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Belief Systems and Durable Inequalities  

An Experimental Investigation of Indian Caste

  Karla Hoff Priyanka Pandey

World Bank World Bank 

 

Preferences Network Meeting, January 9, 2005

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The Question

How can one explain the persistence of inequality across social groups long after discrimination is formally abolished?

Traditional answer: Differences in opportunities

Additional explanation: The ‘cultural legacy of subordination,’ which shapes responses to opportunity

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What do we mean by the cultural legacy of subordination?

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Hindu caste system: “Divine will” divided society into endogamous castes --Brahmins at the top, Untouchables at the bottom, and

“different castes are built of different natural substances” (Gupta,2001)

Belief systems—3 examples

Race relations: The US Supreme Court holds Negroes to be “an inferior class of beings” in the eyes of the Founding Fathers --Dred Scott case, 1857

Gender roles: In excluding women from the legal profession, the US Supreme Court (1873) rules:

“Divine ordinance, as well as the nature of things” bars women frompursuing careers independent of their husbands.“This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society

must be adapted to the general constitution of things.”

What do we mean by the cultural legacy of subordination?

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Hypotheses

* Making social identity salient lowers the performance of the traditionally discriminated against group (controlling for wealth, etc.)

* Implicitly evoking the meaning of one’s outcaste status (by segregating social groups) deepens this effect

Related literature: Claude Steele (1993): stereotype threat—

but doesn’t discuss responses to economic incentives

Glenn Loury (2002): black stigma as a cause of racial inequality

* Expectation of discrimination is one mechanism underlying this effect.

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Legal Status of the Hindu Caste System

Pre-1947: For 2000 years, the low castes were denied most rights.

But the dwellings of the Untouchables shall be outside the village; And dogs and donkeys should be their wealth.

Manu Smriti , about the 3rd century A.D

British colonial regime recognized most Hindu laws.

Post 1950: Upper castes stripped of all privileges, preferences for formerly “untouchable” castes

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Experiment 1The task: To solve mazes in two 15-minute rounds

Data: Number of mazes solved in each round

Subjects: Over 600 boys in 6th & 7th grades,

Setting: Junior high school in Uttar Pradesh, India, Jan, March 2003

Almost double-blind: One experimenter knew, but 3 hired experimenters did not know the hypotheses being tested. The graders did not know subjects’ caste.

equally divided between:

Untouchables High casteChamar (100%) Thakur, 70%,

Brahmin, 24%, Vaishya, 6%

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Experimental conditions

120 subjects

96 subjects

Piece rate—1 rupee per maze solved

Announcement of casteName of child, his village, father and grandfather, and caste are announced once the 6 subjects are assembled

No announcement of caste

• Average earnings = ½ day’s adult wages

Caste announced and segregated 66 subjects

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Set-up of Experiment Room

6 students participate in each session—with random assignment

If caste is announced, that is done first. Then the experimenter distributes the show-up fee=1.5 x hourly wage

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Jeeps for Transporting Participants

10 students – 5 high- and 5 low-caste — are brought in from schools or homes in each of six villages

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Participants

To the extent possible participants in a session are drawn from 6 different buses (villages)Post-experiment interviews show that a subject knows on avg. 1.4 others in his session.

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Passing out Envelopes with Earnings

A session lasts about 1 hour. After the session children wait in a separate room till their mazes are graded.

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RESULT 1No caste gap when caste is not announced

high round 2high round 1

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20

40

60

80

100

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Score

Cum

ulat

ive

freq

uenc

y

low caste, round 1

low caste, round 2

high caste, round 2

high caste, round 1

Round 1

Round 2

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RESULT 2For low caste, the announcement of caste reduces

Round 2 average score by 25%

0

20

40

60

80

100

Round 2 Score

Cum

ulat

ive

freq

uenc

y

Caste Not Announced

CasteAnnounced

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314

p = .04

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RESULT 3But for high caste, the announcement of castehas no effect (it slightly improves earnings)

0

20

40

60

80

100

Round 2 Score

Cum

ulat

ive

freq

uenc

y

p = .44

Caste notannounced

Caste announced

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

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And so… the Announcement of Castecreates a caste gap in mazes solved

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20

40

60

80

100

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Score

Low R2High R2

Caste gapR1 p = .04R2 p = .006

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RESULT 4: Effect of announcing caste on proportion of low caste in each learning decile

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0.2

0.4

0.6

Rel

ativ

e fre

quen

cy

Change in number of mazes solved between rounds (Δ)

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

<1 0 1-2 3-4 >5

Pro

porti

on o

f low

cas

te in

eac

h sc

ore

rang

e

No casteannouncementCaste

announcement

Average improvement falls by 39% for low caste, and rises by 14% for high caste

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Is Caste Just Class?

Responses to post-experiment interview show large differences by caste:

High caste Low caste

Proportion with mother with > primary ed. .42 .14

Proportion having father with > primary ed. .80 .50

Land wealth (in acres) 2.65 1.03

Proportion of subjects with some literacy .72 .60 (measured by non-zero score on literacy test)

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We use 2 sets of controls

Controls (1)

• Parental education and occupation

• Child’s previous exposure to mazes

• Number of kids known in the group

Controls (2)

• Parental education and occupation

• Landholding

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Caste Announced

Caste Not Announced

Caste Announced

Caste Not Announced

Round 1 1.04(.03)

.82

-.02(.73)

-.21(.67)

.42(.48)

. .

Round 2 1.91(.05)

1.83

-.47(.66)

-.18

.89(.07)

1.83

-2.86(.04)

-.18

R2 .24 .27 .30 .25 N 218 146 102 52

Coefficient on High Caste Dummy vs. Raw Score of Caste Gap

Controls (1) Controls (2)

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RESULT 5For low caste, segregating and announcing

caste lowers score by 32% in R1 (vs. 14% drop from announcement alone in R1)

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20

40

60

80

100

120

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Round 1 Score

Cum

ulat

ive

Freq

uenc

y

p =.03

Segregated and announced

Caste notannounced

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For high caste, announcing caste and segregating

lowers Round 1 score by 25 percent

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20

40

60

80

100

120

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Round 1 Score

Cum

ulat

ive

Freq

uenc

y

p = .07Caste notannounced

Segregated and announced

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Why does the caste gap occur?

We can eliminate: - Class - Lower ability - Discrimination in grading That leaves as possible mechanisms:

1. Self-confidence: Consciously or not

2. Risk aversion

3. Expected discrimination Rational Behavioral --i.e. making caste salient activates a theory of

the world and the low caste’s place in the world, which others will enforce

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Candidate 1. Is there a caste gap in self-confidence?

We run a new treatment: Choice

Caste is announced, R1 is as before, and in R2 the experimenter says: This game will be just the same as the first one, except that I will ask each of you to choose the level of difficulty of the puzzles. The payment that you will receive for solving a puzzle depends on its difficultly level.

Level Payment per maze solvedEasy ½ rupee Same as before 1 rupee A bit harder 2 rupees Hard 3 rupees Hardest 4 rupees

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0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1 2 3 4 5

Perc

ent

Choice of Difficulty Level

high castelow caste

No caste gap in choice of difficulty level …

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…and caste has an insignificant and negative effect in a regression

N = 56R2= .25

  High caste -.39(.27)

Mother with some primary schooling .18(.67)

Mother above primary schooling .83*(.06)

Father with some primary schooling 1.08*(.00)

Father above primary schooling .48(.19)

Father non-wage worker .35(.44)

Child has seen mazes before 1.38*(.00)

Dependent variable is choice of difficulty level

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We run a new treatment, Random Winner

Candidate 2. Is there a caste gap in risk aversion?

Caste is announced, R1 is as before, but in R2, the Experimenter says that a random draw determines one child who will receive 6 rupees per maze; the others will receive 0.

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Low caste perform 26% better in Random Winner than in

Piece Rate with Caste Announced

p = ,07

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20

40

60

80

100

120

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Round 2 Score

Random winner

Piece rate with CasteAnnounced

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…which eliminates the caste gap

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20

40

60

80

100

120

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Round 2 Score

Perc

ent

Low caste. Random Winner

High caste, Random Winner

Low

High

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Mean Scores in three treatments…

Average change in number ofmazes solved between rounds

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1

2

3

4

5

6

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Piece Rate Piece Rate with Caste Announced

RandomWinner

High casteLow caste

Average number of mazes solved, Round 2

Piece Rate Piece Rate with Caste Announced

RandomWinner

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

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Candidate 3: Does the low caste expect discrimination?

The task To solve a puzzle based on Rush Hour-Traffic Jam

Decision To accept or reject a gamble. If accept, success payoff 20 rupees & failure payoff 1 rupee If reject, get 10 rupees

Data Proportion that accept the gamble

Subjects 180 low-caste &180 high caste boys in 6th & 7th grade

We run a new experiment in which we manipulate thescope for discretion in rewarding effort: Traffic Jam Game

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March 2004: Same setting as in Maze Experiment

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Game Board with Frame

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No scope for bias(game board with frame)

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0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Caste notannounced

Casteannounced

Caste announced and segregated

High casteLow caste

Frac

tion

that

reje

cts

the

gam

ble

Caste gap in rejection rate only when2 conditions hold: scope for bias and caste is cued

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Scope for bias(game board without frame)

0Caste not

announcedCaste

announcedCaste announced

and segregated

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No scope for bias

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Caste notannounced

Caste announced and segregated

Frac

tion

that

reje

cts

the

gam

ble

Difference in differencesfor low caste, one-sided p–value =.09

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Scope for bias

0Caste not

announcedCaste announced

and segregated

.57.37

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No scope for bias

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Caste notannounced

Caste announced and segregated

Frac

tion

that

reje

cts

the

gam

ble

But for high caste, no difference

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Scope for bias

0Caste not

announcedCaste announced

and segregated

.23.23

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New treatments we will undertake

1. Announcement of personal data except caste

(name of child, village, father, grandfather)

2. Traffic Jam with and without buzzer

Hypotheses:

Announcing caste, not personal data, causes the caste gap

If discrimination is expected, then expanding the scope for discretion (by eliminating the buzzer) should reduce low caste performance

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Social identities as “sunk capital”

Law has a cultural component that cannot be repealed at the stroke of a pen.

Thus discrimination can have persistent effects long after it is formally abolished

Conclusion

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Social identities (a shared symbolic system) are likely also to play a role in the submission to (old) authority and in the reproduction of unequal structures of opportunity.

Hypotheses:

In Ultimatum Game, high caste makes low offers to low caste compared to high caste, and this gap is larger than that which occurs in Dictatorship Game. In Public Goods Game, low caste does not punish high caste for failure to contribute

New Directions

Common Knowledge and Coordination on “Unfair” Equilibria