence of decay or decline (consistent with Gergen and Gergen’s

[

19831hypothesis that we favor progressive over regressive narratives).

7. Temporal comparison is more likely if the affective quality of the present is negative

rather than positive.

Albert focuses primarily on the role of temporality in defining self. In the

research reported below we consider whether temporality and temporal com-

parisons play a similar role in defining and constructing others. It would also

be intriguing to extend this model to consider whether relationships between

self and other are part

of

the temporal contexts that shape the construction of

self and other. In other words, do we define self on the basis of key relationships


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JUD ITH A. HOWARD AND JOCELYN A. HOLLANDER

which take on greater or lesser importance at specific times in our lives?

What times are defined as central may even reflect the significance of our

social relationships.

H u m a n

memory.

One seeming exception to the general assertion that there

has been little social psychological work on time is the vast literature on

human memory. Curiously, time itself is a vague and abstract variable in the

vast proportion of research on memory. Memory is typically divided into two

categories, for example, long-term and short-term memory. Everything that

is not immediately accessible in thought is categorized as long-term memory.

The length of long-term,and possible temporal divisions within long-term

memory, have not been addressed.

One relevant line of work pertinent both to memory and the construction

of self is Michael Ross’ research on personal histories. Ross (Ross and Conway

1986,

Ross

1989) stresses the social construction of autobiography, describing

how people use implicit theories of self to construct their personal histories.

Contemporary themes in social cognition shape much of this research, em-

phasizing the fallibility and bias in the construction of one’s past. Recall is

viewed as selective; consistent with Albert’s hypothesis, we retrieve from

memory what is most relevant and usually most consistent with current

concerns. We reinterpret and reinvent the past. We forget, and we fill in the

gaps in memory by inferring on the basis of the present what might have

occurred in the past. Thus the construction of personal pasts,like memories of

other social events, is vulnerable to a host of cognitive errors and biases (Fiske

and Taylor 1991). Ross does put this vulnerability in

a

different and more

positive light than many social cognitivists, pointing out that theories about

the stability of personal behavior and of one’s self lead us to assume continuity

in the absence of perfect information, an assumption that is often correct.

The significant point for the purpose of this paper is that we do have theories

of personal and interpersonal stability and change, and these theories guide

how we encode and remember social behaviors.

A n

Empirical

Illustration

Some of these aspects of time can be illustrated through an interdisciplinary

study of readers’ interpretations of two published short stories. This study was

designed to evaluate predictions from attribution and reader response theories

(Howard and Allen 1989, 1990). Because temporal themes were evident in

these interpretations, the transcripts of these readings are used as examples

of temporal influences on interpretation.

Texts

The two texts were William Faulkner’s (1946) “A Rose for Emily”’ and a


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MARKING TIME

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story by Jayne Anne Phillips (1979), “Home.” These texts were selected to

incorporate variation in writing style, probable familiarity with the texts

on

the part of the readers, and gender-related themes. In both stories the passing

of time is presented nonchronologically hrough flashbacks and reminiscences.

“A

Rose for Emily” is well-known; it is included in

a

number of twentieth

century short story collections. Briefly, “Emily” is about an older Southern

woman who has outlived her generation. The story, told by an unnamed

narrator who seems to represent the voice of the town, begins with Emily’s

death and in a series of flashbacks describes her youth, her close but tightly

circumscribed life with her father, her unexpected involvement with a Yankee

named Homer, and Homer’s disappearance. The story ends with the revela-

tion that Homer’s body has been in Emily’s bed for many years, with the

strong suggestion that she may have lain with his body all those years.

‘Wome” is a contemporary fiction, told by a member of the Vietnam

War generation. The narrator,

a

woman in her twenties, has come home to

live with her mother while going through difficult financial times. The story

follows the ambivalent relationship between mother and daughter. The

daughter is disturbed by what she sees as her mother’s settling for an unhappy

life. The mother has supported the daughter almost singlehandedly, even before

the death

of

the mother’s alcoholic husband. From the mother’s perspective,

the daughter leads an irresponsible and unstable life. Through a series of

flashbacks, the reader learns of the daughter’s high school relationship with

a

man named Jason and her more recent relationship with Daniel, a Vietnam

veteran. Daniel comes to visit. When the mother is at church, Daniel and the

daughter make love; they continue even when the mother returns, and she

hears them. She reacts by engaging in a ritualistic washing of clean dishes.

Sobbing, she later rebukes her daughter. The story ends with this difficult

emotional scene between mother and daughter.

Readers

The readers in this study were 55 female and 25 male students recruited

in summer school classes. Because some of these readers were adult profes-

sionals attending school for further certification, their ages and life experiences

were more advanced than those of the average undergraduate. Their average

age was 27.5 years;

63

were college students, and

17

of them had attained

a college degree.

Procedures

All participants were asked to read one of these two randomly assigned

short stories and to provide their reactions to

this

story through a tape-recorded

interview and completion of a written questionnaire. The readers were asked


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J U D I T H A . H O W A R D A N D J O C E L Y N A. H O L L A N D E R

to comment on the story while reading it, with the instructions to ”tell as much

as you can about what you’re thinking and feeling” while reading the story.

They were then asked a series of structured interview questions. The transcripts

of these interviews range from one to

20

pages; the average length is 7 03

pages (“Emily”) and

8 .38

pages (“Home”).

General intem’ew questions

nd

codes.

Descriptive codes were constructed for

the responses to each of the structured interview questions. First, the readers

were stopped before the final plot sequence and asked to predict what would

happen

at

the end

of

the story and why. They were

also

asked about the

meaning of the story. We also asked questions specific to each story. Readers

of “Emily” were asked: Why did Emily kill Homer? Why did Emily sleep with

Homer after killing him? What is Emily like? What is the narrator like?

Readers of Wome” were asked: Why did the daughter sleep with Daniel?

Why did the mother react as she did? What is the narrator like? What is the

mother like?

Codes or temporal themes.

Each of the two authors (of this paper) read through

a subset of interview transcripts multiple times to identify mentions of tem-

porality and any dimensions of temporality. The resulting coding scheme

was used to evaluate each

of

the

80

transcripts. With phrases as the unit

of

analysis, any reference to events marked by time,

or

to possible causes or

consequences of events marked by time was coded in terms of as many as ten

variables. When both a cause and a consequence were noted and both referred

to time, both were coded. The full set

of

ten possible descriptors of cause

and/or consequence was treated as a unit. Although each unit logically could

contain up to

20

elements, most were much less extensive.

As

many as ten

units per transcript were entered into the data file.

Each cause

or

consequence unit included up to ten variables. The first

variable was the referent of the statement:

a

trait of one of the actors, an emo-

tional behavior,

a

goal-oriented behavior, an occurrence

or

event, a relation-

ship between the actors, the story as

a

whole,

or

mentions of the actor’s

changing

or

failing to change. Identification of the actor(s), where the referent

was a person, was the second variable. The third variable was the locus of

causality, the most prominent dimension in attributional analyses; was the

cause/consequence internal, external,

or

some combination of these two

dimensions? The fourth variable was the implicit

or

explicit motivation for

the causelconsequence; the categories were endogenous (often present-oriented)

or

exogenous (typically future-oriented: Kruglanski

1975 .

The complexity

of the causelconsequence was coded as simple

or

complex. In practice this

code proved difficult to apply and thus likely has low reliability. The generality

of the cause/consequence was coded simply as specific

or

general.


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MARKING TIME 435

The temporal referent was coded into five categories: distant past, recent

past, present, near future, or far future. We also coded a more complex time

referent, mentions of temporal chains. Brickman et al. (1975) used the term

causal chains to refer to connected distal and proximal causes of a behavior.

We refer to temporal chains, that is, implicit or explicit connections between

two different times, for example, distant past-immediate past, or present-far

future. In coding these we distinguished among distant, recent, and immediate

past, present, and immediate, near, and far futures. We also coded mentions

of

narratives, distinguishing between micro and macro narratives, those that

refer to concrete and particular interactions versus those that are more general

and characterize life stages. We also attempted to characterize the direction

of these narratives as progressive, regressive, or stable, but this proved a more

complex distinction than the readers appeared to apply in their interpretations.

We also coded mentions of several more general variables which were

summed to create a total score for each transcript. These included explicit

mentions of time as a theme in the story, time as part

of

the structure of the

story, and any mentions of possible selves. We coded for past, future, or

time-unspecified possible selves of each of the major characters, the mother,

daughter, and Daniel in “Home,” and Emily and Homer in “Emily.”

Exploratory

Questions

We began by considering basic descriptive information. How prevalent

is the theme of time in these interpretations? Is time perceived as synchronic,

as prevailing social science models assume, or as diachronic? It

is

important

to note that both stories do present events that occur over a full lifetime, and

the passing of time is presented through stylistic techniques that make this

element of the structure of the stories salient. Thus we can assess how much

readers respond to available cues about time, not whether they would miss

its absence.

We consider next the perceived characteristics and structure of time: its

duration, scope, rhythms, and sequencing (including causal and interpersonal

sequences). We turn then to the role of temporality in interpretation. Do the

readers use temporal information about the actors in forming impressions of

those actors? Do readers construct life narratives? Are ”possible others” of

the key actors constructed and used as part of these interpretations? Are

Albert’s 1977) propositions about the role of temporality in defining the self

useful in modeling the construction of “other”?

Descriptions of Time

The most basic question is whether time is perceived as an important

element in these stories. In terms of general reactions to the stories, there are


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J U D I T H

A .

H O W A R D

AND

J O C E L Y N A. HOLLANDER

163

mentions of time as a theme and

61

mentions of time as part of the story

structure. Thus, averaged over the

80

transcripts, time is mentioned as a

theme slightly more than twice in each transcript, and as part of the story

structure in

75

percent of the transcripts. Moreover, there were

73

mentions

of cycles and repetitions in these stories. The following quotations suggest

what we mean by time as a theme: ‘The picture of the house neglected as an

eyesore, probably a sense of time-in the old days it was great and now in the

new days it isn’t so good” (“Emily”). “How much

of

your old life gets locked

up with your present when you do go back” (‘TFlome”,).

The codes developed for the preliminary questions about each specific

story also reveal temporal themes. When explaining the ending they pre-

dicted, readers of “Home” noted that the story has no direction, or leads to a

confrontation. They commented also on the pace of the story and its reliance

on flashbacks. In summarizing its meaning, some readers suggested it was

about recollecting the past, about changes in time. Readers of “Emily” also

commented on the time sequences and the circularity of the narration. In

summarizing the meaning of this story, readers identified insight into the

time period, a sense of Emily as stuck in time, or

a

sense of gradual dying and

decay, as possible interpretations.

As

one example: “You get this sense

of

a

genteel lady from a previous time living in a world that doesn’t exist any

more. Taken together, these patterns suggest that time is indeed a significant

dimension in interpretations of these stories.

These stories are perceived also as diachronic, describing

the

state of the

relevant actors and events across temporal periods, rather than as synchronic,

presenting these entities as timeless and static. Of course, this depends in no

small degree on the actual substance of the stories.

It

is notable, however, that

the readers comment on the progression of events as progressions, the develop-

ment of personalities and style, as developmental. This is especially important

for perceptions of ‘Wome,”

a

story that many readers described as

so

realistic

as to be almost boring. The progressions in the substance of the story mirror

the progressions of everyday, diachronic life.

The

Perception

of

Time

Several variables shed light on how time is perceived. The coding scheme

itself is one indicator. The variable temporal referent was divided into five

categories, as noted above, and the transcripts did not show evidence of more

specific segmentation of time.

As

shown in Table

1,

the two most frequently

used categories were distant past and present. The relatively few mentions of

recent past as opposed

to

distant past, taken together with the lack of more

specific segmentation in the transcripts, suggests that these readers tend to

chunk time into relatively large, undifferentiated segments. The low


13/19

Table 1

Frequencies of the Perception of Time

Descrifitors of Time

Number o Mentions

Time Frame

Distant Past

Recent Past

Present

Near Future

Far Future

Temporal Chain

DP-IP

DP-P

RP-P

P-IF

P-FF

Narratives

Micro

Macro

Unspecified

Internal

External

Combined

Unit of Reference

Locus

Trait

Emotional Behavior

Goal Behavior

Occurrence

Motivation

Endogenous

Exogenous

Combined

Complexity

Simple

Complex

Specific

General

Combined

Generality

47

18

42

9

1

11

117

38

5

24

92

219

11

66

102

170

65

117

144

30

18

99

21

8

284

98

193

6


14/19

438 JUDITH A . HOWARD AND JOCELYN A. HOLLANDER

frequencies for either category of future probably reflect the content of the

stories rather than a more general pattern.

We imposed the greater specificity of the codes for temporal chains in

order to examine the full range

of

possible chains. The frequencies with

which readers used these chains also point to the rather simplistic segmentation

of time. Of 21 possible chains, there were five

or

more mentions of only five

such chains.

Of

these, three dominated readers’ reactions (see Table

1):

distant

past to present, recent past to present, and present to fa r future. These pat-

terns also suggest that these readers tend to structure time into large, undif-

ferentiated units. Another important message is that these readers do construct

temporal chains, linking events through time.

Another indicator of the phenomenology of time is the extent to which

these readers encode events in terms of narratives, stories that are woven

across time and that symbolize particular life paths (Gergen and Gergen

1983, 1984). As shown in Table 1, narratives are prominent in these inter-

pretations. A full 322 narratives are mentioned in these

80

transcripts. Macro

narratives, general stories that characterize life stages, are more than twice

as frequent as micro narratives, stories that refer

to

concrete and particular

interactions. This pattern is yet another indicator of the tendency of these

readers to perceive or construct larger phenomenal units of time. These

readers did not focus on the directions

of

these narratives. Clear directional

codes could be assigned to only twenty of these mentions of narratives.

Of

these, stable narratives predominated, but we hesitate to draw any conclusions

from these few examples.

Sequencing is another aspect of

the

perception of time. Many of the

interpretive codes point to the significance of both intrapersonal and inter-

personal sequencing. In “Home,” explanations of why the daughter slept with

Daniel focused on her unhappy series of love affairs. A number of readers

also pointed to serious negative interactions with her father many years ago

in commenting on the daughter’s personality. Some noted simply that she

focused on the past. Recognition of cohort shifts was

also

evident: readers

described the mother as a product of her age, and they noted also the dif-

ferences in attitudes between the mother and daughter. Comments on the

daughter’s relationship with her mother noted the temporal inappropriateness

of her living with her mother again after having already left home to go to

college. Looking at this pattern from the mother’s perspective,

a

number of

readers commented that the mother was jealous of her daughter, seeing that

her

own

past was over.

For

example: “Maybe she [the mother] is jealous

. .

because that

sets

her into thinking about her past and she herself cannot ever

do it again, while her daughter is enjoying it, so she

is

feeling very unhappy.”

Perhaps the most explicit examples of interpersonal entrainment are the


15/19

MARKING TIME 439

numerous references to the way in which the daughter seemed to

be

repeating

her mother’s life patterns, and to the possibility that the mother wanted to live

her life over again through her daughter. One example: ‘You feel the tension

between perpetuating the life style that the mother has done for her mother

[the daughter’s grandmother] and that she [the daughter] seemed doomed

to do for her mother.”

Many of these interpersonal sequences, of course, are also examples of

causal sequencing. The explanations noted above for why the daughter slept

with Daniel and why the mother reacted as she did-even for the very character

of the relationship between mother and daughter-all suggest a temporal

basis for causal inference. Indeed, virtually all of the trait attributions made

to both mother and daughter reflect temporal bases. Attributions about the

daughter as insecure, being a drifter, having had a bad childhood, not doing

well with men, being overly focused on the past, desperate for love, lonely,

insensitive, all in one way

or

another were connected

to

a life trajectory of

having been reared in a loveless marriage and abused by

her

father.

As

one

reader put it: “She [the daughter] doesn’t feel very secure, perhaps because

of what has happened to her in her childhood or when she was younger what

her father did to her. for the mother, characterizations of her as preoccupied

with sickness, acting like

a

victim, being narrow-minded, lonely, nurturant,

rigid, pessimistic,

or

preoccupied with sex, all reflect her experiences of

spending twenty years taking care

of

a family virtually

by

herself and without

gratitude. “ like the mother better because knowing her past about taking

care

of

the father and making the money for the house, makes you like her

better.

Similar patterns are found in interpretations of “Emily.” By far the most

prominent explanation both for why Emily may have killed Homer and why

she may have lain with his body referred to the overly restricted and close

relationship she had with her father while she was growing up, and to the

abandonment she felt upon her father’s death. The following example demon-

strates the interpersonal sequencing in

this

account. “He [Homer]

was

going

to leave and she couldn’t stand for him-for someone else to leave when her

father had left.” Causality is also explicit in this interpretation: ”She’s mentally

deranged by something that’s happened to her growing up. There must have

been some incident somewhere

or

her [father] probably somehow sheltered

her.” The prominent trait attributions to Emily also reflect temporal progres-

sions: she is characterized as crazy, lonely, sad, socially unskilled, solitary,

proud, independent, or masculine, all traits connected to the patterns of

her early life.

Causal search also seems to prompt the explicit mention of time. All of

the coded units include some reference to time. Among these, there are a full


16/19

440

J U D I T H A . H O W A R D A N D J O C E L Y N

A .

H O L L A N D E R

338 mentions of the causal locus of an event

or

behavior. This suggests, albeit

indirectly, that temporal references are generated in causal thinking. Goal-

oriented and emotional behavior are also particularly likely to generate

statements about time (see Table

1).

Exogenously motivated behavior is also

more likely than endogenous behavior to generate references to time.

Kruglanski (1975) suggests that most exogenous motivators are located in the

future. Given that the temporal references to past were far more frequent

than to the future,

it

would appear that these readers see exogenous motivation

as more likely to derive from past than future motivators. Further, the more

complex the referent, the more likely time will be mentioned. This pattern

is overwhelmingly evident in the complexity variable-almost none of the

referents were coded as simple. But complexity is evident in other ways as

well. The greater frequency of general as opposed to specific referents and the

preference for combined internal and external loci, as opposed to solely

internal

or

solely external loci, also suggest that temporality is more likely to

be mentioned when the referent is complex.

Time nd Self/Other Perceptions

Albert (1977) proposed a number of hypotheses about how temporality

is used to define self. We adapt these hypotheses to consider how temporality

is used

t

define other. Albert’s first proposition is that humans are motivated

to maintain

a

sense of

an

enduring self-identity over time. Our data suggest

that humans are similarly motivated to maintain an enduring sense of other.

The great majority of readers made trait attributions to the key characters in

these stories; indeed, evidence of spontaneous trait attributions was sub-

stantially more prominent than evidence of spontaneous causal attributions

(Howard and Allen 1989). As noted above, these trait attributions reflected

temporal bases either implicitly

or

explicitly. Specific comparisons between

past and present behavior were offered frequently in the interviews as support

for trait attributions.

The next series of propositions concerns the relationship between past

and present self-descriptions. Albert suggests that when these descriptors are

discrepant, we tend to change the view of the past more than of the present,

and that we select from past descriptors those that are similar to present

descriptors. Although these propositions may well apply to self-definition,

they do not

fare

so well with definition of other. The readers do not seem to

feel motivated by a desire for consistency of other across time. In defining

Emily and the mother in “Home,” readers focus primarily on the contrasts

between Emily and the mother’s pasts and their presents. Indeed, it is these

contrasts that provide feelings of empathy and pity for these characters.

Albert also proposes that a tendency to compare a current self with a past


17/19

MARKING

TIME 441

self decreases as the temporal distance increases. There is not much support

for this proposition when applied to the definition of other. Indeed, the inter-

pretations of “Emily” contradict this proposition; the readers tended to

compare Emily in her later years with who she was as a young adult, skipping

over much of her adulthood, despite the fact that the story does provide

information about her at varying points throughout her lifespan. In “Home,

”

the readers did compare the daughter’s curent self with both recent and more

distant pasts, but most of the comparisons made about the mother’s life again

drew on her more distant past. Thus within the constraints of the structure of

these stories, this proposition does not seem to apply to the construction

of

others, although it may well apply to the definition of self.

Two of Albert’s propositions concern the affective direction of change.

He suggests both that temporal comparison is more likely if the affective

quality of the present is negative rather than positive, and that comparisons

that demonstrate progress or growth are favored over those that demonstrate

decline

or

decay, echoing Gergen and Gergen’s

1983)

hypothesis that we

favor progressive over regressive narratives. These propositions themselves

are somewhat contradictory. If an end point is negative, then it would be

harder to find comparisons that demonstrate progress, unless a negative

present can be redefined as one that has provoked personal growth. Further-

more, the comparisons generated in “Home” suggest decline rather than

growth. Most of the readers of this story focused on the daughter’s slide into

a dependent and undirected life, a regressive narrative. Similarly, most

readers of “Emily”suggest that she has gone slowly insane, hardly a progressive

narrative. The failure to support this proposition may be due to the logical

contradiction suggested by the prior proposition that temporal comparison

is more likely when the present self is negative, as well as to the content of

these particular stories. On the other hand, it may also be due to the difference

between defining self and defining other: the concern with a progressive

trajectory, as with the need for consistency over time, may be associated only

with definitions of self.

Themes of temporality are also evident through the interpretive con-

struction of possible selves. These readers were not asked to construct possible

selves (although some did so in their commentaries, referring to themselves

as they interpreted the fictional characters). They did construct what we call

“possible others,” however. Possible others were constructed relatively fre-

quently for the main character in each story, the daughter and Emily. One

example: “She’s [Emily] either supposed to feel sorry for herself, or she’s

supposed to kill herself

or

something or get married.” “[From “Home”] the

daughter is afraid of turning into that person-her mother.

”

Far more of these

possible others referred to the future

59)

than to the past (seven), consistent


18/19

442

JUD IT H A. HOWARD AND JOCELYN A. HOLLANDER

with Markus and Nurius’(

1986)

conception of possible selves, but in apparent

contradiction to

the

temporal referents noted above. Possible others constructed

for the secondary characters, the mother and Homer, were less frequent, but

the preference for future referents remained

22

future vs. two past). Thus,

the construction of possible others-guesses about the projected futures or

pasts of these characters-is part of the interpretive process.

Conclusion

We have suggested that temporality is a central basis for the interpretation

of social life. In contrast to some social scientists, laypeople appear to con-

ceptualize time as diachronic, fluid, and progressive. Time itself appears to

be structured as rather general, composed of large, undifferentiated units

of

time. Temporality is evident in the causal and trait attributions made about

others and in the presence of varied kinds of temporal sequences in interpre-

tation. Although time is clearly an important element in defining others, it

operates differently from its influence on defining self. The use of temporality

in the construction of others is not as strongly shaped by the needs for con-

sistency

or

positivism. Based both on the theoretical reasoning and on the

empirical illustration reported above, we conclude that sociologists who seek

to understand interpretations of social life must incorporate temporality

into their analyses.

E N D N O T E

*This research was supported by a grant from the Graduate School Research Fund, University

of Washington. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1991 American Sociological

Association meeting.

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