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1.0 US-EPR Plant Overview 1

1.0 US-EPR Plant OverviewEPR Development Objectives Improved economics Reduce generation cost by at least 10% Simplify operations and maintenance 3 Safer Reduce occupational exposure

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  • 1.0 US-EPR Plant Overview

    1

  • Design HeritageThe U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (US-EPR) is a global product based on original U.S. technology and experience that has been advanced beyond existing plant designs.

    2

    A mature design based on familiar technology

  • Evolutionary design based on existing PWR construction experience, R&D, operating experience, and “lessons learned.”

    EPR Development Objectives

    Improved economicsReduce generation cost by at least 10%Simplify operations and maintenance

    3

    SaferReduce occupational exposure and low level wasteIncrease design marginsReduce core damage frequency (CDF)Accommodate severe accidents and external hazards with no long-term local population effect

  • Olkiluoto-3 (Finland)Construction started in 2005.Completion in 2012?

    Flamanville-3 (EDF)Site preps started in 2006.Concrete pour started 12/2007.

    UniStar (Constellation Energy + EDF)Calvert Cliffs 3 license application 07/2007 03/2008

    EPRs Under Construction/Proposed

    4

    Calvert Cliffs 3 license application 07/2007, 03/2008.China (agreement signed 11/2007)

    Taishan 1 & 2, Guangdong provinceScheduled for completion in 2013/14.

    AREVA (US-EPR design certification)DCD submitted 12/2007.

    More U.S. License ApplicationsAmerenUE (Callaway), submitted 07/2008.UniStar (Nine Mile point), submitted 09/2008.PPL (Bell Bend), submitted 10/2008.

  • Elements of Design Philosophy

    • Incorporate proven technology based on operating experience of existing PWRs.

    • Make it cheaper & easier to operate & maintain

    5

    maintain.• Make it safer: reduced exposure,

    increased design margins, lower CDF.– N+2 (4 100% train) philosophy for some

    safety-related systems.

  • Conventional 4-loop PWR design, proven by decades of design, licensing & operating experience

    NSSS component volumes increased compared to existing

    6

    co pa ed to e st gPWRs, increasing operator grace period for many transients and accidents

  • Reduced Equipment Quantities

    7

    Study based on: RCS, PZR Spray, RCP seal and leakoff, SI/RHR, CVCS (including boration and demin/seal water, SFP cooling, CCW, FW, AFW/EFW/ and MS

  • U.S. Industry – Average Dose Per Reactor(1973 – 2004, Person-rem)

    8

    Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Occupational Radiation Exposure at Nuclear Power Reactors and Other Facilities 2004Updated: 4/06

  • Improved Design Margins

    9Increased power with improved margins

  • EPRI Utility Requirement

    U.S. Nuclear Industry Safety Goals

    U.S. NRCSafety Goal

    Current U.S. LWR Plants

    US-EPR

    10

    1 X 10-4

    Core Damage Frequency (yr-1)

    5 X 10-5 1 X 10-5 4 X 10-7

  • General Plant Layout

    11

  • US-EPR vs. Current Unit Footprints

    US-EPR1600 MWe

    12

    4-Loop Unit1235 MWe

    (similar to Callaway)

  • Major Design FeaturesNuclear Island

    Proven Four-Loop RCS Design

    Four-Train Safety Systems

    No High Head ECCS

    Double-Walled Containment

    Electrical

    Shed Power to House Load

    Four Emergency D/Gs

    Two smaller, diverse SBO D/Gs

    13

    In-Containment Borated Water Storage

    Severe Accident Mitigation

    Separate Safety Buildings

    Advanced Control Room

    Site Characteristics

    Airplane crash protection (military and commercial)

    Explosion pressure wave resistance

  • Key Plant ParametersPARAMETER

    Design LifeThermal Power, MWElectrical Power (Net), MWPlant Efficiency, %Hot Leg Temperature, °FCold Leg Temperature, °F

    TYPICAL 4-LOOPPLANT (Uprated)

    403587122034619559

    US-EPR

    604590160035

    624563

    14

    Increased power and thermal efficiency

    g p ,Reactor Coolant Flow Per Loop, gpmPrimary System Operating Pressure, psiaSteam Pressure, psiaSteam Flow Per Loop, Mlb/hrTotal RCS Volume, ft3

    Pressurizer Volume, ft3

    SG Secondary Inventory at Full Power, lbm

    100,500225010004.1

    12,2651800

    101,000

    125,000225011095.17

    16,2452649

    182,000

  • EPR Heavy Reflector

    15

    Reduces fuel cycle costProtects RPV shell against

    irradiation embrittlement

  • Pressurizer Discharge Valve Arrangement3 Safety Relief Valves

    • Held closed by PZR pressure• Each opened by:

    • 1 spring-operated pilot valveOR

    • 2 solenoid-operated pilot valves• 661,400 lb/hr each @ 2535 psig

    2 Primary DepressurizationValves with block valves

    •550 lb/sec each

    16

  • Three water-lubricated seals and a standstill seal

    17

    RCP Shaft Seals

  • 4-Train Systems:• Safety

    Injection/RHR• Component

    Cooling Water

    Four-Train Safety Concept

    18

    g• Essential

    Service Water• Emergency

    Feedwater

    Each train of a 4-train safety system is independent and located within a physically separate building.

  • 19

    ECCS• Suction from in-containment RWST; no switchover for

    recirculation is necessary• No HHSI pumps; MHSI shutoff head is lower than

    secondary reliefs– Can’t overfill an SG during an SGTR– SBLOCA response affected, so…

  • MSRT automatically actuated to reduce SG pressure to 870 psi in ~20 min. RCS pressure is then low enough for MHSI injection.

    20

    “Partial Cooldown”

  • Severe Accident Mitigation:Molten Core Spreading Area

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    Molten core leaves vessel and collects in spreading area, where it can be passively or actively cooled by water from IRWST.

  • Operator-Friendly Man/Machine Interface

    22

    N4 Control Room EPR Control Room

    Capitalizing on nuclear digital I & C operating experience and feedback

  • US-EPR Proposed Control Room

    23

  • Electrical Power

    • 4 divisions of Class 1E power (one for each train of safety-related equipment), each with a backup EDG

    • 2 SBODGs normally aligned to

    24

    • 2 SBODGs normally aligned to nonsafety buses but capable of manual alignment to Class 1E buses

  • AREVA’s ConclusionsMost features are typical of operating PWRsFeatures included which help to

    Improve SafetyIncrease redundancy & separationReduce core damage frequencyReduce large early release frequencyMitigate severe accident scenarios

    Protect critical systems from external events

    25

    yAircraft hazardExternal explosionFlood

    Improve Human FactorsLower O & M Costs

    Simplified systemsOn-line maintenanceUse of latest, proven technologyEconomy of scale

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs

    RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates

    RCS Pressure Control Feat res

    3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary

    3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs

    26

    Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)

    2 PORVs(auto & manual)

    1 spray nozzle from all sources

    RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal

    Safety Systems

    4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs

    RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates

    RCS Pressure Control Feat res

    3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary

    3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs

    27

    Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)

    2 PORVs(auto & manual)

    1 spray nozzle from all sources

    RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal

    Safety Systems

    4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs

    RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates

    RCS Pressure Control Feat res

    3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary

    3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs

    28

    Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)

    2 PORVs(auto & manual)

    1 spray nozzle from all sources

    RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal

    Safety Systems

    4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRs

    RV Internals Neutron reflector Bolted baffle & former plates

    RCS Pressure Control Feat res

    3 PSRVs (auto & manual),2 primary

    3 code safeties (auto),2 PORVs

    29

    Features 2 primary depressurization valves(manual)3 spray nozzles (2 main, 1 auxiliary)

    2 PORVs(auto & manual)

    1 spray nozzle from all sources

    RCP Seals Standstill seal No standstill seal

    Safety Systems

    4 100%-capacity trains 2 100%-capacity trains

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsECCS MHSI pumps have

    highest shutoff headIn-containment RWST

    HHSI & LHSI pumps

    Outside RWSTSGTR Miti ti

    Since MHSI pump di h ’t lift

    Relatively prompt t ti d d

    30

    Mitigation discharge can’t lift secondary relief valves, extended time for operator action

    operator action needed to depressurize RCS to prevent SG overfill, radioactive release

    SBLOCA Mitigation

    Partial cooldown automatically initiated to promote MHSI injection

    HHSI injects at high RCS pressures

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsECCS MHSI pumps have

    highest shutoff headIn-containment RWST

    HHSI & LHSI pumps

    Outside RWSTSGTR Miti ti

    Since MHSI pump di h ’t lift

    Relatively prompt t ti d d

    31

    Mitigation discharge can’t lift secondary relief valves, extended time for operator action

    operator action needed to depressurize RCS to prevent SG overfill, radioactive release

    SBLOCA Mitigation

    Partial cooldown automatically initiated to promote MHSI injection

    HHSI injects at high RCS pressures

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsECCS MHSI pumps have

    highest shutoff headIn-containment RWST

    HHSI & LHSI pumps

    Outside RWSTSGTR Miti ti

    Since MHSI pump di h ’t lift

    Relatively prompt t ti d d

    32

    Mitigation discharge can’t lift secondary relief valves, extended time for operator action

    operator action needed to depressurize RCS to prevent SG overfill, radioactive release

    SBLOCA Mitigation

    Partial cooldown automatically initiated to promote MHSI injection

    HHSI injects at high RCS pressures

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsSevere Accident Mitigation

    Core melt stabilization system & severe accident heat removal system provide for ex-vessel cooling of molten core

    Attempt to cool damaged core in-vessel by flooding reactor cavity

    I & C M tl di it l A l

    33

    I & C Mostly digitalWork stations + large-screen displays

    AnalogPanels of switches, pushbuttons, status boards

    Electrical 4 Class 1E EDGs2 SBODGs

    2 Class 1E EDGsVariable AAC sources

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsSevere Accident Mitigation

    Core melt stabilization system & severe accident heat removal system provide for ex-vessel cooling of molten core

    Attempt to cool damaged core in-vessel by flooding reactor cavity

    I & C M tl di it l A l

    34

    I & C Mostly digitalWork stations + large-screen displays

    AnalogPanels of switches, pushbuttons, status boards

    Electrical 4 Class 1E EDGs2 SBODGs

    2 Class 1E EDGsVariable AAC sources

  • Summary of Major DifferencesCategory US-EPR Existing PWRsSevere Accident Mitigation

    Core melt stabilization system & severe accident heat removal system provide for ex-vessel cooling of molten core

    Attempt to cool damaged core in-vessel by flooding reactor cavity

    I & C M tl di it l A l

    35

    I & C Mostly digitalWork stations + large-screen displays

    AnalogPanels of switches, pushbuttons, status boards

    Electrical 4 Class 1E EDGs2 SBODGs

    2 Class 1E EDGsVariable AAC sources

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