The First 50 Years of National Service50 Years

1947-1997DEFENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS AGENCY

1947-1997

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DEFENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS AGENCYTABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Subject

2 Initial Charter for the Armed Forces Special Weapons ProjectJanuary 29, 1947

3 Introduction

4 Dawn of the Atomic Age1941-1947

6 Early Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project1947-1954

10 Discovery1954-1963

14 Strategic Deterrence1963-1971

18 Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity1971-1981

22 Force Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact1981-1991

26 Post-Cold War Priorities1991-

30 Future Challenges

32 Photograph Credits

33 Acronym List

The First50 Years

ofNationalService

1947–1997 — A Brief History

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Initial Charter for the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

* Reproduced text of January 29, 1947 AFSWP charter.

29 January 1947

SUBJECT: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations.

1. On 1 January 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission established by

the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress) took over

the organization and properties of the Manhattan Project.

2. There is established, effective midnight 31 December 1946, a

joint Army-Navy atomic energy organization which will discharge all mili-

tary service functions relating to atomic energy and will be known as the

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Military personnel on duty with the

Manhattan Engineer District at midnight 31 December 1946, and who are

excepted from service with the Atomic Energy Commission, will be assigned

to duty with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project as of 31 December

1946.

3. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project will operate under a

Chief who will be selected by mutual action of the Chief of Staff and the

Chief of Naval Operations. A Deputy Chief from the opposite service shall

be also selected by the mutual action of the Chief of Staff and the Chief

of Naval Operations. Both the Chief and Deputy Chief shall be members

of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. They

will be assisted by an appropriate staff drawn from the War and Navy

Departments.

4. The Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project will:

a. Assume responsibility for all military service functions

of the Manhattan Project as are retained under the control of the Armed

Forces, including training of special personnel required, military partic-

ipation in the development of atomic weapons of all types (in coord-

ination with the Commission), technical training of bomb commanders and

weaponeers, and developing and effecting joint radiological safety mea-

sures in coordination with established agencies.

b. Report directly to the Chief of Staff, United States Army,

and the Chief of Naval Operations.

5. Funds, other than for pay of military personnel, will be pro-

vided initially from those funds of the Manhattan Project which have not

been transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission. Pay of military person-

nel will be from appropriate War and Navy Department appropriations.

SECRETARY OF WAR

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

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Introduction

Secretary of Defense William Perry

On July 16, 1945, at the TRINITY sitein the sands of New Mexico, thefirst atomic weapon was detonated.

That day brought the first glimpse of thepower and potential for destruction now inthe hands of mankind. Soon that potentialwas transformed into two enormous nucleararsenals – one in the hands of the SovietUnion and one in the hands of the UnitedStates. Throughout the Cold War, we livedwith the threat of nuclear holocaust hangingover our heads like a dark cloud,threatening the extinction of all mankind.

It was during this period thatthe agency we now know as theDefense Special WeaponsAgency (DSWA) emerged asone of the key stewards ofour nation’s nuclearweapons capability. Chiefamong its long history ofaccomplishments is thatmaintaining our nuclear

arsenal actually helped prevent that nuclearholocaust and the destruction of our nation.

Today, the Cold War is over, the nucleararms race has ended, the dark cloud haslifted and all the world breathes easier. Butthe nuclear threat has not gone away.Instead, we face the threat of nuclearweapons, technology and materials fallinginto the hands of rogue nations or terrorists.We still must maintain and operate a smallerbut highly powerful nuclear arsenal as adeterrent. We have embarked on a bravenew era of nuclear arms reductions, boldnew safeguards and innovative nucleartechnologies, and we have an even greaterneed for DSWA.

The men and women of DSWA are leadingthe way into this new era. Your dedicationand patriotism helped us survive nearly 50years of nuclear terror. It will be yourinnovation and your continued hard workthat will make the future safer and brighterfor all mankind.

No one knows what challenges the futuremight hold. But I do know that the people ofDSWA are equal to those challenges. Iextend my congratulations to them for theirimpressive contributions to our nationalsecurity, and offer my best wishes for evengreater achievements in the years ahead.

William J. PerrySecretary of Defense

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TRINITY marker atAlamogordo, New Mexico.

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1941–1947— Dawn of the Atomic Age

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3-1. Los Alamos West Gate. 3-2. Churchill,Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta, 1945. 3-3. B-29Superfortress "Enola Gay." 3-4. New York Times,August 7, 1945. 3-5. VJ Day, August 14, 1945.3-6. Japanese surrender ceremony on board theU.S.S. Missouri. 3-7. J. Robert Oppenheimer andGeneral Leslie Groves. 3-8. The Gadget drawingpassed by David Greenglass to Soviets.

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➻ Scientific Discoveries Beforethe Manhattan Project: In 1911,Ernest Rutherford proposed thenuclear model for the atom basedon experimental data. In 1938,Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmandiscovered fission products afterthe irradiation of uranium withneutrons. Lise Meitner and OttoFrisch interpreted this data asbeing caused by the neutron-induced fission of uranium. Thisdiscovery led to over 100 pub-lished papers in 1939, essentiallydefining the modern theory of

atomic fission. In a letter drafted byhis colleagues, Einstein wrote toPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt onAugust 2, 1939: “It may becomepossible to set up a nuclear chainreaction in a large mass of urani-um, which would... lead to theconstruction of... extremely power-ful bombs... .”

➻ Preliminary GovernmentInvolvement: The National DefenseResearch Council, under VannevarBush, supported research in 1940-1941 that indicated weaponsdevelopment was not “remote.”Shortly before the attack on PearlHarbor, the Office of ScientificResearch and Development estab-lished an office (OSRD S-1) todevelop an atomic bomb. Dr. Bushproposed to transfer managementof the project to the Army in thesummer of 1942 to assure priorityand establish security.

➻ The Manhattan EngineerDistrict: On August 13, 1942, theCorps of Engineers, issuing GeneralOrder 33, established the Manhat-

Albert Einstein and J. RobertOppenheimer.

1941-1947—Dawn of the Atomic Age: The ManhattanProject provides America with the means to terminateWorld War II promptly and decisively.

1941 - Pearl Harbor attacked

1942 - Manhattan Project initiated

1943 - Allies begin offensive operations

1944 - D-Day in Europe

1945 - Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombed – War ends

1946 - Atomic Energy Act

1947 - AFSWP established

tan Engineer District (MED), covername for the atomic bomb devel-opment project. Brigadier GeneralLeslie R. Groves served as com-manding officer of the MED fromSeptember 23, 1942, through1946.

➻ The Manhattan Project: Gen-eral Groves selected Dr. J. RobertOppenheimer to lead the scientificeffort. Together, they chose the LosAlamos Ranch School in NewMexico as the site for the atomiclaboratories.

➻ Dawn of the Atomic Era: OnDecember 2, 1942, Enrico Fermi’sgroup operated the world’s firstself-sustaining nuclear fissionreactor under Stagg Field, Universi-ty of Chicago. Techniques for aerialdelivery of atomic weapons weredeveloped at Los Alamos, NewMexico and Wendover Field, Utah,between 1943 and 1945. MEDpersonnel worked with the ArmyAir Corps at Wendover to modifythe newly-produced B-29 bomberand refine bombing techniques.

➻ TRINITY: 100 tons of highexplosives were detonated onMay 7, 1945, as a dress re-hearsal for the TRINITY event.It also served to calibrateinstruments to measureTRINITY phenomena. Then,on July 16, 1945, Los Alam-os personnel detonated animplosion-type plutoniumdevice, named TRINITY,near the remote town ofAlamogordo, New Mexico.

TRINITY High ExplosiveTest Stack.

TRINITY - July 16, 1945.

➻ Hiroshima andNagasaki: On August6, 1945, the 509thComposite Groupdropped Little Boyover Hiroshima, and,on August 9, Fat Manover Nagasaki. Soonthereafter the Japa-nese governmentagreed to surrender,ending World War II on September2, 1945.

➻ Bombing Surveys and Post-war Planning: MED staff partici-pated in initial bomb damage andradiation assessments, as well aspostwar surveys of both Hiroshimaand Nagasaki. They also participat-ed in planning for internationalcontrols, including the Baruch-Lilienthal Plan that the U.S. pre-sented to the United Nations.

➻ Operation CROSSROADS: In1946, MED personnel organizedthe first postwar atomic test series

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at the Bikini Atoll in the PacificOcean. These tests demonstratedthe effects of atomic weapons onsurface ships, including the haz-ards of long-term radioactivecontamination.

➻ The Atomic Energy Act of1946: President Truman signedthe Atomic Energy Act of 1946 onAugust 1, transferring atomicweapons, production facilities, andpatent rights to a five-membercivilian Atomic Energy Commission(AEC), effective December 31,1946.

➻ Transition to the ArmedForces Special Weapons Project:On January 29, 1947, Secretary ofWar Robert P. Patterson and Secre-tary of the Navy James V. Forrestalestablished the Armed ForcesSpecial Weapons Project (AFSWP),the successor organization to theMED. It assumed all functions ofthe MED not transferred to theAEC. AFSWP assured readiness bytraining for both offensive anddefensive atomic warfare, assessingthe effects of these new weapons,and supporting postwar nationaldefense planning.

1941–1947 — Dawn of the Atomic Age

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4-1. Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949. 4-2. Korea map.4-3. Truman with election results. 4-4. Mk-6 bomb.4-5. Vacuum tube computer. 4-6. Edward Teller.4-7. General MacArthur. 4-8. Nixon and Eisenhowerat convention. 4-9. Troops and DOG blast.

1947–1954— Early Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

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➻ Initial Charters: The originalAFSWP charter in January 1947authorized training for assemblyand employment of atomic weap-ons. It encouraged AFSWP partici-pation in the development ofatomic weapons of all types. Arevised charter in July 1947authorized AFSWP to coordinateresearch in atomic energy.

➻ Training for Custody ofAtomic Weapons: The July 1947charter further provided forAFSWP storage and surveillanceof weapons in the custody of thearmed forces. Until the KoreanWar, all atomic weapons re-mained in the custody of thecivilian AEC. In 1947, at SandiaBase in Albuquerque, NewMexico, AFSWP initiated atraining course on atomicweapons, where instructorsfrom Sandia Laboratory taughtweapons assembly procedures.

➻ Establishing a DeterrentForce: A March 1948 “war warn-ing” cable from General LuciusClay, Commander in Chief, Europe(CINCEUR), in advance of massive

Russian troop maneuvers andaccess challenges along corridorsto Berlin, led to the first postwarU.S. plan for atomic bombardmentof Soviet targets.

➻ Weapons Effects Testing:AFSWP participated in all threefission weapon tests at EnewetakAtoll during Operation SANDSTONEin 1948, and prepared technicalreports on weapons effects. AFSWPdeveloped improved instruments tomeasure weapons blast and shockenvironments during futurenuclear weapon tests.

➻ Accelerating Assembly TeamTraining: In April 1948, AFSWPaccelerated the pace of its assem-bly team training. After the SAND-STONE tests, General Groves, firstAFSWP Chief, urged acceleratedproduction of the Mk-4 bomb.

➻ Operational Storage:AFSWP worked jointly with theAEC to establish three NationalStockpile Sites that were acces-sible to the 1st, 8th, and 2nd AirForces, respectively. These sitesbecame operational in 1949-1950.

➻ Nuclear Effects Documen-tation: In 1949, the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) assignedresponsibility to AFSWP forcollecting, reviewing anddisseminating data on the

effects of atomic weapons. Thisresulted in the first integratedreport, The Effects of AtomicWeapons (1950), prepared jointlywith the AEC.

➻ Extending DeterrenceThrough the Berlin Airlift: In June1948, the blockade of road andrail access to Berlin led to a jointAnglo-American airlift of food-stocks and supplies. President Tru-man approved the deployment ofB-29 bombers to British bases inJuly 1948, to signal a U.S. commit-ment to deter military agressionand the occupation of WesternEurope.

➻ Signaling Readiness WhileProtecting the Atomic Arsenal:With a total stockpile of about 50atomic bombs and a shortage ofbomb assembly teams, the forwarddeployment of the U.S. atomiccapabilities seemed imprudent inthe absence of air defenses atprospective forward bases. In July1948, AFSWP supported the Strate-gic Air Command (SAC) and anAnglo-American deception plan insignaling a forward deployment ofatomic weapons two years before

1947-1954—Early Years of the Armed Forces SpecialWeapons Project: The Berlin Blockade and the KoreanWar, along with atomic testing by the United States andthe Soviet Union, set the stage for later Cold War relations.

1947 - Marshall Plan funds European Recovery Program

1948 - Berlin Blockade begins in April 1948 – ends in May 1949

1949 - Formation of NATO – First Soviet nuclear test

1950 - North Korea attacks South – U.S. leads military response

1951 - Truman relieves General MacArthur

1952 - Eisenhower elected President

1953 - Korean Armistice signed in July

1954 - Ballistic missile development accelerated

Firing party prior to MIKE test.

GRABLE test explosion.

A U.S. tank rolls throughChunchon, Korea.

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1947–1954 — Early Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

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such deployments occurred.AFSWP personnel accompanied theB-29 groups during their deceptivemove to British air bases.

➻ Success of the Berlin Airliftand Formation of the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization(NATO): The last verbal threat toAllied use of the Berlin air corri-dors occurred on July 14, 1948,several days before SAC B-29sarrived at British bases. The Berlinairlift expanded its deliveries,without Russian interference, untilthe blockade ended in the spring of1949. AFSWP teams quietly pre-

pared for forward assem-bly operations in 1949-1950, and deployed toRoyal Air Force bases inthe United Kingdom in1951.

➻ Coordinating Weap-ons Requirements:Sandia Pioneers within thelaboratory’s ordnancedivision began informallycoordinating weapons

requirements in 1947. The Septem-ber 1949 detection of debris fromthe first Soviet atomic test, JOE-1,intensified U.S. efforts to maintainits technological lead. AFSWP’sChief briefed the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (JCS) on the potential applica-tions of thermonuclear weaponspreceding President Truman’sJanuary 1950 decision to approvedevelopment of these weapons.Jointly the AEC and AFSWPconducted research on weaponsvulnerabilities and nuclearweapons effects.

➻ Developing a Weapons Vul-nerability Program: In March1950, the Military Liaison Commit-tee, composed of Department ofDefense (DoD) and AEC staff,asked AFSWP to study and test thevulnerability of nuclear weapons.The results helped support thedesign of air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons for air defense: NikeAjax, Nike Hercules, and Genie,among others. A formal AFSWP

Military personnelobserving test.

Operation GREENHOUSEat Enewetak.

Weapons VulnerabilityProgram emerged in 1955.

➻ Test Planning: In1951, the JCS assigned toAFSWP responsibility for testplanning and coordinatingService needs for nucleartest data. The AFSWP and theAEC jointly searched for acontinental test site, settlingon the Nevada Test Site(NTS). AFSWP subsequentlysponsored many nucleareffects experiments at theNTS.

➻ Accelerating Opera-tional Readiness Duringthe Korean War: With Unit-ed Nations (UN) forcesresisting the invasion ofSouth Korea and uncertaintywhether the war wouldspread to Europe, President Tru-man approved AFSWP support toSAC nuclear-capable units at over-seas bases in July 1950.

➻ Atomic Diplomacy and theKorean Armistice: After Chinaentered the Korean war, PresidentTruman decided in November 1950that the atomic bomb could beconsidered for use. AFSWP unitsdeployed aboard three U.S. aircraftcarriers in 1950-1951. Managersof nuclear component stockpiles atSandia Base went on alert status forairplane delivery of both nuclearinsertable-core components andassembly teams within 12 hours ofnotification, per AFSWP order ofApril 24, 1951.

➻ Preparing for Transfer ofWeapons Custody to the MilitaryServices: AFSWP’s July 1951 char-ter called for technical directives,standards for training, and proce-dures for nuclear technical inspec-tions by the military Services.During the Korean War, AFSWPaccepted military personnel de-tailed from each of the militaryServices for training in weaponsassembly and maintenance, inoperational site storage, and intechnical inspection of weapons.AFWSP personnel strength reachedan all-time high of nearly 11,000 in1951-1952.

➻ Test Implications for CivilDefense: In the 225-kiloton test,GREENHOUSE GEORGE, conducted

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Protective lead-glass cloth shroud beingplaced on sampler pilot.

Area 7 ground zero target.

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AFSWP tested the effects of blasts on structures.

Event MIKE (Operation IVY) detonation.

Washdown decontamination of B-17 aircraft.

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in May 1951, the AEC confirmedthe feasibility of thermonuclearweapons. Tests at far smaller yieldsindicated severe damage to typicalwooden structures at overpres-sures under 10 pounds per squareinch (psi). AFSWP releasedGREENHOUSE test data to thefederal Civil Defense authorities inSeptember 1951.

➻ Test Implications for Protec-tive Structures: Operation JANGLE,in November 1951, was the firstevent to test surface and sub-surface cratering effects. These andlater tests stimulated interest in thedesign of protective structures forcommand centers andfor aircraft shelters.

➻ Troop Training:Troop training to oper-ate in nuclear environ-ments commenced on alarge scale duringatmospheric and cra-tering tests at the NTSin 1951 (DESERT ROCKI) with about 5,000troops. AFSWP partici-pated in test site prepa-ration and in trainingmilitary personnelduring field tests ofatomic weapons. Oper-ation UPSHOT-KNOT-HOLE, in 1953, trainedmilitary personnel tofire tactical nuclearweapons and to takeprecautions to copewith ionizing radiation.

➻ Stockpile Surveillance: InAugust 1951, AFSWP and the AECagreed upon coordinated proce-dures at Operational Storage Sitesfor nuclear weapons. By 1952,Sandia and AFSWP Field Commandin Albuquerque, New Mexico, wereboth assisting the Services in con-ducting their own inspections butwere also conducting parallelAFSWP inspections of operationalsites.

➻ Test Implications for Weap-ons Dispersal, IntercontinentalBallistic Missile (ICBM) Develop-ment, and Bomber Rebasing: Anearly thermonuclear device test,

IVY MIKE, produced a yield of 10.4megatons of TNT-equivalent energyin October 1952. A Russian 400-kiloton thermonuclear test inAugust 1953 (Dr. Andrei Sa-kharov’s Second Idea) acceleratedplans for the dispersal of U.S.Operational Storage Sites. Concur-rently, the Teapot (Von Neumann)Panel recommended developmentof guided missiles carrying thermo-nuclear warheads. Other strategicdevelopments included radarwarning networks in Alaska andCanada (the Distant Early Warningor DEW Line) and rebasing ofsome SAC forces to interior basesin the continental U.S.

➻ A Nuclear Strategy of For-ward Deployment and Readinessfor Use: The armistice in Koreapreceded Presidential approval of anew military strategy, called theNew Look (NSC 162/2) of October1953. The Eisenhower administra-tion decided to ex-pand forwarddeployments of nucle-ar weapons in Eu-rope, and to declare areadiness to usenuclear weapons fortactical defense andfor strategic bom-bardment.

➻ Atomic WarfareStatus Center: OnOctober 16, 1953,the Secretary ofDefense directedAFSWP to maintain

1947–1954 — Early Years of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

“a centralized system of reportingand accounting to ensure that thecurrent status and location” of

nuclear weapons “will be known atall times.” This critical functioncontinues to the present day.

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1954–1963 — Discovery

5-1. Sputnik model. 5-2. Nixon/Kennedydebate. 5-3. Fallout shelter. 5-4. Kennedy.5-5. New York Times. 5-6. Castro andKhrushchev. 5-7. TRUCKEE Event atChristmas Island. 5-8. Astronaut JohnGlenn. 5-9. U-2 surveillance aircraft.5-10. Berlin Wall. 5-11. Redstone missile.

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➻ Changing Roles and Mis-sions: The 1954-1963 Era ofDiscovery was punctuated by anumber of developments that, bythe end of the era, forever changedthe roles and missions of AFSWP,its successors, and the world.Prominent among these develop-ments were: (1) the demonstrationof lithium-based compounds as athermonuclear fuel, permittingmissiles to carry thermonuclearwarheads; (2) the deployment ofICBMs and Submarine-Launched

➻ Nuclear Force Survivabilityand Diversity: U.S. atmospherictests in 1954-1958 and 1962 werecritical to the definition of nuclearweapons effects for the design ofsurvivable U.S. offensive and defen-sive weapon systems, includingtheir basing modes. In this era, theU.S. maintained a substantial leadin the number and yield of de-ployed nuclear weapon systems,offsetting the Warsaw Pact conven-tional force advantage over NATO.

➻ Effects of ThermonuclearWeapons: The CASTLE BRAVO teston Bikini Atoll on February 28,1954, was the first of six thermo-nuclear weapon development testsin the CASTLE series. It had a yieldof 15 megatons. The CASTLE seriesindicated that megaton-rangeweapons could be reduced in sizeand weight and deployed on ballis-tic missiles and aircraft.

➻ Radiation Monitoring: Fall-out from the BRAVO test exposedJapanese fishermen aboard theFukurya Maru [Lucky Dragon].Fallout concerns on a global scalecaused the JCS in 1954 to taskAFSWP with monitoring and pre-dicting worldwide fallout. AFSWPsponsored a High Altitude Sam-pling Program (HASP), using U-2aircraft, to determine the strato-spheric burden of radioactivity.AFSWP also performed predictionand modeling of worldwide falloutafter the U.S. and Soviet atmospher-ic tests of 1961-1962.

➻ Dispersal of Storage Sites: In1954-1955, the Technology Capa-bilities Panel urged force dispers-als and increased readiness toreduce vulnerabilities in the ther-monuclear age. On December 1,1954, President Eisenhower ap-proved JCS-proposed plans fordispersal to multiple nuclearOperational Storage Sites in thecontinental U.S. manned by Servicepersonnel. AFSWP trained militarystorage and maintenance staffs,

inspected Service sites, and man-aged National Stockpile Sites incoordination with the AEC.

➻ Coordinating WeaponsRequirements Through AFSWP:AFSWP supported DoD in its deter-mination of the Military Character-istics, suitability, and acceptabilityof nuclear weapons. Concepts forlow-maintenance “wooden bombs”and modular “building block”weapons emerged in the 1950s.

➻ Understanding NuclearEffects for Air Defense: In themid-1950s, the AFSWP Air BlastPanel successfully advocated teststo assess blast and thermal effectson aircraft, missiles, and aircrews.In 1955, Test HA (High Altitude)employed a three-kiloton device at36,000 feet to explore options forair defense without prompt radio-active fallout. Nuclear air defensesystems deployed later includedGenie and Nike-Hercules missiles.

Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), andinitial development activities forICBMs and SLBMs that would carryMultiple Independently TargetedReentry Vehicles (MIRVs); (3) therapid spread in the use of semicon-ductor-based technology in weight-and space-limited applications,such as satellites, missiles, anddigital computers; and (4), the1958-1961 moratorium on nucle-ar testing and the resumption ofatmospheric testing, initiated by theSoviets in 1961.

1954-1963—Discovery: The U-2 Spy Plane and theCuban Missile Crisis fuel Cold War tensions between theU.S. and the Soviet Union, while Sputnik heralds the dawnof the space race.1954 - Practicality of thermonuclear weapons demonstrated

1955 - Warsaw Pact founded

1956 - U-2 flights over the Soviet Union begin

1957 - Sputnik, the world’s first space satellite, launched

1958 - Nuclear test moratorium begins

1959 - Nixon and Khrushchev engage in “kitchen debate”

1960 - Soviets down U-2 aircraft – Kennedy elected

1961 - Berlin Wall erected – Soviets break test moratorium

1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis

1963 - Limited Test Ban Treaty signed

USAF has operated B-52 bombers since 1955.

Nike-Hercules air defense missileused for launch of TIGHTROPE shot.

Premier Khrushchev.

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➻ New Look Implementation:AFSWP coordinated nuclear testsand troop training preceding theforward deployment of tacticalnuclear forces to Europe in 1954.A NATO agreement of June 22,1955, required bilateral programsof cooperation for nuclear systemdeployments. In 1956 NATO’sMilitary Committee (MC) adoptedMC document 14/2, approvingforward deployment of tacticalnuclear weapons and reliance onthem for the defense of NATO. TheNATO force deployments subse-quently included nuclear-capablefighters, ballistic missiles, atomicdemolition munitions, and artil-lery-fired atomic projectiles.

➻ Responding to Accidents:Following several SAC bomber-related accidents, the Services,AFSWP, and the AEC established aJoint Nuclear Accident Coordinat-ing Center in 1958. AFSWP begancoordinating accident responsesabroad.

➻ AFSWP Redesignated: Inaddition to AFSWP gaining newaccident responsibilities, theDirector, Defense Research and

Engineering (DDR&E) beganallocating the majority of DoDnuclear effects research and testfunds through AFSWP in 1958. Toreflect these increases in roles andmissions, AFSWP was redesignatedas the Defense Atomic SupportAgency (DASA) in 1959; the Agen-cy began reporting to both JCS andthe Secretary of Defense that year.

➻ Initial HA Nuclear EffectsProgram: In 1958, the Agency andthe AEC jointly conducted a series ofHA nuclear explosions: tests TEAKand ORANGE in Operation HARD-TACK, launched by rockets fromJohnston Atoll in the Pacific, andthree tests over the South Atlantic inOperation ARGUS. TheSoviet Union conducted itsown set of HA experimentsin 1962.

➻ Disturbance of Dis-tant Communications:Test TEAK, fired at night atan altitude of 77 kilo-meters, resulted in a loss ofhigh frequency (HF) com-munications over much ofthe Pacific that lasted into

RB-57D sampling aircraft during Event JUNIPER.

General Ludecke and GeneralStranathan with TEAPOT MET cloudbehind them.

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Operation CASTLE, Test BRAVO at Bikini Island in 1954.

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the next day as a result of distur-bance of the HF-reflecting layers ofthe ionosphere.

➻ Electrons Trapped in Mag-netic Fields: Operation ARGUS,conducted in 1958 by the U.S. Navywith DASA and Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (ARPA) support,verified the “Christofilos effect” inwhich fission decay electrons be-come trapped, creating man-maderadiation belts. The idea of usingthese belts as a shield against po-tential ballistic missile attack wasnot feasible, since the earth’s mag-netic field was too weak to formsufficiently intense radiation belts.ARGUS did, however, indicate thatsemiconductor circuits werevulnerable to degradation by recur-ring passage through trapped elec-tron belts. Some space satellitesfailed in the aftermath of the 1958tests. DASA pursued techniques toreduce vulnerabilities of electroniccomponents and to improve theendurance of satellite communica-tions and other space systems.

➻ Adaptive Research Duringthe 1958-1961 Moratorium: U.S.atmospheric testing ceased inOctober 1958 and did not resumeuntil 1962, after the Soviets brokethe test moratorium (the U.S.began conducting tests under-ground in 1961). To evaluateMinuteman silos, DASA and the AirForce sponsored high explosive(HE) tests in 1959-1960. Plans for

nuclear radiation effectssimulators also began toevolve in this period, andcomputer models of upperatmospheric chemistrywere refined between the1958 tests and those of1962.

➻ Force Modernization:Dispersal of SAC bases andconstruction of early warn-ing radar networks im-proved bomber force

survivability. The U.S. Navy com-missioned the first operationalsubmarine carrying Polaris mis-siles, the George Washington, onDecember 30, 1959. The U.S. AirForce commissioned the firstMinuteman I missile wing on July15, 1961.

➻ Doubling of Nuclear WeaponDeployments in Europe: After EastGermany constructed the BerlinWall in August 1961, the U.S.accelerated deployments of nuclearweapons to Europe. The totalNATO nuclear stockpile virtuallydoubled between January 1961 andMay 1965 to more than 5,900nuclear weapons.

➻ Supporting the Joint Strate-gic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS):DASA supported the JSTPS, estab-lished at SAC, beginning in 1960.DASA and its contractors developedcomputer models of nuclear ef-fects, notably airblast. SAC, and itssuccessor, U.S. Strategic Command(STRATCOM), have routinely usedthe Agency’s expertise on nucleareffects to support war planning.

➻ DoD Damage AssessmentCenter (DODDAC): DODDACbegan operating in the Pentagonand at the underground AlternateNational Military Command Center(ANMCC) at Fort Ritchie, Maryland,in 1961. In late 1961, at WhiteHouse request, DASA analyzed theeffects of a 100-megaton weaponon the ANMCC, and on proposedWashington, D.C. undergroundfacilities, after the Soviets tested a58-megaton device.

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Decontamination personnel checking forradioactivity.

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President Kennedy signs the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

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➻ Improving Safety and Con-trol Over Nuclear Systems: De-ployment of tactical nuclear sys-tems abroad and the pre-assemblyof warheads on missiles raisedconcerns about the adequacy ofcommand and control safeguards.The Joint Committee on AtomicEnergy, in its Hollifield Report,recommended sweeping reforms inDecember 1960. In 1962, theNational Security Council (NSC)adopted more stringent safeguardsfor command and control, includ-ing Permissive Action Links andimprovements in safety and securi-ty. These affected DASA trainingand inspection programs.

➻ Joint Weapons Safety Test-ing: In “Project 57” and later tests,DASA participated in HE tests topredict and prevent plutoniumdispersal. Joint research with theBritish in 1961-1962 resulted inHE testing of igloo safety in con-junction with the Armed ServicesExplosives Safety Board. Alteredstorage criteria for plutonium-

bearing weapons and improvedstorage site designs resulted.

➻ X-Ray Effects on BallisticMissiles: Concern regarding thevulnerability of guidance systems,reentry vehicles (RV) and nuclearwarheads intensified as more waslearned about the effects of x-rayson materials and electronics. In the1962 DoD-sponsored test MARSH-MALLOW, nuclear effects on sensi-tive components of space andmissile systems were confirmed. Anad hoc Committee on RadiationEffects, established under Dr.William G. McMillan, identifiedretrofit solutions for Minuteman II

systems and advocat-ed designed-in hard-ening for futurestrategic missiles. AsMIRVed ICBMs andSLBMs entered devel-opment, their vulner-ability to x-rays led toplanning for under-ground tests andsimulation of x-rayeffects, implementedlater in the 1960s.

➻ Plasma Distur-bances and Radar

Blackout: The exoatmosphericFISHBOWL tests, in 1962, causedauroral and ionospheric distur-bances. In STARFISH PRIME,bomb-generated plasma becamestriated and spread thousands ofmiles along the magnetic meridianand across magnetic field lines ofthe earth. The implications of thesetests for the degradation of radio

and radar communications wereimportant to the design of U.S.communication satellites, and earlywarning and Anti-Ballistic Missile(ABM) radars.

➻ Electromagnetic Pulse(EMP): The FISHBOWL series alsoconfirmed distant EMP effects uponelectronics predicted by earlierDASA research. Street lamps short-ed on Oahu, about 800 miles fromthe STARFISH PRIME test. DASAserved as the center of expertise inefforts to design enduring commu-nications and command systemsthat could withstand EMP effects.

➻ Operability-SurvivabilityTests for Complete WeaponSystems: In August 1962, FieldCommand, DASA recommendedthat “all components affecting anuclear weapon system” be fieldtested as a unit in an operationalenvironment. DASA solicited testpriorities from the McMillan Panel,a nuclear effects task force for theDDR&E. One of the first completesystems to be tested was the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile,

fired successfully in the last U.S.atmospheric nuclear test onNovember 4, 1962.

➻ Strategic Force Moderniza-tion: To assure weapon systemscould survive nuclear attacks,DASA designed experiments oncratering, airblast, and groundshock at the NTS and elsewhere. Inthe 1960s, DASA’s Strategic Struc-tures Division supported the AirForce in designing hardened silosfor Minuteman II and III missiles.Initial silo construction for ICBMswas already underway before someof the lessons were learned.

➻ Supporting Negotiations ofthe Limited Test Ban Treaty(LTBT): DASA supported ARPA insponsoring research to improvethe detection of nuclear tests inspace, in the atmosphere, andunderground. Interpretation of thefirst fully contained undergroundtest, RAINIER in 1957, led U.S.scientists to conclude that seismicsignals could be “decoupled” by

selection of appropriate soils andcavities. This conclusion hadadverse implications for monitor-ing a ban or yield limit on under-ground testing. The McMillanPanel, relying in part upon DASAresearch, briefed PresidentKennedy on options for nuclear testbans as the administration began toconsider potential treaties limitingnuclear testing.

➻ The 1963 LTBT: The worldcame perilously close to a nuclearexchange between the two super-powers during the 1962 Cubanmissile crisis. In ensuing months,both the U.S. and the Soviet Unionsought accommodations that wouldlessen, control, or avoid such perilin future relations. One of therealized accommodations was theLTBT, which prohibited nucleartests in the atmosphere, in space,and underwater. President Kennedycalled the treaty “...a shaft of lightcut into the darkness.” Eventually, italso eliminated worldwide fallout.

1954–1963 — Discovery

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Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

14

1963–1971— Strategic Deterrence

6-1. John F. KennedyFuneral. 6-2. Anti-war poster. 6-3.Lyndon Johnson.6-4. Dr. MartinLuther King. 6-5.Vietnam soldier.6-6. Gunship inVietnam. 6-7. July21, 1969, New YorkTimes. 6-8. BuzzAldrin on the moon.6-9. Richard Nixon.6-10. Anti-wardemonstration.6-11. Protest button.

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SAGE Panel – August 1966.

➻ DASA Reorganization: Fol-lowing the 1962 atmospheric testseries and the 1963 LTBT, DASAreorganized to attract world-classscientists and engineers to leadDoD nuclear weapons effectsresearch and testing programs.They formed unique cooperativerelationships with other scientistsand engineers in industry, aca-demia, and national laboratoriesthat fueled an intellectual environ-ment and peer review process fornuclear weapons effects activities.This new environment, coupledwith the fact that DASA neverowned or operated weapons sys-tems, established DASA and itssuccessors as the “honest broker”for unbiased research and evalua-tion of the nation’s needs for nucle-ar weapon systems and theassessment of nuclear weaponseffects on those systems.

➻ Tests for Survival and Opera-bility: From 1961 through 1965,the McMillan Panel urged surviv-ability tests for weapons systems.DASA designed and funded many ofthese tests between 1964 and 1970as the centerpiece of the overalleffort. Of particular concern wasthe vulnerability of the MinutemanII guidance system to radiation.The DDR&E and the Air Forceagreed upon testing, redesign, and

retesting. Missile RV hardness, silodesign, and electronic systemvulnerability to EMP were also ofconcern. With DDR&E assent inOctober 1964, the DASA Directorbegan sponsorship of the McMillanPanel. From 1966 to 1993, thepanel was referred to as theScientific Advisory Group on Effects(SAGE). The SAGE Panel wasdisbanded after its 1993 meeting aspart of a government-wide move toreduce the number of federaladvisory groups.

➻ Underground Nuclear EffectsTest Planning: To implement a1962 AEC-DoD agreement withinthe constraints of the 1963 LTBT,AEC and DASA representativesparticipated in a Nuclear WeaponsEffects Coordinating Group to laythe groundwork for the nucleareffects testing advocated by theMcMillan Panel and subsequentlyreaffirmed by JCS action. In De-cember 1963, U.S. scientists urgedpriority for nuclear effects testingof full-scale reentry systems. Overthe next two years, in Operation

SUGAR CANE, DASA and the AECexplored methods to test under-ground for effects on key compo-nents of weapon systems. DASAbegan designing line-of-sight shaftand tunnel systems for x-ray effectstests.

➻ Moscow-WashingtonHot Line: During theCuban Missile Crisis,President Kennedy andSecretary Khrushchevoften had difficulty convey-ing confidential messagesto one another. In 1963,DASA reviewed the surviv-ability of technical designssupporting the June 1963agreement for a Heads-of-Government Hot Line.This Hot Line connectedthe White House, throughthe National MilitaryCommand Center in the

Pentagon, to the Kremlin. DASAalso supported the addition of HotLine Communications Satellite(COMSAT) links in 1971.

➻ HA Effects Analysis: The SAGEPanel recommended priorities forHA effects analysis. In the 1960s,DASA advanced the understandingof both weapons effects and plane-tary physics through analyses oftests conducted in 1958-1962. TheSAGE Chairman also served asChairman of the Special WeaponsEffects Group (SWEG), whichanalyzed the 1962 Soviet highaltitude tests. Suspected nucleareffects, such as EMP disruption ofburied communication links, wereconfirmed by Russian scientists in1995.

➻ Safeguards for the LTBT: Toprotect U.S. nuclear capabilities,four safeguards for the 1963 treaty

were to: (1) continueunderground testing; (2)maintain modern nucle-ar laboratories; (3)establish the NationalNuclear Test ReadinessProgram; and (4) im-prove methods to detectand monitor foreignnuclear detonations.DASA supported verifica-tion research for ARPA’snuclear detection (VELAHOTEL) satellites and forseismic detection ofdecoupled undergroundtests (VELA UNIFORM).

Spartan missile.

Secretary of Defense McNamara andSecretary of State Rusk.

1963-1971—Strategic Deterrence: After the CubanMissile Crisis, Soviet leaders seek to match and exceed U.S.strategic force deployments by 1970.

1963 - Johnson becomes President upon Kennedy’s assassination

1964 - Khrushchev deposed

1965 - Aerial bombing of North Vietnam

1966 - First exposure of reentry systems/underground nuclear test

1967 - SALT Talks begin – 480,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam

1968 - Anti-war protests

1969 - Armstrong walks on Moon – Vietnam troops at 543,000

1970 - U.S. invades Cambodia

1971 - Kissinger begins talks with Chou En-Lai

1963–1971 — Strategic Deterrence

16

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SAILOR HAT test– 500 tons of TNT.

Underground testing.

Mk-12 reentry vehicledamaged by x-rays.

Tritium facility at Savannah River.

➻ Information Systems: Begin-ning in 1960, DASA sponsored theDefense Atomic Support Informa-tion Analysis Center (DASIAC). Theinitial purpose for the DASIACprogram was to ensure the collec-tion and preservation of the HAnuclear test data and the establish-ment of a center of knowledge onit. Subsequently, DASIAC’s missionexpanded to include similar activi-ties for all types of nuclear effects.

➻ Biomedical Research andCivil Defense: Biomedical re-search supported protective mea-sures for troops and civil defense.In 1963, Congress appropriatedfunds for a nationwide falloutshelter program. From 1964through 1993, DASA (and laterDNA) managed the Armed ForcesRadiobiology Research Institute(AFRRI) in Bethesda, Maryland.This interservice facility studies thebiomedical effects of radia-

tion and the treatment of radiationillnesses.

➻ Tools for War Plans: In the1960s, DASA maintained andrefined models of nuclear effectsand radioactive transport, whichhelped SAC develop options for astrategy of controlled response.

➻ Supporting NATO: Bilateralprograms of cooperation permittedforward basing of U.S. nuclearweapons and contingency planningfor allied use. After the 1962 Nas-sau Agreement, DASA and the AECsupported tests in Nevada of Britishwarheads. The U.S. sold Polaris A-3missiles to the British to carrythese warheads. DASA also sup-plied planning data to NATO’sNuclear Planning Group. Nuclearstockpiles in U.S. custody for useby allied forces increased to peaklevels in 1971.

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6-15

➻ Integrating Nuclear-BasedScience and Technology: UnderDASA’s July 1964 charter, a civilianDeputy Director (Science and Tech-nology) oversaw radiation, blastand shock, biomedical, and testplans and programs activities. Withjust four percent of DASA staff in1965 (290 positions), science andtechnology research and test staffmanaged more than three-quartersof the agency’s budget.

In November 1964, DASA consoli-dated nuclear effects knowledgein the classified publication,Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons.A revised edition was published in1968. These publications precededthe two-volume Effects Manual-1(EM-1), first published in 1972.

➻ Operational Tactics: InAugust 1964, the JCS establishedJoint Task Force-2 (JTF-2) atSandia Base to test and validatetactics to penetrate Soviet nuclear-armed air defenses. The JTF-2tested low-level penetration tacticsin conjunction with Sandia Labora-tory and the Air Force SpecialWeapons Center. Stand-off weaponsentered the stockpile in the late1960s.

➻ Techniques for Testing andSimulation: From 1964 through1965, DASA surveyed effects-relatedrisks to weapon systems and devel-oped testing and simulation op-tions. These included: undergroundnuclear tests of airblast and groundshock; exposure of weapons, elec-tronics, and materials to radiation;and development of radiation

simulators to assess EMP, gammaray, and x-ray effects.

➻ Modeling Global Impacts: Forforce exchange models and forprojecting the impact of nuclearwar on fallout and global climate,DASA sponsored software develop-ment at RAND, at the JSTPS, and atAEC laboratories.

➻ HE Testing: When the LTBTprohibited nuclear detonations inthe atmosphere, DASA developedlarge-scale (kiloton-class) HE testbeds to generate airblast andground shock. In 1964, OperationSNOWBALL, a 500-ton HE event,was conducted in Alberta, Canada.The SAILOR HAT test was conduct-ed the following year. These testssimulated nuclear airblast loadingof structures and underwatershock on ships. Subsequent DASAtests included PRAIRIE FLAT andDIAL PACK, both of which helpedthe Air Force assess and improvethe survivability of Minutemen IIsilos. As HE testing evolved, distrib-uted HE arrays, such as the HighExplosive Simulation Technique(HEST) and the Direct-Induced

HEST (DIHEST), were developedby the Agency to test reverse-engineered Soviet silos and toevaluate candidate silo basingmodes for Peacekeeper and theSmall ICBM. DASA also employedHE testing for evaluating the dy-namics of crater formation.

DASA conducted additional experi-ments on forest blowdown inAustralia and Canada. British andCanadian scientists played keyroles in the development andrefinement of HE simulation ofnuclear effects. The resultsachieved by those two countriesand the U.S. were coordinated andexchanged through The TechnicalCoordinating Panel (TTCP). TheTTCP played a major role in estab-lishing a series of multinationalshock physics conferences on themilitary applications of airblast.

➻ Stockpile Surveillance: Dur-ing 1965-1966, DASA developedcommon nuclear stockpile report-ing standards for all of the militaryServices. In 1966, the JCS taskedField Command, DASA with respon-sibility to account for the entireU.S. nuclear stockpile. With confi-

1963–1971 — Strategic Deterrence

17

The SEDAN crater at NTS.

DIAMOND SCULLS underground testfacility.

dence in this system, the JCS autho-rized transfer of all war reservenuclear weapons to Service custodyin the late 1960s.

➻ Transfer of War ReserveWeapons to the Services: In 1965,forty percent of DASA personnelworked at five National StockpileSites. With the transfer of all “warreserve” stockpiles to the militaryServices in the late 1960s, autho-rized personnel declined from apeak of almost 11,000 in the 1950sto 1,800 in fiscal year 1975.

➻ Nuclear Devices for Under-ground Nuclear Effects Tests: In1965, during the SCREAMER event,engineers at Los Alamos employeda new nuclear device for AEC,DASA, and Service experiments.Subsequently, Livermore used itsnew device in a similar test calledTAPESTRY. These two nucleardevices were subsequently fur-nished by the Department of Ener-gy (DOE) laboratories as the

radiation sources for undergroundnuclear effects tests conducted byDASA.

➻ Early DASA UndergroundNuclear Effects Tests: In 1965,DASA began a series of verticalline-of-sight tests that exposedelectronic components, circuits,and systems to gamma rays andneutrons. The first such test wasWISHBONE. The first exposure offull-scale reentry systems (Mk-11Cand Mk-12) was the DASA-spon-sored DOUBLE PLAY event, execut-ed in June 1966. Other testsmeasured shock propagation ingranite for stronger ICBM silos andnational command centers.

➻ Supporting the JCS TestInitiatives: In 1966, the JCS ap-proved a plan, drafted by the DASADeputy Director (Science andTechnology), for an intense seriesof underground tests to assure thehardness to nuclear effects of U.S.strategic offensive and defensive

missile forces. These tests wereexecuted in accordance with thedevelopment schedules of eachService System Program Office(SPO) and were the most com-prehensive effects tests everconducted.

➻ Testing Ballistic Missilesto Avert System Failures: Thefirst major test under the JCS-approved test program–MIDIMIST–was conducted by DASAon June 26, 1967. It involvedreentry systems and otherelements of Poseidon andMinuteman II and III, plus

components and materials for theSentinel ABM. DASA subsequentlycarried out an extensive series ofexposures of those four strategicsystems, with results that oftenrequired redesign for survivability.DASA staff briefed SAGE in 1969 onthe results of survivability testing toavert potential system failures.

➻ Responding to OverseasEmergencies: DASA coordinatedemergency response to removeradioactive debris and recoverMk-28 bombs near Palomares,Spain, in 1966. DASA oversawService decontamination effortsthat removed 237 tons of radioac-tive ice and debris after a B-52crash near Thule, Greenland, in1968. After the Thule crash, DASAprovided a database of nuclearaccidents to the Office of the Secre-tary of Defense (OSD). In 1968,

OSD suspendedroutine SAC airbornebomber patrolsinvolving nuclearweapons. DASA’sdatabases and staffexpertise on mat-ters of nuclearsafety remainedaccessible to boththe military Ser-vices and OSD.Access to DASA’sexpertise con-vinced Dr. CarlWalske, Assis-

tant to the Secre-tary of Defense (Atomic Energy),that it was essential to retain DASAor a successor agency that wouldserve as the conscience of the DoDin matters of nuclear safety.

➻ Assessment Methods forTarget Planning: DASA sponsoredfield tests, calculations, and algo-rithm development to improve theprobability-of-damage calculationsused in force exchange models.These models were developed bythe Air Force Intelligence Center,refined later by the Defense Intelli-gence Agency (DIA), and appliedby the Joint Strategic Target Plan-ning Staff. The method is referredto as the VNTK system, denotingVulnerability Number/Type (oftarget)/K-factor. The “K-factor”accounts for weapon yield effectsand was formulated by the Univer-sity of Illinois based on DASAexperimental data. Initially, DASAproduced slide rules that incorpo-

rated the VNTK system. Later, theAgency made the methodologyavailable on programmable, hand-held calculators. Both the sliderules and the calculators werewidely used by target plannersthroughout the DoD.

➻ Radiation Simulators: DASAsupported EMP simulator designand sponsored an EMP SimulatorPanel in 1967-1968. This workencouraged design of EMP simula-tors of different types for each ofthe military services. DASA fundedand the Air Force Weapons Labora-tory initially operated ARES, anEMP simulator in Albuquerque,New Mexico. DASA also funded theTransportable EMP Simulator(TEMPS), built for the Army, andthe EMP Radiation Effects Simula-tor for Ships (EMPRESS), a simula-tor system built for the Navy.

➻ Testing ABM Systems: Amegaton-range underground test(CANNIKIN) in 1971 verified Spar-tan warhead performance. Subse-quently, the U.S. Army and theAgency tested full-scale Spartaninterceptor survivability in nuclearenvironments. These tests helpedconfirm U.S. readiness for ABMdeployments. System costs andeffects analyses were factors in theeventual negotiation of the 1972ABM Treaty.

➻ Creating the Defense NuclearAgency: On March 29, 1971,Deputy Defense Secretary DavidPackard announced the creation ofthe Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)as successor to DASA.

1963–1971 — Strategic Deterrence

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Effects Manual.

18

1971–1981— Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

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7-1. Commemorative stamp.7-2. Watergate finale.7-3. Terrorist at Munich Olympics.7-4. Jimmy Carter.7-5. Lech Walesa. 7-6. Khomeini.7-7. The Concorde. 7-8. Three MileIsland. 7-9. Gas shortage signs.7-10. America’s 200th BirthdayParade. 7-11. Vietnam evacuation.7-12. Afghanistan rebel.

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➻ DNA Becomes Sole EffectsTest Sponsor: Since 1971, DNA hassponsored all U.S. nuclearweapons effects tests, designedprimarily to permit exposure of thetest objects to radiation whileprotecting them from high-velocitydebris or other products of anuclear detonation. In a one-of-a-kind nuclear effects test, DNAexposed a Defense SatelliteCommunications System III (DSCSIII) mock-up tonuclear effects during the HURONKING event. During exposure, thesatellite mock-up was housed in aspecially designed vacuumchamber at the top of an evacuatedvertical shaft over the nucleardevice.

➻ Improved Operational Safetyand Security in NATO: DNA sup-ported an OSD site security initia-tive after terrorist attacks duringthe Munich Olympics in 1972. Re-sults included non-lethal defensesat storage sites and site securitysurveys. New weapon storage vaultsincluded subsurface weapons stor-age within shelters of aircraft onalert status; these weapon vaultswere deployed beginning in the1980s. The buried storage vaultsafforded prompt access with im-proved site security and site safetyin event of fire or hostile attack.

➻ Integrating Knowledge: In1972, DNA published a two-volumenuclear weapons effects manual

called Effects Manual-1 (EM-1).Two years later, DNA issued aNATO-releasable version of EM-1.These volumes provided criticalplanning information for unifiedand specified CINCs, civilian civildefense activities, and NATOofficials.

➻ New Directions for TheaterDeterrence and Defense: In 1973,the Secretary of Defense and theSupreme Allied Commander Eu-rope (SACEUR) asked DNA tomake a series of assessments ofmethods to provide a strong for-ward defense in Europe. This as-sessment was to be based on allsource information regarding Sovi-et force modernization and exer-cises. The integrated deterrentroles of strategic and theater nucle-ar forces were to be illuminated inthese assessments, and emphasiswas placed on means to provide amuch improved conventional for-ward defense. Suggested improve-

ments included the views of allNATO allies. All of these goals wereaccomplished by DNA in conjunc-tion with many agencies of the U.S.government, including the Con-gress, as well as European alliesand NATO. A major result was theU.S. Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrinethat produced theater-specificforce and strategy improvements

for NATO, Korea, and SouthwestAsia. In 1974, DNA supported theCommander in Chief, Pacific(CINCPAC) in identifying new tac-tics for the use of advanced con-ventional weapons in the defense ofKorea. CINCPAC was able to reducedependence upon early nuclearescalation in Korean contingencyplans. In the mid-to-late 1970s,DNA supported CINCPAC’s effort toensure operability of command,control, and communications (C3)links in nuclear environments,including high-altitude bursts withEMP effects.

➻ Protective Structures: As bal-listic missile accuracies improvedin the mid-1970s, DNA assessednew protective structures for U.S.strategic and theater force deploy-ments and studied potential vulner-abilities of Soviet hardened targets.The Silo Test Program (STP), origi-nally for Soviet target assessment,provided insights for superhardsilo designs for U.S. ICBMs.

1971-1981—Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity:International tensions fueled by the Afghanistan invasionand the seizure of the U.S. embassy by Iranians lead to aU.S. military buildup and strategic modernization.

1971 - “Vietnamization” underway

1972 - President Nixon reelected – Visits China

1973 - U.S. leaves Vietnam

1974 - Nixon resigns – Ford sworn in

1975 - First personal computers appear – South Vietnam falls

1976 - U.S. Bicentennial – Carter elected President

1977 - Neutron bomb controversy

1978 - Vietnam invades Cambodia

1979 - Soviets invade Afghanistan – Iranians seize U.S. embassy

1980 - Reagan elected – Iran/Iraq war begins

1981 - Iran releases hostages

Missile silo test configuration.

President Nixon andPremier Chou En-Laiin China (1972).

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1971–1981 — Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

7-13

20

➻ Simulator Development:In the 1970s, DNA operatedand sponsored Serviceoperation of an array ofradiation simulators. Somesimulators were portable,permitting the testing ofequipment at distant sites.Simulators in this era alsoprovided for x-ray testing atthe component level. DNAprovided community testbedsusing HE simulation of airblastat White Sands Missile Range,New Mexico.

➻ Computational Modelsand Handheld Calculators:DNA was in the forefront ofdeveloping microcomputerapplications for nuclear effects.Beginning in 1974, the DNA DeputyDirector for Science and Technol-ogy personally oversaw thedevelopment of nuclear effectsalgorithms for handheld calcula-tors and the first generation ofpersonal computers. This providedmilitary and civilian analystsplanning tools previously availableonly on mainframe computers.DNA provided field commanderswith the first microcomputer-basedplanning tools, including thecomputerized Targeting andPlanning System (TAPS).

➻ Survival of Missile Systems:Survivability of land-based ICBMsbecame increasingly challengingduring this era as the Sovietsachieved “nuclear parity” with theU.S. Both underground tests andHE simulations supported options

for basing the Peacekeeper (MX)ICBM. DNA supported Air Forcestudies resulting in retrofitting ofMinuteman silos to improve surviv-ability. Later underground tests(UGTs) led to changes for the Min-uteman III Mk-12A RV and the Mk-4 reentry body (RB) for the TridentI SLBM. Trident operability testingpreceded deployment of Ohio-classsubmarines, each carrying 24MIRVed SLBMs.

➻ Aircraft Operability: Aircraftshelters built in Europe protectedaircraft against conventional weap-on attack. DNA tested aircraft shel-ters and shielding against EMP.Assessments of nuclear barragesover air bases improved survivabil-ity of tankers supporting SAC oper-ations.

➻ NATO Theater Force Modern-ization: In October 1977, NATO’s

Nuclear Planning Group es-tablished a task force on the-ater nuclear force moderniza-tion. With DNA-sponsoredassessments, among others,NATO approved a two-tracktheater force modernizationand arms control strategy inDecember 1979.

To preclude the overrunningof Western Europe, NATOsought the capability to attackrear echelon air bases andkey nodes in the Warsaw Pactresupply system. This re-quired new classes of promptstrike weapon systems. Be-yond DNA-sponsored studiesof theater force moderniza-

tion, the Agency participated invarious Joint Working Groups thatprovided a forum with allies tomodel alternative force employ-ment tactics and exercise new sce-narios and force mixes. These ac-tivities helped to convince NATOallies of the importance of forcemodernization. Subsequent U.S.theater nuclear force initiatives inthe 1980s included deployment ofground-launched cruise missiles(GLCMs), Pershing II ballistic mis-siles, and other special purposeweapons. DNA supported harden-ing of the Supreme Headquarters,Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) atMons, Belgium; protective struc-tures assessments for GLCMs; andPershing survivability exercises inthe field.

➻ Theater Force Deployments:To modernize theater nuclear and DoD satellite test chamber (HURON KING). INSET: Satellite

suspended inside test chamber.

CACTUS crater dome at Enewetak Atoll.

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conventional forces, NATO forcesdeployed advanced technologysystems to offset the quantitativeadvantage of deployed Warsaw Pactforces. In the aftermath of NATO’sinitial deployment of modern the-ater nuclear forces and other ac-tions, Soviet delegations walked outof all nuclear arms control negotia-tions in 1983.

➻ Effects of Radiation: AFRRIimproved the understanding ofincapacitating effects of radiation.Among other applications, thisunderstanding influenced Armyplanning for use of, and responseto, enhanced radiation weapons.The AFRRI mission included troopand medical staff training, and theavailability of medical staff forresponse to radiologicalemergencies.

➻ Environmental Remediation:As part of its cleanup of radioactivedebris on Enewetak Atoll, DNAmoved tons of contaminated soil tothe CACTUS crater and entombed itunderneath a massive concretecover designed by the Army Corpsof Engineers. DNA also developedrobotic radiation monitoringequipment that has been used sub-sequently in site remediation activi-ties at the NTS and at JohnstonAtoll.

➻ Nuclear Effects Research andDevelopment: DNA employed acombination of UGTs, simulators,and analytical models to improvethe understanding of a spectrum ofnuclear effects important tosystems being developed or underconsideration during the era.

1971–1981 — Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

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Pershing Battery undergoing tests at Cape Canaveral, Florida.

EMP simulation test setup.

Trident SLBM test shot.

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Close-in and non-ideal airblast,plus direct- and airblast-inducedground shock, were all assessed orreassessed because of theirimportance in understanding thesurvivability of hardened U.S.structures and the lethality of U.S.weapons attacking similar Soviettargets. Methods were evaluated toavoid or minimize erosion of RVsor RBs flying through dust, ice, andrain. Research began on dusteffects on aircraft engines followingdamage observed in engines ofaircraft flying near the Mt. St.

Helens’ volcanic cloud. Hardeningtechniques for system-generatedEMP (SGEMP) effects began to beapplied to spacecraft design.Satellite observations and modelingrefined the scientific understandingof communications degradationdue to nuclear effects on theatmosphere. DNA developed stepsto mitigate or otherwise cope withsuch degradation.

➻ Nuclear Test PersonnelReview (NTPR): The statisticalassociation of leukemia with the

1957 SMOKY test and concernregarding the health of other testparticipants led OSD to establishthe NTPR in 1978. DNA publishedreports describing major nucleartests in the atmosphere, thendeveloped a database on testexposures for military nuclear testparticipants and occupation forcesat Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Subsequently, the NTPR programhas provided individual dosereconstructions to help theDepartments of Justice andVeterans Affairs adjudicateveterans’ claims of radiation-related illnesses.

➻ Enduring C3: The ability tosurvive potential nuclear environ-ments requires enduring C3 capa-bilities. In the 1970s, DNA assesseddistributed C3 network survivabilityafter both direct attack and expo-sure to EMP, and sponsored assess-ments of both satellite and groundstation design for prompt and de-layed radiation events. DNA-sup-plied data on hardening againstradiation and EMP effects support-ed the design of more survivablespace systems, ground-based com-munications nodes, and C3 net-works. In 1979-1980, the Carteradministration initiated new mea-sures for continuity of governmentand military operations in nuclearenvironments.

➻ Strategic Balance Assess-ments: DNA supported OSD-spon-sored net technical and force bal-ance assessments for the Office ofNet Assessment. Results impactedforce budgeting and arms controlplanning preceding the Strategic

Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I of1979.

➻ Joint Exercises for Emergen-cy Response and Site Remedia-tion: Starting in 1979, DNA co-sponsored, with the DOE, jointemergency response exercises.Nuclear Weapon Accident Exercise-79 (NUWAX-79) was the first ofmany biennial emergency responseexercises. It simulated aircraft ac-cidents and employed short-livedradioactive isotopes in dilute quan-tities for realistic training in hazardassessments and nuclear weapon/materials recovery operations.

➻ Holding Soviet Targets atRisk: DNA, with DIA cooperation,reverse-engineered Soviet ICBMsilos and began subscale testing.The STP led to estimates of in-creased silo hardness. New DNAmodels aided JSTPS in SingleIntegrated Operational Plan (SIOP)adjustments as the 1971-1981 eraended.

1971–1981 — Strategic Deterrence with Nuclear Parity

DISTANT RUNNER high-explosive test event.

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1981–1991— Force Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

8-1. Challenger explosion. 8-2. The Reagans.8-3. Tiananmen Square. 8-4. Delta II rocket.8-5. George Bush. 8-6. Berlin Wall.8-7. Gorbachev. 8-8. USS America. 8-9. Spaceshuttle launch.

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1981-1991—Force Modernization and the Demise ofthe Warsaw Pact: The awesome costs of the U.S./Soviet armsrace help bring down the Berlin Wall and communism in theSoviet Union; the threats of the Cold War are replaced by aseries of regional conflicts; and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) becomes a global concern.

1981 - Reagan inaugurated – Beginning of defense buildup

1982 - U.S.- USSR retain limits for SALT II

1983 - Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

1984 - Reagan reelected in a landslide

1985 - Gorbachev becomes General Secretary, Communist Party

1986 - Reagan-Gorbachev talks stall over U.S. SDI program

1987 - Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty

1988 - Bush elected President – Iran-Iraq War ends

1989 - Soviet troops leave Afghanistan – Berlin Wall torn down

1990 - Warsaw Pact ends – Iraq invades Kuwait

1991 - Gorbachev abducted but attempted coup fails

➻ Strategic Force Moderniza-tion: The 1981-1991 era beganwith President Reagan’s defensebuildup. Initially, the focus was onrenewing B-1 bomber productionand reevaluating basing modes forthe Peacekeeper ICBM. DNA con-tinued to provide support to theevaluation of candidate Peacekeep-er basing modes. After theScowcroft Commission’s Report,the President approved silos as thePeacekeeper basing mode and thedevelopment of Small ICBMs withemphasis on nuclear survivability.The Agency provided technicalsupport and briefings to theScowcroft Commission.

Following the Commission’s report,DNA applied its expertise to:craters from tests in the Pacific toreevaluate crater dynamics andtheir application to silo survivabili-ty; non-ideal airblast and its simu-lation for tests of the HardenedMobile Launcher (HML) for theSmall ICBM; ground shock at highoverpressures for silo survivabilityand, later, for lethality againstdeeply buried and hardened under-ground structures; and superhardsilo design and testing. Many ofthese activities were accomplishedjointly with the Air Force’s BallisticMissile Office (BMO). The HMLconcept originated from DNA

airblast testing, which demonstrat-ed the feasibility of anchoringvehicles under high dynamic pres-sure loading. DNA also assistedBMO in hardening Small ICBMelectronics to nuclear effects.

➻ Operability Testing: Duringthe era, DNA executed UGTs thatdemonstrated the survivability ofthe Trident II guidance system,other in-flight missile electronics,and the Mk-5 RB. Separate UGTsverified the survivability of theMk-21 RV for the Peacekeepermissile. These systems, along withMinuteman III, will comprise thestrategic missile element of U.S.strategic forces into the foreseeablefuture.

➻ Communications Connectiv-ity: DNA sponsored summer stud-ies on high altitude nuclear effectsin 1982 and 1986. Simulation of

exoatmospheric plasma striationsusing barium clouds coincidedwith communication and radarexperiments to test communica-tions degradation. These testsemployed satellite transmissionsthrough the striated barium cloudphenomena. DNA sponsored threesatellites designed to explore thesephenomena: WIDEBAND in 1976,HILAT (high latitude) in 1983, andPOLAR BEAR in 1986.

➻ Microelectronics Hardening:Following the DoD Nuclear Surviv-ability Directive in 1983, DNAreinforced its role in encouragingService SPOs to adopt radiation-hardened microelectronics compo-nents. Re-analysis of SGEMP effectsled to early consultations withsystem designers to assure opera-bility without large system retrofitcosts. As the semiconductor indus-try increased processing speedswithin smaller packages, miniatur-ized circuits exhibited reducedtolerances to radiation. DNA spon-sored development of radiation-tolerant satellite and computermicroelectronics, which subse-quently demonstrated their endur-ance through solar flares thatdisrupted other unhardened satel-lites. DNA’s microelectronics hard-ening program has contributed toU.S. preeminence in long-livedreconnaissance, space exploration,and communication satellites.

Deficiencies in understanding ofcertain radiation effects, especiallysource region EMP, led DNA todesign an underground test as part

of the DISTANT LIGHT programand to correlate results with aboveground test simulations and com-puter models.

➻ Enhanced ConventionalMunitions: DNA sponsored tests ofenhanced conventional munitionsand their relative performancecompared to nuclear weapons. In afive-year development program withthe Air Force in 1983-1988, DNA co-sponsored advanced conventionalmunitions tests at Eglin Air ForceBase, Florida.

In 1986, the Johnson Task Forcereport to the Defense ScienceBoard on DNA management reaf-firmed the application of DNA’sexpertise to non-nuclear weaponseffects. This action preceded theMarch 1987 charter authorizingDNA to pursue non-nuclear tech-nology applications where theAgency’s nuclear-derived skillswere highly relevant. This initiativeserved to support precision strikeoperations in the Persian Gulf Warof 1990-1991 and laid the founda-

Peacekeeper missile.

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Radiation hardened 64-kilobit staticRAM chip from the early 1980s.

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tion for the counterproliferationprogram.

➻ Design for Enduring Com-mand and Control: Soviet doctrineand targeting gave priority to“decapitation attacks” upon theNational Command Authority. Sincethe early 1980s, the DNA commu-nity supported presidential initia-tives to procure survivable C3systems and to assure continuity ofgovernment in wartime. Theseprograms incorporated designs tocope with both prompt and delayednuclear effects.

➻ Nuclear Winter Assessments:DNA-funded research led to the1983 Nuclear Winter assessmentof dust and soot impairment ofsunlight transmission. DNA also

Construction of BLACKJACK radiation test simulator.

funded research to improve theunderstanding of uncertaintiesregarding fire phenomenology andtransport models. These modelssupported assessments on theimpact of wartime fires, and weredocumented by the National Re-search Council in The Effects onthe Atmosphere of a Major Nucle-ar Exchange (1985), and in laterassessments of the more than 600concurrent Kuwaiti oil well firesduring Operation Desert Storm.

➻ Strategic Defense: The SDIOffice assigned DNA responsibilityfor evaluating the lethality of all SDIweapons against their potentialtargets. The SDI Office co-spon-sored survivability and operabilitytests and simulations. DNA con- SDI laser test.

Soviet Yankee/Notch class submarine.

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8-14select weapons for earlyretirement, and to assurethe safety of an agingnuclear stockpile. Secre-tary of Defense Cheneytasked DNA to establish aweapons system safetyassessment capability.Working jointly with theServices, DNA applied aprobabilistic risk assess-ment methodology toquantify the likelihood ofplutonium dispersal inplausible accident sce-narios. DNA’s inspectionsbrought discrepancies toService command atten-tion, and ultimatelyhelped major commandsovercome deficiencies.

➻ Environmental Cleanup: In1986, after the waste cleanup activ-ities begun earlier were completed,the government returned Enewetakto the sovereignty of Marshall Is-land inhabitants. Concurrently,DNA began a plutonium wastemonitoring and sorting/collectionprogram to reduce Johnston Atollplutonium contamination that re-sulted from the pre-launch explo-sion of a nuclear-armed missileduring the 1962 atmospheric testseries. In operation from 1986 tothe present, the program hasachieved significant decontamina-tion of plutonium mass on theAtoll. After the 1986 reactor fire atthe Chernobyl power plant inUkraine, DNA deployed a Cherno-byl Site Restoration Assistance

Team from AFRRI to identify hazardmitigation options and participatein developing medical treatmentregimes.

➻ Hard Target Kill: DNA sup-ported JCS initiatives to hold at riskstrategic relocatable targets andSoviet hardened underground C3facilities. DNA established a HardTarget Kill research program thatincluded consideration of earthpenetrating weapons.

➻ Chemical Weapon Demilita-rization at Johnston Atoll: Duringthe period when the nation main-tained the option to resume atmo-spheric nuclear testing, DNA ac-cepted custodianship of JohnstonAtoll, located 800 miles southwestof the Hawaiian Archipelago. DNAsupported users of the Atoll by

1981–1991 — Force Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

ducted underground tests for SDIcandidate subsystems, includingdistributed sensor systems. DNAalso supported SDI Red Teams inassessments of adaptive responsesto candidate SDI systems.

➻ Operational Safety andSecurity: A Titan II missile caughtfire and was destroyed duringroutine maintenance in the early1980s. Following the investigationof this accident, OSD reinstatedemergency response teams underthe coordination of DNA’s JointNuclear Accident CoordinatingCenter. The Agency published aNuclear Weapon Accident Re-sponse Procedure (NARP) manualin 1984.

The Drell Report to the Congress in1990 urged improved hydrocodesand three-dimensional modeling toimprove hazard predictions, to

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DNA EM rail gun being test fired.

Joint DNA/NavyEMPRESS EMP testing.

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maintaining the facilities on theAtoll and protecting it againstfurther erosion by oceanic action.In 1986, the Army began construc-tion of a state-of-the-art chemicalagent incineration system onJohnston Atoll. That system beganoperational testing in 1990. Theprocessing of nerve and mustardagent stocks previously transferredfrom Okinawa also began. InNovember 1990, chemical weaponstocks in the Federal Republic ofGermany were transferred to theAtoll for destruction. The Army’schemical agent demilitarizationprogram continues as the primaryuser of Johnson Atoll.

➻ Nuclear Technology Spinoffs:Pulsed power systems developedfor nuclear radiation simulatorsprovided energy sources for evalu-ation of ideas to improve the rangeand muzzle velocity of artillerytubes and Navy guns. In a jointprogram with the SDI office in1985, DNA tested an electro-magnetic (EM) rail gun that fired a150-gram projectile at 3.1 kilo-meters/second, a world recordfor a projectile of that mass.

In a joint program with theNavy, DNA developedelectrothermal chemical(ETC) projectiles thatdoubled the range ofstandard Navy five-inchguns. This ETC technolo-gy became a leadingcandidate for up-gun-ning the new DD-51class of Navy destroyers.

ETC technology is also being con-sidered for Army artillery and tankgun applications.

➻ Arms Control Implementa-tion: With NATO force moderniza-tion well underway, arms controltalks resumed in 1985. The Treatyon Intermediate Nuclear Forces(INF) of 1987 was the first suc-cessful effort to eliminate an entireclass of nuclear weapon systems inEurope; i.e., ground-based missilesof 500- to 5,500-kilometer range.DNA was assigned responsibility fordeveloping treaty verificationtechnology following the signing ofthe INF Treaty. Examples ofachievements in this enterprise arethe design and field testing of aperimeter and portal monitoringsystem and unique identifiers

(tags) to monitor solid rocketmotor and RV inventories.

DNA provided contracting andadministrative support to thenewly-created On-Site InspectionAgency as it implemented inspec-tions under the INF Treaty, theStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START), and other treaties andbilateral agreements. DNA studiesprovided an analytical foundationfor the 40-percent reduction indeployed strategic warheads man-dated by START I, and for deeperSTART II reductions.

➻ Dual-Use Technology: Federalpolicy encourages dual-use re-search to provide civilian benefitsfrom technologies developed fornational defense purposes. DNAapplied its expertise, developedprimarily to address Cold Warnuclear issues, to a number ofdual-use activities.

DNA’s e-SCRUB program employedpulsed electron beams to removeoxides of sulphur and nitrogenfrom coal stack gases. This tech-nique permits the use of highsulphur coal in electrical powerplants located in sensitive airbasins. DNA adapted nucleareffects models to predict damagefrom hurricanes and other naturalphenomena, thus assisting theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) and other relieforganizations in concentratingdisaster relief operations wheremost needed. DNA has also usednuclear effects ground shock

1981–1991 — Force Modernization and the Demise of the Warsaw Pact

research and tools to advise theconstruction industry on methodsto mitigate earthquake damage tobuildings. The results of the radia-tion-tolerant microelectronicsprogram have been applied to

civilian spacecraft operating innaturally disturbed environments.Finally, advanced numerics andcomputational mesh strategies havebeen employed to improve weatherforecasting.

Maintenance onICBM warheads.

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1991— Post-Cold War Priorities

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➻ The Persian Gulf War:Following the Iraqi invasionof Kuwait in August 1990, aU.S.-led coalition of nationsdeployed forces to SaudiArabia and surroundingareas to help prevent fur-ther Iraqi offensive incur-sions. In January 1991,coalition air power beganexecuting an air campaignagainst Iraq’s military andsupporting infrastructure.The effectiveness of preci-sion-guided munitions andstealth aircraft was quicklydemonstrated. Coalition airpower attacked suspected IraqiWMD facilities protected byhardened bunkers. Coalitionforces launched a ground offen-sive in late February 1991 thatexpelled Iraq’s forces from Kuwait100 hours after the offensivebegan.

DNA’s expertise in weapons lethal-ity and modeling of atmospheric

transport supported target plan-ning and consequence assess-ments during the war. The Agencydeployed expert teams to a DNAassessment facility, to DIA Head-quarters, and to the Pentagon insupport of operational targetingfrom the start of the air campaignthrough the expulsion of Iraqiforces from Kuwait. DNA also setup a 24-hour command center to

assess the consequences of poten-tial WMD warheads on the Scudmissiles Iraq launched againstSaudi Arabia and Israel. DNAprovided the results of theseassessments to Central Command.

➻ Postwar Validation of Dam-age Modeling: DNA officers par-ticipated in post-war inspectionsto validate lethality and survivabil-ity models based on wartimeexperience. Battle damage assess-ments suggested new damageindicators, such as the tempera-

ture of target smoke. TheAgency incorporated lessonsfrom the Persian Gulf War inlethality, survivability, andcollateral effects modeling,especially for hardenedtargets.

➻ Proliferation andCounterproliferation: Thepost-Desert Storm revela-tions of the breadth andscope of the Iraqi quest toobtain nuclear weaponsspawned a heightenedawareness of WMD prolifer-ation. DNA began counter-proliferation initiatives in

1991. This early planning sup-ported a review of all U.S. non-proliferation and counterpro-liferation activities that washeaded by the (then) Deputy Sec-retary of Defense, John Deutch.DNA also supported counterpro-liferation planning by the Assistantto the Secretary of Defense (Atom-ic Energy) (ATSD(AE)), nowATSD (Nuclear and Chemical and

Biological Defense Programs, orNCB). That office was assignedcentralized responsibility for DoDcounterproliferation research anddevelopment activities.

➻ Capabilities to NeutralizeWMD Proliferation: After theearly considerations of prolifera-tion, the ATSD (AE) designatedDNA as the lead DoD agency forthe counterforce elements of thecounterproliferation supportprogram. The centerpiece ofDoD’s counterproliferation activi-ties is an Advanced ConceptTechnology Demonstration(ACTD), which involves the inte-gration of research and develop-ment products with existingoperational assets to demonstratean improved capability to neutral-ize WMD targets with minimal andpredictable collateral effects. TheU.S. European Command(USEUCOM) is the Operation-al Manager of the ACTD withDNA as its DemonstrationManager. Service and DOElaboratories are also partici-pating in the ACTD.

Early ACTD activities in 1996involved live delivery ofinventory weapons againstsimulated biological weapontargets. Post-1996 ACTDactivities will includemore advancedweapons in attackson simulated chemi-cal weapon produc-tion facilities that

are protected by hardened struc-tures. Although the counterprolif-eration ACTD has prompt weaponapplications and high target killprobability in common with othersimilar activities, it is unique in itsfocus on predicting, minimizing,and measuring post-attack collat-eral effects. In common with allACTDs, the counterproliferationACTD will provide unified com-mands with weapons, sensors,and other assets that can be usedimmediately.

➻ The Cooperative ThreatReduction (CTR) Program: Inresponse to the dangers associat-ed with the potential breakdownof nuclear controls in the FormerSoviet Union (FSU), in late 1991the U.S. embarked on an innova-tive program of cooperativeassistance. Until 1993, the CTR

1991— Post-Cold War Priorities: The collapse ofcommunism is followed by regional conflicts, prolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruction, and escalatingterrorism on both domestic and international fronts.1991 - Iraq expelled from Kuwait – Soviet Union dissolved

1992 - Clinton elected President

1993 - START II signed – Israel i/PLO peace accord

1994 - World Trade Center bombing

1995 - Non-Proliferation Treaty extended – Oklahoma City bombing

1996 - DNA becomes Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA)

1997 - DSWA celebrates 50th Anniversary

Defense SecretaryPerry and UkraineMinister of DefenseShmarov signingtreaty.

Destroyed Iraqi hardened shelter.

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Program was called the Safe,Secure Dismantlement Program; itcontinues to be informally re-ferred to as the “Nunn-LugarProgram.” The program’s funda-mental objectives are: (1) to helpall FSU States but Russia becomenon-nuclear; (2) to accelerateSTART arms reductions; (3) toenhance nuclear safety, security,and control; (4) to initiate FSUchemical weapon destruction; (5)to encourage demilitarization; and(6) to extend contacts betweenthe U.S. and FSU defense estab-lishments.

In January 1993, the ATSD (AE),assigned DNA the task of imple-menting the program, on a cradle-to-grave basis, for each CTRelement. As of mid-1996, theAgency is executing over 50 CTRprojects, ranging from supplyingRussia with containers for trans-port and storage of fissile material,to projects in the demilitarizationarea designed to ensure that threatreduction efforts are of an endur-ing, peaceful, and commerciallyviable nature.

Illustrative CTR program achieve-ments include removal of over1,200 warheads from deployedsystems in Russia; realization ofnuclear-free status in Ukraine andKazakstan, with Belarus expectedto do so not later than early 1997;and elimination of many FSUstrategic nuclear delivery systems.

➻ Nuclear Stockpile Draw-down: In 1991, President Bushannounced nuclear posture

changes reflecting the end of theCold War. These changes includedwithdrawal of tactical nuclearweapons from Army bases, surfaceships, and attack submarines;cancellation of mobile basing pro-grams for the Peacekeeper mis-sile; cancellation of the ShortRange Attack Missile-II (SRAM-II)and the Small ICBM; and standdown from alert of strategicbombers and Minuteman ICBMs. AJanuary 1992 Presidential decisionlaid the groundwork for eventualelimination of all 50 Peace-keepers, reduced MIRV deploy-ments, and the shift of bombers toconventional missions.

The Clinton administration con-ducted a Nuclear Posture Review(NPR) in 1993-1994 that led to adefinition of an “enduring stock-pile” of nuclear weapons. DNAsupported the NPR principalsthrough a DNA point-of-contactwho coordinated NPR require-ments with DNA analyses and

other activities, and providedproducts to meet the NPR needs.

In September 1994, PresidentClinton approved a reducedstrategic force comprised ofMinuteman ICBMs, Trident sub-marines (all with D-5 missiles),B-2 and B-52 strategic bombers,and a non-nuclear role for theB-1 bomber.

➻ Training for Reliability,Safety, and Security: Since 1993,DNA has operated the DefenseNuclear Weapons School (DNWS)at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, forall Services. DNWS has sincebroadened its curriculum toinclude courses in counterprolif-eration and counter-terrorism.Although the Army, Marines, andmost Navy commands are nolonger nuclear capable, ongoingtraining is essential to maintainService competency to operate innuclear environments.

➻ Verification TechnologyExpands: The DNA verificationtechnology programs have ex-panded to include support tovirtually every arms control andbilateral agreement to which theU.S. is a party. Recent verificationtechnology achievements andactivities include sensors for Open

The HE Computational Aid for Windows.

Skies aircraft, unified databasesrelevant to arms control, analyti-cal techniques and sensors forchemical and biological agents,gravity gradiometers to character-ize START Treaty Limited Items,and improved seismic sensingcapabilities to verify the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

➻ Nuclear Stockpile Steward-ship: With the 1993 decision toconditionally cease U.S. nucleartesting, questions arose on main-taining the reliability of the endur-ing nuclear stockpile that wasdefined by the NPR. The DOEadvocated “Science Based Stock-pile Stewardship,” in which reli-ability would be preservedthrough stockpile surveillance,laboratory experiments, andimproved computational softwareand hardware.

Subsequently, a DoD-DOE agree-ment called for “dual revalida-tion” of weapons remaining in theinventory through a process inwhich each DOE weapons labora-tory independently and periodi-cally examines all data relevant toa specific weapon type. The re-sults are reviewed by DOE Head-quarters and provided to theNuclear Weapons Council for finalaction. DNA is a participant in theprocess, with DNA militaryofficers located at all three nation-al laboratories. These officerscontribute to the dual revalidationprocess and annual recertificationof the stockpile.

Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Kirtland Air Force Base.

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Science & Technology Digest.

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➻ High Performance Comput-ing: The underpinning of theAgency’s nuclear expertise andadvanced conventional weaponsapplications is high performancecomputing (HPC) and modeling.The High Performance Computingand Communications (HPCC)program has provided advancedscientific computing resources tothe nuclear effects communitysince the mid-1970s. In the earlyyears, this was accomplished bybuying large blocks of time fromAEC and Service laboratories.From 1980-1983, DNA operatedits own CDC 7600 supercomputerat Kirtland AFB. In 1983, theAgency entered into an arrange-ment with LANL to provide HPCresources. Since then, Los Alamoshas integrated a series of DNAsupercomputers (CDC CYBER 176in 1984, Cray X-MP in 1988, andCray M98 in 1994) into its com-putational environment andoperated a private communica-tions network providing classifiedand unclassified computing toDNA’s geographically distributedsupport sites. In 1995, DNAaugmented its HPC capability witha Cray J90 operating at its head-quarters.

➻ Data and Knowledge Preser-vation: Two efforts were initiatedin 1993 as a cohesive program toensure that the legacy of irre-placeable nuclear effects informa-tion and expertise will survive forfuture generations: the DataArchival and Retrieval Enhance-

ment (DARE) Program andProject Graybeard. The DAREProgram locates, stores, andretrieves effects data from itsinventory of waveforms, numerictables, diagrams, reports, photo-graphs, and video media. Integra-tion and declassification of effectsknowledge is underway in the newEM-1 Technical Handbook,scheduled for release in early1997. This handbook will drawupon the authoritative 22-volumeEM-1. The Agency also advancescommunity technology and datapreservation achievements in thepublication Science & Technolo-gy Digest. The second DNAarchival program, Project Gray-beard, identifies, locates, andinterprets test data and lessonslearned, and integrates the infor-mation into the DARE database.

➻ Technology Applications forCounterterrorism: As the breadthand scope of terrorism began toexpand in the 1980s, it becameapparent that much of the DNACold War expertise was applicableto efforts to counter terrorism. Inparticular, DNA expertise in C3facility survivability has directapplication to the safeguarding ofU.S. and allied facilities that arepotential terrorist targets. Forexample, the Agency has per-formed approximately 50 Bal-anced Survivability Assessments ofcritical DoD and federal agencyfacilities. Chief among the findingsare that the judgments regarding afacility’s vulnerability to terrorism

become virtual roadmaps to riskreduction measures. DNA hasperformed structural blast re-sponse calculations using codesand models originally developedfor nuclear applications. Thisanalytical support was provided tolaw enforcement agencies duringforensic investigations of terroristevents, including the WorldTrade Center and OklahomaCity bombings.

➻ DNA Transition toDSWA: In 1992 and again in1993, Congress mandatedreviews of DNA’s roles,missions, and functions.The eventual result was areaffirmation of the DoDcommitment to maintainnuclear competencieswith DNA as the center ofexcellence for the De-partment’s nuclearmatters, including CTRand activities in NuclearStockpile Stewardship.DNA also gained re-sponsibility for non-nuclear development activitiesthat take advantage of the Agency’snuclear heritage. The traditionalDNA roles, along with the newtasks, were institutionalized in anew charter issued in 1995.Subsequently, the Agency reorga-nized to improve service to itscustomers, to implement totalquality management, to breakaway from Cold War traditions,and to foster coordination andteamwork. The Agency was reti-

tled DSWA during ceremonies onJune 26, 1996, culminating theAgency’s evolution in the Post-Cold War environment.

➻ Joint Science Programs:DSWA sponsors joint scienceprograms with scientific institu-tions in Russia, Ukraine, andKazakstan. These programs in-

clude an evaluation of the RussianTopaz reactor for thermionicenergy, applications of energeticmaterials, comparative findingson nuclear weapons effects, andthe use of advanced computation-al techniques.

➻ Munitions Effectiveness:Munitions effectiveness assess-ment modeling uses empirical

data obtained from DSWA’s Per-manent High Explosives Test Site(PHETS) at White Sands MissileRange, New Mexico. Since 1988,there has been more than a 30-fold increase in conventionaleffects tests. DSWA’s White Sandsfacilities were also employed bythe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobaccoand Firearms (ATF) in tests to

create a computerizeddatabase and investigativeprotocol for law enforce-ment agencies to use inlarge-scale vehicle bombinvestigations. The LargeBlast /Thermal Simulator(LBTS), operated jointly byDSWA and the Army at WhiteSands since 1994, is thelargest shock tube in theworld. LBTS can replicate theblast and thermal environmentsof nuclear weapons with yieldsfrom one to 600 kilotons.

➻ Current and Future Chal-lenges: One of the hallmarks ofDSWA’s predecessors was effectiveand timely response to the dynam-ics of the Agency’s internal andexternal environments. Over thefive years of this era, DNA andDSWA successfully transitioned intothe Post-Cold War era. DSWA isnow postured for future achieve-ments directly relevant to thecurrent and future national securityenvironment, including the preser-vation of core competencies sopainstakingly acquired over the last50 years.

1991 — Post-Cold War Priorities

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Future Challenges

➻ Looking Ahead: While no onecan predict the future, we canidentify some of the key factors thatare likely to impact the Agency’smission over the next half-century.

➻ There will be WMD: Since theend of the Cold War, technologiesthat enable state and non-stateorganizations to develop anddeliver WMD — nuclear, radiolog-ical, chemical, and biologicalweapons — have proliferated.Even if all states agreed to elimi-nate WMD, the capability to pro-duce such devices with littlewarning will persist. Planning for

major contingencies will necessari-ly have to consider the possibilitythat antagonists could have WMDcapabilities. Moreover, U.S. citizensmay find themselves exposed toWMD incidents, even though theU.S. is not involved as a protago-nist.

➻ Many Nuclear Futures arePossible: For the foreseeablefuture, there is little likelihood of aresurgence of the Cold War. How-ever, some Cold War-related taskswill continue to engage our timeand resources for programs suchas CTR in the former Soviet Unionand remediation of the human andenvironmental legacies of nuclearweapons. Over the longer term,there are a number of scenarios,ranging from further proliferationand eventual use of nuclear weap-ons in a regional conflict, to thealternative of success in armscontrol, making use of WMD apolitically unacceptable option.

➻ Nuclear Weapons Will Con-tinue to be Special Weapons:Throughout most of the world,nuclear weapons will continue tobe perceived as fundamentallydifferent. Current national policiesare likely to persist, with the de-clared position of the U.S. beingthat our nuclear capabilities are

relevant only in confrontations withother nuclear-weapons-capablestates. Our emphasis will continueto be on planning military optionsto support deterrence and termina-tion of hostilities, with consider-able emphasis on minimizingcollateral hazards. Safety, security,and positive political control willcontinue to be the highest impera-tives.

➻ Others May Regard NuclearWeapons as Being Special in aDifferent Sense: Unable to matchU.S. economic strength, politicalpower or conventional weaponscapabilities, leaders in other statesmay regard the development andacquisition of nuclear weapons asan acceptable path to strategicequivalence or regional domi-nance. In a regional conflict, theymay be tempted to use nuclearweapons to disrupt communica-tions and damage unprotectedelectronics (precluding U.S. infor-mation dominance) or to directlyattack critical nodes supportingconventional operations, such asports and airfields.

➻ Nuclear Force Structures WillBe Less Prominent : The size ofthe U.S. and Russian nuclear stock-piles will decline. Fewer forces willhave nuclear delivery capability. Inthe absence of a Cold War strategicenvironment, a downsized DoD will

THE NEXT 50 YEARS

Major General Gary Curtin, DSWA Director.

STRATEGIC VISION FOR DSWA

➻ A Paradigm Shift: At the endof the Cold War, DoD nuclearrequirements for the future weresharply reassessed. One of theresults from this reevaluation wasthe broadening of the Agency’s roleand its redesignation as DSWA. Inpreparing for its new role, theAgency adopted a new visionwhich emphasized the need for it“to serve as the DoD center ofexcellence for nuclear and otherspecial weapons matters, withemphasis on technical and oper-ational support to the war-fighter.”

➻ Center for Nuclear Expertise:In a world environment in whichthere is less emphasis on nuclearmatters, the need to continueprotecting a core capability withinDoD is clear.

• In assuming that role, DSWAwill continue to perform acritical mission of safeguarding

nuclear core competencies.This will require continuedwork on modeling nuclearweapons effects, as well asunderstanding the variousaspects of nuclear hardness.

• Many of the key nuclear com-petencies are related directly tonon-nuclear advanced weaponprograms. For example, the use

invest a smaller percentage of itsresources in maintaining nuclearcapabilities. Developing newnuclear capabilities will be anunacceptable political option.Earlier, nuclear weapons testingwas already prohibited by Presi-dential direction. The United States

is now party to the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty. Now, other meanswill have to be used to guaranteeconfidence in the stockpile and toensure forces can withstand thenuclear threats posed by prolifer-ant nations or groups.

Dr. George Ullrich, DSWA Deputy Director

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Future Challenges

of DSWA expertise in plasmaand computational physics willcontribute to future advances inETC and EM artillery projectiletechnology.

• Maintaining nuclear effects testand simulation capabilities willalso be a core strategic missionexecuted by DSWA. This willinclude sustaining DoD’s capa-bility to resume undergroundnuclear effects testing, if sodirected by the President.

• DSWA will safeguard the uniquedatabase developed duringnuclear testing and apply thisinformation to meet DoDneeds. World-class computa-tional capabilities will be up-graded to support operationalresearch and developmentrequirements.

➻ DoD Stockpile Stewardship:DSWA will also serve as the leadDoD agency for long-term nuclearweapons stockpile stewardship.

• DSWA experts will continue tobe assigned to the DOE labora-tories in support of the DOEScience-Based Stockpile Stew-ardship Program (Dual Revali-dation) and the joint DoD/DOEAnnual Stockpile Certification.

• DSWA will provide support toDoD components concerningreliability, safety, security, usecontrol, and explosive ord-nance disposal of nuclearweapons.

• Members of the DSWA team willprovide emergency responsesupport for weapons-relatedincidents worldwide.

• DSWA Field Command willprovide nuclear weaponstechnical inspections, qualityassurance programs and logis-tics management support forthe stockpile under DoDcontrol.

➻ Warfighter Support: DSWAwill continue to provide stronganalytical support to the Servicesand Unified Commands worldwide.

• DSWA will push to developtechnologies that will facilitatecounterforce actions againstmobile and hardened targets,especially where WMD arelikely to be involved.

• Specific areas of emphasis arelikely to include peacetimeplanning assistance, as well asdirect technical support duringcontingencies, such as Desert

Storm, to identify what must bedone to defeat hardenedtargets, forecast collateralhazards, support counterpro-liferation, and provide counter-terrorism technology.

• DSWA will also continue toprovide strong support for U.S.STRATCOM as it carries out itsnuclear contingency planningresponsibilities.

➻ National Security PolicyImplementation: Because of itsprogram management and con-tracting expertise, DSWA will con-tinue to serve as the DoD agent fornumerous programs of nationalinterest.

• DSWA will be the principalagent to carry out CTR pro-grams to reduce the risksassociated with the FormerSoviet Union’s nuclear, biologi-cal, and chemical capabilities.As national policy evolves withrespect to CTR, so will DSWA’simplementation program. Ifother potential proliferantseliminate their WMD stockpiles,additional CTR programs maybe established.

• DSWA is likely to continue asthe lead DoD agency fordeveloping and validatingtechnologies for use in armscontrol monitoring.

• Technical collaboration withother nations for work onmatters of mutual interest islikely to continue in line withnational policy direction.

• Finally, DSWA is likely to betasked to support the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense andother authorities in manage-ment of the human health andenvironmental consequencesthat have resulted from nuclearand other designated activities.

32

Photograph Credits

CoverSoldiers and cloud (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Peacekeeper missile (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

NBC-suited students (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Russian/American soldiers–Peacekeeper ‘95exercise (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Table of Contents1-1: DISTANT IMAGE HE detonation, (DSWA/

DASIAC) photo).

Introduction2-1: Sec. Perry (DoD photo).

2-2: TRINITY site (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Dawn of the Atomic Age3-1: Los Alamos West Gate, Los Alamos

National Laboratory photo.

3-2: Roosevelt/Churchill/Stalin, Franklin D.Roosevelt Library photo, Hyde Park, NY.

3-3: B-29, B-29: Superfortress at War, pg.146.

3-4: New York Times, Aug. 7, 1945, The NewYork Times Company.

3-5: VJ Day, Alfred Eisenstaedt-LIFE, from 200Years-A Bicentennial IllustratedHistory, pg. 207.

3-6: Japanese surrender ceremony,Encylopedia of World War II, Vol. 22,pg. 3024.

3-7: Oppenheimer/Groves (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

3-8: Gadget drawing, Frank Shelton,Reflections of a Nuclear Weaponeer,Colorado Springs, CO. 1988, pg. 3-36.

3-9: Einstein/Oppenheimer, Alfred Eisenstaedt-LIFE, from The Best of Life, AvonBooks-Time-Life, Inc., 1973, pg. 236.

3-10: TRINITY HE test stack, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

3-11: TRINITY test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Early Years of AFSWP4-1: Berlin airlift, Walter Sanders-LIFE, from

200 Years - A Bicentennial IllustratedHistory, pg. 233.

4-2: Korea map, Our Times, Century BooksInc., 1995, pg. 394.

4-3: Truman with premature election results,The Best of LIFE , pg. 86.

4-4: Mk-6 nuclear bomb, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

4-5: Computer, Dark Sun, Simon & Schuster,New York, 1995, pg. 50.

4-6: Teller, Los Alamos National Laboratoryphoto.

4-7: MacArthur, LIFE: The Fifties, pg. 423.

4-8: Nixon/Eisenhower, UPI photo from OurGlorious Century, pg. 270.

4-9: Event DOG blast, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

4-10: Firing party, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

4-11: GRABLE test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

4-12: Tank in Korea, Chronicle of America,pg. 754.

4-13: Area 7, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

4-14: Personnel observing test, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

4-15: Operation GREENHOUSE, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

4-16: Pilot protection, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

4-17: Blast on structures, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

4-18: Blast on structures, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

4-19: MIKE, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

4-20: Aircraft washdown, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

Discovery5-1: Sputnik model, Our Glorious Century, pg.

290.

5-2: Nixon/Kennedy, Time-Warner Inc. photofrom Our Glorious Century, pg. 305.

5-3: Fallout shelter/sign, LIFE The First FiftyYears, pg. 159.

5-4: Kennedy, UPI/Bettmann archives, from TheWay We Were, Caroll & Graff Publishers,Inc., New York, 1988, pg. 65.

5-5: New York Times, A Newspaper History ofthe World, pg. 150.

5-6: Castro/Khruschev, Reader’s Digest, pg. 50.

5-7: TRUCKEE Event, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

5-8: Glenn, Our Glorious Century, pg. 50.

5-9: U-2, Our Glorious Century, pg. 295.

5-10: Berlin Wall, American Forces in Berlin,Department of Defense, GPO, 1994. pg.103.

5-11: Redstone missile, Reflections, pg. 8-35.

5-12: SAC B-52, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

5-13: Nike-Hercules missile, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

5-14: Khruschev, Carl Mydans-LIFE, from TheBest of Life, pp. 84, 85.

5-15: RB-57D aircraft, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

5-16: BRAVO test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

5-17: TEAPOT MET, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

5-18: Decontamination, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

5-19: Johnston Atoll, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

5-20: Kennedy signs LTBT, The Way We Were,pg. 158.

Strategic Deterrence6-1: JFK funeral, Our Times, pg. 464.

6-2: Anti-war poster, Winds of Change: 1960-1970, Time/Life, Alexandria, Virginia,1970, pg. 220.

6-3: Johnson, Bettmann archives, from OurTimes, pg. 819.

6-4: M.L. King, LIFE: The Sixties, Doris O’Neilleditor, Time Inc., 1989, pg. 50.

6-5: Vietnam soldier, LIFE: The Sixties, pg.219.

6-6: Vietnam Huey gunship, The Vietnam War(Helicopter War), Marshall Cavendish,Ltd., 1988, pg. 15.

6-7: New York Times, July 21, 1969, The NewYork Times Company.

6-8: Aldrin on moon, NASA photo.

6-9: Nixon, Our Glorious Century, pg. 50.

6-10: Protest, Jane & Michael Stern, SixtiesPeople, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,1990, pg. 195.

6-11: Anti-war button, Winds of Change:1960-1970, pg. 31.

6-12: SAGE Panel, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-13: McNamara/Rusk, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-14: Spartan missile, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-15: UGT, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-16: HUDSON SEAL RV, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

6-17: Tritium facility, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-18: SAILOR HAT, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-19: SAILOR HAT, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-20: DIAMOND SCULLS, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

6-21: SEDAN crater, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

6-22: Glasstone volume, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

Deterrence with Nuclear Parity7-1: Commemorative stamp, LIFE - The

Seventies, pg. 50.

7-2: “The Morning News,” Front Page History,pg. 162.

7-3: Munich Olympics, Our Glorious Century,pg. 50

7-4: Carter, The Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta,GA, from The Official 1977 InauguralBook, Bantam, 1977, pg. 71.

7-5: Walesa, Our Glorious Century,(Wesolowski/Sygma), pg. 421.

7-6: Khomeni, Harold Evans, Front PageHistory, Salem House, Salem, NewHampshire, 1984. pg. 179.

7-7: Concorde, British Airways.

7-8: Three Mile Island, Our Times, pg. 863.

7-9: Gas shortage sign, Front Page History, pg.161.

7-10: America’s 200th, Our Glorious Century,pg. 369.

7-11: Vietnam evacuation, Dorothy andThomas Hoobler, Vietnam: Why WeForgot, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1990,pg. 177.

7-12: Afghanistan rebel, Front Page History,pg. 50.

7-13: Nixon/Chou En-lai, 200 Years-ABicentennial Illustrated History, pg.282.

7-14: Silo test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

7-15: CACTUS crater dome, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

7-16: HURON KING, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

7-17: HURON KING inset, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

7-18: Pershing battery, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

7-19: HE event, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

7-20: Trident, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

7-21: EMP simulation, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Force Modernization8-1: Challenger, National Geographic, from

Our Glorious Century, pg. 417.

8-2: Reagans, Our Times, pg. 869.

8-3: Tiananmen Square, Our GloriousCentury, pg. 421.

8-4: Delta II Rocket, Soviet Military Power,Department of Defense, GPO, 1989, pg.93.

8-5: Bush, White House photo.

8-6: Berlin wall, Our Glorious Century, pg.29.

8-7: Gorbachev, Our Times, pg. 435.

8-8: USS America, Our Times, pg. 662.

8-9: Space Shuttle, National Geographic, fromOur Glorious Century, pg. 417.

8-10: Peacekeeper missile, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

8-11: Microchip, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

8-12: BLACKJACK simulator, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

8-13: Soviet submarine, (DoD photo).

8-14: SDI test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

8-15: ICBM warheads, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

8-16: Rail gun, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

8-17: EMPRESS test, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Post-Cold War Priorities9-1: Clinton, Reuters, from Our Glorious

Century, pg. 435.

9-2: Hussein, Nita M. Renfrew, SaddamHussein, Chelsea House Publishers,1992, pg. 80.

9-3: Powell, Associated Press, Wide Worldphoto.

9-4: F-117, (DoD photo).

9-5: Oklahoma City bombing, by Jim Argo,copyright 1995, Oklahoma PublishingCompany (from the April 20, 1995 issueof The Daily Oklahoman).

9-6: Yelsin, Our Glorious Century, pg. 423.

9-7: Bosnia map, Our Times, pg. 662.

9-8: Soldier with laptop, Strategic Assessments1996, National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,GPO, 1996, pg. 81.

9-9: Kuwait citizen, Santiago Lyon/Reuters/Bettmann archives, from War in theGulf, Turner Publishing Inc., 1991, pg.212.

9-10: Schwartzkopf, War in the Gulf, pg. 104.

9-11: Iraqi shelter, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

9-12: Treaty signing, (DoD photo).

9-13: DNWS, (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

9-14: Computational aids, (DSWA/DASIACphoto).

9-15: S&TD (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

Future Challenges10-1: Maj. Gen. Curtin (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

10-2: Dr. Ullrich (DSWA/DASIAC photo).

33

Acronym List

ABM - Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACTD - Advanced ConceptTechnology Demonstration

AEC - Atomic Energy Commission

AFB - Air Force Base

AFRRI- Armed ForcesRadiobiology ResearchInstitute

AFSWP - Armed Forces SpecialWeapons Project

ANMCC - Alternate NationalMilitary Command Center

ARPA - Advanced ResearchProjects Agency

ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobaccoand Firearms

ATSD (AE) - Assistant to theSecretary of Defense(Atomic Energy)

ATSD (NCB) - Assistant to theSecretary of Defense(Nuclear and Chemical andBiological DefensePrograms)

BMO - Ballistic Missile Office

C3 - Command, Control, andCommunications

CINC - Commander in Chief

CINCEUR - Commander in Chief,Europe

CINCPAC - Commander in Chief,Pacific

COMSAT - CommunicationsSatellite

CTBT - Comprehensive Test BanTreaty

CTR - Cooperative ThreatReduction

DARE - Data Archival and RetrievalEnhancement

DASA- Defense Atomic SupportAgency

DASIAC - DoD NuclearInformation Analysis Center(formerly Defense AtomicSupport InformationAnalysis Center)

DDR&E - Director, DefenseResearch and Engineering

DEW - Distant Early Warning

DIA- Defense Intelligence Agency

DIHEST - Direct-Induced HighExplosive SimulationTechnique

DNA - Defense Nuclear Agency

DNWS - Defense Nuclear WeaponsSchool

DoD - Department of Defense

DODDAC - Department of DefenseDamage Assessment Center

DOE - Department of Energy

DSCS - Defense SatelliteCommunication System

DSWA - Defense Special WeaponsAgency

EM - Electromagnetic

EM-1 - Effects Manual-1

EMP- Electromagnetic Pulse

EMPRESS - EMP Radiation EffectsSimulator for Ships

ETC - Electrothermal Chemical

FEMA - Federal EmergencyManagement Agency

FSU - Former Soviet Union

GLCM - Ground Launched CruiseMissile

HA - High Altitude

HASP - High Altitude SamplingProgram

HE - High Explosive

HEST - High Explosive SimulationTechnique

HF - High Frequency

HILAT - High Latitude

HML - Hardened Mobile Launcher

HPC - High PerformanceComputing

HPCC - High PerformanceComputing andCommunications

ICBM - Intercontinental BallisticMissile

INF - Intermediate Nuclear Forces

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSTPS - Joint Strategic TargetPlanning Staff

JTF - Joint Task Force

LANL - Los Alamos NationalLaboratory

LLNL - Lawrence LivermoreNational Laboratory

LBTS - Large Blast/ThermalSimulator

LTBT - Limited Test Ban Treaty

MC - Military Committee

MED- Manhattan Engineer District

MIRV - Multiple IndependentlyTargeted Reentry Vehicle

NARP - Nuclear Weapon AccidentResponse Procedure

NATO - North Atlantic TreatyOrganization

NCB - Nuclear, Chemical andBiological

NPR - Nuclear Posture Review

NSC - National Security Council

NTPR - Nuclear Test PersonnelReview

NTS - Nevada Test Site

NUWAX - Nuclear Weapon AccidentExercise

OSD - Office of the Secretary ofDefense

OSRD - Office of ScientificResearch and Development

PHETS - Permanent HighExplosives Test Site

psi - pounds per square inch

RB - Reentry Body

RV - Reentry Vehicle

SAC - Strategic Air Command

SACEUR - Supreme AlliedCommander Europe

SAGE - Scientific Advisory Groupon Effects

SALT - Strategic Arms LimitationTreaty

SDI - Strategic Defense Initiative

SGEMP - System GeneratedElectromagnetic Pulse

SHAPE - Supreme HeadquartersAllied Powers Europe

SIOP - Single IntegratedOperational Plan

SLBM - Submarine LaunchedBallistic Missile

SPO - System Program Office

SRAM-II - Short Range AttackMissile-II

START - Strategic Arms ReductionTreaty

STP - Silo Test Program

STRATCOM - U.S. StrategicCommand

SWEG - Special Weapons EffectsGroup

TAPS - Targeting and PlanningSystem

TEMPS - Transportable EMPSimulator

TTCP - The Technical CoordinatingPanel

UN - United Nations

UGT - Underground Test

U.S. - United States

USAF - United States Air Force

USEUCOM - United StatesEuropean Command

VNTK - Vulnerability Number/Type(of Target)/K-factor

WMD - Weapons of MassDestruction

DEFENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS AGENCY

50th Anniversary 1947-1997

— Defense Special Weapons Agency, 6801 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, Virginia 22310-3398 —(703) 325-7095 http://www.dswa.mil

50YEARS