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1.0 US-EPR Plant Overview
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Design HeritageThe U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (US-EPR) is a global product based on original U.S. technology and experience that has been advanced beyond existing plant designs.
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A mature design based on familiar technology
Evolutionary design based on existing PWR construction experience, R&D, operating experience, and “lessons learned.”
EPR Development Objectives
Improved economicsReduce generation cost by at least 10%Simplify operations and maintenance
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SaferReduce occupational exposure and low level wasteIncrease design marginsReduce core damage frequency (CDF)Accommodate severe accidents and external hazards with no long-term local population effect
Olkiluoto-3 (Finland)Construction started in 2005.Completion in 2012?
Flamanville-3 (EDF)Site preps started in 2006.Concrete pour started 12/2007.
UniStar (Constellation Energy + EDF)Calvert Cliffs 3 license application 07/2007 03/2008
EPRs Under Construction/Proposed
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Calvert Cliffs 3 license application 07/2007, 03/2008.China (agreement signed 11/2007)
Taishan 1 & 2, Guangdong provinceScheduled for completion in 2013/14.
AREVA (US-EPR design certification)DCD submitted 12/2007.
More U.S. License ApplicationsAmerenUE (Callaway), submitted 07/2008.UniStar (Nine Mile point), submitted 09/2008.PPL (Bell Bend), submitted 10/2008.
Elements of Design Philosophy
• Incorporate proven technology based on operating experience of existing PWRs.
• Make it cheaper & easier to operate & maintain
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maintain.• Make it safer: reduced exposure,
increased design margins, lower CDF.– N+2 (4 100% train) philosophy for some
safety-related systems.
Conventional 4-loop PWR design, proven by decades of design, licensing & operating experience
NSSS component volumes increased compared to existing
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co pa ed to e st gPWRs, increasing operator grace period for many transients and accidents
Reduced Equipment Quantities
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Study based on: RCS, PZR Spray, RCP seal and leakoff, SI/RHR, CVCS (including boration and demin/seal water, SFP cooling, CCW, FW, AFW/EFW/ and MS
U.S. Industry – Average Dose Per Reactor(1973 – 2004, Person-rem)
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Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Occupational Radiation Exposure at Nuclear Power Reactors and Other Facilities 2004Updated: 4/06
Improved Design Margins
9Increased power with improved margins
EPRI Utility Requirement
U.S. Nuclear Industry Safety Goals
U.S. NRCSafety Goal
Current U.S. LWR Plants
US-EPR
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1 X 10-4
Core Damage Frequency (yr-1)
5 X 10-5 1 X 10-5 4 X 10-7
General Plant Layout
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US-EPR vs. Current Unit Footprints
US-EPR1600 MWe
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4-Loop Unit1235 MWe
(similar to Callaway)
Major Design FeaturesNuclear Island
Proven Four-Loop RCS Design
Four-Train Safety Systems
No High Head ECCS
Double-Walled Containment
Electrical
Shed Power to House Load
Four Emergency D/Gs
Two smaller, diverse SBO D/Gs
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In-Containment Borated Water Storage
Severe Accident Mitigation
Separate Safety Buildings
Advanced Control Room
Site Characteristics
Airplane crash protection (military and commercial)
Explosion pressure wave resistance
Key Plant ParametersPARAMETER
Design LifeThermal Power, MWElectrical Power (Net), MWPlant Efficiency, %Hot Leg Temperature, °FCold Leg Temperature, °F
TYPICAL 4-LOOPPLANT (Uprated)
403587122034619559
US-EPR
604590160035
624563
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Increased power and thermal efficiency
g p ,Reactor Coolant Flow Per Loop, gpmPrimary System Operating Pressure, psiaSteam Pressure, psiaSteam Flow Per Loop, Mlb/hrTotal RCS Volume, ft3
Pressurizer Volume, ft3
SG Secondary Inventory at Full Power, lbm
100,500225010004.1
12,2651800
101,000
125,000225011095.17
16,2452649
182,000
EPR Heavy Reflector
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Reduces fuel cycle costProtects RPV shell against
irradiation embrittlement
Pressurizer Discharge Valve Arrangement3 Safety Relief Valves
• Held closed by PZR pressure• Each opened by:
• 1 spring-operated pilot valveOR
• 2 solenoid-operated pilot valves• 661,400 lb/hr each @ 2535 psig
2 Primary DepressurizationValves with block valves
•550 lb/sec each
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Three water-lubricated seals and a standstill seal
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RCP Shaft Seals
4-Train Systems:• Safety
Injection/RHR• Component
Cooling Water
Four-Train Safety Concept
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g• Essential
Service Water• Emergency
Feedwater
Each train of a 4-train safety system is independent and located within a physically separate building.
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ECCS• Suction from in-containment RWST; no switchover for
recirculation is necessary• No HHSI pumps; MHSI shutoff head is lower than
secondary reliefs– Can’t overfill an SG during an SGTR– SBLOCA response affected, so…
MSRT automatically actuated to reduce SG pressure to 870 psi in ~20 min. RCS pressure is then low enough for MHSI injection.
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“Partial Cooldown”
Severe Accident Mitigation:Molten Core Spreading Area
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Molten core leaves vessel and collects in spreading area, where it can be passively or actively cooled by water from IRWST.
Operator-Friendly Man/Machine Interface
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N4 Control Room EPR Control Room
Capitalizing on nuclear digital I & C operating experience and feedback
US-EPR Proposed Control Room
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Electrical Power
• 4 divisions of Class 1E power (one for each train of safety-related equipment), each with a backup EDG
• 2 SBODGs normally aligned to
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• 2 SBODGs normally aligned to nonsafety buses but capable of manual alignment to Class 1E buses
AREVA’s ConclusionsMost features are typical of operating PWRsFeatures included which help to
Improve SafetyIncrease redundancy & separationReduce core damage frequencyReduce large early release frequencyMitigate severe accident scenarios
Protect critical systems from external events
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yAircraft hazardExternal explosionFlood
Improve Human FactorsLower O & M Costs
Simplified systemsOn-line maintenanceUse of latest, proven technologyEconomy of scale
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs
RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates
RCS Pressure Control Feat res
3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary
3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs
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Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)
2 PORVs(auto & manual)
1 spray nozzle from all sources
RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal
Safety Systems
4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs
RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates
RCS Pressure Control Feat res
3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary
3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs
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Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)
2 PORVs(auto & manual)
1 spray nozzle from all sources
RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal
Safety Systems
4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs
RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates
RCS Pressure Control Feat res
3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary
3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs
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Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)
2 PORVs(auto & manual)
1 spray nozzle from all sources
RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal
Safety Systems
4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs
RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates
RCS Pressure Control Feat res
3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary
3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs
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Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)
2 PORVs(auto & manual)
1 spray nozzle from all sources
RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal
Safety Systems
4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsECCS MHSI pumps have
highest shutoff headIn-containment RWST
HHSI & LHSI pumps
Outside RWSTSGTR Miti ti
Since MHSI pump di h ’t lift
Relatively prompt t ti d d
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Mitigation discharge can’t lift secondary relief valves, extended time for operator action
operator action needed to depressurize RCS to prevent SG overfill, radioactive release
SBLOCA Mitigation
Partial cooldown automatically initiated to promote MHSI injection
HHSI injects at high RCS pressures
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsECCS MHSI pumps have
highest shutoff headIn-containment RWST
HHSI & LHSI pumps
Outside RWSTSGTR Miti ti
Since MHSI pump di h ’t lift
Relatively prompt t ti d d
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Mitigation discharge can’t lift secondary relief valves, extended time for operator action
operator action needed to depressurize RCS to prevent SG overfill, radioactive release
SBLOCA Mitigation
Partial cooldown automatically initiated to promote MHSI injection
HHSI injects at high RCS pressures
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsECCS MHSI pumps have
highest shutoff headIn-containment RWST
HHSI & LHSI pumps
Outside RWSTSGTR Miti ti
Since MHSI pump di h ’t lift
Relatively prompt t ti d d
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Mitigation discharge can’t lift secondary relief valves, extended time for operator action
operator action needed to depressurize RCS to prevent SG overfill, radioactive release
SBLOCA Mitigation
Partial cooldown automatically initiated to promote MHSI injection
HHSI injects at high RCS pressures
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsSevere Accident Mitigation
Core melt stabilization system & severe accident heat removal system provide for ex-vessel cooling of molten core
Attempt to cool damaged core in-vessel by flooding reactor cavity
I & C M tl di it l A l
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I & C Mostly digitalWork stations + large-screen displays
AnalogPanels of switches, pushbuttons, status boards
Electrical 4 Class 1E EDGs2 SBODGs
2 Class 1E EDGsVariable AAC sources
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsSevere Accident Mitigation
Core melt stabilization system & severe accident heat removal system provide for ex-vessel cooling of molten core
Attempt to cool damaged core in-vessel by flooding reactor cavity
I & C M tl di it l A l
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I & C Mostly digitalWork stations + large-screen displays
AnalogPanels of switches, pushbuttons, status boards
Electrical 4 Class 1E EDGs2 SBODGs
2 Class 1E EDGsVariable AAC sources
Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsSevere Accident Mitigation
Core melt stabilization system & severe accident heat removal system provide for ex-vessel cooling of molten core
Attempt to cool damaged core in-vessel by flooding reactor cavity
I & C M tl di it l A l
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I & C Mostly digitalWork stations + large-screen displays
AnalogPanels of switches, pushbuttons, status boards
Electrical 4 Class 1E EDGs2 SBODGs
2 Class 1E EDGsVariable AAC sources
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