1[1] Lesson of Buncefield

7/31/2019 1[1] Lesson of Buncefield

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Buncefield

Command and Control Lessons Learned


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www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk


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3 - LASTFIRE Meeting 29/10/2009 - MRP

UKs response to

the Buncefield

IncidentThe BSTG Report


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BSTG Buncefield Standards Task Group

Ran in parallel to the MIIBinvestigation Finished with publication in July

2007 of the BSTG final report. Final report consisted of four

parts: Part 1 : Actions required ofOperations including timescales

Part 2 : Detailed Guidanceproduced by the BSTG

Part 3 : Work in progress

Part 4 : Comparisons with MIIBRecommendations on the

Design and Operation of FuelStorage sites


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Incident Commander (White surcoat) consulting industry

expert and bronze commanders.


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First decision! Extinguish or burn out!


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Hertfordshire Constabulary

Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service

Beds & Herts Ambulance & Paramedic Service

Hertfordshire County Council

The District and Borough Councils of Hertfordshire

Hertfordshires National Health ServicesVoluntary Agencies

Environment Agency

Utility & Transport companiesMulti Agency Involvement


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This presentation concentrates on fireaspects but many multi-agency lessons

also learned


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Main Command and Control Issues:Access control

Control of Personnel

Payment for resourcesStaging Areas

Equipment deployment

Foam Logistics

ContinuityAvailability

Responder rotation

Run off control

Back up resources

Strategic capability

Tank fire training

Some from report, some personal opinion


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Recommendation

Systems and Protocols to enable national deployment and extended

working of fire resources need to be implemented and tested

between FRSNCC and others. All potential responders should

adhere to accepted protocols and not mobilise until properly

ordered to do so.

Other brigades mobilised without request

Some turned up from overseas to help

Industrial responders mobilised without request

Good intentions but not easy to manage


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Recommendation

All local authority FRSs must work to the current edition of the fireService Manual on incident command. Other fire responders

should be aware of the incident command system and be able to

integrate their working practices in order to ensure a safe system

of work.

i.e.Industrial!

Comment made by On Scene Commander:

Those industrial firefighters who had been with

brigades knew the system


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Recommendation

Structured inner cordon procedures must be implemented and

maintained at major incidents.

Recommendation

A national system needs to be established to maintain an accurate

record of all fire responders at the scene that will enable a rapid

head count if required.

In the early stages there was little access management and

anyone who wanted to turn up could. (HFRS Officer)


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The UK have developed

Civil Resilience enhancement underthe

New Dimensions Programme


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A High Volume Pumping (HVP) moduleunloaded to ground level.


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Deployment of High Volume Pumps


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Recommendation

All equipment should be clearly labelled with the fuel type,

quantities, restart procedures etc.

London Lighting

Unit


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The large foam monitors required huge amounts of foam and water

before they could be used. Not many people appreciated this and

they also didnt understand the enormity of the task to supply them

and the time it takes to get the right equipment in place. (HFRS

Officer)

Specialist foam equipment and training of relief crews on the jobwas a little fraught. (HFRS Officer)

Foam inventory control and coordination: our opinion here is

based on the fact that there were too many points of contact on

foam needs and requirements from the fireground, especially

during the early stages of the incident.


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getting the foam to the fireground was problematic enough but

getting foam concentrate from a 25 litre container into a 1,000 litre

container would take almost an hour: clearly the small containers

were not useful at all. (HFRS officer)

tankers turned up with little or no means to get the foam from it

to another vehicle or branch. Much innovation was needed by

fireground personnel to enable foam to be collected from thesevehicles and delivered into the tankers that delivered the foam to

the branches via inline inductors. (HFRS officer)


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Water run off control


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Recommendation

FRSs should establish mutual aid arrangements with industry fire

brigades.

Response to similar incidents in the future?


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Ultimately many of the lessons learned

are the same as from other incidents


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Caribbean Petroleum CorpSan Juan

Friday 23rd October 2009


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Overall personal opinion?

Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, things could

have been done differently

But!

It was a magnificent effort

The tremendous logistical strength and incident

management expertise of the Local Authority Fire

Brigade under the command of their CFO combined

with the expertise and specialist equipment fromindustry meant that an effective fire attack could be

mounted and sustained.

Cooperation is the way forward.

It h b d l h !


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It has been done elsewhere!

Sweden

Japan

Amsterdam area

Rotterdam Europoort

Its important to learn from each other

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1[1] Lesson of Buncefield