1 Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology: Theoretical and Methodological Affinities

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T RGET RTI LE

Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

Theoretical and Methodological ffinities

Carlo Semenza (Trieste)

Abstract:

The position is taken in this paper that psychoanalysis

can better profit from findings

neuroscience and vice versa)

through the mediation

cognitive science. It sargued that cogni

tive science is highly compatible with Freud s background and

thinking. This opinion stems from a reconsideration Freud s

neuropsychological work, with particular reference

to

his book

on aphasia.

Cognitive neuropsychology and psychoanalysis are also

thought to share some basic theoretical tenets and methods; r

example, the assumption

transparency and the emphasis on

single case studies.

Some basic concepts developed within cognitive neuro)psy

chology may indeed be painlessly incorporated into psychoana

lytic theory. A mon g these, the concepts

modularity and

informational encapsulation as well as the distinction among dif-

ferent types

memory appear to have a particular importance.

Psychoanalysis and neuropsychology, both focused on

establishing a theory of the mind, departed from each

other a century ago, an event that marked the birth of

the former discipline. This happened because Sigmund

Freud, then a well-known neurologist and neuropsy

chologist, could not see how neurological notions

could effectively shape his new creature and the fasci

nating domains it promised to uncover,

s

he had

Acknowledgments:

This paper is based on an invited talk given at the

Neuro-Psychoanalysis Center

of

the New York Psychoanalytic Institute,

May 6, 2000, and a less formal seminar held in Boston on June 13,2000.

I am grateful to Arnold Pfeffer,Mark Solms, and Toni Greatrex for their

kind invitations, and to all members

of

the audiences for their inspiring

comments. Antonio Alberto Semi, Alessandra Ceola, and Konstantinos

Arvanitakis had the patience to discuss the framework of the talk with

me, providing both useful comments and caring encouragement. Giorgio

Sacerdoti did the same. Sadly, he passed away in the summer

of

2000.

This work is dedicated to his memory.

Carlo Semenza, M.D.,

is

Professor

of

Neuropsychology at th Univer

sity of Trieste, Italy.

hoped. In his letter of the September 22, 1898, to Wil

helm Fliess, Freud stated that he believed in an organic

foundation for behavior: Since, however, he had, apart

from his own conviction, no useful theoretical or prac

tical foothold, he concluded that he had to behave as

only psychological facts were available and his writ

ings remained consistent with this statement.

Sigmund Freud s unwilling choice, however, may

not be necessary anymore. Contemporary science pro

vides us with theoretical and methodological tools, un

available a century ago, that, while bridging the gap

between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology, may

also help the one discipline take advantage of the

other, in view of their undoubtedly common aim. This

paper will argue that the new, useful notions are not

so much those brought about by hard neuroscience,

of

which, despite undeniable successes, we are still

very much in need, but rather those inherent in cogni

tive theory. Once properly understood and used, these

notions will also reveal themselves to be surprisingly

consistent with Freud s thought, style, and cultural

background. In this respect one may even be tempted

to speculate that the founder

of

psychoanalysis came

close to discovering by himself most

of

the modern

tenets

of

cognitive neuroscience. On a more cautious

note, however, we may be satisfied with the fact that

most

of

the new neuropsychological theoretical and

methodological apparatus

of

cognitive neuroscience

can be easily and profitably incorporated into theoreti

cal psychoanalysis without any cost. Contrary to

widely expressed concerns, the richness

of

psycho

analysis has nothing at all to lose, and arguably much

to gain, from such an exchange.


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Freud s

Problem with Neurology

A first consideration must precede any other in this

paper: Are we now in a better position vis-a-vis

Freud s problem with neurology? Despite a century of

progress and despite the somehow artificial enthusi

asm raised by new technologies, we are not much

closer, in my opinion, than Freud was to a useful,

advanced neurophysiology. To be fully honest we do

not even know the register on which to match psychol

ogy and neurology.

e

still do not know enough about

the organization

of

the functioning of the nervous sys

tem. This may sound pessimistic, but it in no way

implies that we are stuck in an impasse. On the con

trary, we can legitimately claim to be in the main

stream of science.

In order to describe the present state

of

affairs in

cognitive neuropsychology

s

well s in psychoana

lytic theory, it may be useful to draw an analogy with

what happened in genetics. This science may indeed

claim to have reached, to a certain extent, a satisfac

tory level

of

reductionism, where molecular and func

tional notions are thought to be effectively integrated.

We have known for half a century that the molecular

structure of DNA mediates genetic transmission, ac

cording to rules whose essence we are now able to

grasp. However, the discovery of DNA and of its beau

tiful double helix structure would not have been fully

appreciated if we had not first identified it s the struc

ture, within the chromosomes, directly involved with

genetic information. Even before the discovery

of

the

chromosomes, we knew the precise laws

of

genetics,

and these are valid to this day. This was due to the

efforts of a monk, Gregor Mendel, who around 1865,

entirely unaware of DNA and chromosomes, was able

to workout the laws of genetics, just by observing

the growth of peas in his garden. Gregor Mende l s

endeavor held by no means less spectacular results

than Crick and Watson s experiments in the following

century. There is no shame, therefore, in being in Men

del s position, which is the one that both the cognitive

neuropsychologist and the psychoanalyst can comfort

ably occupy today-deriving laws of behavior from ob

servation. Without these laws it will be impossible to

understand the underlying neural structures. On the

other hand, mere localization

of

function, at present,

has not progressed since Fr eud s time; and it is not

progressing in a significant way, at least for the pur

poses we here have in mind.

lOne s ingle useful finding, however, m ay s ooner or later com e from

m odern ins trum ents : the ability to dis tinguish activation

of

a structure

from its active inhibition. T he fact that nowadays this dis tinction is not

distinguishable says a lot about the value of modern localization findings.

Carlo Semenza

Dealing with a Traditional Criticism

One criticism that has been made

of

cognitive neuro

psychology-and

one that may be directed to psycho

analysis s well-is the argument that there is nothing

to

learn about mental functions from the observation

of mental pathology. Pathological findings are inter

esting only

s

clinical phenomena but have nothing to

say about the normal mind; only laboratory experi

ments and observations of normal behavior would illu

minate this.

However,

s psychoanalysis could have taught

neuropsychology long ago, who is in a position to

decide whether the observations made in laboratory

experiments, designed according to the experimenter s

prejudices, have a greater epistemological value than

the observations made

of

patients whose brains have

been damaged by accidents of nature, entirely blind

to

the investigator s expectations as with patients on

the couch)? In all cases the ultimate filter is the observ

er s theory, which may be more or less correct.

In pathological cases there is indeed a further

advantage: Phenomena happen independently of the

observer s expectations; counterintuitive findings may

prompt adjustment or total changes to theory.

What Freud Missed

Freud could have and indeed might have realized what

I have j us t noted, perhaps in exactly the same way.

However, he did not have at his disposal the sort

of

psychology that may ultimately mediate between psy

choanalysis and neuroscience i.e., cognitive psychol

ogy). Since we have this instrument, we may now be

more optimistic than Freud. We cannot but admire,

however, how close he came to a proper cognitive

science. Cognitive neuropsychogists cannot but be in

awe of the many methodological and theoretical affin

ities displayed by psychoanalysis and cognitive neuro

psychology. Before discussing some of these affinities,

the term cognitivism must be defined via a discussion

of cognitive neuropsychology and its origins and

Freud s own scientific background.

Basic Notions about Cognitivism

The philosophical foundations

of

cognitivism s we

use the term here, are quickly defined by the features

Howard Gardner 1985, pp. 6-7 listed in The Mind s

New Science:


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Psychoanalysis nd Cognitive Neuropsychology

The usefulness

of

the concept

of

representation.

2

The computer metaphor.

3

The (momentary) deemphasis

of

affect, context,

culture, and history.

4. Its foundation in the Western philosophical-scien

tific tradition.

5

A belief in the importance of an interdisciplinary

focus.

How do these theoretical points reconcile with

Freud s position? The main and most original point

of

cognitivism is the belief that it

is

useful and legitimate

to posit a separate level

of

analysis called the level

of

ment l represent tion that is, the level where the sta

tus

of

represented information at a given point

of

pro

cessing is specified. Working at this level, a scientist

deals with entities such as symbols, rules, images, and

codes that constitute the content and format

of

the

represented information. In addition, a cognitive sci

entist explores the ways in which these representa

tional entities are joined, transformed, and confronted

with one another. Reasoning at this level is useful and

does not conflict a t all with an analysis

of

behavior

at the neurological level. Indeed, it may drive such

analyses. Surely, psychoanalysis lays claim to the

same objectives.

The computer metaphor was of course beyond

Freud s grasp. We shall see, however, that some

of

the ways in which mental computations are assumed

to be carried out were already known and were not at

all unfamiliar to Freud.

Gardner s third point may also be seen

as

incom

patible with psychoanalysis. One must, however, keep

in mind that deemphasis

of

affect, and so on, is seen

only

as

a temporary necessity. In order to keep the

field of investigation clear we have to assume that

noise/friction does not exist. Nothing, however, pre

vents us, in principle, from aiming directly for a theory

of

affect; for example, Western science, from Galileo

on, maintains only that it is easier to start from a sim

plified situation. Freud was too deeply educated within

Western scientific and philosophical traditions to ig

nore or disapprove

of

such strategies. The fact that he

also respected Eastern wisdom (e.g., the Cabala) can

not undermine this point. Finally,

so

far

as

interdisci

plinary issues are concerned, a quick look at what

Freud (1919) considered and listed

as

the ideal content

of

an analyst s curriculum provides a satisfactory

answer.

5

The Rise of Cognitive Neuropsychology in

Modern Times nd Its Origin in the 19th

Century

Cognitive neuropsychology developed in parallel with

cognitive psychology and other branches

of

cognitive

science, and it quickly became a respected partner. Its

main aim, like that

of

cognitive psychology, is to pro

vide a description

of

the format and content

of

mental

representations,

of

the processes connecting and acti

vating such representations, and in particular

of

the

functional architecture (i.e., the relation between

representations and processes). It pursues this aim by

studying the functional consequences

of

brain lesions.

Neuropsychology and cognitivism met naturally,

and the reciprocal exchange has been immensely fruit

ful. The reason is simple: Information processing

models like those

of

cognitivists can be lesioned.

A theoretical model can thus be interrupted at its joints

(between one representation and another) or directly,

at one or more

of

the representational levels. Predic

tions can be made about how the functional system

would behave in the presence

of

such lesions. These

may then be tested directly in cases with concrete le

sions in the brain.

f

the model is correct, the behavior

of

the brain-injured patient should reflect its predic

tions; otherwise the model should be revised.

When cognitive neuropsychology developed

around 1980, an identifiable group

of

old masters, in

deed the founders

of

neuropsychology, had just been

rediscovered in the preceding 20 years (mainly by

Norman Geschwind, a neurologist at Harvard). The

contributions

of

this group, which included Broca,

Wernicke, Lichtheim, Liepmann, Lissauer Dejerine,

Bastian, and Charcot (i.e., the creme

of

the neurolo

gists

of

their time), had been all but forgotten. What

distinguished their way

of

reasoning was their use

of

theoretical models and diagrams which,

on

close in

spection, are not at all unlike those used by modern

cognitive psychologists. They seemed to describe

computational processes: They may, thus, be consid

ered protocognitivists. It is interesting to consider why

they fell into such a long period

of

oblivion. Leaving

aside many other factors, like war, the decline

of

Ger

man culture, and academic rivalries, an important ele

ment was that they had been the target

of

ferocious

criticism by the generation

of

neurologists that imme

diately followed them. The reasons for this criticism

were often well grounded, but,

on

the whole, it was

also ungenerous vis-a-vis their vast achievements. The

group was accused

of

weak psychological theories,

inaccurate anatomy, naive understanding

of

the effects


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of lesions (von Monakow was then developing the

concept of diaschisis), and little grasp

of

statistics.

Henry Head, the British neurologist, called them, con

temptuously,

the

'diagram makers

-indeed

the very

reason why we now prize them.

Freud s Position

in

Neuropsychology

Freud himself was an important critic of the diagram

makers. It can never be stressed enough what a good

neuropsychologist he was. He deserves to be remem

bered with the fathers of

neuropsychology, not just for

introducing a term like

agnosia

but for entering into

the diagram makers' way of reasoning and then co

gently criticizing their models. Indeed, he worked en

tirely within their logic, with the full intellectual

equipment that he later used for his own creature, psy

choanalysis. His book On phasia (Freud, 1891) was

the best work on the subject of his time. It does not

really matter that he was ultimately wrong on several

specific issues. What matters more is that he came into

the enterprise of studying language with the theoretical

skills of a linguist, inspired by the (then nascent) Ger

man neogrammarian movement. Freud may thus be

considered the first neurolinguist. He realized that the

form of representation of language in the brain must

be such that local lesions can disturb the functioning

of

a linguistically well-defined subset

of

structures. In

his own words, the reaction of the speech centers to

damage suggests a certain concept regarding their

organisation. This is cognitive neuropsychology as

we know it today. This was the same man who later

invented psychoanalysis, using an analogous way of

reasoning.

Adding highly defendable linguistic constructs to

information processing diagrams has, indeed, been

one

of

the techniques that made cognitive neuropsy

chology so very successful. One basic concept that

influences cognitive neuropsychology, the concept of

modularity, as traditionally conceived, has been seen

as anathema to Freud. The reason for this is easily

discerned, but it reveals that Freud was not an adver

sary of the concept, but instead someone who could

have used the concept with profit.

The reason why Freud has been seen

as

an adver

sary of modularity is that he criticized the theory of

discrete anatomical centers for mental functions; for

example, Broca's or Wernicke's areas. He favored,

instead, the idea

of

a continuous processing space, sit

uated (in the case of language) in the perisylvian re

gions

of

the left hemisphere. In this space, the most

Carlo

Semenza

anterior portions would be more devoted to language

production than to comprehension, while the contrary

would apply to the more posterior parts. This, how

ever, does not necessarily imply that Freud's approach

is

incompatible with modularity. On the contrary, his

insistence on the necessity of giving separate consider

ation to each aspect of language may show that what

he

had in mind, in waiting for better neuroanatomy,

was a functionally modular system. Later develop

ments in psychoanalysis seem to support this view.

Some Early Efforts Toward

an

Integration

of

Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Science

The claim that psychoanalysis is a cognitive science

has already beendiscussed by others to a degree. Erdel

yi (1985) explained in some depth why psychoanalysis

is

indeed Freud's cognitive psychology. Erdelyi

was

impressed by the fact that computational methods

generated a series of concepts and theoretical con

structs that seem to find a match in Freudian metapsy

chology. For each of a number of psychoanalytic

concepts he lists parallel concepts in cognitive theory;

for example, he mentions' 'censorship (buffer, selec

tivity),

ego

(control processes, central executive),

conflict (decisional node), mental economy (ca

pacity), and consciousness (working memory). Er

delyi's work, however, ends there: He does not

consider the extent to which these matches are really

close ones (some are clearly not). He was mainly in

volved in the (creditable) task of

trying to experimen

tally demonstrate psychoanalytic concepts. The reason

why these experimental efforts are not particularly

pursued at the present time is beyond the aims of the

present paper.

What does not seem to emerge clearly enough in

Erdelyi's book,

is

the inadequacy with which cognitive

scientists have faced psychoanalytic theory. A pivotal

example

am glad that Andre Green [1997] has

picked it out

as

well)

is

the attempt to experimentally

demonstrate repression (cf. Baddeley, 1976) on the

pathetic assumption that it should be easier to remem

ber positive than negative events (lack of evidence for

this makes it difficult for some cognitive psychologists

to

accept the whole idea

of

repression)

On the other hand, psychoanalysts have so far

done very little for cognitive science. Cognitive psy

chology notwithstanding, psychoanalytic theory,

which more than anything else may be viewed as a

theory

of

memory, has provided by far the best avail

able theory of forgetting processes, and could provide


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Psychoanalysis

and

Cognitive Neuropsychology

more. There are, moreover, some modern notions

about the structure

of

memory that could readily bene

it psychoanalysis, and some of these will be men

tioned later in this paper.

Modularity in Neuropsychology, and Perhaps

in Psychoanalysis

The modularity theory is based on the idea that the

mind is organized, at certain levels at least, in func

tionally independent compartments. The most detailed

version

of

this theory was developed by Jerry Fodor,

in his popular

Modularity

Mind 1983 .

Neuropsychologists have utilized, explicitly or

(more often) implicitly, several views about modular

ity, which then determined the way they worked. A

complete description of the modularity theory and its

impact on neuropsychology

is

beyond the aims

of

this

paper. There are, however, two basic concepts linked

with modularity that may assume analogous roles in

psychoanalysis: dissociability of

functions and

informational encapsulation.

Modular organization leads to dissociability of

functions. The distribution between hemispheres of

mental functions provides the most trivial and uninter

esting example. Any handbook of neuropsychology

contains much more interesting instances. Mental fac

ulties and processes may thus work independently

of

each other without one process knowing about the

other. Both neuropsychology and psychoanalysis un

cover dissociations, and through observing them build

their models.

2

Informational encapsulation

is

one of the proper

ties

of

Fodor's modules, possibly the most important

one. This term refers to the fact that information

flowing within the module is impervious to extrinsic

information. This description is all too familiar to the

psychoanalyst who knows how encapsulated some as

pects of the patient's personality may be: Each patient,

s

a consequence

of

the psychoanalytic treatment, is

made aware of remote memories and deep conflicts,

but the patient may nonetheless persist in disadvanta

geous behavior vis-a-vis reality. Dramatic improve

ments are relatively rare. Only when the whole

memory system is retranscribed (we will discuss re

transcription or

nachtraglichkeit-Iater

,

through

painful and expensive work with the analyst

n ~

Associations

of

symptoms are also important observations. They

may be misleading but, s in the case of dissociations, their value ulti

mately depends on the strength of the theory they inspire.

transference, the patient acquires more degrees

of

freedom and behavior may change. For some patients,

unfortunately, accessing encapsulated parts remains

an impossible enterprise and the therapeutic process

may fail.

The Assumption

of

Transparency.

Methodological Affinities between Cognitive

Neuropsychology

and

Psychoanalysis

An important concept in cognitive neuropsychology

is the principle

of

transparency. Pathology may

highlight processes that go unobserved in fluent nor

mal functioning. This concept seems, prior to cogni

tive neuropsychology, to have been entirely

idiosyncratic to psychoanalysis. Indeed, mentioning

the issue of transparency naturally leads to the next

methodological issue, which

is

valid for both cognitive

neuropsychology and psychoanalysis: the supremacy

of single case observations over group studies, and the

reduced importance of classic syndromes.

Single case observations have constituted the ba

sis

of

psychoanalysis from the very beginning and fa

mous cases are the real stars

of

its history. Modern

cognitive neuropsychology has renewed the interest in

single cases that the diagram makers (later criticized

for this, but not by Freud) had brought to an art. What,

indeed, justifies this faith in single case observation?

Psychoanalysis has provided an answer, more or less

implicitly, for a century. Interesting cases are those

where one feature

of

normal behavior stands out more

clearly for observation and study. The underlying as

sumption

is

that pathology does not create new struc

tures or processes; rather, it reveals an imbalance

between existing ones. Thus normal defense mecha

nisms are highlighted in the context of neuroses, just

as, with brain damage, the workings of cognitive func

tions no

longer obscured by the harmonious work

ings of

others emerge

A consequence of this line of reasoning is found,

in a parallel fashion for psychoanalysis and neuropsy

chology, in the clinical field. The taxonomy of neuro

ses (no two psychiatry textbooks provide the same

one ) is much less interesting for the psychoanalyst

than the detailed profile of each individual patient's

personality structure. In the same way, for instance,

old aphasic syndromes like Broca's and Wernicke's

aphasias, still described in textbooks (there being no

full agreement among major research groups) are more

or less ignored by cognitive neuropsychologists who

want to distinguish the effects of damage to single,


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8

theoretically defendable components

of

language pro

cessing, such as, for instance, phonological representa

tions.

More on Modularity, Interactivity,

and

the

Psychoanalyst s Concern

In 1983, the year Fodor s book was published, Se

menza, Bisiacchi, and Rosenthal, at the first European

Workshop on Cognitive Neuropsychology, argued

that modularity might be considered an epistemologi

cal choice, rather than be taken literally s reflecting

the state of the brain and its cognitive systems (Se

menza, Bisiacchi, and Rosenthal, 1988). The assump

tion of modularity, they stated, may be meant to reflect

a sort

of

divide et impera strategy in science, where

truth may be better captured bit by bit, isolating prob

lems and trying to resolve them by focusing our interest

on the working of a few processes and representations

at a time. This strategy is independent

of

the fact that

the brain and its cognitive systems may ultimately turn

out to be fully interactive. Even Fodor limits modular

ity to what he calls peripheral systems, admitting

full interactivity for central systems, which, he sug

gests, are impossible to study. This view is not, how

ever, justified by neuropsychological observations

(Shallice, 1988). Neuropsychology has captured for

the modularity view a larger brain area than Fodor had

rather provocatively suggested. Whether reflecting a

tangible reality or not, the modularity assumption has,

therefore, contributed to bringing cognitive neuropsy

chology to its present state

of

sophistication. This is

not to ignore the fact that the concept of modularity,

probably taken literally and in Fodor s narrowest

sense, seems to disturb psychoanalysts (e.g., Green,

1997) who are concerned about the possible loss in

richness of Freud s theory. No problem of this kind,

however, attaches to the concept

of

modularity s in

tended here.

Surely the theories most dangerous to psycho

analysis are those that nowadays, quite surprisingly,

appear to have caught the imagination of psychoana

lysts. I am referring to connectionism, or worse, but

even more popular, the version

of

connectionism dif

fused by Gerald Edelman. While superficially re

flecting the desired degree

of

richness, wild

connectionism is far too unconstrained to be useful. I

am not saying that Edelman s connectionism ( neural

Darwinism ) is wild; but I object to the way it

is

being

used, through unprincipled and shallow analogies.

Nevertheless, Edelman s theory finds little sympathy

Carlo

Semenza

with cognitive psychologists, not even among those

who are favorably disposed to connectionism. This

attitude seems reciprocal: In Edelman s work, indeed,

cognitive psychology is either neglected or grossly

misrepresented.

Some Useful Concepts about Memory

What I think psychoanalysts are looking for, and be

lieve they have found in Edelman s work (cf. Modell,

1990; Green, 1997, 1999), is a model of memory that

allows constant retranscription. Indeed, the Freudian

concept of n htr gli hkeit is crucial to psychoanaly

sis. Recollection

is

not registered only once: Retran

scription

is

thus not isomorphic with experience.

During psychoanalysis, moreover, memory is retran

scribed again, in the interaction with the analyst. It

is perhaps this very process, more than others, that

furnishes the desirable therapeutic effects. It is there

fore important to point out that no cognitive model

of

long-term memory is incompatible with these views.

n

particular, none

of

the current views claims that

recollection (excluding immediate recall)

is

isomor

phic with experience. There is therefore no reason for

psychoanalysts to shun cognitive models of memory.

A positive reason for psychoanalysts to seriously con

sider the models of long-term memory developed in

cognitive psychology lies in the distinctions they have

been able to discern and locate in different points of

the brain. Indeed, the most convincing evidence for

the distinctions comes from lesion studies.

One

of

these distinctions, that between declara

tive or explicit memory and procedural or implicit

memory (for the sake

of

simplicity the question

whether declarative entirely overlaps with ex-

plicit and procedural overlaps with implicit

may be ignored), has indeed been recently recognized

s

useful for psychoanalysis (e.g., Fonagy, 1999). De

clarative memory, in current descriptions, deals with

conscious material, is under conscious control, and

involves the use

of

language. Procedural memory

works automatically, without intentional or conscious

recollection,

is

concerned with the acquisition and en

acting of skills, but may also concern conditioning

habits, biases, and features intrinsic to character.

Fonagy (1999) proposes that some networks

of

unconscious expectation or mental models

of

self-other relationship may be encoded in procedural

memory. These models may be, and surely are, defen

sively distorted by wishes and fantasies. In no sense

do

they bear safe testament to the historical truth and


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Psychoanalysis

and

Cognitive Neuropsychology

they can be highly dysfunctional. Psychoanalysis may

work by modifying these procedures more that any

thing else (obstacles to such modification are certainly

worthy

of

study).

What is only implicit in Fonagy s theory, but co

incides with his intuitions, is the idea that procedural

memory has another fundamental characteristic be

sides that

of

being unconscious. What cognitive psy

chologists have long known is that material stored in

procedural information is hard (and slow) to learn,

hard to forget, and hard to render explicit. Indeed, it

is not easy to learn how to ski, but once the ability is

acquired, it

remains-and

can be reused the following

season (or even after several decades) without much

deterioration in the basic skill. However,

as

those like

me, who learned the Austrian style in the sixties, know

all too well, once a skiing style is acquired, it becomes

very difficult (and expensive) to modify it

to

a more

efficient one (to say nothing of correcting defects). As

with psychoanalytic endeavors (and other things in

life) the likelihood

of

success depends also on age and

devoted sources. And it may (why not?) depend also

on

the relationship with

one s

own

instructor-whose

words (often spoken with a heavy Austrian accent)

have only partial access to the pupil s stored proce

dural knowledge.

The problem

of

dynamic forces preventing modi

fication remains, though there are some indications as

to how it may be overcome. Indeed, Fonagy (1999)

has worked out some of the implications of using the

declarative-procedural distinction in psychoanalysis.

When this enterprise is carried further, psychoanalysts

will have contributed a considerable degree of knowl

edge to cognitive science. I suggest that benefit could

come through psychoanalytic explorations

of

other

distinctions too, such as that between episodic (autobi

ographic) and semantic memory (the two components

of declarative memory whose borders are not that

clear-cut) and that between autobiographic and proce

dural memory. (Most childhood experience of psycho

analytic interest may well pertain,

as

Fonagy suggests,

to the latter rather than the former.)

Conclusion

Psychoanalysis does not need unconstrained theoriz

ing. Indeed most of its tenets can be baldly defended

against criticism

of

Popper s kind by appealing to

methodological assumptions

of

the type I have de

scribed for cognitive neuropsychology. I think that

similar assumptions may easily be adopted by psycho-

9

analysis. Indeed they were not completely absent from

the mind

of

its founder, who, with his stark decision

to leave neurology aside, may have unwittingly set the

scene for a kind

of

perversion. Too often psychoana

lytic writings seem to miss the main object

of

psycho

analysis, namely, a theory

of

the human mind. Too

many wild speculations (and far less rigor than desir

able) often distinguish psychoanalytic publications.

To be sure, psychoanalysts have traditionally

tended to accept the deep truths revealed to them in

the analytic setting, without worrying too much about

methodological questions. One cannot but hope that

this source of knowledge will remain the main one in

psychoanalysis, letting nothing disturb the flow of free

associations. One cannot but be in favor

of

psychoana

lysts engaging in poetry. However, when addressing a

theory

of

mental functioning, a dialogue with other

branches

of

science becomes desirable. I hope every

psychoanalyst engaged in the enterprise will remain

close to the lucidity

of

thought and sheer readability

of

Sigmund Freud.

If

they are unable to maintain such

standards in scientific work, and also unable to express

the same in poetry, let me suggest a course

of

action

for their work, which Freud himself took with the most

obscure

of

his own endeavors, with what we (not he )

called

A

Project for a Scientific Psycholo

gy -throw

it away.

References

Baddeley, A. D. (1976), The Psychology Memory. New

York: Basic Books.

Erdelyi, M. (1985), Freud s Cognitive Psychology. New

York: W. H. Freeman.

Fodor,

(1983), Modularity Mind. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press.

Fonagy, P. (1999), Memory and therapeutic action. In

ternat.

Psycho-Anal. 80:215-223.

Freud, S (1891), On Aphasia. New York: International

Universities Press, 1953.

(1919), On the teaching of psycho-analysis in uni

versities. Standard Edition 17:169-173. London: Ho

garth Press, 1955.

Gardner, H. (1985), The Mind s New Science. New York:

Basic Books.

Green, A. (1997), Cognitivismo, neuroscienze, psicanalisi:

Un dialogo difficile. Psiche 5(2):65-67.

(1999), Consilience and rigour. This Journal

1(1):40-44.

Masson, M., Ed. (1985), The Complete Letters Sigmund

Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904. Cambridge, MA:

Belknap/Harvard University Press.

Modell, A. H. (1990), Other Times Other Realities. Toward

a Theory Psychoanalytic Treatment. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.


9/9

1

Semenza, C., Bisiacchi,

P

S.,

Rosenthal, V (1988), A

function for cognitive neuropsychology. In:

Perspectives

on Cognitive Neuropsychology

ed.

G

Denes,

C

Se

menza, P S Bisiacchi. Hove, U.K.: Lawrence Erl

baum.

Shallice,

T

(1988),

From Neuropsychology to Mental Struc-

ture.

Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Divide

and

Conquer

or

Murder to Dissect ?:

Commentary by Jason Brown (New York)

My commentary on Semenza's paper labors under the

burden

of

having to refute almost every line

of

its

content. I only hesitate because prior critiques have

passed unnoticed (Schweiger and Brown, 1989).

Surely, the diagram school that Semenza so admires

survives in cognitive neuropsychology not by virtue

of the emptiness of past criticism but because an alter

native agenda was not promoted with sufficient vigor,

clarity, or popular appeal. The old models were based

on the telegraph (Eggert, 1977), the new ones on cir

cuit boards, and both have nothing to

do

with brains.

Indeed, it is a striking conceit that a separate level of

analysis

of

mental representation, consisting

of

little

more than a compilation

of

local, often inconsistent,

models that uncouple brain and cognition, can drive

research at the neurological level.

Semenza assumes one can momentarily clean

the field of investigation and ignore the 'noise/fric

tion of affect, context, culture, and history, returning

to these topics once the results

of

a scientific study are

clear. The problem is that after the mental components

have been identified, the noise that was ignored at

the start cannot then be reinserted in the object, where

it belongs, but is attached artificially by way of exter

nal relations. An example

is

the ad hoc postulation

of

a binding mechanism to unify a multiplicity

of

neurocognitive modules that should never have been

isolated in the first place. Another example concerns

the relegation of affect to a furnace in the base

ment, extrinsic to mental content. This is one area

of

overlap with psychoanalytic concepts. In the meta

psychology, Freud attempted to reconcile a static con

nectionism with the flux

of

process in the idea that

Jason Brown, M.D., is Clinical Professor

of

Neurology at New York

University Medical Center, and Director

of

the Institute for Research in

Behavioral Neuroscience.

Jason Brown

Carlo Semenza

Department Psychology

University Trieste

i S Anastasio 12

34100 Trieste Italy

e mail: [email protected]

the substantive or self-identical traces inherited from

association psychology were modulated by libidinal

drive energy (cathexis) which, on the model

of

the

synapse, was conceived as an extrinsic factor.

I have

no

idea whether Semenza understands the

implications of this theory of mind, but I would like

to

remind the reader what

is

at stake in this discussion.

I believe that a coherent psychology must provide an

account not only

of

the major domains

of

cognition,

language, memory, action, and perception, but of au

thenticity, individuality, feeling, and character as well.

And this requires a psychology founded on precisely

those precepts that are the objects

of

cognitivist deri

sion, namely, a theory

of

change, process, and tempo

rality, and their relevance to the nature

of

subjectivity,

value, and moral responsibility.

Identity

and

Authenticity

Cognitivism is but one example of a mode

of

thought

that over the latter half of this past century has had a

profound impact on contemporary life. The assump

tion of timeless, repeatable, or self-identical

objects-

exemplified by the concept

of

representations-has

had a powerful influence on the way we think about

the import of intrinsic relationality and the subjectivity

of mental states. What

is

the nature of a thing that

makes it what it is, or what

is

the quality of difference

that

is

decisive for the individuation of things that

are ostensibly identical? We see this influence in the

tension in this culture between a relative homogeneity

of thought and a striking diversity

of

lifestyle, as if

tattoos and nose rings could authenticate an individu

ality that has been threatened with absorption and loss.

We

see it in the triumph of immediate pleasure over

sustained engagement, or in a cult of celebrity against

Documents

1 Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology: Theoretical and Methodological Affinities