Local Community Preparedness for an Emergency Animal Disease Outbreak A Report for the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation By Elaine Barclay October 2005 RIRDC Publication No 05/131 RIRDC Project No UNE-89A

INCORPORATING THE FORMER RURAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE University of New England Armidale, NSW 2351

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© 2005 Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation. All rights reserved. ISBN 1 74151 194 1 ISSN 1440-6845 Local community preparedness for an Emergency Animal Disease outbreak Publication No. 05/131 Project No. UNE-89A The information contained in this publication is intended for general use to assist public knowledge and discussion and to help improve the development of sustainable industries. The information should not be relied upon for the purpose of a particular matter. Specialist advice should be obtained before any action or decision is taken on the basis of any material in this document. The Commonwealth of Australia, Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation, the authors or contributors do not assume liability of any kind whatsoever resulting from any person’s use or reliance upon the content of this document. This publication is copyright. However, RIRDC encourages wide dissemination of its research, providing the Corporation is clearly acknowledged. For any other enquiries concerning reproduction, contact the Publications Manager on phone 02 6272 3186. Researcher Contact Details Dr Elaine Barclay The Institute for Rural Futures, University of New England Armidale, NSW 2351 Phone: (02) 6773 5141 Fax: (02) 6773 3245 Email: ebarclay@une.edu.au In submitting this report, the researcher has agreed to RIRDC publishing this material in its edited form. RIRDC Contact Details Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation Level 1, AMA House 42 Macquarie Street BARTON ACT 2600 PO Box 4776 KINGSTON ACT 2604 Phone: 02 6272 4819 Fax: 02 6272 5877 Email: rirdc@rirdc.gov.au. Website: http://www.rirdc.gov.au Published in October 2005 Printed on environmentally friendly paper by Canprint

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Foreword For a nation like Australia, which exports around 80% of its total agricultural production, and where the processed food industry is the largest employer in regional areas, the risk of a major outbreak of an Emergency Animal Disease, such as Foot and Mouth, is a major concern. An outbreak of such a disease would devastate Australia’s livestock industry, cause severe financial hardship, result in considerable social disruption for whole communities and threaten the national economy. Although national disease control plans and strict quarantine measures mean that Australia is well prepared to quickly and effectively deal with a possible disease outbreak, relatively little is known about how individual farmers and small rural communities will cope if a crisis occurs. Through a series of three independent studies, this research investigated the level of awareness and preparedness at the individual farmer and small community level for a possible emergency animal disease outbreak and sought to identify those social factors that may facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. The research also assessed the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities. This project was funded from RIRDC Core Funds, which are provided by the Australian Government. This report is an addition to RIRDC’s diverse range of over 1000 research publications, forms part of our Human Capital, Communications and Information Systems R&D program, which aims to enhance human capital and facilitate innovation in rural industries and communities. Most of our publications are available for viewing, downloading or purchasing online through our website: downloads at <http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/Index.htm> purchases at <http://www.rirdc.gov.au/eshop>

Peter O’Brien Managing Director Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation

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Acknowledgments The research that forms the subject of this report has been supported by a grant from the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation. The views expressed are the responsibility of the author and are not necessarily those of the funding body. All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the author. We would like to thank Ruth McGregor for her efficiency in entering the data and Jean Harris for her expertise in the preparation of this report. We are indebted to the farmers who gave their time to complete the surveys and without whom; the study would not have been possible. We are particularly grateful to those who took the time to provide additional comments and suggestions, which provided greater insight into the views of farmers on the issue of bio security. Appreciation goes to those farmers and support service personnel in Devon and Cornwall who agreed to participate in interviews. Thank you to Gerry Dixon of Queensland Department of Primary Industry who provided referrals to the UK participants. Sincere appreciation goes to the advisory committee for providing expertise in developing the questionnaire for the mail survey and in the selection of communities for case study. The committee included Kevin Cooper and Graeme Eggleston (NSW DPI), Simon Bewg (Qld DPI), John Warre (NSW Farmers), the late Tim Roseby and Peter Koob (Federal FMD Taskforce), Jamie Penrose, (Animal Health Australia), and John Crosby (National Livestock Identification Scheme, and former director of the Meat Industry Authority). Our sincere thanks goes to Kevin Cooper and Lyn Stenos of New South Wales Department of Primary Industry who gave of their time and expertise to assist with the four workshops. Thanks also to Bob Lambell (Victorian DPI) who assisted in organising the Camperdown workshop. We are particularly indebted to the people who took the time to attend the workshops in Casino, Roma, Armidale and Camperdown and contributed to the discussions. Acknowledgement is provided to the following organisations:

Armidale Dumaresq Shire Council Richmond Tweed Shire Council Roma/Bungil Shire Council Corangamite Shire Council New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian

Departments of Primary Industry Rural Lands Protection Boards in Armidale

and Casino New South Wales and Queensland Police

Service New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian

Departments of Health Community Health Departments in New

South Wales Family Support in Queensland New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian

Ambulance Services New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian

Departments of Community Services Country Women’s Association

New South Wales Farmers Agforce Queensland Local farmers in Camperdown Salvation Army Roma and Casino Saleyards Casino Abattoirs Rural Financial Counsellors in Camperdown

and Casino Local Veterinarians in Casino, Roma,

Armidale and Camperdown State Emergency Services in Casino, Roma,

Armidale and Camperdown New South Wales Department of Education Livestock Selling Agents in Roma Local Tourism in Camperdown New South Wales Environmental Protection

Agency National Parks and Wildlife New South

Wales New South Wales State and Rural Fire

Service

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About the Author Elaine Barclay is a Program Leader at the Institute for Rural Futures. Elaine has previously conducted research in farm succession and inheritance as well as studies in information technology, welfare services for farm families and crime in rural communities. Elaine has a degree in Social Science, postgraduate qualifications in Psychology and a PhD in Rural Sociology. Prior to joining the Institute in 1995, Elaine was a partner in a family farm operation in northern New South Wales.

Abbreviations AFFA Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry ARIA Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia AQIS Australian Quarantine Inspection Service AUSVETPLAN Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan CSM Coal Seam Methane DARD Department of Agriculture and Rural Development DEFRA Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs DPIWE Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment EAD Emergency Animal Diseases EU European Union FMD Foot-and-Mouth Disease MLA Meat Livestock Authority NFU National Farmers’ Union NLIS National Livestock Identification Scheme OJD Ovine Johne’s Disease UNE University of New England VEIN Veterinary Education and Information Network RAMS Restricted Area Management Security RLPB Rural Lands Protection Board VFF Victorian Farmers’ Federation

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Contents Foreword............................................................................................................................................................... iii Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................ v List of Figures..................................................................................................................................................... viii List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................................... viii Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................. ix 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) ........................................................................................................... 1 1.3 FMD in Australia................................................................................................................................... 2 1.4 Objectives of the study .......................................................................................................................... 3 1.5 Structure of the report............................................................................................................................ 4

2: Background ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 The impact of the FMD epidemic in the UK ......................................................................................... 5 2.3 The potential impact of an emergency animal disease outbreak on Australia ..................................... 11 2.4 Biosecurity in Australia ....................................................................................................................... 16 2.5 Factors affecting preparedness ............................................................................................................ 20 2.6 Conclusion and rationale for the present study.................................................................................... 22

3: STUDY 1: FMD in the UK revisited ............................................................................................................ 23 3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 23 3.2 Method................................................................................................................................................. 23 3.3 The findings......................................................................................................................................... 23 3.4 Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 27

4: STUDY 2: Biosecurity on Australian farms ................................................................................................. 29 4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 29 4.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................................................ 29 4.3 Method................................................................................................................................................. 29 4.4 Results ................................................................................................................................................. 30 4.5 Summary and conclusions ................................................................................................................... 47

5: STUDY 3: Potential Social Impact of an EAD Outbreak Upon Small Communities in Australia.......... 51 5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 51 5.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................................................ 51 5.3 Method................................................................................................................................................. 51 5.4 The immediate social impact of a FMD outbreak ............................................................................... 53 5.5 Armidale, New South Wales ............................................................................................................... 55 5.6 Casino, New South Wales ................................................................................................................... 58 5.7 Roma, Queensland............................................................................................................................... 61 5.8 Camperdown Victoria.......................................................................................................................... 64 5.9 Summary and conclusions ................................................................................................................... 67

6: STUDY 3: The Workshop Discussions ......................................................................................................... 69 6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 69 6.2 Objectives ............................................................................................................................................ 69 6.3 Method................................................................................................................................................. 69 6.4 The Armidale exercise......................................................................................................................... 72 6.5 Focus group discussions ...................................................................................................................... 73 6.6 Summary and discussion ..................................................................................................................... 89

7: Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 93 7.1 Summary and discussion ..................................................................................................................... 93 7.2 Implications of the findings ................................................................................................................. 95 7.3 Further research ................................................................................................................................... 96 7.5 Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 96 7.6 Recommendations ............................................................................................................................... 97

References............................................................................................................................................................ 99

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List of Figures

Figure 2.1: FMD-free countries. Source: (OIE, 2002)..................................................................................... 16 Figure 2.2: Day 84: Exercise Minotaur: Simulated spread of disease (Koob 2004b)....................................... 18 Figure 2.3: Protect Australian Livestock Campaign (AHA, 2005)................................................................... 19 Figure 3.1: Launceston Show 2004. ................................................................................................................. 26 Figure 3.2: No-one stops to disinfect their footwear. ....................................................................................... 27 Figure 3.3: Few vehicles stop for disinfection.................................................................................................. 27 Figure 4.1 Livestock enterprises and mean herd sizes (n=1232). ..................................................................... 31 Figure 4.2: Sources of information (n=1232). .................................................................................................. 31 Figure 4.3: Primary source of information in the event of disease outbreak, by state. .................................... 32 Figure 4.4: Discussions held re biosecurity on-farm (n=1232)........................................................................ 33 Figure 4.5: Rate of checking stock across the sample. ..................................................................................... 34 Figure 4.6: Stock identification. ....................................................................................................................... 34 Figure 4.7: Biosecurity strategies on farms, by state. ...................................................................................... 35 Figure 4.8: Biosecurity, by livestock type. ....................................................................................................... 38 Figure 4.9: Factors preventing biosecurity practices. ....................................................................................... 38 Figure 4.10: Where producers would first report unusual symptoms in stock, by state. .................................. 39 Figure 4.11: How soon producers would contact vet by disease symptoms..................................................... 40 Figure 4.12: Perceptions of greatest risks of disease. ....................................................................................... 41 Figure 4.13: Typology of risk perception. ........................................................................................................ 42 Figure 4.14: Clusters of risk perception............................................................................................................ 44 Figure 4.15: Clusters by biosecurity strategies. ................................................................................................ 44 Figure 4.16: Perceptions of responsibility for biosecurity, by state.................................................................. 45 Figure 4.17: Attitudes towards NLIS as essential for biosecurity, by state. ..................................................... 46 Figure 4.18: Attitudes towards compensation, by state. ................................................................................... 47 Figure 5.1: Location of .................................................................................................................................... 52 case-study communities.................................................................................................................................... 52 Figure 5.2: Productivity Commission’s (2002) estimated effect of a 12-month FMD outbreak on the value of output over 10 years, by Statistical Division. .................................................................................................. 52 Figure 5.3: Armidale-Dumaresq Shire............................................................................................................. 55 Figure 5.4: Richmond Valley Shire. ................................................................................................................. 58 Figure 5.5: Roma and Bungil Shires................................................................................................................. 61 Figure 5.7: Corangamite Shire.......................................................................................................................... 64 Figure 6.1: The hypothetical site of a FMD outbreak in the Casino district. .................................................... 71 Figure 6.2: Inspector Matt Lynch and David Steller, Local Emergency Management Committee at the Armidale exercise. ............................................................................................................................................ 72 Figure 6.3: The general store/post office in a village near Roma. .................................................................... 86

List of Tables

Table 4.1: Biosecurity strategies for stock........................................................................................................ 36 Table 4.2: Biosecurity strategies for properties generally. ............................................................................... 37 Table 4.3: Attitudinal scale of risk perception.................................................................................................. 43 Table 6.1: The Hypothetical of a FMD outbreak in the Armidale district. ....................................................... 71

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Executive Summary

Introduction For a nation like Australia, which exports around 80% of its total agricultural production, and where the processed food industry is the largest employer in regional areas, the risk of a major outbreak of an Emergency Animal Disease (EAD), such as Foot-and-Mouth, is a major concern. An outbreak of such a disease would devastate Australia’s livestock industry, cause severe financial hardship, result in considerable social disruption for whole communities and threaten the national economy. While there are national strategy plans in place to quickly and effectively deal with an outbreak, there is some uncertainty as to how communities will cope if a crisis occurs.

Objectives The purpose of this research was to assess the level of preparedness at the individual farmer and small community level for a possible emergency animal disease outbreak and identify those social factors that facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. The research also assessed the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities. The research comprised three independent studies.

Research Outcomes First, on a visit to Devon and Cornwall in July 2004, information was gathered on the social impact of the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth epidemic three years on and on the current level of biosecurity on UK farms. Interviews with farmers and support service personnel revealed that the most significant consequences of the FMD outbreak was the poor communication between government and local communities, the social isolation of farm families and the social divisions that occurred within some communities. Community recovery was instigated through church and volunteer community groups that emerged to provide a coordinated, comprehensive network of support for the farming community. Despite the catastrophic consequences of the FMD outbreak, there was a level of complacency about biosecurity amongst UK farmers. Most tended to believe that responsibility for biosecurity lay with those government agencies responsible for quarantine measures and should another FMD outbreak eventuate, there was little that farmers could do about it. Second, a mail survey of 3000 Australian livestock producers across Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria assessed their level of knowledge about emergency animal diseases. The study revealed a high level of concern about the threat of disease outbreak amongst producers. Most sourced information about emergency animal diseases from newspapers and radios. However, should an outbreak occur, farmers would first seek advice from their local Department of Primary Industry, RLPB officers or local vet; people they know and trust within their local community. Furthermore, if producers found unusual symptoms in their stock they would first report it to their local vet. Few would use the emergency disease hotline. Few respondents were aware of biosecurity plans at the community level and only half of the sample had instigated biosecurity precautions on their properties. Most strategies employed were basic farm management practices such as isolating new stock for a short period of time to check for disease. Property size, location and nature of the terrain appear to determine a farmer’s ability to implement strategies. Feral pigs or goats were perceived to be a serious risk for disease particularly for producers on large outback properties. Other perceived risks to properties included neighbours who import animals or semen or who have a high turnover of stock, having a public road through a property or being adjoined to a stock route or National Park, imported products or foodstuffs, deteriorating quarantine regulations or monitoring of ports, international tourists, illegal immigrants and terrorism. Australian farmers’ attitudes to biosecurity reflect those of their English counterparts; that the responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity lies primarily with government. Specifically, if agencies and those responsible are working efficiently, producers should not have to be concerned about

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disease entering Australia. Nevertheless, the study did reveal requests for more education regarding biosecurity on farms to enable farmers to better protect their properties. The study found that farmers who believed they would have some measure of control in the event of an outbreak were more likely to have instigated biosecurity on their properties. Consequently, changing farmers’ perceptions about their ability to control the safety of their property and livestock may be necessary for future biosecurity extension policies. Third, case studies of four rural communities evaluated biosecurity preparedness at the local community level. Social impact analyses emphasised the diversity amongst small rural communities in the nature and degree of likely social impact from an emergency disease outbreak. A community’s experience and resilience to crisis will be dependent upon its unique geographic, economic, and social profile, degree of social cohesion, effectiveness of community leadership and history of overcoming crises. Understanding of these differences at the small community level will be important in planning for recovery. The study did find that all four communities are likely to experience a similar lack of alternative job opportunities for displaced workers from agricultural and associated industries with a subsequent loss of people and skills from the community as workers opt to leave in search of work. The focus groups conducted with residents of the four case-study communities assessed the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities. The study recommended that Local Community Disaster Management Exercises should involve local farmers, owners of associated agricultural industries, service providers and other relevant stakeholders to enhance awareness and preparedness across all sectors of the community. Local Emergency Management Committees need to work towards consistency in biosecurity preparedness across Local Government Areas. Communication between government and local communities in the event of a disease outbreak was an important consideration. Local communities should be contacted at first sign of a disease outbreak and be provided with as much information as they require. Information must easy to access, reliable, transparent, and consistent. Communities should be consulted by an Emergency Control Centre as to how they would prefer to be informed in the event of a disease outbreak. A Media Plan attached to a Community Disaster Management Plan would enable the effective flow of information between government agencies and local communities and disseminate information that is locally relevant through a variety of mediums but originating from a primary source. Emergency hotlines would be more effective if they initiate calls to people to check on their welfare rather than wait for contact from the public. There is a need to educate the public on the implications of not reporting cases of diseased stock. Communities need to explore options for community-based projects to sustain a displaced workforce throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries to prevent the potential loss of people and skills from the community. Community recovery preparedness will be enhanced if existing community support networks remain available to provide support in the event of a disease outbreak. Alternatively, self-help groups should be encouraged. Support networks for families of emergency workers will also need to be established. However, recovery programs and policies will need to account for the diversity in the experience and coping ability of individual communities for an EAD outbreak. The study concluded that there is a need to raise awareness across rural Australia about the potential social impact of emergency animal diseases and encourage community leaders and various community organisations to consider the issue and revise their disaster management and community recovery plans to include EAD’s. Biosecurity awareness campaigns would be more effective if they emphasised the social impacts of a disease outbreak, particularly the financial losses that individuals could incur. The Industry Liaison Officer program should be encouraged for various groups (including farmers) to encourage awareness and facilitate the flow of information between government and the community.

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1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction Australia’s relative isolation from the rest of the world and strict quarantine measures have so far protected our agricultural industries from a major Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) epidemic. There are 87 types of emergency animal diseases that are of concern to Australia including foreign (exotic) diseases that could escape our quarantine barriers, such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD); diseases that emerge within Australia, such as equine morbilli virus; and those that occur within Australia that present as a serious epidemic, such as Anthrax (AFFA 2005). The disease of most concern is Foot-and-Mouth because an outbreak would have a devastating effect on livestock exports and livestock products and consequently the national economy (AUSVETPLAN 2002). The threat is ever-present. FMD is endemic in many parts of the world and becoming more prevalent in our region (Productivity Commission 2002). While there are national strategy plans in place to quickly and effectively deal with an outbreak, there is some uncertainty as to how individuals and communities will cope if a crisis occurs. The purpose of this research is to assess the level of preparedness of small rural communities for a possible emergency disease outbreak and identify those social factors that facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. This research consists of three studies. First, on a visit to Devon and Cornwall in July 2004, the researcher conducted several interviews with farmers and support service personnel to gather information on the social impact of the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth epidemic in the UK and gather an understanding of the current level of biosecurity on UK farms. Second, a mail survey of 3000 Australian livestock producers assessed their level of knowledge about emergency animal diseases, their access to information and support for a potential disease outbreak, their perceptions of risk of such an outbreak, and whether or not they had instigated any biosecurity strategies on their properties. Third, case studies of four rural communities evaluated biosecurity preparedness at the local community level. Social impact analyses and focus groups with residents assessed the extent of the social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon the communities. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the research procedure; the reasons why this investigation was undertaken, and the methodological practices and theoretical interpretations employed. It begins with an overview of the epidemiology of FMD, the disease used throughout the study as an example of an emergency animal disease. FMD was chosen because it was assumed that most Australians would be aware of this disease through media coverage of the outbreak that occurred in the UK in 2001 and of the devastation that followed.

1.2 Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly-contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals: cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, deer, buffalo, alpacas and llamas. It is not a health risk to humans. The disease is characterised by fever, loss of production, and fluid filled blisters or vesicles in the mouth, muzzle, feet, teats and udders. The symptoms are most severe in cattle and pigs. In young animals, the virus attacks the developing heart muscle, resulting in death without other clinical signs. FMD is rarely fatal in adult animals but is debilitating, resulting in severe production losses (Animal Health Australia 2004; AUSVETPLAN 2002; Dixon 2002; House of Commons 2002).

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FMD is spread rapidly by contact with infected animals through saliva, mucus, milk or faeces, especially in cool damp climates where animals are penned. Animals can be infected by eating contaminated feed (especially food refuse or swill). The disease can spread through the air and be carried on wool, hair, grass or straw, footwear, clothing, veterinary or livestock equipment or vehicle tyres. FMD can also be present in meat and meat products, dairy foods, soil, bones and untreated hides as well as frozen, chilled and freeze-dried foods (Dixon 2002; QDPI 2002; Productivity Commission 2002). FMD includes seven serotypes and more than 60 strains (VEIN 2003). Immunity to one type does not give immunity to another. An animal that recovers from FMD may still carry the virus for nearly a year with no evidence of infection. Eradication of the disease requires slaughtering infected animals and disinfecting or destroying infected materials (Forsyth and Bredahl 1992). Currently, there are 55 countries in Africa, Russia, and parts of Europe, the Middle East, Asia and South America that have the disease. The most serious outbreak in recent times occurred in Europe in 2001 (AFFA 2002c; Animal Health Australia 2003; AQIS 2003).

1.3 FMD in Australia For a nation like Australia, which exports around 80% of its total agricultural production, and where the processed food industry is the largest employer in regional areas, the risk of an FMD outbreak of the magnitude experienced in the UK is of concern (AFFA 2002e). An outbreak of such a disease would devastate Australia’s livestock industry, cause severe financial hardship, result in considerable social disruption for whole communities and threaten the national economy. The livelihoods of many people besides farmers and owners of infected stock would be affected. There would be repercussions for the transport and retail industries, government agencies, consumers, and sporting and social events. Other industries affected would include the racing industry, food processors, retailers, stock feed and supply and tourism. Unemployment could rise, government services would be cut and the standard of living would fall (QDPI 2002). With several Asian countries in our vicinity experiencing or having experienced FMD outbreaks, Australia cannot be complacent about such a threat (Jane 2002). Furthermore, there are increasing concerns about agricultural terrorism. Such fears have been a reality in the United States since the destruction of the World Trade Centre and subsequent attempts to target key political figures through the spread of Anthrax spores. There are also concerns about the spread of the disease using crop dusting planes (Donnermeyer 2003). Recent events in the world (i.e., the Bali bombing) unfortunately indicate that Australia is also now vulnerable to acts of bio-terrorism. Anthrax and FMD are only two of the diseases that could be deliberately introduced to this country as an act of terrorism to devastate our agricultural industries. The Australian Federal and State Governments are very well-prepared to quickly and effectively deal with an outbreak through strict quarantine measures and national disease control strategies, namely the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN). Biosecurity strategies aim to minimise the risk of disease entering the country or, if it does enter, ensure the outbreak is localised and does not develop into an epidemic (House of Commons 2002). There have been discussions and reports on preparedness, such as the economic and social impact study by the Productivity Commission, and exercises such as Operation Minotaur, held in September 2002 to test state and federal responses to a simulated outbreak of FMD. However, views expressed by those closely involved in the exercise revealed some concerns that the exercise was not practical enough and that there was still a lack of knowledge about how those in the field will know what to do if a crisis occurs. In addition, previous research conducted by the author which examined the problem of farm crime in New South Wales (Barclay et al. 2001) revealed that the persistence of livestock theft in Australia threatens livestock

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disease control measures. It also became evident that many people (farmers, rural police) lack sufficient knowledge and awareness of FMD to recognise the disease or know how to respond if an outbreak occurred. Basically there is a need for more on-farm surveillance. The most important people for identifying and notifying an FMD outbreak will be livestock owners and others who work with livestock. They will need to notify suspicious symptoms immediately to their local vet, and then instigate appropriate biosecurity arrangements to contain the spread of the disease. The lesson learnt from the outbreak in Britain in 2001 is that farmers and veterinarians must be able to recognise the problem when they first see it and notify the authorities. By the time the disease had been confirmed in the UK, at least 57 farms had been infected (Roberts 2001). The purpose of the present study is to raise awareness and preparedness about biosecurity amongst producers and others within rural Australia, and provide important information on the social impact of a disease outbreak on small communities to assist in the planning and management of state and national responses to an emergency animal disease outbreak.

1.4 Objectives of the study The primary objective of the present study is to develop a clearer picture of the level of awareness and preparedness for emergency animal diseases at the individual farmer and small community level and to make recommendations to better defend and respond to a potential crisis. The second objective is to assess the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon rural communities. Third, the study is designed to address some of the concerns about lack of knowledge and surveillance on farms by conducting an education/extension exercise to educate and raise awareness while surveying farmers to assess their levels of knowledge and preparedness. A further goal of this study is to investigate how individuals perceive the possible risk of an emergency animal disease epidemic when the occurrence is probable but the timing is unknown. Through mail surveys, focus groups and interviews, the study will seek to identify those social impediments that may facilitate or inhibit the recognition, reporting and response to an EAD outbreak. The aim is to seek a deeper level of understanding of community preparedness, to assist policy makers and the various agencies responsible for biosecurity in Australia. The specific objectives of the study are to: Review the literature on the social and community effects of previous EAD outbreaks. Liaise with EAD experts in the UK to place the Australian situation into an international

context. Review the information on EAD’s available to the general public and identify the various

dissemination pathways. Conduct a mail survey of 3000 livestock producers across Queensland, NSW and Victoria (the

States most vulnerable to a FMD outbreak) to assess their level of knowledge about EAD’s, their access to information and support regarding biosecurity, their perception of risk for a disease outbreak, and whether or not they have instigated any degree of biosecurity on their properties.

Conduct focus groups within four small diverse rural communities across three states with local livestock owners as well as various practitioners in first responder agencies (police, state emergency services, veterinarians, livestock officers and other representatives of the agricultural industries, as well as local community leaders) to facilitate discussion and reinforce existing State and Federal biosecurity programs and projects which are applicable to the local community.

Identify those social factors that may facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans in rural communities.

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Conduct a social impact study within each of the sample communities on the potential effects of a hypothetical Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak.

1.5 Structure of the report In Chapter 2, the literature both here and abroad relating to the social impact of emergency animal disease outbreaks is reviewed and the implications for Australia’s preparedness for a possible emergency animal disease outbreak are discussed. In Chapter 3, the findings of the first stage of the research are presented. Interviews conducted with farmers, members of farming organisations and support services in Devon and Cornwall are summarised and discussed. In Chapter 4, the results of the second study: a mail survey of 3000 farmers across the eastern States of Australia, are outlined. Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings of the third study, which was comprised of case studies of four communities that involved a social impact analysis of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon each community and focus group discussions conducted with residents. In Chapter 7, the findings of the three studies are summarised and the implications for biosecurity at the small community level are discussed.

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2: Background

2.1 Introduction This chapter presents a review of the Australian and international literature on the social impact of an emergency animal disease outbreak which was conducted using the World Wide Web, the University of New England’s Library and various electronic databases including ProQuest 5000, Wiley Interscience, Expanded Academic, Sociological Abstracts, AGRICOLA (Rural Sciences), APAIS (Australian Public Affairs), CAB Abstracts (Rural Sciences), Expanded Academic ASAP, and Experimental Agriculture. Possible sources of unpublished material were sought through direct contact with farmer organisations, and agricultural extension services or government departments of agriculture. The review includes a discussion on the social impact of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom as well as two crises in animal health that have occurred in Australia, namely the outbreak of Newcastle disease at Mangrove Mountain in 1999 and Ovine Johne’s Disease in southeast Australia in 1990. The implications drawn from these events for Australia’s preparedness for an emergency disease outbreak are outlined. Finally, this chapter considers factors that may facilitate or impede the biosecurity preparedness of small rural communities. 2.2 The impact of the FMD epidemic in the UK The FMD outbreak in Britain began in February 2001 after swill containing illegally imported, contaminated materials was fed to pigs on a farm in Northumberland (Elliot 2002c; Oates 2003). By the time the disease had been confirmed, at least 57 farms had been infected. Critically, the case was not diagnosed until pigs had been sent for slaughter at an abattoir in Essex. By then, the virus is believed to have been spread by air, to seven other farms in Tyne and Wear, and then to Hexham market and Longton market in Cumbria. Extensive animal movements ensured that the virus was then dispersed widely across the UK and then to France, Ireland and the Netherlands before a total ban on livestock movements was imposed. The disease was particularly concentrated in the districts of Cumbria, North Devon and Northumberland (Roberts 2001; European Information Service 2002). The epidemic lasted for 32 weeks. Around 10,000 personnel including vets, field staff, soldiers, support staff and contractors were engaged in controlling and eradicating the disease (Dixon 2002). The cost to Britain (February to September 2001) involved: expenditure in excess of £2.7 billion ($7.4 billion) for the slaughter and disposal of stock,

disinfection of farms, welfare slaughter scheme and compensation to farmers the slaughter of more than four million head of livestock on 10 000 farms, with an additional

two million slaughtered under the Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme estimated losses of approximately £5.1 billion ($14 billion) to rural businesses (NSW

Agriculture 2002). Furthermore, virtually every farmer in the UK was affected by the impacts of the disease through restrictions on movements, increased costs and impacts on domestic market prices (Roberts 2001). The outbreak highlighted the interdependencies within rural economies particularly the conflicts between the needs of those associated with the farm sector and other rural sectors, residents, and tourists to the regions. Downstream from the farm gate, there were losses of income and employment associated with the closure of markets, abattoirs and the haulage industry (Roberts 2001). The effect on farms and these other businesses had a flow-on affect for plumbers, painters and decorators, car and machinery suppliers, livestock carriers, laundry services and food wholesalers.

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Many non-farming businesses were adversely affected in areas such as tourism (hotels, restaurants, stately homes and other visitor attractions) and recreational activities (fishing, riding stables, outdoor equipment and saddlers). To halt the spread of the disease, the public were asked to keep away from the countryside and to be wary of holding social events or opening visitor attractions if there was any risk of contact with livestock. Local councils closed all footpaths in their area. Most visitor attractions, car parks, lay-bys and picnic sites were also closed to discourage visitors (Oates 2003). Rural pursuits such as walking, climbing, riding, recreational angling, and shooting were immediately curtailed, many rural visitor attractions closed, and agricultural and sporting events cancelled (DEFRA 2001; Roberts 2001; Oates 2003). Caz Graham (2001:1) writes of the FMD outbreak in the UK:

Despite all the technical advances of the 21st century [sic]… in a matter of months, a microscopic organism wreaked untold havoc on the lives of thousands of people in the developed world. It’s humbling, a reminder of our human fallibility.

2.2.1 Social impact The social impact of the FMD outbreak upon farm families and their communities as well as those working in control programs and support services was significant and the consequences were far-reaching and enduring (Dixon 2002). Lindsay and Miles (2000) define social impacts as having to do with people’s feelings, which can be overwhelming and often unacknowledged. Such feelings have been described as: uncertainty, stress, anger, a sense of loss of personal control over life, and despair. These feelings impact on the way individuals behave and the way communities thrive or decline. Lindsay and Miles (2000) note it can be difficult to separate the emotional impacts of the disease itself from the impact of actions taken to control the disease such as the slaughter and disposal of livestock and the movement restrictions placed upon people and livestock. It can also be difficult to separate social from economic issues. Most of the major reports on the economic impact of FMD in the UK have included some observations on the social effects of the outbreak, often distinguishing between effects on individuals and families and on rural communities as a whole (Bennett et al. 2001; Countryside Agency 2001; Haskins 2001; Rural Task Force, 2001; CFMI 2002; House of Commons 2002; National Farmers’ Union 2002; National Audit Office 2002; Royal Society Edinburgh 2002; Impact Assessment Group 2003; Mercer 2002).

2.2.2 Impact on farm families The impact of FMD upon farm families was financial and also psychological, as they witnessed animals being culled and transported away, or buried or burnt. Farms and businesses suffered and their way of life were significantly altered (Graham 2002). There were several factors that caused stress for farm families. These included: bereavement over the loss of their stock (in some cases bloodlines which had been established

over many generations) the sacrifice of healthy herds in the contiguous culling operations surrounding outbreak areas distress at the sight of slaughtered animals, and the insensitivity of some officials in the

slaughtering process delays of up to two weeks to remove the slaughtered animals from farms being the first in an area to contract the disease which meant neighbours within a three-

kilometre radius would also have their animals culled concern over animal welfare (associated with lack of feed and poor conditions in the fields at

a time coinciding with the lambing season)

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the inability to access accurate and reliable information on disease locations and control measures

the loss of control over their lives and, in the case of farms experiencing a cull, a feeling of redundancy

restrictions on livestock movements isolation arising from both the legislative restrictions on movements and self-imposed

restrictions on movements through fear of spreading the disease. Families became confined to their farms even before this was enforced by the FMD restrictions. Visits to family, friends or social venues were curtailed

some children were moved from their homes for a time to allow them to continue to go to school. While this caused short-term distress, it may have been judged by parents to be less severe than remaining on the farm and observing the slaughter and disposal of animals. Others were kept at home, which led to feelings of isolation. Some children from infected properties suffered abuse at school

constraints were placed on normal life off-farm businesses were closed or kept in operation by the ‘away posting’ of one member of

the family falls in both farm and off farm income caused financial pressures; including short-term

financial concerns (associated with both the need to purchase stock feed and the inability to access benefits) as well as the long-term financial worries (Bennett et al. 2001; Countryside Agency 2001; Deaville and Jones 2001; CFMI 2002:76; Dixon 2002; Impact Assessment Group 2003).

One farmer (Frost-Pennington, in Graham 2001:9) wrote of his experience: It was not only the blood, the tears, the mud, the acrid plumes of smoke or the

stench of rotting carcasses. It was also the silence. The imprisonment. The lack of information. The frustration and hopelessness. The fear. The waiting.

Another farmer whose stock was slaughtered had to wait eleven days before the carcasses were removed. She wrote: The most horrific thing is the terrible silence. You used to hear cows clanking

and the sheep calling. Now there is silence with the wind moaning round the house. I find myself doing odd things. Baking, cleaning, restless, unsettled. The bodies of the cattle lie sprawled in the yard, bloated, hEAD’s out-stretched, and tongues hanging out, undignified. The stench is quite horrendous. It’s always a horrible experience seeing an animal ‘down’ but to see a whole herd like that is just indescribable.

(Graham 2001:77)

The isolation of families had a devastating effect: Babies were born and could not be shared with families, people died and could

not be laid to rest in their own burial ground, children were separated from parents or from education. Employment off-farm was sacrificed in the interests of biosecurity and concern for neighbours.

(Graham 2001:193)

Requests for assistance to support agencies increased dramatically (Countryside Agency 2001; Church of Scotland 2002). Calls to the Rural Stress Info Network increased from 200 to 2000 calls per month (Cooper 2004). Many of the calls to help lines concerned situations where the epidemic overwhelmed the caller’s ability to cope with existing family crises and economic loss (Graham 2001:193).

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Haskins (2001) found the restriction on livestock movements created major problems for those livestock properties in affected areas that did not lose stock. Unable to sell their stock, or move them for sale or to other grassland, this group experienced greater difficulty than those who were culled out. Farms soon became overstocked which depleted pastures and fodder reserves. Without income, these farmers were unable to purchase feed, and animals were slaughtered for welfare reasons (Dixon 2002). A survey of 150 livestock producers in Britain conducted by the National Farmers’ Union found 6% affected by the FMD crisis reported they would leave farming. Almost half of those surveyed did not believe compensation had been adequate. Forty per cent of livestock producers would not return to their traditional farming practices but would come back to farming in a different way, producing a commodity other than livestock; for example, forestry (NFU 2002).

2.2.3 Impact on other businesses The strong message that people should stay off farmland combined with the restrictions placed on access, affected tourism, outdoors leisure businesses and the outdoor amenity of local communities. The tourist industry was brought to a halt. Individual small businesses, which were caught up in the crisis, suffered distress and personal hardship. These groups included many self-employed or part-time workers, casual or seasonal workers, as well as businesses in non-farming sectors (CFMI 2002:65). The economic inter-linkages within an integrated rural economy had not been sufficiently recognised by policy makers (Roberts 2001; CFMI 2002:70). Hutcheson (cited in Feedstuffs Editorial 2002) also noted that the British Government’s decision to close the countryside was based on the misnomer of a separate rural economy isolated from the rest of the economy and failed to acknowledge how businesses other than agriculture also rely on high quality countryside. A study of the impact of the FMD epidemic in Exmoor (Sheppard and Turner 2001) also highlighted the close interdependence of the business economies of rural areas. Many businesses had interests spanning two or more economic sectors. Furthermore, many households were dependent upon several linked economic sectors. The survey of residents found 92% of farms, 90% of accommodation and 80% of retail businesses were negatively affected. Farms suffered from loss or delay in sales of their products, reduced commodity prices and from additional costs. Accommodation sectors lost income from the cancellation of bookings and the loss of passing trade. The retail sector also suffered from the loss of passing trade. Twenty-three per cent of respondents and 42% of their families reported experiencing worry, stress, depression, uncertainty, anger, fear and frustration. Twenty-eight per cent felt isolated through the restrictions placed on movements, 21% lamented the loss of social contact and community interaction while 16% resented their inability to walk, cycle or ride. Studies of the impact of FMD upon other businesses in rural areas (Countryside Agency 2001; Deaville and Jones 2001) reveal that the effects were largely stress-related impacts associated with the financial problems and uncertainly caused by the outbreak. Like the farmers, owners of non-farm businesses and other local inhabitants in affected areas experienced a lack of control over their livelihoods. However, unlike those farmers directly impacted by the FMD outbreak, no financial compensation was available (Impact Assessment Group 2003). Several reports concluded that the main lesson learned from the FMD crisis was a new public awareness of the complexities and interconnectedness of rural economies (Roberts 2001; Donaldson et al. 2002; Impact Assessment Group 2003).

2.2.4 Impact on communities The slaughter and disposal of animals on pyres and in mass burial sites close to settlements disturbed the country environment and the lives of residents (CFMI 2002:57). Pyres burning slowly gave off an acrid smoke containing particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide as well as other products of combustion (CFMI 2002:75). Together these events caused high levels of distress for many of the

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population and there have been concerns about the short- and long-term consequences for health. Furthermore, world wide media coverage of burning carcasses became distressing for the wider community and did nothing to encourage tourists to visit Britain (CFMI 2002; Dixon 2002). Rural communities were affected by the quarantine controls that restricted movements and prevented normal community functions and interactions. Their economies were threatened as businesses struggled with the fall in trade and visitors failed to appear. Loss of employment and income increased family stress and problems that impacted upon communities (Dixon 2002). Village organisations, societies and clubs went into abeyance. Sports and arts events were cancelled. Although these activities were quickly restarted in uninfected areas, many farming families continued to stay away from such events. Local Authorities, Health Boards and other community agencies also found the FMD control restrictions posed difficulties to the delivery of services. Grass cutting, rubbish collections, pathway maintenance, ‘meals on wheels’, funerals, welfare services and the like faced problems wherever they involved services to farms or access across farmland (Bennet et al. 2001; Countryside Agency 2001; CFMI 2002:77). Shucksmith et al. (1996) notes that the curtailment of social and community activities impacted mostly on those considered vulnerable in rural areas; that is, the elderly, women with young children and youths. There was concern that the outbreak would have a long-term effect on the viability of community groups and resources. However, the studies found the outbreak actually helped to validate the important role played by social and community groups in rural areas (National Council for Voluntary Organisations 2002). In England and Wales, new community groups formed in response to the crisis (Countryside Agency 2001; Impact Assessment Group 2003). In one community in Yorkshire, up to 160 people attended regular meetings of the ‘cull club’ held at the local pub to allow farm families to discuss the issues, receive information and support, and mingle socially (Dixon 2002). However, the extent of the impact of the FMD outbreak varied greatly between communities. Some remained close-knit and very supportive of local farmers, while in others, the outbreak created tensions both within the farming community and between farmers and other businesses affected. Some communities sustained a general feeling of sympathy about the plight of the agricultural community, while in others there were conflicts between tourism and other industries (The Impact Assessment Group 2003). There were also tensions between farmers pertaining to financial aspects, in particular differing opinions on livestock valuations and the details of compensation rules. In other cases, tensions arose between farmers in their perceptions of how the disease was being spread and certain farm management practices. However, the Impact Assessment Group (2003) suggests that such tensions were insignificant compared to the way in which the farming community united to overcome the problems they faced. As Frost-Pennington (in Graham 2001:10) notes: The biggest tragedy is the way the disease has torn communities apart.

Neighbour has been set against neighbour. Normal activities have been erased from the calendar. Rumour, like the virus itself, spread like wildfire. Everyone wants someone else to blame. Yet, I have been amazed by the fortitude, courage, friendliness, kindness and strength of spirit in this most resilient group of people —farmers.

2.2.5 Impact on emergency service personnel Those employed to implement the control policies were also adversely affected by the outbreak. Workers directly involved in the cull, were not all used to slaughtering animals and dealing with distraught people (Countryside Agency 2001). As the virus is shed in large quantities before infected animals show any signs of disease, many of the animals, which appeared perfectly healthy, had to be

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slaughtered (Graham 2001:9). Furthermore, workers were subject to extremely long hours and difficult working conditions. The manager of one of the largest livestock auction sales group in Europe who made a team of auctioneers available for the valuation of animals prior to slaughter stated: These were the most harrowing of times for our farming customers whom we

knew so well and whose lives were in turmoil…Our auctioneers would arrive at an infected farm at 6.00 am and depending on the numbers and complexity of the livestock may visit another four farms in that day in an attempt to keep ahead of the slaughter men. Biosecurity arrangements were an additional pressure with many of our auctioneers having their own livestock and were unable to return home – in some cases for up to nine weeks at a time.

(Graham 2001:75)

The response teams were most at risk from subsequently developing health problems from the stress incurred as a result of the long hours worked and/or in the nature of the eradication procedures. Those operating help lines found their task very stressful. No training was available to assist the workers respond to angry, emotional and suicidal people. As a result, they felt inadequate and unable to help and were consequently powerless to protect themselves emotionally. Debriefing was described as inadequate and not offered soon enough (Dixon 2002). As a consequence, emergency response agencies have called for a corporate stress strategy so that, in the future, managers will be better placed to deal with both their own personal stress and that of their staff (Scottish Executive 2003). Farmers and industry were critical of the Government’s handling of the eradication and control of the outbreak. The Government experienced difficulty in effectively communicating and disseminating accurate and reliable information to the public. Consequently, farmers took their anger and frustration out on local government staff who were unable to assist (Dixon 2002). One of the 20 Australian veterinarians who went to the UK to assist with the FMD outbreak found that while his training and experience well-equipped him to deal with the task including the mass slaughter of stock, the human cost was emotionally disturbing. He concluded that although Australia is training to cope with such an outbreak, he did not believe any amount of training would really prepare individuals for an epidemic on the scale of the one that Britain experienced (Daley 2001).

2.2.6 Psychological impact The Institute of Health Research at Lancaster University is currently conducting a study into health problems amongst farmers and farm workers, small business operators, government workers and disease control personnel, members of the community and health professionals. Results after the first year of this project found that amongst the core study group of 54 people: 11.1% have been clinically treated for depression or anxiety 7.4% have a family member who has been treated for depression or anxiety 20.3% are reporting signs of ‘post-traumatic experience’ 44.4% report feelings of anxiety or stress that are not being dealt with 29.6% are reporting on-going health, financial or social problems that they relate directly to

the FMD crisis (CFMI 2002:79). In a study comparing the psychological impact of the FMD outbreak upon farmers in a badly infected area (Cumbria) and an uninfected area (Scottish Highlands), Peck et al. (2002), found farmers in Cumbria recorded higher levels of psychological morbidity than farmers in the Highlands. The findings are consistent with the argument that FMD increased levels of morbidity over and above levels in the general farming community. More interestingly, only moderate differences were found in

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the morbidity levels of farmers who had actually had their animals slaughtered and those who had not. The authors attributed this finding to the fact that the latter, despite experiencing financial hardships, did not receive compensation. It could also be associated with the longer duration of uncertainly faced by uninfected farmers. Some studies note the effects on children caused by the slaughter of stock, in some cases family pets, and seeing parents and relatives in distress (Countryside Agency 2001). Deaville and Jones (2001) in a telephone survey of organisations supporting individuals found that while farm women and their children used health services to discuss issues arising from the FMD outbreak, men generally did not. However, one study found that seven out of ten farmers’ wives had severe anxiety about their husband’s state of mind during the outbreak. Emergency service personnel, help-line and other support service staff were subject to psychological stress due to the long working hours and stressful situations they faced. Some involved in the slaughter and disposal of animals were vulnerable to post-traumatic stress disorder (Dixon 2002). Amongst emergency service personnel, these symptoms are described as Critical Incident Stress (Duckworth 1986). Mitchell (1983) defines Critical Incident Stress as any situation faced by emergency service personnel that causes them to experience unusually strong emotional reactions that have the potential to interfere with their ability to function either at the scene or later. Zinsstag and Weiss (2001) maintain that the FMD epidemic in the UK demonstrated a need for an overarching social approach to livestock production and disease control.

2.3 The potential impact of an emergency animal disease outbreak on Australia

Should there be a FMD outbreak of this magnitude in Australia, the economic and social impacts of the outbreak could be similar to that experienced in the UK. However, there would also be some major differences. For example, the greater value to Australia of livestock exports—almost $10 billion in 2000-2001, or 6% of total exports—means that the trade effects of an outbreak would be far greater in Australia than was the case in Britain (Plunkett and Wilson 2002; Productivity Commission 2002). The single greatest consequence of a FMD outbreak in Australia would be exclusion from premium meat markets from FMD-free countries such as Japan and the United States. Australia’s tourist industry is not linked to agriculture to the same extent as the UK and most tourist attractions would not be directly affected by an outbreak. Tourism in areas surrounding an outbreak would most likely be transferred to other regions (Productivity Commission 2002). However, Tasmania is one State that could be disadvantaged through the loss of tourism (DPIWE 2004). The Productivity Commission report found that a major FMD outbreak involving the closure of key lamb and beef markets for 15 months would cost the nation up to $13 billion of gross domestic product with consequences lasting for ten years beyond the outbreak. Even a small isolated outbreak would potentially cost up to $3 billion of GDP (Plunkett and Wilson 2002; Productivity Commission 2002). An economic modelling study of the impact of three emergency diseases: FMD, classical Swine Fever and Sheep Pox in three regional areas in Australia, found FMD caused greater economic losses than the other diseases and was the most expensive to control (Garner and Lack 1995). The nationally agreed strategies to control an emergency disease outbreak are set out in the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN) and involves: establishing a quarantine area around all known infections

slaughtering all infected herds and other herds that have been in ‘dangerous contact’ with them

disposing of animals

disinfecting properties, and

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compensating stockowners for the livestock slaughtered as part of the stamping-out activity. Significant government and industry resources would be required to eradicate FMD. The Productivity Commission estimated that that it would cost about $8 million per day in control and eradication costs, the loss of up to 25,000 jobs and up to $70,000 of lost income to each producer. Control and compensation costs could range from around $30 million for a small outbreak over three months to $450 million for a year-long outbreak. Compensation to producers for livestock slaughtered to control the disease could cost between $4 million for a small outbreak scenario up to around $40 million for a large outbreak (Plunket and Wilson 2002; Productivity Commission 2002). Compensation will only be available for livestock slaughtered for the purpose of eradication or prevention of the spread of the disease. It will not cover loss of income or losses arising from the outbreak, such as movement restrictions preventing stock being transported to markets (Australian Farm Journal 2003). The Productivity Commission notes that many social impacts would flow from the pervasive effects associated with the loss of export market revenue, while others would result directly from the measures undertaken to control the spread of FMD within Australia and its elimination. The impact of the control measures would vary according to the proximity to the outbreak. In the restricted areas: Areas containing properties with known infections, or properties that

had contact with them either directly or indirectly through transfer of personnel, animals etc, and properties within a buffer zone around infected properties, would be directly affected by strict quarantine restrictions. These restrictions would remain until all susceptible animals and animal products were destroyed, infected properties decontaminated and there was no longer any evidence of the disease. The control measures are likely to have an impact on the people on these properties and on those involved in applying the quarantine measures.

In the control areas: People would be affected by controls over the movement of susceptible livestock and by epidemiological surveillance undertaken to confirm the disease-free status of livestock. Until the restricted areas are more accurately delineated, there could be a significant number of people initially affected. The movement controls would mainly affect livestock producers and others involved in the transport of livestock and livestock products, but all travel into and out of the area would be affected.

The balance of Australia: While most people in the remainder of Australia would be largely unaffected by FMD control measures, those involved in the livestock industries would be directly affected by the trade effects of the disease. Some in the related upstream input supply and downstream processing industries would also be affected. The loss of export markets, which would follow an FMD outbreak, would sharply lower livestock prices that would have ramifications for livestock industries in all regions of Australia (Productivity Commission 2002, p. 118).

While Australia has not had the direct experience of a significant FMD epidemic, there have been other episodes of emergency animal diseases that can be drawn upon to gather some understanding of the social impact of a possible EAD outbreak occurring in the future. These include the outbreak of Newcastle Disease, which occurred in Mangrove Mountain in New South Wales in April 1999 and the Ovine Johne’s Disease (OJD), which occurred in Victoria in 1995.

2.3.1 Newcastle Disease, Mangrove Mountain The Newcastle Disease outbreak occurred in April 1999 in the Mangrove Mountain district on the central coast of New South Wales. Newcastle Disease is a highly-contagious viral disease, which causes nervous symptoms including respiratory distress in domestic poultry, caged and wild birds. The disease sprEAD’s rapidly from direct contact and can also be spread through infected material in garbage that is fed to poultry (NSW Department of Community Services 2000). The Mangrove Mountain outbreak arose from a mutation of a local endemic virus rather than a virus that was introduced from overseas. Once the disease was confirmed, national and state emergency

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animal disease response plans were implemented to manage the eradication program. All birds were destroyed on the initial infected property by 4 April, and the property decontaminated by 14 April. Between 12 April and 15 May, eight more commercial farms within a 5 km radius of the initial farm had become infected. A restricted quarantined area was established which was surrounded by a control area to provide a barrier to the disease. All poultry in the restricted area were exterminated and the properties disinfected to eradicate the virus and prevent the spread of the disease to neighbouring districts. Restrictions were placed upon the movement of meat chickens and all other birds out of the restricted area, which were enforced by 24-hour roadblocks on all access roads. Some restrictions were also imposed upon farms within the control area. Of the 75 commercial poultry businesses with a commercial flock of 5 million birds in the region, thirty farms were affected resulting in the destruction of 1.9 million meat chickens, 13 000 laying hens, 5000 ducks, 3000 meat pigeons, 60 000 pullets, 17 ostriches and over 2000 domestic birds. Pet birds in the restricted area were also destroyed. Wild birds including sparrows and starlings were eradicated on commercial farms. There were 103 freight containers of dead birds transported from infected properties and buried in two sites. Birds on uninfected properties were burned in pits using over 120 000 railway sleepers as fuel. During July, all properties were cleaned and disinfected and the response operation ceased. Restocking of properties also commenced, with vaccination of restocked birds to suppress any residual infection. This was the largest disease eradication process ever undertaken in Australia. The total cost of the outbreak, including the compensation paid to the owners on the basis of the value of destroyed stock, was $26.4 million. The estimated cost to the poultry industry of the outbreak was $200 million (NSW Department of Community Services 2000). The Mangrove Mountain Community Recovery Committee was established to ensure a coordinated and planned approach to service provision and facilitate community recovery. Up to $8.5 million in compensation was paid to farmers for the loss of stock and damage to sheds, equipment or property resulting from the destruction of disinfection process. However, no compensation was paid for loss of income. Farmers were eligible for support under the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment through Centrelink and offered low-interest loans under the Rural Assistance Authority. Other services provided included counselling through the local neighbourhood centre, a free-call information hotline, an emergency welfare centre, and lobbying of the banks to be sympathetic to the growers’ plight. A weekly newsletter providing information on developments was also distributed to farmers and residents within the restricted and control areas at roadblocks, shops and individual letterboxes (NSW Department of Community Services 2000).

Social impact

The NSW Department of Community Services conducted a survey of 1703 people who lived in the Mangrove Mountain region during the outbreak of the disease to assess the long-term impacts and the social, environmental and economical effects upon the community. The response rate was low, producing a sample of 184 residents. Of these, 60% of the chicken farmers and 1.9% of non-chicken farmers reported they had been unable to work for at least one month and some up to eight months. Income ceased for three to eight months for all of the chicken farmers and 6% of the non-chicken farmers. Chicken farmers reported their savings were depleted; some had their debt levels increase while others sought additional loans. Non-chicken farmers reported they were unable to sell cattle, deliveries took longer and staff were therefore absent for long periods of time. Eggs and chicken manure had to be imported in from outside the control zone, there was less work in the area, and property sales plummeted (NSW Department of Community Services 2000). Most of the chicken farmers (88%) reported the outbreak had significantly affected their lives. They experienced worry, fear and stress, isolation from the community and inconvenience. Twelve per cent of the non-chicken farmers reported the outbreak affected their lives a lot, while the majority were affected very little. The inconvenience of roadblocks impacted upon their daily commitments, the smell from the eradication and disinfection process caused nausea, and many people were concerned

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about wildlife in the area. Residents reported fear, isolation, community emotions and stigma as well as changes in their diet. The most common symptom of stress reported by 21% of respondents was tension followed by strong memories (19%). When asked what was the greatest impact upon the communities, respondents identified the economic impact resulting from the loss of cash flow within the district and secondly, the split that arose within the community resulting from the benefits that were afforded to the chicken farmers that normal farmers could not access. Farmers noted feelings of powerlessness with the loss of control over their farm and their lives. The majority (69%) reported that it would take up to two years to recover from the outbreak. Most (70%) reported that they had family or friends to support them in the recovery process. However, 30% reported that they had no such support (NSW Department of Community Services 2000). The Seventh Day Adventist Church was the most frequently used service provider during the outbreak, followed by St Vincent de Paul, the Salvation Army and the local Council. As Stayner and Barclay (2002) found in their examination of service provision for farmers during the 1996 drought, these local, familiar and trusted agencies within rural communities are preferred over Government agencies for accessing support. Yet, Mangrove Mountain residents found it difficult to accept offers of assistance but noted they would not have survived without such support (NSW Department of Community Services 2000). The counselling service offered by the Area Health Service was the least accessed service despite a large advertising campaign. Stayner and Barclay (2002) also found these services were poorly utilised by drought affected farmers as most considered their problems to be economic or physically health related rather than mental health related. Also, the confines of small rural communities precluded residents from openly approaching mental health services. The report concluded that all disasters may have a common thread but the unique nature of any disaster coupled with the individual needs or underlying issues that arise as the disaster unfolds within differing communities makes the recovery process very specialised to that community. It was also evident that during the epidemic, attention was focused upon technical information and the need to control further outbreaks so that the recovery process for the community and its residents was put aside (NSW Department of Community Services 2000).

2.3.2 Ovine Johne’s Disease (OJD), Victoria Ovine Johne’s Disease is an incurable, slow developing wasting disease of sheep, which is ultimately fatal. Infected animals are unable to absorb nutrients because their intestines become thickened and inflamed. Death usually occurs six to twelve weeks after they start to show signs of severe wasting. The disease is insidious as symptoms may not appear for months or several years after animals become infected. The disease is spread primarily through the movement of infected stock or the run-off of infected water. Lambs at foot may also become infected from their mother’s milk, or possibly in utero. OJD is present in virtually all Temperate sheep producing countries in the world including New Zealand, the USA, Spain, South Africa and Iceland. It is suspected that OJD was introduced to Australia by infected sheep imported from New Zealand and was confined to the Central Tablelands of NSW for more than ten years. However, the number of properties and districts reporting the disease has now increased (Lindsay and Miles 2000). An outbreak of OJD occurred in Victoria in 1995 and resulted in the immediate quarantine of infected properties and the eradication program of infected sheep and goats. Producers were paid the slaughter value of the animals plus compensation according to the number and types of animals slaughtered. However, by the end of 1999, the level and spread of the disease had become greater than first anticipated. Costs of the control program escalated and farmers who had been affected directly by the control program experienced considerable distress (Lindsay and Miles 2000).

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Social impact

In a review of the impact of this event upon the Victorian community (Lindsay and Miles 2000), farmers described a sense of losing control and of being unable to make proper provision for their families, of being regarded as a poor neighbour or a failure at the enterprise to which they had committed their lives. As well as farmers, the emotional strain and overwork experienced by government staff required to implement the control program were reported. Residents reported the whole community was stigmatised once OJD was identified within it. There were reports of animosity developing between neighbours where some have de-stocked and others had chosen quarantine. Uncertainty that the eradication program would prove effective added to the direct impacts of de-stocking. At the same time, many rural communities showed considerable resilience in the face of challenging circumstances (Lindsay and Miles 2000). Farmers described the information about OJD as being either poor or absent. They claimed that de-stocking orders were presented in threatening terms and often issued with insufficient time for farmers to prepare themselves (for example, shear sheep before they were sent for slaughter). Many farmers appear to have thought that de-stocking was compulsory, at least in the first year or two. There was confusion and a lack of communication on this issue. Quarantine was described as an unattractive and hazardous option. Some producers stated that the threat of financial liability, should the OJD spread from their property, appeared to place farmers with infected stock in an unviable position (Lindsay and Miles 2000).

2.3.3 Implications for Australian preparedness The incidents in Australia, although not of the magnitude of the FMD outbreak in the UK, highlight some similarities in the types of stressors that emerged. These include: farmers’ sense of loss of control over their property and lives the isolation farmers’ loss of income and associated problems over the short- and long-term the lack of information available for farmers lack of support for farmers not directly affected by the disease restrictions on livestock movements psychological stress for farmers and emergency service personnel the need for support and training for emergency service personnel tension amongst residents of communities, and the lack of attention to the social aspects of the crisis with the main focus being upon the

technical aspects of controlling the disease.

Dixon (2002) has proposed several recommendations to address the potential social aspects of an emergency animal disease outbreak in Australia. These include: The need for a communications strategy that facilitates the effective flow of information

between government agencies and the farming community. The information should be easy to access, accurate, transparent, conform to a consistent agenda, disseminated through a variety of mediums but originate from a primary source. Farmers need information on the progression of the disease. If they are informed on restrictions and control measures, they are more compliant. Without such information, the result is stress, anger and mistrust of those involved in policies and the process of disease control.

The need for strategies for assessing fair market values for livestock slaughtered.

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The need for immediate and ongoing financial assistance and counselling services for farmers affected by the outbreak, with those already experiencing financial difficulty given a priority. As many Australian producers are facing difficulties through drought and low commodity prices, the loss of income through a disease outbreak could be the breaking point.

The need to ensure that there are sufficient support services for unemployed workers and small business owners who are affected by the disease outbreak.

The need for up-to-date training and adequate debriefing for support service and help lines personnel meeting the needs of angry, emotional and suicidal callers.

The need to encourage the establishment of self-help groups during a disease outbreak. The need for strategies such as a rural stress action plan, to recognise and practically account

for the significant and enduring psychological impacts on farm families, unemployed workers and emergency service personnel (Dixon 2002).

2.4 Biosecurity in Australia

2.4.1 Our vulnerability to an FMD outbreak Australia has not experienced a FMD outbreak for 120 years. The last incident occurred in Victoria in 1872 when the disease was identified in a bull imported from England. Two farms were infected before the disease was eradicated (Animal Health Australia 2003). While there are now strong quarantine measures in place to guard against disease, the outbreak of FMD in Europe in 2001 was a strong reminder of the need for vigilance (AFFA 2002b, 2002d). Figure 2.1 displays those countries declared FMD-free.

Figure 2.1: FMD-free countries. Source: (OIE, 2002).

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Nowadays there are greater numbers of livestock and the problems of major epidemics have become more severe. The threat of importing disease is high because of changes in livestock farming practices; high global demand for meat and meat products; extensive international travel and transport of meat and other foods throughout the world; improved transport routes, and climate change. A new and more intense threat is the deliberate release of pathogens through bio-terrorism (Murray 2001). It is likely that the risks of an outbreak of FMD cannot be completely avoided. Thus, Australia will be better planning for when, not if, an outbreak occurs. The most likely path of infection to Australia would be through the importation of infected animals, semen or infected food. The UK FMD outbreak originated when pigs were fed swill comprised of infected meat that had come from overseas. Consequently, Australia does not permit imports of any live animals, semen or uncooked meat or unprocessed dairy products from FMD-affected countries and has a ban on the feeding of swill to pigs. Other risks for infection are soil, straw, material that might be on imported farm machinery, footwear or clothing, or used animal handling equipment such as halters that could harbour the FMD virus (AFFA 2002e). Factors that predispose the spread and establishment of the virus in Australia include increased movement of livestock and livestock products; changes in industry practices; the nature of the disease in sheep; as well as the characteristics of the Pan Asia strain, which is relatively resistant to inactivation in the environment. Illicit activities and failure to report suspect FMD cases also increase the spread of the disease (Murray 2001). For example, there were incidences in the UK epidemic where some individuals deliberately spread the disease to ensure their access to compensation (Cooper 2004, personal communication). Garner and Cannon’s (1995) analysis of weather data found that conditions in much of Australia, particularly at night, are suitable for the spread of the FMD virus through the air. The ideal conditions are stable atmosphere and low wind speeds which are both common in Australia. As the risk of spread is proportional to the density of livestock downwind, large concentrations of stock in saleyards or feedlots would be most vulnerable. Thus animals most susceptible to infection would be those in intensively managed dairies and piggeries, extensive cattle and sheep properties and feral animals such as pigs, goats, buffalo and camel (AUSVETPLAN 2002). Pigs, both domestic and feral, represent a substantial disease threat. In FMD outbreaks they can act as amplifying hosts and may be asymptomatic during viral excretion (Australian Pork Industry 2002). Infected pigs excrete 1000 to 3000 times as much virus as cattle or sheep. Cattle are more at risk of infection because of their higher respiratory volume than sheep or pigs. Therefore the pattern of wind-borne spread would be from pigs to cattle (Garner and Cannon 1995). Dr Tony English of the University of Sydney warns that feral animals such as the 20 million wild pigs in Australia, could make it impossible to eradicate FMD should they became infected. Feral pigs would be particularly susceptible for the pan-Asian strain of the disease (ABC 2001). Hone and Pech (1990) suggest that the probability of detecting FMD in feral pigs would be very low because these animals occupy large, remote uninhabited areas of Australia which receive only sporadic veterinary surveillance.

2.4.2 Biosecurity strategies Biosecurity strategies aim to minimise the risk of disease entering the country and, if it does enter, ensure the outbreak is localised and does not develop into an epidemic (House of Commons 2002). The Federal Government provided approximately $600 million dollars in 2001 for Australia’s border agencies and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service to upgrade quarantine facilities at international airports and mail centres around the country (AFFA, 2004). FMD-free countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US, guard against the disease through strict import regulations

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restricting imports of live cattle and pigs from infected countries—even those using vaccination to control the disease (unless the animals are subjected to a lengthy and controlled quarantine procedure). Countries that rely on vaccination are treated as if the disease were present as the vaccination produces antibodies that interfere with serological testing and may mask the clinical symptoms of FMD (Forsyth and Bredahl 1992).

2.4.3 Exercise Minotaur In September 2002, Australia’s readiness to respond to a FMD outbreak was tested through a national exercise code named Exercise Minotaur. More than 1100 people from Commonwealth, State, Territory government agencies, local governments and livestock industry bodies took part in the five-day simulation which tested the ability of high-level government frameworks communications and decision-making procedures to manage and contain a major disease outbreak across several states. There were also 100 observers and facilitators for the exercise (AFFA 2002a; Morse 2002). The exercise simulated a three-month period following an outbreak in pigs and cattle on a farm in the Gold Coast hinterland. Infections were traced to northern New South Wales and Victoria. At the end of the exercise, there were 454 infected properties, and 822 504 animals from 1819 properties had been slaughtered (AFFA 2002b). Once the disease was brought ‘under control’ by the fourth day of the simulation, participants were asked to deal with the social and economic effects of such an event. Unemployment, the closure of tourism destinations, a fall in the price and domestic consumption of meat, depression in rural communities and water contamination problems arising from the slaughter of animals were some of the hypothetical issues examined.

Figure 2.2: Day 84: Exercise Minotaur: Simulated spread of disease (Koob 2004b).

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Following the exercise, some participants expressed concern that the exercise did not go far enough. Dr Andrew Nicholson of the Australian Veterinary Association stated: It’s all very well to have the paper shuffled in the right directions that’s great but

we need to know that the practitioners out in the field are going to know what to do and how to do it when the time comes—and it will come.

(ABC 2002a.)

At the community level, farmers and veterinarians must be more aware of the risks and be more familiar with the symptoms of emergency diseases (Royal Society of Edinburgh 2002). Professor Richard Whittington, the director of Farm Animal Health at the University of Sydney, stated there is a need to increase on-farm surveillance in Australia (ABC 2002c). Livestock producers and others who work with livestock will be the key to Australia’s ability to control and eradicate FMD in the event of an outbreak. Should a case of FMD occur, it would be vitally important for it to be diagnosed early and for the infected and in contact animals to be immediately slaughtered before the disease has a chance to spread (AFFA 2002c; Jane 2002). Recent biosecurity prevention programs in Australia, such as Animal Health Australia’s Look. Check. Ask a Vet. program, has focused upon encouraging producers to report ANY unusual symptoms in their animals rather than insist on them knowing and understanding emergency disease symptoms (Animal Health Australia 2004). There are concerns that producers may be reluctant to call a veterinarian to examine sick livestock. The tragedy of the FMD outbreak in Britain was that the first case of the disease was not reported and diagnosed before infected sheep had been marketed all over Britain and elsewhere. Meanwhile an outbreak in Italy, which was diagnosed and acted upon immediately, was confined to three farms only with relatively little economic loss (Jane 2002).

Figure 2.3: Protect Australian Livestock Campaign (AHA, 2005).

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2.4.4 Tracing animal movements The capability to trace animal movements is vital to bringing the spread of disease under control (NSW Agriculture 2002). A fully implemented National Livestock Identification Scheme (NLIS) would greatly contribute to confining a disease outbreak due to its accurate identification and rapid trace-back capabilities (MLA 2003). The NLIS is designed to improve tracing and monitoring systems for stock diseases and chemical residues to allow Australian producers to compete on the international market. The European Union (EU) requires strict quality control of livestock sales and full traceability of all cattle slaughtered for their market. The basis of the NLIS is a consistent system of property registration, which uses an eight-character property identification code on the identifiers applied to individual animals. These devices contain a radio transponder, which can be read by a machine, and the information is automatically conveyed to a computerised database. In most cases, these devices are ear-tags, but they can also be a bolus, which is inserted down the throat of the animal where it remains lodged in the animal’s rumen for its lifetime. Coupled with scanners at saleyards, feedlots and abattoirs, these devices will enable each animal to be reliably traced from its property of birth until slaughter. Many saleyards, feedlots and abattoirs throughout Australia are now installing readers and links to the NLIS database (MLA 2003). When the concept was first introduced, farmer organisations were not generally supportive of the compulsory participation in a NLIS due to the costs to producers, particularly those with large herds. By 2003, all States agreed to participate in the scheme for both sheep and cattle. The scheme will be introduced over a two-year period beginning with the mandatory electronic tagging of all calves born in 2004. The next stage will be the compulsory tagging of all cattle sold through saleyards and between properties. The final stage will include stock sold directly from the property of origin to the export market or to abattoirs (Crosby, member of NLIS National Committee, personal communication).

2.5 Factors affecting preparedness

2.5.1 Community dynamics The studies of FMD in the UK found the impact of the outbreak varied greatly between communities. Garner and Lack (1995), in an economic modelling study of the impact of emergency diseases in three regional areas in Australia, found regional factors influenced the way the disease spread and manifested itself and impacted upon local communities. The less diversified the economy, the greater the effect of an emergency disease outbreak. The size of the community, diversity in geographical location and social structure of communities will also contribute to differences in community experience. Within a small community, the ability of the police, emergency services and other relevant first responder agencies to cooperate and respond effectively to a disease outbreak will be largely affected by the cohesion and integration of a community. Community cohesion can be defined along two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Wilkinson 1970; Garkovich 1989; Sharp 2001 cited in Donnermeyer 2002). Vertical integration refers to the strength of relationships between individuals or groups at the local level and individuals or groups beyond the community; for example, local emergency services and State and Federal Government agencies. Horizontal integration refers to the strength of relationships between individuals and groups within the immediate boundaries of the community (Donnermeyer 2002).

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Sometimes close social networks that can sustain a community can also be a destructive force. A study of farm family stress in the UK (Reed, Lobley, Winter and Chandler 2002) found that peer pressure was placed upon those farmers who considered not restocking after FMD. Some farmers who left farming were subject to verbal abuse. A study of livestock theft in Australia by the author (Barclay et al. 2001) revealed attitudes and behaviours within the culture of farming communities actually facilitated crime. A tendency to blame victims of theft for their misfortune and a reluctance by victims to report thefts to police created a culture that allowed a certain degree of crime to go unpunished. Similar attitudes may act as impediments to the reporting of unusual disease symptoms in stock as well as the overall community response to an EAD outbreak should it occur.

2.5.2 Individual’s perception of risk The way people perceive risk influences the way they adjust to crises (Pijawka et al. 1988). A significant body of research indicates that people typically underestimate risks to which they are exposed (Burton et al. 1978; Wohlwill and Weisman 1981). Thus lack of biosecurity on farms may result from a lack of knowledge or understanding of the negative impacts of an emergency disease epidemic and inaccurate risk perception. Slovic (1991) argues that experts’ judgments of risks tend to correlate with the technical aspects of a hazard; for example, stock loss probabilities and financial costs, while lay people relate to other characteristics of risks, such as the uncertainty, controllability, catastrophic potential, equity and threats that extend into the future. Risk judgments are influenced by the memorability of past events and the imaginability of future events. Consequently, factors that make a hazard unusually memorable, such as heavy media coverage, can distort perceptions of risk. Uncertainty about risks can increase anxiety. Individuals may try to reduce anxiety by denying the uncertainty, making the risk seem so small that it can be ignored or so large that it must be avoided. People object to being given statements of probability rather than fact preferring to know exactly what will happen. Effective communication of the risk of an EAD outbreak will need to take account of these social values that underlie people’s perceptions (Slovic 1991). Lehman and Taylor (1987), in a study of students’ perceptions of risk of earthquake, concluded that individuals cope with an unknown threat by ignoring or denying the seriousness of the threat. Only 5% of the participants in their study had taken any earthquake precautions. The authors suggest that individuals may construe such events as uncontrollable and may therefore manage their emotional response through denial rather than taking precautionary actions. Sims and Bauman (1972) found that people who believed they had more control over their lives and the threat of tornados were more likely to take precautions and were less vulnerable to injury than those who displayed an external locus of control. Lehman and Taylor (1987) suggest that before people can be encouraged to learn or prepare for a potential EAD outbreak, their perceptions about the controllability of such a disaster will need to be modified. An extensive literature has examined the way people cope with natural disasters such as bushfire (McFarlane et al. 1997), cyclones (Parker 1977), as well as human disasters such as the Kempsey bus crash (Wilson 1990) and the Granville train disaster (Raphael et al. 1984). However, most of this literature examines how people cope after a disaster. Few studies have examined how people cope with a potential disaster when the likelihood is probable but the timing is unknown (Lehman and Taylor 1987). One aim of the present study is to examine how producers perceive the risk of a possible EAD outbreak in Australia and whether their perceptions relate to the level of biosecurity on their properties.

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2.6 Conclusion and rationale for the present study The above discussion has highlighted a number of key issues that require further investigation. The literature review has revealed that an emergency animal disease epidemic has significant and enduring impacts upon the health and wellbeing of individuals and the communities in which they reside. While there have been several logistic exercises and economic modelling studies conducted to estimate the potential technical and financial impacts of an emergency disease outbreak in Australia, relatively little is known about the potential social impact of such a event. While Federal Government and State Governments are well-prepared for such an outbreak through strict quarantine measures and national disease control strategies, there are still concerns that those in the field will not know what to do if a crisis occurs. For example, although there are Local Government Emergency Action Plans in place, what factors within communities will facilitate or impede the maintenance of such plans? Will producers have sufficient knowledge and awareness of EAD’s to know how to respond if an outbreak occurs? Will they readily report unusual symptoms in their stock to arrest the potential spread of disease? With drought and low commodity prices being among the major concerns of Australian farmers over the past few years, focus upon biosecurity and concern about a disease that has not previously occurred in Australia may not be a priority for producers. As one farmer interviewed in the preparation of this study stated, ‘This is not a front of mind issue’. Biosecurity strategies on farms may be analogous to crime prevention strategies. The rationalisation that ‘crime is something that happens to other people’ which lEAD’s to lax attitudes towards security on farms (Barclay et al. 2001) may also apply to biosecurity. There is a need to assess to what extent information about biosecurity has been taken up by producers. These issues and others were explored within the present study to identify the readiness of producers and small communities to cope with an emergency disease outbreak.

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Chapter 3: STUDY 1: FMD in the UK revisited

3.1 Introduction In July 2004, the investigator visited Devon and Cornwall to meet with farmers and support workers who were involved in the 2001 FMD outbreak in those regions. The purpose was to gather first-hand observations of the social impact of the 2001 epidemic and assess farmers’ attitudes to biosecurity three years since the outbreak occurred. This chapter provides a summary of the information gathered in these meetings.

3.2 Method Interviews were arranged via email prior to the investigator’s visit. Contact details for possible interviewees were obtained from various researchers and government officers in Australia who had established contacts in the UK when visiting or working there during the 2001 FMD epidemic. The investigator attended a country show held in Launceston in Cornwall and visited local properties to speak with farmers and support service personnel. Meetings were held with agricultural chaplains, representatives of the National Farmers’ Union (NFU), the Farm Crisis Network and the Rural Stress Information Network, as well as researchers who had conducted studies of the FMD crisis. Eight formal interviews were conducted supplemented by several additional conversations with farmers and support workers.

3.3 The findings

3.3.1 Social impact The interviews with people in Devon and Cornwall confirmed the findings of the many reports on the impact of the FMD epidemic reviewed in Chapter 2. Farmers and service providers alike were critical of the Government in its handling of the outbreak, namely the tardiness in its response, particularly the delay in closing livestock markets and banning livestock movements; the lack of information disseminated to farmers; and the fact that control was top down with little consideration given to the needs of local communities or the benefit of utilising local knowledge. Consequently, decisions made were costly and impractical. Those interviewed argued that control was concentrated in London and that there needed to be regional bases to administer control measures. They stressed that the lack of information from government was a major problem for farmers. One stated: In the beginning of the outbreak, nobody knew what was happening. On one

instance, I called five times on the same day and asked the same question and got five different answers from five different people. The problem was that they didn’t have time. MAFF officials would say, ‘We’ll ring you back,’ and as soon as they said that you knew that would be the last you heard from them.

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One academic who had conducted research on the FMD crisis noted that one of the main social impacts of the disease outbreak was the social tension that arose within previously cohesive communities. For example, farmers who had their livestock culled received compensation, which enabled them to cancel debts and take a holiday. However, they could not discuss their situation with anyone, as their neighbours may not have received benefits. They were also embarrassed about the impact on their immediate neighbours who had to endure the effects of burning pyres of infected carcasses. Conversely, those farmers who did not lose stock were confined by livestock movement restrictions and consequently worked harder to feed and care for their animals. When bans were lifted, they were able to sell their stock, but received low prices. Forced to reduce their labour force, the whole family often worked twelve or more hours a day, seven days a week to manage their farm business. These families also resorted to ‘belt tightening’ to sustain their farm business. Anything from the farm went back into the farm. Some families survived on their parents’ old age pension. The crisis also led to social change. Women took up off-farm work, which often left men isolated on farms. Gender roles changed which had an impact upon relationships. Farm-women observed how other men lived and worked and urged their partners to find another way of life. Following the outbreak, 6% of farmers diversified their operations or one of the partners worked off-farm. Farm labourers left rural areas to seek alternative employment. Another service provider noted that the FMD outbreak compounded the economic downturn farmers were already experiencing. The BSE outbreak in 1997 resulted in significant falls in livestock prices, which

was followed by three difficult economic years, which was then followed by the FMD outbreak. It is only now (2004) that things are returning to normal.

3.3.2 Support services To support farm families in crisis, some communities organised a telephone link up. At first farmers appreciated this support service. However, as the epidemic persisted, the regular calls became annoying for some. Farmers were asked if their stock were infected and many did not want to say. Fear of infection would lead people to distance themselves from those who contracted the disease. There were suspicions that some farms contracted the disease illegally, which also divided the community. Service providers maintained the isolation of farm families was the most demoralising social impact of the disease outbreak. Farm families from non-infected properties self-imposed their quarantine. Children were isolated and kept from school. Pubs and churches lost patronage. In the small community of Bow in Devon, three pubs were soon reduced to one. The focus for service providers was to get people mixing again. By disinfecting their vehicles and tractors, farmers were free to leave their properties. Service providers encouraged farmers to attend dinners at pubs or at neighbouring farms. Fodder banks, which were set up to deliver feed and straw for stock, required farmers to go to the delivery points, which broke their isolation. In Horsham in Cornwall, one enterprising local fast food business established a mobile café at these sites, setting up chairs and tables and a television, which created a meeting point for the local community. Community groups such as Young Farmers, Women’s Institutions and churches provided food parcels to farm families. A Farm Aid appeal raised some £22,500,000 across the country in three months, which demonstrated to the farming community that the urban community was concerned about their plight. One service provider reported that in 2003, his organisation received 24 000 calls for assistance from farmers who continue to struggle in the aftermath of the disease, which is about ten per cent of the 250 000 farmers nationwide. He reported that farmers find it difficult to ask for assistance. However, neighbours who may be concerned about a farm family in their district will alert his organisation.

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Service providers are unable to cold call on families and must wait until families contact them. However, local vicars can visit people within their parish and a pattern has developed where vicars will visit, counsel the family and seek their permission to allow various support services to assist them. Farm families present with various problems relating to financial and technical difficulties, social isolation, depression, domestic violence, and family and relationship issues. There are about ten mostly non-government support agencies within a network that work together to provide various types of assistance ranging from financial to mental health support and advocacy. Some of these agencies include the Rural Stress Information Network, National Farmers’ Union (NFU), Help Lines, the Farming Advice Support Team, various churches, agricultural chaplains, the Farm Crisis Network and the Samaritans. The Samaritans were a group that provided significant counselling support during the FMD outbreak and now continue to provide support for service providers themselves. Another service provider added that communication between all service providers was vitally important throughout the FMD outbreak and regular meetings were conducted. Now meetings are held twice a year. He stressed ongoing communication was essential to ensure service providers know what others are doing.

3.3.3 Biosecurity in the aftermath of FMD epidemic The representative of the NFU reported that if another FMD outbreak occurs in the future in the UK, there will be an immediate vaccination of stock. There will never again be incineration of diseased animal carcasses in open-air pyres. The images and stench of the pyres had a significant impact upon the local population as well as the tourist industry. Many farmers believe the pyres contributed to the spread of disease. Regulations regarding matters of biosecurity have increased as a result of the FMD epidemic. For example, a six-day ban on livestock movement is imposed upon farmers buying livestock onto a property. The NFU representative believed the six-day period was sufficient time for any disease symptoms to be identified. He believed farmers were not as complacent about biosecurity on-farm as they had been prior to the FMD epidemic. Pig farmers were particularly vigilant as pigs were the source of the FMD epidemic. However, currently, Swine Fever is the major concern for pork producers. At the time (July 2004), Tuberculosis was a concern for beef producers. Badgers are implicated in spread of this disease to cattle. Although this disease does not require major biosecurity control responses, it does necessitate quarantine of infected properties. Government officials regularly inspect stock on properties for Tuberculosis. A Farm Assurance Scheme has been introduced to ensure farmers are maintaining a high standard of animal welfare. Farmers are expected to regularly check their stock and insure that a veterinarian regularly inspects their animals. However, some farmers were frustrated by the fact that while they maintained high quality standards, livestock products are still being imported from countries where standards are much lower. Farmers were also concerned about the recently introduced ‘Countryside and Right to Roam’ legislation which gives tourists access to privately owned land for recreation will increase the risk of disease to properties. Other farmers interviewed indicated that biosecurity on farms was basically commonsense. It is common practice for containers used to transport livestock to be washed down and disinfected. Producers comply with regulations regarding swill feeding and are also more attentive to maintaining livestock records. Most producers take care to purchase stock from a reputable livestock owner. There are increased biosecurity practices in place at livestock markets and abattoirs as the risk of disease is heightened in such places. In 2003, the European Union banned the burial or burning of animal carcasses on farms. Consequently, all animals that die from natural or accidental causes on

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farms must be taken to incinerators at various locations. The British Government is providing £10 million to pay 30% of the costs of collecting fallen farmed stock. However, there are concerns about biosecurity with lorries carrying animal carcasses across the country. When asked about a NLIS in Britain for disease control, the NFU representative responded that such a scheme will be introduced within the next two to four years. Buyers want full traceability. British farmers have accepted the concept in principal, as the current paper system of animal identification is laborious and extremely time-consuming. However, an electronic identification scheme will require farmers to become more computer-literate. Currently only 50% of UK farmers use computers. As the average age of farmers in the UK is 55 years, some older farmers may find learning new skills a difficult process. However, it is believed that the actual average age of farmers may be considerably younger as many of the older generation remain on family properties with their successors. Other farmers interviewed agreed that the introduction of such a scheme would not greatly concern British farmers. They sympathised with Australian producers’ concerns over the cost of the NLIS as they have larger herds. Most properties in the Devon/Cornwall area are small, on average between four to five acres in size and a large herd was two to three hundred animals. However, the NFU representative expressed similar concerns to those raised by Australian producers, that a NLIS must be foolproof and affordable. If an animal loses its identification, the system is meaningless.

3.3.3 Attitudes of farmers towards biosecurity It was interesting to observe that many of the British farmers’ attitudes towards the livestock industry, the Government and their local community were very similar to Australian farmers’ attitudes. The prevailing attitude of farmers, which was evident in all interviews conducted, was that if government agencies do their job, for example on the wharves, ports and airports, farmers should not have to be greatly concerned about biosecurity. It was notable that at a local country show, which was held in four fields, footbaths of disinfectant were placed at the gate of the field where cattle were displayed, yet the investigator observed no-one abiding by this biosecurity requirement. Facilities were also in place at the main gate with a sign instructing all vehicles leaving the ground to be disinfected. At the end of the day, two men from the local slaughterhouse were employed to spray all vehicles as they left the grounds. Few vehicles stopped. When questioned, the workers reported that they believed their presence was a waste of time. Ideally, vehicles should travel through a disinfectant dip to effectively eradicate any virus. However, they recognised that it was important that the government be seen to be proactive regarding biosecurity.

Figure 3.1: Launceston Show 2004.

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Figure 3.2: No-one stops to disinfect their footwear.

Figure 3.3: Few vehicles stop for disinfection.

3.4 Conclusion The most significant social impacts of the FMD outbreak upon the farming community in the UK according to those interviewed, was the poor communication between government and local communities, the social isolation of farm families and the social divisions that occurred within some communities. However, churches and volunteer community groups came together to form a network to provide a coordinated, comprehensive support service for farm families in crisis. Similarly, in

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Australia, networks of support services have emerged over the past decade of drought, which have been similarly effective in supporting Australian farm families. These networks could be employed to aid in community recovery should an emergency disease outbreak occur in Australia. It may useful to conduct a closer investigation of the types of practices and support services that proved to be successful in breaking down the self-imposed social isolation of the British farmers and encouraging them to seek support. It is likely that Australian farmers will react in similar ways when confronted with such a crisis and may respond to the same types of support programs. Gathering information on what did and did not work in the welfare response to the UK epidemic may assist in Australia’s preparedness. The most important finding of this small study was that farmers are taking some steps towards improved biosecurity on farms but, in general, there is a pervading belief that responsibility for biosecurity lies with the government. Farmers believe that if quarantine measures are effectively enforced, there should be no further problems. Furthermore, farmers seem to think that if there is another outbreak, there is little they can do to prevent it. In the next chapter, these views will be compared with the attitudes of Australian farmers towards biosecurity on farms.

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Chapter 4: STUDY 2: Biosecurity on Australian farms

4.1 Introduction In this chapter, the findings of the second study in this research project are presented. The study involved a mail survey of 3000 livestock producers across the eastern states of Australia, which investigated the extent of biosecurity practices on farms and the level of knowledge of emergency animal diseases amongst farmers. The chapter begins with an outline of the aims and objectives of the study and the method by which the data were gathered for the study. The results are then presented according to several aspects of biosecurity that were addressed within the survey including the sources of information for farmers, biosecurity strategies on farms, perceptions of risks for emergency animal disease and attitudes towards the issue of biosecurity. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the main findings.

4.2 Objectives The aim of this second study was to conduct a mail survey of 3000 livestock owners across Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria (the states most vulnerable to a FMD outbreak) to gather an understanding of their level of knowledge and understanding of emergency animal diseases, their access to information and support regarding emergency animal diseases, and whether or not they have instigated any degree of biosecurity on their properties. A further goal of this study was to understand how individuals perceive the possible risk of an EAD epidemic when the occurrence is probable but the timing is unknown. The survey was designed to educate and raise awareness about emergency animal disease while surveying farmers.

4.3 Method From the approximately 30 000 livestock producers located throughout New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, a random sample of approximately 3000 was selected for a mail survey. The proportions for each State were assessed by taking 4% of the number of livestock producers listed in the Australian Bureau of Statistics data on Agricultural Commodities (ABS 2004). The sample comprised 656 for Queensland, 1207 for New South Wales and 979 for Victoria—a total of 2842. The names and addresses of the survey participants were drawn from Telstra’s Yellow Pages listings of livestock producers. The sample represented a range of livestock industries, including cattle, sheep, alpaca and llama, deer, goats, pigs, buffalo and dairies. While this sample is biased to the extent that it represents only those producers with a telephone that choose to advertise in the Yellow Pages, it did provide access to the target population for the survey; that is, livestock producers across a range of livestock types. The survey instrument was developed and reviewed by the Advisory Committee as well as representatives of the New South Wales and Queensland Departments of Primary Industries, and the New South Wales Farmers’ Association. The survey was piloted with 200 graziers in New South Wales and Queensland before being mailed in the autumn of 2004. A covering letter outlining the purpose of the study accompanied each questionnaire. A reminder notice and questionnaire were sent to non-respondents after four weeks.

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The overall response rate to the mail survey after allowing for ‘return to senders’ was 55% providing data from 1232 surveys for analysis. This rate included 47% for Queensland providing a usable sample of 254 respondents, 55% for New South Wales, a sample of 554; and 56% for Victoria with data for 419 respondents (five respondents were unidentifiable by state). In the questionnaire, some basic demographic information about the producers and their properties was sought as well as information on the following aspects of biosecurity on farms. Information: What sources of information on biosecurity are available to producers and

where they would go first to seek information in the event of a disease outbreak. Biosecurity on farms: What safety and security precautions are employed on properties and

what are the main things that prevent producers from putting such strategies into place. Producers were asked how often they checked their stock and what types of identification they used. They were also asked whether they had discussed biosecurity issues with anyone in their district.

Perceptions of risk: Producers were asked what were the greatest disease risks to their property, how soon they would call a vet having observed illness in their stock and, if they were concerned about unusual symptoms in their stock, where they would go first to report it. Drawing on a risk perception scale devised by Lehman and Taylor (1987), participants were also asked to rate seven statements pertaining to the likelihood of an emergency management disease outbreak in Australia on a four point scale ranging from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree. This scale produced a fourfold typology, which was then used to analyse the responses to questions on preparedness.

Attitudes to biosecurity: Producers’ opinions were sought on the issues of vaccination for stock, compensation for stock losses from disease, reporting disease outbreaks, the National Livestock Identification Scheme and where the responsibility lay for biosecurity in Australia.

The survey was supplemented with information gathered in telephone interviews with producers in outback Queensland, which sought an understanding of their concerns regarding biosecurity on large outback properties.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Profile of the sample The survey sample of 1232 respondents included 1021 (85%) males and 180 females (15%) (31 respondents did not indicate their gender). Their ages ranged between 21 and 86 years (Mean 53.92 years, SD 12.94 years). As the average age for farmers in Australia is 55 years (ABARE 2001), the sample is representative of a cross-section of Australian farmers. Respondents had been farming as an adult for an average of 35.59 years (SD 15.03). The majority (41%) had lived in their district between 20 and 50 years, while 38% had been there most of their lives (50 years or more). Only 36 farmers (3%) were relative newcomers to the district (less than three years). Seven were absentee landlords. The majority of farm businesses were family partnerships (62%); another 21% were private or family companies, while sole operators managed 14%. Only five (0.4%) were public companies. Just under half of the sample 601 (49%) were livestock only operations, the majority being in beef (33%) or wool production (35%). Figure 4.1 displays the proportions of the various livestock enterprises within the sample. Most of the ‘other’ types of livestock carried on properties within the sample were horses (3.4%). Herd sizes ranged from 2 to 50 000 animals. The average herd size was 3322. The larger operations were mostly beef and wool production.

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Figure 4.1 Livestock enterprises and mean herd sizes (n=1232).

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Wool (Mean 4,708; Range 10 to 45,000)

Beef (Mean 1,074; Range 1 to 30,000)

Sheep (Mean 1633; Range 1 to 40,000)

Dairy (Mean 285: Range 1 to 1,300)

Alapacas (Mean 46; Range 1 to 300)

Goats (Mean 434; Range 1 to 3,000)

Pigs (Mean 2,173; Range 1 to 35,000)

Deer (Mean 162; Range 2 to 750)

Other

(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

The remaining 51% of the respondents had mixed farming operations. Of these, the majority involved grain cropping (20%), oilseeds (2%), fodder crops (6%), legumes (4%), rice (2%), sugar cane (1%), timber (1%), fruit (1%), vegetables (1%) and grapes (1%).

4.4.2 Sources of information In the questionnaire, farmers were initially asked where they sourced information on emergency animal diseases. The majority (73%) of respondents reported that the newspaper was the most common source of information followed by radio (68%) and television (54%) (see Figure 4.2). Thirteen people reported that they had received no information on this topic.

Figure 4.2: Sources of information (n=1232).

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Newspaper

Radio

Television

RLPB/Dept Agriculture

Farm Journal

Local Vets

Government Mailouts

Farmer Organisation

Stock Agent

Neighbours or friends

Field Days

Internet

Local C ouncil

Breed Society

No Information

(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

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A follow-up question sought information on where producers would go first for information if they heard there was an emergency animal disease outbreak in Australia. In this situation, 65% of the respondents indicated that local Departments of Agriculture/Primary Industry or Rural Lands Protection Boards would be the first port of call while 42.6% would contact their local vet. Clearly, in such circumstances, well-known and trusted people within a local community will be relied upon for advice in preference to the media. One producer noted: There is a need to save local rural Ag Department support for farmers—

centralising these services will effectively remove them from the local farmer who wants advice based on local knowledge of their situation.

Figure 4.3 displays the proportion of sources of information by state. More Victorian producers would contact their local vet than would their counterparts in other states. Producers from New South Wales would be most likely to go to their local RLPB or Department of Primary Industry officers.

Figure 4.3: Primary source of information in the event of disease outbreak, by state.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

RLPB/Dept Primary Industry

Local Vet

Radio

Newspaper

Television

Farmer Organisation

Stock Agent

Internet

Farm Journal

Neighbours or friends

Government Mailouts

Local C ouncil

Field Days

(per cent)

QLD NSW VIC Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

Just over a third (35.3%), of all respondents had discussed strategies to protect their properties and livestock from disease with others within their community. Of these, the most likely people were Department of Agriculture/Primary Industries or Rural Lands Protection Board Officers, local vets and neighbours or friends (see Figure 4.4).

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Figure 4.4: Discussions held re biosecurity on-farm (n=1232).

0 5 10 15 20

RLPB/Dept Agriculture

Local Vet

Neighbours or Friends

Farmer Organisation

Stock Agent

Field Days

Local Council

Breed Society

(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen. Only 112 respondents (9.2%) were aware of the existence of any biosecurity initiatives in their district. Twenty-seven respondents (2.22%) noted Ovine Johne’s Disease (OJD) exclusion zones and ten (0.8%) cited Footrot strategies. Another 37 (2.8%) knew about community biosecurity plans through discussions with local vets, RLPB rangers or Department of Agriculture/Primary Industry officers. However, as one farmer suggested, it would be of use to farmers to be included in such plans. The local RLPB and Dept of Ag have held scenarios, which centre upon major

disease outbreaks. There has been no formal ‘local farmer’ orientated simulation or plan developed.

Only three people were aware of a Local Emergency Disaster Plan. These findings suggest that local communities that have established plans need to publicise the existence of such strategies within their community. Thirty-two (2.6%) cited the AUSVETPLAN and other National strategies and awareness campaigns. One producer noted: I suggest that the ordinary livestock producer is largely unaware of these plans

(e.g., Ausvet plans) and how they will (or won’t) work, and especially their role in their formulation and implementation. Above all else, producers want, and deserve, the best quarantine protection, adequately funded, by Australian Governments.

4.4.3 Biosecurity on farms A series of questions sought information about biosecurity practices on farms. Producers were initially asked how often they checked their stock. Most checked their stock daily or at least once a week (see Figure 4.5). This result may reflect a large number of small livestock operations in the sample. The smaller the operation, the greater the opportunity for checking stock frequently.

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Figure 4.5: Rate of checking stock across the sample.

0 10 20 30 40 50

Daily

Once a week

Once a Fortnight

Once a month

Every 3 Months

Every 6 Months

(per cent)

The types of identification participants used for their stock were also investigated (see Figure 4.6). Not surprisingly the majority of respondents used ear tags and ear marks. Branding was also common. A total of 212 respondents (17%) were currently using electronic identification. Only 16 people reported they used no identification at all.

Figure 4.6: Stock identification.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Ear Tags

Ear Marks

Tail Tags

Brands

Tattoos

Electronic Identification

No Identification

(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen. Just over half 718 (58.3%) reported that they had implemented some type of biosecurity strategy on their properties. There were significant differences between the states on whether or not producers had biosecurity plans (χ2=34.58 p<0.001). Of the three states, Queensland producers were the least likely to have strategies in place (see Figure 4.7). The larger land mass and herd size on outback stations in Queensland and also western New South Wales do inhibit the ability of producers to implement biosecurity strategies. Many of these producers believed their geographic isolation would protect their property from a disease outbreak. However, they were particularly concerned that their properties and livestock would be vulnerable to diseases such as FMD being spread through feral pigs and goats. As one wrote: This (Biosecurity) all seems to be a blatant waste of time, when there are millions

of feral pigs running free in Australia, and no attempt is being made to eradicate them.

35

Figure 4.7: Biosecurity strategies on farms, by state.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

QLD NSW VIC

(per

cen

t)

Have Strategies in Place No Strategies In developing the survey, questions regarding biosecurity strategies on farms were piloted twice as an original question that asked respondents to identify their practices from a supplied list of strategies produced response bias. The question was then reduced to an open-ended question, which provided data that better reflected the nature of biosecurity on farms. Table 4.1 lists the type of strategies used by producers to protect stock while Table 4.2 lists those strategies employed to protect the property generally. The most common strategy practiced for the protection of stock was the isolation of all new stock coming onto a property to check for disease (40%). One producer explained: Stock are visually assessed on a daily basis, and paddock rotated fortnightly. Any

‘suspect’ stock are yarded and checked in a race and/or crush. New stock are isolated in stockyards and two 10 ha holding paddocks upon arrival for seven days to settle, be drenched and vaccinated, tagged and branded.

Others (20%) chose not to introduce new stock, preferring to breed their own replacement stock. Strategies for the property generally included securing boundary and internal fences (14%). It is evident that the majority of strategies reported by participants were simply sound farm management practices rather than specific biosecurity strategies. As one respondent acknowledged: We are not thinking of a major disease, but we are separate all new animals from

our stock, mainly to observe scouring, worms, ticks etc.

While these practices do contribute to maintaining biosecurity, these findings suggest that there is a need for widely publicising various options for biosecurity amongst producers. Those producers who were more aware were clearly identifiable within the range of responses.

36

Table 4.1: Biosecurity strategies for stock.

Quarantine all new stock: supervise for several days. Classes of stock in separate paddocks (age, mobs, species); isolate young stock. No other stock allowed in grazing areas; stock not moved to other properties. Good stock management strategies to maintain disease-free status/general health. Check stock regularly; footbath/check feet/trim feet; drench; vaccinate; regular vaccination and

worming; feed stock regularly. Test annually for insect-borne viruses. Cull poor-doers; isolate ill stock; cause of death of stock investigated (autopsy if necessary). Physical examination of new stock on arrival; new stock blood-tested for particular diseases on

arrival; vet check if concerned about origins or advice/consultation; report anything unusual; vet certificate for all new stock; check history of introduced stock and health statements/vendor declaration.

Purchase vaccinated stock only. No stock introduced; closed herd/flock; self-replacing herd/flock. Stock fed and watered in washable troughing. Purchase sires only; only purchase rams/bulls/semen from OJD-negative farms and/or

accredited/health checked; purchase semen only (AI/ET). Participation in Market Assurance Program. Stock rotation/spell paddocks between use. Special mating yard for visiting stud animals. Do not purchase stock from high-rainfall areas. Maremma dogs to deter feral animals and trespassers. Minimal time off property for mating; no contact with faeces. No animals that leave farm return—not allowed off truck once on. Stock sold/purchased off-farm, not through saleyards. Cattle kept off boundaries away from other farms. Clean vehicles; clean truck to transport stock from property to property or use own truck for transport

—no carriers. Knowledge/awareness of symptoms/up-to-date information. Do not purchase stock from overseas. Good recording system of stock identification/stock movement. Don’t feed stock animal products.

37

Table 4.2: Biosecurity strategies for properties generally.

Fencing: Secure boundary fences; locked/security gates; stock proof vehicle entry; buffer/double fences; electric boundary fences; secure internal fences.

Straying Stock: Inform neighbours immediately if stock stray; report promptly straying stock on public roads; remove stray stock ASAP; isolate neighbours’ stock until they are removed; destroy strays; vet check animals which stray onto property.

Feral animals: eradication/control. Regular checks/vigilance; monitor areas where incoming fodder and stock have been. Control hay purchases/don’t introduce any fodder or grain. Awareness of bringing organic materials or items from other livestock properties that may carry

disease. Biosecurity protocols re visitors and animal contact; tourists use disposable boot covers and/or wash

shoes; no unauthorised visitors; no trespassers; visitors must sign in on arrival; limited access to outside people and vehicles; control trucks and equipment entering the property.

Contact with neighbours and RLPB officers. Wash troughs out; water pumped to troughs from safe source; separate water supply; manage water

flow-onto property. Slash area along boundary fencing. Barriers of trees/plantations separating neighbours. Awareness of stock movements in area (including neighbours). Fence waterways to prevent stock movement; isolate creek crossing. Protection due to isolation of property; limited road access. Organically-accredited and have quarantine areas. No agistment. Apply lime to soil. Staff awareness; staff not to come into contact with other pigs. Don’t overstock; keep good grass cover on paddocks. Regularly burn paddocks. Have someone watch property when away for a period of time.

4.4.4 Biosecurity across industry When compared across industry types, pork producers were the most likely to be diligent about biosecurity (see Figure 4.8). This is likely to be a reflection of the pro-activity of the Pork Industry in ensuring their producers are informed about biosecurity. Pigs were the source of infection for the FMD outbreak in the UK. Infected pigs excrete 1000 to 3000 times as much virus as cattle or sheep and thus will contribute to the spread of disease (Garner and Cannon 1995). One respondent commented: As pig farmers, we are very conscious of disease outbreaks. We are extremely

disturbed by the latest Government initiatives that affect our industry.

Dairy producers were the least likely to practice safety and security measures. This is a surprising finding as the dairy industry has also been proactive in encouraging biosecurity amongst their producers.

38

Figure 4.8: Biosecurity, by livestock type.

0 20 40 60 80 100

Pigs

Goats

Alapacas

Other

Sheep

Deer

Wool

Beef

Dairy

(per cent)

4.4.5 Factors inhibiting biosecurity on farms Respondents were also asked what were the main things that prevented them from putting biosecurity strategies into place on their properties. Lack of money, time and information and the drought were the main reasons (see Figure 4.9). Others 59 (4.9%) believed there was no need for biosecurity plans on their land due to their good farm management practices. Thirteen respondents (1.5%) reported it was impossible to implement strategies because of the nature of their properties, i.e. the property was too large, there was a public road or river passing through their land, it was impossible to isolate new stock on the property or because there was a lack of cooperation from people entering their property. As one producer noted, biosecurity was impossible because ‘my property borders a Travelling Stock Reserve (30 km) and public roads run through the property.’ Eleven people (0.9%) believed biosecurity was unnecessary because national strategies and quarantine policies will safeguard Australia from disease. Another 14 respondents (0.11%) believed there was nothing that could be done that would prevent disease while a further ten (0.8%) believed precautions would not be required until an outbreak was discovered in Australia.

Figure 4.9: Factors preventing biosecurity practices.

0 10 20 30 40

Lack of money

Drought

Lack of time

Lack of information

Lack of support

Other Priorities

Don’t believe epidemic will occurhere

No need for biosecurity on myproperty

Not possible on my property

(per cent)

39

4.4.6 Reporting disease in stock When asked where they would go first to report any unusual symptoms in their stock, the majority of respondents (70%) reported that they would go to their local vet. One stated: Good stock management is essential and a willingness to seek professional advice

if in doubt. Thankfully, we have a good rapport with our local vet, so we feel free to seek advice any time (free) by phone.

Others (27.4%) would call a government veterinary officer and 16% would contact a stock inspector. Five (0.4%) would report to their local stock agent. Less than 4% reported they would use the Emergency Disease Watch Hotline. Figure 4.10 displays participants’ responses by State. Victorian producers were most likely to call their local vet in such circumstances while Queensland producers would mostly contact their local stock inspector. One Queensland producer noted veterinary officers were not always available: The Government no longer places VO’s in our immediate area. They do not come

immediately upon request—can be days. Why bother with them?

Figure 4.10: Where producers would first report unusual symptoms in stock, by state.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Private Vet

GovernmentVeterinary Officer

Stock Inspector

EmergencyDisease Hotline

(per cent)

QLD NSW VIC

However, some respondents reported that negative experiences with biosecurity management in the past would mean they would hesitate to contact authorities if they discovered disease in their stock. As a goat producer in my locality, I have been adversely affected by the OJD

management program for no good reason. Goats are low-risk by comparison with sheep, but the restrictions are far more severe and there is no relief in sight. In the light of the OJD experience, anyone would be ‘off their rocker’ if they report suspicious symptoms.

The survey also endeavoured to assess how quickly producers would call a vet if they observed any disease symptoms in their stock. The current extension policy on this issue is to encourage producers to contact their local vet, stock inspector or the emergency hotline at the first sign of ANY unusual symptoms in their animals. Accordingly, the question asked respondents to indicate how soon they would report disease in their stock across a range of symptoms, including some that would be indicative of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. The findings are presented in Figure 4.11. PLEASE NOTE: These findings are an indication only and must be interpreted with caution. Producers’ responses to this question would vary according to their level of expertise regarding animal husbandry, the size of

40

their property, industry type and many other social factors. As one noted, ‘Because of many years’ experience, we would only report things that we have not had experience with.’ Another qualified his response: Usual illnesses can be contributed to something other than an exotic disease

outbreak, but if there were FMD in the country, notification would be immediate.

Figure 4.11: How soon producers would contact vet by disease symptoms.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Unexplained death oftwo or more adult

animals

Unexplained death ofone adult animal

Sudden death in younganimals

ANY unusual symptomsthat you have not seen

before

ANY symptoms ofillness

Blisters on tongue, lips,gums, teats or feet

Drooling(excesssalivation) andsmacking of lips

Lost body weightdespite continued

appetite.

Decreased milkproduction

Nervousness oraggression

Difficulty in rising,abnormal posture or

poor coordination

Lameness: tendency tolie down

Fever and loss ofappetite

(per cent)

Not Necessarily Immediately After 2-3 days After 4-5 days

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen. It was possible to compare differences between respondents’ answers by property size and industry type using Kruskal-Wallis tests for independent groups. Across all of the symptoms listed, dairy farmers were most likely to immediately report disease in their cattle. Alpaca producers were most likely to immediately call a vet for any signs of illness, but particularly for fever, lameness or abnormal posture. There was no difference between groups on those symptoms that would indicate Foot-and-Mouth Disease such as drooling or lesions on mouth or feet. Most producers would report these immediately. There was no difference between groups in immediately reporting any unusual symptoms that they had not seen before. Most would report the death of young animals immediately or within the first few days. There were different patterns comparing reporting by size of operation across production type. Beef producers with smaller operations were significantly more likely than larger producers to immediately

41

report disease in stock across most of the symptoms listed. However as found above, there was no difference between large, medium or small operations when it came to reporting unusual symptoms, the death of young animals or symptoms of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. For dairy producers, differences were found for posture, nervousness, weight and milk production with those with larger operations being likely to respond earlier than those with smaller dairies. For sheep producers there were no differences in operation size except when it came to those more serious symptoms of Foot-and-Mouth death in young animals disease or any unusual symptoms. There were no differences in operation size for reporting disease amongst deer, goat or pig producers.

4.4.7 Risk perception and behaviour

Risks for properties

To assess what producers believed were the greatest risks to their property for an emergency animal disease outbreak, respondents were asked to rate nine possible sources of risk and indicate what other concerns they might have (see Figure 4.12). Those factors identified as having a high risk were the presence of feral pigs or goats in an area, neighbours who import animals or semen or who have a high turnover of stock. Other potential risks noted by respondents included imported products or foodstuffs (2%), or deteriorating or reduced quarantine laws and regulations or monitoring of ports (2%). As one producer noted: ‘I feel we are at the mercy of the quarantine people in preventing these diseases.’ Other reported risks for disease included a public road running through a property, a property being adjoined to a stock route or National Park (1%), international tourists (1%), illegal immigrants (1%) and terrorism (1%).

Figure 4.12: Perceptions of greatest risks of disease.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Neighbours who fail to report unusualsickness or deaths in their stock

Feral pigs or goats

Neighbours who import animals or semen.

Neighbours who have a high turnover ofstock, i.e. commercial breeders or general

traders

Illegal trespassers on your land

The close proximityof a property to a feedlotor piggery, abattoir or saleyards.

Visitors to a property; i.e. tourists,professional shooters, contractors,

tradespeople.

A local veterinarian not having enoughknowledge to identify a serious disease

Family members working off farm on otherproperties or saleyards etc.

(per cent)High Risk Some Risk No Risk

42

Queensland respondents were most concerned about the risk of FMD from feral animals. The issue invoked several comments by participants. …A major outbreak of say FMD will not be eradicated in Australia due to the

vastness of our country, and the lack of control of wild animals such as pigs, goats, deer, kangaroos, and the constant movement of stock in the long paddock and stock reserves.

…Should an outbreak occur in Australia, because of our vastness, number of wild

pigs etc, nothing we can do with any little local ‘Plan’ will have any affect on the outcome whatsoever. I wonder if any of you comprehend the vastness, remoteness, roughness, and inaccessibility of some of our properties, Aboriginal lands, and large uncontrolled heritage expanses of Queensland that harbour wild animals.

…The key to FMD containment is the pig. What is required is an eradication

program. It will work, but requires Commonwealth funding on a significant scale—in all, only 1% of the cost if we get an outbreak of FMD. Pigs are now everywhere. In the river country, they are out of control.

Risks for the Nation

Respondents were then asked to rate seven attitude statements concerning the potential risk of an emergency animal disease outbreak occurring in Australia. These questions were designed to understand how farmers perceive and cope with the probability of disease outbreak when there is no knowledge of how, when or where such an outbreak may occur. The differences in farmers’ perceptions and coping styles were then assessed according to their propensity to implement biosecurity strategies on their properties. The scale was designed to generate a fourfold typology of risk perception based upon two factors of the reality of the risk of an impending disease outbreak and the sense of control over that outcome (see Figure 4.13).

Figure 4.13: Typology of risk perception.

The majority of respondents were concerned about the threat of emergency animal disease occurring in Australia. Most had thought a lot about the issue and believed an outbreak would be significant. Most believed the threat had not been exaggerated. Yet the majority did not think an outbreak was inevitable or that there was little anyone could do about it. Respondents were fairly evenly divided on whether Australia’s isolation from other countries and strict quarantine measures will prevent outbreaks and whether the vastness of the country will mean an outbreak will be contained. Table 4.3 presents the proportions of responses to questions regarding the risk of emergency animal disease.

UnconcernedRisk is exaggerated

UncontrollableOutbreak will be serious

ControllableOutbreak won’t be serious

Concerned Risk is real

43

Table 4.3: Attitudinal scale of risk perception.

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly

Disagree I am extremely concerned about the likelihood of

a major disease outbreak like FMD occurring here in Australia.

47.5 39.1 11.6 1.8

There may be a disease outbreak in Australia but it won’t be that bad. 3.3 20.9 44.5 31.3

Australia’s isolation from other countries and strict quarantine measures have prevented major disease outbreaks in the past and will continue to prevent outbreaks in the future.

8.2 39.0 40.9 11.9

The likelihood that a major disease outbreak will occur here has been greatly exaggerated. 2.0 16.6 61.6 19.7

It is highly likely that there will be a disease outbreak in Australia, but the vastness of the country will mean that the outbreak will be contained in one area and eradicated quickly.

3.9 30.0 46.9 19.2

I think a major disease outbreak like FMD in Australia is inevitable and there is little anyone can do about it.

3.5 11.4 64.8 20.3

I haven’t thought much about the possibility of a major disease outbreak happening here. 2.1 25.7 50.6 21.5

A typology of risk perception

To generate a typology of risk perception, a hierarchal agglomerative cluster analysis was performed to group respondents according to their similarity in their scores around the mean. The use of standardised scores permitted comparisons of diverse distributions within the analysis. Ward’s minimum variance cluster analysis was employed with dissimilarities between scores defined by squared Euclidean distance (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984). Inspection of the dendrogram and scree plot resulting from the clustering procedure clearly indicated the presence of four clusters. Quick Cluster was then used to refine the solution using interactive reallocation (k means). Figure 4.14 displays the standardised means of the various measures of risk perception across the four clusters. The analysis indicated that participants in Cluster Four (N=252) had thought a lot about the problem and were the most concerned about the threat of an EAD outbreak in Australia. They believed a potential outbreak will be significant, Australia’s isolation will not provide immunity, and the threat has not been exaggerated. At the same time, this group believed such a threat was controllable. At the other end of the continuum, participants in Cluster Three (N=211) were the least concerned about such a threat and also believed the threat has been exaggerated and should a disease outbreak occur, it would be contained. However, this group saw the threat as uncontrollable. Cluster Two (N=275) had not thought much about the possibility of a disease outbreak, were unconcerned and believed the risk has been exaggerated. They also were more likely to think that an outbreak is uncontrollable to a degree in that they believe Australia’s isolation and vastness will mean that the outbreak will not be that devastating. Participants in Cluster One were concerned about the possibility of an outbreak but believe it will not be that bad. They were also honest enough to report they had thought little about such a threat. This group also believed a possible outbreak was controllable.

44

Figure 4.14: Clusters of risk perception.

-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5

I'm very concerned

It won't be that bad

Australia's isolation andquarantine measures:will

protect

The threat isexaggerated

Australia's vastness willcontain outbreak

An outbreak isinevitable:Uncontrollable

I haven't thought about it

Disagree (Mean Standardised Scores) Agree

)Cluster1 (N=345 )Cluster2 (N=275 )Cluster3 (N=211 )Cluster4 (N

The clusters were evenly apportioned across the three States and across livestock industry types and operation size. Analyses conducted to examine whether the groups differed in their propensity to implement biosecurity practices on farm revealed that respondents in Cluster One and Cluster Four were more likely than those in the other three clusters to have discussed biosecurity strategies with others in their district (χ2=29.33 p<0.0001), to be aware of local community biosecurity plans (χ2=16.29 p<0.001), and to have implemented biosecurity strategies on their properties (χ2=25.79 p<0.0001) (see Figure 4.15). These findings suggest that personality factors of control have an impact on how farmers cope with the prospect of a disease outbreak.

Figure 4.15: Clusters by biosecurity strategies.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Have BiosecurityStrategies on farm

Have discussedbiosecurity

Aware of C ommunityPlans

(per

cent)

C luster1 C luster2 C luster3 C luster4

45

4.4.8 Farmer attitudes towards biosecurity

Responsibility for biosecurity

To assess farmers’ attitudes towards responsibility for emergency animal disease prevention in Australia, participants were asked to rate farmers, local communities, state and federal government departments according to the degree to which they believed they were responsible. Responses ranged from Mainly responsible, Partially responsible to Least responsible. Figure 4.16 presents the findings. The majority of respondents believed responsibility lay with the Federal Government (84%) and State Departments of Primary Industry (65%). Local communities were seen as least responsible. Only 38% of respondents thought producers were primarily responsible while 43% thought they were partially responsible. Queensland respondents were more likely to maintain that producers were primarily responsible than respondents in the other states (χ2=14.85 p<0.005). Respondents generally thought the community was partially responsible although more Queensland farmers thought the community should be primarily responsible (χ2=26.49, p<0.0001). There was no difference between the states regarding respondents’ beliefs that the Federal Government was primarily responsible.

Figure 4.16: Perceptions of responsibility for biosecurity, by state.

VIC 35 50.1 14.9 4.8 46.5 48.7 67.8 29.7 2.5 89 9.3 1.8

NSW 42.3 45.9 11.8 10.4 42.4 47.2 68.3 30.6 1.1 86.1 12 1.9

QLD 49.8 41 9.2 17.2 45.7 37.1 70.2 24.8 5 88.6 9.4 2

Mainly responsible

Partially Responsible

Least Responsible

Mainly responsible

Partially Responsible

Least Responsible

Mainly responsible

Partially Responsible

Least Responsible

Mainly responsible

Partially Responsible

Least Responsible

Producers Community State DPI Federal Biosecurity

Reporting within small communities

Respondents were also asked if they suspected a neighbour’s animals had a serious disease, whether they would find it difficult to report him/her to the authorities because they live in a small community. While the majority (77%) reported that they would not have any problem, 205 respondents (18%) believed that small community dynamics would influence their decision to report a neighbour. ‘Dobbing in’ a person to authorities is not consistent with Australian culture. There were no differences between the States on this issue.

National Livestock Identification Scheme (NLIS)

A question relating to the importance of the NLIS for a means of trace-back in the event of an emergency disease outbreak invoked a strong response from respondents. This was expected considering the debate at the time on the mandatory introduction of this scheme across Australia in 2004. A large proportion of respondents (69%) agreed with this statement. However, there was a significant difference between the three States in participants’ responses (χ2=140.93, p<0.0001) (see Figure 4.17).

46

Figure 4.17: Attitudes towards NLIS as essential for biosecurity, by state.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

QLD NSW VIC

(per

cen

t)

Agree Disagree

Victorian farmers were more accepting of the scheme than those in Queensland. This possibly reflects the already established scheme in Victoria and conversely, the larger herd sizes in Queensland where producers clearly object to the financial costs of the scheme and the relevance of the concept for their large and usually isolated properties. As one respondent wrote: NLIS can be an effective tool. However, feral and pest animals and birds need to

be controlled, especially pigs if we hope to contain FMD etc. NLIS is more about market access than disease control and should not be relied on as the sole protection alone.

Another added: ‘All the tags in the world won’t help prevention. None of the feral pigs will have tags anyway.’ Most of the concerns relating to NLIS related to the mandatory implementation of the scheme, its unproven reliability and the costs to producers. Producers wrote: …I strongly disagree with NLIS being mandatory. It should be voluntary. Tail

tags enable a very efficient trace-back to property of origin, and are not fraught with all the unreliability of electronic devices. You only need one failed NLIS tag to cause potential disaster.

…The mandatory NLIS is extremely unnecessary, creating much additional work

for the cattle producer, as well as being expensive. The existing scheme is adequate, if administered by competent personnel. Some of the most efficient primary producers are not computer-literate, but far more capable of producing and handling cattle and property management than most with university degrees.

…Not all great theories work in practice; this is the case with NLIS. As an EU

producer, we see first-hand the flaws that will cripple the NLIS if it becomes nationwide. As it is now, it cannot keep up. It is about time that people start listening to the producers that depend on the cattle industry for their livelihoods and not the hobby farmers and so-called ‘experts’ who are often great with theory and not so good with practice. NLIS is not the answer to disease security.

Compensation

A further question sought participants’ attitudes towards the statement that: Some farmers may doubt that they will receive adequate compensation for stock that are slaughtered, and therefore may not bother to report unusual symptoms in their animals. Most participants (67%) agreed with this concern. This result concurs with the finding presented in Figure 4.18, which revealed that participants believe that neighbours not reporting disease in their stock are the greatest risk to their

47

property for a disease outbreak. A significant difference was found between the States in participants’ views on this issue (χ2=24.96, p<0.0001). Victorian producers were far more concerned about this issue than those from Queensland.

Figure 4.18: Attitudes towards compensation, by state.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

QLD NSW VIC

(per

cen

t)

Agree Disagree

Vaccination against disease

Respondents were also asked whether they believed vaccination of stock against FMD was necessary to protect the industry. Just over half (56%) disagreed with this statement. Several respondents noted that they would like to know more about vaccination. Three wanted to know if a vaccine was available. As one respondent noted: ‘I understand that vaccination will automatically give Australia FMD status, so it defeats the purpose.’ There were no significant differences between the states on this issue.

4.5 Summary and conclusions This study of biosecurity on Australian farms has demonstrated that livestock producers generally are very concerned about the threat of an emergency animal disease within Australia and have thought a great deal about the issue. Several of the written comments they provided confirmed their concern. One of the objectives of this study was to raise awareness of these issues while surveying farmers and that objective was clearly met. As one respondent wrote: ‘This questionnaire frightened me into a lengthy discussion with my local PP Board vet!’ The study found that farmers primarily use newspapers and radio as sources of information on emergency animal diseases. These findings are similar to those of a study of South Australian farmers, Kerby (1994) which concluded that print media continues to play an important part in information delivery particularly when the information is locally relevant or actively sought. Local papers in particular are well-read by farmers. Although Kerby found that farmers spent less time reading than their urban counterparts, she maintained that newspaper will continue to be important to farmers in the future because of its familiarity, convenience of access and as a record which can be kept. Kerby also found that radio was an important source of information for farmers. Most of Kerby’s respondents had ready access to radio during the day either in their homes, cars, farm vehicles, tractors, headers, sheds and workshops, dairies and piggeries. The majority listened to the ABC Country Hour. While all of her sample owned a television set, half watched less than ten hours of television a week. Therefore, information regarding EAD’s and biosecurity is likely to be most effective using radio and newspaper.

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However, the present study also found that if an emergency animal disease outbreak occurred, farmers would primarily source information and advice from their local Department of Primary Industry or RLPB officers or their local vet. In such situations, farmers will turn to well-known and trusted people within a local community for advice in preference to the media. Similarly, Kerby (1994) found farmers listed intimates as the most important sources of information and support when making decisions about important issues demonstrating the importance of intimacy, trust and support. Interpersonal communication directly with others in a one-to-one situation or small groups appeared to be the major component of farmers’ communication patterns and processes. The present study also found that if producers found unusual symptoms in their stock they would first report it to their local vet. Few would resort to the emergency disease hotline. While this finding does not suggest that the emergency hotline is irrelevant, it does suggest that future policy and programs regarding reporting disease symptoms will need to account for the reliance of producers upon local veterinarians. Few respondents were aware of biosecurity plans at a community level. Biosecurity may be improved if exercises conducted by local community emergency management committees include stakeholders such as farmers. Not only will community preparedness be improved but also the concepts may translate to individual properties. Overall, the findings are disappointing with regards to the extent of biosecurity on farms. Only half of the respondents to the survey reported they had implemented some type of precaution on their properties. Most of these strategies take the form of basic farm management practices. Some producers believed that was all that was required to safeguard their property. The most common type of practice was isolating new stock for a short period of time to check for disease. Property size and geographical location clearly affect a farmer’s ability to implement strategies. Those on large outback properties particularly in Queensland were less likely to have precautions than were their Victorian counterparts on small, more closely settled properties. Not that those on larger properties were any less concerned about the possibility of an EAD outbreak. Other factors that impeded biosecurity on farms were the lack of money, time and information and the drought. Some farmers found it impossible to implement strategies because there was a public road or river passing through their land. Some believed biosecurity was unnecessary because national strategies and quarantine policies will safeguard Australia from disease. Others believed there was nothing that could be done that would prevent disease or that biosecurity on farms would not be required until an outbreak was discovered in Australia. Future programs for biosecurity on farms may need to address these particular concerns of producers, particularly those on large outback properties. Pork producers were the most likely to have biosecurity plans in place which clearly demonstrated their heightened awareness of the need for vigilance for disease, particularly Foot-and-Mouth. Several respondents were concerned that current policy regarding imported products as part of free trade agreements negates any diligence on the part of Australian producers for biosecurity at the farm level. As described in Chapter 3, these sentiments echo those of British farmers. Dairy farmers were the least likely to have biosecurity plans on-farm, yet they were the most likely group to immediately report any symptoms of disease in their stock to their local vet. The exploration of producers’ perceptions of risks of disease for their properties revealed that feral pigs or goats were considered to be a serious threat. Producers on large outback properties were particularly concerned and felt unable to safeguard their properties. The feral animal problem is of current political contention. However, these findings suggest that possible biosecurity strategies to address these concerns do need to be explored. Finucane (2000, cited in Botterill and Mazur 2004) in a review of the influence of rural locations upon perceived risk found greater independence created by isolation may lead to greater risk tolerance. However, sometimes feelings of vulnerability resulting from that isolation can heighten concerns about risk. Other risks to properties noted by respondents included neighbours who import animals or semen or who have a high turnover of stock, imported products or foodstuffs, deteriorating quarantine regulations or monitoring of ports, having a public road through a property or being adjoined to a

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stock route or National Park, international tourists, illegal immigrants and terrorism. Slovic (1991) in a review of risk perception research concluded that there is wisdom as well as error in public attitudes. Their basic conceptualisation of risk is richer than that of expert opinions and reflects legitimate concerns that are often omitted from expert risk assessments. As a result, risk communication efforts are destined to fail unless they are structured as a two way process. These findings suggest that future extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity may need to address these particular concerns of producers. By grouping respondents according to their perceptions of risk for an EAD outbreak in Australia, it was revealed that those who believed they would have some measure of control in the event of an outbreak were more likely to have instigated biosecurity on their properties. Those who perceived a disease outbreak as an uncontrollable event might cope with such a prospect by managing emotional responses through denial, rather than taking precautionary actions (Lehman and Taylor 1987). These findings suggest that changing farmers’ perceptions about their ability to control the safety of their property and livestock may be necessary for future biosecurity extension policies. The findings revealed that Australian farmers’ attitudes to biosecurity reflect those of their English counterparts; that the responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity lies primarily with government. Specifically, if agencies and those responsible are working efficiently, producers should not have to be concerned about disease entering Australia. One respondent’s comment summarised these sentiments:

If the Government authorities do their job correctly; i.e., the coastline, our seaports, airports and foreign fishing, we, the livestock producers, won’t have a disease problem. We haven’t had a disease problem in the past; why should we be expecting one in the future? Are the Government inspection services going to fall down?

As it was observed in Chapter Three that British farmers appear to be still somewhat complacent about biosecurity despite their recent experience of the devastation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, perhaps it is expecting much of Australian producers to be vigilant about a risk they have no familiarity with. Nevertheless, the study did reveal requests for more education regarding biosecurity on farms to enable farmers to better protect their properties. As one respondent stated: ‘No advice has been forwarded to suggest that such strategies should be in place or what they should be.’ Another suggested: ‘The Government should provide mail-out education and host field days.’ Another added: ‘What we need is an awareness sheet—one page only—on what to look for and what to do in the event of a disease outbreak.’ Another suggested: ‘Every farmer should be sent a booklet stating clearly the symptoms of what to look for in FMD and BSE—and their obligations to report it and who to report it to.’ It can be concluded that a higher level of participation of producers and other stakeholders in risk assessment and biosecurity planning at all levels will lead to higher levels of communication and information exchange between the parties which may lead to a greater understanding and compliance with biosecurity by farmers.

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Chapter 5: STUDY 3: Potential Social Impact of an EAD Outbreak Upon Small Communities in Australia 5.1 Introduction In the third stage of the study, case studies of four rural communities across three states were conducted to explore the potential social impact of a hypothetical emergency disease outbreak upon a small rural community in Australia. Social impacts are defined as the consequences to human populations of an event that alters the way in which people live, work and play, relate to each other, meet their needs and cope as members of a community (Burge et al. 1994). Social impacts are felt by people as uncertainty, stress, anger, a sense of loss of control over life and despair. These feelings in turn impact upon ways in which individuals behave and whole communities thrive or decline. Some communities return to normal quickly once the source of disruption is dealt with while others do not (Richards and Hall 2000). In this chapter, the findings of a social impact analysis that examined the possible consequences of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon four rural communities are presented. Data for the analyses for each community were drawn from the 2001 Australian Census of Population and Housing Profiles for Local Government Areas.

5.2 Objectives The purpose of the third study was to conduct a social impact study within four case-study communities on the potential social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak. The objective was to identify social impacts idiosyncratic to each community to raise awareness of the heterogeneity of small communities in their ability to respond and cope with an emergency animal disease outbreak.

5.3 Method

5.3.1 Case-study communities Four communities were selected for case-study in consultation with the Advisory Committee to the project. The communities identified in New South Wales were Casino in the northeast and Armidale in the Northern Tablelands. The other two communities were Roma in southwest Queensland, and Camperdown in southwest Victoria (see Figure 5.1). Armidale was selected because it is in a major fine wool producing area. Casino was chosen because it is in a major beef producing area and has several associated industries, such as meatworks that would be significantly affected should an emergency animal disease occur. Casino also played a significant role in the hypothetical FMD outbreak within Exercise Minotaur. Roma was chosen because this community has the largest livestock market in Australia. Roma also provided the opportunity to investigate biosecurity in communities in more remote locations. Camperdown in Victoria was selected because of the dairying industry there and for the fact that the area has the largest dried milk plant in the southern hemisphere.

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Figure 5.1: Location of case-study communities.

5.3.2 Analysis Social impact is a complex phenomenon that requires assessment of several social indicators to provide a profile of how sensitive a community might be to change. The degree of impact will depend upon various social and economic characteristics of a community. In general, a community that has a low level of social disadvantage and is performing well economically is likely to cope better and recover more quickly than a community less well-equipped (Productivity Commission 2002). However, there are other factors that contribute to a community’s ability to cope, such as the size of the community, the level of social capital, the community’s previous history of dealing with change, and the ability of displaced workers to find alternative employment. Communities that are expanding will have more work opportunities. However, these opportunities may require different skills from those possessed by displaced workers (Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for Social Impact Assessment 1994). The impact of losing job opportunities within a community will be greater if those who are unemployed are ill-equipped to seek employment or create jobs for themselves. The impact of rising unemployment within a community will be lessened if the community is experienced in working together to deal with events that dislocate the routine patterns of life. Furthermore, impacts are cumulative over time and industry sectors (Richards and Hall 2000). For example, the effect of extensive drought and a disease event can combine to result in a greater impact than either event alone. The Productivity Commission (2002) estimated the cumulative economic impact of a year-long FMD outbreak on the value of output over ten years across Statistical Divisions in Australia. Those regions most affected were those with greater dependence upon livestock industries. Armidale and Roma and are in areas that would be most adversely affected, while Casino and Camperdown are in districts that would be partially affected (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: Productivity Commission’s (2002) estimated effect of a 12-month FMD outbreak on the value of output over 10 years, by Statistical Division.

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The Productivity Commission (2002) identified several socio-economic variables which would best measure social impacts and assess a community’s ability to cope with a FMD outbreak. These included: growth or decline in regional output, employment and population ratio of ‘younger’ population to ‘older’ population age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers median income relative to the national median educational and skill profile of inhabitants extent of housing ownership unemployment rate degree of structural change from ‘declining’ industries to ‘expanding’ industries degree of remoteness; and frequency and scale of shocks.

These criteria were used as a general guide for the social impact analyses of a hypothetical FMD outbreak in the four case-study communities within the present study.

5.4 The immediate social impact of a FMD outbreak Should a FMD outbreak occur in any one of the case-study communities, once the disease had been confirmed, there would be an immediate ban placed upon all livestock movements. Australia’s export markets for meat, dairy product and possibly even wool would be closed. A Rapid Response Team would immediately be sent to the town and a Control Centre established. Strict quarantine restrictions would be placed around areas containing infected properties, or properties that had contact with them either directly or indirectly through transfer of personnel, animals etc. People living and working within a buffer zone around infected properties would also be directly affected by the restrictions. Road blocks would police those restrictions. These restrictions would remain in place until all susceptible animals and animal products were destroyed, infected properties decontaminated and there was no longer any evidence of the disease (DPIWE 2005). The following social impacts are likely to occur. With the immediate ban on all livestock movements, all livestock sales, agricultural shows

and race meetings in the district would be cancelled. There would be mass testing of animals by teams of vets. All susceptible animals (i.e., cattle,

sheep, pigs etc.) on infected properties and on properties neighbouring those infected properties would be slaughtered. If the disease were spreading out of control, as it did in the UK in 2001, all other susceptible animals within a 3 km radius of an infected property might also be slaughtered to arrest the spread of the disease.

If the movement restrictions prevented the transport of feed to animals (such as in feedlots or in winter or drought), those animals may also be culled for welfare reasons.

The disposal of large numbers of carcasses would commence, mostly by burial in large excavated pits. The technical aspects of this task will present significant challenges to the community. If carcasses are to be buried, the community may divide over where the site will be located while people living in close proximity to the site may object.

There will be flow-on effects for months as the community adjusts to the disruption that occurs. Normal community networks will be disrupted. Informal gatherings such as those at a hotel will cease as people limit their movements. Social events such as race meetings may be cancelled.

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The establishment of a very large Control Centre will monopolise important community facilities in the town. A large number of emergency workers will enter the community (for example, at least 5000 strong workforce was required at Mangrove Mountain). Local infrastructure, such as accommodation, will be stretched as it endeavours to meet the requirements of outsiders.

Local businesses will suffer. Those associated with the agricultural industry will cease operation. This will include livestock selling agents and carriers, agricultural advisors, shearers and other rural contractors. Jobs will be lost. In the short-term, many displaced workers will be utilised for disease control. However, in the long-term, with no other prospects in the district some workers will leave to seek work elsewhere, which will mean a loss of skills and people from the community. The flow-on effect to retail and other types of local businesses will also affect the local economy. Tourism will suffer as tourists avoid the district.

Thirty days after the slaughter and decontamination of the last FMD case, sentinel animals will be placed on the previously infected properties. These animals are regularly tested for FMD for at least another 60 days. If no sign of FMD is detected, an application for the reinstatement of FMD-free status can be made to the World Animal Health Organisation. Once approval has been obtained, key export markets can be re-opened. However, Australia will then have to compete with those countries that began supplying our traditional export markets during the FMD outbreak.

The long-term social impacts of livestock movement restrictions, losses to the local economy, public anger and residents’ psychological health will be social aspects that the community will need to address (Productivity Commission 2002; Cooper 2004; Koob 2004a; DPIWE 2005).

The long-term social impacts upon the case-study communities were assessed primarily drawing upon data from the 2001 Census of Population and Housing (ABS 2001a; 2001b; 2002c; 2002d; 2001e 2001f). Supplementary information was derived from the social plans and emergency plans of Shire Councils within each of the communities (Armidale-Dumaresq Shire 2004; Richmond Valley Council 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Roma Bungil Council 2004; Bungil Shire Council 2004; Corangamite Council 2004). From these data, a possible social impact for each community is outlined in the following sections.1

1 In the following sections, data are summarised to present community profiles for each case-study while complete data tables are presented in Appendix 2.

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5.5 Armidale, New South Wales

5.5.1 District Armidale is the major centre for the Northern Tablelands in northern New South Wales. The city is situated 578 km north of Sydney and 467 km south of Brisbane. The Armidale-Dumaresq Shire covers an area of 4223 square kilometres and includes the villages of Wollomombi, Ebor, Black Mountain and Hillgrove. Grazing land as well as four national parks featuring rugged gorge country surrounds the City of Armidale.

Figure 5.3: Armidale-Dumaresq Shire.

5.5.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline

The estimated resident population, in June 2003, was 24 675 persons. Average population growth declined (-4.83%) between 1991 and 2001, but currently there is a stable, or even modest, population growth. There has been a loss of population from the city and from the rural hinterland while the population rural residential areas within 10 to 15 km of the city has increased by 19%. The local population is relatively mobile. Only 49% of the population aged five years or over in 2001 lived at the same address at the previous census date in 1996 compared to 39.5% for the nation. This difference can probably be attributed to the youthful age profile and the presence of the University of New England in Armidale. In 2001, there were 1241 Indigenous persons, more than 5% of the area’s tota1 population. The national proportion is 2%. In 2001, over 86% of the local population was born in Australia compared to 72% nationally. Ten per cent were born overseas compared to 29% nationally. Over 92% spoke English at home while 4% spoke languages other than English, namely Australian Indigenous, Chinese and Arabic. There are approximately 53 different nationalities residing in this community.

Ratio of ‘younger’ population to ‘older’ population

There is a higher proportion of people in Armidale-Dumaresq in the 5 to 24 year age group, comprising almost 38% of the total population compared to 27% for all of Australia. This is largely due to the numbers of private and public educational facilities within the city including the University of New England. Fifteen per cent are aged 60 and over compared with 16.6% Australia-wide. The median age for the city is 28 years compared to 35 for Australia. Conversely, the outlying rural areas of Armidale-Dumaresq reflect an older age demographic (with considerably smaller proportions of people in the 15 to 24 year age groups). The median age is 38 years.

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Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers

Over 30% of agricultural workers are over the age of 55 compared to 27% Australia-wide. There are several well-established grazing families in the district. The greater proportion of workers in Armidale-Dumaresq (41%) is aged between 35 and 54 compared with 45% nationally.

Median income relative to the national average

The median weekly individual income of $300 to $399 and the median weekly family income of $800 to $899 equates to national medians. However, the median weekly household income was $600 to $699, which is lower than the $700 to $799 for the nation.

Educational and skill profile of inhabitants

The population is relatively well-educated. At the 2001 Census, 7% held a postgraduate degree; graduate diploma or graduate certificate, while 11% held a bachelor degree and 14% a certificate. This compares to national proportions of 3.2%, 9.7% and 15.7% respectively. At the time of the census, 39% of the community were undertaking some form of study at an educational institution. Yet 63.6% held no qualification or did not state a qualification compared with 65% nationally. Other non-school qualifications were in the fields of education (5.32%), management and commerce (6.99%) and society and culture (6.42%).

Housing ownership

Just over half of all dwellings in Armidale-Dumaresq (58%) are privately owned or are being purchased compared to 66% nationally. Over 35% are rented compared to 26% Australia-wide.

Unemployment The unemployment rate was 9% as at the 2001 Census for the shire compared to 7.4% nationally. The Education Sector is the largest employer in the district (19.88%) which is greater than the Australian average of 7%. The retail industry employed a further 15% while the health industries employed 11.42%. Agriculture employs 8.4% of the workforce compared to 4% nationally.

Remoteness

Armidale is assessed as being moderately accessible on the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA). That is, there is a moderate restriction upon accessibility to goods and services and opportunities for social interaction.

5.5.3 Economic sustainability Grazing and the production of high-grade fine wool are the major sources of income for the local economy. The Armidale Saleyard operates two days per week and is serviced by eight livestock-selling agents and eleven livestock carriers. Timber processing and the production of potatoes and stone fruits are also important agricultural industries. Tourism opportunities include bushwalking in the national parks, to trout and fly-fishing, fossicking and horse riding. Wool Expo and the Australian Wearable Wool Fashion Awards are held annually in May. Armidale is also a major educational centre with a University, two State High Schools as well as several prominent private schools. The University of New England (UNE) in particular plays a central role in the area’s economy and social composition.

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The district suffered economic difficulties in the early 1990's associated with a national recession, poor seasonal conditions, weak rural commodity markets and industry and government restructuring in the wake of National Competition Policy. However, there has been recent recovery in education, research and development capacity, especially in the rural sector. Armidale hosts a number of Breed Societies. In the 2001 Socio-Economic Indexes for Country Areas (Haberkorn et al. 2004:98), Armidale-Dumaresq scored relatively well in terms of four socio-economic disadvantage factors—low income, low educational attainment, high unemployment and people with low skilled occupations; factors likely to influence how a community copes with crisis. The rural surrounds of Armidale were ranked in the category 5 to 20% above the non-metropolitan average for this index while the city area ranked 0 to 5% above the average.

The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak The Productivity Commission (2002) estimated that the northern Statistical Division would be amongst those districts whose economy would be most adversely affected by a FMD outbreak. As education is one of the major industries sustaining the economy in Armidale, the city is likely to be reasonably well-placed to withstand the crisis. However, the grazing industry in the surrounding areas would be significantly affected. This is a prime Merino wool growing area with long established operations. The culling of stock particularly from stud operations would mean the loss of significant bloodlines and breeding stock, which will be traumatic for the owners and result in long-term consequences for the local economy. There will be a loss of jobs on farms, and from associated businesses such as the saleyards, selling agents, livestock carriers, and agricultural contractors. There would be few opportunities for farm employees within the timber processing or non-livestock farming operations. Although many displaced workers would be utilised in the emergency response, once that task was completed, there could be a loss of these employees and their families and their skills from the district as they seek work elsewhere. Those agricultural workers who are older are less likely to be able to seek alternative employment or move from the district. Although the district records a sound socio-economic index rating, an unemployment rate of 9% means that there will be little alternative employment opportunities. However, it is likely that the number of students within the community will sustain the local economy throughout the period of downturn in the agricultural industries. There are several Breed Societies located within Armidale and Livestock Cooperative Research Centres on campus at the University of New England. These would also be affected by a disease outbreak as grower contributions fall with the consequential loss of income from the disease outbreak. It is likely that Wool Expo would be cancelled with the loss of income and prestige associated with that event. While the community generally is not as dependent upon the agricultural industries for employment, the loss of income in the rural sector would mean that the retail sector would subsequently lose income as well. This may also result in the loss of jobs. As the Productivity Commission (2001) notes, expenditure by farm families on household items, farm inputs and large capital items is an important source of income for local business such as retail trade, transport and storage, finance and machinery repairs. These businesses in turn provide opportunities for off farm employment for farm families. Such opportunities will be lost. Tourism would suffer as tourists are diverted to other areas. Education institutions, particularly the private boarding schools, may lose students as farm families withdraw their children because they can no longer afford to keep them in school or because they fear the spread of disease. Communication and information delivery during an emergency disease outbreak will need to take account of the significant numbers of different cultures within this relatively small community. Information targeting non-English speaking residents will need to ensure that biosecurity precautions are understood by this sector. Local Community Preparedness Armidale has a Local Emergency Management Plan maintained by a management committee comprised of representatives of those government agencies that would be involved in the response and recovery to an emergency if it occurs. The Committee convenes regular meetings and staged a tabletop exercise on the social impact of a FMD outbreak, which is incorporated into the present study (see Chapter 6).

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5.6 Casino, New South Wales

5.6.1 District Casino is located 726 km north of Sydney and 228 km south of Brisbane, on the Richmond River on the Far North Coast of NSW. The town is the hub of all the major east/west and north/south transport routes as the Bruxner Highway links the Northern Tablelands with Lismore, while the Summerland Way connects with Brisbane and Grafton. Casino is the major centre of the Richmond Valley Shire. The Shire encapsulates rural farming communities and coastal tourist communities. These include Evans Head, Woodburn, Broadwater/Rileys Hill and Coraki.

Figure 5.4: Richmond Valley Shire.

The district comprises mountain bush and hilly scrubland, timber country and grazing land, sugar cane, and tea tree stands to coastal heath. Most of the area is relatively flat or gently sloping terrain. Approximately 30% of the total area contains state forests, national parks and nature reserves. The areas’ natural features (rich soils, temperate to sub-tropical climate and high rainfall) provide an ideal environment for various agricultural and horticultural enterprises.

5.6.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline

The 2001 Census population for the Richmond Valley Shire was 20 369—a fall of -4.2% since 1996. Casino is the largest town with a population of 10 057. Yet, like many inland rural communities, Casino has experienced an outflow of population (-6.7%) since 1996. The contributing factors in Casino are linked to young people needing to access tertiary education and employment options in other areas. This is reflected in the low proportion of 25 to 34 year old age groups (11%) in the town. Conversely, the rural areas have increased their populations by 2.5% since 1996. Just over 54% of the population was living at the same address as they did at the 1996 Census compared to 39.5% for Australia as a whole. Indigenous people comprise 5.5% of the total population. According to the 2001 Census, 89.8% of the population is Australian-born while 5% of the population was born overseas. This compares to 72% and 29% respectively for the nation. Most of the shire’s population (94%) speaks English compared to 79% nationally. The remainder of the population speaks Chinese, Italian, German and Filipino languages.

Ratio of ‘younger’ population to ‘older’ population

The shire has an aging population. The median age for Casino is 38 years and 39 years for the remainder of the shire compared to 35 years for Australia. Twenty-two per cent of the population are aged over 60 years, 32% are aged 35 to 59 years and 27% are aged 5 to 24 years. Nationally 17% of

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the total population are aged over 60 years, 34% are aged 35 to 59 years and there is the same proportion of 5 to 24 year olds (27%) as the Richmond Valley Shire.

Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers

Thirty-four per cent of agricultural workers are aged 55 years and over compared to 27% nationally. The larger proportion (44%) is aged between 35 and 54 years compared with 45% across Australia. As in the Armidale-Dumaresq Shire, these rates reflect the aging of the farming population generally.

Median income relative to the national average

The median weekly individual income was $200 to $299, compared to $300 to $399 for Australia as a whole. The median weekly family income was $600 to $699 compared with the national median of $800 to $899. The median weekly household income was $500 to $599 compared with $700 to $799 for the nation.

Educational and skill profile of inhabitants Eight per cent of the population held a postgraduate degree, graduate diploma or graduate certificate, 3.3% held a bachelor degree and 15% had a certificate level qualification. This compares with 3.2%, 9.7% and 15.7% respectively nationwide. Over 79% did not hold a qualification or did not state one compared with 65% nationally. Other skills are mostly in the area of engineering (6.68%) and management and commerce (4.31%).

Housing ownership

Of all occupied private homes in the 2001 Census, 67% were privately owned or are being purchased compared to 66% nationally. Over 26% are rented which equates to the national average.

Unemployment Unemployment is high (12.5%) compared to 7.4% for the whole of Australia. Nevertheless, unemployment has declined in the past decade. The nature of employment has changed with an increase in the number of persons employed part-time (Richmond Valley Shire 2004). The major industries employing people within the Richmond Valley LGA are retail (15.36%), manufacturing (14.38%), agriculture, forestry and fishing (11.17%), and health and community services (10.41%). The national averages are 14.6%, 12.2%, 4% and 9.7% respectively.

Remoteness

Casino is categorised as ‘accessible’ by the ARIA scale. This means that geographic distance imposes only some restriction upon accessibility to the widest range of goods and services and social interaction opportunities.

5.6.3 Economic sustainability Economic activity is predominantly rural. Agricultural industries include beef production, sugar cane, tea tree, soybean, dairy farming, and poultry. There is also commercial fishing, and timber production. A major sugar mill is located at Broadwater. The rural areas of the LGA are closely connected with the township of Casino, in terms of major primary products processing plants including meat works and abattoirs. Over 120 000 head of cattle are sold at the Casino Livestock Selling Centre each year. Casino is known as ‘The Beef Capital’. It has an official Beef Week, which is held each May.

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Tourism is a developing industry along the coastal strip, with a focus on Evans Head. According to the Socio-Economic Index for Areas, the shire is ranked 0 to 5% below the average for non-metropolitan areas. This would reflect the lower family and household income, low education levels and proportion of low skilled occupations.

The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak With this community being so dependent upon agricultural industries it will be significantly affected by an emergency animal disease outbreak. Such an outbreak may require the closure of the highways, which would significantly disrupt several major road links and result in the loss of passing trade for the local economy. There is a high unemployment rate in the district and a higher proportion of part-time work, which means that there will be limited employment opportunities for the large numbers of displaced workers from the agricultural operations and associated industries that will cease in the event of a disease outbreak. Although there is a sugar industry within the area, recent economic downturns in the industry will not provide many opportunities for those seeking work. In addition, job opportunities would be limited for the many older workers within the shire. However, should displaced workers leave this community, there would be significant fall in the skill base. There is a high proportion of home ownership, which means most people (particularly the older, established residents) may not wish to leave their community. There will need to be some support systems to sustain these residents until the community has recovered from the crisis. However, the Productivity Commission has estimated that the Statistical Division, of which Richmond Valley is a part, will be only partially affected by a FMD outbreak because livestock and ancillary industries employ only 11% of the workforce. The timber and tourism industries may continue to support some sectors. The district’s proximity to Lismore and the Gold Coast may provide some employment alternatives for the period of downturn. Local Community Preparedness The Casino community are very well-aware of the devastating consequences of an emergency animal disease outbreak within their district. Accordingly, they have been proactive in emergency management. The Casino Saleyard was the first saleyard complex to develop an emergency plan. This plan has been used as a model for saleyards in other communities. The abattoir has also been proactive in planning strategies, as it is a total export-oriented market employing 330 full-time workers and up to 700 casual workers. Casino was also a significant player within Exercise Minotaur. The Local Emergency Management Committee is actively pursuing new and better ways to safeguard the community in the event of a disease outbreak.

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5.7 Roma, Queensland

5.7.1 District Roma is located in South Western Queensland, 487 km west of Brisbane on the Warrego Highway. Roma is centred in the Bungil Shire, which covers an area of 13 302 square kilometres. Roma town accounts for a further 77.7 square kilometres. Bungil Shire includes the towns of Injune, Muckadilla, Hodgson and Wallambilla. Most of the area comprises flat grazing plains but north of Injune is the Carnarvon Gorge National Park. The climate is generally dry with an average rainfall of less than 600 mm per year. Drought has adversely affected agriculture and only recently has the drought declaration been lifted. However, most properties have been affected and will take time to recover.

Figure 5.5: Roma and Bungil Shires.

5.7.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline

Roma is the largest regional centre in South Western Queensland. The population according to the 2001 Census was 6346 people. This represents a decrease of (-1.4%) since the 1996 Census. For Bungil Shire, the population was 1999, an increase of 1.1% since 1996. The larger proportion (400) resides in the town of Injune. Roma has a high turnover of population with only 42% reporting being at the same address as five years ago. For Bungil Shire, 55% of the population were living at the same address as they did in 1996. There were 469 Indigenous people (7.4%) an increase of (13.6%) in Roma and 44 (2.2%) in Bungil. The majority of the population (91.1%) were Australian-born. The proportion of people born overseas was (4.3%). Most (95%) spoke English while the remainder spoke Chinese, French, Hindi and Croatian languages.

Ratio of ‘younger’ population to ‘older’ population

The proportion of young people (those aged 5 to 24 years) was 29% (the national average is 27%). Only 15% are aged 60 years and over compared to 16.6% for the nation. The median age for Roma is 32 years and for Bungil Shire, it is 37 years compared to 35 years for the nation.

Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers

Over 36% of agricultural workers are over the age of 55 years compared to 27% Australia-wide. The greater proportion of workers (39%) is aged between 35 years and 54 years compared with 45% nationally.

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Median income relative to the national average

The median weekly individual income was $400 to $499, which is greater than the median for the rest of the country ($300 to $399). The median weekly family income was $800 to $999 and the median weekly household income of $700 to $799 is the same as the median for the nation as a whole.

Educational and skill profile of inhabitants In 2001, postgraduate degrees, graduate diplomas or graduate certificates were held by 1.1% of the population while 7% held a bachelor degree and 14% had a certificate level qualification. The national proportions are 3.2% 9.7% and 15.7% respectively. Other skills were in the area of engineering (7.11%) and health (4.35%).

Housing ownership

Of all the occupied private dwellings in the 2001 Census, (61%) were either fully owned or being purchased, while (30%) were being rented.

Unemployment In the 2001 Census, the unemployment rate stood at 4.3% compared to the national rate of 7.4%. Agriculture is the principal employer in this region (16.24%) followed by retail trade (14.80%), health services (9.24%) and construction (7.33).

Remoteness

Roma is categorised as ‘remote’ on the ARIA scale. That is, there is a high level of restriction on access to goods and services and opportunities for social interaction.

5.7.3 Economic sustainability The economy is predominately rural. The main industries are beef production, grain growing and wool growing. Sheep numbers have significantly decreased since 1970, while cattle numbers have increased. Roma has a meat works and Injune has two sawmills. The district has a large natural gas and coal seam methane gas (CSM) industry. Significant expansion to the gas fields is taking place east of Injune and north east of Roma. There is also a winery. The tourism industry offers 4WD tracks, bush walking, fishing and rock climbing and the Carnarvon Gorge. Roma has several historic buildings and an oil and gas museum. The Roma-Bungil Saleyard is a major contributor to the district’s economy. The complex is the largest cattle-selling centre in Australia with an annual throughput of 220 000 animals. The centre primarily caters for cattle sales (mainly store cattle) and related activities, such as bull sales. Store and prime sales are held weekly. Being in a very central location, the Centre attracts buyers and sellers across Queensland and interstate. The saleyards employ three permanent staff and up to six casual staff. Contractors engaged at the yards employ a further ten staff. The saleyards also impact upon employment capability within associated businesses such as the six Stock and Station Agents that employ 55 people as well as other indirect rural businesses. Livestock transport businesses rely upon the saleyard for their business and therefore employment. A survey of producers, livestock buyers, transporters and others associated with the saleyard (Livestock Exchange Consultancy and Kattle Gear Australia 2003) found the centre is a significant place of social interaction—88% of respondents had attended the sales at the saleyard on at least six and up to 15 occasions over the previous year without selling or buying. Livestock producers travel an average of 119 km and up to 500 km to attend sales while buyers travelled on average 240 km. Therefore, these people would stay and shop in Roma on sale days. Of the nine livestock transport services interviewed, most had their vehicles serviced in

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Roma and most bought tyres, fuel and accommodation services. The study found over a quarter of the saleyard’s customers come from outside the area. A survey of local businesses found 82% believed the saleyards had a positive effect on their business. It is estimated that Roma has 412 businesses and 100 sale days, which equates to $211 000 per sale day and $21.1 million annually. This equates to 40 full-time jobs. In the 2001 Socio-Economic Indexes for Country Areas (Haberkorn et al. 2004:98), Roma-Bungil Shire score the highest rank 5 to 20% above the non-metropolitan average for this index. The higher salaries, and low unemployment rate would contribute to this rating. However, Bungil Shire scored a much higher rating than surrounding local government areas.

The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak

The Productivity Commission (2002) rated South Western Queensland as the area that would be most adversely affected by a year-long FMD outbreak. This assessment was based upon analyses of Statistical Divisions according to employment growth, unemployment rate and relative socio-economic disadvantage. The district was amongst those regions most dependent upon livestock for economic sustainability (Productivity Commission 2002). In addition, a decade of drought will have weakened the resilience of this community to withstand a disease outbreak. Although unemployment is relatively low in comparison with the other communities, there will be limited alternative work opportunities in the region. Some employment may be available within the gas industries, depending upon the types of skills required. Education levels are low which lessens the ability of displaced workers to find alternatives. Along with the remoteness of this region many workers will leave the area, which will mean a significant loss of skills from the district. The remoteness of this region will compound the isolation of farm families in restricted areas. Many are older and will require social and economic support to sustain them over the period of downturn and re-establish their farm businesses. Conversely, the isolation may assist in the control of the disease although significant infestation of feral pigs in this outback region and their possible role in spreading disease will be a major concern.

Local Community Preparedness Roma-Bungil Shire is well-prepared with emergency management plans that are reviewed annually or following an emergency. The plans include a community recovery committee, which will coordinate the recovery process. The plan incorporates the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, St Vincent de Paul and Ministers’ Fraternal and local service clubs working with Community Health, the Neighbourhood Centre and the Department of Family, Youth and Community. Training ‘simulations’ are conducted periodically to test the knowledge of the response agencies in dealing with and planning for such events. Several community groups, such as the Salvation Army, Red Cross and the combined churches, have outlets in town and are usually part of disaster exercises and disaster recovery operations. Welfare headquarters will be based at the Roma Neighbourhood Centre which functions as a Family Support Service providing ongoing assistance to rural families, namely support and counselling for family problems, an information service and assistance for community groups dealing with rural and drought issues. This role will be extended in the event of a disease outbreak.

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5.8 Camperdown Victoria

5.8.1 District Camperdown is the largest centre within Corangamite Shire in the centre of South West Victoria. The shire covers an area of approximately 4396 square kilometres. It extends from Port Campbell in the south to Skipton in the north, east to Lake Corangamite and to west to Terang. The shire also encompasses the communities of, Cobden, Simpson, Timboon, Princetown, Derrinallum, Darlington, Lismore and Noorat. The shire has a diversity of land types ranging from lower rainfall, cropping and grazing plains in the north through volcanic areas containing stony rises on the eastern side and closer settled farming areas in the south.

Figure 5.7: Corangamite Shire.

5.8.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline

In 2001, the population of the shire was 16 675, a decrease of 3.7% in the north of the shire and an increase of 0.8% in the south. The population is rising in a number of townships while the number of people living in rural areas is declining. Camperdown has the largest population of 3600 followed by Cobden with 1400. The population is relatively stable as in 2001, over 61% of residents were living at the same address as they did in 1996. There were only 69 Indigenous people in the shire (0.4%). Corangamite has a high proportion of people born in Australia (90%) and 95% speak English. The remaining 10% of overseas born residents speak German, Netherlandic and Italian.

Ratio of ‘younger’ population to ‘older’ population

The shire has an aging and shrinking population. Over 20% of residents are aged over 60 years compared to 16.6% nationally, while 27% are aged 5 to 24 years, which is the national average. The median age is 38 years compared with a median age of 35 years for Australia.

Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers

The Census data show that 26% of farmers and labourers in agricultural operations are aged 55 years and over while 48% are aged 35 to 54 years. This again reflects the national trend of the aging of the farming population (Barr 2001).

Median income relative to the national average

In 2001, the median weekly individual income was $300 to $399, which equates with the rest of the country. The median weekly family income was $700 to $799 compared with $800 to $899 for the

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whole of Australia. The median weekly household income was $600 to $699 compared with $700 to $799 for the nation.

Educational and skill profile of inhabitants

The greater proportion of people in Corangamite Shire (15%) held certificate level qualifications, which is similar to national averages of 15.7%. Few (7%) held university or tertiary level qualifications compared to (13%) nationally. Other qualifications were held mostly in engineering and related technologies (5.98%), agriculture, environmental and related studies (4.07%) and health (4.39%).

Housing ownership

In 2001, 75% of all occupied private dwellings in Corangamite Shire were either fully owned or being purchased. This represents a level of home ownership and/or home purchasing that is greater than the national figure of 66%.

Unemployment The unemployment rate was 4.3% as at the 2001 Census compared to 7.4% nationally. Agricultural industries employ 36.16% of the workforce compared to 4% nationally. Other major employers are manufacturing (9.76%), and health services (8.57%).

Remoteness

The Camperdown district, being only 192 km from the city of Melbourne, is assessed as being accessible on the ARIA scale. That is, there is only minor restriction upon accessibility to goods and services and social opportunities.

5.8.3 Economic sustainability Corangamite Shire is primarily a farming area, producing milk, wool, beef, fat lamb and grain. A livestock selling complex is located in Camperdown. The Centre sells approximately 67,000 livestock annually. Corangamite Shire is one of the largest dairying regions in the southern hemisphere and this supports a number of milk processing and stock feed producing industries. The region is a major provider of raw milk for processing by local manufacturers as well as manufacturers in other regions. Bonlac in Cobden is one of the largest milk drying plants in the world. It employs up to 30 people and has the capacity to handle 20 million litres of milk. The Cobden plant uses milk from approximately 830 farms and employs up to 250 people in the peak season. Bonlac’s products are exported to over 50 countries worldwide with major growth to South America, Central America and China. Other developments in Corangamite Shire include a small food manufacturing industry, producing ice-cream, cheeses, wines, smoked eel, production and export of stock feed pellets, and poly products producing water tanks and troughs. A plantation forestry industry is being established in the north of the shire. Plants have been established in several centres in the shire to treat forestry plantation products. A large industry based on natural gas extraction and supply has developed in the southern half of the shire. Tourism is also a major industry. Corangamite Shire offers the Great Ocean Road, the Port Campbell National Park, fishing lakes and volcanic hills and craters. Major industry growth includes the dairying sector, estimated to be growing at around 7% per annum (FSS DBA Dairy Web Report 2002 cited in Corangamite Shire 2004), and tourism, which is estimated to be growing at around 10% per annum. Over the next decade milk production is expected to double

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and visitor numbers to Port Campbell are expected to increase to 3.5 million by the year 2009 (Parks Victoria 2002 cited in Corangamite Shire 2004). Gas projects have brought short-term economic growth and some ongoing employment. According to the relative Socio-economic Disadvantage Index (Haberkorn et al. 2004:98), Corangamite Shire scored the highest ranking (5 to 20%) above the non-metropolitan average. The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak The Productivity Commission (2002) assessed that this region would be the least affected by a year-long FMD outbreak (see Figure 5.2). However, this Local Government Area has the highest level of employment within agriculture and related industries (36%) and therefore, these employees would lose their positions if a FMD outbreak occurred. The local economy would suffer from the closure of local dairy factories, stockfeed plants and other agricultural industries. Cottage industries associated with the dairying industry would also cease. Unemployment is relatively low and there are employment opportunities in the timber and natural gas industries, although whether those with skills in the agricultural industries would be suitable for this type of employment is unknown. Being within an hour’s drive of the city of Geelong and two hours from Melbourne, it is highly likely that many workers would leave for more employment opportunities. However, this community is stable with a high level of home ownership. It is also an aging population and therefore, many people would prefer not to leave the district. The Great Ocean Road, which is a major tourist attraction in Australia, may be closed for a period of time. Even if there were no road closures, tourists would be deterred from entering the region. Local Community Preparedness Corangamite Shire is well-represented in the area of emergency services. There are 41 fire brigades within the municipality and five State Emergency Service units. The shire has a local emergency management planning committee, which meets regularly to update Local Emergency Plans and discuss issues. The Committee is made up of representatives of all emergency services and support services.

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5.9 Summary and conclusions The above analyses have highlighted the fact that small rural communities are not homogeneous and, accordingly, their ability to cope with an emergency disease outbreak will differ. The Productivity Commission’s (2002) economical impact study of a FMD outbreak was conducted by Statistical Division but the above analyses have shown that within these regions, there will be variance between communities in the degree of economic impact and consequently the social impact. A community’s experience and response will be dependent upon its unique geographic, economic, and social profile. However, the analyses identified some similarities between the four case-study communities. There will be few alternative job opportunities for displaced workers from agricultural and associated industries and therefore these communities are likely to lose people and skills as workers opt to leave in search of work. However, there were many older farmers/agricultural workers who are likely to be settled in these communities and will not wish to leave. It is recommended that community leaders explore options to sustain and retain these workers in the event of an emergency management disease outbreak. A community’s resilience to crisis will be influenced by social factors that are not always measurable, such as the degree of social cohesion amongst residents, the effectiveness of community leadership and the history of overcoming other crises within the community. These aspects of community were explored within the workshop discussions conducted within each of the case-study communities to examine more closely how small communities would cope with the social impact of a hypothetical Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak. The findings of the workshops are presented within the following chapter.

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Chapter 6: STUDY 3: The Workshop Discussions

6.1 Introduction As part the third study in this research project, focus groups were conducted within each of the four case-study communities with farmers, local community leaders as well as various practitioners in first responder agencies (police, state emergency services, veterinarians, livestock officers and other representatives of the agricultural industries). The purpose of the focus groups was to discuss with residents the potential social impact of a hypothetical Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak upon their community. The findings of this study are summarised in this chapter according to several themes addressed within the discussions. These included the issue of information dissemination within the community and possible communication networks that could be utilised, possible support systems that could address the social impact of an EAD upon farm families and the wider community, the possible unemployment and economic loss that could result from an outbreak and the steps community organisations could take to better prepare their district to withstand such a crisis.

6.2 Objectives The aim of the study was to facilitate discussion amongst residents within the four case-study communities regarding the potential social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon the community and to explore ways to better safeguard the community should such an event occur. Within these discussions, the study sought to identify those social factors idiosyncratic to each community that may facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. The objective of the study was to highlight various social issues at the small community level that will need to be considered in any future development of policies and programs pertaining to community recovery.

6.3 Method The focus of the present study, which centred upon gathering an understanding of the views of residents on community preparedness for an EAD, supported the use of focus groups as the primary means of gathering data. Focus groups encourage the interaction of group members towards identifying and clarifying issues and in doing so can enhance the knowledge of participants. The limitations of focus groups are the non-random selection of group participants and the limited numbers of those who are able to participate (Stayner and Foskey 1997). The fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 2004–2005. The workshop in Armidale was held in conjunction with a tabletop exercise on the response to a Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak in that community that was conducted by the Shire’s Local Emergency Management Committee. The exercise focused primarily on the immediate social impacts of the technical response to control the disease. The workshops within Roma, Casino and Camperdown considered the immediate as well as the long-term social impacts of an EAD outbreak upon the community. Workshop participants were identified by contacting various agencies located in each district. Initially, cooperation was sought with the local

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Shire Council, namely those staff responsible for local emergency management. Organisations invited to participate included: Police, State Emergency Services, Ambulance, State and Rural Fire Services National Parks and Environmental Protection Agencies Departments of Education, Health and Community Services, and Primary Industry Local Councils, Rural Lands Protection Boards, veterinarians, local saleyards, abattoirs and

dairy factory, livestock selling agents, livestock transport businesses; and Community groups such as the Country Women’s Association, Chamber of Commerce,

Farmer organisations, Salvation Army, and Rural Financial Counsellors. Organisations in each community were initially contacted by telephone and invited to attend the workshop. Information on the study and details on the workshop was then forwarded to prospective participants by fax, mail or email. Those contacted were very interested in the project and keen to attend. Several sought permission to invite colleagues who also wished to participate. Those who could not attend requested information on the outcomes of the workshop. The only group that was not interested in participating were the Chambers of Commerce in each community. While their commitments to their local businesses may have precluded them from attending, they did not appear to be as interested in the study as their fellow residents. Yet, small local businesses would be significantly affected by a disease outbreak. For example, the first business to close in Mangrove Mountain was the local childcare business. This finding may indicate that future biosecurity awareness campaigns should be extended to the wider community to raise awareness that the impact of an EAD outbreak will not be confined to just the agricultural industries. Attendance at the workshop was taken as participants’ consent to be a part of the study. Each participant was provided with a letter outlining the purpose of the study and advised that they were under no obligation to participate in the workshop and need only contribute to the discussion as much as they wished, and that they were free to leave at any time. Participants were also assured of confidentiality. These assurances were reiterated at the commencement of each workshop discussion. Each workshop was videotaped to record proceedings. Permission to do so was obtained from participants prior to the commencement of each meeting. Participants were advised that the tapes would be destroyed once the investigator had completed the final report. None of the participants objected to the recording. The transcripts of each tape were evaluated and relevant data were summarised for inclusion in the study. The responses to four open-ended written questions completed by participants were assessed. There were 27 people in attendance at the Armidale exercise, 30 at the workshop in Casino, 22 in Roma and 15 in Camperdown. The workshops were conducted over two-and-a-half hours. Mr Kevin Cooper, who is responsible for Emergency Disease Management with NSW Department of Primary Industry and was an advisor to the project, attended three of the four workshops to present an overview of his experience assisting with the FMD outbreak in Britain in 2001 and his management of the Newcastle Disease outbreak in poultry at Mangrove Mountain in 1999.2 For the workshop in Camperdown, Ms Lyn Stenos (NSW Department of Primary Industry) gave the presentation in Mr Cooper’s absence. Participants in the workshops were keenly interested in the presentation and clearly found it most informative. While most were aware of the FMD outbreak in the UK, few were aware of the details of the impact upon the Mangrove Mountain community of the Newcastle Disease outbreak and the measures taken to control the disease. Mr Cooper’s presentation was followed by discussion of a hypothetical FMD outbreak on the community. Each workshop was provided with a ‘hypothetical’, which was used to guide the discussion on how a potential FMD outbreak would socially impact upon

2 A summary of Mr Cooper’s presentation is provided in Appendix 1.

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the community. The hypothetical was devised by the committee organising the Armidale tabletop exercise (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: The Hypothetical of a FMD outbreak in the Armidale district.

At 6.00 p.m. on Wednesday 9 June 2005 the Armidale RLPB District Vet is contacted by a local farmer advising of a mysterious disease in a pig at a rural village 30 km east of Armidale. The RLPB District Vet arrives at the farm on the following morning at 9.00 am and is presented with a clear case of FMD in the pig. The Armidale cattle sale is on Thursday 10 June at the Armidale Saleyards. Cattle are already in the saleyards. The agents for the saleyards also run the hobby farm sales in town. The village shop owner purchased the infected pig from the hobby farm sale in Armidale on Sunday 6 June. The pig is now kept in a pen behind the shop. The other 5 pigs in the pen all went to different purchasers around Armidale. The village consists of about 20 houses, a shop (including the post office outlet), a pub and a school. The village has a dog stud, as well as several hobby farmers with goats, alpacas, cows and sheep as ‘walking lawnmowers’/pets. It is on a major road between Armidale and the coast and it services a rural community around the village out to about 20 km. This road becomes very busy during school holidays, is a popular tourist route and is an important transport link from the Southern Tablelands to Grafton, Coffs Harbour and Kempsey. The June long weekend commences on Saturday 12 June and school holidays commence Friday 2 July. The village is to host the local rodeo on the long weekend and stock are already in the yards ready for the show that starts Friday 11th June. The shop owner does a ‘milk run’ around the farms in the area and did his last run on Wednesday 9 June where he visited amongst other cattle/sheep farms, a piggery of about 8000 pigs. At 8.30 am on Thursday 11 June 30 local school kids start classes. There are three teachers and two additional staff at the school. The kids were brought to the school through the village on dirt roads in school buses from the north and south of the village. There has been sporadic rain for the last two weeks and roads in the area are wet with vehicles coated with mud. A cold front is about to hit eastern NSW. It is expected to drop 20 mm of rain in the Northern Tablelands and drop day temperatures to 10oC. It will be accompanied by gusty winds to 30 km/hr. (Source: Armidale Local Emergency Management Committee 2004.) The hypothetical was modified to reflect the characteristics of each of the three other communities. A small village with similar characteristics to the site of the disease outbreak as described above was identified in each area (see Figure 6.1). For example, a similar village is situated 40 km west of Casino on the Bruxner Highway, which has a population of 140 and services a rural community within a circumference of 20 km. There is a general store (including a post office outlet), a hotel, a garage, several cattle studs, a livestock transport business and a primary school with about 30 pupils. Stock graze on blocks of land that are scattered throughout the village. Farmland and significant national parks, forests and nature reserves surround the community. The town is located on a major road, which is a popular tourist route and an important transport link from northern inland areas to the coast.

Figure 6.1: The hypothetical site of a FMD outbreak in the Casino district.

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6.4 The Armidale exercise The workshop in Armidale was organised and conducted by the Armidale-Dumaresq Shire Local Emergency Management Committee as a ‘real-time’ tabletop exercise. The objectives of the Armidale exercise were: to test the response capabilities of

emergency services and functional area teams to an EAD outbreak

to assess the socio-economic impact of a FMD outbreak on a rural community

to observe how disease spread can impact on social and infrastructure networks

to highlight to response agencies the social impact of a FMD outbreak.

(Armidale Local Emergency Management Committee 2004.)

Figure 6.2: Inspector Matt Lynch and David Steller, Local Emergency Management Committee at the

Armidale exercise.

Using the hypothetical to guide the exercise, several scenarios were introduced and the various agencies were asked how they would respond. The exercise evolved as follows: An immediate restriction was placed upon movement of people, livestock and livestock

products within the restricted areas, which was policed by roadblocks. The local saleyard was locked down. All stock held at the yards would have to be destroyed.

The 300 farmers, buyers, agents and others present along with their vehicles, dogs and horses had to be disinfected before being allowed to leave. Decontamination requires removal and disposal of clothing and showering, and there are no showers at the site. A perimeter barrier and decontamination units had to be established. Food, clothing and other support services for those within the saleyard as well as the emergency workers had to be organised. The Environmental Protection Agency requested that wastewater from the wash down area be retained.

One person within the locked down area of the saleyard had a suspected heart attack requiring urgent medical attention. Emergency response teams were required to handle the situation to ensure contamination was not carried off the site. The hospital needed to secure an area to treat the patient.

The village where the disease was first identified was also locked down. This involved the closure of a school and a major tourist road that was policed by three police vehicles. A decontamination unit and a drop-off point for food and clothing were set up on the periphery of the restricted area. Parents of children at the school had to be contacted to collect their children. Children who had been in contact with livestock within the village needed to be disinfected. Counselling services would be required.

The restricted zone around the village also includes a National Park. There were concerns about campers or bushwalkers likely to be in the park. There are also feral pig populations. The National Parks and Wildlife Service provided two shooters and a helicopter to eradicate the pigs.

The rodeo was cancelled. There were 100 steers in the yards considered to be a risk which had to be culled. About 1000 people estimated to attend the event had to be stopped. Some people, such as rodeo participants, would be immediately affected by this action and would

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require accommodation and financial assistance to move on. The local shopkeeper who sponsored the event demanded compensation.

There was a risk of disease within the remaining litter of pigs sold at the hobby sale. Other animals may also be infected. The 350 people who attended the sale would have to be contacted and measures taken if they had contact with livestock. Selling agents maintain records of vendors and buyers, which would enable the trace of the source and destination of stock sold.

The media would be utilised to disseminate information to the community to alert others who visited the hobby sale but did not participate. This would need to be done without creating hysteria within the wider community. It will be imperative to ensure accurate and timely information is disseminated to the community. Few people will have prior experience with the consequences of such a response. The community is likely to divide, as some will not realise the importance of what needs to be done to control the emergency.

Thirty people presented to the hospital with what they believe to be FMD symptoms. The hospital must cope with this crisis and ensure information about the disease not being infectious to humans is communicated to the general public.

A vehicle rolled in wet and slippery conditions on the highway one kilometre west of the quarantined village, resulting in a spill of diesel and chemicals into the table drain. The State Emergency Services vehicle attended with three staff. The highway was closed to all traffic, and soil used to render the area safe. The fire brigade attended to prevent diesel entering waterways.

Support services were organised for 500 emergency workers and the public caught in restricted areas. The Salvation Army would provide food, with St Vincent de Paul providing clothing and bedding, and Red Cross, Seventh Day Adventist and Anglicare providing accommodation and support. The show grounds would be used as a dissemination point.

The fire hazard may increase through a build-up of vegetation on the now empty blocks. Farms not culled would require assistance with feed and care for stock that remained confined by movement restrictions. (Armidale Local Emergency Management Committee 2004.)

The exercise concluded with a general discussion of the long-term social impacts of such an outbreak upon the Armidale community. Some of the main points of the discussion are included within the following sections which summarise the findings of the workshops held in Casino, Roma and Camperdown.

6.5 Focus group discussions

The focus group commenced with participants being asked to list what they considered to be the greatest risks to their community for an Emergency Animal Disease. Roma residents believed breaches of quarantine such as swill feeding; feral pigs and goats; or imported livestock were the greatest threats. In Casino, it was international tourists and the district’s proximity to the coast where boats could land or dump waste offshore. Armidale residents cited bio-terrorism; breakdown in quarantine procedures; peri-urban hobby farmers not recognising disease symptoms in stock; and international students bringing in contaminated foodstuffs. Participants were also asked to identify what they believe would be the main social impacts of an EAD outbreak. The perceived social impacts identified in Armidale were isolation; crime; economic decline and division within the community. In Casino, the likely social impacts were the loss of employment and income, isolation, the loss of community and psychological stress. Roma participants talked about social isolation; economic loss; unemployment and people leaving the district. In Camperdown it was unemployment; economic loss; decline in tourism; disruption to normal life and a loss of innocence with contamination.

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The groups were also asked what were the strengths of their community for coping with crises. Participants were able to draw upon their previous experiences with bushfires, drought and the closure of major businesses. Participants in all communities talked about community resilience, strong social networks and past histories of residents uniting to support each other in times of crisis. When asked if any barriers existed that may prevent their community coping with crisis, participants in Casino listed the dependency of the local economy on the livestock industries; apathy, ignorance or denial within the community about the effects of a disease outbreak; a large number of unemployed or low income populations lacking resources to cope with the crisis; and a lack of cooperation and distrust of officials. In Armidale, participants cited a lack of funding and resources; the lack of cohesion between ‘the townies and the rurals’ that would lead to a ‘them and us’ problem; and the number of absentee landowners in the district, which has been a problem for emergency services in the past. Roma participants cited distance; a lack of funding, resources and manpower; and a lack of experience in EAD’s combined with a culture of independence that may limit requests for outside assistance. The workshop participants had considered the possibility of an emergency disease outbreak within their community and the social consequences that would follow. One of the Armidale group noted: We could be looking at an economic downturn that’s five times greater than that

of the drought. We would have a major population decline—probably going from 25 000 to 20 000 fairly quickly with businesses having to close. That will have consequences for schools. Teachers will have to leave because there are not enough students at school and we will lose a whole host of established families. And it’s hard to get people to move to regional areas like Armidale—we are trying to grow the population all the time.

A Casino resident observed: The impact would be huge if a major exotic disease like Foot-and-Mouth hit this

region. Casino has traditionally relied very heavily on the beef and dairy industries. In the past, cattle price fluctuations have governed the entire economics of the town. Recent years have seen a greater diversification of income. However, a lot of our economic turnover is still related to cattle prices. Assuming a stock standstill for six months and quarantine etc, the local economy would be devastated with disastrous flow-on effects.

6.5.1 Immediate social impacts The workshop discussions then moved to consider the immediate impacts of a FMD outbreak as defined by the hypothetical. Much of the discussion considered many of the issues covered within the Armidale tabletop exercise as described above. However, there were some additional points of interest raised in the focus group discussions that are summarised in the following sections.

The local saleyards

In Roma, past incidences with diseases in stock provided some appreciation of the types of problems that could arise at a saleyard if disease was identified. As one participant explained: You don’t need a FMD outbreak to close saleyards. Someone unloaded tick-

affected cattle at Chinchilla saleyards. Fortunately the ticks were discovered before the cattle were put in with the rest of the stock. So you could use the saleyards but the unloading facilities were closed for nine months.

There was some discussion of the difficulties that would be encountered in ensuring the decontamination of all people, dogs, horses and vehicles quarantined at the sale. Kevin Cooper did advise that this may not be as arduous task as first imagined. Those required to undergo disinfection

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will only be those with high risk of infection. There may be an agreement that producers go home or to a motel immediately and wash their clothes and footwear. Roma participants also raised the issue of tracing livestock movements from the saleyards. …A transport truck could have taken those cattle to different places, they’d move

in with other cattle from different places as well, so you’d have to track down where those trucks have been going. They might have only been there for an hour.

Another agreed: The interim stuff that they do as well, I mean, like taking a load from here to

there, and inter-property stuff in the meantime. To trace that is just mind-blowing.

Another added a further concern: I can’t imagine those trucking companies volunteering the fact that their truck

was used. They’d be keeping very quiet about it. They’d be trying to put hoses out very quickly themselves and let it go down the drain.

The discussion then addressed the concern that there may be drivers who might wish to report that they may have carried infected animals across the country but have been instructed by their company to remain quiet. The question was raised as to whether there would be an opportunity for a driver to surreptitiously report such information. Another asked whether it would be possible to fine people who did not voluntarily come forward. Kevin Cooper responded that past experience has shown that the community excerpts more pressure than the regulatory bodies: ‘Someone usually says something to someone along the way. There is a lot of peer pressure.’

Health

The groups were also asked to consider how they would cope if a farmer quarantined at the saleyards had a heart attack. Ambulance officers in each group responded with a description of the procedures for treating a patient in accordance with AUSVETPLAN. The response would be focused upon not spreading disease, which would require leaving the ambulance at the perimeter of the quarantined area and under advice of those in charge, observe quarantine procedures, stabilise the patient and then transport him to hospital. Hospital representatives were also asked how they would cope. The representative in Camperdown commented that she would immediately know about a disease outbreak because she would lose staff: ‘Most of my staff are women from the land, either working part-time or casually.’ She noted that normal staffing shortages would mean that the inevitable loss of staff would create significant difficulties. She concluded that any increase in patients would mean they would have to be sent to ‘St. Elsewhere’ because the local hospital would be unable to cope. She also raised the issue that with restriction zones, district nurses would be unable to move about the district to treat patients. Another participant advised that under the Area Health Disaster Plans, patients would be moved to various hospitals according to requirements. Health workers were also asked to consider how they would cope with people presenting to the hospital complaining of ‘symptoms’ of FMD. A Casino participant suggested that the emergency department might not be first point of call for these people. They may present to pharmacies and general practitioners. Health representatives responded that they would use the media to address misinformation within the community.

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Schools

The discussions then centred upon how the local school which was quarantined in the hypothetical scenario would cope with the quarantine procedures and the reuniting of children with their parents. Kevin Cooper explained that as with the saleyard, quarantine procedures would be conducted according to the degree of risk: Even people on infected premises can leave to get their children provided they

meet specific conditions; for example, they don’t use the farm ute. People are just expected to change clothes and disinfect shoes. If children have to feed stock, to do that they would need to put on specific clothes and then change afterwards and wash the clothes and shoes. Disinfection of School Buses would be dependent upon risk assessment. If buses were in or near infected sites, there would be a need to disinfect the wheels. Restricted Area Management Security (RAMS) officers would enforce quarantine requirements but they would try to make soft rather than hard restrictions, as they have to educate as well as enforce regulations.

One of the educators within the Casino group questioned: Something like that would be like a flood; happen very quickly. We would have

contacts for every child and would have to let parents know. We would have get advice... While all schools have emergency management plans, lock down procedures etc, do we need to go to the extent of having something in place generically developed for all of the state so that everyone is aware of what to do in the event of a major disease outbreak?

Kevin Cooper agreed that such plans should be developed but plans should also be developed in the context of each school. Another participant maintained that such plans should not be too involved. All that a headmaster would require is a job card outlining what to do if disease outbreak occurs. The educators agreed that schools could establish such a scheme with knowledge of the right procedures. For example, schools would be unable to release students to non-family members unless they were authorised by parents. He noted that a Hotline for schools was about to be introduced and it may be possible for the operator to also be responsible for alerting the appropriate people in schools in an EAD emergency. The eductors concluded that it was vitally important that policies on how to respond to disease outbreaks be on the Education Department’s agenda. Another participant suggested that such plans must be developed in line with AUSVETPLAN to ensure consistency. In Casino, the local shire representative noted that a school has been included in the community consultation process currently being conducted as part of risk assessment of possible hazards within the shire. The shire has provided the school with a list of contact details for various emergency management services and the school in turn will provide a list of executives who can be contacted immediately in the event of a crisis. She noted: The school has a checklist of what to do in an emergency and therefore what to

do in the event of a disease outbreak could be incorporated fairly easy into these plans. But this would need to be right across the shire. There will be no point in having plans in one district and not an adjoining one. Such plans in place would make the job of local emergency management committees much easier.

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She also noted that there is no consistency between Shire Councils in their level of commitment to emergency management. While every Local Government Area will have to assess hazards risk posed to

people and infrastructure, the level of consultation will differ between councils. We plan to go one-step further and contact schools and we will get round to other community organisations. This area is very vulnerable to Foot-and-Mouth.

6.5.2 Communication The majority of the workshop discussions concentrated on several concepts of the social impact of an EAD outbreak. First, workshop participants were asked how they could best meet the information needs of local people in the event of a disease outbreak. One of the main complaints from farmers in the United Kingdom during the FMD outbreak was the lack of information from government agencies. Farmers wanted access to accurate and reliable information on disease locations and control measures, and what they should be doing to protect their properties. The participants in Roma initially raised concerns about how soon the local community would be notified that a disease outbreak had occurred. As one person noted: I just raise this because the last suspected disease outbreak near Taroom about

three years ago, it was just mentioned to me off-handedly about a day after it happened that something was going on.

Kevin Cooper stated that the local community should know at first suspicion. He explained that in the past, the community was not told until a disease had been confirmed. There were concerns that if tests prove to be negative and news of an outbreak reached the outside world, it may damage export trade. The policy now is for communities to be informed as soon as there is a high suspicion that disease will be confirmed. There was concern in all groups about the flow of information being ‘top down’ and the needs of local communities may not be considered. This may extend to a lack of consultation throughout the management of the entire control and recovery response. Kevin Cooper noted that there were problems in the UK and there are only two levels of government, central and regional; whereas in Australia, there are three levels, namely Federal, State and Local. He informed the meetings that a National Communications Network would prepare and authorise all official media releases. There is a website (www.outbreak.gov.au), that will be used during an event, and a National Hotline will roll out under Centrelink’s banner immediately a disease outbreak is confirmed. While it will be important that information is consistent and reliable, there will be a need for some local variation on that information, namely what it will mean for local people. There is also a need to identify the best means of reaching people within a community. One Camperdown participant stated there would be a need to manage the flow of positive information to ally people’s fears, reassure them that the outbreak has been isolated and contained and focus upon their concerns about daily life; for example, their ability to move freely outside the restricted zones and what they can do as individuals to protect their livestock and properties. In all communities, local radio was identified as the best means of disseminating information, followed by local newspapers and flyers sent by mail. There were discussions about the use of mobile phones in the early stages of the crisis; for example, with the lockdown of the saleyard. Most people (including farmers) have mobile phones. However, there were concerns that networks could soon become overloaded in such situations. Participants also noted that there was a need for a hotline. The Department of Community Services in Victoria has an information pack containing emergency

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information including the hotline number, which could be distributed in the event of a disease outbreak. However, Kevin Cooper noted that during the Mangrove Mountain disease outbreak, getting people to use the hotline was difficult. Only those directly infected by the disease used the hotline while the broader community did not. What was effective for information delivery was a newsletter containing information about the 1800 number delivered through a letterbox drop to 2300 local residents. There were 14 editions delivered over four months. He added: It is a question of, even if you do a newsletter, of people reading it and taking it

in. It wasn’t until the fourth newsletter went out which had a fridge magnet stapled to the front of it with the 1800 number and a logo, that a day later, our 1800 number network was overloaded. The fridge magnet was an instant success.

A farmer in Roma agreed: I think some of the best information we’ve received about most things is through

the mail. We get information in flyers about whatever’s going on. They send it out in the mail and you have it right there in front of you. You can do your own thing. You’re not always in town getting a local paper.

Kevin Cooper continued: The community has to know the stakeholders, who they are and what is their most

likely means of receiving information. Information has to flow both ways—you put it out but you must also get it back. The UK control centres all had hotlines but all the volunteers did was sit and wait and all they received was complaints. The UK has database with information on each rural holding so I got them call out to people to ask them how they were doing, whether anyone had been to visit. There was a significant turn around in the use of the call centre. But this is a major change of thinking in the way of using hotlines.

One person in Casino suggested that the Shire’s contact details for ratepayers could provide similar information: You could draw a circle of 10 km around the area and calls could then be made

to farmers to check on their support needs.

Another participant pointed out, that there is an assumption that people who pay the rates live on the property and that there will be a need to know what proportion of farmers are on a lease arrangement. Concerns were also raised about privacy and confidentiality issues regarding access to such information and the need to establish protocols before an outbreak occurs. Kevin Cooper noted that one of the best ways to get information out to people in Mangrove Mountain proved to be through the local schools. Participants representing local schools in Casino agreed and noted that the best contact would be the district office of Education. This office would be able to email information to every school and would know who would be the best person to contact. However, another participant cautioned that not all residents have children at school. In Camperdown, participants noted that the district is a closely settled area and as one person stated: ‘Good or bad news, it does get around.’ Participants in each community noted there was a need for a consistent overall message. Casino’s Shire representative suggested that as most organisations have their own means of distributing information, there would be a need to form a full media unit to bring those people together to ensure consistency in the information disseminated to the community. A media plan could be attached to the community’s disaster plan structured along the lines of the

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procedures for information release used by the rural fire service, which instruct the public to listen to the local radio station to receive up to date information.

6.5.3 Impact upon farm families It is likely that farm families would suffer significant financial, social and psychological stress in the aftermath of an EAD outbreak. Workshop participants were asked what they could do to assist farm families isolated in restricted areas; for example, delivery of food to farm gates. Farmers within the group were also asked to consider whether they would be concerned about the spread of infection if they assisted their neighbours. The groups were asked to consider that farmers typically find it difficult to ask for help and explore ways of overcoming that problem. In each group, representatives of local health services noted the local mental health teams would be assisted by teams from neighbouring communities to address the psychological health needs of farm families, particularly those whose stock must be destroyed. Kevin Cooper noted that disease control response teams ideally would like a counsellor to accompany them when they approach a farm family to inform them they are about to cull their stock. In Roma, one of the participants noted that having a farmer go with the emergency response team to help explain to a farmer what to expect and what support was available might help. He gave an example: Most of the oil companies around this area now when they’re dealing with

property owners—and I tell you, property owners are fairly adverse to people coming on and digging up places and chasing cattle and stock—what they do is, they take on board people from the land, and have them go out and talk to property owners and get them used to the fact that the oil companies are going to come on, this is what they’ll be doing when they get here, don’t be afraid of that because they will fix up your fences. By doing that, they save a lot of problems down the line because they’re appeasing the worries and concerns that the property owners have. Before they did that, they had a lot of problems. People would stop them at the gate, ‘You can’t come on, and you can’t do this.’ I think all the big industries now utilise people from the land to sell what they’re doing.

Kevin Cooper added that the Mangrove Mountain response had 15 people working full-time in community relations for 2300 households. Every tool was used to contact people including door knocks. Some people don’t

come and go from the house and you have got to know where they are. Every time we had destruction on a property, we’d make sure we’d notify all the adjoining properties. We’d ask them if they had kids, do you want your kids here, or do you want to send them to your mother’s? —so children weren’t exposed to that sort of environment.

Practical support

Participants were asked about practical support for the delivery of food to farm families and fodder for livestock. One SES representative reported that agencies would organise food drops to farms as they have in the past with floods. Kevin Cooper pointed out support services will need to be very subtle and well-managed as farmers are proud, independent people and will not want the community to know what support they are accessing whether its food or financial support. One Roma participant noted the pressure local service groups experienced during the drought when they were given the responsibility of disseminating financial assistance to farm families in need. The responsibility was overwhelming and it was difficult to decide who were the deserving recipients amongst their neighbours and friends. This is a task they would not like again. She explained:

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We found that in the drought, we had this problem especially with money. Money was a bad issue all round. People were too proud—they didn’t want to be seen to be taking money. You’ll only get those ones that come forward for the money that really shouldn’t be getting it anyway. Food issue was another thing. Where food is supplied to groups or Community Health, people are still too proud to come forward to accept it. You find that once the food is supplied to the groups to distribute, they are given the responsibility of distributing evenly; how much does this person get, how much that does that person get.

The difficulties of delivering fodder to livestock in restricted areas were also discussed. One Roma participant noted: While stock are impounded, you’re going to have to start feeding them, so you’re

going to have to bring fodder in from somewhere. I don’t know how you’re going to get it in, whether you rail it in or not, or maybe the rail would be stopped from travelling through the area as well.

One Armidale resident noted: During the drought, Council was asked by ratepayers to supply fodder to farmers

who were in difficulties at no cost. How far do you go— does the community start buying fodder from outside? There is pressure on carriers to do it at low cost or no cost. That creates tensions. There is probably a host of issues that we would not be aware of until it happens.

Kevin Cooper noted that some companies might not wish to assist when it involves an EAD. One of the challenges we’ve had, and it was the same with the UK, was that

companies didn’t want to be seen to be associated with the infected area, because of fear of contamination. We had a real problem at Mangrove Mountain, because chickens eat a lot and the feed companies refused to deliver feed to the area, so we had to move feed between the farms.

Social isolation

Workshop participants were also asked how they would assist farm families who would be isolated by the legislative restrictions on movements as well as self-imposed restrictions on movements through fear of spreading the disease. Kevin Cooper reported that Mangrove Mountain farmers chose not to participate in any social events organised by the community recovery teams. One of the Roma farmers recalled:

We found this a big issue during the drought. The CWA held put on things for people just to come and have a cup of tea. We didn’t really know how to help, except, maybe, asking them to come along for a barbecue or a cup of tea to sit down and join in and talk. We found that the women came along, mainly to talk about issues that they had with husbands. We couldn’t get the husbands to come, because they’re too proud; they didn’t want to be seen to be sitting down and talking to women about their problems. Even if it was men amongst men, we thought that might help, but men just won’t do it. Men won’t let their feelings out; they hold them in. Whereas, the women were coming to get rid of the emotional issues they were having with the fact that they could see their husbands deteriorating in front of their eyes and going downhill, but they didn’t want to talk about it.

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Workshop participants who represented the local churches were asked about ministering to families in these situations. In Roma, one Chaplain responded: My role is to visit people and help them with their emotional feelings, more so

than actual finances. Because sometimes, people in times of a disaster—and this would be a disaster—there would be a lot of grief and loss. Farmers would be feeling emotional, and that’s what we’re saying about men: they won’t come out and socialise because they won’t face their problems, not like women do. Men hold a lot of emotion inside and why I go out is sometimes to talk to the men. A lot of it is just going out there, not actually talking to them, but listening to them, because if they open up, that will help them a lot.

When asked if he could foresee a problem with farmers being concerned about disease if they knew he was visiting other farmers on infected properties, he responded: I don’t know. A lot of times you go out, is that fellow down the road going to

know? You’ve got to be very careful. When you go and visit one farmer, you don’t say to the fellow down the road that ‘I’ve been up visiting him’.

When asked the same question, a counsellor in Camperdown replied that he would respond to requests for assistance but would point out to the farmer that he had been visiting infected properties but had followed protocol regarding disinfection. One of the local farmers in Roma noted that many of the traditional churches in the district had closed and had been replaced by non-traditional charismatic congregations. The effect of such social change in rural areas upon the loss of traditional models of support is a factor that could be explored in further research. The Casino community did not believe they would have problems encouraging farm families to join in with community social events. One of the service providers reported that during the drought, local farmers readily attended Farm Family Gatherings the local community organised. A network of support services comprised of government and non-government agencies, such as the local Rural Financial Counsellor, Health Services, Lifeline and the Salvation Army, facilitated ongoing support for farmers. This type of support service also worked with dairy farmers with the deregulation of the dairy industry. It was agreed that the network structure would be maintained ready to be instigated should another need arise. She continued: ‘We didn’t know it would work when we started it, but it did.’ However, one person questioned whether a structure like that would work in a community divided between those on infected properties and those not infected. Such divisions would cause the community structure to break down. One participant cited divisions arose within the Casino community when divisions occurred within the local dairy industry. As another noted, with the drought, everyone was affected. This would not be the case with a disease outbreak. One farmer disagreed and maintained that all farmers would be affected, as the livestock industry is export orientated. One of the Armidale participants concluded: I think one of the big things that came out of looking at this is that communities

must be strong after such an event. They must not become insular and keep to themselves. One of the roles of community services could be to keep social events happening. Maybe that means shelling out dollars for events to keep them cheap or free to keep the community vibrant and meeting with each other and talking through the issues instead of people going their separate ways.

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Stigma

The issue of division within the community was discussed at length. Divisions may arise from some people not realising the importance of control measures. Adjacent farmers may not be treated in a similar way. Some would be declared exclusion and destroy zones and would receive compensation while others would not. There can be gossip and blaming about the source of infection. Kevin Cooper noted that such divisions were evident at Mangrove Mountain and in the United Kingdom, adding: ‘Nothing divides a community like this exercise.’ He recalled that public meetings held at Mangrove Mountain were ‘delightfully challenging’: horrific events but worthwhile as they allowed people to vent their anger and frustration. However, often these meetings provided an excuse for residents to air other simmering community issues. A Casino participant agreed: ‘I think that this community is not going to be easy. There will be plenty of opportunities for those things to arise.’ A service provider responded: There will be a need to get people to understand the grief and loss cycle so people

understand their own actions and what is motivating them. There needs to be stress debriefings, otherwise they will keep behaving in those ways.

However, in Camperdown one of the local farmers strongly believed that such division would not occur in his district. I was surprised that you suggested that there would be a stigma associated with

farmers who have the disease. I’ve worked for a long time with the VFF (Victorian Farmers’ Federation) and other farmer bodies. I would have thought there would be enormous support from local farmers for their neighbours and other farmers. I very much doubt that would be the case here. As a producer, I believe my fellow farmers would support each other.

Yet several others in the group disagreed. One believed that farming communities in the UK were very similar to the Camperdown community and it would be very likely that the same division would occur. Another maintained that rumours and misinformation would be rife. There would be suspicion, animosity and blame that someone did not get it right, alienation of the ‘guilty’ that should have done more and uncertainty about the future. He asserted that media scrutiny would magnify these feelings. However, another farmer stated that if someone were in need, they would help: If someone is a neighbour and a friend that you have known for many years,

you’re not going to say, ‘I’m not going to bother with you.’

Another participant concluded: Farmers are incredibly reluctant to admit to weakness and will think they are

immune from negative social illnesses. If we are going to do anything as a result of today’s discussion, just getting people to talk about the fact that feelings of anxiety, depression, loneliness and aggression and an increase in crime will happen because of the incredible stress farmers will be under is important. We need to let people know that if an outbreak happens to expect that they will have all these emotions, but there will be people they can talk to even if it is their next-door neighbour.

The diversity in the discussions between the four communities reflects the diversity that is likely to occur within various communities who may face an emergency disease outbreak. Some communities that have strong social networks of support and social cohesion are more likely to have residents unite and support each other through the crisis while other communities that are less cohesive may see more division.

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The non-reporting of diseased stock

It was put to workshop participants that it would be very likely that some livestock owners may elect to kill and bury sick animals and not report an outbreak to authorities. Farmers and police were asked how they would deal with this problem. One of the farmers in Roma agreed that killing and burying sick animals would very likely occur and noted that considering the size of properties and the isolation in that region, no-one would ever know about it. In Casino, one of the farmers there commented that the one case of Mad Cow Disease in Canada had catastrophic consequences for the Canadian industry and the suggestion had been made that it would have been better to ‘shoot, shovel and shut up’. Another Casino participant questioned what were the moral, ethical, and legal obligations of professional people for reporting a client for such actions. For example, if a patient tells a doctor in confidence that he/she has infected

stock but has dealt with the problem by shooting and burying the animal and has not reported it, does patient/doctor confidentiality prevent the doctor reporting this to authorities?

While professionals in such positions would be legally bound to report such incidents to authorities, it may be worthwhile for professions to clarify the issues for their workers faced with such a dilemma.

6.5.4 Impact upon emergency workers In the UK, those employed in the control response and operating telephone help lines were also adversely affected by what they experienced. Workers were subject to extremely long hours and difficult working conditions. Many animals that appeared perfectly healthy had to be slaughtered. Participants were asked to comment on this issue and explore possible supports that could be made available for emergency workers. One emergency service representative in Roma observed: Coming to terms with those sorts of things would be difficult for most people.

You would have to be cautious about who you were going to utilise to deliver that service.

Another maintained that it would be preferable to utilise people from the immediate area, as they would be able to come to terms with what they are doing far easier than people brought in to do the task. Another agreed: ‘It would be better to have ten people who know what they are doing–you don’t need forty.’ Kevin Cooper agreed and noted that this was a principle he applied in Mangrove Mountain. We went to Scone, Blayney, Macksville and Eden—towns that all had abattoirs

that had shut down and we got the abattoir workforce. It was good for them because they were unemployed, but for us, we got the floor supervisor and his team. They were in a work environment that was familiar. They understood livestock and they understood the work environment. You’ve got to work really hard laterally, not only think laterally, and then argue the case with someone else outside the area that this is the best way to go.

One participant advised that there are structures in place for Critical Incidence debriefing for workers to care for their emotional health. However, what will be needed is a support network for the families of emergency workers. She explained: ‘This problem has arisen in the past with major fires when emergency workers haven’t been home for weeks.’

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Kevin Cooper recalled that it was important to organise social activities for emergency workers, such as international soccer games, else workers tended to work from 6.00 am to 10.00 p.m. every day. The Casino resident suggested that once an emergency occurs, workers should be scheduled to work five days on and two days off.

6.5.5 Impact on the wider community

Unemployment

The meetings were asked to reflect upon how they could address the problems resulting from the rise of unemployment within the district due to the probable closure of the saleyards, abattoirs, dairy factories and other associated agricultural industries along with the restriction of the movement of shearers and other rural contractors. While some unemployed workers would be coopted to assist with the cull of livestock, once that work was completed, many would leave the district to seek employment elsewhere. Workshop participants were asked whether there were any schemes that could be implemented to employ local people to retain them and their skills within the region. Participants were concerned about the length of time the agricultural industries would be closed for business. Kevin Cooper explained that if the saleyard was outside the Restricted Area and was not an infected premise, the down-time would be less, but if it was an infected premise or considered a dangerous contact for FMD, the saleyard would be subject to the same requirements as a farm, or a milk factory and may be closed for six to nine months. AUSVETPLAN has enterprise plans for all types of enterprises. He explained: As we experienced in the Northern Territory in March (2004), the saleyard

wasn’t the focus of the disease, but the properties next door were all positive, so the saleyard couldn’t get active business until those properties were cleared and had gone through the cleaning protocol.

He continued: The challenge for you would be what else do the people, or the saleyards, or

whatever, do in that nine months. What are the options? The Canadians with Mad Cow Disease were exceptionally clever. They held these mass barbecues using the saleyards as the venue. They actually increased red meat consumption per capita in Canada—the only country to have done so. This is thinking laterally—what do you do with this resource? Do you find some excuse to have a major party that brings half of Queensland to Roma for some reason?

The unemployment issue was a major concern for participants. In Camperdown, residents could not identify any other possible options for employment in the region. One stated: The [Major Dairy Company] may be able to relocate some of the workers but I

couldn’t see them accommodating all of the staff. Some people may not want to move—they may say, ‘We will ride this out.’

However, another recalled that following the closure of the local abattoirs and the relocation out of the area of several other businesses, about 1000 jobs were lost over a period of eighteen months, yet the town survived. The response was: ‘It survives but you remember what Camperdown was like at that time. You do get through it but you have to deal with it in the short-term.’ One of the Casino farmers noted that following the recent drought, finding trained staff has been a major problem for local farmers. He also noted that there were no alternative employment

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opportunities in the area to accommodate the large group of people involved in agricultural industries who would be unemployed if an FMD outbreak eventuated. One other Casino participant believed most local people would not pack up and leave the district. Another added: ‘If they do leave, it will be for a long time.’ The aim would be to try and keep people in the area with some employment until the industry is re-established. A Casino Shire representative suggested perhaps there could be a means of displaced workers being sent to agricultural industries in neighbouring regions on secondment. Kevin Cooper suggested that there is a need to look for community-based projects to find work for workers for at least three to six months. Alternatives may need to be industry driven. He suggested that the local abattoir does not source everything locally and they could source supply from elsewhere which would keep local people employed. However, as one of the farmers pointed out, the export industry will be stopped and markets will cease. Kevin replied that Australia would still export to FMD positive countries albeit at lower prices than currently received from FMD-free countries. Yet one resident believed the Casino community would rally to support workers. He recalled when the local abattoir faced closure in the past, a public meeting was called, and workers elected to reduce wages to sustain the business.

Financial assistance

Farmers disadvantaged through an EAD crisis will be eligible for support under the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment through Centrelink. The workshops were asked whether there would some people who may not be eligible for assistance and what support could be offered. In Roma, one participant noted that problems that arise from the distribution of financial support. One issue you’ve also got to watch is this release of money. During the

Charleville floods, two people came out and distributed money to people in the community that had nowhere to go. Charleville town was awash and people had money and nowhere to spend it, other than going out to Morven, and picking up grog—and that created another issue we had to deal with. They weren’t going to get food; they were waiting for us to feed them. You can imagine—heaps of people, particularly as they were all living under one roof, in an airport hangar. And there was no record of who collected money. I’ve never seen so many people come up in a line with so many different names in one day.

An Armidale participant recalled:

With the hailstorm in 1996, the recovery team that was part of the local emergency management committee ran for several months. There were people who were uninsured who needed to access to government funds that they did not know were available for fixing rooves and windows that were damaged in the storm. There were people in financial difficulty. This was a difficult period for the committee because everyone in the community was affected to a certain extent—people were driving around for years afterwards with damaged cars. So Council couldn’t really have a fundraiser to support anyone—how would we distribute funds? Who would be the beneficiaries? Were there really needy cases or some just too lazy to do anything about it. In the case of a FMD outbreak, it will be a bit different. There will be people severely affected with a downturn in income. Fortunately many farmers in this area have dual incomes—not every one is a full-time farmer in our region—one partner will have daytime job. But people will still have to pay off properties, they will still have operational costs, still have to feed stock, pay bills, control weeds and then restock.

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One of the Roma participants suggested that rather than financial support being handed out to individuals, it would be better for government to support local businesses. I think it would be a much better idea if food were actually given to the local

shops, because they’re the ones that suffer in the long run. They’d have no money to buy anything. You lose your shops, your local things; they don’t turn about, they don’t grow. If they’re supplied with food and the people then get vouchers—like in a war situation, and if everybody gets vouchers, then they’re not too proud to go and use them.

Another added that: ‘Little shops in little communities are often the ones that carry the local people.’ Another participant agreed: I can see your thing with this food distribution and the local businesses because

I saw it during the drought. I know some little towns did miss out badly. They went broke because of outside handouts. The local community weren’t getting the business.

Figure 6.3: The general store/post office in a village near Roma.

Kevin Cooper reported that during the Mangrove Mountain response, he directed every purchasing opportunity possible towards the local community, which was often contrary to government protocol. He explained: Senior decision-makers started to understand that it was better to keep the shop

afloat than have to pay them unemployment benefits somewhere down the track because the shop had gone broke. Contractors would come and work for us, and my department would say: ‘Why are we giving them lunch?’ And I replied, ‘Because if they’re on an infected premise, by the time they disinfect, come off, go and buy lunch, it’s costing us more than $5 to give them lunch on the property.’ But more importantly, we were spending that $5 in the local community.

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6.5.6 Perception of risk Participants’ perceptions of the risk of an EAD outbreak occurring in Australia were also assessed. They were asked whether they believed that: an outbreak was something Australians should be extremely concerned about an outbreak was inevitable and there is little anyone can do about it, or the likelihood of a disease outbreak in Australia has been greatly exaggerated, or the vastness of the country will mean that the outbreak will be contained in one area and

eradicated quickly, or Australia’s isolation from other countries and strict quarantine measures will continue to

prevent disease outbreaks. In Camperdown, participants thought an EAD was inevitable. Another added: ‘Not because of a lack of trying but Foot-and-Mouth has spread rapidly across the world in the past 25 years and someone who is careless will bring it in.’ One of the Casino farmers believed that there was a need to balance the risk against the costs. He stated: It was 1872 since the last outbreak of FMD. Australia has good quarantine

standards. Yet FMD is in the Philippines. We need to know, what’s the probability of an outbreak?

Another thought the risk was low. One other added: ‘We are an island and are a bit more protected than other countries but we have be alert and we have to have procedures.’ The local vet concluded: The risk is low but the risk is increasing. People are more mobile, air travel is

more common, there are new disease agents undergoing virulent changes and bio-terrorism. Put it all together with a declining workforce on farms, if there is an outbreak, the impact will be very high.

In Roma, two participants maintained: ‘It’s going to happen; it’s just a matter of when.’ Others were concerned about disease entering the northern part of Australia from neighbouring countries and progressing across the country. One participant raised concerns about disease spread through poor attention to livestock identification requirements or illegal activities. Increasingly, you see more cattle coming into Queensland. Cattle are coming up

from other states with nothing more than just a tag. No NVD’s or anything. Another thing with NLIS, cattle recently stolen in Victoria all had NLIS tags. It wasn’t worth tagging them.

Kevin Cooper responded: Part of the National cost-sharing agreement now includes that industries have

their own biosecurity systems in place—saleyard biosecurity, property and company biosecurity etc. So, increasingly in the world we live in, they’re going to be important for the early detection and prevention of disease. Stock might come from Kununurra, but if you’ve got a two-day trip, hopefully you’re going to be seeing some symptoms by then anyway, so those systems in place will actually detect those symptoms.

However, one participant remained concerned that a reduction in DPI staff and a lack of trained workers will mean that unusual disease symptoms may be overlooked.

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6.5.7 Community education The workshops also discussed ways to raise awareness within their communities about biosecurity and enhance preparedness. The Department of Primary Industry representative in Roma noted: We aimed to get information to people while they are getting information about

something else. They don’t go to look for exotic disease information, so you’ve got to get it to them when something else is happening, and that’s one of the big challenges. We put 200 000 fliers throughout Queensland two years ago, with rate notices. We’ve been at it for probably 26–27 years, trying to get people to understand what do you look for and what to do if you see something, and don’t feed swill. They’re the issues we’ve been hammering, and hammering. It does work. A couple of years ago, we shot an anti-swill feeding video and we tried to get some swill in Toowoomba, and nobody would give it to us, so it actually worked in Toowoomba.

Kevin Cooper noted that his Department has projects targeting people from non-English speaking backgrounds, as they are considered to be a high risk for bringing in contaminated foodstuffs from overseas. One Camperdown participant was concerned that the general public does not have an awareness of what problems could eventuate if they do not do the right thing. Even amongst some country people there is a perception that: ‘It can’t happen to me.’ He suggested that government should have a campaign to raise the level of awareness about the consequences. Likewise, a Roma participant commented: Most people that are not dealing with the cattle industry or pig industry, FMD

would mean absolutely nothing to them. It would be: ‘Foot-and-Mouth, oh yeah, what is that?’ They wouldn’t have a clue, except it’s a disease that cattle get, whatever it is, animals. But if they knew that their job was at risk—if this was present in your community, do you realise that down the track, you could be out of a job? That may make a difference.

The groups did agree it was important to educate people on the necessity to report disease in stock. A representative of the Country Women’s Association reported that they could send out information to 60 branches in a month, which would reach 10 000 people. While the target group will be women, they would share the information with their families. One of the educators within the Casino group suggested that perhaps there needed to be regulations regarding mandatory training for livestock producers about the risks of disease. As certification is required for farmers handling chemicals, and a disease outbreak will have dire consequences, similar processes should apply. However, the farmers within the group disagreed: You need to weigh up the probability of a FMD outbreak against the cost of

certifying farmers. The amount of legislation we have to deal with is overwhelming—like Workcover. What is required is information on the ground for people when they need it. It’s OK if you are an employee and you get paid to do a course but it is not so good if you are a farmer.

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One of the participants representing Agforce in Roma advised: Within Agforce, we’ve got link-ups to 12 shires and there are 23 branches, which

are made up of that, so 1600 members. We’ve recently just passed a motion that there should be at least one or two people from each branch to be industry liaison officers who actually get some training with how to deal with a disease outbreak. At the moment, it’s more looking at the technical aspects of a disease outbreak, but maybe there’s some room to incorporate within that, the social impacts so those people are also geared to understand that as part of what they’re doing. We’re actually looking to get people in the local areas skilled.

Kevin Cooper explained that the Industry Liaison Officer program is a recent initiative of the government. There have been 128 people trained in over the past year in NSW. The person that coordinates the destruction and disposal has always been a

Government person, but we’ve started training beekeepers, dairy producers to do that role. They’re not always producers. They might be CEO’s. I’d much rather be dealing with these people because they have the corporate knowledge, the industry knowledge, the understanding, and the language.

An increase in the focus of Industry Liaison Officers program upon the social impact of may lead to a greater awareness amongst those people with whom they interact.

6.6 Summary and discussion One of the main aims of the focus groups, was to raise awareness amongst residents of the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon their local community, and this was achieved. Time did not permit the development of concrete recommendations for increasing community preparedness. However, many of the participants intended to return to their various organisations to further discuss their role in community recovery in the event of a disease outbreak and in educating their members. Following the meetings, some participants discussed ongoing collaboration between various community services towards planning community preparedness strategies. EAD’s are not on the agendas of many organisations that could be significantly affected by an outbreak; for example, schools, small businesses and local community groups. There is a need to raise awareness across communities of the social consequences of disease outbreaks and stress that community recovery must begin with the control response. In many instances, this will merely require an extension of an organisation’s existing disaster plans. For example, those representing local schools in Casino were keen to submit to the Education Department that current policies and programs for disaster management be revised to include emergency management disease outbreaks. It is also important that these plans be tailored for each school. It is also recommended that while disaster management plans must also be tailored to each community, Local Emergency Management Committees should be encouraged towards some level of consistency in preparedness as noted by one Casino participant, there is no point in one shire having certain plans in place when a neighbouring shire does not. Observation of the Armidale tabletop exercise led to the conclusion that exercises conducted by Local Emergency Management Committees would be greatly improved by the inclusion of local farmers, representatives of other agricultural industries and small businesses and local service providers who would be affected by an EAD outbreak. In particular, Chambers of Commerce should be included to raise their awareness of the implications of an EAD for local businesses, as this group was the least interested in participating in the workshops. Interaction between emergency services and these groups would enhance preparedness in all sectors of the community. The involvement of farmers may lead to greater levels of biosecurity on individual and neighbouring farms. It is also suggested that a person within the community who has an understanding of social issues, facilitate community discussions. It was evident within the focus groups that representatives of emergency services whose task is to

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quickly and effectively fix a problem tended to dwell upon the technical aspects of a disease response which necessitated guiding the discussion back to focus upon the social impacts. Unemployment in the aftermath of a disease outbreak was a major concern for participants. Communities, therefore, should explore possible options for community-based projects that would sustain the displaced workforce throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries. Communication was also a concern for participants. Radio, newspapers and flyers delivered in letterbox drops appear to be the most agreeable ways of disseminating information for farming communities. Magnets for refrigerators containing basic emergency information were successful in Mangrove Mountain. Also following the Mangrove Mountain experience, it is suggested that procedures for hotlines in emergency situations be revised to initiate calls to people to check on their welfare rather than wait for contact from the public. Furthermore, it is suggested that any issues regarding privacy and confidentiality be resolved to enable the collation of a database of information on farmers within a community, which can be used by a call centre in an emergency. However, Hulse (2005) suggests that a community should be asked by a Emergency Control Centre how they would like to be informed as community newsletters may be preferred and would be a much cheaper option than expensive advertising. A media plan attached to a disaster plan for each community would enable a communications strategy that facilitates the effective flow of information between government agencies and local communities. As Dixon (2002) noted, information should be easy to access, be accurate, transparent, conform to a consistent agenda, and be disseminated through a variety of mediums but originate from a primary source. If farmers are informed on restrictions and control measures, they are more compliant. Without such information, the result is stress, anger and mistrust of those involved in policies and process of disease control (Dixon 2002). The mail survey of farmers revealed that farmers who believed they would have some measure of control in the event of an outbreak were more likely to have instigated biosecurity on their properties (see Chapter 4). Thomson (2005) notes the community will be uncertain of what to expect from central government during a disease control response. It is only when the community has a clear appreciation of the processes that would be followed that they will be able to anticipate their role and the role of other organisations and what they can do to effectively participate in the short and long-term. The communication process will need to be regularly and openly reviewed, which will necessitate feedback from the community. Hulse (2005) in a review of the response to a Painted Apple Moth outbreak in New Zealand noted that local people expect to be consulted. Hulse concluded that local councils should be contacted at first sign of a disease outbreak, as they will know best how to work with the community. The wider community should be involved as soon as possible and be trusted with as much information as required to encourage collaborative solutions to problems. Sharing problems with the community and responding to sensible requests will build trust and show intent by Government to work in partnership with the community (Hulse 2005). The likelihood of division within the community in the event of a disease outbreak created animated discussion within the workshops. It can be concluded that should a major disease epidemic occur in Australia, the experience of individual communities will differ significantly according to the nature and structure of the community, and degree of social cohesion. As found in the UK FMD epidemic, in some communities, there were significant tensions between farmers and between farmers and other community groups. Yet other communities remained close-knit and supportive of local farmers. The issue of non-reporting of diseased stock by farmers or farm employees or employees of associated livestock industries is an issue of concern and the community needs to be educated regarding the consequences of not reporting unusual symptoms. It may also be necessary to provide advice and policy guidelines on the need to report knowledge of unreported disease outbreaks for counsellors, general practitioners and other professionals who may be confronted with the dilemma of breaking the confidentiality of a client.

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There is a need to ensure that existing community support networks be encouraged to remain available to provide support in the event of a disease outbreak. Alternatively, self-help groups should be encouraged within a community. There will also be a need to establish support networks for families of emergency workers. The loss of traditional churches from rural communities and consequently the loss of that avenue of social support should be examined further. The focus groups offered some ideas on ways to educate the public on the need for biosecurity. The promotion of industry liaison officers for various groups (including farmers) appears a worthwhile option for encouraging awareness and the flow of information between government and the community. It was suggested that awareness campaigns should be extended across the community with emphasis given to the direct social impact on individuals and communities, particularly the financial loss as this may encourage responsiveness amongst the general public and ultimately increase preparedness.

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7: Summary and Conclusions

7.1 Summary and discussion The focus of this study has been upon the degree of awareness and preparedness for an EAD outbreak at the individual farmer and small rural community level. At a National and State level, emergency disease control plans and strict quarantine measures are in place to quickly and effectively control a possible disease outbreak. However, to date, there has been a lack of knowledge about how individual farmers and small rural communities would cope if a crisis occurred. Accordingly, through a series of three studies, the present research sought to identify the level of awareness and preparedness of farmers and small communities for a possible EAD outbreak and identify those social factors that may facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. A second objective was to assess the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities. An initial review of the literature on the social impact of EAD’s on communities conducted as background to the research revealed that disease outbreaks result in significant and enduring social impacts upon farm families and their communities as well as those working in disease control response and support services. However, the studies revealed the extent of the impact varied greatly between communities. Some remained close-knit and supportive of local farmers while others experienced significant division. The first study conducted as part of the present research revisited Devon and Cornwall in the UK to gather information on the social impact of the 2001 FMD epidemic three years on and to seek some insight into the current level of biosecurity on UK farms. Interviews with farmers and support service personnel revealed that the most significant consequences of the FMD outbreak was the poor communication between government and local communities, the social isolation of farm families and the social divisions that occurred within some communities. Community recovery was instigated through church and volunteer community groups that emerged to provide a coordinated, comprehensive network of support for the farming community. The most surprising discovery was that despite the catastrophic consequences of the FMD outbreak, there remains a certain level of complacency about biosecurity amongst UK farmers. Most tended to believe that responsibility for biosecurity lay with those government agencies responsible for quarantine measures and should another FMD outbreak eventuate, there was little that farmers could do about it. The second study explored the attitudes of Australian farmers towards biosecurity on farms through a mail survey of 3000 producers across the eastern states. The study revealed a high level of concern about the threat of an emergency animal disease amongst Australian producers. Most sourced information about emergency animal diseases from newspapers and radios. However, should an emergency animal disease outbreak occur, farmers would first seek advice from their local Department of Primary Industry, RLPB officers or local vet; people they know and trust within their local community. Furthermore, if producers found unusual symptoms in their stock, they would first report it to their local vet. Few would use the emergency disease hotline. Few respondents were aware of biosecurity plans at a community level and only half of the sample had instigated biosecurity precautions on their properties. Most strategies employed were basic farm management practices such as isolating new stock for a short period of time to check for disease. Property size, location and nature of the terrain appear to determine a farmer’s ability to implement strategies.

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The findings revealed that Australian farmers’ attitudes to biosecurity reflect those of their English counterparts; that the responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity lies primarily with government. Specifically, if agencies and those responsible are working efficiently, producers should not have to be concerned about disease entering Australia. Others believed that biosecurity on farms was ineffectual or unnecessary until a disease outbreak occurred. Several respondents were concerned that current policy regarding imported products as part of free trade agreements negates any diligence on the part of Australian producers for biosecurity at the farm level. Nevertheless, the study did reveal requests for more education regarding farm biosecurity to enable farmers to better protect their properties. The study found that farmers who believed they would have some measure of control in the event of an outbreak were more likely to have instigated biosecurity on their properties. Consequently, changing farmers’ perceptions about their ability to control the safety of their property and livestock may be necessary for future biosecurity extension programs. Feral pigs or goats were perceived to be a serious risk for disease particularly for producers on large outback properties. Other perceived risks to properties included neighbours who import animals or semen or who have a high turnover of stock, imported products or foodstuffs, deteriorating quarantine regulations or monitoring of ports, having a public road through a property or being adjoined to a stock route or National Park, international tourists, illegal immigrants and terrorism. As Slovic (1991) noted, public attitudes reflect legitimate concerns that are often overlooked by policy makers and consequently, risk communication efforts are likely to fail unless they are structured as a two way process. Thus, future extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity may need to address these particular concerns raised by producers. In the third study, case-studies of four rural communities evaluated biosecurity preparedness at the local community level. Social impact analyses and focus groups with residents assessed the extent of the social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon their local community. The social impact analyses emphasised the diversity amongst small rural communities in the nature and degree of likely social impact from an emergency disease outbreak. A community’s experience and resilience to crisis will be dependent upon its unique geographic, economic, and social profile, degree of social cohesion, effectiveness of community leadership and history of overcoming crises. Understanding of these differences at the small community level will be important in planning for recovery. The study did find that all four communities are likely to experience a similar lack of alternative job opportunities for displaced workers from agricultural and associated industries with a subsequent loss of people and skills from the community as workers opt to leave in search of work. The focus groups conducted with residents of the four case-study communities produced some important considerations for biosecurity management planning. These included the need to place EAD epidemics on the agendas of a variety of community organisations to enhance preparedness and raise awareness of the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak. In many instances, this will merely require an extension of existing disaster management plans. Furthermore, Local Community Disaster Management Exercises should involve local farmers, owners of associated agricultural industries, service providers and other relevant stakeholders to enhance awareness and preparedness across all sectors of the community. Local Emergency Management Committees need to work towards consistency in biosecurity preparedness across Local Government Areas. Communication between government and local communities in the event of a disease outbreak was an important consideration. Local communities should be contacted at first sign of a disease outbreak and be provided with as much information as they require. Information must easy to access, reliable, transparent, and consistent. Communities should be consulted by an Emergency Control Centre as to how they would prefer to be informed in the event of a disease outbreak. A Media Plan attached to a Community Disaster Management Plan would enable the effective flow of information between government agencies and local communities and disseminate information that is locally relevant through a variety of mediums but originating from a primary source. Emergency hotlines would be more effective if they initiate calls to people to check on their welfare rather than wait for contact from

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the public. There is a need to educate the public on the implications of not reporting cases of diseased stock. Finally, communities need to explore options for community-based projects to sustain a displaced workforce throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries to prevent the potential loss of people and skills from the community. Community recovery preparedness will be enhanced if existing community support networks remain available to provide support in the event of a disease outbreak. Alternatively, self-help groups should be encouraged. Support networks for families of emergency workers will also need to be established. However, recovery programs and policies will need to account for the diversity in the experience and coping ability of individual communities for an EAD outbreak.

7.2 Implications of the findings The findings of this study have implications for the education of farmers and rural communities and for national and local community planing for biosecurity preparedness. The study has shown that Australian farmers, those involved in associated agricultural industries, veterinarians and advisors to the agricultural industries are very aware of the possible implications of an EAD outbreak in Australia and are most concerned about the possibility of such an event occurring. However, it appears that amongst farmers, this concern does not necessarily translate to being proactive about biosecurity strategies on farms. Australian farmers’ attitudes towards biosecurity are similar in many respects to British farmers who appear to be somewhat complacent about biosecurity despite their recent experience of the devastating FMD outbreak. Consequently, it may be expecting much of Australian producers to be vigilant about a risk they have no familiarity with. However, the survey of farmers revealed that those producers who perceived the risk of an EAD as controllable were more likely to have instigated biosecurity strategies on their farms. As Slovic (1991) notes, uncertainty about risks can increase anxiety. Individuals may try to reduce anxiety by denying the uncertainty, making the risk seem so small that it can be ignored or so large that it must be avoided. Effective communication of the risk of an EAD outbreak will need to take account of these social values that underlie people’s perceptions (Slovic 1991). Consequently, farmers’ perceptions about the controllability of an EAD will need to be modified to encourage them to learn and prepare for a potential EAD outbreak. It is suggested that future policies and programs focus upon the practical strategies that can be applied to farms to provide farmers with a greater sense of control of the potential risk of disease. As farmers themselves requested, what they would like is a one-page of information on what to look for and what to do in the event of an EAD. It is suggested that future extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity seek to address the particular concerns of producers about potential risks for disease. Producers’ perceived risks identified within the present study included feral pigs or goats particularly on large outback properties, neighbours who import animals or semen or who have a high turnover of stock, having a public road through a property or being adjoined to a stock route or National Park and imported products or foodstuffs. By addressing these concerns with practical advice and information, farmers may more readily accept biosecurity concepts. Farmers will be most receptive to educational programs and information generally about EAD’s that is disseminated through radio, newspaper and flyers sent in the mail. However, in the event of a disease outbreak, there is a need for disease control response plans to recognise that it will be local vets or agricultural advisors that farmers will depend upon for advice and information. Furthermore, it will be important for local communities to be consulted as to how they would like information delivered. The findings suggest that biosecurity on farms and within whole communities will be improved by a higher level of involvement of producers and other interested groups in risk assessment and

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biosecurity planning which will lead to higher levels of communication and information exchange between all parties. This may also lead to a greater understanding and compliance with biosecurity by farmers. This is occurring in Tasmania where the State Department of Primary Industry and several local governments have organised a series of EAD workshops that are designed specifically to step local community leaders through the issues and challenges they may confront if there were to be an EAD outbreak. The aim of the workshops and follow up sessions is to ensure that local community leaders have an understanding of how a Local Community Disaster Management Committee operates and the ways they and the committees can work together to provide an effective response to a disease outbreak (DPIWE 2004). Greater emphasis on the social impacts of an EAD outbreak for individuals and communities may provide them with a heightened sense of reality of biosecurity preparedness. Finally, the study has consistently found that rural communities are not homogeneous and consequently, control and recovery programs will need to take account of the fact that each community’s response and recovery process in the event of an EAD will differ greatly.

7.3 Further research The research has highlighted some key issues that require further investigation. First there is a need to conduct a review of the types of practices and support services used in the FMD outbreak in the UK that proved to be successful in breaking down the self-imposed social isolation of the British farmers and encouraging them to seek support. It is likely that Australian farmers will react in a similar way when confronted with such a crisis and may respond to the same types of support programs. Gathering information on what did and did not work in the welfare response to the UK epidemic may assist in Australia’s preparedness. Second, the study found that traditional churches are declining in rural communities and consequently, traditional means of social welfare supports may also have declined. While non-traditional churches are emerging in some communities, further research is necessary to establish how these social changes will impact upon the ability of communities to respond to crises. Third, there may be a need to review the process of disseminating financial aid to people in crisis. While well-known and trusted agencies such as the Salvation Army Red Cross and the Country Women’s Association have shown to be the most accepted and effective vehicles for delivering aid within rural communities, some groups have found the experience of determining the deservingness of their neighbours most difficult. Other alternatives, such as providing support for local businesses, should be explored.

7.5 Conclusion It is clear that an EAD outbreak in Australia will result in significant social impacts for rural communities. What is not clear is the nature and extent of these social impacts upon individuals and the communities in which they reside. There will be diversity in the way individuals experience, respond and cope with the crisis and this diversity will be reflected in the way communities’ experience, respond and cope. There is a need to raise awareness across rural Australia about the potential social impact of emergency animal diseases and encourage community leaders and various community organisations to consider the issue and revise their disaster management and community recovery plans accordingly towards enhancing the level of biosecurity preparedness across the country.

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7.6 Recommendations The following recommendations have been drawn from the findings of this study. ♦ Recommendation 1

That local government Emergency Management Committees hold exercises that incorporate interested parties across the community, particularly farmers, representatives from other agricultural industries, small business owners and representatives of support services.

♦ Recommendation 2 That Education Departments in each State update their Disaster Management Plans for schools to include procedures for a response to an EAD outbreak in consultation with Animal Health Australia and in accordance with AUSVETPLAN.

♦ Recommendation 3 That national, state and community hotlines established for emergencies consider providing a proactive service of calling people within the district to check on their welfare rather than waiting for people to call them. Furthermore, that consideration regarding privacy and confidentiality be resolved to enable the establishment of a database of information on farmers within a community, which can be used by a call centre in an emergency.

♦ Recommendation 4 That a wide range of community organisations be encouraged to consider biosecurity preparedness to raise awareness of the potential social impact of a disease outbreak across communities. In many instances, this will merely require an extension of existing disaster plans.

♦ Recommendation 5

That Local Emergency Management Committees be encouraged to seek a level of consistency in preparedness to ensure general biosecurity strategies are equally established across Local Government Areas.

♦ Recommendation 6

That Shire Councils be encouraged to explore options for community-based projects to sustain a displaced workforce throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries in the aftermath of an EAD to address the potential loss of people and skills from a community.

♦ Recommendation 7

That in the event of an EAD, that communities be consulted by an Emergency Control Centre as to how they would prefer to receive information in the event of a disease outbreak.

♦ Recommendation 8

That Shire Councils be encouraged to establish a Media Plan attached to a Disaster Management Plan to enable the effective flow of information between government agencies and local communities and disseminate information that is locally relevant through a variety of mediums but originating from a primary source.

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♦ Recommendation 9 That future extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity address the particular concerns of producers about the risk of and EAD. Ongoing consultation with producers to understand their perceived risks for disease and the addressing these concerns with practical advice and information, may encourage farmers to be more attentive to biosecurity plans.

♦ Recommendation 10

That response and recovery programs and policies take into account the diversity in the experience and coping ability of individual communities.

♦ Recommendation 11

That advice and policy guidelines regarding the need to report knowledge of unreported disease outbreaks be made available to counsellors, general practitioners and other service personnel who may be confronted with the dilemma of breaking the confidentiality of a client.

♦ Recommendation 12

That the Industry Liaison Officer program be encouraged for various groups (including farmers) to encourage awareness and facilitate the flow of information between government and the community.

♦ Recommendation 13 That existing community support networks be sustained to provide support in the event of a disease outbreak. Furthermore, that self-help groups be encouraged within a community should an outbreak occur.

♦ Recommendation 14

That support networks for families of emergency workers be established as part of disaster management control and recovery plans.

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Appendix 1

Emergency Management Information Sessions

A Presentation by

Kevin Cooper Leader Animal Plant & Fish Health Emergency

Preparedness & Response NSW DPI

Casino and Roma, November 2004

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1: Introduction

Kevin Cooper is the Leader of Emergency Preparedness and Response with the NSW Department of Primary Industries. He is arguably the most competent and experienced Local Animal Disease Control Centre Manager in Australia. He has a wealth of experience in Control Centres in Emergency Animal Diseases and fire-fighting. He was the only Australian to manage a Local Disease Control Centre in the United Kingdom Foot-and-Mouth outbreak in 2001. He also managed the control of the outbreak of Newcastle Disease in poultry at Mangrove Mountain on the Central Coast of New South Wales. The following summarises Kevin Cooper’s presentation to the workshops in Casino and Roma in November 2004.

Figure 1: Kevin Cooper (left) and Mr David Steller (Armidale Local Emergency Committee) at the

Armidale EAD exercise.

I will talk about two specific experiences in today’s session. One is my

experience in the United Kingdom with FMD outbreak, and the other is at Mangrove Mountain, where we responded to an outbreak of Newcastle Disease in poultry.

Kevin Cooper

Emergency Animal Diseases (EAD’s) have the potential to cause major economic and social consequences through serious international trade losses, national market disruptions and severe production in the livestock industries that are involved. EAD’s also affect non-farming industries, exports, tourism and general community and social activities. As part of the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, a National AUSVETPLAN has been formulated, which is available on the Internet from the Australian Animal Health Council website and consists of 68 volumes. AUSVETPLAN is a series of technical response plans that describe the proposed Australian approach to an emergency animal disease occurrence. There are currently around 66 emergency animal diseases that would have a severe impact upon Australia. Most of the disease events that have occurred in Australia in the past ten years have been home grown viruses—not imported. For instance, the Lyssa virus was identified in a black flying fox in Australia in 1996, and was subsequently found in other bat species in Australia. The Hendra virus first appeared in Brisbane in 1994, which resulted in the death of a horse trainer and 13 of the racehorses he trained; and the Menangle virus, which is a paramyxovirus virus in pigs, which infected two people in 1998.

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2: Current Risks 2.1 Avian influenza (Bird Flu) Avian influenza is an infectious disease of birds caused by Type-A strains of the influenza virus. There was extensive media coverage of Bird Flu outbreaks in Asia in 2004, whereas there were few reports of the disease in The Netherlands. One hundred million chickens were slaughtered in The Netherlands, 92 of the workers involved in the response were infected and one veterinarian died. One thousand producers were infected in this outbreak. Australia is the only continent in the last twelve months not to have had strains of Bird Flu that have affected other countries. To put this in perspective, between 1975 and 1995, Australia had the second highest incidence of Bird Flu in the world, second to the UK. We have had five disease events in 12 years.

2.2 BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy—Mad Cow Disease) BSE is a progressive neurological disorder of cattle. BSE cost the Canadian industry $1.1 billion (Canadian) in the first three months after detection. Canada is the third largest exporter of beef products in the world (15% of world business). Australia is the largest exporter of beef products (23% of world business). Canadian beef exports were worth $4.1 billion (Canadian) in the year before BSE was diagnosed in a single cow in May 2004, and by late June, the value of beef exports from Canada was almost zero. All Canadian states were affected, even though BSE was only diagnosed in a single animal in one state. One interesting fact is that Canada is the only country in the world where the consumption of red meat per capita increased during the disease event, whereas all other countries that were affected by BSE significantly reduced their per capita consumption of red meat.

3: What Happens when an Emergency Animal Disease Comes to Town? Most people have had some experience with fire, flood or tempest emergencies; if not first hand, they are aware of these common crises in Australia via the media. What sets those emergencies apart from emergency animal diseases, or plant or fish diseases?

Time-frame. Emergency animal diseases often persist for months.

Floods and fires are more obvious. When diseases cannot be seen and are not as evident, it often contributes to the paranoia in the wider community and across the country.

There is very little experience within the local community. Most people in the broader community have had some involvement with a flood or bushfire, or have witnessed them on television, and they have some sense of it. With emergency animal or plant diseases, there is little experience within the Australian community.

Nature of the emergency. When there is a fire, flood or tempest, initially a single person is affected, followed by the community, which works together—then it might be a region or a district. The approach to the event is usually ‘bottom up’. Conversely, an emergency disease

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is of national interest because it affects our export industry. Seventy-five per cent of red meat that Australia produces is exported. Thus the response is ‘top down’. All major decisions are made at the National level. How do you relate a decision that has been made nationally to a local community?

The first step involved in an animal disease emergency is to locate the disease quickly. Often, a farmer contacts a veterinarian with a suspected problem, and a diagnostic team is sent to the property to collect samples, which are then sent to an animal health laboratory for diagnosis. The property is then quarantined and there will be either a NSW Department of Primary Industry vehicle or Rural Lands Protection Board (RLPB) vehicle located at the main entrance to the property. This is the first sign to the community that there is a problem. In the case with FMD; for example, a diagnosis can be made in less than 24 hours, from the time the sample is collected to the time of a diagnosis. If the test is positive, the livestock are then valued, destroyed and disposed of. The property will then be cleaned up. There are two decontamination cycles, normally separated by 21 days. Eventually, the property will be restocked. 3.2 Timeline The timeline from start to finish for a single case of an exotic disease, optimistically, is six months. More typically, for multiple cases, the first case might take 24 hours. Subsequent cases will take less than an hour to diagnose if veterinarians go with clinical diagnosis. Destruction could take six hours per 100 head of livestock.

4: Response Actions 4.1 Mangrove Mountain The Newcastle Disease outbreak at Mangrove Mountain occurred on 1 April and was brought under control by 23 July 1999. Newcastle Disease is a highly-contagious, generalised viral disease of domestic poultry, cage and aviary birds, and wild birds. This was the largest disease event of its kind in Australia. This disease was not imported; it was a mutation of a virus that has been in Australia since 1966. A single case of Newcastle Disease was confirmed on 1 April. A Control Centre and a Staging Area were immediately established. Security gates were installed to control movement of animals and animal by-products. Decontamination pits were constructed, and destruction and disposal of animals began.

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Figure 2. Local Disease Control Centre—Gosford Rural Fire Control Centre.

The multi-agency response of 44 various agencies, which included: ● NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service ● NSW Environmental Protection Agency ● NSW Forestry ● Queensland Department of Primary Industries ● Australian Quarantine Inspection Service ● Queensland Fire and Rescue and SES ● NSW Department of Public Works and Services ● Gosford and Wyong Councils ● Rural Lands Protection Boards ● NSW Rural Fire Services ● NSW Fire Brigades ● NSW Police ● Royal Australian Airforce and Navy ● Dept of Corrective Services. The large-scale operations in the area lasted over four months, involving a total of 5000 emergency response personnel, which peaked at 1000 people per day, with 800 working in the field. Of the people involved in the EAD, 90% were not trained for the work they were doing. There were 500 contracted companies involved, which supplied everything from port-a-loos, to waste bins, to 3500 meals, and laundering of 9000 garments each day that were handled as infectious. Personnel involved in the EAD were briefed daily at the Local Disease Control Centre each morning so that information that was delivered was timely and accurate.

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Figure 3. Aerial view of the forward staging area at that was erected at the Central Coast Soaring Club, which serviced 600 workers at the beginning and end of each shift for two

months.

An important objective during an EAD is public awareness and relations. At Mangrove Mountain, 15 personnel were employed full-time to assist with public relations to ensure there was support for the operation and that the community was kept informed. Personnel were involved in a wide range of activities, which included notification of adjoining neighbours each time veterinarians were sent to a property to destroy animals.

Figure 4: Media Officer NSW Ag, & PR NPWS keep the community informed.

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4.2 Response actions—United Kingdom Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is an acute, highly-contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals. FMD was identified in the UK on 20 February 2001. The UK engaged 20 000 people to assist with the FMD outbreak. Of the personnel involved, 4% were trained for the work they carried out.

5: In the Beginning Until July in North Yorkshire, there had been no disease problem. From Yorkshire, the nearest outbreak was 50 miles away. On 4 July, one Yorkshire farmer received a telephone call from a Government veterinarian at 10.30 am, informing him that he was a ‘hot trace’—a movement of stock had linked him with an infected property. The farmer had 200 acres of wheat and 45 heifers. The veterinarian arrived on his property at 11.30 am, and at 12.30 pm, began killing his stock. At 6.30 pm that evening, the job was completed. The Government had directed that all infected animals be killed within 24 hours. The military was brought in to expedite the process.

6: When the Government has gone 6.1 Isolation and loneliness Figure 6: Quarantine sign that were

placed on the entrances to farms during the FMD outbreak.

What was it like for the farmer the next day, and the ensuing days? When he arose the next morning, his daily routine was gone—he had no direction, no purpose. There were mixed emotions—loss of control, grief, anger, and relief. The quarantine sign on his gate advertised that his was an Infected Premise (IP). The family became isolated. His children were harassed at school. Their older daughter cancelled her wedding even though there was no legal requirement to do so.

Figure 5: Two of the first farmers affected by FMD outbreak in the Yorkshire area.

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6.2 Compensation and restocking Often, the first questions that farmers ask are: ‘When do I get my money for compensation?’ and ‘When can I restock?’ In the UK, compensation was provided within two weeks from the European Union. In contrast, compensation at Mangrove Mountain took more than six months. Restocking is dependent upon confirmation that the last case of FMD has been controlled. The average time to restock in the UK after FMD was nine months. In Australia, there is a cost-sharing arrangement for compensation. The Commonwealth Government pays 50%, The State Government pays on a pro-rata basis and the Industry pays up to 1% of gross value of product.

Figure 7: Destruction and decontamination of infected animals.

Farmers are compensated for the market value of livestock at the time of destruction and any livestock products. Recent changes to the legislation state that when farmers are ready to restock, if the value of the livestock is greater, they can be compensated for the difference between the two. There is no compensation available for consequential losses of a disease outbreak.

In the UK, the farmers whose stock were not culled but were nevertheless restricted by the control measures in their district experienced more difficulties than those whose stock were culled and were compensated for their losses. Once a property was declared an IP, movement restrictions applied to all properties within a minimum of three km. The 139 000 farms in designated Infected Areas were subject to tight restrictions for nine months, which prevented movement of animals except for slaughter. Farmers received no compensation for difficulties experienced. There were also animal welfare issues to consider. For instance, in intensive farming operations; for example a piggery, the number of stock increased daily. The UK provides compensation for destruction on animal welfare grounds; Australia does not.

Figure 8: Roadside signs were put in place to limit the movement of animals and animal

by-products.

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7: One Farm becomes Many 7.1 Movement restrictions

In Mangrove Mountain, farmers could not leave to go to town without going through a roadside checkpoint, which was in place around the clock. While it was difficult for the community, bear a thought for the person who had to stop cars at 2.00 am and ask if the driver was carrying any chicken products etc.

Figure 9: Security checkpoint at Mangrove Mountain.

7.2 Adjoining properties affected Contiguous properties in the UK for FMD and properties for dangerous contact in Australia will be slaughtered out automatically. This increases the isolation of families. The UK had a particularly strong regulatory approach. Part of their strategy was to have Police on milk tankers, to make sure where it could go, when to go, and how it should go. Police could issue infringement notices to farmers for not making up a disinfectant footbath daily at the front gate.

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7.3 Information On the producer and community side, there was passive delivery of options and lack of information. Information was delivered via the Internet. The names and addresses of all 2006 IP’s in the UK were available on the Internet; however, information at a community or producer level was very poor. It was not timely, was late and incomplete. 7.4 Farmer suicides In the first three months of the FMD outbreak in Yorkshire, the coroner investigated and found that thee out of four suicides were directly linked to FMD. A report written 15 months later identified that the teenage suicide rate was much higher, with 15 suicides related to FMD.

8: From One to Many

Figure 10: Aerial view of the properties affected at Mangrove Mountain.

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Other incidences at Mangrove Mountain that provides a sense of the magnitude of the situation were: A family from China, who operated a King Pigeon export breeding business, were on an

immigration visa that was dependent upon them establishing a successful business operation within two years. Their birds were killed six weeks before their first export.

On a duck farm that was declared an infected premise, the caretaker—who only spoke

Chinese—had a heart attack at the front gate of the farm. The security guard on the checkpoint that day spoke English and Italian.

Another couple living on an old piggery was approached to have a disposal site excavated on

their private land. After negotiation, the hole was completed within seven working days, with people working 18 hours a day. This severely impacted upon the lives of neighbouring farmers. The excavation held 45 shipping containers of bird carcasses stacked two-high and covered with nine metres of fill.

A poultry farmer, who had been operating for less than two years, had all his stock culled. His

chicken sheds which were 200 m long, presented another challenge for the emergency crews moving into the sheds to catch the chickens.

Figure 11. Personnel carrying out the distressing task of catching chickens

to be euthanased.

Figure 12: Destruction of chickens using carbon monoxide.

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Dust from the large disposal sites drifted to a neighbouring market gardening operation that

supplied large supermarket outlets. Tests on the produce found that dust exceeded recommended levels of residues of fruit and vegetables.

On a brand-new farm, which cost $1.2 million for construction, chickens were destroyed at 18 days of age, and the property was not restocked for 7.5 months.

On another property, three generations of one family lived on an egg-producing farm, which

had 7000 birds. Children delivered eggs after school.

The Maitland Correctional Centre supplied 130 prisoners each day to assist the response. When two prisoners were released some time later, they were responsible for a theft at one farm they worked on.

Figure 13: Decontamination of infected broiler sheds.

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Figure 14: Decontamination Pit 3–Pre-excavation. Pit site is the centre top of the photo. Pit size equals one soccer field.

Figure 15: Commencement of construction of Decontamination Pit 3.

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Figure 16: Construction and lining of Decontamination Pit 3.

Figure 17: Construction Pit 3 operations.

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Figure 18: Decontamination Pit 3 closed.

9: From Part to Most 9.1 Community divides The community divided in every way imaginable. The movement restrictions placed on the properties were the regulatory Government’s restrictions; however, in our experience, the community enforces its own movement restrictions. One of my first experiences of community sentiment was at Mangrove Mountain, where a lady from a property, which had just been declared an IP, asked me to get her some milk, and I naïvely asked why. The community had already made up its mind if she left her farm, she would infect the rest of community, and so she didn’t go anywhere. At Mangrove Mountain, a mother, father and son were isolated on three separate properties. We were trying to bring them together, but were blamed for their isolation. It was the industry, and the community generally, that forced their isolation out of fear. The first business to collapse was the childcare centre. Parents removed their children from the centre for a variety of reasons.

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9.2 Business downturn The impacts were felt by businesses across the country, not just in rural areas or areas of active disease —although it was most severe in those areas. In the early stages, hotels and other tourism-dependent businesses almost everywhere were affected by the fall in visitors. In Mangrove Mountain, a junior netball competition was cancelled over the long weekend, which in turn adversely affected the 14 motels/hotel in the area. 9.3 Environmental issues Environmental factors were also an issue. There were issues with water tables, for instance. In Mangrove Mountain, 1.1 million litres disinfectant was collected; this was 95% of the disinfectant that was made up for use. In the UK, none was collected.

10: Across the UK The UK Government’s priority was to control, then eradicate, the disease. However, at an early stage in the outbreak, it became clear that the measures put in place to control it were having a major impact on activities other than livestock farming, notably countryside recreation and inbound overseas tourism. 10.1 Countryside closed Footpaths across the country were closed. Fourteen percent of UK farmers were affected by the FMD outbreak. 10.2 Agribusiness collapsed Follow-on effects for the UK agricultural supply sector included a decline in sales, livestock market closures and loss of business to livestock transporters. Estimates of the impact of FMD suggest whole economy losses for the UK in 2001 ranged from 0.2% of GDP to 0.8% of GDP (£1.6 billion to £6.3 billion). 10.3 Other business affected Agriculture in the UK is a small industry compared with tourism. The impact on tourism was significant. The tourism industry suffered a loss of £150 million per day; agriculture was £20 million per day. Other industries were affected by the down-turn in agriculture. The loss to the National economy during the 12 months of the outbreak was £6.3 billion, which equals 0.8% of GDP (the UK economy is not very reliant on livestock industries as they are net importers.)

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Some of the areas worst affected by the disease are also particularly dependent on countryside tourism, notably the Lakes District. There, a canoe business in February of that year was worth £200 000. When it was sold in August, it was worth £2000. A maggot-breeding industry for fly-fishing was worth £250 000 a week. When all footpaths were closed, access to fly-fishing points were also closed, which resulted in the collapse of the business. In EAD’s, it is important that social and sporting activities are maintained so the community is able to come together for stress relief and for communication. Often however, these activities cease due to paranoia about spread of the disease and normal networking within the community is lost. In Penrith, there were 6 pubs; in two months, only one remained open. Also, church groups ceased activities through paranoia about disease.

11: What of the ‘Rescuers?’ As part of my involvement in bushfire management, most people are very pleased to see me when I arrive; whereas, when there is an emergency disease outbreak, people are not pleased to see me. The EAD workforce was just as focused as any other rescue workers. Almost all workers are temporary; they were living away from home and family. Many people involved in the UK effort lived for in hotels for 14 months. 11.1 Focus on disease control At Mangrove Mountain, although we strived to provide human support services through the Council and local community support workers, they were under-resourced. 11.2 Health and safety Health and safety was a big issue. In Mangrove Mountain, 1140 injuries occurred amongst the personnel who assisted in the operation. One third of these injuries involved foreign matter in eye. Out of that third, six workers were not wearing eye protection that was supplied. There were 12 transports to hospital. Six others were overcome by carbon dioxide that was used to kill the chickens. These incidences were the result of lapses in training protocol.

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Figure 19: Human health protected during destruction of birds.

In the UK, the disease incidence that occurred in personnel involved was unexpected. Some military personnel had contracted Leptospira and Q-fever—these people do not normally get exposed to those agents, so they don’t normally have measures in place in disposal sites. Mental health was also big issue. Up to February 2004, two people were still receiving support. 11.3 Preparedness and Support Part of the focus of disease control was whether workers were really ready to cope for the situation they are going into. In the UK, workers were involved in a one-hour trauma management course. Veterinarians understood there was a trauma response curve; eg, farmers could get physical when their stock were destroyed. The veterinary profession spend most of their careers trying to keep animals alive; in the UK and Mangrove Mountain, they were doing the opposite.

12: Local Growth Industries The logistics of a large-scale operation during an EAD are enormous. One positive outcome was that local economies were boosted during the operation, particularly in the transport and machinery industries, meals and accommodation and personnel provided for operations.

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Examples of services provided by agencies included: Erection of 200+ roadside signs Multi-agency response of 44 Railway sleepers 60,000+ Soil moved >100,000 cubic meters Water transported 14 million litres Task requests 3000 Recording of Entries-on-Duty

>2768 Meals peaked at 2780/day for 3

weeks Imported disinfectant of 12 tonnes Shorts/T-shirts 8,500.

Figure 20: Machinery for litter disposal.

13: Consequences of an EAD 13.1 Emotional loss exceeds economic loss Ten per cent of the Australian poultry industry was located in Mangrove Mountain. There were 72 farms involved with 2300 households affected. Every family in the community was affected. There were 2.1 million chickens and 2176 backyard birds destroyed, which resulted in a $55 million financial loss in three months. In the UK, the impact of FMD on the UK’s economy in 2001 was 0.5% of the UK’s GDP— £4.1 billion. Tourism lost £3 billion in 2001, while the Agriculture industry lost £2.4 billion in 2001. Operational Costs were £5 billion. The total cost of FMD compensation to farmers for slaughtered livestock was £1.2 billion. However, the emotional loss was greater than the economic loss. Many UK farmers took photos of individual animals before their destruction. Over 5.5 million animals were compulsorily slaughtered on 9515 farms.

Figure 21. The emotional loss as a result of compulsory slaughter on farms had a significant

impact on the farmers and the community.

There was very little local community and charity support. Support was often started by Churches. Where support did exist, volunteer networks; e.g. the Good Samaritans were effective. In Australia, community support is administered from established charities. In NSW alone, there are nearly 200 agencies. The challenge for community groups is to work together towards the same goals.

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13.2 Skills/training What happens when people leave a community and skills are lost due to a downturn in the local economy? How can a community keep people in the local area? Communities need to find reasons to keep people in the area. In Mangrove Mountain, we recruited enough people in the local community to sustain local skills and training. For example, the abattoir workforce from Scone, Blayney, Macksville and Eden was recruited for two months to assist with operations. These abattoirs had closed and personnel were available for work, and worked in an environment that was familiar to them. 13.3 Petty crime Petty crime increased during EAD’s. At Mangrove Mountain, first-aid kits were frequently stolen as they could not be locked down for safety reasons. Also, people wore their own clothes to work, and wore home the clothes supplied, so it was a challenge to maintain the supplies of clothing. In the UK, a study was undertaken by the UK National Audit Office on petty crime. The ensuing report did not distinguish between the community and the workforce, as petty crime and fraud was prevalent in both. Although people expect things to above-board, petty crime and fraud is big business as a lot of money is turned over. In the UK during the FMD outbreak, it was law to have a portable tank of disinfectant at the front gate of IP’s. On one property alone, replacement tanks were stolen 3 times in 4 months. In the UK, 160 burial sites were excavated and were re-buried in the following twelve months. In the process, a header was excavated from a farm where a farmer had claimed compensation.

14: Economic Measures Economic measures were put in place to assist communities during and after EAD’s, as recovery was dependent on agricultural restructuring, skill and resource retention. During the EAD in Mangrove Mountain, bank support for affected properties and business was widespread. Banks were unable to sell affected properties, and therefore, worked with the response team. There was low-uptake on loan guarantee. As in the UK, there was no significant increase in the uptake of Social Security. Although social security was provided, the uptake was low. As in the UK, women were much better at finding other things to do, both paid and unpaid work, whereas men were less adept at establishing a new routine. Restructure of the agricultural industry in the UK saw the implementation of a Rural Development Program that incorporated a 7-year recovery program for the UK. Rate devalue and Tax relief, Business Recovery Funds were provided and charity funds were matched by the Government. A Business Advice Service was also provided. It was into the third month of the EAD in the UK that business advice could be obtained. IP’s received compensation and unlimited advice, whereas the 139,000 properties that were affected by movement restrictions only received three days to access advice. Initially, £78 million was allocated in the first month for business recovery, which was all targeted at the industries that were already receiving compensation. It took some time before it was realised that the money was better allocated elsewhere to other industries.

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15: Contact Details for Kevin Cooper Phone: (02) 4640 6467 Mobile: 0412 139 267 Fax: (02) 4640 6300 Email: kevin.cooper@agric.nsw.gov.au

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Appendix 2: 2001 Census Profile for Case-study Communities

ARMIDALE-DUMARESQ, NSW Table 5.3.1: Age Structure. No. % 0 to 4 1469 6.28 5 to 17 5013 21.43 18 to 24 3876 16.57 25 to 34 2770 11.84 35 to 49 4824 20.62 50 to 59 1996 8.53 60 to 69 1585 6.77 70 to 84 1518 6.49 85 and over 346 1.5 Total 23397

Table 5.3.2: Age Structure: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. No. % 15 to 19 48 5.8 20 to 24 57 6.9 25 to 34 125 15.17 35 to 44 173 20.99 45 to 54 172 20.87 55 to 64 156 18.93 65 and over 93 11.29 Total 824 Table 5.3.3: Highest qualification obtained. No. % Postgraduate Degree 894 4.76 Graduate Diploma or Certificate

421 2.24

Bachelor Degree 2046 10.89 Advanced Diploma and Diploma

1053 5.6

Certificate level 2669 14.21 Not applicable 9877 52.59 Not stated 1822 9.7 Total 18782

Table 5.3.4: Labour Force Profile.

No % Full-time 5892 60.31 Part-time 3639 37.25 Employed—not stated 239 2.45 Total employed 9770 Unemployed 967 9.0 Total labour force 10737 Not in labour force 7517

Table 5.3.5: Tenure. No. % Fully owned 3195 37.9 Being purchased 1755 20.82 Rented—Government 423 5.02 Rented—Private and other rental type

2537 30.09

Other tenure type 252 29.89 Not stated 268 31.8 Total 8430

Table 5.3.6: Employment by Industry. No. % Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing

824 8.43

Mining 93 .95 Manufacturing 334 3.42 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply

42 .43

Construction 469 4.8 Wholesale Trade 295 3.02 Retail Trade 1469 15.04 Accommodation, Cafes, Restaurants

712 7.29

Transport and Storage 212 2.17 Communication Services 118 1.21 Finance and Insurance 191 1.95 Property and Business Services

805 8.24

Government Admin. and Defence

406 4.16

Education 1942 19.88 Health and Community Services

1116 11.42

Cultural and Recreational Services

199 2.04

Personal and Other Services 371 3.8 Non-classifiable* / not stated 172 1.76 Total 9770

Table 5.3.7: Other Skills.

No. % Natural and Physical Sciences 500 2.66 Information Technology 139 0.74 Engineering and Related Technologies 921 4.90 Architecture and Building 469 2.50 Agriculture, Environmental & Related Studies

462 2.46

Health 820 4.37 Education 1000 5.32 Management and Commerce 1312 6.99 Society and Culture 1205 6.42 Creative Arts 262 1.39 Food, Hospitality and Personal Services

329 1.75

Mixed Field Programs 6 0.03 Field of Study inadequately described 112 0.60 Not stated 1369 7.29 Not applicable(b) 9877 52.58 Total 18783

Sources of Information ABS, 2001.

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CASINO (RICHMOND VALLEY SHIRE)

Table 5.4.1: Comparative Age Structure. No. % 0 to 4 1404 6.91 5 to 17 4232 20.82 18 to 24 1297 6.38 25 to 34 2162 10.64 35 to 49 4305 21.18 50 to 59 2318 11.40 60 to 69 2040 10.04 70 to 84 2201 10.83 85 and over 367 1.81 Total 20326

Table 5.4.2: Age Structure Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. No. % 15 to 19 22 2.90 20 to 24 38 5.01 25 to 34 106 13.98 35 to 44 163 21.50 45 to 54 168 22.16 55 to 64 139 18.34 65 and over 122 16.09 Total 758

Table 5.5.3: Highest qualification obtained. No % Postgraduate Degree 84 0.54 Graduate Diploma or Certificate 88 0.57 Bachelor Degree 574 3.69 Advanced Diploma and Diploma 542 3.48 Certificate level 2379 15.30 Not applicable 10004 12.11 Not stated 1883 64.32 Total 15554 Table 5.4.4: Labour Force Profile. No. % Employed: Full-time

4176

61.64

Part-time 2325 34.32 Employed—not stated 274 4.0 Total employed 6775 Unemployed 972 12.5 Total labour force 7747 Not in labour force 7164

Table 5.4.5: Tenure. No. % Fully owned 3564 45.12 Being purchased 1693 21.43 Rented—Government 310 3.92 Rented—Private and other rental type 1719

21.76

Other tenure type 287 3.63 Not stated 326 4.13 Total 7899

Table 5.4.6: Employment by Industry. No. % Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 758 11.17 Mining 15 0.22 Manufacturing 976 14.38 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 28 0.41 Construction 369 5.44 Wholesale Trade 426 6.28 Retail Trade 1042 15.36 Accommodation, Cafes, Restaurants

351 5.17

Transport and Storage 265 3.91 Communication Services 116 1.71 Finance and Insurance 122 1.80 Property and Business Services 341 5.03 Government Admin. and Defence 289 4.26 Education 453 6.68 Health and Community Services 706 10.41 Cultural and Recreational Services

110 1.62

Personal and Other Services 222 3.27 Non-classifiable* and not stated 38 0.56 Total 6785

Table 5.4.7: Other Skills.

No. % Natural and Physical Sciences 69 0.44 Information Technology 37 0.24 Engineering and Related Technologies 1039 6.68 Architecture and Building 383 2.46 Agriculture, Environmental & Related Studies 167 1.07 Health 561 3.61 Education 404 2.60 Management and Commerce 670 4.31 Society and Culture 262 1.68 Creative Arts 93 0.60 Food, Hospitality and Personal Services

322 2.07

Mixed Field Programs 7 0.05 Field of Study inadequately described 44 0.28 Not stated 1492 9.59 Not applicable(b) 10004 64.32 Total 15554

Sources of Information ABS, 2001.

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ROMA/Bungil Shire

Table 5.5.1: Comparative Age Structure. No. % 0 to 4 686 8.25 5 to 17 1709 20.56 18 to 24 683 8.22 25 to 34 1267 15.24 35 to 49 1824 21.94 50 to 59 874 10.51 60 to 69 640 7.70 70 to 84 551 6.63 85 and over 80 0.96 Total 8314

Table 5.5.2: Age Structure Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. No. % 15 to 19 11 1.6 20 to 24 27 3.9 25 to 34 139 20.2 35 to 44 128 18.63 45 to 54 137 19.94 55 to 64 135 19.65 65 and over 110 16.01 Total 687

Table 5.5.3: Highest qualification obtained. No % Postgraduate Degree 24 0.38 Graduate Diploma or Certificate 46 0.73 Bachelor Degree 441 7.03 Advanced Diploma and Diploma 270 4.30 Certificate level 909 14.49 Not stated 524 8.35 Not applicable 4061 64.72 Total 6275 Table 5.5.4: Labour Force Profile. No. % Employed: Full-time 2970 69.62 Part-time 1158 27.14 Employed—not stated 138 3.23 Total employed 4266 Unemployed 187 4.20 Total labour force 4453 Not in labour force 1625

Table 5.5.5: Tenure. No. % Fully owned 1254 39.75 Being purchased 672 21.30 Rented—Government 98 3.11 Rented—Private and other rental type

840 26.62

Other tenure type 159 5.04 Not stated 132 4.18 Total 3155 Table 5.5.6: Employment by Industry. No. % Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 687 16.24 Mining 122 2.88 Manufacturing 279 6.59 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 49 1.16 Construction 310 7.33 Wholesale Trade 228 5.39 Retail Trade 626 14.80 Accommodation, Cafes, Restaurants

190 4.49

Transport and Storage 222 5.25 Communication Services 65 1.54 Finance and Insurance 83 1.96 Property and Business Services 209 4.94 Government Admin. and Defence 195 4.61 Education 325 7.68 Health and Community Services 391 9.24 Cultural and Recreational Services 42 0.99 Personal and Other Services 123 2.91 Non-classifiable* and not stated 85 2.01 Total

Table 5.5.7: Other Skills. No. % Natural and Physical Sciences 25 0.40 Information Technology 11 0.18 Engineering and Related Technologies

446 7.11

Architecture and Building 128 2.04 Agriculture, Environmental & Related Studies 122 1.95 Health 273 4.35 Education 232 3.70 Management and Commerce 248 3.96 Society and Culture 118 1.88 Creative Arts 27 0.43 Food, Hospitality and Personal Services

119 1.90

Mixed Field Programs 0 0.00 Field of Study inadequately described 18 0.29 Not stated 441 7.03 Not applicable(b) 4061 64.78 Total 0 Sources of Information ABS, 2001.

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CAMPERDOWN (CORANGAMITE SHIRE) VICTORIA

Table 5.6.1: Comparative Age Structure. No. % 0 to 4 1207 7.3 5 to 17 3471 21.0 18 to 24 998 6.0 25 to 34 1901 11.5 35 to 49 3588 21.7 50 to 59 1998 12.1 60 to 69 1556 9.4 70 to 84 1523 9.2 85 and over 310 1.9 Total 16552

Table 5.6.2: Age Structure Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. No. % 15 to 19 66 2.5 20 to 24 144 5.39 25 to 34 470 17.59 35 to 44 708 26.5 45 to 54 578 21.63 55 to 64 472 17.66 65 and over 234 8.76 Total 2672

Table 5.6.3: Highest qualification obtained. No % Postgraduate Degree 55 0.4 Graduate Diploma or Certificate 111 0.9 Bachelor Degree 688 5.5 Advanced Diploma and Diploma 575 4.6 Certificate level 1876 14.9 Not applicable 7817 62.2 Not stated 1439 11.5 Total 12561 Table 5.6.4: Labour Force Profile. No. % Employed: Full-time

4979

64.6

Part-time 2122 27.5 Employed—not stated 273 3.5 Total employed 7374 95.7 Unemployed 329 4.3 Total labour force 7703 Not in labour force 4343

Table 5.6.5: Tenure. No. % Fully owned 3410 54.2 Being purchased 1295 20.6 Rented—Government 132 2.1 1 Rented–Private and other rental type

804 12.8

Other tenure type 419 6.7 Not stated 235 3.7 Total 6295 Table 5.6.6: Employment by Industry. No. % Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2672 36.16 Mining 32 0.43 Manufacturing 721 9.76 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 33 0.45 Construction 382 5.17 Wholesale Trade 274 3.71 Retail Trade 89 1.20 Accommodation, Cafes, Restaurants

275 3.72

Transport and Storage 228 3.09 Communication Services 68 0.92 Finance and Insurance 65 0.88 Property and Business Services 225 3.05 Government Admin. and Defence 133 1.80 Education 432 5.85 Health and Community Services 633 8.57 Cultural and Recreational Services 82 1.11 Personal and Other Services 154 2.08 Non-classifiable* and not stated 191 2.58 Total 7389 Table 5.6.7: Other Skills.

No. % Natural and Physical Sciences 47 0.37 Information Technology 24 0.19 Engineering and Related Technologies

751 5.98

Architecture and Building 265 2.11 Agriculture, Environmental & Related Studies

511 4.07

Health 551 4.39 Education 463 3.68 Management and Commerce 351 2.79 Society and Culture 193 1.54 Creative Arts 77 0.61 Food, Hospitality and Personal Services

273 2.17

Mixed Field Programs 6 0.05 Field of Study inadequately described 39 0.31 Not stated 1197 9.53 Not applicable(b) 7817 62.21 Total 12565

Sources of Information: ABS 2001.