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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

STATEMENT

OF

FACTS 4

ANALYSIS

6

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SHOULD

BE GRANTED

EXPEDITIOUSLY BECAUSE THE LAW IS SETTLED;

AND NO AMOUNT OF

DISCOVERY

OR FUTURE

PROCEEDINGS CAN ALTER OR AMPLIFY ON

THE

MATERIAL FACTS OR CONTROLLING LAW 6

A. Summary Judgment is Appropriate under the

Circumstances at Bar 6

B. Given the Ninth Circuit's Controlling Precedent

in Latta v. Otter,Summary Judgment Should be

Granted Expeditiously and Without Delay 7

II . WHILE MOST O F G U A M S MARRIAGE LAWS A R E

PURPORTEDLY

GENDER-NEUTRAL,

TOGETHER

THEY

IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICT MARRIAGE

LICENSES TO

OPPOSITE-SEX APPLICANTS

13

A.

Guam s

Marriage Eligibility Laws are Ostensibly

Gender-Neutral 13

B. The

Office o f Vita l S ta ti s ti cs

Statute

Defines

Marriage as for Persons of Opposite-Sex 14

C. Similar Marriage License Bans have been Struck

Down to the Extent they have been Applied in a

Discriminatory Manner 15

D.

DPHSS s

Application

of

Guam's Marriage Licensing

Laws in a Discriminatory Fashion Violates the

Constitution's Guarantee

of

Equal Protection 17

III. G U A M S

B A N ON MARR IAGES F O R S A M E- SE X

COUPLES DOES N O T SURVIVE HEIGHTENED

EQUAL PROTECTION

SCRUTINY

UNDER

CONTROLLING CIRCUIT PRECEDENT 19

i

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IV. G U A M S B A N

ON MARRIAGES F O R

SAME-SEX

COUPLES UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

VIOLATES

PLAINTIFFS FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT TO MARRY 23

CONCLUS ION

25

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Campaign for S. Equal, v. Bryant.

_ F. Supp. 3d

_

2014 WL 6680570 (S.D. Miss. 2014) 2

Condon v.

Halev.

2014 WL 5897175

10,12

Condon v. Halev.

21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014) 2,11

Country Classic Dairies, Inc. v. State ofMontana, Dep't

of

Commerce Milk Control Bureau.

847 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1988) 17

De

Leon

v. Perry.

975 F Supp. 2d632 W.D. Tex.

2014

2

DeBoer v.

Snyder.

772 F.3d 388 6th Cir 2014 2

Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross

and

Blue Shield,

600 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1990) 11

First Nat l Bank v.

Cities

Servs . Co..

391 U.S. 253 (1968) 7

Freeman v. City o f Santa Ana .

68 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) 18

Geieer v. Kitzhaber.

994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014) 2

General Synod o f t he Unit ed Church o f Christ v. Resinger.

12 F. Supp. 3d 790 (W.D.N.C. 2014) 2

Gray

v.

Orr,

4 F. Supp. 3d 984 (N.D.

111.

2013) 2

Griego v.

Oliver.

316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) 16

Guam v. Guerrero.

290 F.3d

1210

(9th

Cir.

2002)

17,23

Guzzo v. Mead.

No. 14-cv-200,2014 WL 5317797 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17,2014) 2, 11,12

IV


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Majors v. Home.

14F. Supp. 3d 1313(D.Ariz. 2014)

passim

Marie

v . Mose r.

_ F .

Supp.

3 d _

2014 WL 5598128 (D. Kan. 2014) 2, 12, 15

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574(1986) 7

McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp..

81

lF.2d

1336 (9th Cir. 1987) 7

McGee v. Cole.

_ F. Supp. 3d _ 2014 WL 5802665 (S.D. W. Va. 2014) 2

McGee

v.

Cole.

2014 WL 5802665 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 7,2014) 11

Obergefell v. Hodges,

_ S. Ct.

_

2015 WL 213646 (2015) 2

Obergefell v. Wvmyslo.

962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev don other grounds sub nom.

DeBoer. 772 F.3d 388, cert, granted,Obergefell. 2015 WL 213646 2

Ogawa v. U.S. Explore Study. Inc..

CIVIL CASE No. 11-00002,2013 WL 2256220 (D. Guam May 20, 2013) 7

Rainey v. Bostic.

135S.Ct.286(2014)

2

Rolando v. Fox,

23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014) 2, 8,10,22

Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard .

_ F . Supp. 3 d _ 2015 WL 144567 (D.S.D. 2015) 2

Searcy v. Strange.

No. 14-cv-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015) 2

Sevcik

v.

Sandoval,

911

F.Supp.2d996(D.Nev.2012)

20

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs.

740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014),

reh g en banc denied,

vi


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759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014)

18,20,22

Tanco

v.

Haslam.

_ S.Ct._, 2015. WL 213648 (2015) 2

Tanco

v. Haslam.

7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn.),

rev dsub

nom. DeBoer.

772 F.3d 388, cert, grantedsub nom.Tanco v. Haslam,

_ S. Ct.

_

2015. WL 213648 (2015) 2

Turner v. Safley.

482 U.S.

78(1987)

24

U.S. v.

Windsor,

U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013)

20,21,22

United States v. Spedalieri.

910 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1990) 8

Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702 (1997) 23

Whitewood

v. Wolf.

992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014) 2

Wolf

v.Walker.

986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis.),

affdsub

nom.

Baskin.

766 F. 3d 648 (7th Cir.),

cert, denied sub

nom. Walker v. Wolf.

135 U.S. 316 (2014) 2

Zablocki v. Redhail.

434 U.S.

374

(1978) 24

STATUTES

PAGE(S)

10

GCA

§ 3207(h) 14

19 GCA § 3101 13

19

GCA

§ 3202(a)(8) 14

19

GCA

§ 3202(b) 14


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O T H E R

AUTHORITIES

PAGE(S)

Fed. R.

Civ.

P.

56

4 6 7

Kansas Stat. Ann. § 23 101 15

NMSA

1978, Section 40-1-1 (1862-63) 15

l ll


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Plaintiffs Loretta M. Pangelinan and Kathleen M. Aguero submit this memorandum

of

points and authorities in support their motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs request that

t hi s Cour t d ec la re

unconstitutional

under the United States Const it u ti on and

Guam s

Bill o f

Rights Guam's marriage laws, namely 10 G.C.A. § 3207(h), and any other sources

of

Guam

law to the extent that they preclude same-sex couples from marriage or refuse to recognize their

lawful marriages (hereinafter the Marriage Ban ), and enjoin Defendants and their officers,

employees, and agents from enforcing them.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs only seek to enjoy the same Constitutional right to marry and equal protection

of the laws that every other person in Guam—indeed, every other person within the Ninth

Circuit—already enjoys. They have enjoyed a committed, loving relationship for over nine

years. From the beginning, they have been committed to wed each other, but have not done so

because they were not sure the Guam authorities would allow them to marry. Now they know.

Despite binding and clear federal precedent proscribing the denial

of

marriage to same-sex

couples, Defendants—Guam public officials—refused to accept Plaintiffs' Guam Marriage

License Application, based on a facially discriminatory statute similar to those that have failed

to withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses

of

the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution in nearly every jurisdiction where such laws have

been challenged.

Fortunately, however, this honorable Court may make quick work

of

the instant action

because Plaintiffs' civil rights action only seeks to enforce the clear and unequivocal law in the

Ninth Circuit that government officials must allow same-sex couples the freedom to marry.

The near-unanimous pronouncement

of

scores

of

federal district and appellate courts across the

1


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United States that state laws precluding same-sex couples from marriage or refusing to

recognize their lawful marriages violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal

protection has occurred swiftly across this country and has settled the manner within this

Circuit.1

As a result, numerous courts

have

comprehensively

rejected

all of the purported

justifications for the denial ofmarriage licenses to same-sex couples.

1 See, e.g., Latta v.

Otter.

771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014);

Baskin

v.

Boean.

766

F.3d

648 (7th Cir.),

cert, denied,

135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir.),

cert, denied,

135 S. Ct.

308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith. 760 F.3d 1070(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen v.

Herbert. 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Searcy v. Strange. No. 14-cv-

0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015); Rosenbrahn v. Daueaard. _ F. Supp. 3d _ 2015 WL 144567

(D.S.D. 2015); Jernigan v. Crane. _ F. Supp. 3d , 2014 WL 6685391 (E.D. Ark. 2014); Campaign

for S. Equal, v. Bryant. _ F. Supp. 3d _^ 2014 WL 6680570 (S.D. Miss. 2014); Rolando v. Fox. 23 F.

Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014); Bradacs v. Halev._ F. Supp. 3d _ 2014 WL 6473727 (D.S.C. 2014);

Condon v. Halev. 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014); McGee v. Cole. _ F. Supp. 3d _ 2014 WL

5802665 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); Lawson v. Kelly. F. Supp. 3d _ 2014 WL 5810215 (W.D. Mo. 2014);

Marie v. Moser. _ F. Supp. 3d _ 2014 WL 5598128 (D. Kan. 2014); Guzzo v. Mead. No. 14-cv-200,

2014 WL 5317797 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014); Hambv v. Parnell. _ F. Supp. 3d _ 2014 WL 5089399

(D. Alaska 2014); General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger. 12 F. Supp. 3d 790

(W.D.N.C. 2014); Majors v. Home. 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313 (D. Ariz. 2014); Brenner v. Scott. 999 F. Supp.

2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Bowling v. Pence. _ F. Supp. 2d _ 2014 WL 4104814 (S.D. Ind. 2014);

Burns v. Hickenlooper. No. 14-cv-1817, 2014 WL 3634834 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014); Love v. Beshear.

989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky.), rev dsub nom. DeBoer v. Snvder. 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert.

grantedsub nom. Bourke v. Beshear. _ S. Ct. , 2015 WL 213651 (2015); Whitewood v. Wolf. 992

F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Baskinv. Boean. 12F. Supp. 3d 1144 (S.D. Ind.), aff d, 766 F.3d 648

(7th Cir.),

cert, denied,

135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Wolf v. Walker. 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis.),

aff d

sub nom.

Baskin. 766 F. 3d 648 (7th Cir.),

cert, deniedsub nom.

Walker v. Wolf. 135 U.S. 316 (2014);

Geigerv.Kitzhaber. 994 F. Supp. 2dl 128(D. Or. 2014); Latta v. Otter. 19F. Supp. 3d 1054(D. Idaho),

affd, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Himes. 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (S.D. Ohio), rev dsub nom.

DeBoer. 772 F.3d 388, cert,

granted sub

nom. Obergefell v. Hodges. _ S. Ct. _ 2015 WL 213646

(2015); DeBoer v. Snvder. 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014),

rev d,

772 F.3d 388,

cert, granted,

_ S. Ct.

_

2015 WL 213650 (2015); Bourkev. Beshear. 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev d

sub

nom. DeBoer. 772 F.3d 388,

cert, granted,

Bourke v. Beshear. _ S. Ct. _ 2015 WL 213651

(2015); Tanco v. Haslam. 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn.), rev dsub nom. DeBoer. 772 F.3d 388, cert,

granted sub nom.

Tanco v. Haslam. _ S. Ct. _ 2015. WL 213648 (2015); De Leon v. Perry. 975 F.

Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey. 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va.), affd sub

nom.

Bostic. 760 F.3d 352,

cert, denied sub nom.

Rainey v. Bostic . 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014); Bishop v. United

States ex rel. Holder. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla.), aff d sub nom.Bishop. 760 F.3d 1070, cert.

denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Obergefell v. Wvmvslo. 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev d on

othergroundssub

nom. DeBoer. 772 F.3d 388, cert,

granted,

Obergefell. 2015 WL 213646; Kitchen v.

Herbert.

96IF.

Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013),

aff d,

755 F.3d 1193,

cert, denied,

135 S. Ct. 265 (2014);

Lee v. Orr. No. 13-cv-8719, 2013 WL 6490577 (N.D. III. Dec. 10, 2013); Gray v. Orr. 4 F. Supp. 3d

984 (N.D. 111.2013).

2


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WhileDefendantsmaydisagreewith the avalancheof federal court decisions ruling that

states may not, consistent with constitutional guarantees of liberty and equal protection,

prohibit same-sex couples and their families from the privileges and protections of marriage,

they may not disregard the rule of law. The legal issue is now completely settled in this

jurisdiction. In the Ninth Circuit, any doubt about the matterwas put to rest late last yearwhen

the court held that it is a violation of the Equal Protection clause

of

the Fourteenth Amendment

of

the United States Constitution for a jurisdiction to forbid an otherwise qualified same sex

couple from being married. See Latta v. Otter. 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014),pet. for reh g en

banc denied,

779 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. Jan

9,2015).

In Latta. the United States Court

of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unequivocally ruled

that laws barring same-sex couples from marriage unjustifiably discriminate on the basis

of

sexual orientation, and are in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 771 F.3d at 476. In

doing so, the Ninth Circuit rejected every justification the States of Idaho and Nevada had

conjured to justify their exclusions

of

same-sex couples from marriage.

Id.

Attempts to obtain

en banc review or to have the decision in Latta stayed were rejected by the Ninth Circuit and

the U.S. Supreme Court, respectively. See Otter v. Latta. 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014); Latta. 779

F.3d 902. As a result, the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate and, accordingly, it is undeniable

that same-sex couples throughout the Ninth Circuit must now be allowed to get married.

Consequently, Plaintiffs only seek from this Court what Latta requires: A timely ruling

declaring Guam's Marriage Ban unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution and Guam Bill of

Rights, and enjoining the enforcement

of

Guam laws that prevent same-sex couples from

marrying because such laws violate the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due

process.


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and difficult to arrange, given their busy schedules, responsibilities, and limited financial

resources. More importantly, they want to be

able

to invite

their

family and friends on

Guam

to bear witness to their love and commitment for each other in the same way that different-sex

couples

in Guam are

able to

do

through marriage.12

Kate and

Lo

believe

that they

should not

have to leave Guam tohave their love and commitment recognized.13

On April 8, 2015, Plaintiffs personally brought their application for a marriage license

to the Vital Statistics Office of DPHSS, in Mangilao, the office that processes marriage license

applications on Guam.14 DPHSS officials

refused

to accept the application and handed the

women two documents: (1) a 2009 opinion letter from the Acting Guam Attorney General

regarding common-law unions in Guam; and (2) a copy of certain provisions from Tile 10 of

the Guam Code Annotated, including 10 GCA Section 3207(h), indicating that, [mjarriage

means

the

legal union of persons of

the

opposite sex. 15 At no time has any government

official articulated any reason for failing to issue a marriage license to Plaintiffs aside from

their status as a same sex couple.

/ /

/ /

/ /

Aguero Decl. at ^ 9; Pangelinan Decl. at H9.

Aguero Decl. at ^f

10;

Pangelinan

Decl.

at ^J10.

13 Aguero Decl. atTI11; Pangelinan Decl. at^ 11.

4 Aguero Decl. at^12; Pangelinan

Decl.

at i 12.

5

Aguero

Decl. atH13;

Pangelinan

Decl. at^13.

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718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir.1983) (quotinzFirst Nat'l Bank v. Cities Servs. Co.. 391 U.S. 253,

288-89 (1968)). The opposing party's evidencemust be sufficient to create a genuine issue of

fact that is material to the outcome

of

the suit,

whether or not it has the

burden

of

proof

at

trial Oeawa v. U.S.

Explore

Study. Inc.,

CIVIL

CASE No. 11-00002, 2013 WL

2256220,

at *3 (D. GuamMay 20, 2013) (per Tydingco-Gatewood, C.J.) (emphasis in the original),

citing

McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp.. 811 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, [w]hen the moving

party has carried its burden . . . its opponentmust domore than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

Furthermore, the Advisory Committee's Notes to the 2010 F.R.C.P. Amendments

recognize that Rule 56(b) eliminated the timing provisions in former subdivisions (a) and (c)

and allows a motion for summary judgment to be filed at the commencement of an action.

The Notes recognize that, in many cases, the motion will be premature until the nonmovant has

had time to file a responsive pleading or other pretrial proceedings have been had. Id.

Nevertheless, the new Rule clearly permits summary judgment motions to be brought,

maintainedand ruledupon expeditiously, and in advance

of

discovery in appropriatecases.

B. Given the Ninth Circuit s Controlling Precedent

in Latta

v. Otter*

Summary

Judgment Should be Gran ted Expedit iously and Without Delay

Because the Ninth Circuit in Latta held that state laws barring same-sex couples from

marriage unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and are in violation of

the Equal Protection Clause, 771 F.3d at 476, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court act

promptlyto resolve the issues presented in this motion for summary judgment and lift the cloud


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2 4

of

inferiority

cast upon

Plaintiffs and similarly-situated

Guam

residents.

Simply put, the people

of

Guam

enjoy

the same

constitutional

rights under the

Fourteenth

Amendment

as

every other

American. There is no reason to delay thevindication of such rights, particularly, when the law

is completely settledwithin this Circuit.

Because Latta is binding precedent, expedited summary judgment is appropriate in the

instant case. Indeed, uponthe issuance of

Latta,

multiple districtcourtsacrosstheNinthCircuit

expeditiously granted injunctive and declaratory relief against state laws, similar to Guam's

Marriage Ban, barring same-sex couples

from

marriage in direct

response

to the

Ninth

Circuit's

clear pronouncement that laws barring same-sex couples from marriage are unconstitutional.

See,

e.g.. Rolando. 2014 WL 6476196, *4 (Granting summary judgment invalidating Montana's

ban on marriage for same-sex couples one month after Latta because Latta represents binding

Ninth Circuit precedent and provides the framework that this Court must follow. ); Hamby,

2014 WL 5089399, *12, n. 35 (Granting summary judgment invalidating Alaska's ban on

marriagefor same-sex couples one week after Latta because Latta is the controlling law

of

this

Circuit. ); Majors, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1315 (Granting summary judgment invalidating Arizona's

ban on marriage for same-sex couples ten days after Latta because [t]his court is bound by

decisions of the Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit. ); see also United States v. Spedalieri,

910 F.2d 707, 709 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1990) (when no Supreme Court decision establishes

controllingprecedent, a district court must follow the precedent

of

[its] circuit, regardless

of

its

views [about] the advantages

o f

precedent from elsewhere).

Given that the law in the Ninth Circuit is now settled, summary judgment should be

granted without delay. There is no need for extensive briefing or oral argument. Nor is it

8


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necessary for this Court to write a lengthy opinion. Summary judgment should be granted

without delay because Ninth Circuit law controls the disposition of the instant case.

As previously noted, in Majors v. Home. 141 F. Supp. 3d 1313, the District Court for

the District ofArizona, which also sits in the Ninth Circuit, promptly granted pending summary

judgment motions challenging Arizona's ban on marriage for same-sex couples just ten days

after issuanceof the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Latta. In so holding, the court's two-pageOrder

and Opinion stated:

When the pending motions were filed the law of this circuit

was not

clear.

Thus, resolution

of

the motions would

have

required this court to write a lengthy decision. However, the

Court

of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that

substantially identical provisions of Nevada and Idaho law

that prohibit same-sex marriages are invalid because they

deny same-sex couples equal protection

of

the law, the right to

which is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

This court is

bound by

decisions

of the Court

of

Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit For that reason plaintiffs are

entitled to a declaration

that

the challenged laws are

unconstitutional together with a

permanent injunction

prohibiting enforcement

of

the

challenged laws

Id. at 1315 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).

The Majors court refused to stay its ruling, noting that no request for appellate or

certiorari

reliefwould likely succeed:

A stay of this decision to allow defendants to appeal is not

warranted. It is clear that an appeal to the Ninth Circuit would

not succeed. It is also clear—based on the Supreme Court s

denial

of

petitions for writs

of

certiorari filed in connection

with

severa l c i rcui t

court decisions whic h h eld t ha t s ame- se x

marriage must be recognized in Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah,

Virginia, and Wisconsin—that the High Court will turn a deaf

ear on any request for relief from the Ninth Circuit s decision.

Majors. 14F. Supp. 3d at 1315 (internal citations omitted).


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At the same time Majors was decided, another district court

sitting

within the Ninth

Circuit

rendered a similar, if longer, opinion

and

order granting summary

judgment

finding that

Alaska s

ban

on

marriage

for

same-sex couples

is

unconstitutional

asa

deprivation

of

basic

due

process and equal protection principles under the Fourteenth Amendment

of

the U.S.

Constitution. Hambv v. Parnell.

2014

WL 5089399 (D. Alaska Oct. 12, 2014). In

so

holding,

the court noted that Latta is the controlling law of this Circuit, and that neither the mere

pendency of

an

appeal nor a petition for rehearing destroyed the finality of Latta as binding

authority. Hambv. 2014 WL 5089399, at *12, n. 35. A month later the District Court for the

District of Montana also granted summary

judgment

invalidating Montana s marriage ban in

light ofLatta. Rolando. 2014 WL6476196, *4.

Elsewhere, courts have not hesitated to

act

expeditiously in the face of binding

circuit

court rulings on the

constitutionality

of laws barring same-sex

couples from

marriage. For

example, inCondon v.Halev. 2014 WL 5897175, a district court judgesitting in South Carolina

granted summary

judgment

in

favor

ofa

same-sex

couple

less than

one

month after

the

filing

of

an action

similar

to the

one

at bar. InCondon, the plaintiffs applied for a marriage

license

on

October

8,2014.

Their application

was

accepted by

the

clerk but

the

Attorney General

of

South

Carolina then immediately

initiated

a state court action

prohibiting

the

clerk

from granting a

marriage

license to Plaintiffs

until

a

pending federal constitutional

challenge had

been heard and

decided. On October 15, 2014, the couple that was denied the license sued in DistrictCourt for

the District of South Carolina

and

moved for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment

just 6 days later, on October 22,

2104.

The courtgranted the motions on November

12,

2014

based on controlling FourthCircuit authority on point. Id.,

citing

Bostic v. Schaefer. 760 F.3d

352(4thCir. 2014). In so holding, thedistrict judge saidthe following:

10


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While this debate over precedent and constitutional principle

is interesting, this Court

finds

most persuasive the clearly

stated authority

of

the Fourth Circuit's seminal decision in

Bostic.

It is axiomatic that a decision

of

a circuit court, not

overruled by the United States Supreme Court, is controlling

precedent for the district courts within the circuit.

Condon

v.

Halev.

No.

CIV.A. 2:14-4010-RMG, 2014 WL 5897175 (D. S.C. Nov. 12, 2014)

(internal citation omitted). Similarly, a district court in West Virginia granted

summary

judgment invalidating

West

Virginia's ban on marriage for same-sex couples one month after

the

Fourth

Circuit's precedent in

Bostic became binding

because [t]heholding in

Bostic

controlled]

th[e]

case.

McGee

v.

Cole.

2014

WL

5802665

(S.D.

W.Va.

Nov.

7,2014).

The grant of expeditious relief has not been limited to district courts within the Fourth

and Ninth Circuits, however. Faced with binding precedent from the Tenth Circuit in Kitchen

andBishop, a district court in

Wyoming

granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement

of Wyoming's ban on marriage for same-sex couples a mere ten days after the filing of the

original complaint and entered summary judgment less than one month after the filing of the

action was

commenced. See Guzzo.

2014

WL 5317797

(D.

Wyo.,

Oct.

17,

2014)

*9.

In

granting prompt relief, the Guzzo court stated that, [w]hile the Tenth Circuit's decisions in

Kitchen v. Herbert. 755 F.3d

1193

(10th Cir. 2014), and Bishopv. Smith. 760 F.3d 1070(10th

Cir. 2014), may be publicly debated, one thing remains undebatable: '[A] district court is

bound by decisions made by its circuit court.' Id., quoting Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross and

BlueShield. 600 F.3d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir.

1990).

In similarly promptfashion, a district court

in Kansas enjoined enforcement of Kansas's ban on marriage for same-sex couples less than

one month after the commencement

of

the action [b]ecause Tenth Circuit precedent is binding

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on this Court, Kitchen and Bishop dictate the result here.

See

Marie v. Moser. 2014 WL

5598128 (D. Kan. Nov. 4,2014).

Moreover, as seen from the above examples, the grant

of

expeditious relief in cases

concerning the validity of state laws barring same-sex couples from marriage is not limited to

pending cases. In multiple instances, federal courts faced with binding precedent have granted

relief within a matter of a few weeks, if not days, after the commencement of an action.

See,

e.g.,

Condon. 2014 WL 5897175 (granting summary judgment invalidating South Carolina's

marriage ban less than one month after the filing of the complaint); Guzzo. 2014 WL 5317797

(D. Wyo., Oct. 17, 2014) *9 (enjoining enforcement

of

Wyoming's marriage ban a mere ten

days after the filing of the complaint); Marie. 2014 WL 5598128 (enjoining enforcement of

Kansas's marriage ban less than one month after the commencement of the action).

As in all

of

the aforementioned cases, the Court here faces the unequivocal precedent

of

a circuit court decision holding laws barring same-sex couples from marriage unconstitutional.

Because such precedent has not been overruled by the United States Supreme Court, it is

controlling and dispositive with respect to this action. Just as the district judges in Alaska,

Arizona, Kansas, Montana, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming were bound by

controlling Circuit precedent; this Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit 's precedent in Latta. As

with the aforementioned courts, this Court should act expeditiously and enter summary

judgment without delay.

These and other cases demonstrate that Defendants have no legitimate justification to

continue to deny or delay justice to Plaintiffs, or similarly situated same-sex couples. There is

no effective or meaningful remedy for the loss

of

Constitutional rights; the only remedy

of

any

value is swift justice. This Court can rule expeditiously, as a matter

of

law, that the Guam's

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marriage

ban violates Plaintiffs fundamental constitutional rights

to

marry

the

person they

choose by faithful application ofcontrolling law

as set

out by the Ninth

Circuit

in Latta v. Otter.

This

case

is

ripe

for

review without further delay;

and

this Court

should

put

an

end to

the

unnecessary

suffering, humiliation, stigma,

and

anxieties attendant to Guam s purported

marriage ban

on

Plaintiffs

and

all committed

same-sex

couples

and

their children who

want, and

need,

the security of

marriage. As

discussed below, every

conceivable justification for

bans

on marriage

for

same-sex

couples

has been considered and

rejected

by the Ninth

Circuit

in

Latta.

Thus,

itwould

be

a colossal

waste

ofjudicial resources

to

prolong this

case.

I I .

WHILE MOST OF GUAM'S MARRIAGE LAWS ARE

PURPORTEDLY GENDER-NEUTRAL, TOGETHER

THEY IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICT MARRIAGE

LICENSES TO OPPOSITE-SEX APPLICANTS

A. Guam's Marriage Eligibility Lawsare Ostensibly Gender-Neutral

Guam s marriage laws

are

gender neutral insofar

as

they

specify

who is or is not

eligible for marriage.

The

key statute defining marriage

on Guam

reads

as follows:

§ 3101.What Constitutes Marriage.

Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a

civil contract,

to whichthe consent of parties capable of making that contract

is necessary.

Consent

alone will not constitute marriage; it

must

be

followed

by a solemnization

authorized

by this

Title.

19GCA §3101 (2015).

Amongst all the provisions

of

Title

19

regulating marriage, only

a

few

make

any

distinction at all between the

gender

of the

marriage

applicants;

and

none purports to

ban

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marriage for same-sex couples.16 For example, none of the statutory grounds for denial ofa

marriage

license,

set forth in

Title

19 Section 3202(b) of

the

Code,

has

anything

to do with the

gender

of

the applicants.17

B The Office of Vital Statistics Statute Defines Marriage as for Persons

of

O ppos i te -Sex

However,

gender-specific language

regarding marriage licensing

is

found

in a

completely

separate Title of the

Guam Code

Annotated, Title 10. That provision falls within a

chapter of the Code establishing

and

regulating the

DPHSS

Office of

Vital

Statistics,

and

amongst other

definitions

provides that,

[mjarriage

means the legal union

of

persons

of

the

opposite sex.

10 GCA § 3207(h). It is this provision

that purportedly

supports

DPHSS s

denial

o f a license

to Plaintiffs.

16 Sections 3108

and 3109 thereofprovide that the

wife

is the sole

member

of the

contracted

union

or subsequent

family who may elect

to

use

her

maiden

name as surname.

See also

3202(a)(8)

(Providing

that

marriage license must indicate,

[w]hether the

female elects

to

retain

hermaiden name

as her surnameuponmarriageas providedfor by§3108. ).

17 Section

3202(b)

provides

as

follows:

(b) No

license

shall be issued when either of the applicants therefore is an imbecile, insane as

determined

by the properauthority or who, at the time of

making

of the application of proof

required

for said license, is under the influenceof intoxicating liquoror narcotic drug. If an applicant is under

the age of

eighteen

(18) and has not been

previously

married, no

license

shall be issued unless the

consent

in

writing

of a

parent

or

guardian

of the

person under

age is

presented

withthe

application.

A

consent must be verified and such consent shall be retained with the application in the files

of

the

Department of Public Health and

Social

Services. The

fact

of the consent shall be noted upon the

license. In addition to the consentrequired, no license shall be issuedfor any personbetweenthe age of

sixteen (16) and eighteen (18) unless the

marriage

of that

person

has been approved by an order in

writing

issued

from the Superior Court. A license to marry shall not be issued to any person under the

ageof

sixteen

(16)

unless

the court

authorizes

a license to be issued to anapplicant who is under

sixteen

(16) and with a child.No licenseshall be issued permitting marriage between first cousins, betweenan

adoptive parent and an adoptive child, between a step-parent anda

step-child

or between a guardian and

a ward unless a written order authorizing such a marriage has been issued by the Superior Court.

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C Similar Marriage License Bans have been Struck Down to the Extent they

have been Applied in a Discriminatory Manner

To the

extent

that

DPHSS relies

on the Guam Code's opposite sex

definition

of

marriage to justify its rejection of marriage

licenses

to same-sex couples, its reliance is

misplaced. While the particular language of

purported marriage

bans

varies

slightly from

jurisdiction

to

jurisdiction,

there

can

be no

doubt

in

the

wake of

Latta

that such

laws

violate the

Equal Protection Clause

of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they deny lesbians

and gays who wish tomarry persons ofthe same sex a right they afford to

individuals

who wish

to

marry

persons

of

the

opposite

sex.

Latta.

771

F.3d

at

464-65.

[See

also

Part

III

of

this

memorandum, infra.] Forthis reason, the court in

Marie

v.Moser. 2014

WL

5598128

(D. Kan.

Nov.

4,

2014),

followed similar Tenth

Circuit precedent

on

point

in holding unconstitutional a

Kansas

statute—nearly identical to the

Guam

statute at issue here—that definedmarriage as a

civil contract between

two parties

who are

of

opposite

sex

(together with

a state

constitutional

provision defining marriage as

between one man and

one

woman. ). Id.,

at

*4; Kansas

Stat.

Ann.

§23

101.

BecauseGuam's marriage statutes are similar to the corresponding statutes found in the

state

of

New Mexico, it is also useful to look to New Mexico law on point. The New Mexico

statutes, in kind with Guam's, describe marriage as a gender-neutral contractual arrangement

solemnized by the

parties

and sanctioned by the government.18 The substantive New Mexico

laws

addressing

eligibility to

marry,

like

those

of

Guam,

neither

sanctioned

nor

prohibited

18 TheNewMexico statutes provide that marriage is contemplated by the lawas a

civil

contract,

for which the consent of the contracting parties, capable in law of contracting, is essential. Each

couple

desiring tomarry pursuant to the laws ofNew

Mexico shall

first obtain a license

from

the county

clerk

of this stateand

following

a

ceremony concluded

inthisstate

while

the

license

for

recording

inthe

county issuing the license. NMSA 1978, Section

40-1-1

(1862-63).

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marriage for same-sex couples. However, in New Mexico (circa 2013), the official marriage

license

application

only provided

for

asingle male

applicant

and a single

female applicant,

which

are

the

identical terms

found

on

the

Guam

Marriage License

Application

Form.

Thus,

some county clerks inNew Mexico denied same-sex couples marriage licenses.

The Supreme Court

of

New

Mexico in

Grieeo

v.

Oliver, 316

P.3d 865 (N.M.

2013),

unanimously held that county clerks of

that

state must issue marriage licenses to same-sex

couples

that

meet the

statutory requirements for

marriage.

Despite generally gender-neutral

marriage

statutes, the court

found statutory differentiation between

same-sex and opposite-sex

couples

based on

a 1961 enactment authorizing the

use

of the gender-specific terms male

applicant

and

female applicant.

Id

p.

875.

The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the

use of these

terms,

as

well

as the

terms

bride and groom in the

marriage license

form

evidenced a

legislative intent that

that a civil marriage be between a man and a woman. Id at

875.20

Finding

no defensible legal justification

for

treating same-sex

couples

differently than

opposite-sex couples,

the New Mexico

high

court ordered county clerks

to

allow qualified

same-sex couples to wed and also required the clerks to

provide

gender-neutral marriage

license application forms. Id.

As indicated, the identical terms male applicant and female applicant are used in

Guam s

Marriage

Application

form.

Asin

New

Mexico, it appears that the

Guam

Legislature

19

See

Aguero

Decl. atH12, Exh. A.

20

TheNewMexico Supreme Courtconcluded thatwhile noneof the marriage statutes specifically

prohibited

same-gender

marriages, when read

as

a

whole, the

statutes had

the

effect

of

precluding same-

sex couples

from

marrying

and

benefiting

from

the rights, protections,

and responsibilities

that flowed

from a

civil

marriage,

and,

therefore, the statutory

scheme

was subject to state constitutional

equal

protection challenge,

where the

phrasing of

many

statutes limited the concomitant state-based

rights,

protections,

and responsibilities

of

marriage

to

opposite-gender married couples.

Griego

v. Oliver. 316

P.3d at

876.

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1 a discriminatory manner

or

imposes different burdens

on

different classes ofpeople.

Christy v

Model

857

F.2d

1324,

1331

(9th Cir. 1988), cert

denied

490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct.

3176,

104

L.Ed.2d 1038

(1989).

The next step ... [is] to

determine

the level

of

scrutiny.

Country

Classic

Dairies,

847

F.2d a t 596.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2 4

Freeman v. Citv

of

Santa Ana.

68

F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995),

as

amended on denial

of

reh'pandreh'genbanc

(Dec.

29,1995).

Here, laws [that]

distinguish

on their

face between

opposite-sex

couples,

who are

permitted to

marry ... and

same-sex couples,

who are

not

permitted

to marry

.. .

discriminate

on the

basis

of

sexual orientation. Latta,

771

F.3d

at

467-468. Thus, there

can

be

no

question

that Guam s marriage licensing laws are being applied in a

discriminatory

manner,

namely

to

the complete

exclusion

of same-sex

couples.

It is now settled

law in the Ninth Circuit that

laws

purporting to deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples discriminate on the basis of sexual

orientation and are subject to heightened scrutiny. Id at 468 {citing SmithKIine Beecham

Com,

v.

Abbott

Labs.

740

F.3d 471

(9th Cir.

2014), reh g en

banc

denied,

759

F.3d

990 (9th

Cir. 2014)); see also

Baskin

v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654, 656-657 (7th Cir. 2014). Likewise,

they discriminate on the basis of gender

and are

also subject to heightened scrutiny on that

basis.

Latta.

771 F.3d

at 480

(Berzon, J., concurring). Because Defendants have failed

to and

cannot offer

any

legitimate—let alone, compelling—justification for such discrimination,

Plaintiffs areentitled to

summary

judgment in their

favor.

/ /

/ /

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HI

GUAM S

BAN ON

MARRIAGES FOR SAME-SEX

COUPLES DOES NOT SURVIVE HEIGHTENED

EQUAL PROTECTION SCRUTINY

UN R

CONTROLLING

CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

As discussed,

in

Latta. the Ninth Circuit held that

it is a

violation

of

the

Equal

Protection

guarantee

of

the

United States Constitution

for

a

jurisdiction

to forbid an otherwise

qualified same-sex couple from being

married.

See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d

456.

Of course it

iswell settled

that

[a] district court bound by

circuit authority

. . .

has

no choice but to follow

it,

even

if

convinced that

such

authority

was

wrongly

decided.

Hart

v.

Massanari,

266 F.3d

1155, 1175

(9th Cir. 2001).

Thus, to

the extent

that Guam s

marriage

laws

are construed

and

enforced

as restricting

marriage

to opposite-sex

couples,

such

classification

simply does not

survive

the heightened

level

of equal protection scrutiny required by binding, Ninth Circuit

authority as announced in Latta.

Because Latta is controlling Circuit

precedent,

it is

useful

to review the court's opinion

in

some

detail. Latta involved interpretation of

Idaho

and Nevada

statutes

and constitutional

amendments

preventing

same-sex

couples from

marrying

and refusing to recognize

the

marriages

of same-sex couples

validly performed elsewhere.

Plaintiffs in the

separate

underlying cases were

same-sex

couples living in Idaho and

Nevada

and either wished tomarry

there or have their out-of-state unions recognized there. They had sued for declaratory relief

and

to

enjoin

the

enforcement

of

the laws, because they

deprived

plaintiffs

of

the fundamental

due process right

to

marriage, and because they denied them equal protection

of the

law

by

discriminating

against

them on thebasis of their

sexual

orientation andtheir sex.

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In the

Nevada

case, Sevcik v. Sandoval,

911 F.Supp.2d

996

(D. Nev. 2012),

rev d sub

nom. Latta. 771

F.3d

456, the court

applied

a rational basis standard of review and

upheld

Nevada s

laws.

Subsequently,

the Ninth

Circuit

handed down

its

decision

in

SmithKIine

Beecham Corp.. supra,

759

F.3d 990, which held

that

laws purporting to deny marriage

licenses

to

same-sex couples

were subject to

heightened equal

protection scrutiny. After the

Ninth Circuit's decision in SmithKIine. the district court hearing the Idaho lawsuit concluded

that

heightened

scrutiny

applied to Idaho s laws

because they

discriminated

based

on sexual

orientation, and invalidated them.

Latta v.

Otter. 19

F. Supp.

3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014), aff d,

771F.3d456 .

On a consolidated appeal of both the Idaho and Nevada rulings, the Ninth Circuit in

Latta held that the Idaho and Nevada laws at issue violate the Equal Protection Clause

of

the

Fourteenth Amendment because they deny lesbians and gays who wish

to

marry persons

of the

same

sex

a right they afford to individuals who

wish

to

marry

persons of the opposite sex,

and

donot

satisfy

the

heightened scrutiny

standard

we

adopted

in

SmithKIine.

Initially,

the

Latta court rejected

the

defendants claims

thatthe

lawsuits did

not

present

substantial federal questions, stating, [a]s

any

observer of the Supreme Court cannot help but

realize, this case and others like it

present not only substantial

but pressing

federal questions.

Id

at

467, citing U.S.

v.

Windsor. U.S.

,

133 S.Ct. 2675, 2694-96 (2013). Latta next

rejected the defendants claim that the Idaho and Nevada marriage bans

for

same-sex couples

did not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather on the basis

of

procreative

capacity, noting

that the

laws

at

issue—like the Guam

statute at bar—distinguished on their

face

between

opposite-sex

couples

and

same-sex couples.

Id at 485.

The

court

noted

that

the

Idaho and Nevada laws were grossly over- and under-inclusive with respect to procreative

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capacity, because the states issued marriage licenses to many opposite-sex

couples who

cannot

or

will

not reproduce but not

to

same-sex

couples

who already

have children

or

are

in

the

process of havingor adopting them.

Id.

at

472.

The court then discussed its earlier ruling in SmithKIine. in which the court had held

that the Supreme

Court

in

Windsor

had established a level of scrutiny for classifications

based

on sexual orientation that is

unquestionably higher

than rational basis review,

thus

requiring

that

heightened scrutiny be applied toequal protection claims involving sexual orientation.

Id

at 468, quoting

SmithKIine

at481.

Accordingly, the Latta

court applied heightened scrutiny to

its review of the Idaho and Nevada laws, finding that the laws discriminated on the basis of

sexual

orientation.

Id.

at

468.

Applying

the heightened scrutiny standard, the Latta court then rejected, oneby

one,

as

unfounded

the defendants' purported justifications for the marriage

bans.

For example, in

addressing the

perceived threat marriage between people

of the

same

sex

posed

to the

institution of marriage, the court said, . . . the fear that an established institution will be

undermined due to private opposition to its inclusive shift is not a legitimate basisfor retaining

the status

quo.

Id. at 470. In

rejecting

theargument thatdifferential treatment wasjustified in

order to promote an optimal male-female parenting model, the court said:

To allow same-sex couples to adopt children and then to label

their families as second-class because the adoptive parents are

of

the

same sex is cruel as well as unconstitutional.

Classifying some families, and especially their children, as

of

lesser value should be repugnant to all those in this nation

who profess to believe in family values. In any event, Idaho

and Nevada's asserted preference for opposite-sex parents

does not, under heightened scrutiny, come close to justifying

unequal treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.

Id.

at

4 7 4 .

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The Latta court concluded that, Windsor makes clear that the defendants' explicit

desire

to express a preference for opposite-sex

couples over same-sex

couples is a categorically

inadequate

justification

for discrimination. Expressing

such

a

preference

is

precisely

what they

may not do.

Id.

at 473. As the court said,

Idaho and Nevada's marriage laws, by preventing same-sex

couples from marrying and refusing to recognize same-sex

marriages celebrated elsewhere, impose profound legal,

financial, social and psychic harms on numerous citizens of

those states. These harms are not inflicted on opposite-sex

couples, who

may,

if they

wish,

enjoy the rights and assume

the responsibilities of

marriage.

Laws that treat people

differently based on sexual orientation are unconstitutional

unless a legitimate purpose ... overcome[s] the injury

inflicted by the law on lesbians and gays and their families.

Id. at 475, quoting SmithKIine. 740F.3dat 481-82.

In short, under a heightened scrutiny standard, the Ninth Circuit in Latta

comprehensively and convincingly

rejected all

of

the

defendants purported justifications for

the Idaho and Nevada marriage bans.

It is clear in the wake of Latta, that district courts sitting within the Ninth Circuit are

bound to apply a heightened scrutiny to any state or territorial attempt to deny same-sex

partners the right to a marriage

license.

See, e.g., Rolando, 2014

WL

6476196, *4 ( Latta

represents binding Ninth Circuit precedent

and

provides

the framework that this

Court must

follow. );

Hambv. 2014 WL

5089399,

*12,

n. 35 ( Latta is the controlling law of this

Circuit. ); Majors. 14

F.

Supp.

3d at

1315 ( This

court is

bound

by

decisions

of the

Court

of

Appeals for

the

Ninth Circuit. ).

Unquestionably, the

Defendants unjustified

and

unjustifiable

refusal to issue a marriage license to

Plaintiffs

in the

instant

case

fails

to

survive any level

of

equal protection

scrutiny, must less heightened

scrutiny.

Because

Guam s statute restricting

marriage to opposite sex

couples

is functionally

identical

to the Idaho and

Nevada

statutes

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As the FourthCircuit held in

Bostic. marriage bans,

such as Guam's, unquestionably

...

impede the right to marry by preventing same-sex couples

from

marrying and nullifying

the

legal

import

of

their out-of-state marriages.

370

F.3d

at

377.

The freedom

to

marry

is a

fundamental

right,

Turner v. Saflev.

482 U.S. 78,

95

(1987),

that

has

long been recognized

as

one of the vital personal

rights

essential to the

orderly

pursuit of happiness by free

men,

Loving

v. Virginia, 388

U.S.

1, 12

(1967). Moreover,

[t]he choice of whether and whomto

marry is an intensely personal decision that alters the course of an individual s

life.

Denying

same-sex

couples

this

choice prohibits them

from participating fully in our society, which is

precisely the type of segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot countenance. Bostic,

370 F.3dat

384.

[T]hefundamental right to marriage, repeatedly recognized by the

Supreme

Court, in cases such as Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434

U.S.

374 (1978),

and

Turner v. Saflev.

482

U.S. 78 (1987), is properly understood as including the

right to

marry

an

individual

of one's

choice. That right applies

to same-sex

marriage

just as it

does

to

opposite-sex marriage.

Latta.

771

F.3d

at

477

(Reinhardt,

J.,

concurring).

As

such,

those who wish to

marry

a person of the same sex are entitled to exercise the same

fundamental

right

as is recognized

for persons who wish

tomarry a person oftheopposite sex.

Kitchen.

755 F .3d a t 1229-1230.

Thattheadage 'justice

delayed

isjusticedenied' may bynowbe trite, thatmakes it no

less true. Laforee v. Consol. Rail Corp.. 1988 WL 38321, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1988).

This truth has particular application

here, where

interference with rights as fundamental as

familial integrity andthe

choice

of whom to marry are infringed. As special asGuam is, there

is nothing special about its marriage ban or the justifications supporting it that would warrant

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continued delay.

Plaintiffs,

and all same-sex couples

who

wish to marry on Guam, should be

afforded their

constitutional

rights without further

delay

or governmental obstruction.

CONCLUSION

This brief

is

lengthy, but

only for the

sake

ofthoroughness.

In fact, the Court s task is

simple

and

straightforward. No

extended

opinion and order is required. Based on controlling

Ninth Circuit authority,

the denial ofa marriage license

to same-sex couples

on Guam is a

violation of the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection. It

is

also a deprivation of the

Plaintiffs

fundamental

right

to marry.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs

motion

for summary

judgment

should be GRANTED, and

the

Court should enjoin enforcement of

Guam s

ban of same-sex

couples from marriage and declare that same-sex couples are

entitled

to marry on Guam on the

same terms as different-sex couples.

Respectfully submitted

this 13lh

day of

April, 2015.

THOMPSON GUTIERREZ

ALCANTARA,

P C

Attorneys

for

Plaintiffs Kathleen

M.

Aguero

and

Loretta M. Pangelinan

By.

RANDALISTOBD THOMPSON

PI 51021.RTT

Documents

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