Obra v Badua

Facts:1.  The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents against Obra before the RTC. Defendant Obra is the husband of the petitioner now.

Respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot commonly owned by them were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the national highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of petitioner’s property and the southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and Baduas.

Obra constructed a fence on the northern boundary of their property; thus, blocking respondents’ access to the national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused.

Petitioner averred that respondents had not established any easement of right-of-way either by law or agreement.

o Respondents had another access as ingress and egress to the public road other than the one traversing her property.

The RTC dismissed the complaint and held that the respondents “were not able to satisfy all the requisites needed for their claim of an easement of right of way.”

It observed that when petitioner fenced the northern portion of her property, respondents were able to use another pathway as ingress and egress to the highway. It stated further that “the new pathway is more than adequate” for respondents’ use. Thus, the applied easement of right-of-way on the northern portion of petitioner’s property was not allowed.

2. It must be noted that the “new” pathway used by respondents, however, traversed the southern portion of petitioner’s property. 3. Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again restricted the use of respondents’ “new” pathway. 4. Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20, 2001 Order, held that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioner’s representation that she was allowing respondents to use the southern portion of her property as an alternative pathway.

Since the southern portion was an “agreed pathway,” petitioner could not reduce its width; thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking the passage.

 Issue

WON RTC was correct in establishing an easement on petitioner’s property without proper adjudication

Ruling The trial court’s reference to the “new” pathway was merely a

declaration of its existence and not necessarily a creation of an easement of right-of-way.

We agree with petitioner’s postulation. When the RTC dismissed the case in its July 7, 2000 Decision, it

ruled that respondents had no cause of action against petitioner and her husband, Anacleto, because they failed to satisfy one of the four requisites for the entitlement of a right-of-way, namely—that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway.

The trial court took note of the fact that the new pathway which incidentally traversed the southern portion of petitioner’s lot is an adequate outlet to a public highway.

While its body mentioned the existence of an alternative pathway located south of petitioner’s lot, such was made only to emphasize that respondents failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right-of-way. 

No pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and legality of this “new” pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the Court on petitioner’s property.

It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable and unalterable.

The dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033 meant that no easement was ever established on petitioner’s property.

o However, the trial court, by issuing its March 20, 2001 Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that limited respondents’ passage, effectively created a right-of-way on petitioner’s property in favor of

respondents allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement between the parties.

This directive was in contravention of its July 7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void for having been issued outside of the court’s jurisdiction.

The records of Civil Case No. 5033 do not reveal any agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-of-way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon by the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.

More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.

  

Valdez v Tabisula

Facts

Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land.

Contained in the deed of sale is a stipulation that the Sps. Valdez ‘shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale’

Sps. Tabisula then built a concrete wall on the subject property. Sps. Valdez filde a case for specific performance against the

Tabisulas with the RTC. The Sps. Tabisula contended that :

o Sps. Valdez and family also are the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining properties have access to two public roads ; and

o They could not have agreed to providing petitioners an easement “on the western side of their lot” as there exists a two-storey concrete house on their lot where the supposed easement is to be located, which was erected long before the subject property was sold to the Valdez’s

thus, the easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject property and not from theirs.

Issue

WON the Sps. Valdez are entitled to the right of way as provided for in the deed of sale

Ruling

Noo An easement or servitude is “a real right constituted

on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by

virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person.”

o There are two kinds of easements according to source – by law or by the will of the owners.

This case is neithero From the allegations in Sps Valdez’ complaint, it is

clear that what they seek to enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: “they shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.”

The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they “shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale” is not a disposition of real property.

The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is “not included in this sale” could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose.

The use of the word “shall,” which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.

o Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties.

o Sps Valdez are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the following preconditions must be established:

(1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;

(2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner

of the dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point

least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing

rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

o The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein Sps. Valdez.

Since the Sps. Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by the Sps. Tabisula of an easement on the “western side of the Tabisula’s lot.”; it appearing that the Sps. Valdez and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways.

Privatization v Legaspi Facts:

Caruff Development Corporation (now Legaspi Towers 300 Inc) owned several parcels of land along the stretch of Roxas Boulevard, Manila.

Caruff obtained a loan from PNB to finance the construction of a 21 storey condominium

o Secured by real estate mortgage over land on which the condominium was to be erected

In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the mortgaged parcels of land.

Along with the other appurtenances of the building constructed by Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set) and two sump pumps in the adjacent lot

Due to Caruff’s failure to pay the loan, PNB foreclosed the mortgage

In a compromise agreement, Caruff agreed to transfer and convey to the government, through APT, the foreclosed land where it built the generating set and sump pumps

In 1989, respondent filed a case for declaration of existence of an easement

o Alleging that Caruff’s acts of constructing the powerhouse and sump pumps on its property constituted an easement in favor of the respondent

ISSUE/S:Whether or not the construction of a generator set and 2 sump pumps constitutes an easement of the property RULING:

No

o Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. 

o Legaspi claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary easement

However, Legaspi Towers 300 Inc. the owner of the property where the generator set and sump pumps was built is also the same owner of the property where the condominium was constructed.  In fine, the properties are owned by the same person.

o When the owner of two properties alienates one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed.

Compromise agreement provides all titles, free from any and all liens and encumbrances

When the subject property was assigned to the National Government thru the APT, no easement arose or was voluntarily created from the transfer of ownership, considering that the parties, more particularly, Caruff, pledged that it was assigning, transferring, and conveying the subject property in favor of the National Government thru the APT free from any and all liens and encumbrances.

Bicol Agro-Industrial v Obias

Facts BISUDECO constructed a road (the disputed road) measuring

approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site

Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired the assets of BISUDECO

Bicol filed a complaint against respondents for unjustifiably barricading the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioners and the other sugar planters vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner

Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed.

o The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties.

Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECOs assets.

Respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road.

Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under Martial Law.

IssueWON the easement of right of way was acquired by prescription

Ruling No

o The easement of right of way is the privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to pass over another’s land, usually through one particular path or line, is characterized as a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.

o Plaintiff failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was such an agreement between BISUDECO and defendants.

Testimonies that the plaintiffs-appellants presented are mainly hearsay

o Easement was not acquired by virtue of prescription

o Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements.

o Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.

o The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.

o The road in dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the same may be apparent. 

It cannot be acquired by prescription

Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation v. Chung

FACTS

Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of land

o Contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement carried over from the OCT of Encarnacion S. Sandico

o Declaring that Francisco Hidalgo has the right to open doors in the course of his lot and to pass through the land of Encarnacion Sandico, until the bank of the estero that goes to the Pasig River, and towards the right of a Callejon.

o The annotation does not expressly provide that it will be binding to the heirs and assigns of the parties.

The memorandum of encumbrance was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandico’s property until it was acquired by the petitioner.

Hidalgo’s property, on the other hand was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph, Kia and Cleto all surnamed Chung.

Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street which was granted by the trial court but eventually reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES

WON the right of way can be cancelled by the petitioners who owns the servient estate on the ground that that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road

WON the easement is binding only between Hidalgo and Sandico since the annotation did not expressly provide the intention to bind their heirs and assigns. 

RULING

An easement is a real right on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or allow something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. 

These are established either by law (legal easement) or by the will of the owner (voluntary easement).

o Petitioner itself admitted that the existing easement is voluntary.

The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. 

The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. 

This easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. (Art. 631,NCC)

A voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract that is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. 

Salimbongan v Tan

FACTS:

Petitioner Victoria Salimbangon, together with her brothers and sister, inherited the subject property from her father.

They divided the lot into Lot A, B, C, D, and E. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street while D and E

were interior lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs

established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.

Petitioner Victoria became the owner of Lot A and constructed therein a residential house and two garages.

The other portions were sold by petitioner’s co-heirs to the Tans.

o The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area.

o They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a

complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans, while the Tan’s filed an action with the Regional Trial Court for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement among the heirs for the benefit of Lot A has been extinguished.

HELD:

Yes.

o An easement established by agreement of the parties could be extinguished only by mutual agreement.

o However, since the agreement of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the street, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law when the ownership of Lots B, D, and E was consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans.

The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.

Castro vs. Monsod

FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Piñas City

Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner

Respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of petitioner

o The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property

o Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate

RTC said that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of petitioner

Issues WON easement of lateral and subjacent support exists WON it may be annotated at the back of the title of the

servient estate

Held Yes

o The residential house and lot of respondent is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioner’s property; hence, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent

An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support

Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.

Noo Respondent’s assertion that he has an adverse claim

over the 65 sq.m. property of petitioner is misplaced since he does not have a claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Therefore, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary