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ASEAN Regional Forum and held several bilateral talks with other foreignministers in attendance. Her active participation was a sharp contrast to thatof her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, who skipped the ministerial dialogue

with ASEAN and the forum twice in her four-year term (2005 in Vientianeand 2007 in Manila).

On September 23, 2009, Clinton attended a meeting of the Group ofFriends on Myanmar hosted by the UN secretary-general. 16 This participa-tion implied an increased interest in Myanmar on the part of the UnitedStates. (Normally the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nationswould attend such a meeting.) After the meeting, Clinton announced theObama administrations new policy approach to Myanmar at the United

Nations headquarters in New York: The United States will begin a directdialogue with Burmese authorities to lay out a path towards better relationson . . . democracy and human rights; cooperation on international securityissues such as non-proliferation; areas of mutual benet, such as trafckingin persons, counter-narcotics; and recovery of WWII-era remains. 17

The new U.S. policy approach to Myanmar seemed good enough to winsupport from Aung San Suu Kyi. Her spokesman told the media in Yan-gon, [Daw Suu Kyi] said she had always supported the idea of engagement.However, that engagement should be done with both the military govern-ment and the democratic forces .18

On September 25, 2009, Aung San Suu Kyi sent a letter to Senior Gen-eral Than Shwe to suggest ways to convince Western governments to liftpolitical and economic sanctions on Myanmar. She requested and obtainedpermission to meet with Western diplomats to discuss how to remove thesanctions. 19 This represented a change in her attitude toward the sanc-tions, which she had previously welcomed as a way to put pressure on theMyanmar government and military leadership. Consequently, the European

Union approved a new ve-year Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fundof 35 million euros to support programs to improve job and food securityin Myanmars Rakhine, Chin, Shan, central Myanmar, and Kachin regions.

Back in New York, Myanmars prime minister General Thein Seinaddressed the UN General Assembly on September 28, 2009. He is the mostsenior Myanmar government leader to attend the UN General Assemblyin fourteen years. Before him, General Maung Aye, vice chair of the StatePeace and Development Council, attended the assembly in October 1995.

The presence of the prime minister of Myanmar at the UN General Assemblycould signify the readiness of his government to engage the world commu-nity, including the United States, more actively.


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ASEANs Policy of Enhanced Interactions 161

In his address to the General Assembly, Prime Minister Thein Sein statedthe following:

Sanctions cannot legitimately be regarded as a tool to promote human

rights and democracy.Sanctions are being employed as a political tool against Myanmar, and the

government of Myanmar considers them unjust. Such acts must be stopped.The transition to democracy is proceeding. . . . The government is tak-

ing systematic steps to hold free and fair elections. 20

The rst ASEAN-U.S. Summit, including all ten ASEAN leaders, was heldwith President Barack Obama on November 15, 2009, immediately after theend of the Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation summit in Singapore. In the

recent past, President George W. Bush had met with only seven ASEAN lead-ers on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation summit meet-ings in Los Cabos (2003), Pusan (2005), and Hanoi (2007).

ASEANs Stand on Myanmar

On the issue of the long-standing internal conict in Myanmar, the ASEANSecretariat and the organizations other nine member states have consistently

defended the membership of Myanmar in ASEANopposed any discrimination directed at Myanmar in ASEANs external

relations and cooperation with any dialogue partner or other external party 21

continued to support Myanmars quest to join Asia-Pacic EconomicCooperation as soon as the moratorium on organization membership is lifted

supported Myanmars joining the annual ASEAN-Europe meeting,along with Laos and Cambodia, starting from the fth meeting in Hanoi inOctober 2004

encouraged and supported dialogue and cooperation among all parties

concerned with achieving peaceful resolution to the political problems andnational reconciliation in Myanmar

supported the prompt implementation of Myanmars seven-step road-map to democracy, as expressed, in particular, at the 2003 ASEAN Summitin Bali

encouraged Myanmar to keep fellow ASEAN member states fullyinformed of progress as well as setbacks in implementing various measuresin the roadmap

supported the ASEAN chair when interacting with Myanmarsupported the good ofces of the UN secretary-general and his specialenvoy to Myanmar


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supported and participated in the concerted efforts of the Group ofFriends of Myanmar in the United Nations

called for the immediate release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi

and all other political prisoners, especially since the 2003 summitencouraged Myanmar to help defend the common interests of ASEAN 22

had no direct formal contact with Aung San Suu Kyi or other Burmeseexile groups nor recognized any Myanmar exile groups

expressed readiness to support Myanmar in ensuring free and fair gen-eral elections in 2010

supported Myanmars active participation in ASEAN activities, includ-ing the Initiative for ASEAN Integration aimed at narrowing the develop-

ment gaps between old and new member states as well as within needy mem-ber statestaken an active leadership role in mobilizing ASEAN and international

support for the operations to provide humanitarian assistance to survivorsof Cyclone Nargis, under the Tripartite Core Group of ASEAN, the UnitedNations, and Myanmar

supported capacity building for the Myanmar government, includingattachment to and training at the ASEAN Secretariat, as well as recruitmentof Myanmar nationals to work in the ASEAN Secretariat 23

supported Myanmars invitations to host ASEAN meetings, includingmeetings held in Naypyidaw

Taking together, these actions and advocacies indicate that ASEAN andits member states know what to do and how to work with Myanmar. Theircollective stand is consistent with ASEANs paramount value of keepingevery member state inside the ASEAN fold happily cooperating with all othermember states in the process of community building.

Myanmars membership in ASEAN serves the long-term interest of all

parties concerned with Southeast Asia. Trying to ostracize or isolate thecountry runs against the common beliefs and unique values of ASEAN. TheASEAN member states believe that every Southeast Asian nation and itspeople have a legitimate role to play and that together they can play this roleconstructively in building the ASEAN community.

Notes

1. Timor-Leste, which gained independence in May 2002, is actively prepar-ing for ASEAN membership and has expressed its wish to join the group by 2012.The country has been regularly invited to attend opening ceremonies at the ASEAN


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foreign ministers meetings and ASEAN Summit meetings as a guest of the hostcountry and lately as a guest of ASEAN (which denotes a higher status). Timor-Lestestarted participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum at its twelfth annual meeting in

Vientiane, Laos, on July 29, 2005. On January 13, 2007, Timor-Leste acceded to theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In a January 2007 meeting inCebu, the ASEAN foreign ministers assured the deputy prime minister of Timor-Leste, Jose Luis Guterres, that ASEAN membership for Timor-Leste was a questionnot of whether but of when. Guterres attended the opening ceremonies at a latermeeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Phuket in July 2009. The Thai host notedwith appreciation the high-level representation of Timor-Leste at the meeting, sayingthat it signied the continued strong interest of the country in learning about ASEANand preparing for its eventual membership. Papua New Guinea has been a special

observer in ASEAN since the late 1980s. In March 2010 Papua New Guinea expressedrenewed interest in ASEAN membership and received an expression of support fromIndonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. However, a moratorium on newmembers is in effect until 2015, with the understanding (at least on the ASEAN side)that it would continue to afliate with the Pacic Islands Forum. Papua New Guineawas the rst nonregional state to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperationin Southeast Asia (on July 5, 1989) and took part in founding the ASEAN RegionalForum in 1994.

2. First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Minister

Hun Sen both signed for Cambodia. The 1995 treaty entered into force on March 27,1997. So far, only China has expressed its readiness to sign the protocol to supportthe treaty. Four other nuclear weapon states (France, Russia, the United Kingdom,and the United States) have raised some objections, on issues such as the zone ofcoverage, which includes continental shelves, and the 200-mile exclusive economiczones of the treatys signatory states.

3. See full text of the Bangkok Summit Declaration on the ASEAN Secretariatswebsite (www.aseansec.org/5189.htm [July 2010]).

4. See Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on

Cambodia, Kuala Lumpur, July 10, 1997 (www.aseansec.org/1826.htm).5. Opening statement of H. E. Mr. Ohn Gyaw, the Union of Myanmar (www.asean.org).

6. Crisis Prevention, Newsweek International, July 21, 1997.7. Surin Pitsuwan, opening statement, Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meet-

ing and Post-Ministerial Conference, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand,June 12, 1998 (www.asean.org). Surin Pitsuwan and Anwar Ibrahim were amongthe founding members of the Asian Dialogue Society. The founding members werea group of Southeast Asian intellectuals and politicians (including M. R. Sukhumb-

hand Paribatra, now the governor of Bangkok, the Thai journalist Kavi Chongkit-tavorn, and the Singaporean think tank scholar M. Rajaretnam) aspiring to build abetter Asia through international dialogue and cooperation. The society had funding


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support from the Hans Seidel Stiftung, the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Sasakawa Foundation, the NipponFoundation, and UNESCO, among others.

8. These points are based on the recollection of the author, who accompaniedthe ASEAN secretary-general to a working dinner of ASEAN foreign ministers inManila on July 23, 1998.

9. Surin, statement, June 12, 1998.10. Mr. Abdullah Badawi, opening statement, Thirty-First ASEAN Ministerial

Meeting and Post-Ministerial Conference, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thai-land, June 12, 1998 (www.asean.org).

11. As it turned out, however, the Thai prime minister briefed his counterpartsfrom Indonesia and Malaysia on the Deep South issue during their meeting on the

Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle in Vientiane before the start of thetenth ASEAN Summit.12. ASEAN foreign ministers were briefed by Cambodia and Thailand on the bor-

der temple dispute during a working dinner in Singapores Botanic Garden on July20, 2008. While Cambodia welcomed ASEANs involvement, Thailand objected onthe ground that there were existing bilateral border mechanisms that could be usedto address the dispute. Nevertheless, Singapore, as the chair of ASEAN, issued a state-ment saying that the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting also decided to offer its facili-ties to be placed at the disposal of Cambodia and Thailand in the event that they felt

the need for further support to nd an early resolution to the issue .13. See the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of anASEAN Community by 2015 (www.asean.org) (ASEAN summits). One of the mainreasons for the acceleration was that ASEAN risked losing its economic competitive-ness if its economic integration toward one ASEAN market and regional productionbase moved too slowly. The ASEAN economic ministers were the rst to agree onrealizing the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The ASEAN foreign ministersthought it would be incongruent (or even divisive) to move faster on the economicpillar than on the other two pillars. Therefore, they recommended the acceleration of

the ASEAN Political and Security Community and the ASEAN Sociocultural Com-munity by 2015 so that all the three pillars would advance in tandem.14. ASEAN certainly did not invent noninterference. The principle is recognized

in the UN Charter and in international law. However, the principle is enshrined inthe 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Article 2(b) asserts theright of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, sub-version or coercion. Article 2(c) includes non-interference in the internal affairsof one another as part of the regional code of interstate conduct in Southeast Asia.

15. Scott Marciel, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacic

affairs, was appointed U.S. ambassador to ASEAN on April 11, 2008 (holdingboth positions at the same time). He became the rst ambassador to ASEAN morethan eight months before the ASEAN Charterwhich under article 46 encourages


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ASEANs friends and partners to accredit their ambassadors to ASEANenteredinto force on December 15, 2008. By the end of 2009, twenty-eight other nonregionalgovernments had appointed ambassadors to ASEAN. Most of these are concurrently

ambassadors of their respective countries to Indonesia.16. The Group of Friends includes Australia, China, the European Union, France,India, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, theUnited Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam.

17. Based on a U.S. nonpaper on U.S. policy on Burma, which was shared withthe ASEAN Secretariat. A U.S. delegation visited Myanmar for ofcial talks and fact-nding in November 2009. It was led by the assistant secretary of state for East Asianand Pacic affairs, Kurt Campbell.

18. Quoted in Suu Kyi Backs U.S engagement with Burma, Mail and Guardian

Online, Rangoon, September 25, 2009.19. Aung San Suu Kyi Seeks to Meet Western Diplomats, Jakarta Post , Septem-ber 29, 2009.

20. Based on the prepared text of Thein Seins address released by the UN Secre-tariat (www.un.org/ga/64).

21. From 2007 to 2009, Myanmar was the country coordinator for the ASEANNew Zealand Dialogue Partnership. New Zealand could not host any ASEANNew Zealand meeting, even though it was New Zealands turn to do so. Hence theASEANNew Zealand Dialogue Partnership was virtually frozen during this period.

Myanmar is now the coordinator of the ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership andno such problem for Russia is foreseen. Myanmar hosted the ASEAN-Russia JointCooperation Committee meeting in Yangon on November 2425, 2009.

22. Myanmar was encouraged to skip the ASEAN chairmanship in 200506 andthe chairmanship of the ASEAN economic ministers meeting in 200607.

23. In 2009 there were three Myanmar nationals working in the ASEAN Secre-tariat. In 2012 it will be Myanmars turn to nominate a deputy secretary-general toserve a three-year term in the ASEAN Secretariat.


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166

The Last Bus to Naypyidaw

pavin chachavalpongpun

10

M yanmar was admitted into the ASEAN family in 1997. In the faceof strong objections from the West and certain civil society organizationsin the region, ASEAN insisted on welcoming Myanmars regime, claimingthat the admission served the organizations long-term interests. It wantedto engage the rulers of Myanmar constructively to moderate the regimesrepressive policies. It wanted to counter Chinas increasingly tight embraceof the Myanmar junta and its growing inuence inside Myanmar, consid-ered a potential threat to ASEAN. 1

The organizations approach to Myanmar underwent multiple modica-tions over the years, from constructive engagement to exible engagementand then to forward engagement. 2 The ten member countries of ASEANhad their own views and interpretations of these multiple modications,reafrming their independence vis--vis Myanmar. None of the positionsseemed satisfactory. Along the way, Myanmar exploited ASEANs mecha-nisms, taking advantage of the groups strict principle of noninterference as a

political shield. Sadly, many ASEAN members themselves have also sufferedfrom a legitimacy deciency. This condition allowed Myanmar to manageits domestic affairs without outside interference and moral policing fromASEAN members. Because ASEAN membership is irreversible, and becausethe Myanmar regimes behavior has become more unpredictable, ASEANhas embarked on an effort to reconstruct certain identities for Myanmar to justify its membership and to cloak ASEANs own discomfort.

Fiction versus Reality The incongruity between ASEAN-constructed Myanmar and the realityinside the country resurfaces every so often. In 2009 at least three signicantincidents seriously challenged ASEANs standing on Myanmar.


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The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 167

First, in May, the Myanmar junta decided to press charges against AungSan Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy, over abizarre episode wherein an American entered her residence uninvited, which

the junta interpreted as a violation of the terms of her house arrest. WhileASEAN practiced its usual diplomatic rhetoric, calling for the unconditionalrelease of Aung San Suu Kyi, the junta found her guilty and extended herhouse arrest for another eighteen months. 3 The sentence effectively bars theNational League for Democracy leader from participating in the upcomingelection in 2010.

Second, in late August there were armed clashes between the Tatmadawand the Kokang militias, despite previous ceasere agreements. ASEANs

concentration on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the juntas reconcili-ation with the National League for Democracy had eclipsed the fact that theunderlying causes of ethnic conict in Myanmar had not been addressed. 4

Third, in September Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced whatwould become a watershed in U.S. policy toward Myanmar. No longerdepending solely on sanctions, the United States was adopting an engage-ment approach, forming a dual-track policy on Myanmar, and would soonbegin a direct dialogue with the juntas representatives. Although the shiftin U.S. policy on Myanmar was welcomed by ASEAN, it could potentiallyfurther undermine ASEANs position vis--vis Naypyidaw.

During the past twelve years, myth has unmistakably taken a central stagein ASEANs policy toward Myanmar. ASEAN re-created Myanmars militaryregime, the State Peace and Development Council, as a political entity lledwith hope and possibility for a thriving democracy. ASEANs constructiveengagement was designed to make that come true. The group believed thatits regional approach would be able to foster change in Myanmar. An envoyfrom ASEAN was appointed to convince the Myanmar regime to open itself

up politically.The real Myanmar, however, has remained unchanged. It has been con-

tent to be the black sheep of the ASEAN family. The juntas refusal to releaseAung San Suu Kyi and its continued disregard of the human rights of itsown people not only debunked the constructive engagement approach butalso gave the lie to ASEANs highly romanticized Myanmar policy. ASEANlegitimized Myanmars seven-step roadmap to democracy without havinglooked at it carefully to determine whether it was a real step forward for the

country or whether it warranted ASEANs support. In an interview, formerASEAN secretary-general Rodolfo Severino noted that ASEAN had falleninto its own oblivion trap. Consequently it has become more difcult tocriticize Myanmars so-called democratization process, especially the juntas


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168 Pavin Chachavalpongpun

scheme to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi from the 2010 election and perpetuatethe militarys position in politics. 5

ASEAN has also embraced a view of China as possessing overwhelming

power over Myanmar. In 1997 ASEAN was in a hurry to pull Myanmar outof the orbit of Chinese inuence. Throughout the following decade, the per-ception of Chinese inuence has been intensied by a more visible Chinesepresence in Myanmar, through the inux of Chinese migrants into northernMyanmar, and a ood of Chinese investment that has threatened to domi-nate the Myanmar economy. This perception has kept ASEAN from seri-ously addressing difcult issues with Myanmar for fear that doing so woulddrive the regime further into Chinas arms.

As an example, Thailand was reluctant to criticize the Myanmar regimebecause of its dependence on gas from Myanmar. The Thai governmentwas concerned about its energy shortages and thus avoided upsetting theMyanmar junta, which might turn its back on Bangkok and look towardenergy-hungry China instead. In reality, ASEAN has never understood thetrue nature of Sino-Myanmar relations and has often adopted the opinionof Western governments and the media. The complexity of Sino-Myanmarrelations served to obstruct ASEANs own efforts to deal with the Myan-mar issues more directly and honestly. However, the recent exchange of rebetween the Tatmadaw and the Kokang militias underscores the complexityof the relationship between China and Myanmar.

Ian Storey has argued that the Kokang incident illustrates that the StatePeace and Development Council is capable of undertaking actions that chal-lenge Beijings interests and belies characterizations of Myanmar as Chinasclient state. Fighting at the border could severely disrupt bilateral trade,much of which is conducted at the border, which would adversely affectChinas landlocked southwestern provinces. It could trigger an outpouring

of refugees into China whom the authorities would be forced to feed andhouse. According to the UN high commissioner for refugees, as many as37,000 Kokang refugees ed in August 2009 to the Chinese border towns ofNansan and Genma. Moreover, construction of the Kyaukphyu-Kunmingpipelines, which China considers a strategic necessity, could be suspended, asthe proposed route passes close to potential battle zones. 6 From this perspec-tive, Myanmar has successfully demonstrated independence in its relationswith China. 7

The shift in U.S. policy toward Myanmar under the Obama administra-tion has emerged as a wake-up call for ASEAN. All along, ASEAN seemedto believe that it had been the sole provider of legitimacy to the State Peace


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and Development Council, while the global community was punishing theregime with harsh sanctions, which made its role indispensable. SeeingASEAN as Myanmars only sanctuary, some ASEAN leaders were convinced

that the organization would be able to inuence the regime and dictate itsbehavior, simply because nobody else could offer the same legitimacy. As apoint of fact, Myanmar made it known that it would disallow any outsidepressure. From petty to serious matters, Myanmar cares very little aboutASEANs reputation and credibility.

The junta relocated its capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw withoutinforming other ASEAN members. It changed its mind at the last min-ute and objected to the participation of Ibrahim Gambari, special adviser

to the United Nations secretary-general, in the 2007 East Asia Summit inSingapore, where he was expected to receive a brieng on the situation onMyanmar in the aftermath of the juntas crackdown on street protestersin September 2007. The Myanmar regime brushed aside ASEANs offer tolead the reconciliation process, judging it to be an act of intervention. It haseffectively exploited the differing regional and international approaches toits own advantage, from irting with ASEANs constructive engagement inthe 1990s to tilting toward the United Nations in recent years and now toreaching out to the United States. At this hour, according to some analysts,the junta apparently considers the United States, not ASEAN or the UnitedNations, as the real provider of legitimacy. 8

This development raises a serious question about the future of ASEANand how it can remain in the drivers seat as it manages regional issues suchas democratization in Myanmar. Kurt Campbell, the U.S. State Departmentsassistant secretary for East Asian and Pacic affairs, may emphasize that theUnited States will continue to coordinate closely with ASEAN as a means ofreinforcing the fundamental message of reform to the Myanmar regime. 9

But ASEANs role is at stake. ASEAN is confronted with two options: eithergive up on Myanmar or quickly jump on the last bus, driven by the UnitedStates, to Naypyidaw.

ASEANs Critical Hurdles

Evidently, ASEAN has chosen to jump on the U.S. bandwagon and todownplay its own failure to persuade Myanmar to undertake serious politi-

cal reforms. After the meeting of the Group of Friends on Myanmar at UNheadquarters in New York on September 23, 2009, Singapores foreign min-ister George Yeo declared, Singapore welcomes the shift in position by the


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U.S. and Europethe decision to engage Myanmar while keeping sanctionsin place for the time being. We believe this would enable the United Statesand Europe to have more inuence in the political evolution of the coun-

try. 10 The Singapore media swiftly congratulated the new U.S. policy, whileinterpreting the policy shift as ASEANs own success. ASEAN can take sat-isfaction in the Obama Administrations new track. The group has been noless aggrieved over the juntas abuse of the constitutional process and thelong detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, but it stuck by its policy of engagementand it disputed the usefulness of sanctions. 11 Once again, ASEANs supportfor the new U.S. policy is merely a reaction to the changing strategic inter-ests of Washington in Naypyidaw. How can ASEAN be certain that the U.S.

policy shift will not have a negative impact on its own position in Myanmar?Has ASEAN ever dened its own strategic interests in this member country?As the United States is modifying its policy toward Myanmar, signs that

ASEAN might be marginalized are clearly detectable. According to LarryJagan, the United States began its high-level talks directly with senior rep-resentatives of the Myanmar government in Beijing in July 2007, brokeredby the Chinese government. 12 But the follow-up meeting collapsed becauseof the juntas crackdown on antigovernment demonstrators two monthslater. Not until the concerns over Myanmars renewed ties with North Koreaand the State Peace and Development Councils nuclear ambition reachednew heights was the United States compelled to consult with certain ASEANmembers, notably Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The consulta-tions took place during the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 23, 2009, inPhuket, Thailand. ASEAN might have anticipated the review of U.S. policytoward Myanmar after President Obama assumed ofce in January 2009. Atthe forum meeting, however, sanctions seemed to be very much on the mindof Secretary Clinton, partly because the United States had become increas-

ingly suspicious of the elusive relations between Myanmar and North Koreaand partly because the ASEAN Regional Forum took place in the middle ofthe controversial trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. Even at that point, ASEAN didnot anticipate that the United States would establish a direct dialogue withthe Myanmar regime.

As the likelihood of ASEAN marginalization increased, the group startedto realize that its inuence over Myanmar had long since passed a criticalthreshold. Economic and political factors may be responsible for ASEANs

growing constraints in dealing with the Myanmar issue. Some ASEAN mem-bers clearly do not want political issues to disturb business opportunities inMyanmar, and some continue to restrain themselves by adhering tightly to


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the nonintervention principle as they interact with the Myanmar regime. Butthe most critical hurdle, arguably, stems from the lack of a concerted effortand a unied stance among ASEAN members on how to collectively tackle

the political malaise in Myanmar. During the past decade, not only has theASEAN approach greatly differed from that of the rest of the world, but eachASEAN member has also had its own way of dening the Myanmar problem.These differences persist in ASEAN.

Thailands Challenges

Thailands policy toward Myanmar took a sharp turn when the DemocratParty came to power at the beginning of 2009. The government of Abhisit

Vejjajiva impatiently discarded the business-oriented Myanmar policy offormer premier Thaksin Shinawatra. Abhisits government has been particu-larly vulnerable because it has no record of civilian supremacy over the mili-tary nor a commitment to democracy and reconciliation. Therefore, Abhisithas been forced to construct his own legitimacy by appearing to advocatedemocratic principles both in his domestic and foreign policies. His strategyserved Thailand well, as the country was the chair of the ASEAN StandingCommittee in 2009. In May Abhisit released a statement on behalf of ASEANexpressing grave concerns over the way the junta handled the trial of AungSan Suu Kyi. ASEANs statement infuriated the Myanmar leadership. Myan-mar foreign minister Nyan Win took a swipe at ASEAN for deviating fromits noninterference policy: Some countries in our region and others have astrong interest in the case of John Yettaw and Aung San Suu Kyi. But theirinterest in the case has been found over-proportionate, overlooking theprinciples of non-interference in internal affairs, and should not have hap-pened. 13 Not long after that, the Tatmadaw launched attacks against theKaren National Union to disturb trade and create insecurity along the Thai-

Myanmar border.In another attempt to secure legitimacy at home, in August 2009 the

Abhisit government rallied support from fellow ASEAN members to requestthat Senior General Than Shwe grant a pardon for Aung San Suu Kyi. Singa-pore, Malaysia, and Indonesia supported the Thai initiative, although in theend Thailand failed to get full ASEAN support for its initiative. Some mem-bers, like Vietnam, saw it as a violation of the nonintervention principle.Moreover, this idea was completely overshadowed by the visit to Naypyidaw

of U.S. senator Jim Webb in the same month.The Thai government has been relatively unenthusiastic about the shift inU.S. policy toward Myanmar. The Foreign Ministry released a statement on


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September 30, 2009, that supported the new U.S. policy direction: Thailandand ASEAN have consistently used an engagement approach with Myan-mar, for the benet of Myanmar and her people as a whole. In this regard,

Thailand stands ready to work closely with ASEAN, the United States, theUnited Nations, and other stakeholders to engage with Myanmar in a con-structive and concerted manner to ensure substantive political developmentin Myanmar. 14

Indeed, the dilemma for Thailand is how to exploit the U.S. presencein Myanmar for its benet and at the same time remain independent fromthe U.S. approach to Naypyidaw. Abhisit once said, I insisted that ASEANcountries and western countries have the same goal or opinions but it does

not mean that we can resort to the same procedure. We have different con-ditions particularly between countries in the region and countries far from[Myanmar]. We have different relationship policies. 15

Indonesias Challenges

After years of political turmoil, Indonesia has nally emerged as a reborndemocracy and is now considered the most stable democratic state in South-east Asia. Accordingly, the country has become more vocal about promotingthe regions democratization. The successful political transition has madeIndonesia less patient with ASEANs progress in this direction. While thegovernment of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is seeking to reinventits role in ASEAN in a more proactive way, some members of the House ofRepresentatives, others across a number of political parties, and some lead-ing think tanks, have all been pushing for a more radical change in the coun-trys perception of ASEAN.

Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Interna-tional Studies, has called for a post-ASEAN foreign policy because of the

failure of ASEAN as an effective organization. He alleges that ASEAN con-tinues to ignore critical issues, such as the role of the ASEAN human rightsbody. Instead, ASEAN defends Myanmar at various international forums,including the International Labour Organization and the UN Security Coun-cil: We should stand tall and proclaim that enough is enough. It is enoughfor Indonesia to imprison itself in the golden cage of ASEAN for morethan 40 years. Indonesia needs to begin formulating a post-ASEAN foreignpolicy. ASEAN should no longer be treated as the only cornerstone of Indo-

nesias foreign policy. For Indonesia, ASEAN should constitute only one ofthe available platforms through which we can attain and fulll our nationalinterests. Some of our foreign policy initiatives, such as the Bali Democracy


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Forum, the G20, and strategic partnerships with global and regional majorpowers, have already shown signs toward that direction. 16

With this new attitude, Indonesia loudly hailed the U.S. decision to

engage the reclusive Myanmar junta, urging the latter to respond positivelyto the appeasing gesture from Washington. 17 If the shift in U.S. policy towardMyanmar could possibly marginalize ASEAN, Indonesias post-ASEAN for-eign policy would serve the country well in the new regional order. Indonesiahas already expressed its interest in playing a leading role in Myanmar. Pre-viously preoccupied with its own democratization, Indonesia is now payingmore attention to the situation in Myanmar to bolster its own democraticcredentials. Jakarta is in the position to do so because it does not have sub-

stantial economic interests in Myanmar. It also wants to carve out a nichefor itself that is commensurate with its status as ASEANs largest and mostpopulous member. 18

Singapores Challenges

Singapore takes every opportunity to stress its seemingly pro-U.S. foreignpolicy. This position extends to its support for the shift in U.S. policy towardNaypyidaw. The city-state has been at the forefront in responding to theUnited States new move in Myanmar. Foreign Minister Yeo was amongthe rst ASEAN personalities to applaud the landmark U.S. decision. Overthe years, Singapore has successfully maintained its channel of communi-cation with Myanmars top leaders, thereby signaling its championing ofengagement. Singapore has been one of Myanmars top trading partners,with annual bilateral trade of more than $1 billion. At the same time, thisrelationship has been occasionally beset by various allegations, includingthat Singapore has supplied the Tatmadaw with arms used to suppress dis-sidents. 19 More recently, it was reported that the junta has siphoned off from

the national coffers some $4.85 billion in revenue generated by Total andChevrons Yadana gas project and has deposited almost all of the moneyoffshore with Singapores Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation and DBSGroupan allegation promptly dismissed by the banks concerned. 20

Among its ASEAN partners, Myanmar seems to have been most comfort-able in its interactions with Singapore. Former prime minister and seniorminister Goh Chok Tong became the rst foreign leader to meet Senior Gen-eral Than Shwe, in June 2009, following the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi. His

visit came at a time when relations between Myanmars military regime andASEAN had soured over the trial. It was clear that the ongoing political crisisin Myanmar presented ASEAN with a critical challenge as the organization


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was pushing ahead with plans to introduce a charter that encompassed aregional human rights body. Thus while in Naypyidaw, Goh expressedASEANs concern over Myanmars political situation. However, Than Shwe

was not enraged by Gohs repeated call for the emancipation of Aung SanSuu Kyi. Instead, Goh was given the red-carpet treatment during his four-day trip to Myanmar. Myanmar analysts believe Gohs message carried moreweight than those from other ASEAN nations. 21

As a small state, Singapore values multilateral cooperation and has soughtto identify itself with ASEAN so as to reduce the pressure from bigger powerswithin the organization. As a result, Singapore has seen itself as one of thekey players in ASEAN. It supports ASEANs role in Myanmar and opposes

sanctions. Singapore strongly backed ASEANs initiative in acting as a bridgelinking Myanmar and the United Nations in the aftermath of Cyclone Nar-gis. Robert Chua, Singapore ambassador to Yangon and also dean of the dip-lomatic corps, played a signicant role in the Tripartite Core Group (consist-ing of ASEAN, the United Nations, and the Myanmar government) that ledthe Nargis relief effort. From this perspective, Singapore will be tempted touse its connections inside Naypyidaw to facilitate the new U.S. dialogue withthe juntaa win-win foreign policy option for the city-state.

Vietnams ChallengesVietnams view of the new U.S. Myanmar policy is important in partbecause Vietnam assumed ASEANs chairmanship at the beginning of 2010.Although Vietnam and Myanmar are fellow members in various regionalorganizations, such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong EconomicCooperation Strategy and the Greater Mekong Subregion, the bilateralrelationship has not progressed far because there are no deep historical tiesbetween them. 22 In 2007 UN special adviser Gambari paid an ofcial visit to

Hanoi to exchange views with the Vietnamese leaders on the Myanmar issue.Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem told Gambari that as a formervictim of embargo and blockage policies, Vietnam would not support anyembargo or blockage on Myanmar but would respect the Myanmar peoplesright to self-determination. 23

Vietnams opposition to Western sanctions justied its reluctance tounambiguously endorse demands for political transition in Myanmar. Jr-gen Haacke has argued that this was more or less clearly linked to concerns

about the incumbent regimes own political future as well as concerns aboutany ASEAN role in amplifying external pressure. 24 In August 2009 Vietnammade a strong statement indicating that it refused to support calls by other


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ASEAN members for Myanmar to free Aung San Suu Kyi. It is our view thatthe Aung San Suu Kyi trial is an internal affair of Myanmar, said Vietnam-ese government spokesman Le Dung. 25

As the most impassioned advocate of traditional understandings asso-ciated with the ASEAN way and its application to Myanmar, Vietnamschairmanship of ASEAN in 2010 could bring a certain awkwardness. So far,the Vietnamese government has kept quiet about its view of the shift in theUnited States Myanmar policy. Although Vietnam successfully normal-ized its relations with the United States, that does not automatically meanit would cheer for U.S. direct intervention in Myanmar. Taking its currentstance to the extreme, it is possible that, as the ASEAN chair, Vietnam will

assume responsibility for protecting the groups core values and thereforeseek to shrink the range of opinion. (Vietnam disagreed with the scheduledGambari brieng at the East Asia Summit in 2007, arguing that it wouldrepresent interference in Myanmars domestic affairs.) Vietnam could alsond itself in conict with other more liberal members, such as Indonesia, incompeting to redene the role of ASEAN.

The United States Tangible Move

To reafrm his governments seriousness about its new policy, U.S. assis-tant secretary of state Kurt Campbell paid an ofcial visit to Myanmar onNovember 34, 2009, the rst high-ranking American diplomat to visit thiscountry in fourteen years. Campbell seemed to be a good choice to representU.S. interests in interacting with the regime. He came across as genuine inhis immense interest in and concerns about the situation in Myanmar. Hemight not have known everything about the junta, yet Campbell was notshy in consulting experts while seeking opinions regarding the best way to

deal with the Myanmar regime. Campbells approach was refreshing, and itproved practical during his rst visit to Myanmar. 26

Campbell met with both the ruling generals and Aung San Suu Kyi. 27 Hisvisit symbolized a thaw in U.S.-Myanmar relations and an end to the UnitedStates ofcial policy of isolating Myanmar. But Campbell strongly stated thatthe objectives of U.S. policy remained unchanged. He called on the militarygovernment, represented by Prime Minister Thein Sein, to open a dialoguewith the opposition and the ethnic minority groups that have been struggling

for a measure of autonomy. He also urged the junta to allow Aung San SuuKyi more freedom to meet with people concerned with the political process,particularly her own partys senior executives. Campbell declared, The goals


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of the new U.S. policy are strong support for human rights, the release ofAung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners, and the promotion ofdemocratic reform. 28 While the conversation between Campbell and Aung

San Suu Kyi was not made public, it was reported in the press that the U.S.diplomat would seek Suu Kyis opinions on the sanctions against her coun-try, on how she perceived the reconciliation process and the upcoming gen-eral election, and on how Myanmar might move forward in the postelectionperiod. It is too early to call the new U.S. policy shift a success. Yet Campbellsvisit has certainly elevated the level of optimism in this reclusive country.

When President Obama attended the rst ASEAN-U.S. Summit in Sin-gapore in November 2009, he reiterated his unbending demand for tangible

political developments as part of the process of improving relations betweenNaypyidaw and Washington. Obama was the rst U.S. president to initiatea dialogue with a Myanmar leader since 1966. He raised the issue directlywith Prime Minister Thein Sein and reiterated the U.S. demands alreadyconveyed to the Myanmar junta by Campbell. Obama insisted on the releaseof Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, an issue that saw a sharpdifference in viewpoint from some members of ASEAN.

In the twenty-eight-point joint statement, the leaders of ASEAN wel-comed the high-level dialogue and the policy of the United States to engagewith the Government of Myanmar but did not specically request AungSan Suu Kyis release. The two sides underscored the importance of achiev-ing national reconciliation and stated that the general elections to be heldin Myanmar in 2010 must be conducted in a free, fair, inclusive and trans-parent manner in order to be credible to the international community. 29 There was no explanation why ASEAN omitted the request for Aung SanSuu Kyis release, when it had many times in the past called for her freedom.Observers speculated that ASEAN did not want the United States to use the

summit as a platform to belittle both the group and Myanmar. Whatever thereasons might have been, differences between the United States and ASEANin their approaches to Myanmar remain. These could become more conten-tious as the United States further deepens its new relations with Myanmar.

Campbell returned to Naypyidaw on May 10, 2010, for his second visitin six months. The timing of his visit could not have been more crucial. TheNLD had decided to boycott the upcoming election following the enactmentof the Union Election Commission Law, which stated that anyone currently

serving a jail term would be banned from joining a political party and par-ticipating in the election. This law effectively barred Aung San Suu Kyisinvolvement in the election. 30 In a statement issued at the end of his visit,


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Campbell said, We are profoundly troubled by the response of the Burmeseleadership [to the change in U.S. policy]. 31 While in Myanmar, Campbellheld discussions with Aung San Suu Kyi as well as a number of Myanmar

government ofcials, including foreign minister Nyan Win, informationminister Kyaw San, and science and technology minister U ThaungMyan-mars former envoy in Washington, who is the point person for Myanmarsengagement with the United States. Key issues raised by Campbell were thedisappointing election laws, the absence of a credible dialogue among allstakeholders in Burma, the continued incarceration of political prisoners,increasing tensions between the central government and the ethnic minori-ties, and possible noncompliance with UN Security Council Resolution

1874, which imposed sanctions on North Korea related to its nuclear weap-ons program.

The Bus Is Leaving

It is clear that ASEAN members have reacted to the shift in the United StatesMyanmar policy on an individual basis. No attempt has been made for aregional response, conrming the perception that ASEANs policy on Myan-mar remains fragmented. There is also no guarantee that even if ASEAN asone unied entity ramps up its support for the new U.S. policy, the memberscan work in harmony. Min Zaw Oo has argued that the U.S. engagementwith Myanmar will be quite different from the way ASEAN does business. 32

Democratization and human rights will still be among U.S. policy goalsin Myanmar. But the most crucial aspect of U.S. policy will probably be itsapproach to the 2010 election. Washington does not want to abandon itsmoral code altogether and thus will need a plausible reason to maintain itspolicy shift on Myanmar. By contrast, most ASEAN members will be satis-

ed with the completion of the election and disinclined to question the newregimes legitimacy.

More critical is the possibility that the diverse views within ASEANcould be highly self-defeating. ASEANs position on Myanmar has appearedunchanged since Myanmar joined the group twelve years ago. What is worse,forty-two years after its creation ASEAN members have not yet seen it fun-damentally important to dene the groups strategic interests and to dem-onstrate its solidarity and maturity. True, the principle of noninterference

has in recent years been toned down. But the degree of commitment in newessential areas, such as human rights protection and democratization, hasremained low.


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ASEANs shortcomings do not lie only in the various perceptions of itsmembers. Organizational weakness has greatly impeded its progress. Asrepeatedly noted here, ASEANs permanent position is to react to events.

Its Myanmar policy has been mainly driven, and sometime provoked, bythe opinion of Western governments and the international media. ASEANslack of strategic thinking could potentially lead to misinterpretations of thetrue situation. For example, while ASEANs main focus has been to call forthe release of Aung San Suu Kyi, none of the member states has ever delveddeeper into the lingering conicts between the junta and the many ethnicminorities. It is now time for all ASEAN members to design an integratedstrategic policy on how best to deal with Myanmar if they wish to truly

encourage political change in this member state.The global community is watching how ASEAN will readjust its positionnow that the United States has made a signicant change in its policy towardMyanmar. Such a question only reinforces the view that ASEAN reacts to,rather than anticipates or initiates, events. It is therefore fair to conclude thatsince ASEAN has failed to take the lead in addressing Myanmars politicaldeadlock, it has indeed marginalized itself. With or without the U.S. policyshift, ASEAN must dene its strategic interest in Myanmar. This process islong overdue. If it fails to do so, ASEAN might actually miss this last bus toNaypyidaw.

Notes

1. Robert I. Rotberg, Prospects for a Democratic Burma, in Burma: Pros- pects for a Democratic Future, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Brookings, 1998), p. 2. Also seeDavid Arnott, China-Burma Relations, in Challenges to Democratisation in Burma:Perspective of Multilateral and Bilateral Responses (Stockholm: International Insti-

tute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001) (www.burmalibrary.org/docs3/BURMA_beyond_2000.pdf [July 2010]), p. 7.

2. See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Neither Constructive nor Engaging: TheDebacle of ASEANs Burmese Policy, in Between Isolation and Internationalisation:The State of Burma, ed. Johan Lagerkvist, pp. 20122, Working Paper 4 (Stockholm:Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2008).

3. Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair, expresses grave concern about recent devel-opments relating to Daw Aung San Aung San Suu Kyi, given her fragile health. In thisconnection, the Government of the Union of Myanmar is reminded that the ASEAN

Leaders had called for the immediate release of Daw Aung San Aung San Suu Kyi.ASEAN Chairmans Statement on Myanmar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand,May 19, 2009 (www.aseansec.org/PR-ASEANChairmanStatementonMyanmar.pdf).


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4. Tania Branigan, Thousands Flee Burma as Army Clashes with Kokang Mili-tias, The Guardian , August 28, 2009 (www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/28/burma-shan-refugees-ghting-china).

5. Rodolfo Severino, interview with author, October 5, 2009, Singapore.6. Ian Storey, Emerging Fault Line in Sino-Burmese Relations: The KokangIncident, China Brief 9, no. 18 (2009) (www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35468&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=3cc6a7017c>).

7. This material is covered in the authors interview with the Washington Times .See Michael Standaert and Simon Roughneen, Myanmar Refugees Return as Fight-ing Cools, Washington Times , September 3, 2009.

8. Chua Chin Hon, Thaw in US-Myanmar Ties, Straits Times, October 5,2009. Chua quotes Singapore lecturer Bridget Welsh: When people talk about the

issue of acceptance (of the legitimacy of the upcoming elections in Burma), they arereally referring to this recognition from the United States, Asia News Net, May 10,2009 (www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=8067&sec=1).

9. Kurt Campbell, U.S. Policy toward Burma, testimony before the Subcom-mittee on East Asian and Pacic Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Wash-ington, September 30, 2009 (http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/CampbellTestimony090930p.pdf).

10. George Yeo, comments to the media after the meeting of the Group ofFriends on Myanmar at the United Nations headquarters in New York, September

23, 2009 (www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/mfa/press_release/P-20090924-2).11. Myanmar: ASEAN Stands Vindicated, editorial, Straits Times, September

29, 2009 (http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,13603).12. Larry Jagan, U.S. Policy Shift on Burma Gets Mixed Reactions, Inter Press

Service, September 25, 2009 (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48589).13. Martin Petty, Myanmar Says Suu Kyi Trial Not Political, Reuters, May 28,

2009 (www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54R2DU20090528).14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Press Release 470-2552, September

30, 2009.15. Quoted in Usa Pichai, ASEAN Will Not Expel Burma: Thai PM, Mizzima,July 24, 2009 (www.mizzima.com/news/regional/2499-asean-will-not-expel-burma-thai-pm.html).

16. Rizal Sukma, ASEAN Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy, Jakarta Post ,June 30, 2009.

17. Ary Hermawan, Indonesia Lauds U.S. Policy Shift on Myanmar, JakartaPost , September 28, 2009.

18. Simon Roughneed, Indonesia Steps into the Spotlight, Irrawaddy 17, no. 6

(2009) (http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16673).19. Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein quote Professor Mya Maung, who claimed

that Singapores economic linkage with Myanmar is one of the most vital factors for


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the survival of Myanmars military regime. This link was also central to the expan-sion of the heroin trade. Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein, Burma-Singapore Axis:Globalising the Heroin Trade, Covert Action Quarterly , no. 64 (Spring 1998) (www.

singapore-window.org/804caq9.htm).20. Total, Chevron Enriching Burma Junta, Agence France-Presse, Septem-ber 10, 2009 (news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/total-chevron-enriching-burma-junta-20090910-vd.html).

21. Aung Zaw, As Burma Draws Fire, ASEAN Gets Burned, Irrawaddy 17, no. 4(2009) (www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=16215).

22. Jrgen Haacke, ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards aRegional Initiative? Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008): 35178, 360.

23. Vietnam Supports National Reconciliation in Myanmar, VietNamNet ,

November 25, 2007 (http://english.vietnamnet.vn/politics/2007/11/756612/).24. Haacke, ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar, p. 361.25. Quoted in Sahil Nagpal, Vietnam Disagrees with ASEAN over Aung San Suu

Kyi, TopNews Indonesia, August 14, 2009 (www.topnews.in/vietnam-disagrees-asean-over-suu-kyi-2201675).

26. Kurt Campbell, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacicaffairs, interview, Washington, October 29, 2009.

27. Campbell did not meet with Senior General Than Shwe, nor apparently didhe request such a meeting.

28. Kurt Campbell, Aung San Suu Kyi Meet in Burma: A First in 14 Years,Associated Press, November 4, 2009 (www.hufngtonpost.com/2009/11/04/kurt-campbell-aung-san-su_n_345059.html).

29. Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity, Joint Statement,First ASEAN-U.S. Leaders Meeting, November 15, 2009 (www.aseansec.org/24020.htm [June 2010]).

30. Burma Law Formally Bars Aung San Suu Kyi from Election, BBC News,March 10, 2010 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacic/8559048.stm).

31. Purposes and Principles of U.S. Engagement in Burma, Statement by Kurt

M. Campbell on May 10, 2010, Rangoon, Burma, U.S. Department of State (www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/05/141669.htm).32. Min Zaw Oo, Inevitable US Policy Shift on Burma: Why and How, Mizzima,

September 7, 2009 (www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/2729-inevitable-us-policy-shift-on-burma-why-and-how-.html).


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andrew selth

Myanmar, North Korea,and the Nuclear Question

Since the late 1990s there has been a steady trickle of reports in thenews media and on activist websites that Myanmar is developing a close rela-tionship with North Korea. 1 These reports invariably hint at secret militaryprograms with dire consequences for regional stability. During the latterpart of 2009, these reports increased in frequency, and warnings about linksbetween these two pariah states grew stronger. They included accusationsthat Pyongyang was helping the Naypyidaw regime develop the worlds rstBuddhist atomic bomb.

If accurate, these reports would be grounds for serious concern. Beforedrawing any rm conclusions, however, it is important to separate rumorfrom reality and what is actually known from what is assumed or is the prod-uct of speculation.

Seven Headlines

Apart from occasional stories about the military governments human rightsviolations, Myanmar does not often feature in the mainstream news media.North Korea is mentioned more often but until recently was rarely linkedwith its fellow outpost of tyranny, as former U.S. secretary of state Condo-leezza Rice described the two countries in 2005. 2 In a remarkable conuenceof events, however, between June and October 2009 seven developments tiedMyanmar and North Korea together in the news media and thus in the pub-lic imagination.

The rst development was the publication on June 9 of several photo-graphs showing underground facilities being constructed in Myanmar. Over


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182 Andrew Selth

the following weeks, more photographs were released purporting to reveal anetwork of secret bomb-proof tunnels. 3 The Democratic Voice of Burmaclaimed that between 600 and 800 tunnels were being built, with the help of

North Korea. The purpose of these facilities was not clear, but activist groupscited the photographs as evidence of nefarious dealings between Naypyidawand Pyongyang.

The second development was the departure from North Korea on June17 of the cargo vessel Kang Nam I , apparently bound for Rangoon. It wasclaimed that, in violation of a UN Security Council resolution passed ear-lier that month, the ship was carrying Scud-type missiles, nuclear weaponcomponents, or even nuclear weapons. The Kang Nam 1 was shadowed by a

U.S. destroyer until June 29, when it turned around and headed back home.It was widely believed that North Korea wished to avoid an inspection of thevessel by states supporting the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative.

The third development took place on July 21, when the U.S. secretaryof state spoke at a press conference in Thailand, where she was attendinga meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. She said that theUnited States took seriously growing concerns about military coopera-tion between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw. She believed such cooperationwould be destabilizing for the region and pose a direct threat to Myan-mars neighbors. 4 Hillary Clinton revealed that the United States concernsincluded the transfer of nuclear technology and other dangerous weaponsfrom North Korea to Myanmar. 5

Two days later, Japanese police announced that they had issued a secondwarrant for the arrest of Ri Gyong Go, president of a Tokyo-based tradingcompany. Ri was suspected of illegally exporting to Myanmar, in 2008, aninstrument for grinding magnets. According to press reports, this devicecould be used to develop missile control systems and centrifuge machines for

uranium enrichment. Ri was initially arrested on June 29, 2009, on suspicionof attempting to export to Myanmar another machine, reportedly used fordeveloping missiles. 6

Also in July, Myanmar opposition groups obtained a report of the visitto North Korea in December 2008 by a delegation led by Myanmars jointchief of staff General Thura Shwe Mann. The leaked report described theinspection of several military bases and arms factories. It also referred to adraft memorandum of understanding outlining proposals for closer defense

cooperation between the two countries. The memorandum covered NorthKorean assistance with military training programs and the construction ofunderground bunkers and arms shelters in Myanmar.


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Myanmar, North Korea, and the Nuclear Question 183

Throughout this period, there was a lively debate on Internet sites aboutvarious unidentied facilities in Myanmar, which had been found usingcommercial satellite imagery. These facilities were suspected of being related

to a nuclear weapons program. One buildingknown as the Burma Boxwas said to be located at a place identied by Myanmar defectors. 7 Someobservers claimed to have found the signatures of a nuclear reactor and auranium processing plant.

These six stories prepared the ground for the publication on August 1,2009, of a report by two Australian researchers stating that, according to twoMyanmar defectors, Naypyidaw had embarked on a secret nuclear weap-ons program.

Since then, news outlets around the world have cited claims that theregime decided in 2002 to build a nuclear reactor and develop a nuclearweapon. The reactor was said to be hidden underground at Naung Laing,near Pyin Oo Lwin. This project reportedly included all key components ofthe nuclear fuel cycle. According to the two Australian researchers, technol-ogy and expertise for the project was being provided by North Korea. Theyestimated that if everything proceeded according to plan, by 2014 Myanmarcould produce a bomb a year, every year. 8

These seven developments created a sensation. Yet it is worth puttingthese reports into a broader context and examining them more closely. For,considered from a more critical perspective, the picture is not as clear as itmight rst appear.

The Historical Background

Since they both achieved independence in 1948, Myanmar and North Koreahave enjoyed a checkered relationship. 9 Myanmar established full diplomatic

relations with both Koreas in 1975. The Ne Win government took pains tobalance the demands of North Korea and South Korea for diplomatic sup-port and trade. However, during the late 1970s Myanmars relationship withPyongyang became a little stronger than that with Seoul, as Ne Win and theBurma Socialist Program Party forged direct links with Kim Il-sung and theKorean Workers Party.

The relationship with North Korea collapsed in 1983, after Pyongyangsent three agents to Rangoon to assassinate South Korean president Chun

Doo Hwan, who was making a state visit to Myanmar. Ne Win consideredthe attack against Chun not only a violation of Myanmars sovereignty butalso a personal insult. He severed diplomatic relations between Rangoon


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184 Andrew Selth

and Pyongyang and withdrew recognition of North Korea as an indepen-dent state. Kim Il-sung later made several attempts to restore ties but wasrepeatedly rebuffed.

Ironically, it was Myanmars ostracism by the West after the abortive 1988prodemocracy uprising that gave North Korea its chance to reestablish links.Shunned by its usual aid donors and arms suppliers, the new military regimein Rangoon turned to China and the former Eastern-bloc countries for assis-tance. It also developed relationships with states that were out of favor withthe United States. Contacts were made with North Korea in the early 1990s,leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations in 2007. Even before then,however, there were a number of bilateral agreements and arms sales. Reli-

able information is scarce, but it seems that in 1990 Myanmar purchasedsome small arms ammunition from North Korea. This deal was reportedlyfollowed in 1998 by the purchase of about a dozen eld guns. Around 2002the regime may have opened discussions with Pyongyang about the purchaseof a small submarine. The following year there were reports that Myanmarsmilitary leaders were interested in acquiring short-range ballistic missilesfrom Pyongyang. The latter deals do not appear to have gone ahead, how-ever, probably because of pressures from Washington.

The periodic visit of North Korean freighters to Myanmar since then,and the secrecy surrounding their cargoes, has led to speculation that otherdeliveries of conventional arms and military equipment have occurred. Forexample, there were reports in 2007 that North Korea had supplied Myan-mar with some truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems. Claims havealso been made regarding the sale to Myanmar of various kinds of missiles,including short-range ballistic missiles. However, none of these arms dealshas yet been conrmed.

The bilateral relationship seemed to reach a turning point in 2003. North

Korean technicians were observed on Myanmar military bases, and it wasreported that North Korean aircraft had unloaded heavy equipment in cen-tral Myanmar. It was also reported that the Daesong Economic Group, whichhad a record of conducting clandestine activities on Pyongyangs behalf, wasdealing with the regime. 10 Later it was claimed that the Namchongang Trad-ing Companywhich probably assisted Syria with its secret nuclear reactorprojecthad sold some sophisticated dual-use equipment to Myanmar. 11 The implication of these reports was that North Korea was helping Myanmar

with a secret nuclear program.Since then, there have been numerous reports in the news media andon activist websites accusing Myanmar and North Korea of conducting


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suspicious activities. Most have lacked hard evidence. Even so, it has becomeevident that North Korea has developed strong military ties with the StatePeace and Development Council. The links between the two states have

caused unease in Washington and among Myanmars neighbors. The actualnature of the relationship, however, remains the subject of debate.

Rumors and Realities

Over the past twenty years, Myanmar has signicantly increased its militarycapabilities. The armed forces have been expanded and modernized. Theregime has also strengthened Myanmars defense infrastructure and con-

structed a range of underground facilities. It was logical for Naypyidaw to askPyongyang to assist in these projects. Both are authoritarian regimes fearful ofexternal intervention. Pyongyang needs Myanmar primary products, whichNaypyidaw can use to barter for North Korean arms, expertise, and technol-ogy. North Korea has considerable experience in subterranean engineering.

Many of the underground facilities depicted on the Internet are probablyfor military purposes. The generals have long feared an attack from the airand have taken measures to protect against such a threat. However, some ofthe tunnels pictured are quite modest and, despite efforts at concealment,would be vulnerable to attack by a modern air force equipped with the latestweapons. A few are likely to be related to civil engineering projects. Moreimportant, none of the photos supports claims of a secret nuclear reactor ora nuclear weapons program.

Press coverage of the Kang Nam 1 incident seems to be another case ofpublic commentary running ahead of the facts. The ship was indeed going toRangoon, but it returned to North Korea at Naypyidaws request. Its cargoremains a mystery. Reports that it was carrying short-range ballistic missiles

have never been conrmed. The claim that it was transporting nuclear weaponcomponents, or nuclear weapons, is even less credible. Indeed, the most recentnews reports suggest that the ship may have only been carrying small arms.

Before claims that the Kang Nam I was carrying strategic weapons toMyanmar are dismissed entirely, however, it is worth remembering theexport of dual-use technology from Japan in 2008 and the attempt to do soagain in 2009. They are not the only occasions when Naypyidaw has triedto acquire high-precision machinery for which there have been few logical

explanationsapart, that is, from the manufacture of weapons or weaponcomponents. In 2006 and 2007 Myanmar imported some machine toolsfrom Europe, which aroused the suspicions of proliferation analysts.


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186 Andrew Selth

Yet such purchases do not necessarily mean that the State Peace and Devel-opment Council is engaged in a secret program to develop weapons of massdestruction. Myanmar has a large defense industrial complex. Faced with the

threat of a comprehensive arms embargo after 1988 and suspicious even of itscurrent suppliers, the regime has sought to become more self-sufcient. It ispossible that Myanmar is trying to develop a capability to manufacture moresophisticated arms. The report on Shwe Manns visit to North Korea, forexample, suggests that Myanmar wishes to produce its own ballistic missiles.

Caution also needs to be exercised about the identication of variousfacilities around Myanmar as part of a secret nuclear weapons program. Forexample, the Burma Box was revealed to be nothing more than an industrial

workshop.12

Indeed, suspicions that this building was some kind of nuclearfacility had been dismissed by the International Atomic Energy Agency somesix months earlier. 13 Not all unidentied facilities in Myanmar can be dis-counted as easily, but the Burma Box asco demonstrates how speculationabout secret weapons programs can take on a life of its own.

Bear in mind too that Hillary Clinton did not say North Korea was pass-ing Myanmar nuclear weapons technology. After mentioningconfus-inglythe possible transfer of nuclear technology and other dangerousweapons, she said, Im not saying it is happening, but we want to be pre-pared to try and stand against it. Moreover, she referred only to dealingsbetween Pyongyang and Naypyidaw that were perhaps taking place. 14 Thecommander of U.S. forces in the Pacic later stated that he was not awareof any direct evidence to support claims of nuclear weapons technologytransfers to Myanmar. 15

Few of the claims made by the two Australian researchers in August 2009were new. Rumors about a secret nuclear reactor and weapons program hadbeen circulating in Thailand and on activist websites for years. 16 While some

of the defectors claims are plausible, their testimony needs to be treatedwith caution. Defectors are rarely reliable or disinterested sources. Someof their claims cited in the press are incorrect, while others have lacked thenecessary context. 17

There are other reasons to be cautious. Myanmar would have to overcomeenormous nancial, technical, and practical obstacles to develop all elementsof the nuclear fuel cycle, build an underground reactor, and make a deliver-able nuclear weapon. Even for more developed, technologically advanced,

and better resourced countries, these would be daunting challenges. If NorthKorea is as deeply involved in a Myanmar nuclear weapons program as thedefectors claim, then such obstacles may not be insurmountable. Even so,


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suggestions that Myanmar could produce a nuclear weapon by 2014 and ahandful of devices by 2020 must be considered extremely optimistic. 18

Relations between Myanmar and North Korea have clearly come a long

way since 1983. North Korea is selling Myanmar conventional arms, shar-ing its military expertise and experience, and helping upgrade Myanmarsdefense infrastructure. It is likely that North Korea is also aiding Naypy-idaws arms industries, and it is possible that Pyongyang is passing nucleartechnology to Naypyidaw. It still cannot be conrmed, however, that NorthKorea is helping Myanmar build a nuclear reactor and fuel-processing facili-ties, with the aim of producing a nuclear weapon.

Myanmars Nuclear AmbitionsArguably, of all the Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar has the strongeststrategic rationale to develop nuclear weapons. Since 1988 Myanmars mili-tary leaders have feared external intervention, possibly even an invasion torestore democratic rule. These fears have waxed and waned over the pasttwenty years, but they have never gone away. Indeed, they have been keptalive by the aggressive rhetoric leveled against the regime by the UnitedStates and some other members of the international community, the eco-nomic sanctions imposed against Myanmar, and the support given to thecountrys opposition movement.

An invasion of Myanmar has never been a serious prospect, but it wouldbe a mistake to underestimate the impact such threat perceptions havehad on the regimes security policies. Some Myanmar generals are clearlyattracted to the idea of acquiring a nuclear weapon, in the belief that posses-sion of weapons of mass destruction would give Myanmar the same statusand bargaining power that they believe is now enjoyed by North Korea. The

key question, however, is whether this is just wishful thinking or indicates aserious attempt by the regime to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

In 2000, when Myanmars military government announced that it plannedto purchase a small reactor from Russia, activist groups warned that the gen-erals were not to be trusted. They accused the regime of planning to developa nuclear weapon to threaten the international community and resist pres-sures to reform. They cited the regimes long record of duplicity, its fear ofexternal intervention, and its customary disregard for international norms

of behavior. They dismissed assurances that the proposed Russian reactorwas for peaceful research and would be placed under International AtomicEnergy Agency safeguards.


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After 2003 others warned against Myanmars relationship with NorthKorea, even then suspected of spreading sensitive nuclear technologies. Forexample, the then chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Richard G. Lugar, called Myanmar a potential source of instability through-out South and Southeast Asia. Noting the increasing contacts betweenMyanmar and North Korea, he stated that the link-up of these two pariahstates can only spell trouble. 19

At the time, these suspicions were greeted with skepticism. 20 Myanmarhad a long record of opposition to nuclear weapons and was party to all themajor nonproliferation agreements. Its nancial reserves and level of tech-nological development were very low. It was struggling even to maintain its

basic civil infrastructure. The countrys higher education system had col-lapsed. After an inspection tour in 2001, the International Atomic EnergyAgency declared Myanmar to be completely unready for the construction ofeven a small Russian research reactor.

Since then, however, the situation has changed. Thanks to natural gassales, Myanmar now has large foreign exchange reserves that could be usedto fund a nuclear program. 21 The armed forces can boast an extensive net-work of military training, research, and development institutions. Russiais providing technical instruction for a large number of Myanmar service-men and ofcials, including some in the nuclear eld. Items of sophisticatedequipment have been imported, and it is possible that expertise and sensitivetechnologies are being provided by North Korea. In these circumstances, thequestion of whether Myanmar has embarked on a covert nuclear weaponsprogram may now depend more on issues of intention and political will thanon matters of resources, expertise, and practical management.

Myanmar has not made any public response to the spate of news reportsin 2009, but during U.S. senator Jim Webbs visit to Naypyidaw in August

of that year a senior ofcial told him that Myanmar did not have a secretnuclear program. Similar assurances were given to the Japanese foreign min-ister in October. Predictably, the international response to these statementshas been mixed.

The Ofcial Silence

All these developments have raised concerns, but without hard evidence few

claims can be veried. Indeed, some reports have prompted more questionsthan they have answered. One of the most intriguing questions is why so fewgovernments and international organizations have made ofcial statements


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specically addressing this subject, despite all the publicity it has received.Most puzzling of all, given its usually strong stance on Myanmar, is the U.S.governments continued silence.

The Bush administration had no love for Myanmars military regime,which it took every opportunity to criticize. At the same time, the admin-istration made nuclear nonproliferation one of its highest priorities. TheUnited States condemned countries, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and NorthKorea, that it believed were pursuing nuclear weapons programs or spread-ing nuclear technologies. At no time, however, did the Bush administrationaccuse Myanmars government of trying to build a secret reactor or developnuclear weapons, with or without North Korean assistance.

Throughout this period, Washington was watching developments inMyanmar closely. Since 2006 the United States has known about the Myan-mar defectors on whose testimony the two Australian researchers basedtheir August 2009 news stories. Indeed, the researchers suggested that a thirdMyanmar defector was picked up by U.S. intelligence agencies in 2008,presumably to be interviewed about Naypyidaws nuclear ambitions. 22 Yeteven when armed with the apparent revelations of all these defectors, theBush administration remained silent about Myanmars nuclear status.

As rumors of a secret nuclear program grew in frequency and scope, theadministration came under pressure from activists and members of Congressto accuse Naypyidaw of developing nuclear weapons. Yet it refused to do so.This position prevailed even in 2006, when Washington conducted a cam-paign in the UN Security Council for Myanmar to be branded a threat tointernational peace and security. It is difcult to escape the conclusion that theBush administration remained silent on this issue because it did not have theevidence on which to make a public case against Naypyidaw and Pyongyang.

The Obama administration has investigated this matter closely, as part

of its review of U.S. policy toward Myanmar. It has reiterated U.S. con-cerns about nuclear proliferation and North Koreas activities, but it too hasrefused to conrm that Myanmar is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.In July incoming assistant secretary of state Kurt Campbell told Congressthat he would watch all external support for Myanmars nuclear activities,including from Russia and North Korea, but he made no reference to a secretweapons of mass destruction program.

Following Hillary Clintons remarks in Thailand, the State Department

conceded that the United States did not have a good sense of the militarycooperation between Myanmar and North Korea. 23 After the dramatic newsstories that August, ofcial U.S. spokespersons repeatedly refused to answer


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questions about Myanmars reported nuclear ambitions, other than to say itwas an intelligence matter. This continuing reticence suggests that while theUnited States is concerned about Naypyidaws relationship with Pyongyang,

it still does not have hard evidence of a secret nuclear weapons program.Indeed, the United States seems to have accepted Myanmars assurances

that it will implement UN sanctions against North Korea, which prohibit armsand nuclear technology transfers. In September 2009 Washington announcedplans for closer engagement and increased dialogue with Naypyidaw. U.S.ofcials have stated that their discussions will cover nuclear proliferation andMyanmars relations with North Korea. Yet such a signicant policy shiftwould seem unlikely if the United States believed Naypyidaw was already well

advanced on a covert nuclear weapons program, with Pyongyangs help.A few other governments have commented on this issue, but none hasconrmed the existence of a secret nuclear program. In 2006, for example,the British government said that it was not able to corroborate reportsabout the alleged transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea to Myan-mar. 24 In October 2009 London was still referring to unconrmed reportsof nuclear cooperation between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw. 25 In August2009 senior Thai ofcials refuted news reports that Myanmar was building asecret nuclear reactor.

Policy Challenges

In tackling the nuclear issue at a policy level, governments and internationalorganizations face a number of seemingly intractable problems. The greatestis the sheer difculty of determining whether or not Myanmar actually hasa secret nuclear program and, if so, how far it might have progressed. Thisis clearly proving a real challenge, even to agencies with enormous resources

and highly sophisticated technologies.Understandably, foreign ofcials looking at this issue are being very cau-

tious. No one wants a repetition of the mistakes that preceded the 2003 Iraqwar by giving too much credibility to untested intelligence sources or byunderestimating a countrys capabilities. Particularly in the highly chargedpolitical environment that surrounds consideration of Myanmars complexproblemsnot to mention proliferation issues more generallyno govern-ment is going to accept claims of a secret nuclear weapons program without

investigating them thoroughly.If, for the sake of argument, evidence of such a program were found,then another problem arises. The military government has shown that it


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is determined to decide its own security policies, according to its percep-tions of Myanmars national interests. If it has embarked on a weapons ofmass destruction program out of a fear of external intervention, then there is

unlikely to be any progress toward halting the program until those fears areassuaged. Yet in the current political climate the United States among oth-ers would nd it difcult to offer the Naypyidaw regime the kind of securityguarantees this would probably require.

Should the international community try to force Naypyidaw to abandona clandestine nuclear weapons program, it would face another set of prob-lems. Over the past twenty years, many countries have tried to make theregime surrender power, release political prisoners, and adopt more humane

policies through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and other puni-tive measures. Yet as Hillary Clinton acknowledged in February 2009, thisapproach has been demonstrably unsuccessful. Indeed, it has probably hard-ened the regimes resolve to resist external pressures.

Countries enjoying closer ties to Myanmar, such as China and India,would doubtless share international concerns about a secret nuclear pro-gram. Their inuence with the military government is not as great as is oftenclaimed, however, and it is likely that in dealing with Myanmar on this issuethey would encounter many of the same problems as the regimes critics.In halting a serious nuclear weapons program North Koreas cooperationwould be vital, but Pyongyang is unlikely to be responsive to internationalpressures.

Naypyidaw does not appear to fear international criticism or the threat ofincreased sanctions. Myanmar occupies a critical geostrategic position and isrich in natural resources. The regime knows it is unlikely to be abandoned byMyanmars powerful and energy-hungry neighbors. If Myanmar were foundto have a nuclear weapons program, then it could be expelled from ASEAN. 26

Even if that were to occur, however, the generals seem prepared to see Myan-mar return to its pre-1988 isolation and poverty if that is the price they mustpay to remain masters of the countrys destiny.

As the international community has repeatedly been reminded sinceMyanmars armed forces took back direct political power in 1988, there arefew practical ways to inuence a government that is deeply committed toits self-appointed role in national affairs, does not care for the welfare ofits own people, does not observe international norms, and is protected by

powerful friends and allies. If that government has embarked on a secretnuclear weapons program, then the international community faces a realpolicy challenge.


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Conclusion

On security-related issues, Myanmar and North Korea are information blackholes. Given the isolated and secretive nature of both regimes, it is difcultto determine the precise nature of their relationship. Both countries are atthe center of emotive and highly politicized debates about human rights,nuclear proliferation, and regional security. The picture is further cloudedby rumors and speculation in the news media and on activist websites. Thereis the danger, too, of individuals and groups encouraging anti-Naypyidaw oranti-Pyongyang sentiments for partisan political reasons.

Any suggestions of a secret nuclear weapons program, however, particu-larly one conducted by a country like Myanmar, must be cause for concern.Some of the information that has leaked out of the country in recent yearsseems credible, and other snippets of information have emerged that, takentogether, raise suspicions. No one should underestimate the lengths to whichMyanmars military leaders will go to stay in power and to protect the coun-tryand themselvesfrom perceived threats.

With this in mind, many observers are looking to the Obama administra-tion to settle Myanmars nuclear status once and for all.

The Burmese JADE Act enacted by the U.S. Congress in July 2008 stip-

ulates that, within 180 days, the secretary of state must issue a statementdescribing the provision of weapons of mass destruction and related mate-rials, capabilities, and technology, including nuclear, chemical, and dual usecapabilities to Myanmar. 27 That deadline has already passed without theappearance of any statement.

The world is still waiting for an authoritative public statement from theU.S. government or some other credible source that will put all the rumors,blogs, and newspaper stories into their proper perspective. Until that appears,

Myanmar watchers may have to be satised with the ndings of the Inter-national Institute for Strategic Studies, which concluded in September 2009that there was insufcient information to make a well-founded judgmentabout Myanmars nuclear ambitions and the North Korean connection. 28

Notes

1. See Andrew Selth, Burma and North Korea: Conventional Allies or NuclearPartners? Regional Outlook 22 (Brisbane, Australia: Grifth Asia Institute, Grifth

University, 2009).2. Rice Names Outposts of Tyranny, BBC News, January 19, 2005 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4186241.stm).


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3. Myanmars Secret Tunnels Revealed, Al Jazeera,June 25, 2009 (http://eng-lish.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacic/2009/06/20096255353936689.html).

4. Quoted in Glenn Kessler, U.S. Concerns Growing about N. Korean Military

Ties with Burma, Washington Post , July 22, 2009 (www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/21/AR2009072101021.html).5. Secretary Clinton Interviewed in Thailand, Secretary Clinton Blog , July

23, 2009 (http://secretaryclinton.wordpress.com/2009/07/23/secretary-clinton-interviewed-in-thailand/).

6. Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Holds 3 Accused of Trading for N. Korea, Taiwan News, June 30, 2009 (www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=990278&lang=eng_news).

7. See, for example, The Box in Burma: Preliminary Analysis, Verication,

Implementation, and Compliance , August 13, 2009 (www.armscontrolverication.org/2009/08/box-in-Burma-preliminary-analysis.html).8. Hamish McDonald, Revealed: Burmas Nuclear Bombshell, Sydney Morn-

ing Herald , August 1, 2009 (www.smh.com.au/world/revealed-Burmax2019s-nuclear-bombshell-20090731-e4fw.html). See also Daniel Flitton, Burma andthe Bomb, The Age, August 1, 2009 (www.theage.com.au/world/Burma-and-the-bomb-20090731-e4h6.html?page=-1).

9. Andrew Selth, Burmas North Korean Gambit: A Challenge to Regional Secu-rity? Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense 154 (Canberra: Strategic and Defense

Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2004).10. Bertil Lintner and S. W. Crispin, Dangerous Bedfellows, Far Eastern Eco-nomic Review, November 20, 2003, pp. 2224.

11. Kessler, U.S. Concerns Growing about N. Korea

Documents

181 Myanmar Burma