1 Bernardo v. CA

11/29/2014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 007

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No. L18148. February 28, 1963.DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate

of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the institutedheirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTUROBERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATEHERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES,ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.

Descent and distribution; Estate proceedings; Determinationby probate court of question as to title to property; General ruleand exceptions.—While as a general rule question of title toproperty cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays merely for theinclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in whichcase the probate court may pass provisionally upon the questionwithout prejudice to its final determination in a separate ction(Garcia v. Garcia, 87 Phil. 353; Guingguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil.144), however, when the parties are all heirs of the deceased, it isoptional on them to submit to the probate court a question as totitle to property, and when so submitted, said probate court maydefinitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil.561; Mañalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661).

Same; Same; Same; Probate courts vented with jurisdiction totry controversies between heirs regarding ownership of propertiesallegedly belonging to deceased.—The jurisdiction to trycontroversies between heirs of the defeased regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate is vested in

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368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution



of the residue among the heirs and legatees, and by liquidation ismeant the determination of all the assets of the estate andpayment of all the debts and expenses (Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil.982).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate court vested with jurisdiction to determine if properties belong to conjugal partnership.—The question of whether certain properties involved in atestate proceeding belong to the conjugal partnership or to thehusband exclusively, is a matter within the jurisdiction of theprobate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugalpartnership in order to determine the estate of the decedentwhich is to be distributed among his heirs.

Ownership; Waiver by party who raises an objection.—Wherea party, by presenting a project of partition including thereindisputed lands, puts in issue the question of ownership of thelands, they can not thereafter, just because of an oppositionthereto, withdraw the issue from the jurisdiction of the court.There is a waiver where the parties who raise the objection arethe ones who set the court in motion (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80Phil. 229, 232), and they can not be permitted to complain if thecourt, after due hearing, adjudges the question against them(Mañalac v. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661).

Estoppel; Silence with knowledge of the facts required.—Toconstitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the factsand be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the actconstituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge worksno estoppel (21 C.J. 11521153).

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of theCourt of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners. Romerico F. Flores for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the

decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Courtof First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate courtin Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determinethe validity of the deed of donation in question and to passupon the question of title or ownership of the propertiesmentioned therein.

The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of

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VOL. 7, FEBRUARY 28, 1963 369Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals

the Court of Appeals as follows:

“Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife.The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for thesettlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the FistInstance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; hiscousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamedCapili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamedBernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Uponpetition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of thedeceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateralrelatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Franciscoand Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia,Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.

“On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition inthe testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentaryheirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share wasalloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16,1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s project ofpartition and submitted a counterproject of partition of theirown, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of thedeceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not tothe latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

“The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 andFebruary 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partitionfor hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties,followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legalissues. In the memorandum for the executor and the institutedheirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in thewill of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusivelyand not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyeshad donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) thatthe collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing orgrounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that evenassuming that they could question the validity of the donation,the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in aseparate civil action.

“The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part,argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of theoriginal conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal



presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and thatsince the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capilidid not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore couldnot validly dispose of it in his will.

“On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M.Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void

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370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDBernardo vs. Court of Appeals

without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, thatis, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that,considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 ofthe Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses duringthe marriage; and considered under the second category, it doesnot comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being noattestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved bothprojects of partition and directed the executor to file another,‘dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament ofthe deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in thedeed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of thedeceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceasedHermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties wereconjugal properties of the deceased spouses.’ On September 27,1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating andemphasizing the contention previously raised in theirmemorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to takecognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyesinvolving title to the properties mentioned in the will of EusebioCapili and taking exception to the court’s declaration of thenullity of the donation ‘without stating facts or provision of law onwhich it was based.’ The motion for new trial was denied in anorder dated October 3, 1960.”

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed

from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petitionfor review by certiorari.

The petitionersappellants contend that the appellatecourt erred in not declaring that the probate court, havinglimited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power toadjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the



rule.In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that

as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot bepassed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,1 exceptwhere one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion orexclusion from the inventory of the property, in which casethe probate court may pass provisionally upon the

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1 Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386; Devese V. Arbes, 13 Phil. 274;Franco v. O’Brien, 13 Phil. 359; Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil. 71; Lunsod v.Ortega, 46 Phil. 644; Ongsingco v. Tan & Borja, G.R. No. L7635, July 25,1955; Raquial v. Anihan, G.R. No. L4377, January 23, 1953; Mallari v.Mallari, G.R. No. L4656, February 23, 1953.

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question without prejudice to its final determination in aseparate action.2 However, we have also held that when theparties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it isoptional to them to submit to the probate court a questionas to title to property, and when so submitted, said probatecourt may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v.Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Mañalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil.661); and that with the consent of the parties, mattersaffecting property under judicial administration may betaken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestateproceeding, provided interests of third persons are notprejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).

In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly thatthe trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred inupholding the power of the probate court in this case toadjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as towhether the properties herein involved belong to theconjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and HermogenaReyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?

At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issueis not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced byappellants that the trial court had completely no authorityto pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that itsdecision on the subject is null and void and does not bind

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even those who had invoked its authority and submitted toits decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is acreature of law and parties to an action can not vest,extend or broaden it. If appellants’ contention is correct,then there can be no exception to the nojurisdiction theory.But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo(supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. JusticePedro Tuason: “Determination of title to property is withinthe jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The respondingSoriano’s objection (that the probate court lackedjurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of thelots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure,which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects

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2 Garcia v. Garcia. 67 Phil. 353; Guingguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144.

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only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of anindependent ordinary action) which may be waived”.Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction overthe person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdictionto try controversies between heirs of a deceased personregarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong tohis estate, has been recognized to be vested in probatecourts. This is so because the purpose of an administrationproceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distributionof the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidationmeans determination of all the assets of the estate andpayment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter,distribution is made of the decedent’s liquidated estateamong the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceedingis in the nature of an action of partition, in which eachparty is required to bring into the mass whatevercommunity property he has in his possession. To this end,and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties mayintroduce proofs relative to the ownership of the propertiesin dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution ofthe decedent’s estate are before the court, and subject tothe jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents




necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so longas no interests of third parties are affected.4

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy isthe question of ownership of certain of the propertiesinvolved — whether they belong to the conjugalpartnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matterproperly within the jurisdiction of the probate court whichnecessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership inorder to determine the estate of the decedent which is to bedistributed among his heirs who are all parties to theproceedings, including, of course, the widow, nowrepresented because of her death, by her heirs who havebeen substituted upon petition of the executor himself andwho have appeared voluntarily. There are no third par

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3 Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil. 982.4 Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353, 355.

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ties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirsof the deceased widow are not heirs of the testatorhusband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right tothe conjugal property. And it is this right that is beingsought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, theclaim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir tothe testator and, consequently, it complies with therequirement of the exception that the parties interested(the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) areall heirs claiming title under the testator.

Petitioners contend additionally that they have neversubmitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probatecourt, for the purpose of the determination of the questionof ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borneby the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputedthat they were the ones who presented the project ofpartition claiming the questioned properties as part of thetestator’s asset. The respondents, as representatives orsubstitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project ofpartition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals





said, “In doing so all of them must be deemed to havesubmitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding.Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as theydo, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus,have the court take it for granted that their theory as tothe character of the properties is correct, entirely withoutregard to the opposition of the respondents”. In otherwords, by presenting their project of partition includingtherein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they weredonated by the wife to her husband), petitionersthemselves put in issue the question of ownership of theproperties — which is well within the competence of theprobate court — and just because of an opposition thereto,they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearanceor the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly,there is here a waiver where the parties who raise theobjection are the ones who set the court in motion.5 Theycan not be permitted to complain if the court,

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5 Cunanan v. Amparo, supra.

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after due hearing, adjudges question against them.6Finally, petitionersappellants claim that appellees are

estopped to raise the question of ownership of theproperties involved because the widow herself, during herlifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of theseproperties in the inventory of the assets of her deceasedhusband, but also signed an extrajudicial partition of thoseinventoried properties. But the very authorities cited byappellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actormust have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of hisrights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel,because silence without knowledge works no estoppel.7 Inthe present case, the deceased widow acted as she didbecause of the deed of donation she executed in favor of herhusband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if intervivos, and ineffectual if mortiscausa, as it has not beenexecuted with the required formalities similar to a will.




WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appealsbeing in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmedwith costs against appellants. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,concur.

Makalintal, J., did not take part.

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—Recovery of rentals allegedly due the estatedoes not come within the jurisdiction of a probate court andshould be by separate suit commenced by theadministrator, not by mere motion by the administrator inthe probate proceedings, because of the absence of expressstatutory authorization to coerce the lessee debtor intodefending himself in the probate court (Bezore, et al. v.Camon, L21034, April 30, 1966). Even matters affectingproperty under judicial administration may not be takencognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if the interests of third persons are prejudiced

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6 Mañalac vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661.7 21 C.J. 11521153.

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(Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 282).As to other cases defining the scope of the jurisdiction of

a probate court, see Olave v. Canlas, et al., L12709, Feb.23, 1962, 4 SCRA 463, and the annotation thereunder.

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1 Bernardo v. CA