136297_%28U-FOUO%29 AFNOR

FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ONLY MAY CONTAIN UP TO U/FOUO/LES INFORMATION

CONUS NORAD REGION

HQ 1ST AIR FORCE

AIR FORCES NORTHERN

CONR-1AF (AFNORTH)

FORCE PROTECTION SUMMARY (FPSUM)

49-11

02-08 DECEMBER 2011

UP TO: U//FOUO//LES WARNING: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of

installation personnel, equipment and facilities. The below information was extracted from various reports provided by sources within the Military, Law Enforcement,

Security and Antiterrorism communities. Contained within, information is compiled from open-source intelligence (OSINT)/unclassified information; therefore, information should be treated with due care. This collection of information is offered for informational purposes only and is not to be released either in written or oral

form to the media or the public without prior approval of the originating agency or person. It is not, and should not be construed to be, officially/formally evaluated

intelligence.

USNORTHCOM AOR FPCON STATUS:

USNORTHCOM DIRECTED BASELINE: ALPHA w/BRAVO measures 4, 5, 7, 10, 12 and 16 This condition applies when there is an increased general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel or facilities,

the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON

BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs measures resulting

from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained

indefinitely.

Mexico in FPCON BRAVO as of 091725ZJAN09

TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL:

United States - SIGNIFICANT (DIA, 20 Sep 11)

Definition-Anti-US terrorists are present and attack personnel as their preferred method of operation or a group uses

large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method but has limited operational activity. The operating

environment is neutral. (DOD O-2000.12-H, Feb 2004)

Canada - MODERATE (DIA, 20 Jun 11)

Definition- Terrorists are present but there are no indications of anti-U.S. activity. The Operating Environment

favors the Host Nation/U.S. (DOD O-2000.12-H, Feb 2004)

Mexico - LOW (DIA, 14 May 11)

Definition- No group is detected or the group activity is non-threatening (DOD O-2000.12-H, Feb 2004)

For updates to any USNORTHCOM AOR refer to the SIPR DIA website:

http://ctkb.dia.smil.mil/ctdb/country/ThreatChangeMatrix.jsp

National Terrorism Advisory System The National Terrorism Advisory System, or NTAS, replaces the color-coded Homeland Security

Advisory System (HSAS). This new system will more effectively communicate information about

terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the public, government agencies, first

responders, airports and other transportation hubs, and the private sector.

Imminent Threat Alert

Warns of a credible,

specific, and impending

terrorist threat against the

United States.

Elevated Threat Alert

Warns of a credible

terrorist threat against the

United States.

2 FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ONLY MAY CONTAIN UP TO U/FOUO/LES INFORMATION

(U) Table of Contents

I. USNORTHCOM AOR THREAT INCIDENTS ......................................................................................... 3

A. MEXICO THREATS: .................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1. (U//FOUO) WEEKLY FMSO INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEXICAN TCOs: .......................................................................... 3 2. (U//FOUO) LOS ZETAS LEADER FLEEING DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO ..................................................................... 4 3. (U) RING TRYING TO SMUGGLE IN GADHAFI SON DISMANTLED IN MEXICO .......................................................... 4 4. (U) POLICE CHIEF MURDERED IN COAHUILA ................................................................................................................... 5

B. CANADA REPORTS ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1. (U) CANADA-U.S. BORDER DEALS MERGE SECURITY CONCERNS WITH NEED FOR TRADE ................................ 5

II. DOD FOURTEEN CATEGORIES OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY INCIDENTS .................................. 6

A. ELICITING INFORMATION ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 1. (U//FOUO) MEMBER OF JIHADI FORUM LOOKING FOR BLUE PRINTS FOR THE PENTAGON ................................. 6

B. EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED THREAT ........................................................................................................................................ 6 1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS RESERVE AIRMAN DISPLAYED RADICAL VIEWS POPE AFB ........................................... 6 2. (U//FOUO) US ARMY PFC ADMITTED FOR PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO HIMSELF AND ARMY RESERVISTS NJ ......................................................................................................................................................... 6

C. SURVEILLANCE ........................................................................................................................................................................... 7 1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY AT SHEPPARD AFB ..................................................................... 7 2. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS PHOTOGRAPHY AT THE NEW NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY (NSA) CONSTRUCTION SITE - UT .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 7

III. MISCELLANEOUS FORCE PROTECTION INFORMATION ............................................................ 8

A. LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORIES ....................................................................................................................................... 8 1. (U//FOUO) PLANNED PORT PROTEST ALONG THE UNITED STATES WEST COAST .................................................. 8

B. WORLDWIDE OR TERRORIST TTPS ...................................................................................................................................... 8 1. (U//FOUO) FATHER OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI RELEASES VIDEO .................................................................................... 8 2. (U//FOUO) EXPLOSIVE DEVICE SENT TO BANK CEO GERMANY ............................................................................... 9

C. OTHER THAN DOD SUSPICIOUS INCIDENTS ...................................................................................................................... 9 1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS MALE TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS ALONG AIRPORT FENCE LINE NH ............................... 9 2. (U//FOUO) POSSIBLE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF A VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE IN AUSTIN, TX ........................ 9

D. FP WATCH UPDATES ................................................................................................................................................................ 10 1. (U//FOUO) UPDATE: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY FROM 14 30 NOV AT FORT LEONARD WOOD MO ..................... 10 2. (U//FOUO) MILITARY A GROWING TERRORIST TARGET, LAWMAKERS WARN ..................................................... 10

E. AT/FP PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................... 11 1. (U//FOUO) PERIODIC FORCE PROTECTION BULLETINS ................................................................................................ 11

F. FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION ISSUES .............................................................................................................................. 11 1. (U) TRAVELERS HEALTH..................................................................................................................................................... 11

G. FORCE PROTECTION DIRECTIVES/ADVISORIES RELEASED ..................................................................................... 11 1. (U//FOUO) USNORTHCOM FP ADVISORY 10-341 (2011 HOLIDAY SEASON) ............................................................... 11


H. US GOVERNMENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS/ADVISORIES ........................................................................................... 11 1. (U) US DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRAVEL WARNINGS/ALERTS .................................................................................. 11

I. AFNORTH FP PRIORITIES OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR) .................................................................... 12 1. AFNORTH FORCE PROTECTION PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (FP PIRs) ......................................... 12

J. AFNORTH FP WATCH WEBSITE ACCESS .......................................................................................................................... 14

K. AFNORTH FP WATCH CONTACT INFORMATION ........................................................................................................... 14

I. USNORTHCOM AOR THREAT INCIDENTS

A. MEXICO THREATS:

1. (U//FOUO) WEEKLY FMSO INCIDENTS INVOLVING MEXICAN TCOs:

- AUTHORITIES NARROWLY MISS ARRESTING EL LAZCA AND EL TALIBAN IN

FRESNILLO, ZACATECAS 01 DECEMBER 2011

On 15 November 2011, a joint air/land operation led to the arrest of a Zetas leader known as El

Aleman/El Comandante Aleman in Fresnillo, Zacatecas. Additional information regarding this operation

was reported as follows by the news media source Mundonarco:

It was carried out at a ranch and hotel in Fresnillo, Zacatecas. High ranking Los Zetas operators were

allegedly in the area to celebrate the birthday of El Talibn.

With this operation, authorities had hoped to arrest key Los Zetas operators to include:

o Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano aka El Lazca aka Z-3, a founder and the key

leader of the group

o Ivn Velzquez Caballero aka El Talibn aka El Z-50, the Los Zetas plaza

leader of Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potos, and part of Guanajuato

Just before the operation, El Lazca, El Taliban, and others were reportedly

present for a horse race being conducted as part of the birthday festivities, but

were tipped off about the raid prior to its initiation. This notice provided them

sufficient time to flee the scene and avoid capture.

Eyewitnesses reported to Mundonarco that U.S. agents participated in the operation.

- GUNFIGHT BETWEEN RIVAL GROUPS REPORTED IN CIUDAD JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA

05 DECEMBER 2011

A gunfight between two rival groups took place at the intersection

of Jimenez and Delicias Streets in the 9 de Septiembre

neighborhood of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. A former judicial

police officer was wounded during this confrontation. Recovered

from this crime scene were 50 spent shell casings and a Toyota

pickup without plates.

- REMAINS OF DISMEMBERED VICTIM RECOVERED FROM TRASH CAN IN CIUDAD

JUAREZ, CHIHUAHUA 05 DECEMBER 2011

On 05 December 2011, the chest and severed arms of an unidentified murder victim were recovered from

a trash can in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. The trash can in question was located at the intersection of

Iztaccihuatl and Xolotl Streets in the Del Real neighborhood.


2. (U//FOUO) LOS ZETAS LEADER FLEEING DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

(U//FOUO) The Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison (OIIL) received information from

the DEA indicating Los Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano is preparing to enter the U.S. and

will engage law enforcement if encountered.

(U//FOUO) As of November 16, 2011, leader of the Los Zetas DTO, Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano,

was reportedly preparing to enter the U.S. in order to escape violence occurring in Mexico.

Reportedly, Lazcano will enter the U.S. by crossing the Rio Grande and may hide in Palmview, TX.

Lazcano allegedly will have a security detail and will engage U.S. Law Enforcement if approached.

(U) According to open source reporting, on November 15, 2011, the Mexican military conducted a

major operation to capture Lazcano-Lazcano in Fresnillo, Zacatecas, Mexico, but Lazcano fled prior

to the operation. (See story from FMSO above)

Source: DHS Intelligence Alert 02 Dec 2011

(U//FOUO) CONCLUSION: No additional information regarding specific dates or geographic area

for this threat is currently available. CBP OIIL will continue to monitor for additional information

and provide updates as warranted.

3. (U) RING TRYING TO SMUGGLE IN GADHAFI SON DISMANTLED IN MEXICO

A ring that was trying to smuggle Saadi Gadhafi, the son of late Libyan dictator Col. Moammar

Gadhafi, and his family into Mexico has been dismantled, officials said Wednesday.

Four suspects two Mexicans, a Canadian and a Dane involved in the scheme were arrested

during Operation Guest, Government Secretary Alejandro Poire said.

The suspects were trying to provide 38-year-old Saadi Gadhafi and his family with false Mexican

identification documents. The plan called for the Libyan businessman to acquire properties in

different parts of Mexico and establish his residence in Bahia de Banderas, a Pacific coastal town in

Nayarit state.

The suspects were identified as Cynthia Ann Ranier, a Canadian who is allegedly the gangs leader

and ran its finances; Gabriela Davila Huerta, a Mexican living in the United States who also used the

alias Gabriela Davila del Cueto, served as the logistics link

and contacted the document forgers; and Pierre Christian

Fleisborg, a Danish national who was in charge of logistics. The

fourth suspect was identified as Jose Luis Kennedy Prieto, a

Mexican citizen who was in charge of obtaining the false

documents.

The suspects face forgery, people trafficking, bank fraud and organized crime charges.

Saadi Gadhafi, who was born in 1973, commanded the Libyan Special Forces and is known for his

love of soccer.


An arrest order was issued for Gadhafi by Interpol on Sept. 29 at the request of Libyas National

Transitional Council, which accuses him of taking properties via force or intimidation while serving

as head of the Libyan Soccer Federation.

Source: Borderlandbeat.com

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This information is provided for your situational awareness.

4. (U) POLICE CHIEF MURDERED IN COAHUILA

The police chief of Saltillo, the capital of the northern Mexican

state of Coahuila, and his 11-year-old son were killed by gunmen

while driving, prosecutors said Monday. Almaguer Perez and his

son were driving in their SUV when the gunmen opened fire on

them, the AG's office said.

Source: Borderlandbeat.com


B. CANADA REPORTS

1. (U) CANADA-U.S. BORDER DEALS MERGE SECURITY CONCERNS WITH NEED FOR

TRADE

Prime Minister Stephen Harper is hailing a new set of border

agreements between Canada and the United States as a merger

between security concerns and the need for commerce and travel.

Harper says the deals on perimeter security and regulatory

harmonization represent the most significant steps forward in

Canada-U.S. co-operation since the North American Free Trade

Agreement. In the text of a speech delivered after a meeting with

President Barack Obama in Washington, Harper says the agreements

create a "new, modern border for a new century." The prime minister

says Canada shares U.S. security concerns, but he adds measures to

deal with criminal and terrorist threats can thicken the border and

hinder efforts to create jobs and growth. He calls the border deals

"practical steps to reverse that direction." Both countries agree the best way to deal with trouble is with

smarter systems at the continental perimeter, minimizing multiple inspections of freight and baggage . "We also believe that, just as threats should be stopped at the perimeter, trusted travellers should cross the border

more quickly," Harper said. "Indeed, these priorities are complementary: The key that locks the door against

terrorists also opens a wider gate to cross-border trade and travel." The second joint initiative will reduce

regulatory barriers to trade by streamlining and aligning standards "where it makes sense to do so."

"Naturally, in this area, as in all others, no loss of sovereignty is contemplated by either of our governments,"

Harper said. "Every rule needs a reason," he added, and "where no adequate reason exists for a rule or

standard, and that standard hinders us from doing business on both sides of the border, that rule needs to be

re-examined."

Source: Joint Base Lewis-McChord Protection Daily (07 Dec 2011)



II. DOD FOURTEEN CATEGORIES OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY INCIDENTS

A. ELICITING INFORMATION

Suspicious questioning of personnel by any means about particular DoD structures, functions, personnel, or procedures at the facility or infrastructure.

1. (U//FOUO) MEMBER OF JIHADI FORUM LOOKING FOR BLUE PRINTS FOR THE

PENTAGON

On 6 December 2011, a member of the Shumukh al-Islam, a top tier Al-Queda forum, initiated a discussion

thread he was requesting plans, blue-prints, for the Pentagon. He did not mention why he wanted these plans,

and only four responses have been observed. These responses included a diagram of the Pentagon and another

advised he should do a Google search. The translated request read as follows:

I need plans for the Pentagon building. Peace be upon

you and Allahs mercy and blessings. Proud brothers

and sisters, just as in the title, who can assist me, let

him not be stingy, and his recompense shall be with

Allah. The blue prints are available. I found them then

I lost them, Allah will help. George Edwin is the

building designer. Your brother Laith.

Source: eGuardian FLFCUCFIX-2011-00002

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This message is provided for situational awareness.

B. EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED THREAT

A threat to DoD personnel or threatened damage to or compromise of a DoD facility or infrastructure.

1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS RESERVE AIRMAN DISPLAYED RADICAL VIEWS POPE

AFB

On 4 December 2011, an identified reserve airmen was admitted to Womack Army Medical

Hospital, Ft Bragg; for a mental health evaluation. The airmen stated on an identified social

networking site that he was denouncing his American citizenship to join the Moorish American

Nation. He further posted he converted to Islam, joined the Moorish American Nation, and changed

his name. The airman held a TS/SCI, and it was revealed his brother held more radical views than

he. Upon arriving at Womack the airman shut down and tried to flee. His overnight bag was

subsequently searched and a loaded .40 caliber weapon was discovered.

Source: SKIWEB

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: Individuals with a security clearance acting radically present

a unique challenge to force protection as their access to facilities with increased security measures

routinely goes unfettered. Members are reminded to report suspicious activity to appropriate

authorities. This matter is currently under investigation.

2. (U//FOUO) US ARMY PFC ADMITTED FOR PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AS A

POSSIBLE THREAT TO HIMSELF AND ARMY RESERVISTS NJ

On 22 November 2011, an identified US Army PFC was admitted to Lourdes Medical Center for

psychiatric evaluation. While training at Ft. Dix, NJ this individual told other soldiers he wanted to

shoot himself. During the evaluation he told the social worker since he was 14 he had the urge to


shoot others. He also said he wanted to kill all of his fellow reserve soldiers.

Source: eGuardian NJFBINK00-2011-00269

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: Ft Dix is a joint base with McGuire AFB. Numerous Air Force

personnel routinely find themselves working/training on Ft Dix. Although there was no direct threat

to Air Force personnel awareness must be given due to the proximity of this threat.

C. SURVEILLANCE

Monitoring the activity of DoD personnel, facilities, processes, or systems, including showing unusual interest in a facility, infrastructure, or personnel (e.g.,

observation through binoculars, taking notes, drawing maps or diagrams of the facility, and taking pictures or video of a facility, infrastructure, personnel, or the

surrounding environment) under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to perceive a threat to DoD personnel, facilities, or forces in transit.

1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY AT SHEPPARD AFB

On 7 November 2011, two AF police officers witnessed an unidentified individual pacing in front of

a dining facility frequented by numerous military personnel and he appeared to have something

concealed under his clothing. This individual was described as possibly Middle Eastern. Security

Forces personnel responded but were unable to locate the individual. Approximately one week later,

witnesses reported an unidentified male, matching the same description as the individual mentioned

above, examining two water fountains at Sheppard AFB.

Source: eGuardian TXAFXSAFB-2011-00001

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This unusual behavior appears to be the same person and

stood out to numerous witnesses as suspicious. It is unknown if his actions are surveillance or simply

happenstance. Members are reminded suspicious activity such as this should be reported to the

proper authorities.

2. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS PHOTOGRAPHY AT THE NEW NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY

(NSA) CONSTRUCTION SITE - UT

On 10 November 2011, a dark grey pick-up truck was observed parked on the shoulder. Out of the

drivers side window a large zoom lens was observed pointed in the direction of Camp Williams and

the new NSA server facility construction site. This vehicle was observed a second time in a different

location taking additional photos.

Source: eGuardian UTFCUSIAC-2011-00006



III. MISCELLANEOUS FORCE PROTECTION INFORMATION

A. LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORIES

1. (U//FOUO) PLANNED PORT PROTEST ALONG THE UNITED STATES WEST COAST

According to their official website, on 12 December 2011,

participants of the Occupy Movement intend to interrupt commercial

port operations in Anchorage, AK; Seattle, WA; Tacoma, WA;

Portland, OR; Longview, CA; Oakland, CA; Port Hueneme, CA; Los

Angeles/Long Beach, CA; and San Diego, CA. Sympathizers of this

West Coast Port Blockade seek to disrupt commerce at various

West Coast commercial ports in order to emphasize principles

supported by the Occupy Wall Street Movement.

Source: DTS-036-340-2011

MTAC COMMENTS: Based on fleet and NCIS field component liaison, as

well as open source research, MTAC is unaware of any current information

indicating protestors aim to target military installations, operations or

personnel. While the recent Occupy Oakland protest, held on 2 November

2011, demonstrates the possibility of heightened civil disturbance, MTAC is

not aware of any information to suggest that protestors aim to use violence

against individuals leaving or entering the identified ports. MTAC advises DON personnel to remain alert to

the possibility of civil disturbances that may lead to conflict between protestors and law enforcement and to

avoid these areas. MTAC remains engaged with other law enforcement agencies regarding this situation and

will pass relevant information as it becomes available.

B. WORLDWIDE OR TERRORIST TTPS

1. (U//FOUO) FATHER OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI RELEASES VIDEO

In an English-language video, college professor and former Fulbright Scholar, Nasser al-Aulaqi

condemned the death of his son in a US missile strike on 30 September 2011, and called on Western

Muslims to continue his son's jihadist teachings. The video was posted on YouTube on 2 December

2011, and was played at a London protest condemning US drone strikes in Muslim countries;

according to open source media, the video had only been viewed ten times online as of 4 December

2011. In the video Nasser reiterates there was no evidence presented against his son and that "no one

was concerned with justice"; he also claims the death of his grandson, Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, was

"murder by a state gone mad," claiming that he was not operationally involved in terrorism.

Source: NGB J34 and New York Daily News (http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/dad-u-s-

terrorist-anwar-al-awlaki-son-blood-vain-article-1.986595#ixzz1fg1UCGL8)

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: The authenticity of this video is unknown at this time. Despite

this, the death of Al-Awlaki and this video have the potential to influence lone-wolf attackers within

the United States. On Friday, U.S. Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano said the risk of

"lone wolf" attackers, with no ties to known extremist networks or grand conspiracies, is on the rise

as the global terrorist threat has shifted. Lone-wolf attackers may need only an influential push to

move them to act.


2. (U//FOUO) EXPLOSIVE DEVICE SENT TO BANK CEO GERMANY

A report of a confirmed mail (package) explosive device was

addressed and sent to CEO, Dr. Joseph Ackermann of Deutsche Bank

in Frankfurt, Germany. The package was detected by x-ray

technology inside the mail room. The package did not detonate. An

investigation is ongoing.

Source: NYPD Shield

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: Suspicious packages remain a constant concern as a force

protection issue to Air Force members and facilities. Members are reminded if they receive a

package they deem suspicious they should notify the proper authorities.

C. OTHER THAN DOD SUSPICIOUS INCIDENTS

1. (U//FOUO) SUSPICIOUS MALE TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS ALONG AIRPORT FENCE

LINE NH

On 28 November 2011, a suspicious individual was identified taking photographs along an airport

fence line in Londonderry, NH. Police officers questioned the man, but he denied taking

photographs. They searched his cell phone with his permission and found a single, blurry photograph

of a Southwest Airlines plane. The individual explained he was off of work and was out sightseeing.

Source: eGuardian MAFBIBS00-2011-00168

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: This incident by itself seems rather innocent; however, a

similar incident reported in March, involved three individuals of the same nationality, same last

name, all living in the same area, which makes this particular incident more suspicious in nature.

2. (U//FOUO) POSSIBLE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF A VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE IN

AUSTIN, TX

On 17 November 2011, a contract security officer at the

Veterans Affairs Finance Service Center observed a vehicle

stopped on the east end of the facility. The individual inside

appeared to utilize a video camera. When the officer asked

whether the individual was waiting on someone the individual

stated no and indicated he was waiting for a friend from

another building. The individual would not look at the officer

and did not answer who he was waiting on. The officer called

another officer over and as the second officer approached the individual made a U-turn and drove

off.

Source: eGuardian TXFBISA00-2011-00041



D. FP WATCH UPDATES

1. (U//FOUO) UPDATE: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY FROM 14 30 NOV AT FORT LEONARD

WOOD MO

The Threat Working Group Intelligence Fusion Cell released a Suspicious Activity Summary

highlighting three similar attempts to gain access to the Fort Leonard Wood installation. The

following is a recap on each of these incidents:

1. On 14 Nov 2011, two middle-eastern males entered the Visitor Control Center (VCC) and

requested information and directions to the Main PX, claiming they were interested in selling

trinkets at the PX. After asking questions they departed in a silver 4-door vehicle.

2. On 27 Nov 2011, two middle-eastern males entered the West Gate Visitor Center. The men

requested information and directions to the Main PX claiming they heard it was good place

to eat. They were instructed to pull their vehicle into the inspection point. The two departed

and attempted to access in two vehicles (white 4-door & blue 4-door). Each occupied by 4

individuals. Instructed to depart the installation after MOBILISA was unable to verify

identity of all occupants.

3. On 30 Nov 2011, two middle-eastern males attempted to access FLW via the North Gate.

They were directed to the Inspection Lane where their IDs were verified through NCIC. One

individual presented a Valid MO DL, the other a MO Temp DL and Tulsa OK School ID.

After the verification the individuals departed the Inspection Lane, NFI.

Source: USNORTHCOM J34 LETIC

INTELLIGENCE FUSION CELL COMMENT: Three incidents in 3-weeks of suspicious activity

involving individuals attempting to gather information regarding the base, requirements for access,

and the post shopping area (PX). In each incident access was denied, with the last access granted

and individuals allow to proceed. It is unknown what activity occurred after obtaining access.

2. (U//FOUO) MILITARY A GROWING TERRORIST TARGET, LAWMAKERS WARN

There is growing evidence that homegrown terrorists see military personnel

and bases as legitimate, high-value targets, lawmakers said ahead of a joint

session of the House and Senate Homeland Security Committees on

Wednesday. "People in uniform are symbols of the United States. They're

symbols of America power, symbols of America might," Rep. Peter King of

New York, the Republican chairman of the House Homeland Security

Committee, told Fox News. "And if they (military personnel) can be killed,

then that is a great propaganda victory for Al Qaeda." King said there is also

evidence that extremists have joined the services. "There is a serious threat

within the military from people who have enlisted who are radical jihadists," King stated. "The

Defense Department is very concerned about them. They feel they're a threat to the military both for

what they can do within the military itself and also because of the weapons skills they acquire while

they're in the military."

Source: DHS Terrorism Report

Peter King (R-NY)


AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENTS: Within the last week Pope AFB saw the threat of an airman

with radical views. This threat was deterred by fellow airman remaining observant and alerting law

enforcement personnel. Fort Hood has also seen the horrific tragedy a lone-wolf soldier with radical

views can have. It is imperative we remain aware of these threats and report suspicious activity to

the appropriate authorities.

E. AT/FP PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

1. (U//FOUO) PERIODIC FORCE PROTECTION BULLETINS

Recently Added to the AFNORTH FP WATCH PORTAL HOMEPAGE

Classification and Title Source

1. (U//FOUO) Behavioral Indicators Offer Insights for Spotting Extremists National Counterterrorism Center

2. (U//FOUO//LES) Texas Gang Threat Assessment Texas Department of Public Safety

3. (U//FOUO) Terrorist Tactics Against US Government Facilities DHS-FBI Roll Call Release

4. (U//FOUO) Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities US House of Representatives

See below headline AFNORTH ATFP WEBSITE ACCESS instructions to view these bulletins

F. FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION ISSUES

1. (U) TRAVELERS HEALTH

Air Force Public Health offers information to assist DOD travelers--active duty, reserve, guard, and

family members--and their healthcare providers decide which vaccines, medications, and other

actions are necessary to prevent illness during international travel--official or leisure. Contact the

Public Health office at your nearest AF Base for assistance before you go. (Public Health is part of

the base Medical Group.)

G. FORCE PROTECTION DIRECTIVES/ADVISORIES RELEASED

1. (U//FOUO) USNORTHCOM FP ADVISORY 10-341 (2011 HOLIDAY SEASON)

- Click on the link to see this and other USNORTHCOM Messages (registration will be required)

Source: USNORTHCOM/J34

AFNORTH FP WATCH COMMENT: USNORTHCOM is publishing this Force Protection Advisory

to raise awareness to potential attacks against DOD personnel and facilities during the 2011 holiday

season.

H. US GOVERNMENT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS/ADVISORIES

1. (U) US DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRAVEL WARNINGS/ALERTS

The Department of State Travel Warnings/Alerts is updated frequently and should

be monitored at least weekly for troops deploying and on leave. Copy and paste the

URL below into your web browser for further details regarding current travel alerts.

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/pa/pa_1766.html

USNORTHCOM AOR Location Mexico: 04/22/2011 Travel Alert


I. AFNORTH FP PRIORITIES OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR)

1. AFNORTH FORCE PROTECTION PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (FP PIRs)

In order to focus collection and analysis efforts AFNORTH developed FP PIRs to drive information

collections across the USNORTHCOM AOR. We are actively seeking the reporting of these requirements to

the FP Watch for the purpose of analysis and sharing. DODI 2000.26 states Those responsible for protecting

DoD resources must have timely access to properly acquired FP threat information, particularly information

that indicates a potential threat regarding those who want to attack the U.S., their plans, capabilities and

activities, and the targets that they intend to attack. We are listing the AFNORTH FP PIRs below to socialize

them in order to increase reporting. They are also available on our SharePoint website at the hyperlink above.

1. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 1 - (Attack): Are there indications of a possible or actual attack within the USNORTHCOM Area of

Responsibility (AOR) Area of Operation (AO) effecting DOD and/or Air Force (AF) personnel or assets from any entity group or

individual?

1.1. (U//FOUO) Are there indications of a possible or actual attack involving an individual/group actively engaged in killing or

attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area? What tactics are being used, how many attackers are there,

weaponry, hostages, multiple targets, and are they mobile?

1.2. (U//FOUO) Does a threat exist from a known or suspected transnational or domestic terrorist group(s); organized criminal

enterprises; transnational criminal organizations (TCO); foreign intelligence services (FIS); sympathizers or individuals

(Lone Wolf) against DOD/AF personnel, families, resources, and/or infrastructures?

1.3. (U//FOUO) What tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) might these groups use (i.e., eliciting information; test or

attempting restricted area access; hoax threats; remote/local surveillance; loss or theft of uniforms/equipment/materials; theft

or acquisition of resource/material)?

1.4. (U//FOUO) What capabilities/weapons do these groups possess for deployment of an attack against USNORTHCOMs

AOR (i.e., Weapons of Mass Destruction; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE);

environmental destruction; or Man-Portable Air Defense System)?

1.5. (U//FOUO) Has there been any theft or wrongful appropriation of CBRNE agents, munitions parts, precursors, or specialized

equipment used in handling/processing CBRNE material within the USNORTHCOM AOR or the vicinity of an DOD

asset/location?

1.6. (U//FOUO) Are there indications of recruitment, training, weapons acquisition or assembly/fundraising by these groups

inside the US or overseas with the intent to transit capability into the US (i.e., suspicious attempts to gain employment at

critical facilities/security units/outside vendors with access to critical DOD/AF facilities; attempts to recruit insiders to

support/advance criminal activities planning or execution; information that identifies plans for deception, diversionary

tactics, or planned security breaches)?

2. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 2 - (Leadership): Are there known information, threats, and/or plans which could precede an attempt to

harm, kidnap, or impede any other personal security to the President of the United States (POTUS), or other senior officials

whose security is supported by AF personnel, or COCOM Commander, or any other high risk personnel (HRP) residing

in/transiting the USNORTHCOM AOR?

3. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 3 - (POL-MIL): Has any other incident/event occurred in the US, or allied nation/nation of interest that

could be of immediate concern to USNORTHCOM AOR based on its nature, gravity, potential for adverse political/military

publicity or potential consequences (i.e., assassination/attempt, deployment of forces into/near the areas of conflict)?

4. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 4 - (FPCON Change): Has a Force Protection Condition (FPCON) change notification (raising or

lowering) been received within the USNORTHCOM AOR?


4.1. (U//FOUO) Has there been a change in USNORTHCOM FPCON baseline or has an USAF directed Force Protection

Condition Alerting Message (FPCAM) been received (this includes any additional measures other than RAMS)?

4.2. (U//FOUO) Has there been a change in FPCON at any MAJCOM or Installation?

5. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 5 - (Criminal Activity): Has criminal activity in a crisis area exceeded the capabilities of local law

enforcement within the USNORTHCOM AOR?

5.1. (U//FOUO) Is there an off-installation riot, sabotage, illegal/serious disturbance, demonstration, or disruption effort targeted

at DOD/AF and in a manner that directly threatens personnel, facilities, property, or missions?

5.1.1. (U//FOUO) Are there any illegal direct threats or injury to DOD/AF personnel, facilities or property that occur

during what began as a legally-sanctioned off-installation demonstration?

5.1.2. (U//FOUO) Have there been any indications of conspiracy or conduct of illegal acts against DOD/AF (i.e.,

blocking DOD/AF convoys)?

5.2. (U//FOUO) Are there any agenda-driven activities, or hate crimes, directed against DOD personnel, infrastructure, resources,

or critical information systems with the intent of degrading or disrupting the DOD/AF mission?

5.3. (U//FOUO) Have there been any thefts or losses associated with a DOD/AF facility or infrastructure (i.e., badges, uniforms,

identification cards, emergency vehicles, technology or documents) that are proprietary to the facility?

5.3.1. (U//FOUO) Have there been instances of misusing or presenting false insignia, documents or identification, or

engaging in any other activity to misrepresent ones affiliation?

5.4. (U//FOUO) Has there been any theft of military arms, ammunition or explosives (AA&E) that have not been rendered inert

(i.e., missile, rocket, mine, mortar, artillery shell, automatic-fire weapon, fragmentation, concussion, phosphorous, high-

explosive grenade, other explosives, detonation cord, and/or blasting caps), and actual or attempted break-ins of weapons

rooms or storage areas?

5.5. (U//FOUO) Has there been a bomb/explosive incident(s) resulting in death or injury to DOD/AF personnel/property, that is

suspected or determined not to be an accident?

5.6. (U//FOUO) Has there been any reported association or communication of a DOD/AF affiliated person in support of a

terrorist, extremist, supremacist, gang, or organized criminal organization?

5.7. (U//FOUO) Are there any incidents or reports of an individual or group missing (i.e., unusual short absences of government

employees and/or foreign national student absences without leave) that may have the intent or capability to harm AF

personnel/resources?

6. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 6 - (Cyber): Were DOD/AF information systems affected by an attempted or unauthorized entry from an

external or internal threat within the USNORTHCOM AOR?

6.1. (U//FOUO) Were DOD/AF systems destroyed or stolen by an unauthorized individual or organization (i.e., cyber attacks;

loss and/or serious disruption of essential communications)?

6.2. (U//FOUO) Are there potential threats to DOD/AF government computer and/or communication networks (i.e., leaks in

classified information that could compromise mission/operation and cause loss of life; access to encrypted communication

radios)?

7. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 7 - (Disaster): Are there potential threats to DOD/AF personnel or equipment during natural disasters,

man-made disasters, or other events causing loss of life and large scale evacuations, potentially requiring support from DOD/AF

within the USNORTHCOM AOR?


7.1. (U//FOUO) What environmental incidents (earthquakes; tsunamis; tidal waves; wild fires; hurricanes; typhoons; cyclones;

floods; avalanches; tornados; etc.) could affect USNORTHCOM AOR and to what extent and timing?

7.2. (U//FOUO) What local, state, and federal infrastructure damage exists potentially degrading the capabilities of first

responders in the USNORTHCOM AOR?

7.3. (U//FOUO) What conditions of major lines of communication, airports, coastal navigation, interstate highways,

energy/power networks, and railroads impact AFNORTH personnel or assets (leased facilities; critical infrastructure;

transiting forces; etc.)?

8. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 8 - (Medical Threats): Are there any potential medical threats to the USNORTHCOM AOR?

8.1. (U//FOUO) Does the potential for a pandemic event exist within the USNORTHCOM AOR that could affect DOD/AF

operations?

8.2. (U//FOUO) Are there indicators that a group or individual is attempting to secure biological weapons or samples for the

purpose of targeting DOD/AF personnel within the USNORTHCOM AOR?

9. (U//FOUO) FP PIR 9 - (Mexico\Canada): What are the current threats and environment in neighboring countries that could

affect DOD/AF personnel and assets within USNORTHCOM AOR (continental US (lower 48), Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Puerto

Rico, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, St. Pierre & Miquelon, Turks & Caicos, and US Virgin Islands)?

9.1. (U//FOUO) Are there indications of targeting, surveillance, or information collection on DOD/AF personnel and/or assets?

9.2. (U//FOUO) Are areas experiencing emergent or increased violence and/or criminal activity from criminal organizations

where DOD/AF personnel may be operating?

9.3. (U//FOUO) Is there anti-US sentiment in the area that may harass or harm personnel?

References:

USNORTHOM J34 Law Enforcement Threat Information Requirements (LETIR)

CDRCONR-1AF (AFNORTH) Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

J. AFNORTH FP WATCH WEBSITE ACCESS

The FPSUM, as well as plans and information sharing products, is posted to the CONR - 1st AF (AFNORTH) FP WATCH website. This

site allows more information to be posted within and aside from the FPSUMs, which have been sent via E-mail in the past. Access will be

granted to those needing access via a registration process, as the FP WATCHpage must be entered through the NORAD-NORTHCOM

Portal. A formal Request for Information (RFI) process is available on the website for MAJCOM ATOs to inquire about AT/FP related

issues.

To register for access, please follow the instructions detailed at the following URL:

Once registration completed and access granted, the direct link to the AFNORTH FP WATCH webpage is:

https://operations.noradnorthcom.mil/sites/afnorth/Directorates/A7/Force%20Protection/AT-FP/default.aspx.

SIPR http://conr.tyndall.af.smil.mil/directorates/a7/antiterrorism/default.aspx

NOTE: No registration required for SIPR access

K. AFNORTH FP WATCH CONTACT INFORMATION

1AF (AFNORTH)/A7SA

Security Forces & Force Protection Division

AFNORTH FP WATCH


1214 Beacon Beach Road

Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5545

DSN: 523-5678/5832

Comm: 850-283-5678/5832

NIPRNet: [email protected]

SIPRNet: [email protected]

RELCAN: [email protected]

JWICS: [email protected]

Documents

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