1140460 Judge Reed's Response

8/9/2019 1140460 Judge Reed's Response

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No. 1140460________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA________________________________________________

Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy InstituteAnd Alabama Citizens Action Program

(In re: Alan L. King, in his official capacity as Judge OfProbate for Jefferson County, Alabama, et al.)_______________________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

ANSWER AND BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STEVEN L. REED

________________________________________________

Robert D. Segall (SEG003)Copeland, Franco, Screws &Gill, P.A.P.O. Box 347Montgomery, AL 36101-0347Phone: (334) 420-2956Fax: (334) 834-1180

Thomas T. Gallion (GAL010)

Constance C. Walker (WAL144)Haskell Slaughter & Gallion,LLC8 Commerce Street, Suite 1200Montgomery, AL 36104Phone: (334) 265-8573Fax: (334) 264-7944

Samuel H. Heldman (HEL009)The Gardner Firm, PC

2805 31st St NWWashington, DC [email protected] Phone: (202) 965-8884Fax: (202) 318-2445

Tyrone C. Means (MEA003)H. Lewis Gillis (GIL011)Kristen Gillis (GIL078)Means Gillis Law, LLCP.O. Box 5058Montgomery, AL 36103-5058Phone: (334) 270-1033Fax: (334) 260-9396

John Mark Englehart(ENG007)9457 Alysbury PlaceMontgomery, AL 36117-6005Phone: (334) 782-5258Fax: (334) 270-8390

E-Filed02/18/2015 @ 05:44:31 PM

Honorable Julia Jordan Weller

Clerk Of The Court

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities ..............................ii-5

I. INTRODUCTION ............................1

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ..................4

III. Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring ThisProceeding, and This Court Thus LacksSubject Matter Jurisdiction to Hear It ..4

IV. The absence of standing in this case is notremedied by purporting to sue for the Statein an “ex rel” fashion ..................20

V. This Court lacks original jurisdictionover the petition .......................24

VI. The prerequisites for issuance of the writare absent here .........................35

VII. The Chief Justice’s Administrative Orderdoes not provide a basis for issuance ofthe Writ ................................36

VIII. The fictitiously named Probate Judgesshould be struck from the Petition ......37

CONCLUSION.............................................39

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................41

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Case

Ala. DOT v. Harbert Int’l, 990 So.2d 831,

848 (Ala. 2008) ...................................2

Ashley v. State, 109 Ala. 48, 49, 19 So. 917, 918 (Ala.1895) .............................................34

Brogden v. Employees’ Retirement System, 386 So. 2d 1376,1379 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) ........................ 29,30,31

Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 4 So.3d 460, 462-63(Ala. 2008) .......................................6,7

Chilton County v. Butler , 225 Ala. 191, 142 So. 531 (Ala.1932) .............................................20

Cotton v. Rutledge, 33 Ala. 110 (Ala. 1958) .......29

Denson v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 247 Ala. 257,258, 33 So. 2d 714, 714-15 (1945) .................24

Ex parte Ala. Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 613,7 So. 2d 303, 306 (Ala. 1942) .....................27-31

Ex parte Aull, 149 So.3d 582, 591 (Ala. 2014) .....5-7

Ex parte Barger , 243 Ala. 627, 628, 11 So. 2d 359,360 (1943) ........................................24

Ex parte Davis, ___ So.3d ___, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 16, *9, *14(Ala. 2015) .......................................3,35

Ex parte Du Bose, 54 Ala. 278, 280-281 (Ala. 1875) 32,33

Ex parte Ferrari, ___ So.3d ____, 2015 Ala.LEXIS 13, *16 (Ala. 2015) .........................32

Ex parte Giles, 133 Ala. 211, 212, 32 So. 167 (1902) .... 24

Ex parte Jim Walter Res., Inc., 91 So. 3d 50Ala. 2012) ........................................27

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(Continued)

Ex parte King , 50 So.3d 1056, 1059-60 (Ala. 2010) ...................................................6,8,14

Ex parte Morgan, 259 Ala. 649, 651, 67 So. 2d889, 890 (1953) ...................................24

Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521, 523 (1884) .........25

Ex parte Price, 252 Ala. 517, 41 So. 2d 180(Ala. 1949) .......................................25

Ex parte Richey , 255 Ala. 150, 157, 50 So. 2d 441,

447 (1951) ........................................24

Ex parte Russell, 29 Ala. 717 (Ala. 1857) .........25

Ex parte Sasser , 730 So. 2d 604, 605 (Ala. 1999) .. 2

Ex parte Stover , 663 So.2d 948, 951 (Ala. 1995) ...38

Ex parte Town of Valley Grande, 885 So. 2d 768,770 Ala. 2004) ...................................26

Ex parte Tubbs, 585 So. 2d 1301, 1302(Ala. 1991) .......................................24

Franks v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 679 So. 2d214, 216 (Ala. 1996) ..............................27

Hollingsworth v. Perry , 133 S.Ct. at 2662 .........10-18

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n,432 U.S. 342-43 (1977) ................................ 15

Jones v. Black, 48 Ala. 540, 543 (Ala. 1872) .......... 15

Kendrick v. State, 256 Ala. 206, 213, 54 So.2d 442,447 (Ala. 1951) ..................................... 20-23

Kid’s Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Human Resources, 843So.2d 164, 165 (Ala. 2002) ........................7,8,14

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(continued)

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61,

(1992) ............................................6

Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Morris, 273 Ala. 117, 120(Ala. 1961) .......................................2

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,811-12 (1985)..........................................39

Ramaguano v. Crook, 88 Ala. 450, 451, 7So. 247 (1890) ....................................25

Russo v. Ala. Dept. of Corrections, 149 So.3d 1079, 1081 (Ala. 2014) .........................31

Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala.) ...35

State Bd. of Optometry v. Lee Optical, 287 Ala.528, 531, 253 So.2d 35, 37 (Ala. 1971) ............23

State ex rel. Chilton County v. Butler ,225 Ala. 191, 142 So. 531 (Ala. 1932) .............20

Strange v. Searcy , No. 14A-840 ....................22,35

Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children,904 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Ala. 2004) ..................6-15

Town of Flat Creek v. Alabama By-Products Corp.,245 Ala. 528, 531, 17 So. 2d 771, 772 (1944) ......26

United States v. Windsor ,570 U.S.12 (2013) ........22

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) .........15

White v. John, 92 So.3d, 737, 2014 Ala.LEXIS 144, *29 (Ala. 2014) ........................2

Wood v. Farnell, 50 Ala. 546 (Ala. 1874) ..........29

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Statutes

Ala. Code 12-2-7(3) ...............................24 Ala. Code § 12-11-30(4) ...........................26Ala. Code § 12-2-7(2) .............................25-26

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ..................................36

Rules

Ala. R. Civ. P. 9(h)...................................37-38Ala. R. Civ. P. 17(a) .............................23

Constitutional Provisions

Art. VI, § 140(b),Const. of Ala. 1901

............24

Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of Ala. 1901 ............26

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I.INTRODUCTION.

The petition should be dismissed for several reasons,

including that Petitioners have no standing and are not

otherwise proper parties to bring this action on behalf of

the State, that there is no original subject matter

jurisdiction in this Court, and that the prerequisites to

the grant of the requested writ are not satisfied. Those

arguments are addressed below. But even if one leaves

those aside for the moment, still the Petition – both in

what it says, and what it obscures – offers no equitable

reason for this Court to intervene.

The Petition seeks a ruling based only on Alabama law. The

Petition does not ask this Court to rule on the federal

constitutional questions about same sex marriage.

Respondents do not ask this Court to rule on those federal

questions either, and it would be too late for Petitioners

to make such a request in their reply brief.

What Petitioners do not mention, oddly, is that the

Supreme Court of the United States will decide the federal

questions by approximately the end of June, just about four

months from now.

Another thing Petitioners do not mention is the very

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high probability that, if this Court were to issue an order

stopping Respondents from issuing marriage licenses,

Respondents would be sued in federal court. And it is

probable, given the majority view among the federal courts,

that Respondents would be enjoined to issue licenses.

A mandamus petition is either a proceeding in equity,1

or a proceeding at law governed by equitable principles.2

Among those principles are that “equity will not do a vain

thing,”3 and that equity is always mindful of balancing the

respective harms to the parties before issuing a remedy.

The question thus arises: what good, and what harm,

would this Court do by issuing the order that Petitioners

seek?

By granting the requested relief, this Court would not

actually stop any couple from marrying for very long. The

Court, by deciding the issues of state law as Petitioners

1 Ala. DOT v. Harbert Int’l, 990 So.2d 831, 848 (Ala. 2008)(Murdock, J., concurring specially).

2 Ex parte Sasser , 730 So. 2d 604, 605 (Ala. 1999).

3 Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Morris, 273 Ala. 117, 120 (Ala.1961); see also White v. John, 92 So.3d, 737, 2014 Ala.LEXIS 144, *29 (Ala. 2014) (injunction will not issue wherethere is no demonstration that it would actually preventthe allegedly threatened injury).

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request, would simply make Respondents into targets of

federal litigation.

Therefore, if this Court granted the writ that

Petitioners seek, it would put Probate Judges in an

untenable position, even worse than the “angst and

consternation,” “`darned if I do, darned if I don't’

dilemma” that already faces them now. Ex parte Davis, ___

So.3d ___, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 16, *9, *14 (Ala. 2015) (Bolin,

J., concurring).

If a Probate Judge followed this Court’s order (of the

sort that the Petition seeks), a Probate Judge would

subject himself to suit in federal district court, which

would in turn lead to much expenditure of public funds: not

only funds for the defense of the case, but in all

likelihood an award of attorneys’ fees to any plaintiff

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Multiplied across all the various

counties in the State, the cost to the taxpayers would be

enormous at a time when the State can ill afford it.

On the other hand, if a Probate Judge honored the

decision of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Alabama, which both the Eleventh

Circuit and the United States Supreme Court determined

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should not be stayed, then the Probate Judge might be held

in contempt in state court.

This Court should not place Probate Judges in such

unfair and undeserved jeopardy, especially when the legal

battle over same sex marriage is very likely to be

concluded within a few months, and when the order

Petitioners seek from this Court would not settle the

matter, even for a moment.

In short, given the actual circumstances that face the

Court, granting the requested relief would be inequitable –

no matter what one’s view on the federal questions that are

not before this Court for decision.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Respondent Reed adopts the Statement of the Facts set

out in the Joint answer and Brief Respondents King and

Ragland.

III. Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring This Proceeding, and

This Court Thus Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to

Hear It.

Petitioners, two non-profit organizations “dedicated to

influencing public policy in the interest of … preserv[ing]

… strong families” and “lobbying the Alabama Legislature”

to “promote … pro-family and pro-moral issues,” Petition,

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at 9, 10, have failed to identify any tangible, concrete

interest of their own or their members that is served by

Alabama’s ban on same-sex marriages -- much less any harm

caused to any such interest by the federal court’s

suspension of that ban; how that suspension caused any such

harm; or how this Court’s issuance of an “emergency” writ4

would remedy any harm to any legally protected, personal

interest of petitioners. This lack of standing on the part

of petitioners is a jurisdictional defect, e.g., Ex parte

Aull, 149 So.3d 582, 591 (Ala. 2014), which requires

dismissal of their petition.

4 It is unclear from the petition the precise relief

petitioners seek. An order “giving Alabama probate judgesa clear judicial pronouncement that Alabama law prohibitsthe issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples,”Petition, at 25, would compel nothing, and only restates anabstract principle of Alabama law that no one disputes.Alternatively, petitioners deem it “appropriate for thisCourt to command probate judges’ compliance with [ChiefJustice Moore’s] Administrative Order,” Petition, at 24, --effectively banning either the named respondent judges orall Alabama probate judges from issuing marriage licenses

to same-sex couples. Such a ban would be contrary to thefederal court’s finding that such a ban isunconstitutional, and in direct conflict with an injunctionexpressly prohibiting, at present, one such named probatejudge from enforcing that ban. But, to the extentpetitioners request entry of such an order, they nowhereaddress how that would affect any tangible interest theypersonally enjoy.

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This Court has expressly adopted the same test for

standing applied by the United States Supreme Court. E.g.,

Ex parte Aull, 149 So.3d at 592; Ex parte King , 50 So.3d

1056, 1059-60 (Ala. 2010); Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens

Caring for Children, 904 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Ala. 2004).

Under this test, a party establishes standing to sue when

it satisfies three elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury

in fact” – an invasion of a legally protectedinterest which is (a) concrete and particularized,and (b) “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural”or ”hypothetical.” Second, there must be a causalconnection between the injury and the conductcomplained of – the injury has to be “fairly …trace[able] to the challenged action of thedefendant, and not … th[e] result [of] theindependent action of some third party not beforethe court.” … Third, it must be “likely,” asopposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury

will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61,

(1992) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has

further explained that "[b]y particularized, we mean that

the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and

individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1.

“Standing is the requisite personal interest that must

exist at the commencement of the litigation.” Cadle Co. v.

Shabani, 4 So.3d 460, 462-63 (Ala. 2008) (quotations

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omitted). Standing is a jurisdictional requirement. E.g.,

Ex parte Aull, 149 So.3d at 591. When parties without

standing “’purport[] to commence an action, the trial court

acquires no subject matter jurisdiction.’” E.g., Cadle

Co., 4 So.3d at 463 (quoting State v. Property at 2018

Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999)); Kid’s

Care, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Human Resources, 843 So.2d

164, 165 (Ala. 2002)(same). In the absence of subject

matter jurisdiction, the court “can do nothing but dismiss

the action forthwith.” Cadle Co., 4 So.3d at 363.

Petitioners, Alabama Policy Institute (“API”) and

Alabama Citizens Action Program (“ALCAP”), pay only lip

service to demonstrating injury-in-fact, and fail at both

steps. The generalized interests they’ve articulated are

neither sufficiently particularized, concrete, nor personal

to petitioners to be legally protected; nor have

petitioners specified what harm they suffered to their

interests or how.

API as an organization asserts an interest in

“influencing public policy” to “preserv[e] … rule of law,

limited government, and strong families.” Emgergency

Petition for Writ of Mandamus (“Petition”) Petition, at 9-

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10. To the extent arguably relevant here, API pursues that

policy interest by publishing studies showing the benefits

to families of heterosexual marriage and the detriments to

families from same-sex marriages. Id. at 10. ALCAP’s

asserted organizational interests are even more vague:

ALCAP states only that it exists to lobby the Alabama

Legislature on unspecified “pro-life, pro-family and pro-

moral issues” on behalf of “churches and individuals who

desire a family-friendly environment in Alabama.” Id .

But, similarly elusive and abstract interests in

promoting certain values or preferred policy outcomes have

routinely been found by both the United States Supreme

Court and this Court not to qualify as “legally protected

right[s],” e.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1256;

2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d at 1027, and an alleged harm

or impediment to such a value or policy preference found

not to constitute “injury in fact” or injury to a legally

protected right, e.g., id.; Ex parte King, 50 So.3d at

1060-61 (no right or injury); Kid’s Care, Inc., 843 So.2d

at 166-67 (no injury), as necessary for standing to exist.

For example, in Town of Cedar Bluff , a political

committee (Citizens Caring for Children) and its

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chairperson sued their town and mayor to enjoin a local

option wet-dry election concerning whether to allow the

sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages within the

then-dry town, on the ground that the enabling legislation

that authorized the election was unconstitutional. 904

So.2d at 1255 and n. 2. The trial court allowed the

election to proceed, but later declared the enabling

legislation unconstitutional and the election void; and

enjoined the town from issuing any licenses authorizing the

sale of alcohol. Id. at 1255.

On appeal, this Court found plaintiffs lacked standing

to sue and reversed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at

1259. Plaintiffs made conclusory claims – which are more

specific than petitioners’ assertions here -- that (1)

citizens and voters, including plaintiffs, are injured

“when an invalid election is held as the result of an

unconstitutional statute,” and (2) “the introduction of

alcohol sales into a town like Cedar Bluff … will result in

an injury to the town’s ‘welfare, health, peace and

morals.’” Both were held insufficient to establish the

“actual, concrete and particularized injury in fact” to

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plaintiffs as required to satisfy the first element of

standing. Id. at 1257, 1258-59.

Even more squarely on point, the U.S. Supreme Court in

Hollingsworth v. Perry found that the private intervenors,

even though designated as the official proponents of a

ballot initiative to amend the California state

constitution to define marriage as a union between a man

and a woman, lacked standing to appeal to defend the

constitutionality of the duly enacted constitutional

amendment, after the state Attorney General and other state

official defendants (all of whom had declined to defend the

law in the District Court) chose not to appeal.5 133 S.Ct.

2652, 2662-2664, 2668 (2013).

5 The California attorney general and other state officialschose not to defend the law in the District Court; wereenjoined by the District Court from enforcing the law, whenthat court declared the law unconstitutional; and thenelected not to appeal the District Court’s judgment.

Instead, the private intervenors defended the law in theDistrict Court, appealed that court’s adverse judgment, anddefended the law before the U.S. Court of Appeals for theNinth Circuit. Id . at 2660. Here, Judge Granade hasenjoined the Alabama Attorney General and those acting inconcert and participation with him from enforcing theAlabama marriage statute and constitutional amendment.Exhibit A, at 10; Ex. B, at 4.

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The Hollingsworth intervenors’ only interest in

pursuing an appeal was to “vindicate the constitutional

validity of a generally applicable [state] law.” 133 S.Ct.

at 2662. Here, petitioners’ request that this Court (in a

collateral proceeding) reiterate the requirements of

Alabama law, and then require all state probate judges to

comply with that state law6, also seeks merely to vindicate

enforcement of that law -- even though that law (as with

the Hollingsworth intervenors and the California marriage

amendment) does not affect either API, ALCAP, or any known

or alleged “constituent” in “’a personal and individual

way.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1)(“injury

that affects [the party] in a ‘personal and individual

way’” is required for that party’s standing).

Stated differently, petitioners API and ALCAP claim

“only harm to [their] and every citizen’s interest in

proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seek[]

relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [them]

6 Even though such an order is inconsistent with a federalcourt’s finding of unconstitutionality, and even thoughcompliance with such an order, for any named defendantprobate judge in that federal court, would violate afederal injunction.

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than it does the public at large.” Hollingsworth, 133

S.Ct. at 2662 (quotation omitted). But, it is well settled

that “such a ‘generalized grievance,’ no matter how

sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.” Id. One can

readily surmise from their mandamus complaint that

petitioners disagree sincerely (and likely strongly) with

the federal court’s order holding the Alabama marriage

statute and marriage amendment unconstitutional, having

requested this Court order all probate judges to comply

with the state statute and amendment regardless (unless and

until, implicitly, the U.S. Supreme Court issues “binding

authority,” see Petition, at 18-19 n. 3). But, “[t]he

presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious

it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet” standing

requirements. Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2661 (quotation

omitted).

Even if petitioners’ full-throated but generalized

interest in the enforcement of the Alabama marriage statute

and marriage amendment were a “legally protected right,”

e.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1256, their

petition fails to show that interest was injured in fact.

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Indeed, petitioners nowhere allege that they have been or

will be harmed by the challenged acts.7

Petitioners’ only arguable allegations of harm consist

of: 1) a passing reference to “the [unspecified] statewide

injury to the public caused by infidelity to Alabama’s

marriage laws,” Petition, at 23; 2) “confusion and

disarray” resulting from some probate judges issuing, and

others refusing to issue, same-sex marriage licenses,

Petition, at 23, 25; and 3)implicitly, “the [unspecified]

detriments [to families] associated with … same-sex unions”

-- which petitioners have not alleged to have occurred, but

which arguably may be inferred from API’s publication of

studies asserting the existence of such harms. See

Petition, at 10.

7 Petitioners have not specifically identified the acts theychallenge, requiring respondents and this Court tospeculate whether petitioners challenge and seek relieffrom (a) Judge Granade’s order declaring that the marriagestatute and constitutional amendment violate the federal

constitution, and her orders enjoining the Attorney Generalfrom enforcing the statute and amendment, and Mobile CountyProbate Judge Don Davis from refusing to issue marriagelicenses, or from refusing to issue licenses to same-sexcouples; or (b) the decisions by the respondent judges hereto follow Judge Granade’s declaration ofunconstitutionality and issue marriage licenses to same-sexcouples, or (c) both.

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But, none of those allegations asserts that either

petitioner (or even any particular “constituent” or set of

“constituents”) has been, or even will be, harmed itself.

E.g., Ex parte King , 50 So.2d at 1061-62 (no standing where

plaintiffs not personally deprived of right to vote or

denied equal treatment); Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at

1258 (failure to allege particular injuries plaintiffs

would suffer). Petitioners’ allegations fail to support

even that anyone else in particular has been or will be

harmed. E.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1258

(failure to allege particular injuries anyone other than

plaintiffs would suffer). Nothing in petitioners’

complaint shows how or in what manner petitioners or anyone

else has been or will be harmed. E.g., id. at 1257 (failure

to allege in what respect plaintiffs were injured by the

holding of the allegedly unconstitutional local option

election); Kid’s Care, Inc., 843 So.2d at 167 (lack of

allegations how DHR’s failure to perform local market

survey harmed plaintiff).

Even if petitioners had alleged a particular (and not

vague) harm, whether to themselves or others, they failed

to show how and in what respect the respondent probate

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judges’ acts harmed them – in effect, asking this Court to

presume those acts caused them harm. But, as this Court

first made clear over 150 year ago, for standing to exist,

“’injury will not be presumed; it must be shown.’”8 E.g.,

Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at 1256 (quoting Jones v.

Black, 48 Ala. 540, 543 (Ala. 1872)). This petitioners

have failed to do.9

8 This showing refers to allegations in the complaint, notevidence. See, e.g., Town of Cedar Bluff , 904 So.2d at1256-57.9 Petitioners’ argument for standing is not advanced by anylegal interest held or any harm suffered by any member ofeither organization. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington StateApple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 342-43(1977)(associational standing); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.490, 511 (1975)(same).

Neither group purports to be a voluntary association or

specifically claims any members, see, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S.at 342, although both groups purport to have “thousands ofconstituents throughout Alabama.” Petition, at 9-10(emphasis added). But, apart from the unnamed “churchesand individuals” referenced by ALCAP, neither group hasidentified any of those “constituents,” or any particularlegal interest of any such constituent, whether shared withor independent of that group – much less any harm caused toany such “constituent’s” claimed legal interest by thechallenged acts (presumably the issuance of same-sex

marriage licenses).Even if either petitioner organization otherwise

satisfied the requirements for associational standing, thelack of any alleged member who suffered harm to a concrete,particularized, and legally protected interest from thechallenged acts would deprive both petitioner organizationsof standing to bring this action. E.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at343; Warth, 422 U.S. at 511-12. Absent any injury in fact

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Moreover, the claims by both groups either to have been

a “leading proponent” or to have “vigorously promoted

passage” of the Marriage Act and/or the Marriage Amendment,

Petition, at 10-11, likewise fail to establish the standing

of either to sue. Even if either API or ALCAP had

performed an official role under Alabama law in the passage

of the Act or the Amendment – which neither did –, upon

approval of the Act (by the Legislature) and the Amendment

(by the voters) both measures became duly enacted law. At

that point, both groups lacked any official authority to

enforce either measure. Accordingly, both groups lacked

any “’personal stake’ in defending [either law’s]

enforcement that is distinguishable from the general

interest of every citizen of [Alabama],” as would be

required to have standing to defend those laws here.

Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2663.

Furthermore, the Court in Hollingsworth identified

several reasons not to extend standing to private party

“proponents” of a state law to defend its validity or to

to their own legal interests (as is missing here), bothpetitioner organizations lack standing to sue. E.g.,Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2663, 2665.

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seek its enforcement, as petitioners seek here. On one

hand, the State of Alabama clearly “has a cognizable

interest in the continued enforceability of its laws that

is harmed by a judicial decision declaring a state law

unconstitutional.” Id. at 2664 (quotation omitted). But,

“[t]o vindicate that interest or any other, [Alabama] must

be able to designate agents to represent it” in court, id.,

which the State has not done with respect to petitioners.

Nor could petitioners (as alleged prominent

“proponents” or “promoters” of the marriage statute and

amendment) claim a cognizable interest in enforcing those

laws as putative agents of the people of Alabama. As a

threshold matter, as with California and the intervenors in

Hollingsworth, Alabama (including its Attorney General,

whom the federal court has enjoined from enforcing those

laws) would have no agency right of a principal to control

petitioners’ actions, if this Court permitted petitioners

to sue. 133 S.Ct. at 2666.

Furthermore, petitioners are not elected officials. If

granted standing, petitioners would be accountable to no

one as to the manner in which they exercise that standing.

Owing no fiduciary obligation to the State of Alabama,

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petitioners would “decide for themselves, with no review,

what arguments to make and how to make them.” Id.

Petitioners would be “free to pursue a purely ideological

commitment to [each] law’s constitutionality without the

need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in

public opinions, or potential ramifications for other state

priorities,” id ., -- for example, the financial burdens on

the respondent probate judges and taxpayers of their

counties if this Court opens up each judge to suit in

federal court (by effectively barring all of them from

following the federal court’s order invalidating the same-

sex marriage ban, or from complying with any injunction

against enforcing that state law ban).

Whether viewed in terms of standing or proper parties

to enforce sovereign rights, these considerations all led

the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth to deny the intervenors

the right to sue to defend their generalized interest in

“proper application of the Constitution and laws.” Id . This

Court should do likewise as to petitioners. To hold

otherwise and to find petitioners here have standing would

“place[] [standing] in the hands of ‘concerned bystanders,’

who will use it simply as a ‘vehicle for the vindication of

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value interests.’” Id. (quotations omitted). But, “[n]o

matter how deeply committed petitioners may be to upholding

the [Alabama marriage statute and amendment] or how zealous

[their] advocacy, that is not a ‘particularized’ interest

sufficient to create a case or controversy” so as to find

standing and invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Id.

(quotations omitted).

In sum, even if petitioners had identified any legally

protected interest in defending the validity of Alabama’s

same-sex marriage ban, they have failed to allege how any

such interest was harmed by lifting of the same-sex

marriage ban; how they personally were harmed; or how an

order of this Court reinstating Alabama’s ban would remedy

any such harm to either petitioner’s personal interest.

Petitioners have not alleged, and cannot show, that they

suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; the

injury to their personal interest is fairly traceable to

the respondents probate judges’ challenged acts; or it is

likely that their injury-in-fact will be redressed by a

favorable ruling, i.e., any of the elements required to

demonstrate their standing.

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also has some interest in how the law is observed or

whether the executive action was proper. All laws and

executive actions affect the public in some sense, directly

or indirectly. But the rule of cases such as Kendrick must

have a real field of operation: there are matters that

“concern the sovereign rights of the State” such that only

the Attorney General may sue a state officer on the State’s

behalf. Claiming a public “interest” in enforcement of the

law, or an “interest” in how a public official handles a

difficult situation, is not always enough to allow any

private entity to sue a State officer in the name of the

State.

No matter what position one takes on the federal

questions regarding same sex marriage – and again those

questions are not before this Court – one thing is crystal

clear. That is this: that the “matter concerns the

sovereign rights of the State,” and concerns whether the

State’s sovereign right to define marriage is limited by

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

in the way that advocates of same sex marriage contend.

Indeed, Governor Bentley emphasized the connection to

State sovereign rights to the Supreme Court of the United

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States, when he appeared as amicus in support of the

unsuccessful request for a stay of Judge Granade’s orders:

he repeatedly emphasized his view that defining “the

incidents of the marital relation” was a matter of the

State’s “sovereign power.” See Motion of Robert J.

Bentley, Governor of Alabama, in Strange v. Searcy , No.

14A-840 (Supreme Court of the United States, filed February

4, 2015).10

Here, Probate Judges are faced with a complex

situation: i.e., what to do when State laws have been held

unconstitutional by a federal court, and all levels of the

judiciary up to and including the Supreme Court of the

United States have declined to stay that ruling. When a

Probate Judge faces this quandary, the matter concerns

10 This document is currently viewable at

The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that

the definition of marriage and laws related to marriageconcern the sovereign rights of the State. See United States v. Windsor ,570 U.S.12 (2013) where, in the majorityopinion, the Court noted that: “The arguments put forwardby BLAG are just as candid about the congressional purposeto influence or interfere with state-sovereign choicesabout who may be married. . . .”

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questions that highly implicate state sovereignty, as well

as implicating related questions about compliance with

federal law. Under cases such as Kendrick, this is the

very sort of situation in which state officials must not be

subjected to litigation by just anyone who feels strongly

about the issue.

2. There is another more fundamental point, though

given what has been said above, the Court should not have

to reach it. The more fundamental point is this: a private

party purporting to sue “on behalf of” the State, in an “ex

rel” capacity, is a remnant of a bygone era that should be

put to rest. In the modern era, litigation must be brought

in the name of the real party in interest. Ala. R. Civ. P.

17(a). The same should be true in original proceedings in

this Court. Thus this litigation is by the Petitioners,

period. State Bd. of Optometry v. Lee Optical, 287 Ala.

528, 531, 253 So.2d 35, 37 (Ala. 1971) (noting, even before

the Rules of Civil Procedure, that the relator is the real

party in interest). And in the modern era, this Court has

attended with great care to issues of standing – which, as

explained above, include the settled rule that one does not

have standing merely because he has a generalized grievance

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that he would like to see the law enforced as he thinks it

should be.

V. This Court lacks original jurisdiction over the

petition.

This is a court of “very limited original jurisdiction.”

Ex parte Tubbs, 585 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Ala. 1991); Ex parte

Giles, 133 Ala. 211, 212, 32 So. 167 (1902). This Court does

not have, or should not exercise, jurisdiction here for

multiple reasons.

1. This Court has original jurisdiction “to issue such

remedial writs or orders as may be necessary to give it

general supervision and control of courts of inferior

jurisdiction.” Art VI, § 140(b), Const. of Ala. 1901. This

authority is also reiterated in Ala. Code 12-2-7(3). This

Court, however, will not exercise original jurisdiction in

the issuance and determination of writs of mandamus (and other

extraordinary writs) to inferior courts, such as probate

courts, when there is another court that has jurisdiction to

entertain such writ. Ex parte Tubbs, 585 So. 2d at 1302;

Denson v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 247 Ala. 257, 258,

33 So. 2d 714, 714-15 (1945); Ex parte Barger , 243 Ala. 627,

628, 11 So. 2d 359, 360 (1943); Ex parte Morgan, 259 Ala. 649,

651, 67 So. 2d 889, 890 (1953); Ex parte Richey , 255 Ala. 150,

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157, 50 So. 2d 441, 447 (1951); Ex parte Price, 252 Ala. 517,

41 So. 2d 180 (Ala. 1949); Ramaguano v. Crook, 88 Ala. 450,

451, 7 So. 247 (1890); Ex parte Russell, 29 Ala. 717 (Ala.

1857); see also, Ex parte Pearson, 76 Ala. 521, 523 (1884):

By statute, this court is impliedly prohibitedfrom exercising original jurisdiction in the issueand determination of writs of mandamus, in relationto matters of which any other court hasjurisdiction; and from issuing remedial and originalwrits, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction,except when necessary to give it a general

superintendence and control of inferiorjurisdictions. [Citation omitted] And by Section657, the Circuit Court has authority to exercise ageneral superintendence over all inferiorjurisdictions. By the statutes, the Circuit or CityCourt has jurisdiction of the matter; a generalsuperintendence over the Probate Court of Montgomerycounty. The issue of a mandamus directly from thiscourt, to the Probate Court, is not necessary togive a general superintendence and control. Suchsuperintendence and control are acquired by an

appeal from the judgment of the judge of the Circuitor City Court, as the case may be, on applicationfor the writ of mandamus. For these reasons, theapplication must be dismissed.

Under these cases, this Court does not have – or at least

should not exercise – jurisdiction here.

This Court also has authority to “exercise original

jurisdiction in the issuance and determination of writs of

mandamus in relation to matters in which no other court has

jurisdiction.” Ala. Code § 12-2-7(2). But here, the circuit

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courts do in fact have the authority to issue writs of

mandamus to probate courts. Consequently, § 12-2-7(2) grants

no jurisdiction to this Court here.

The Circuit Courts have “the authority to issue such

writs as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate its

powers, and shall have such other powers as may be provided

by law.” Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of Ala. 1901. Further,

the Circuit “shall exercise a general superintendence over

all district courts, municipal courts, and probate courts.”

Ala. Code § 12-11-30(4).

This Court has held that to the extent a circuit court

cannot exercise its “general superintendence” over an

inferior court by appeal, the circuit court has the

constitutionally-based authority to exercise such general

superintendence by appropriate writs, such as a writ of

mandamus. Town of Flat Creek v. Alabama By-Products Corp.,

245 Ala. 528, 531, 17 So. 2d 771, 772 (1944) (“[O]rders and

decrees [of the probate court] not within the statute

[authorizing appeals from the probate court] are reviewed by

certiorari, mandamus or writ of prohibition, as the case may

be”); Ex parte Town of Valley Grande, 885 So. 2d 768, 770

(Ala. 2004) (circuit courts have authority to review orders

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of probate courts, either through direct appeal or, when no

statute grants appellate jurisdiction, by review on petitions

for writ of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition); Franks v.

Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 679 So. 2d 214, 216 (Ala. 1996).

Because the Circuit Court could consider a petition like

the present one, there is no jurisdiction in this Court

arising from § 12-2-7(2).

Ex parte Jim Walter Res., Inc., 91 So. 3d 50 (Ala. 2012),

upon which Petitioners rely, should not be read as rejecting

this argument. The Jim Walter court did not consider or even

refer to the provisions that empower circuit courts to

determine requests for writs (Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of

Ala. 1901), and to exercise general superintendence over

probate courts (Ala. Code § 12-11-30(4) (1975)).

Petitioners also ask this Court to exercise original

jurisdiction based on a narrow exception used by the Supreme

Court in Ex parte Ala. Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609,

613, 7 So. 2d 303, 306 (Ala. 1942). The exception, framed

around the question whether action by this Court is “necessary

to afford full relief and do complete justice,” id., was

deemed warranted solely on that one occasion, and only under

unusual circumstances not present here.

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Specifically, in Ala. Textile Products, this narrow

exception was held to justify this Court’s exercise of

original jurisdiction over a petition for writ of certiorari

seeking review of a quasi-judicial order of the Alabama

Department of Industrial Relations - not a petition for writ

of mandamus directed to a probate judge. This Court also

reasoned that it should exercise jurisdiction because all

parties consented to such jurisdiction. Id. at 614. Such

consent of the parties is not present in this case.

Moreover, Ala. Textile Products presented a unique

factual and procedural situation that likewise is not present

here. For instance, there did not initially appear to be any

lower court with the authority to review the petition in that

case. There were also significant concerns regarding the

need for an immediate decision which are not present here.

The narrow exception set forth in Textile Products does

not apply here. Enlarging and extending the narrow exception

to this case is not supported by legal authority, and would

lead to undesirable results. Any time an official allegedly

violated a law with state-wide application, Petitioners’

theory would justify the filing of a request for an

extraordinary writ with the Supreme Court. Bypassing the

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circuit courts who have authority to issue such writs would

become commonplace. This Court should not honor the

Petitioners’ request to exercise jurisdiction based on

Textile Products.

2. There is also an alternative basis for holding that

the circuit courts would have jurisdiction and that this Court

has none. This alternative argument proceeds from the premise

that issuing marriage licenses is an administrative, not a

judicial, act. Wood v. Farnell, 50 Ala. 546 (Ala. 1874);

Cotton v. Rutledge, 33 Ala. 110 (Ala. 1958).

Art. VI, § 142(b), Const. of Ala. 1901 provides, in part,

that the “circuit court shall exercise general jurisdiction

in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law.” As

explained in Brogden v. Employees’ Retirement System, 386 So.

2d 1376, 1379 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976), the circuit courts

possess two types of jurisdiction that are pertinent here:

(1) general subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) supervisory

jurisdiction over inferior judicial bodies, boards,

commissions and officers exercising judicial powers. Id.

Actions challenging the administrative acts of officials fall

within the circuit court’s general jurisdiction, whereas

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actions challenging the judicial acts of inferior courts fall

within the circuit court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Id.

The alternative argument here is that circuit courts

would have jurisdiction, in a case like this one, because the

acts of issuing and denying marriages licenses are

administrative acts, and any action challenging these acts

falls under the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts.

Brogden, 386 So. 2d at 1379. In Brodgen, the court held that

an action for declaratory judgment regarding the

administrative acts of a state official was under the general

jurisdiction of the circuit court. The supervisory

jurisdiction of the circuit court was not invoked because

there was no judicial act of an inferior court involved. Id.

at 1380.

Moreover, because the case falls within the general

jurisdiction of the circuit courts, this Court has no

jurisdiction over the subject petition. This is not a case

invoking the Supreme Court’s general supervisory jurisdiction

over inferior courts because there is no judicial act of an

inferior court that must be supervised. To the contrary, this

is an action challenging the administrative acts of officials.

There is no original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. See

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Ferrari, ___ So.3d ____, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 13, *16 (Ala.

2015). Those criteria are not met here.

The fourth criterion, a lack of jurisdiction, has been

addressed above and will not be repeated.

As to the third criterion – lack of another adequate

remedy – the proper conclusion is that if Petitioners are

parties with standing to seek any remedy, they should seek

it in Circuit Court as argued above. But more to the

point, they do not have any remedy in any court because

they have no standing. This does not mean that they meet

the third criterion for mandamus. On the contrary, it

means that they are not entitled to any remedy in mandamus

or otherwise, because standing is a jurisdictional point.

As to the first criterion – the “clear legal right in

the petitioner to the order sought” – Petitioners fail in

various ways. They themselves have no right to the order

sought, again because they have no interest that gives them

standing. Furthermore, a court should not issue a writ

that would, “in a collateral manner, decide questions of

importance between parties who are not parties to the

proceedings, and have had no notice or opportunity to

interpose their defense.” Ex parte Du Bose, 54 Ala. 278,

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280-281 (Ala. 1875). Petitioners seek a ruling on issues

that will (at least temporarily) affect those who seek

marriage licenses, yet no such person is a party to this

proceeding. Mandamus is inappropriate under Du Bose.

Moreover, both as to the first criterion (“a clear

legal right in the petitioner to the order sought”) and

perhaps even more importantly the second (“an imperative

duty on the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal

to do so”), Petitioners fail to appreciate the position

that Probate Judges now find themselves in.

According to Petitioners’ view of the situation, the

question of “imperative duty” can be determined in this

case by looking only to state law. (Petition, p. 22).

They properly do not ask this Court to address the

questions of federal constitutional law. But improperly,

they pretend that such questions have no bearing on what a

Probate Judge must, or can, do in this situation.

To put it most plainly, the Court should not place on

Probate Judges an “imperative duty” under the particular

circumstances of this particular case, to take actions

which will cause them to be sued in federal court (or even

possibly to be subject to contempt proceedings in federal

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court), and in all likelihood to lose and incur substantial

expense to the public. Probate Judges, under the

particular circumstances facing them here, should have

discretion as to how to proceed. Ashley v. State, 109 Ala.

48, 49, 19 So. 917, 918 (Ala. 1895) (“the duty of issuing

marriage licenses under our statutes by the probate judge,

though ministerial, is a duty involving discretion,

official and personal”). And if there is discretion, then

mandamus is inappropriate; for mandamus will not issue to

compel the exercise of discretion in a particular manner.

See, e.g., State v. Ellis, ___ So.3d ____, 2014 Ala. LEXIS

162, *36 (Ala. 2014).

The circumstances include at least the following: (1)

A federal District Court has held that the United States

Constitution forbids the denial of marriage licenses to

same sex couples; the Court has held that Alabama laws

which require such denial are unconstitutional. (2) The

federal District Court has further noted that officials who

were not parties to that litigation may certainly follow

her ruling about the demands of the United States

Constitution – and has warned that those who decline are

subject to suit, to injunction, and to adverse financial

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consequences for the public.11 (3) The United States Court

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court

of the United States refused to stay the District Court’s

order. (4) Probate Judges take an oath to follow both the

State Constitution and the United States Constitution. Art.

XVI, § 279, Const. of Ala. 1901. As Justice Bolin aptly

noted when concurring in Ex parte Davis, Probate Judges

were (as of last week) already in an “untenable position.”

Davis, 2014 Ala. LEXIS 16, *9.

Since that time, the situation has become more

untenable, if anything. Now, the federal District Court

has enjoined Mobile County Probate Judge Davis, “and others

in active concert or participation” with him, from denying

same sex marriage licenses. Some advocates believe that

this new injunction is binding on all Probate Judges, on

the theory that all such Judges act in concert (because,

for instance, Probate Judges do not serve only the

residents of their home counties). Judge Reed does not

vouch for this argument, but it cannot be dismissed out of

hand; and this Court could not resolve the issue, because

11 January 28, 2015, “Order Clarifying Judgment,” (Doc. 65 in

Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala.)) at p. 3.

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it would be a matter for the federal court to decide under

federal law. This is all the more reason to recognize

that Probate Judges must have some discretion, in terms of

which risks they choose to take in this situation.

An important question, then, is whether Probate Judges

in this untenable situation have an “imperative duty” to

ignore the federal court’s ruling about what the United

States Constitution requires – even when the higher federal

courts have declined to stay that ruling, even when that

ruling is in line with a clear majority of other federal

courts, even when most observers predict that the United

States Supreme Court will agree with that ruling, and even

when Probate Judges can surely expect that they too will be

sued in federal court if they resist the ruling.

Judge Reed respectfully suggests that it is important

from both a present and a historical perspective for this

Court to hold that state officials, such as Probate Judges,

have no “imperative duty” to fight against federal court

rulings on the United States Constitution.

VII. The Chief Justice’s Administrative Order does not

provide a basis for issuance of the Writ.

Respondent Reed adopts the argument of Judge Martin on

this issue.

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VIII. The fictitiously named Probate Judges should be struck

from the Petition.

In addition to the four named respondent probate

judges, petitioners listed as fictitiously named

respondents “Judge Does ##1-63,” each representing an

Alabama probate judge “who may issue, or may have issued,

marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Alabama.”

Petition, at 9. Even if pleading fictitious parties were

allowed in this Court, petitioners’ use violates standard

fictitious party requirements, requiring that all the Judge

Does be struck from the petition.

There is no rule (including but not limited to any

Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure) that by its terms

permits fictitious party practice here. That alone should

require dismissal or striking of all the fictitiously named

judges. Alternatively, even though Alabama Rule of Civil

Procedure 9(h) does not apply by its terms to an original

mandamus petition in this Court, if any fictitious party

practice is allowed in a petition like this, certainly the

principles of Rule 9(h) should apply as a matter of justice

and efficiency. See Ala. R. App. P. 1.

Rule 9(h) provides:

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When a party is ignorant of the name of anopposing party and so alleges in the party'spleading, the opposing party may be designated byany name, and when that party's true name isdiscovered, the process and all pleadings and

proceedings in the action may be amended bysubstituting the true name.

Rule 9(h) is "not meant to excuse ignorance of the

identity of a cause of action, but only ignorance of the

name of the party against whom a cause of action is

stated."

Ex parte Stover , 663 So.2d 948, 951 (Ala. 1995)(quotation

omitted).

Petitioner cannot credibly claim to be ignorant of the

identities of the Judge Does, all of whom are elected

public officials who can readily be identified with minimal

effort.12 Petitioners clearly failed to exercise the due

diligence required under Rule 9(h), e.g., id., to be

allowed to name respondents under fictitious names.

12 Even if it were relevant for Rule 9(h) purposes,petitioners can scarcely even claim they were ignorant of acause of action against the Judge Does, given that asignificant majority of Alabama probate judges have beenissuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples since amatter of days after the stay on Judge Granade’s injunctiveorder expired.

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Although their pleading does not state this expressly,

petitioners presumably seek the same relief against the

fictitiously-named Judge Does ##1-63 as against the named

respondent judges. For these fictitiously-named (but

readily identifiable by petitioners) Judge Does to be bound

to any relief granted or order entered by this Court,

without being personally served, and receiving notice, the

opportunity to appear in person, and to respond to the

petition and otherwise be heard, would violate each such

judge’s right to due process. See, e.g., Phillips

Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). And,

any judgment or order entered in violation of due process

would be void. Accordingly, all fictitiously-named Judge

Does ##1-63 are due to be struck from the petition.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained in this brief, and in the

briefs of other Respondents, Judge Reed respectfully asks

that the Court deny the requested writ and dismiss the

petition.

Attorneys for Judge Steven Reed

s/Robert D. SegallRobert D. Segall (SEG003)

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Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill,P.A.P.O. Box 347Montgomery, AL 36101-0347Phone: (334) 420-2956

Fax: (334) [email protected]

s/Constance C. WalkerThomas T. Gallion (GAL010)Constance C. Walker (WAL144)Haskell Slaughter & Gallion, LLC8 Commerce Street, Suite 1200Montgomery, AL 36104Phone: (334) 265-8573

Fax: (334) [email protected] [email protected]

Samuel H. Heldman (HEL009)The Gardner Firm, PC2805 31st St NWWashington, DC [email protected] Phone: (202) 965-8884Fax: (202) 318-2445

s/Tyrone C. MeansTyrone C. Means (MEA003)H. Lewis GillisKristen GillisMeans Gillis Law, LLCP.O. Box 5058Montgomery, AL 36103-5058Phone: (334) 270-1033Fax: (334) 260-9396

[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

John Mark Englehart9457 Alysbury PLMontgomery, AL 36117-6005Phone: (334) 782-5258

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mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I efiled the foregoing with theClerk of the Court on this 18th day of February, 2015 and Ihave served the following counsel of record by email:

Attorneys for Petitioner

Mathew D. Staver Email: [email protected]: [email protected]

Horatio G. Mihet Fla. Bar No. 0026581Email: [email protected]

Roger K. Gannam Email: [email protected]

LIBERTY COUNSELP.O. BOX 540774Orlando, FL 32854-0774Phone:(800)671-1776Fax:(407)875-0770

A. Eric Johnston Email:[email protected] 1071200 Corporate DriveBirmingham, AL 35242Phone:(205)408-8893Fax:(205)408-8894

Samuel J. McLureEmail:[email protected] Adoption Law FirmPO Box 2396Montgomery, AL 36102Phone:(334)612-3406

Attorney for Judge TommyRagland

George W. Royer, Jr.(Roy001)Brad A. Chynoweth (CHY001)Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne,P.C.

Attorneys for Judge Robert M.

Martin

Kendrick WebbEmail: [email protected] H. KiddEmail: [email protected] L. ClementsEmail:[email protected] & Eley, PC

P.O. Box 240909Montgomery, AL 36124-0909Phone: (334) 262-1850Fax: (334) 262-1889

Attorneys for Judge Alan King

Jeffrey SewellEmail:[email protected] McMillanEmail:[email protected], Sewell, McMillan, LLC

1841 2nd Ave., Ste. 214Jasper, AL 35501-5359Phone: (205-544-2350Fax: (205-544-2345

Hon. Luther StrangeOffice of the Attorney GeneralEmail: [email protected] P.O. Box 300152Montgomery, AL 36130-0152

Phone: (334) 242-7447

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P.O. Box 20872101 West Clinton Avenue,Suite 102 (35805)Huntsville, AL 35804Phone: (256) 535-1100

Fax: (256) 533-9322Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

s/Robert D. SegallOf Counsel
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

Documents

1140460 Judge Reed's Response