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The Policies of China and India toward Myanmar 115

Kyaukphyu wharf began on October 30, 2009. Located on Langley Island

in Rakhine state, it is the starting point of the pipelines. The agreement is

evidence that energy security cooperation between China and Myanmar has

entered an operational phase.8

Economic Cooperation

Myanmar is a crucial source of natural resources. Beyond natural gas, Myan-

mar is rich in hydropower, timber, gems, jade, nonferrous metals, and arable

land. With a vast territory of more than 670,000 square kilometers and a

population of more than 50 million, Myanmar is also an important desti-

nation for exports and direct investment. Moreover, if the Sino-Myanmar

land-and-water transport network is opened after completion of the Sino-Myanmar oil pipeline, Myanmar will become a key land bridge for south-

west China, providing access to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe, and

Africa. Bypassing the Malacca Straits shortens the distance to South Asia and

beyond by 3,000 kilometers and reduces travel time by five days.9

Friendly Relations with Other Developing Nations

That the Burmese used to call the Chinesepauk phaw(brothers) underscores

the close ties between the two countries. Because China is the worlds larg-est developing country, consolidating and expanding cooperation with other

developing countries remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Myanmar

has come under harsh criticism in the West for its abuse of human rights and

lack of progress toward democracy. Chinas Myanmar policy has strength-

ened relations between China and other developing countries; rather than

jumping on the Western bandwagon, China has stressed the importance of

nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries and has resolutely

opposed the sanctions on Myanmar proposed by Western countries. Bydoing so, China aims to be seen as a reasonable, just, and fair country in the

eyes of other developing countries.

Objectives of Indias Policies since 1988

After a new military came into power in September 1988, the Indian gov-

ernment signaled its commitment to democratic rule by severing contact

with Myanmar. Since 1993, however, the Indian government has gradu-ally adjusted its policies toward Myanmar, shifting from idealism to real-

ism, to achieve its strategic objectives. Indias policy objectives in relation


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116 Li Chenyang

to Myanmar are to strengthen relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors,

to moderate Chinas influence in Myanmar, to contain unrest in its own

northeastern states, and to obtain access to needed natural energy resources.

Strengthening Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

In 1991 India adopted a Look East policy, which aimed at expanding Indias

influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Actually, the policy focuses on ASEAN

member countries and shows Indias eagerness to strengthen its relation

with the Southeast Asian countries.10

Myanmar is Indias land bridge to the ASEAN community as well as an

important barrier protecting Indias eastern shores. Therefore, Myanmar

plays a crucial role in strengthening Indias geopolitical position in South-east Asia. Myanmar is a key stepping stone in Indias new Look East policy,

which seeks to develop and expand political, economic, and security ties with

ASEAN.11 Indias new foreign policy strategy and its geopolitical relations

with Myanmar do not allow India to be hostile toward Myanmar over the

long term. M. K. Rasgotra, the former Indian foreign secretary, has noted

that not isolating but contacting the Myanmar government is the solution.

We have to keep in mind [that] Myanmar is a component of ASEAN, no

matter what kind of a regime it has.12

Containing Chinas Influence

India provides political and economic support to Myanmar to deter Chi-

nas commercial and military influence.13Andrew Selth has observed that

Indias Myanmar policy objective is to test the strategic relation between

China and Myanmar.14

Foreign scholars are led to such views, in part, because of the differing

social systems and ideologies in China and India. Moreover, India has been

worried about Chinas gradual emergence as a competitor and one of themain threats to Indias national security. Therefore, China is an inevitable

factor in Indias Look East policy.15Myanmar is a major coastal state on the

Bay of Bengal. Its western and northern borders connect Bangladesh, China,

and the sensitive northeastern states of India, and its southeast coast is close

to Indias Nicobar archipelago in the Andaman Sea. India regards Myanmar

as crucial to its national interests and will not allow it to become a haven for

foreign naval intervention.16Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh declared

publicly at the opening ceremony of the Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo highwayin February 2001 that the development of the relations between India and

Myanmar relates to Indias national interest.17


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From the viewpoint of India, the ever-closer military ties between Beijing

and Naypyidaw mark the end of Myanmars traditional nonaligned policy.18

India fears that China will constrain Indias relations with Southeast Asia

beyond Myanmar. In particular, it will penetrate into Indias weak north-eastern region and control the Bay of Bengal, thereby exposing India to

attack both from the immediate east and from the more distant west by way

of Pakistan. India has been stressing the potential threat of Sino-Myanmar

military cooperation since the 1990s and even used this threat as a reason for

nuclear weapons testing in 1998.

Solving the Ethnic Minority Issue in the Northeastern States

Separatist activities against the Indian government have occurred for manyyears in the India-Myanmar border area and have become increasingly

fierce. A number of Indian antigovernment militants fled to Myanmar to

avoid being apprehended and even established camps and training bases

in Myanmar. Without help from the Myanmar government, India cannot

effectively combat these rebels. Furthermore, in an effort to fundamentally

weaken the centrifugal tendency in the northeast, India has taken steps to

improve economic conditions in the northeastern states and narrow the eco-

nomic gap between these states and the rest of India by expanding border

trade with Myanmar.

Obtaining Access to Gas and Oil

India is currently the seventh-largest energy-consuming country in the

world, with an average daily oil consumption of more than 2 million bar-

rels. Owing to its limited reserves, 70 percent of its oil and gas is imported.

To enable gas from foreign sources to be transported directly and easily to

India, the Indian government has proposed building three gas pipelines: the

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline in the north, the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline in the west, and the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India

pipeline in the east.

In January 2004 the natural gas field discovered near Sittwe was estimated

to contain between 2.9 trillion and 3.6 trillion cubic feet (82 billion to 101

billion cubic meters) of recoverable gas. The Indian government immedi-

ately offered to buy that gas and to build a gas pipeline from Sittwe to Kolk-

ata through Bangladesh. In mid-January 2005 the energy ministers of Myan-

mar, India, and Bangladesh reached agreement in principle on constructingthe pipeline and agreed to sign a formal contract in March of that year.

When India and Bangladesh failed to agree on the terms for constructing the


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118 Li Chenyang

pipeline, the Myanmar government instead sold the natural gas to Chinese

companies.

To sum up, China and India have the same objective in seeking to

strengthen relations with Myanmar: protecting their own national interests,particularly their geopolitical security. Thus there are obvious reasons for

these two countries to be competing against each other.

The Content of Chinas Policies toward Myanmar

Both China and India have tried their best to develop comprehensive coop-

eration with Myanmar. In particular, they both supported the Myanmar

governments seven-step roadmap to democracy and strongly opposedWestern sanctions against Myanmar. However, some significant differences

in the content of Chinas and Indias policies since 1988 can be seen.

China has adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the

basic principles of the UN Charter in its relations with Myanmar. Scrupu-

lously abiding by the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of

Myanmar, China has improved its bilateral relations with Myanmar and

promoted bilateral cooperation in various fields on the basis of equality and

mutual benefit, in the context of a long-term commitment to maintain a

friendly, balanced relationship.

Political Development and Democratization

China believes that Myanmar is not yet a modern nation because there are

tens of thousands of armed militants in Myanmar who occupy and gov-

ern discrete territories and who do not accept the authority of the central

government. Simply adopting the Western democratic system would cause

social chaos and humanitarian disasters. Building its own nation is the top

priority for the government of Myanmar at present. Democratization is agradual process and needs a stable and favorable external environment, one

that includes respect for Myanmars sovereignty and a policy of noninterfer-

ence in its internal affairs on the part of other governments. The Myanmar

issue involves a variety of factors and can only be solved through dialogue

between its government and people. China would like to see a stable, demo-

cratic, reconciled, and developing Myanmar. China supports the efforts by

the Myanmar government to advance the domestic political system, safe-

guard national stability, and improve the peoples well-being. China hopesthat Myanmar can achieve democracy at an early date and welcomes the steps


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by Myanmar to accelerate the implementation of the roadmap to democracy

within a specific time frame. China supported Myanmars referendum on

the draft constitution in May 2008, referring to it as a significant step from

a military government to an elected government.19

Armed Ethnic Minorities in Northern Myanmar

In 1990 the Chinese government issued its Regulations on Specific Policies

toward Myanmars Armed Ethnic Minority Groups, declaring that China

would give no political recognition, military support, or economic assis-

tance to the armed ethnic minorities but would regard them as Myanmars

local authorities temporarily conducting general business based on the actual

situation. Furthermore, China would take opportunities to do construc-tive work with their leaders under certain circumstances, but would ensure

that this does not go too far.20The Chinese government adhered closely to

this policy, in particular by not giving military support to the armed eth-

nic minorities. Soon after adopting this policy, China had to grapple with

drug proliferation involving the armed ethnic minorities in northern Myan-

mar. However, different policy approaches surfaced among the relevant

departments and scholars in China on how to deal with these groups. One

approach was to actively cooperate with the Myanmar government by crack-

ing down on the drug-trafficking activities of the groups, thereby assuring

the long-term stability of the Sino-Myanmar border. A second approach

favored the continued existence of these groups as a buffer between China

and the Myanmar government.

Economic Development and Cooperation

China has shared with the Myanmar government its experience with reform

and opening up as a guide for Myanmars economic development. When top

Myanmar leaders visit China, the government arranges for them to visit eco-nomically developed cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shen-

zhen to see how they have prospered. Nevertheless, Chinas development

experience may have limited relevance owing to various constraints, such as

Myanmars strong nationalism and the sanctions imposed by the West.

China attaches importance to developing investment, trade, and tech-

nical cooperation with Myanmar. At present, China and Myanmar coop-

erate closely in the fields of energy, transportation, and communications,

among others. China has been providing Myanmar with grant assistance(including foreign exchange, equipment, and technology) and low-interest


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120 Li Chenyang

or interest-free loans since 1988. From 1992 to December 2009, China pro-

vided Myanmar with $930 million in grants and loans.21However, the acts

of Chinas local governments and corporations are not entirely consistent

with the policies of the Chinese central government. It is evident that localgovernments and corporations focus narrowly on their own interests and

exploit Myanmars natural resources.

Arms Sales and Security Cooperation

China has actively pursued military and security cooperation with Myan-

mar since the military junta assumed power in September 1988. China has

sold weapons and other military equipment to Myanmar including missiles,

fighter planes, ships, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and radar. China hastrained a large number of Myanmar air and naval officers, though this train-

ing is largely confined to instruction in the use of military equipment from

China. China has encouraged nontraditional security cooperation, mainly

focused on illegal immigration, cross-border crime, smuggling, environ-

mental damage, highly contagious diseases, and disaster relief. For example,

to eradicate opium poppy cultivation, the Chinese government introduced

special policies to encourage Chinese enterprises to engage in alternative

cultivation in Myanmar. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Com-

merce provided 50 million (renminbi) toward this objective each year from

2006 to 2010. In addition, customs exempts alternative agricultural products

from import duties and the import value-added tax.

Four distinctive features of Chinas military and security cooperation

with Myanmar are worth mentioning. First, China sells missiles, aircraft,

and other heavy weaponry but not rifles, pistols, submachine guns, or other

light weapons. This is to deflect criticism from the international community

that the military junta is using weapons from China to suppress its people.

Second, China sells arms to Myanmar merely to enhance Myanmars defensecapabilities. China does not encourage Myanmar to engage in armed con-

frontation with other countries and is opposed to Myanmar development of

chemical, biological, nuclear, or other weapons of mass destruction. Third,

China does not object to Myanmars purchase of weapons and military

equipment from other countries. In fact, Myanmar has also bought arms

from India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Fourth, China respects Myanmars

sovereignty. China has not set up any military bases in Myanmar. There is

also no military intelligencesharing agreement between the two countries.China and Myanmar have not mounted any joint security operations against

India or other countries.


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Sanctions and Other Hard-Line Measures by Western Countries

It is Chinas view that the Myanmar issue results from complex historical

experiences and current realities. China believes that the international com-

munity should take an objective view of the current situation in Myanmar

and the efforts made by its government. The Myanmar issue only can be

resolved by its government, its people, and other parties directly concerned.

China is willing to see the international community, especially Myanmars

neighboring countries, promote the national reconciliation process in a con-

structive manner based on respect for the sovereignty and dignity of Myan-

mar. China is resolutely opposed to imposing sanctions or applying pres-

sure. Personally, this author is pleased to see the pragmatic nature of the new

U.S. policy toward Myanmar.China considers the Myanmar issue to be essentially an internal affair of

Myanmar that does not pose any threat to international or regional peace

and security.22Still, China appreciates the mediation efforts undertaken by

the UN secretary-general and the UNs special envoys. Because Myanmar is

an ASEAN member and signatory of the ASEAN Charter, China believes the

Myanmar issue will be resolved gradually in the process of ASEANs inte-

gration. China does not want the Myanmar issue to have a negative impact

on overall relations between China and ASEAN. Although the policies ofASEAN members toward Myanmar are not entirely consistent with one

another, China supports ASEANs constructive role on the Myanmar issue

and fully respects ASEANs autonomy to solve its internal affairs. This does

not mean that China entirely excludes or ignores the influence of the United

States and the European Union in addressing the issue of Myanmar. China

has always encouraged Myanmar to reach out to the international com-

munity. In June 2007 China arranged a ministerial-level dialogue in Beijing

between the United States and Myanmar at the mutual request of the two

parties. In December 2007 China expressed its willingness to maintain com-

munications with the European Union to resolve the Myanmar issue. How-

ever, China opposes the establishment of a cooperation mechanism in which

the big powers are in charge while Myanmar is excluded or its sovereignty is

threatened. China regards Myanmar as an equal partner and will continue to

treat it as an equal partner in the future.

The Content of Indias Policies toward Myanmar

After the Myanmar military came to power in September 1988, the Indian

government was critical of the Myanmar government on the grounds that a


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122 Li Chenyang

democratic country could not have normal relations with a military junta.23

The Indian government accepted a large number of political refugees from

Myanmar and allowed them to carry out activities in New Delhi and other

cities against the military regime. It also appealed to the Myanmar govern-ment to release Aung San Suu Kyi unconditionally and hand over power to

the National League for Democracy. However, India abandoned its hostile

attitude toward the Myanmar military government after 1993 and commit-

ted to strengthen its cooperation with Myanmar in all fields.

Political and Diplomatic Cooperation[end]

Cooperation between India and Myanmar in the areas of politics and diplo-

macy has developed continually and become increasingly routine since themid-1990s. In November 2001 General Maung Aye, the vice chair of the

State Peace and Development Council, made an ice-breaking visit to India.

Since then, India-Myanmar relations have markedly improved.

India and Myanmar support each other on issues concerning the interests

of each country. In particular, the frequent visits among high-level leaders

of the two countries represent a significant source of support for an isolated

military regime like Myanmars.24At the request of the Myanmar govern-

ment, India withdrew its support to the National League for Democracy

and stopped allowing the exiled dissidents from Myanmar to engage in any

kind of activities against the Myanmar government. On a visit to Singapore

in June 2006, the Indian defense minister explained that India would pur-

sue a policy of peaceful coexistence with Myanmar and would not interfere

with its democratization process. Since then, the Myanmar government has

repeatedly declared its full support for Indias bid to become a permanent

member of the UN Security Council.

Military and Security CooperationCooperation in the military and security fields is Indias top priority in its

relations with Myanmar. According to incomplete statistics, there have

been more than twenty exchange visits between military officers from the

two countries since Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997. The Indian Express

has reported that four telephone hotlines connect the military commands in

India and Myanmar.

Cooperation in the field of nontraditional security is another priority. In

October 2004, during Than Shwes visit to India, a memorandum of under-standing was signed to intensify security cooperation in the border area, to

combat terrorism, and to exchange security personnel and information.


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With the improvement in bilateral relations, India and Myanmar have

strengthened their cooperation in fighting against ethnic minority separat-

ists in the northeastern Indian states. In 2000 Indian and Myanmar mili-

tary units attacked the camps of three antigovernment organizations (NagaNational Socialist Council, the United Liberation Front of Assam, and the

Manipur Peoples Liberation Army). This was the largest operation against

antigovernment insurgents on the India-Myanmar border in forty years.

Myanmar military officers have been allowed to study in Indian military

academies since 2000. The Indian military also assists Myanmar in training

the coast guard force it established in 2001. During the visit of Indian Air

Force commander S. P. Tyagi to Naypyidaw in November 2006, the Indian

government agreed to sell military helicopters, maritime aircraft and airdefense radar, and other advanced weaponry to Myanmar and committed to

upgrade Myanmars fighter jets purchased from China and Russia.


India has actively advanced cooperation with Myanmar in trade, invest-

ment, aid, infrastructure construction, energy, and other economic areas.

The Myanmar-India Joint Trade Committee was set up to promote bilateral

economic cooperation; its first meeting was held in July 2007 in Yangon.

In February 2001 the road from Morey in India to Tamu, Kaletwa, and

Kalemyo in Myanmar was completed with 1 billion ($30 million) contrib-

uted by the Indian Armys Border Roads Organization. This 160-kilometer

border road not only contributes to trade and investment in the border area

but also promotes social and economic development in northwest Myanmar.

It facilitates joint military operations against antigovernment Indian sepa-

ratists and Indias access to Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Indian foreign

minister Jaswant Singh called it the India-Myanmar Friendship Bridge. In

June 2008 Myanmar and India signed the Agreement on Promoting Invest-ment and Protection between Myanmar and India. The Myanmar Foreign

Trade Bank and the Export-Import Bank of India also signed an agreement,

according to which India will provide Myanmar with a $20 million loan for

an aluminum conductor steel-reinforced wire project and a $64 million loan

for a power transmission equipment project.25

Oil and gas cooperation became another focus of economic cooperation

in recent years. TheMyanmar Timesreported in February 2004 that Myan-

mar would start to buy diesel fuel from India while India would purchasenatural gas from Myanmar. In September 2007 Indian petroleum minister

Murli Deora, on behalf of Indias National Oil and Natural Gas Corporation,


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124 Li Chenyang

signed a $150 million contract for natural gas exploration and drilling with

the State Peace and Development Council and the Myanmar Oil and Natural

Gas Corporation. Under this agreement, Indian companies acquired explo-

ration and development rights in three of Myanmars deep-water areas.26

Comparison of Indias and Chinas Myanmar Policies

Whereas a high degree of consistency can be seen in Chinas Myanmar policy,

India-Myanmar relations have gone through three phases since Myanmar

independence: criticism and opposition from 1988 to 1992, normalizing rela-

tions from 1993 to 2000, and comprehensive cooperation since 2000. Even

so, there are differences between China and India in their attitudes towardAung San Suu Kyi and Western countries sanctions. After the outbreak of

the Saffron Revolt in September 2007, the Indian government proposed that

UN Security Council sanctions should be the last resort. Meanwhile, Indian

foreign minister Pronab Mukherjee suggested to Myanmar foreign minis-

ter Nyan Win that the Myanmar government should consider [investigat-

ing] the case of the demonstration and use of force that happened recently.

He also expressed the hope that the national reconciliation and political

reform launched by the Myanmar government could move forward.27India

wants to join the international community, but it does not want to offend

the Myanmar military government.

During the Saffron Revolt, the Chinese government hoped that Myan-

mars military government could show self-restraint, properly handle the

problem, avoid further complicating the situation, and not affect adversely

the stability of Myanmar or regional peace and stability. After Myanmars

military regime cracked down on the Saffron Revolt, the government of

China supported the UN Security Council statement condemning the mili-

tary regimes violent behavior. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao also exchangedviews on this problem with Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda and Brit-

ish prime minister Gordon Brown by telephone. Furthermore, the Chinese

government actively urged the military regime to allow Ibrahim Gambari,

the UNs special envoy, to visit Myanmar. However, the Chinese govern-

ment clearly opposed the sanctions against Myanmar.

Although the economies of India and Myanmar are highly complemen-

tary, Myanmars trade with India has been smaller than its trade with Thai-

land, China, and Singapore. In 200809 bilateral India-Myanmar trade was$951 million, less than half the value of bilateral China-Myanmar trade. Yet

India is Myanmars second-largest source of imports, with a value of $805


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million in 200809.28Until January 2008 Indias cumulative investment in

Myanmar was $220 million, less than one-sixth of Chinas investment. Of

the total Indian amount, $137 million was invested in oil and gas fields. Thus

cooperation in economic matters is a stronger focus in Myanmars relationswith China than in those with India, but political and strategic factors are

more significant in India-Myanmar cooperative relations.29

Results of Chinas and Indias Myanmar Policies

Chinas and Indias policies toward Myanmar in the twenty-first century are

essentially the same. However, from the perspective of implementation, China

still enjoys a privileged position in Myanmars foreign relations. The Myan-mar government firmly supports the Chinese government on issues con-

cerning Chinas core interests such as Taiwan and Tibet, and the exchanges

between China and Myanmar in the political and economic areas are broader

and much deeper. According to British scholar Dr. Marie Lall, With regard

to the picture from Myanmar, the relationship with India is not perceived as

straightforward. Whilst there is a general sense that Myanmar wants to bal-

ance out Chinese influence, India is recognized as being too slow and as not

having an organized vision about its relationship with Myanmar.30

Three main factors contribute to the differing influence of these two coun-

tries in Myanmar. First, China, unlike India, is a permanent member of the

UN Security Council and can give Myanmar more support in international

policy debates. Second, Chinas economic strength is much greater than that

of India. Chinas investment, aid, and trade in Myanmar are all much higher

than Indias. Third, Chinas political system is fundamentally different from

Indias. Its policy toward Myanmar is almost free of pressure from domestic

political forces and therefore can have a higher coherence than Indias. The

Indian governments policy toward Myanmar is widely constrained by theparliament, opposition parties, and nongovernmental organizations. More-

over, different Indian ministries work separately from one another with

different goals and visions. This is especially the case with the Ministry of

External Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Petroleum.

Possibly this applies to the Ministry of Defense as well, although the evi-

dence is less clear.31Compared with China, Indian administrations do not

seem to have a long-term (twenty years or longer) vision of relations with

Myanmar. The horizon seems to be set by the next election. Thus India lostaccess to the gas from the offshore A-1 and A-3 blocks because of slower

decisionmaking and less focus. China got the gas deal because it was quick to


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126 Li Chenyang

respond and was seen as reliable and because of Chinas political support for

Myanmar (expressed in its veto of the U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council

resolution).

In the security area, however, the depth and range of cooperation aregreater between India and Myanmar than between China and Myanmar. For

example, in the mid-1990s, India and Myanmar launched Operation Golden

Bird to suppress the antigovernment rebels in the northeastern Indian states.

Furthermore, cooperation between Indias and Myanmars security forces in

counterinsurgency operations has grown dramatically since October 2004,

when Senior General Than Shwe visited New Delhi. During that visit Than

Shwe assured New Delhi that he would not allow his country to be used by

anti-Indian militant groups.32

By contrast, Myanmar and China have notconducted any joint military operations since 1988. In addition, some of

Indias military equipment sold to Myanmar is more advanced than Chinas.

The Indian government allows the sale of technology and advanced weapons

to Myanmar and also the joint production of military equipment.

Indias influence surpasses Chinas in other areas as well. An agreement

on water-land transportation was supposed to be signed between China

and Myanmar during Chinese president Jiang Zemins visit to Myanmar

in December 2001. It was withdrawn after Myanmar proposed additional

harsh terms, reportedly in response to pressure from India. No other agree-

ment between China and Myanmar that has reached the form of a prepared

text has been withdrawn since September 1988. Finally, Myanmar has always

supported India in its quest to become a permanent member of the UN

Security Council.

Although the policies that China and India now maintain toward Myan-

mar are almost the same, the international community expresses much

greater dissatisfaction with China than with India. Western politicians and

media constantly criticize Chinas noninterference policy and suggest thatChinas support is the root cause for the military regimes long-term sur-

vival and the lack of progress in Myanmars democratic development. Even

though these accusations cannot be substantiated, the pressure on China

over the Myanmar issue is far greater than the pressure on India.

Challenges for China in Strengthening Relations with Myanmar

Although Chinas Myanmar policy has contributed a lot to the consolidationand development of Sino-Myanmar relations since 1988, it has also faced


13/45


numerous challenges. Relations between India and Myanmar have also faced

challenges, but they are fewer in number and the difficulty not as great.

Economic CooperationThe Myanmar government distrusts foreign investors and believes that they

have a hidden agenda to exploit its rich natural resources for their own self-

ish purposes. Such distrust is a result of Myanmars colonial past and its

perception that developing countries are in a disadvantageous position in

the existing international world order. At present, no Myanmar organization

or individual can sign contracts related to resource exploitation with foreign

companies without the permission of the military authorities.

However, some county authorities in Yunnan province and some Chinesecompanies have signed natural resource exploitation agreements with cease-

fire groups in the northern part of Myanmar. This phenomenon persists

even though Chinas central government forbids it. The disorderly exploita-

tion of timber and minerals has led to ecological and environmental damage.

In addition, Myanmar has a large trade deficit with China because of the

relatively large gap in the productive capacity of the two countries.

Illegal Immigration

Illegal immigration is becoming an increasingly important issue. Immigrants

from both countries cross the border, but the number from China is pre-

sumably much larger. Chinese workers and illegal immigrants moving into

Myanmars hinterland are posing a threat to the interests of local people.

Moreover, many Chinese in Myanmar commit crimes. It is said that more

than 80 percent of the criminal acts in Yangon are committed by Chinese. As

a result, the people of Myanmar have an increasingly negative impression of

Chinese people and Chinese-funded businesses.

Narcotics

China has urged Myanmar to do its best to curb the production of narcotics

because of its serious negative impact on China. However, Myanmar points

out that the chemical ingredients for making heroin, methamphetamines,

and other kinds of drugs and related equipment come mainly from foreign

countries, and most narcotics are consumed in foreign countries. Therefore

Myanmar should not be the only country held accountable for the drug

problem. The Myanmar military government is also concerned that devel-opment of substitute crops in the opium-producing areas would increase


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128 Li Chenyang

the income of the armed ethnic minorities, which is not conducive to the

management and eventual unification of these areas.

GeopoliticsFull trust has not been established between China and Myanmar despite

twenty-one years of improvement in Sino-Myanmar relations. Seeing Chinas

rapid economic rise, the Myanmar government is eager to get more Chinese

trade, investment, and aid. At the same time, the military regime is afraid

that greater Chinese involvement will make Myanmar more dependent on

China. In other words, the deeper political, economic, and security coopera-

tion becomes, the more Myanmar officials worry about suffering badly from a

change in Chinas policy. Moreover, the Myanmar government is concernedthat China might support the armed ethnic minorities in their struggle with

the central government. Consequently, the military regime tends to adopt a

policy of equal-distance diplomacy between ASEAN, India, and China.

Challenges for India in Strengthening Relations with Myanmar

Despite the change in Indias policy toward Myanmar since 1993, speeches

are frequently made by nongovernmental organization leaders and govern-

ment officials attacking the Myanmar government and supporting Aung San

Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Support is even given to

anti-Myanmar government exiles in India. These activities pose the most

serious challenge for India, which is unable to stop them, in seeking to

strengthen its relationship with Myanmar.

As noted earlier, following the change of leading parties in the last elec-

tion, the Indian government has been unable to pursue a long-term strategy

toward Myanmar. Whenever a new party comes into power, there is a risk

that projects in Myanmar initiated by the previous government will not becontinued. Whether the military stays in power or an elected government

takes over, Myanmar needs substantial foreign investment, aid, and loans.

Its hope lies with China, ASEAN, India, and even Western countries. Coop-

eration between India and Myanmar in the political, military, and strategy

arenas could be adversely affected if India is unable to catch up with China

and ASEAN member countries in cooperating with Myanmar in the eco-

nomic arena.

Although India has attached great importance to its relationship withMyanmar, it does not pay as much attention to Myanmar as China does.

The two aspects mentioned abovethe anti-Myanmar sentiment within


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the country and the lack of a long-term strategyare the best examples of

Indias lesser attention to Myanmar. Indian media and even officials accuse

China of posing a great threat to India, and they often criticize Myanmar for

being Chinas satellite. Such remarks have hurt the Myanmar governmentand people. By contrast, the Chinese government and the Chinese media are

sensitive to the cooperation between India and Myanmar, but their response

is far less critical.

Trends in Myanmars Relations with China and India

The current trends in Sino-Myanmar relations and India-Myanmar rela-

tions can be analyzed from three perspectives. First, both China and Indiawill continue their current friendly policies toward Myanmar and expand

cooperation in many areas. Myanmar will remain an important object in

the geopolitical and geoeconomic policies of China and India and in their

competition as great powers in the world. Both China and India will con-

tinue to support Myanmars political reforms, led by the military, and accept

the validity of its new constitution. They will support the general election in

2010 and accept the results. They will quickly recognize the new government

and seek to develop closer relations with it.

Second, Myanmar will maintain friendly relations with China and India

but will not allow either of them to have a dominant influence. Myanmar is a

country with strong nationalist sentiments. Its top leaders do not trust China

and have little confidence in India. Like other Southeast Asian countries adopt-

ing a balance-of-power strategy, Myanmar will adhere to its traditional neutral

position and continue to balance its relations with China, India, ASEAN, and

the Western democracies. Some scholars argue that the current diplomatic

strategy of Myanmar is a mixture of balance of power and seeking security

through cooperation.33As a country between two emerging world powers,however, Myanmar has no choice but to pursue a balance-of-power strategy.

It will not completely turn to China or India unless one of them pushes Myan-

mar too far. It will not be possible for China or India to adopt policies that

irritate Myanmar. At the same time, Myanmar may take advantage of China

and India in order to gain more concessions from the other.

From a long-term perspective, Myanmars strategic interest lies in devel-

oping its relations with India and ASEAN to balance Chinas influence.34The

Singapore scholar Poon Kim Shee also agrees that Myanmar is now imple-menting an anti-risk strategy. To reduce economic dependence on China,

it cooperates closely with India, consolidates relations with ASEAN, and


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130 Li Chenyang

encourages investment from Japan and other industrialized countries.35 If

the influence of China or India becomes too strong, Myanmar may introduce

other powers into its balance-of-power strategy, such as the United States or

Russia. Thus there was strategic significance in Myanmars purchase of tenMIG-29 fighters from Russia in 2001. It is an example of Myanmars using

Russia to counterbalance China and India.36

Third, the continuing competition over Myanmar will not lead to deteri-

oration in Sino-India relations. While competition between China and India

in Myanmar is inevitable over the long term, the great game predicted by

some Western scholars will not materialize. Other more vital issues will set

the tone of relations between these two powers, such as border and territorial

disputes. Moreover, the two powers share a common interest in the stabil-ity and development of Myanmar. If the national interests and security of

Myanmar were to be affected by the competition between China and India,

Myanmar might choose ASEAN, Russia, Japan, and Western countries as its

cooperation partner. Most Chinese scholars share the view that it is normal

for Myanmar to strengthen its cooperation with India, ASEAN, and even the

Western democracies because China alone cannot meet all of Myanmars

development needs. They see India adjusting its policy toward Myanmar

to increase its influence on Myanmar and reduce Myanmars reliance on

China. The objective is to move Myanmar back to a position of strategic

neutrality rather than to push China out of Myanmar.

In short, competition exits between China and India in their relations

with Myanmar. However, there could be cooperation between the two

countries if a point is reached where competition is threatening other vital

national interests.

Conclusion

China and India have made great efforts to develop their relations with

Myanmar as a consequence of Myanmars strategic importance. The differ-

ent results achieved reflect differences in their policies and political systems.

Looking ahead, China and India will continue to compete for access and

influence over the long term despite the numerous challenges they face.

China may continue to enjoy a privileged position in Myanmars foreign

relations, but Indias influence may surpass Chinas on some specific issues.

Most likely, the Myanmar government will maintain friendly relations withboth countries at the same time in order to maximize the benefits from this

competition.


17/45


Notes

1. Some Taiwan scholars believe that the ultimate objective of Chinas policy

toward Myanmar is to gain access to the Indian Ocean, using Myanmar as a landbridge to Southeast Asia and South Asia and a buffer state. See Yuh-Ming Tsai,

Breakout: China Foreign Policy toward Myanmar, Feng Chia Journal of Humani-

ties and Social Sciences, no. 8 (May 2004): 30225.

2. Wai Moe, China Signs Burmese Gas Deal for 30-Year Supply, December 26,

2008 (www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=14849).

3. Wu Hongying,CPPCC Thematic Consultations for the Proposal of Build-

ing the Indian Ocean Channel, 21st-Century Business Herald, March 10, 2009

(www1.21cbh.com/HTML/2009-3-10/HTML_SKBAI7DM7BKJ.html).

4. In the past, the total length of the Myanmar-China border has been estimatedto be 2,185 kilometers. Currently, Myanmar government estimates place it at 2,204

kilometers. See Myanmar Embassy, Basic Facts about Myanmar (www.myanmar-

embassy-tokyo.net/about.htm).

5. For 2008, see http://blog.ce.cn/html/81/329481-228751.html; for 2009 and

projected 2020, see www.okokok.com.cn/intelli/Class9/200502/73420.html.

6. The threat is primarily from terrorist attacks, pirate attacks, ship collisions, oil

leaks, navigation capacity limitation, channel congestion, and other nontraditional

security factors. A few years ago, Chinese scholars posited a Malacca dilemma,

based on an assumption of war between China and the United States. Under thisscenario, once armed conflict broke out the American navy could launch an attack

on Chinas oil tankers anywhere in the world, not only in the Straits of Malacca. The

Malacca dilemma is a pseudo-proposition; to the extent that this concept remains

relevant, it can be based only on nontraditional security issues.

7. China Has the Advantage over the Scrambling for the Natural Gas of

Myanmar [Zhengduo miandian tiranqi, zhongguo zhanshangfeng],Lianhezaobao

[United Morning News, Singapore], March 15, 2007 (www.zaobao.com/finance/

pages/comment070315.html [July 2010]).

8. Poon Kim Shee, The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Stra-tegic and Economic Dimensions, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Stud-

ies1 (2002): 3353, 35.

9. Liu Xing, Retrospect and Reflection on Sino-Myanmar Land-and-Water Coordi-

nated Transport Construction (Mangshi, China: Dehong Minority Press, 2007), p. 114.

10. Ma Ying, The India-Southeast Asia Relation in the 1990s,Contemporary

Asia-Pacific,no. 2 (2002): 4752, 49.

11. Shee, The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations, p. 40.

12. Ashok Bhattacharjee, Indias Natural Gas Project Will Contribute to Strengthen

Regional Ties,Asian Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong ed., January 25, 2005.13. Helen James, Myanmars International Relations Strategy: The Search for

Security, Contemporary Southeast Asia26, no. 3 (2004): 53053, 53637.


18/45

132 Li Chenyang

14. Quoted in Andrew Selth, Burma and the Strategic Competition between

China and India,Journal of Strategic Studies19, no. 2 (1996): 21330, 213.

15. Li Jiaxiang and others, Analysis of the China Factor in Indias Look East

Policy, Around Southeast Asia, no. 3 (2003): 6668, 66.16. Tony Allison, Myanmar Shows India the Road to Southeast Asia, Asia

Times, February 21, 2001 (www.atimes.com/report/CB21Ai01.html).

17. Fu Xiaoqiang,India Intends to Get Out of South Asia,Global Times, Sep-

tember 7, 2001.

18. J. Mohan Malik, Myanmars Role in Regional Security: Pawn or Pivot? Con-

temporary Southeast Asia19, no. 1 (1997): 5273, 57.

19. Myanmar to Hold National Referendum in May and General Election in

2010, Peoples Daily, February 10, 2008.

20. Yu Jiang and Wang Chaozuo, Dui zhongmian bianjing guanlizhong yumi-andian minzu defang wuzhuang shili kaizhan jingwu hezuo de sikao[Reflections on

policy cooperation with Myanmar local minority armed forces in Sino-Myanmar

border management],Journal of Yunnan Public Security College, no. 1 (2001): 6771,

6768.

21. See www1.voanews.com/chinese/news/ChinaTightensEconomic-20091221-

79848027.html.

22. Statement by Ambassador Wang Guangya to the UN Security Council, New

York, November 13, 2007 (www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/ldhy/ld62/t380811.

htm).23. Qian Feng, Yinmian hezuo, gequ suoxu [India and Myanmar get what they

need through cooperation], November 1, 2004 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/

2004-11/01/content_2162360.htm).

24. High-level visits between China and Myanmar are also frequent. See Li

Chenyang, China-Myanmar Relations since 1988, in Harmony and Development:

ASEAN-China Relations, ed. Lai Hongyi and Lim Tin Seng, pp. 4964 (Singapore:

World Scientific, 2007), p. 50.

25. Minister of Commerce and Industry of India visited Myanmar; India and

Myanmar signed several cooperation agreements (http://mm.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200806/20080605635749.html [July 2010]).

26. See www.atchinese.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=

44813&catid=189%3A2009-03-19-06-15-48&Itemid=110.

27. See http://blog.163.com/zijire@126/blog/static/36066503200798959544/.

28. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/27/content_11954504.htm.

29. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than, eds.,

Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives(Singapore: Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, 2005), p. 39.

30. Marie Lall,India-Myanmar Relations: Geopolitics and Energy in Light of theNew Balance of Power in Asia, Working Paper 29 (Singapore: National University

of Singapore, Institute of South Asian Studies, January 2009), p. 29.


19/45


31. Ibid., p. 2.

32. Indian Troops Poised to Enter Myanmar for Joint Operations, IndiaDefence,

July 21, 2005 (www.india-defence.com/reports/47).

33. James, Myanmars International Relations Strategy, p. 549.34. Malik, Myanmars Role in Regional Security, p. 63.

35. Shee, The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations, p. 39.

36. Ibid., p. 36.


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134

A Strategic Perspective on

India-Myanmar Relations

gurmeet kanwal

8

India and Myanmar were historically part of the extended BritishEmpire in Asia. Since the two countries became independent at the end of

World War II, relations between them have by and large been friendly. At

the outset Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and U Nu worked closely with

each other in the area of economic development. India even provided some

military assistance to Myanmar, and both were active members of the Non-

Aligned Movement. However, relations between the two became strained

in 1962. India strongly opposed the imposition of military dictatorship in

Myanmar by General Ne Win and supported the prodemocracy forces.

The Ne Win regime adopted an anti-Soviet stance at a time when relations

between India and the Soviet Union were burgeoning, refused to join the

Commonwealth of Nations, and withdrew from the Non-Aligned Move-

ment in 1979.

Relations between India and Myanmar did improve from 1988 onward,

however, although some tensions remained. India continued to sympathize

with prodemocracy groups and awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award forInternational Understanding to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1993, by which time

she had already becomepersona non gratato the Myanmar government. The

isolationist strategy adopted by the State Law and Order Restoration Council

further hampered the renewal of full relations between the two countries.

After 1993, however, Indias policy toward Myanmar was reviewed and India

adopted a more pragmatic and less moralistic stance. This purposeful shift

The author wishes to thank Samarjit Ghosh, associate fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies

(CLAWS), New Delhi, for additional research.


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A Strategic Perspective on India-Myanmar Relations 135

from an idealistic foreign policy to one that was firmly anchored in realpoli-

tik has been the driving force behind the improvement of relations between

the two countries. Prime Minister Narasimha Raos focus on the Southeast

Asian nations reflected Indias growing interest in its regional neighborhood.Former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran explains Indias quest to reach

out to its Asian neighbors in these words:

Proximity is the most difficult and testing among [the] diplomatic

challenges a country faces. We have, therefore, committed ourselves

to giving the highest priority to closer political, economic and other

ties with our neighbors in South Asia. . . . Geography imparts a unique

position to India in the geo-politics of the Asian continent, with our

footprint reaching well beyond South Asia and our interests straddlingacross different sub-categories of Asiabe it East Asia, West Asia,

Central Asia, South Asia or South-East Asia.1

Indias Look East policy was targeted at opening markets in Southeast

Asia, and cooperation with Myanmar was important for its implementation.

That Bangladesh was a recalcitrant partner in this endeavor further high-

lighted the importance of Myanmar. Without this shift in policy, the growth

of several of Indias northeastern states would have been hindered by the

attendant risk of fueling ongoing insurgencies.2

Indias interest in Myanmar and the Look East policy also reflect grow-

ing international interest in Asia as an engine of economic growth in the

twenty-first century. Myanmar supports Indias quest for a place in the sun

and is comfortable with Indias increasing engagement with its immediate

and extended neighborhood.3For the Myanmar government, the additional

purpose of addressing problems in the northeastern states comes as a wel-

come part of the deal. Moreover, Indias move to engage Myanmar closely

reflects its growing concern over Myanmars jettisoning its policy of neutral-ity toward India and China and gradually tilting toward China.4

A number of external and internal factors point to Myanmars strategic

importance for India:

Myanmar is located at the junction of East, South, and Southeast Asia

and functions as a land bridge to Southeast and East Asia. For the govern-

ment of Myanmar, a policy of engagement with India not only helps balance

its excessive dependence on China but also helps to boost its international

image and legitimacy.5

Myanmar is the second-largest of Indias neighbors and the largest on

its eastern flank. The two countries share a land border of 1,640 kilometers,


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136 Gurmeet Kanwal

almost all of it unfenced, along which Indias Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland,

Manipur, and Mizoram states border Myanmars Kachin, Sagain, and Chin

states.6Multiple insurgent groups operate in the northeastern states of India,

and they are known to operate from bases in Myanmar. Such groups can besuccessfully tackled only on a bilateral basis.

Myanmar is a key player in the Bay of Bengal littoral region and

shares a maritime boundary with India. Given the increasing significance

that India now ascribes to its own centrality in the northern Indian Ocean

region, Myanmar now shares in that importance. An unfriendly Myanmar

could host a rival naval presence in the Bay of Bengal and complicate Indian

security.

Myanmar shares a 2,185-kilometer border with China, which is locatednext to the disputed section of the India-China border.

Myanmar is said to have the tenth-largest gas reserves in the world,

estimated at 90 trillion cubic feet.7It is in Indias interest to gain from its

proximity in the use of these resources. India can provide help by way of

investment and technology for exploration as well as production.


A Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and Tranquility in Border Areas

was signed by India and Myanmar in January 1994. This document commits

both countries to hold talks at the joint secretary and home secretary levels

every year, alternately in each country. Thus far, fifteen meetings at the joint

secretary level and fourteen at the home secretary level have been held.8

Relations have been further cemented through regular high-level visits,

notably Senior General Maung Ayes inaugural visit in January 2000 and,

most recently, his visit in April 2008. The current chair of the State Peace and

Development Council, Senior General Than Shwe, visited India in October2004. This was the first visit to India by a Myanmar head of state in twenty-

five years. From the Indian side, Vice President Shekhawat visited Myanmar

in November 2003; and President A. P. J. Abdul Kalams visit in March 2006

was the first visit by an Indian head of state to Myanmar since Rajiv Gandhi

was prime minister in 1987. More recently, Vice President Hamid Ansari

visited Yangon in February 2009. The foreign ministers of Myanmar and

India have met frequently throughout the last decade. During these visits,

several memorandums of understanding and agreements have been signed.9

The key ones are listed in box 8-1.


23/45


Box 8-1. Key Memorandums of Understanding and Agreements

between India and Myanmar

2003Protocol on Consultations between Indias Ministry of External Affairs and

Myanmars Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Establishment of the Joint Trade Committee

Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Communications,

Information Technology, and Services between Indias Ministry of

Communication and Information Technology and Myanmars Ministry of

Communication, Posts, and Telegraph

Agreement on the Extension of a Credit Line of U.S. $25 Million to Myanmar

Agreement on Visa Exemptions for Official and Diplomatic Passport Holders

Memorandum of Understanding between Indias Human Resource

Development Ministry and Myanmars Education Ministry

2004

Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of

Nontraditional Security Issues (Counterterrorism)

Memorandum of Understanding on the Thamanthi Hydroelectric Power

Project on the Chindwin River

2005

Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Hydrocarbon Sector2006

Framework Agreement for Mutual Cooperation in the Field of Remote Sensing

Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Petroleum Sector

between Indias Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas and Myanmars

Ministry of Energy

2007

Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing the India-Myanmar Centre

for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills at Yangon

2008

Agreement and Two Protocols for the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport

Project

Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreement

Memorandum of Understanding between Indias National Hydroelectric

Power Corporation and Myanmars Hydroelectric Power Department for

Building the 1,200-Megawatt Thamanthi Hydroelectric Power Project and

the 600-Megawatt Shwezaye Project in the Northwestern Chin State of

Myanmar


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138 Gurmeet Kanwal

Trade

Bilateral trade between the two countries grew from $273 million in 198081

to $995 million in 200708.10India is today the fourth-largest trading partner

of Myanmar, after Thailand, Singapore, and China, and the second-largest

export market for Myanmar after Thailand, absorbing approximately 25

percent of its exports.11Whereas the goods imported by India from Myan-

mar are predominantly agricultural and forest-based products, the exports

from India are mainly steel and pharmaceutical products, and the balance is

generally in favor of Myanmar.

The Border Trade Agreement signed in 1994 specified points for cross-

border trade. These have yet to be made fully operational, however. When

they become so, the agreement will help enormously in curbing illegal tradeand monitoring the movements of insurgents in the border areas between

the two countries. The existing border trade points at Moreh and Zowkha-

thar in India and Tamu and Rhi in Myanmar were recently converted into

normal trade links. Avankhu in the state of Nagaland is being developed as a

third border trade point.12

Bilateral trade has been declining somewhat because of the greater popu-

larity of products imported from China and other countries. Intimidation

by insurgent groups in the border regions has also hampered trade, eventhough the free movement across the border of the tribal people inhabiting

the border areas in both countries, who share ethnic links with their coun-

terparts, has been regulated by a memorandum of understanding signed in

2004.13The local populations are also unhappy because they are not benefit-

ing much from the trade.14

Oil and Gas

India has been given the right to build, operate, and use an offshore hub forMyanmar gas. The link is to be established between Mizoram in India and

Sittwe in Myanmar, and completion of the project is expected within five

years. In this way, the landlocked northeastern states will get direct access to

international trade and bilateral trade will be boosted. India lost out to China

in purchasing Myanmars offshore gas resources in Rakhine state.15The ini-

tial pipeline project, which was envisaged in collaboration with Bangladesh,

had to be discarded because of unreasonable demands on the part of Bangla-

desh.16

An alternate proposal to build a pipeline from Myanmar through thenortheastern states to West Bengal was deemed economically unfeasible and

was shelved in July 2009.17


25/45


India still hopes to tap Myanmars bountiful energy resources in the

future. This objective can be achieved only through astute diplomacy and

friendly relations with the military regime. The latest proposal on the table

is to transport gas through a 1,575-kilometer Sittwe-Aizwal-Silchar-Guwa-hati-Siliguri-Gaya pipeline. In the interim before the pipeline is constructed,

India has offered to transport the gas by ship as liquefied natural gas. The Oil

and Natural Gas Corporation and the Gas Authority of India Limited hold

a 30 percent stake in the exploration of and production from the offshore

natural gas fields near Sittwe.18

Infrastructure

India completed the 160-kilometer India-Myanmar Friendship Road in

2001 and is currently involved in the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral

Highway project.19 The Ministry of Commerce is developing Sittwe port

and the open sea route connecting to Mizoram state in northeastern India.20

India has also signed agreements with Myanmar for the construction of the

Thathay Chaung hydropower project in Rakhine state,21 joint ventures in

the Chindwin river basin that include a 1,200-megawatt hydropower dam at

Thamanthi, and a 600-megawatt hydropower dam at Shwezaye. Both dams

will be financed by India, and the electricity they produce will be supplied to

Manipur state in India.22

At a time when energy security is a paramount concern for all developing

nations, New Delhi is working with Yangon toward a hydropower develop-

ment program that will ensure the supply of power to India while simultane-

ously developing hydropower resources in neighboring countries.23India and

Myanmar are also working on the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport

Facility, which, apart from connecting the two countries, will lead to better

connectivity across the India-Myanmar border and within Indias northeast-ern states. The project is designed to connect Indian ports on the eastern sea-

board with Sittwe port in Myanmar through roads and riverways.24

Apart from infrastructure projects, India has been consistently provid-

ing development aid to Myanmar, totaling more than 100 crore rupees ($20

million) over the past ten years.25Both countries participate in several mul-

tilateral forums, including the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral

Technical and Economic Cooperation and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation

group. Myanmar is a full member and India is a summit-level member ofthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). They are also part-

ners in the Forum for Regional Economic Cooperation among Bangladesh,


26/45

140 Gurmeet Kanwal

China, India and Myanmar (BCIM). In addition, India and Myanmar have

signed on to the Trans-Asian Railway Project, which will connect twenty-

eight nations and allow India to enhance the pace of implementation of its

Look East policy and consolidate its relations with Southeast Asia.26

Defense Cooperation

Defense cooperation between India and Myanmar is based on mutual

interests and national security considerations. It has been marked by regu-

lar exchanges of high-level visits and some bilateral military exercises. The

Indian chief of army staff, General V. P. Malik, met with his Myanmar coun-

terpart, Senior General Maung Aye, in Yangon and Shillong in 2000.27

Sincethen, visits by top officials of all three military services have been a regular

feature. Major visits include those by Vice Admiral Soe Thane, commander-

in-chief of the Myanmar navy, in April 2007, and Admiral Sureesh Mehta,

the chief of naval staff for the Indian navy, in May 2007.28General Deepak

Kapoor, the former chief of army staff, visited Myanmar in October 2009,

as did his predecessor, General J. J. Singh, in November 2005. Beginning in

2004, Myanmar, along with other nations in the Asia-Pacific region, has par-

ticipated in the annual multilateral Milan naval exercises and interactions

in the Indian Ocean.29

Cooperation in the field of counterinsurgency operations overrides

other factors in determining the contours of Indias strategic engagement

with Myanmar. The insurgents operating in the northeastern Indian states

of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram have ethnic links

with the tribal people on the Myanmar side of the border. Acts of terrorism

initiated by these groups, who claim to represent the tribal people on both

sides of the border, have been on the rise since the 1990s, necessitating good

relations between the militaries of the two countries. Incidents of drug traf-ficking and narcoterrorism in the northeastern states have also been increas-

ing. To minimize the potentially dangerous manifestations of drug abuse,

India needs to play a proactive role as a balancer and a stabilizer and must

ensure that its concentration on traditional security does not divert atten-

tion to nontraditional security challenges. India must work with neighbor-

ing countries to create both regional and subregional institutions to address

these challenges. There is an increasing realization on the part of New Delhi

that the insurgent groups cannot be dealt with by military means alone.Joint counterinsurgency operations have been conducted for quite some

time. In AprilMay 1995 the Indian and Myanmar armies conducted a


27/45


successful joint military operation, codenamed Operation Golden Bird,

against northeastern insurgent groups including the United Liberation

Front of Assam, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, and the Peo-

ples Liberation Army (Manipur).30Forty insurgents were killed and a hugecache of arms was recovered. In November 2001 the Myanmar army raided

several Manipuri rebel bases, rounded up almost 200 rebels, and recov-

ered 1,500 guns. Senior General Than Shwe, during his visit in 2004, had

assured India of action against insurgents operating from Myanmar, and

the Tatmadaw conducted additional operations against them in 2005 and

2006.31The Tatmadaw launched another military offensive against insur-

gent groups in 2007.32In 2008 a Memorandum of Understanding on Intel-

ligence Exchange Cooperation was signed that enables both countries toexchange real-time actionable intelligence to deal effectively with insur-

gents in the border region.33

India has offered, and Myanmar accepted, battlefield training as well as

uniforms for Myanmars armed forces. India also leased a helicopter squad-

ron to the Myanmar military and offered to help maintain its existing Rus-

sian military equipment. Since 2003, joint naval maneuvers and a number

of port calls have been conducted.34Armed forces officers from Myanmar

in various ranks have received training from the Indian military in various

sites over the years.35 Indias Assam Rifles paramilitary force has the dual

role of maintaining internal security in the northeastern states and guarding

the Indo-Myanmar border.36The Indo-Tibetan Border Police also covers the

Myanmar border region as part of its duties.37Both these paramilitary and

police forces work in close cooperation with Myanmar counterparts.

India has supplied military hardware to Myanmar but has limited its

transfers mainly to small arms. Myanmars quartermaster general, Lieuten-

ant General Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo, a member of the State Peace

and Development Council, visited India in April 2007 and presented a shop-ping list for military hardware to the chief of army staff.38Lieutenant General

Tin wanted infantry weapons and ammunition in return for providing help

in flushing out Indian insurgents. Small arms like assault rifles, light machine

guns, and side arms figured prominently on the Myanmar list.

India has extended immense help to Myanmar during natural disasters

and has usually been the first to deliver humanitarian relief. In the aftermath

of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, India launched Operation Sahayata (Opera-

tion Help). Two Indian navy ships and two Indian air force aircraft were dis-patched to aid the cyclone-impacted people of Myanmar.39A large quantity

of aid was provided in the form of medical supplies and emergency rations.


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142 Gurmeet Kanwal

The China Factor

China has been consistently raising its profile in Southeast Asia, including

Myanmar. It has provided substantial economic, military, and political sup-port to Myanmar despite the sanctions imposed by the West. Consequently,

India recognizes that it risks being left behind in economic and trade rela-

tions with Myanmar, especially with respect to the oil and natural gas

resources that have been discovered and are urgently needed, if it does not

engage politically with Myanmar. It is in Indias interest to counterbalance

Chinas growing influence in Myanmar.

China is a major supplier of military hardware to Myanmar. It has pro-

vided jet fighters, armored vehicles, and naval vessels valued at close to US$2billion, using a barter system, as Myanmar has insufficient foreign exchange

resources to pay for these arms. China has also helped the Myanmar authori-

ties to modernize their naval bases at Hanggyi, the Coco Islands, Akyab, and

Mergui. Thanks primarily to Chinas contribution, the Myanmar army is

the second largest in Southeast Asia, after Vietnam's. It has expanded from

180,000 to 450,000 personnel in just a few years.40China has also built an

all-weather road from Kunming in southern China to Mandalay in central

Myanmar. Trade between the two has increased by multiples, so much so

that China is now Myanmars third-largest trading partner (after Thailand

and Singapore).41 Plans have also been formalized for the transportation

of oil and gas through a 1,100-kilometer pipeline from Kyaukphyu port in

Myanmar to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province.42After the comple-

tion and activation of this pipeline, Chinas dependence on the Malacca

Straits will be reduced considerably.

From the Indian perspective, China has gained significant strategic space

in the Indian Ocean region through its close engagement with Myanmar.

There is a lingering belief in India that China will use the opportunity cre-ated by the modernization of naval bases and ports to conduct surveillance

on Indian maritime activities and naval bases in the Bay of Bengal.43From

the Chinese perspective, Myanmars importance cannot be disputed, as

close relations with Myanmar give China access by land to the Indian Ocean,

allowing it to bypass the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits.44

Myanmar has assured India that it is not leasing any bases to China and

has no intention to do so in the future. However, there are persistent reports

that it has already leased the Coco Islands to the Chinese government, whichhas established a maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence sta-

tion there.45China has made no secret of the fact that it would like to keep


29/45


Myanmar closely engaged by means of military and economic coopera-

tion. Such engagement is a natural outcome of its strategy to keep India off

balance and prevent its rise as a competing regional power. In the String of

Pearls encirclement strategy that is part and parcel of Chinas foreign policytoward India, Myanmar is a key pearl. Although the military junta in Myan-

mar is domestically strong, it has been unable to stand up to the overwhelm-

ing influence of China and is only now realizing the full ramifications of its

dependence on China. India views the renewed and steady interest of Myan-

mar in cooperating with India as an attempt to balance Chinese influence.46

The Nuclear Dimension

Recent reports have indicated that Myanmar has nuclear ambitionslike

North Korea, another totalitarian regime. The source of these reports has

been the testimony of two defectors whose identities are not known but

whose knowledge of the internal workings of the Myanmar government

lends considerable credence to their views. (However, the views of these

two defectors have not been independently corroborated.) According to

the defectors, codenamed Moe Jo and Tin Min, although Myanmars inter-

est in a nuclear energy program has been made public, the government has

kept secret its plans to build an underground complex below Naung Laing

mountain in northern Myanmar with possible North Korean help. This site

is close to the civilian research reactor being assembled by Russia.47Photo-

graphs taken of the complex between 2003 and 2006 are reported to show

more than 800 tunnels.48

North Korea is suspected of having passed nuclear technology to Myan-

mar. As the greatest proliferator in the region in the past, China too has come

under suspicion for indirectly encouraging the North Koreans. While rela-

tions between Myanmar and North Korea were disrupted after an attemptby alleged North Korean agents to assassinate South Korean president Chun

Doo-hwan in 1983 during a visit to Myanmar, they were reestablished in

2007.49North Korea was reeling from the effects of a famine in the late 1990s,

while Myanmar was expanding its military arsenal, and thus they were able

to help each other out. North Korean ships have been sighted calling at Yan-

gon, a port popular for unloading military cargo, and the tunnels in question

are said to have been dug with North Korean assistance.

In other words, considerable circumstantial evidence points to Myanmarsnuclear aspirations. However, knowledgeable commentators have stated

that while the international community must maintain a close watch on such


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144 Gurmeet Kanwal

proceedings, reports to the effect that Myanmar is seeking to acquire nuclear

weapons remain unsubstantiated.50Myanmar is a signatory not only to the

1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty but also to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the 1972 Seabed Test Ban Treaty.The government in Myanmar has adhered to all of these treaties at least since

1988.51The reactor supplied by Russia is covered by a safeguards agreement

with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, Myanmar has yet

to comply with the additional protocol imposed on it, which would allow

the agency to carry out surprise inspections of Myanmars nuclear facilities.52

The situation calls for the international community to be on the look-

out. Should evidence merit further action, all measures necessary must be

adopted to prevent the rise of another state with nuclear weapons in theregion. A sobering lesson in this regard can be found in the rumors about

North Korean collusion with Myanmar. If there is any truth in these rumors,

it is at least in part a result of the common situation the two nations find

themselves in: ostracized by the international community and subject to eco-

nomic sanctions imposed by the West.

Conclusion

The Indian government supports national reconciliation and a gradual

return to democracy in Myanmar even as it balances its concerns for human

rights violations with its strategic interests. In the words of an Indian Min-

istry of Defense report, Myanmars adoption of a new Constitution, fol-

lowing a referendum in May 2008, paves the way for elections in 2010. India

desires a stable Myanmar with an inclusive and broad based national recon-

ciliation process, including [engagement with] ethnic groups.53

However, there are many vociferous critics of the Indian governments

Myanmar policy. According to one prominent Indian scholar, Indias standon the Myanmar question is neither spontaneous, nor ethically grounded,

nor even driven by an internal process of policy deliberation. It is impelled

largely by international pressure, spearheaded by the United States. This

does not speak of a proactive approach worthy of an emerging power with

an independentforeign policy orientation.54

There is dissatisfaction in India over Myanmars treatment of the minor-

ity Indian population in the country. The Indian population in Myanmar is

considered an alien minority, despite its origins in migration that occurredduring colonial rule in the late 1800s. Attitudes toward the Indian popu-

lation have traditionally ranged from considering them a backward and


31/45


impoverished community to hatred for the moneylenders who became

influential landlords.55Myanmars citizenship laws deny Indians their right-

ful claim to a position in society and to compensation for property seized

from them under land reforms programs.56Despite the growing tide of dis-enchantment among the Indian diaspora from Myanmar, the Indian gov-

ernment has shown little interest in intervening on their behalf with the

Myanmar junta.57

The Indian government has had to face its share of brickbats for main-

taining the status quo in its relations with Myanmar. It maintained public

silence after the verdict in Aung San Suu Kyis trial was announced in July

2009 sentencing her to three years imprisonment (later commuted to eigh-

teen months of house arrest). The Indian governments position was main-tained despite the fact that several members of ASEAN, though generally dis-

posed to remaining silent on any issues concerning Myanmar, called on the

regime to release Suu Kyi and to hold free and fair elections.58Even China

endorsed UN secretary-general Ban Ki Moons request to meet both the mil-

itary regime and Aung San Suu Kyi in July 2009, although the military regime

rejected the request. Nevertheless, like other democratically ally elected gov-

ernments, the Indian government would like to see an early return to demo-

cratic rule in Myanmar and a substantial improvement in governance.

The economic sanctions imposed by the Western democracies have not

deterred the military regime. It appears from recent developments that there

is a growing realization on the part of the sanctioning authorities that it would

be better to use a mix of policy tools in which sanctions may remain but a

process of dialogue with the people and the military regime is initiated.59The

United States government should consider encouraging the member nations

of ASEAN to promote better governance in Myanmar rather than punishing

both Myanmar and its ASEAN partners for Myanmars continuing member-

ship in the ASEAN community. Sanctions have always been a blunt policyinstrument. A sanctions regime does little but limit the ability of both par-

ties involved to work amicably within the international community to bring

about constructive reform. Incremental adjustments in policy must be made

from time to time. If given some encouragement, the military regime may be

amenable to winding down some of the harsh practices it has used. India has

recently realized that a foreign policy based solely on occupying the moral

high ground on every international issuelike the policy it followed dur-

ing the early decades after its independenceis not a sustainable one nowand that economic and strategic objectives must sometimes override other

objectives. Hence although the Indian government supports democracy as


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146 Gurmeet Kanwal

a system of government in principle, it does not interfere in the internal

affairs of other sovereign nations. While New Delhi is interested in seeing the

political situation in Myanmar normalize, Myanmar is keen to keep its ties

with New Delhi on an even keel to further consolidate its policy of regionalengagement, reduce its growing dependence on China, and counter pressure

from the West in the form of sanctions.

Indias long-term strategic interests may well be better served by a demo-

cratic regime in Myanmar. However, the Indian government must maintain

a pragmatic foreign policy and help build democratic institutions in Myan-

mar in ways that do not embarrass the military junta. Constructive engage-

ment through official and diplomatic channelsnot confrontationis the

key to weaning the military regime away from totalitarian measures. Thestrategic and security interests of India justifiably outweigh the domestic

concerns within India favoring Myanmars return to democracy. The solu-

tion lies not in attempting to export democracy to Myanmar but in trying

to nudge the ruling military regime toward democracy through regional

engagement involving all stakeholders.

Notes

1. Shyam Saran, Present Dimensions of Indian Foreign Policy, in Indian For-

eign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (New

Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), p. 115.

2. See R. Hariharan, Myanmar: Wishing Away Suu Kyi, South Asia Analy-

sis Group, Working Paper 2598, February 22, 2008 (www.southasiaanalysis.org/

papers26/paper2598.html); and Anand Kumar, India-Myanmar Gas Pipeline: With

or Without Bangladesh? South Asia Analysis Group, Working Paper 1474, July 26,

2005 (www.southasiaanalysis.org//papers15/paper1474.html).

3. Relations between the two were further strengthened when Myanmar expressedits support for Indias bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Coun-

cil. See India-Myanmar Joint Statement 2004, The New Light of Myanmar, October

30, 2004 (www.myanmar.gov.mm/NLM-2004/Oct04/enlm/Oct30_h8.html).

4. The main reason for Indias shift was the growing concern and uneasiness

over Myanmars abandonment of its traditional strategic neutrality policy and stra-

tegic tilt toward China. Poon Kim Shee, The Political Economy of China-Myanmar

Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of

International Studies1 (2002): 3353.

5. Jrgen Haacke, Myanmars Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and Interna-tional Implications(New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 37.

6. Zhao Hong, India and China: Rivals or Partners in Southeast Asia? Contem-

porary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (2007): 12143.


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7. Sudha Ramachandran, China Secures Myanmar Energy Route,Asia Times,

April 3, 2009 (www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KD03Df03.html).

8. International Cooperation, inAnnual Report 20082009: Ministry of Home

Affairs, Government of India(New Delhi, 2009), p. 112.9. See Annual Reports: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (New

Delhi, 1999 through 2008).

10. India and ASEAN, India Brand Equity Foundation, June 2009 (www.ibef.

org/artdispview.aspx?in=31&art_id=23397&cat_id=400&page=2).

11. K. Yhome, India-Myanmar Relations (19982008): A Decade of Redefin-

ing Bilateral Ties, Occasional Paper 10 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation,

January 2009).

12. India, Burma Agree to Expand Border Trade, Mizzima, October 17, 2008

(www.mizzima.com/component/content/article/1149-india-burma-agree-to-expand-border-trade.html).

13. International Cooperation, inAnnual Report 20032004: Ministry of Home

Affairs, Government of India(New Delhi, 2004), p. 46.

14. C. S. Kuppuswamy, Indo-Myanmar Relations: A Review, South Asia

Analysis Group, Working Paper 2043, November 30, 2006 (www.southasiaanalysis.

org/%5Cpapers21%5Cpaper2043.html).

15. C. S. Kuppuswamy, Indo-Myanmar Relations: Visit of Senior General Maung

Aye, South Asia Analysis Group, Working Paper 2664, April 9, 2008 (www.southasia

analysis.org/papers27/paper2664.html).16. Kumar, India-Myanmar Gas Pipeline.

17. Sinderpal Singh, Silence Is Golden: Indias Current Position on Myanmar,

Brief 124 (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, August 2009).

18. GAIL Buys 30 pc Stake in Myanmar Oil, Gas Block, Hindu Business Line,

December 9, 2006.

19. Indo-Thai-Myanmar Highway, Times of India, December 24, 2003.

20. Kuppuswamy, Indo-Myanmar Relations: Visit of Senior General Maung

Aye.

21. Indias Neighbours, in Annual Report 20072008: Ministry of ExternalAffairs, Government of India(New Delhi, 2008), p. 10.

22. William Boot, India to Receive All Electricity from Two Hydropower Proj-

ects, Irrawaddy, Septe

Documents

136 Myanmar Burma