1. -Power to- And -Power

The SAGE Handbook of Power

‘Power to’ and ‘Power over’

Contributors: Gerhard GöhlerEditors: Stewart R. Clegg & Mark HaugaardBook Title: The SAGE Handbook of PowerChapter Title: "‘Power to’ and ‘Power over’"Pub. Date: 2009Access Date: October 14, 2013Publishing Company: SAGE Publications LtdCity: LondonPrint ISBN: 9781412934008Online ISBN: 9780857021014DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9780857021014.n1Print pages: 27-40

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Chapter 1: ‘Power to’ and ‘Power over’

The distinction of power to and power over has featured prominently in the discussionof power inthe last few decades. This may seem surprising, since bothpower to andpower over appear to be simple phrases, the term ‘power’ merely extended by twoprepositions. After all, Hanna Pitkin coined both terms almost by chance in 1972, but itsoon became clear that they express a fundamental distinction in our understanding ofpower, with the result that the distinction between power over and power to has been noless than groundbreaking in the years since. Power, then, is either a property or actuallyexercised. Why has this distinction proved to be so successful? There appear to be tworeasons.

The first is that experiences of power are particularly complex. Among the concepts thatdescribe fundamental social phenomena, the concept of power seems to be one of themost unclear and controversial. There have been countless endeavors to define powermore precisely and conclusively, all of their results remain as unsatisfactory as ever(Morriss 1987: 1). Initially this sounds surprising, since we think of power as distinctlyexperienceable and identifiable in everyday life. However, the academic discussion ofpower can demonstrate that this impression is misleading, since a more penetratinganalysis is consistently able to discover new characteristics of power. The work sincethe 1980s has contributed greatly to this, which is the second reason for the increasinguse of power to and power over.

The complexity of power, which has, in any case, long been acknowledged in thediscussion of power, became a main focus of social science's discussion of power inthe 1980s. In the 1960s and 70s the concern was still to broaden empirical researchon dimensions of power over that had hitherto escaped immediate perception. Thus,“new faces” of power were discovered (Bachrach/Baratz 1977, Lukes 1974 and2005) as part of an endeavor to tighten the elements of critique against an affirmativeunderstanding of power. Since the 1980s things have become less straightforward.The discussion about power has widened and become even more complex. Manifold,

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formerly unconsidered aspects have been introduced, new perspectives opened. Moreoften than stemming from [p. 28 ↓ ] professional empirical analysis, these were by-products of broader social theories: Talcott Parson's structural functionalism, HannahArendt's description of the conditio humana, Michel Foucault's discourse analysis,Pierre Bourdieu's exposition of the concepts of capital and hegemony as put forwardbyWestern Marxism, Niklas Luhmann's subtle system theoretical modeling. All in all, itseems, the new elements in the discussion of power in the 1980s and 90s have broughtabout a muddled situation that is hard to disentangle. It becomes increasingly difficultto incorporate the different approaches of analysis into a comprehensive concept

or a common definition of power.1 Consequently, it becomes more difficult to give a

systematic overview of the current ideas of power.2

In this situation, it proves to be extraordinarily helpful to distinguish power to and powerover as the two fundamental dimensions of power. This differentiation – having becomeprominent in the last 20 years – allows to better place different approaches to thecurrent discussion of power, and to grasp the coherence of the concept despite itsmultifold aspects. Therefore, I will take the distinction between power to and power overas a starting point for structuring the newer concepts of power, and I will explore this

direction as far as possible.3 It has to be acknowledged, however, that in some respectseven the distinction between power to and power over is not unproblematic and needsfurther clarification. As will be seen, the power to and power over framework does notalways bring clarity to the multiple ramifications of contemporary understanding ofpower and recent discussions often progress beyond the initially illuminating distinctionbetween power to and power over. Therefore, in my final analysis, I will argue in favor ofrestructuring the concept of power in a way that goes beyond power to and power over.I propose to use the distinction between transitive and intransitive power for furtherdifferentiations. The analytic value of this elaboration can be illustrated using the classicopposition of Max Weber's and Hannah Arendt's concepts of power. Seen as transitiveand intransitive power, they turn out to be complementary to each other and refer to anintegrative concept of power.



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The ‘Power to’ and ‘Power over’ Distinctionand its Limits

The distinction of the two concepts was introduced by Hanna Pitkin, who formulated it

for political science in a study on Wittgenstein and justice:4

One may have power over another or others, and that sort of poweris indeed relational (…) But he may have power to do or accomplishsomething all by himself, and that power is not relational at all; it mayinvolve other people if what he has power to do is a social or politicalaction, but it need not. (Pitkin 1972: 277)

Power over means power over other people, enforcement of one's own intentionsover those of others, and is thus only conceivable in a social relation. Power to, onthe other hand, is not relatedto other people. Itis an ability to do or achieve somethingindependent of others. It is not a social relation. This distinction corresponds to adifferent normative judgment of power. Exercising power over within a social relationalways produces a negative result for those subjected to it, because it narrowstheir field of action. This is the case regardless of the possibly noble intentions orpositive outcomes of the exercise of power. A's autonomy within a power relationshipnecessarily means correspondingly less power for B. Power to, on the other hand, isgenerally considered favorably. The reason for this is that power to is [p. 29 ↓ ] notdirected at others, but at the individual or the group as actors themselves. The focus isnot on the effects of power on others, those subjected to it, but on power as the ability toact autonomously. In this sense, power is constitutive for society.

Pitkin's conceptual distinction is the starting point for further differentiation which hasbecome definitive for the contemporary discussion of power. Even when power overand power to are not explicitly mentioned as terms, contemporary accounts of powertypically no longer define it merely as a social relation which one may or may not viewcritically. It is also seen as a precondition for communal life, in which individuals maythen be constituted as such. Acommon expression of this point of view is the ideaof the ‘productivity’of power. Power to produces the social relations through which




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power acts and in which the individual is thus also ‘produced’. For those concerned, theresults of this are contradictory. On the one hand, power to creates autonomy while,on the other, power over limits the field of action. Modern concepts of power can beplaced on either one side or the other, but there are cases in which both aspects canbe united. Then ambiguities emerge which are hard to reconcile in everyday speech.Foucault demonstrates this using the word ‘sujet’(subject): ‘There are two meanings ofthe word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control or dependence, and tied to hisown identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ (Foucault 1982: 212). Hence, poweroperates as power over and power to; it is repressive and productive at the same time.In the following, we will see how far the contemporary discussion of power can bestructured according to the terms power over and power to, and where the distinction isnot adequate.

‘Power over’

Power over covers all concepts of power which – in keeping with the everyday use ofthe term – define having power as prevailing over others. Power over is subjective whenimposing one's will, interests or preferences, or objective when carrying out inherentnecessities or given norms. Here, the self-referential definition of power to is eithersilently implied or explicitly excluded (Wartenberg 1990). A classic power over analysisis the debate on ‘faces’ or ‘dimensions’ of power, which took place in the 1960s and1970s. Its starting point is Robert A. Dahl's empirical study on actually exercised power.He aims to show that American society is not ruled by elites but that it is pluralist despitethe criticism suggesting otherwise (Dahl 1961, 1968). This point of view is questionedby Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz on the basis that Dahl only addresses the openlyexposed face of power. Bachrach and Baratz present an additional, second dimensionof power, the dimension of ‘non-decisions’ which can have tremendous consequencesjust because they are not apparent. Non-decisions are provisions which ensure thatsome issues do not even make it onto the agenda. In this respect, American society isindeed ruled by elites and not at all pluralist (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). Steven Lukesadds a third dimension: power is not only the suppression of subjective, but also ofobjective interests – interests that those subjected to power are not aware of, but would



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pursue if they knew that they corresponded with their objective situation (Lukes 1974,2005).

The debate can by now be considered to have ended (Ball 1988; Clegg 1989). Itdeveloped mainly in the context of ‘left-wing’, essentially Marxist social critique, whichcould not be continued without strain in the 1990s in the face of increased awarenessof the oppressive practices of Eastern bureaucracies in the name of socialism. (Phillips1991: 12)

[p. 30 ↓ ] Still unconcluded is the question of who exercises power over: agency orstructure? Also, what is the status of power to and power over in the feminist discussionof power? Agency or structure: From the actor's perspective, power relationshipsare mainly oriented toward acting persons or collective actors (agency). From theperspective of the system, they are mainly impersonal mechanisms (structure).Both perspectives address very different aspects, and it would make little senseto reduce them to the same thing. Thus, both perspectives will continue to existalongside each other. This remains certain, despite mediations. Since Gidden's theoryof structuration at the latest, it can be argued that agency and structure must be seenas complementary. ‘Structuration’ means that society is the product of a reciprocalprocess: ‘Human agency produces structures which simultaneously serve as theconditions for reproduction of human agency in a continuing process’ (Clegg 1989).For instance, the feminist discussion of power sees agency and structure together fromthe beginning. The power women are submitted to – the ‘subjection of women as theconditions for reproduction of human agency in a continuing process.’ (Clegg 1989:139) Power is exercised in two ways. Actors limit the field of action of others. If they arecontinually successful in doing this, existing structures are either reinforced or changed.At the same time, these structures purport all personal exercise of power within onefield of action.

Therefore, the feminist discussion of power sees agency and structure together fromthe beginning. The power women are submitted to – the “subjection of women” (JohnStuart Mill) relates to actions as well as to structures: it is both the direct suppressionof women by men and the overpowering of women by the structural asymmetry ofthe sexes which results from patriarchy and is often also internalized by womenthemselves. Undoubtedly power affects women through discrimination on the basis



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of sex, which must be abolished – either by establishing equality between the sexes(equality feminism) or by acknowledging the intrinsic value of womanhood (differencefeminism).

The starting point of these analyses is power as power over, but the feminist discussionof power does not stop there. It includes power as power to (see below) or destroys– sometimes in connection with power to – the basis of the simple idea of power overin relations between the sexes. This inevitably leads to difficulties. Anyone who wantsto measure the exercise of power must establish who exercises it and who enduresit. From the feminist perspective, this signifies a clear identification of sexes; but thispremise has been questioned by postmodern, post-structuralist approaches since the1980s. Sexes are mostly culturally conditioned and socially constructed. Sex consists of(biological) sex and (social) gender, and even this differentiation is questionable (Butler1993). Nothing solid, substantial remains. Because of this, power can no longer simplybe seen as power over, no matter whether it results from male actions or structures. Itis no longer enough to insist on a fundamental and universal difference between thoseexercising power and those submitted to it, as does ‘point-of-view feminism’ (Dunker1996).

Critics of this development fear that the feminist concept of power may lose its bite, withviolence and dominance becoming diffuse (Holland-Cunz 1998) and the previously well-defined subject disappearing rather than resisting (Benhabib 1996). Nancy Hartsock(1990), analyzing this from a Marxist position, argues similarly: within the manifoldrelations of power, one loses sight of the real suppression of the acting subject.Emphasizing the social construction of gender differences, searching for new feministstrategies which draw less on the common experience of oppression than on a diversityof [p. 31 ↓ ] coalitions (Mouffe 1998, 2000) – all this has made locating power over ingender relations increasingly difficult (Butler 1993).

‘Power to’

The analysis of power relations described as power over presupposes that at leastone of the parties is able to execute more power than the others. Here, power is aprecondition: it first has to exist before it can be exercised; but it is really power if it is



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not exercised over others? Obviously, power is not only the realization of options toact; it is these options. Therefore, it is useful to not only analyze the effects of power onothers but also as a property or ability. This is the aspect of power to. In analyses thatrelate to power to, power to either precedes power over and defines the preconditionsfor power relations (Dowding 1996; Morriss 1987), or it is not considered simply as aprecondition but as a form of power in itself, a fundamental aspect of social relations.

As far as the preconditions for exercising power are concerned, power is primarily adisposition: it is a capacity as opposed to exercised power; while it remains unexercisedit is latent, still invisible, and only potential, not actual (Wrong 1979; Morriss 1987;Dowding 1996). In essence, all these descriptions of power to are similar, even thoughthey appear with different connotations within the discussion. When power is consideredas a disposition, it is also latent and only potential.

Concepts that deal primarily with power to reject a hasty analysis of power relationsalong the lines of power over (Morriss 1987). There is indeed a problem in so far as asimple examination of the effects of power remains too superficial to recognize the realunderlying social and political connections. On the other hand it is argued that empiricalresearch on power can only be conducted by examining its effects, and that the analysisof power to therefore has a merely heuristic value (Wartenberg 1990; Dowding 1996).One wonders whether the discussion could not be ended by the simple suggestion thatboth aspects of power belong together. Power over can only be effective if it also existsas a potential – on the other hand, the mere potential of power remains undefined andtherefore nonexistent unless it is realized and becomes visible in social relations. Inthis context, power to is generally analyzed in terms of the resources needed to makepower relations effective, and power over is analyzed in terms of the effects of powercapacities on social relations. It makes sense, nevertheless, not to approach poweranalysis via this symmetrical question, but first to pursue the aspect of power to alone.

The starting point is the observation that power is not always a zero-sum game assupposed in all concepts of power over. In a zero-sum game, the purpose of exercisingpower is to strengthen one's own position and to diminish the power of the addressee.However, this idea is not adequate for analyzing power processes in which both sidesmay gain. The transition from a concept of power as a zero-sum game to a concept ofpower as productive for all participants is most clearly demonstrated by Talcott Parsons



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and Niklas Luhmann: in relationships of reciprocal interaction, power engages withcounterpower in such a way that the power of A is strengthened by the power of Band vice-versa. The increases in power on both sides of the relationship are mutuallydependent on one another (see Göhler 2000: 45). For Parsons (1963), power, likemoney, is a circulating [p. 32 ↓ ] medium by which obligations are exchanged withinthe political system. It is in this way that the possibility of common action is createdand increased: power is ‘the generalized medium of mobilizing resources for effective

collective action’ (Parsons 1963: 108, cf. Clegg et al. 2006: 191–7).5 For Luhmann,power is a symbolically generalized medium of communication. Via the medium ofpower, credit is given and performance is expected: the high performance expectedof leaders by those being governed demands an ‘investment’ in the form of increasedsupport. The result is a joint increase in power. (Luhmann 1975, 2000; cf. Clegg et al.2006: 201–3).

Finally, the transition to productive power is given a radically normative twist byHannah Arendt. She defines power exclusively as people speaking and acting ‘inconcert’ (Arendt 1970: 44) – meaning fundamentally that the public and politicalsphere exists and people are constituted as individuals only by speaking and actingin human society (Arendt 1958, 1970). Thus, Arendt takes an extreme position byexplicitly limiting her definition to power to and rejecting power over as violence, thatis to say the opposite. Power is a purely self-referential relation, not referring to oneindividual, but to a group and therefore to a community of individuals. Since humancohabitation and politics are produced by power, it is not only a potential but exactlythe opposite: realized power through communication. Power isnot onlya capacity butalso empowerment, people gaining the abilityofautonomous action. Here, making adifference between potential and actual power is meaningless. The normative approachis the decisive antipole to our basic understanding of power over in the everyday senseof the words. At the same time, it radically questions the common differentiation of thetwo terms. If it is even the slightest bit convincing, the seemingly helpful concept ofpower over and power to becomes obsolete.




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‘Power to’ and ‘Power over’

At this stage it seems that only two alternatives remain. The first alternative is to

combine power over and power to.6 Indeed, there are concepts of power where thedifferentiation of power over and power to does not hold water, because they cover bothaspects or at least it is not conclusive which side they are on. The second alternativeis more far-reaching. In light of all the difficulties in distinguishing power over andpower to, might it not be necessary to replace the power over/power to concept withsomething new to avoid these difficulties? In the following section we will look at the firstalternative. Concepts of power in which the differentiation of power over and power todoes not work have an ambiguous understanding of power to – either as a capacity (1)or as empowerment (2).

(1) The theories of international relations usually distinguish four approaches: realism,institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism (e. g. Schimmelfennig 1998). Realistapproaches focus on states as the main actors within the international system;institutionalist approaches on international centers of power in the form of organizations(the UN, the World Bank) or regimes (GATT, WTO); liberal approaches point tothe domestic system as determining the behavior of a state within the internationalarena; and constructivist approaches to the structuring of the international systemthrough ideas and norms. What does this mean for a theory of power? Realist,institutionalist and liberal approaches discuss whether power should be viewed as acapacity or a social relation (Baldwin 2002). Any capacity [p. 33 ↓ ] obviously becomeseffective only in a relation between actors at the point where resources are unevenlydistributed, so that threats suffice (see Morgenthau 1948). Here, institutionalist andliberal approaches look not only at actors, but are also interested in structures. Forconstructivist approaches the connection between agency and structure is centralbecause ideas and norms are structural factors influencing actors' behavior. At thesame time, actors are able to change guiding ideas and regulating norms within the

international system – it is not a one-sided dependency (Guzzini 1993, Wendt 1999).7

In this co-dependent relation, power to would be attributed to the structures, power overto the actors – structures set the framework within which actors actually exercise power.But if this relation is generally open and interchangeable, it seems to make very little





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sense to preserve the differentiation of power over and power to. On the contrary, italmost seems consistent that the theories of international relations should take very littlenotice of the differentiation at all.

(2) But power can bedefined not only as acapacity but also as empowerment, asgaining and retaining autonomous power to act. Theories that use power to in thesense of empowerment occasionally distinguish power over and power to but theysee the two concepts as complementary to each other. Constructivist approacheswithin the theories of international relations already contain the idea of power asempowerment because ideas and norms not only structure actions, but also give themtheir initial power to act (Barnett and Duvall 2005). In the contemporary discussionof power in the social sciences, this aspect has gained in importance, especially inthe theories of Foucault and Bourdieu, who call it “productive power”. Individuals areconstituted as autonomous individuals only in the sense that they are subjects, i. e.subjected to social power relationships. In this case, then, power over and power tomust be distinguished and preserved at the same time. Foucault and Bourdieu bothview power critically as a means of domination, as power over. Foucault considerspower a ‘multiplicity of force relations’ (Foucault 1990: 92), in which the individual isentrapped not so much by repression as by the structures of discourse and socialpractices, which pervade him or her to the innermost. Bourdieu discusses structures ofcapital and emphasizes symbolic capital. Prevailing symbol systems are the dominatingform of expression in every society. Accordingly, individuals are located within thesocial system of power by their form of expression, their ‘habitus’. This is also theindividuals' own perspective of perception, so they accept the symbolically cementedpower relations as legitimate, even if they are disadvantageously positioned withinthe social system by them (Bourdieu 1977, 1987). Power relations of this sort areconstitutive for both societies and individuals. Foucault considers the fact that powerpervades the body of the individual as a precondition for the constituting of subjects asindividuals. They internalize the norms of social discourse and practice, but becauseof the tensions emerging in the process, they are also able to realize their individualityand develop potential for resistance against ruling social force relations. Bourdieu ismore cautious in this respect; all the same, the individual can enhance his or her statusand – enlightened by intellectuals – penetrate relations of dominance and fight them insymbolic struggles.



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Feminist concepts of power often refer to Foucault – and Hannah Arendt – with theaim of connecting power over and power to. Thus, Judith Butler interprets Foucault'sconcept of power in such a way as to allow norms of mutual acceptance betweenindividuals to develop within force relations. All-pervading power affects the body in itsself-preservation and its desires. Under these conditions, how can a form of individualitydevelop which depends [p. 34 ↓ ] on mutual acceptance? Power is the medium. It‘orchestrates […] the way in which we affectively reassure ourselves of our identityor give it up’ (Butler 1993: 66). Amy Allen – referring to Foucault, Arendt and Butler– explicitly takes up the problem of the distinction of power over and power to for thefeminist discussion of power and attempts to resolve it by introducing a third dimension:power with (Allen 1999). She takes power over as the ability to limit other people'sopportunities for choice; power to as the individual ability to achieve a goal or resist;power with as the ability to act jointly and in solidarity. In this way, she attempts to linkFoucault and Arendt from a feminist perspective. In comparison with power over andpower to, however, power with is a far more normative category, since joint actionsof solidarity may well be urgently desired, but cannot be empirically presupposedto exist. Hence, the difficulties in distinguishing power over and power to remain,while power with begins at a whole different level. Amy Allen has worked throughthe contemporary discussion of power intensively and moved it on with impressiveconsistency. Nonetheless, simply adding another dimension leaves too many questionsunanswered to restructure the concept of power in a useful way. A more fundamentalapproach is necessary.

Restructuring the Concept of Power:Transitive and Intransitive Power

In relation to Hanna Pitkin's distinction of power over and power to, how can the abilityof an individual or a collective actor be considered effective at all without referring tothe realization of power in a social relation? It seems clear that power over and powerto cannot easily be separated. Nevertheless, there is evidence that - in a very differentway -power over and power to must not necessarily be connected. Military strengthis a form of power that must not necessarily be exercised in order to influence others'



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behavior and reach one's goals. Here, power is - in the sense of power to - the abilityto accomplish something, but power is not only about its effect on others. As HannahArendt has shown, a group's power to act can only be won through its power over itself,and here, power to as a group's self-reference exists before its influence on the outside.So in addition to the difficulty in distinguishing power over and power to, the latter isambiguous in itself. As we have seen already in the previous section, power to means

In the first case, power to is potential. The possible effects of capacity can, of course,only be assessed when it is actualized, but when there is adequate experience, it doesnot need to be actualized to be effective (see military strength again); the threat suffices- and appears even more intense (Luhmann 1975). Power, then, is latent; it creates itseffects without acting. The threat has to be visible to its addressee - possibly throughearlier experiences -but is not actualized again to further influence actions (compareBachrach and Baratz's ‘non-decisions’).

In the second case, power to is actual. When speaking of empowerment, the powerof an individual or a group is either existent or not. If existing, it is always actual; ifpotential, [p. 35 ↓ ] it is not. Autonomous power to act always has to be actualized toexist: through renewed integration of citizens (Smend 1928) or through the continuouscommunication of everyone concerned (Arendt 1958, 1970). It does not exist withoutbeing permanently actualized. But, power over, too, is ambiguous in this sense: Firstly,power over signifies a social relation in which one actor prevails over another. Thisrelation is a manifest influence, i. e. an observable social event; actual and related to anaddressee with a relationship of wills. But power over can also be self-referential andpotential. This is the case when a society binds itself by obligating itself in a constitutionnot to substantially change certain inalienable rights of the individual or fundamentalnorms of the social system (how ever disputed they might be in a given case), and totie important decisions to the consent of a substantial majority. The effect is potential,because it is only questioned in case of violation; at the same time, it influences thebehavior of everyone within that society. They orient themselves in a certain way out ofconviction or to avoid sanctions (Elster 1983).

Both power over and power to mean different things, depending on their potentiality oractuality and on whether their point of reference is inside the group (self-reference) oroutside:



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Potential Actual

Reference to the outside power to capacity power over influence

Self-reference power over self-binding power to empowerment

So one can explain why the two dimensions of power over and power to are so hardto distinguish, even though they are intuitively illuminating. What they mean is in bothcases ambiguous and mutually entwined.

In view of these results, I propose structuring the concept of power differently (Göhler1997, 2000). Power referring to the outside is transitive power, i. e. power whichtranslates the will of an actor into another actor's will and thereby exercises influence.Power referring to the inside, i. e. power as self-reference, is intransitive power, i.e. power that is produced and preserved by itself, by society. Both – transitive andintransitive power – can be actual and potential:

Potential Actual

Transitive power: referenceto the outside

influence

Intransitive power: self-reference

empowerment

Both tables do not differ concerning the contents, but using the differentiation oftransitive and intransitive power, the two basic aspects of power – potential and actual– can be clearly distinguished. The intuition of the differentiation between power toand power over is maintained but its ambiguity banned. If the categories power overand power to are transferred to the categories transitive and intransitive power, allcharacteristics of power introduced by the distinction of power over and power tocan be upheld. At the same time despite the similarities, distinguishing transitive andintransitive power solves some of the [p. 36 ↓ ] analytical difficulties the discussion ofpower has been faced with since the introduction of power to and power over.



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Conclusion: Max Weber, Hannah Arendtand the Idea of an Integrative Concept ofPower

The starting points of the distinction of transitive and intransitive power are the twoclassic theories of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, which seem almost incompatible.Max Weber sees power as being transitive, while Hannah Arendt understands it to beintransitive. Max Weber understands power as enforcing one's own will within a socialrelation, which can also be done by using violence: ‘Power is the probability that oneactor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despiteresistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’. (Weber 1978: 53)Exerting an influence over others is a widespread understanding of power within thesocial sciences. But Weber only speaks of a probability or a chance. Power for Weber ispotential, a capacity, which hastobetranslated into actual influence. HannahArendtontheother hand understands power as communicating with one another and acting ‘inconcert’(Arendt 1970: 44). Power for her is the opposite of violence. Here, power isa relation people produce by acting and communicating together; it is not primarilydirected on others. Were it only potential, it would not matter. The relation is only powerwhen it is public; power is empowerment when realized. Both with Max Weber and withHannahArendt it would be too short sighted to only speak of power over (Max Weber) orof power to (Hannah Arendt). With Max Weber, power is capacity as well as influence,with Hannah Arendt power is self-binding as well as empowerment. Thus, Max Weber'sconcept of power is not only power over but it is transitive, while Hannah Arendt'sconcept is not only power to but it is intransitive. At the same time, both concepts arecomplementary.

In this way, they are both starting points for an integrative concept of power coveringboth its transitive and intransitive dimensions. Power is the medium in social relationstostructure fields of action. When power emerges or is exercised, certain options to actare opened up or closed off to the parties involved. More precisely: there are significantdisadvantages to be expected when disregarding opened up options to act or pursuingclosed off options, or there are significant advantages to be expected when pursuing



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opened up options to act or disregarding closed off options. Even though it appearsthat other media, like money or love, might also structure the involved parties' optionsto act in other ways, at a closer look, the structuring medium is always power. If moneyis not only about earning and love not only about affection, but when they structurethe participant's fields of action, it is the power of money or the power of love affecting

this.8 Power can structure fields of action in a dual way, transitively or intransitively. Inthe transitive sense, power means that actor A influences actor B with the intention toopen up or close off specific options to act to him or her. This can be done potentiallyby capacity or actually by influence. More difficult to understand is that intransitivepower can also structure the fields of action of actors involved, especially and not leastaccording to the understanding of power of Hannah Arendt. While transitive powerinterlocks the fields of action of the parties involved in social relations by executinginfluence, intransitive power creates a common field of action in the first place by‘speaking and acting in concert’ (further Göhler 2000: 48–9). By way of communication,a [p. 37 ↓ ] community is not only created, but structured because it opens up certainoptions to act and closes off others. It is the trademark of common action or a commonbasis for individual action that the options to act are not arbitrary but oriented toward acommunity or at least framed by common values. Who complies with them is includedinto the community, who does not is excluded.

There are certainly other approaches than the normative concept of power by HannahArendt, which help to understand the intransitive dimension of power. Foucault can alsohelp us comprehend how common power as a medium can generate structure (Göhler2000: 46). But the opposition of Hannah Arendt and Max Weber illustrates especiallywell how transitive and intransitive power work, how they do not exclude each other,but how they are complementary. Altogether, they thereby open up the perspective onan integrative concept of power, even if each concept taken by itself may not suffice toincorporate all the differentiations of the contemporary discussion of power.

Notes

1 As Haugaard notes, ‘There is no single essence that defines the concept but there area number of overlapping characteristics, as in a large family, which define membership.




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Each theory has local usage which makes sense for that theory but is not entirelyapplicable in a different context’. (Haugaard and Lentner 2006: 9).

2 Recent overviews of the different concepts of power are given by Lukes (1986), Clegg(1989), Imbusch and Leutner (1998), Haugaard (1999, 2002, 2003), Scott (2001) andClegg et al. (2006, see footnote 3).

3 Similarly, Clegg et al. (2006: 190–227) present power to and power over as ‘twomajor theoretical auspices for the social theory’ (190). They facilitate new insights in theunderstanding of power even if in the last analysis they cannotbe separated. ‘Power willalways consist in a complex contingent tension between a capacity toextend freedomof some to achieve something and an ability to restrict the freedoms of others in doingsomething or other’. (191)

4 Pitkin hereby refers to the late Wittgenstein, to use the ordinary-language philosophyfor the understanding of power: ‘A Wittgensteinian approach will suggest that we beginby asking not what power is, but how the word “power” is used’. (Pitkin 1972: 276)

5 In this context, Barnes, with Parsons, develops a concept of social power connectedto the cognitive order of a society: ‘Social power is the added capacity of action thataccrues to individuals through their constituting a distribution of knowledge and therebya society.’ (Barnes 1988: 57)

6 Here, Haugaard (Haugaard and Lentner 2006: 10) position Giddens, Morris, Foucaultand himself. Presupposing that the understanding of power to is consensual, whilethat of power over is conflictual (Haugaard 2002: 4), he understands social reality as asystem of meanings always constructed from ‘confirming-structuration’ where power tocapacitates action, and from ‘destructuration’ where power over creates new hierarchies(Haugaard and Lentner 2006: 50–4, cf. Haugaard 1997, 2002). Gramsci's, Laclau's andMouffe's concept of hegemony fulfils exactly these premises (Haugaard and Lentner2006; with emphasis on autonomy: Lentner 2005).

7 This differs from structural theories in international relations. Dependency theoriesand modernization theories assume that the existing power gap between the First andthe Third World cannot be explained by the actions of politicians. Rather, it is founded



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on structural conditions, namely the differing degrees of development, which lead tounequal conditions of exchange (Galtung 1971, Strange 1989).

8 Thus, power is not only the specific code of politics (Luhmann 1986, ch. XIII), itappears in all social relationships as a structuring medium (Foucault 1976).

Gerhard Göhler

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Documents

1. -Power to- And -Power