(02)Civpro - Jurisdiction Part 1

7/21/2019 (02)Civpro - Jurisdiction Part 1

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G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO,petitioner,vs.

WINAI PERMSKUL an T!E !ON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRU",J.:

An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out

as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the

Court is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized under Section 4 of

!.". !l#. $%& in the li#ht of Article '(((, Section $4 of the Constitution.

)n *ay %$, $&+4, the petitioner leased his apartment in *aati to the private

respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of "-,. a month.

"ursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the petitioner

the amount of "&,. to answer for unpaid rentals or any dama#e to the leased

premises ecept when caused by reasonable wear and tear. )n *ay -$, $&+/, the

private respondent vacated the property. 0e thereafter requested the refund of his

deposit minus the sum of "$,., representin# the rental for the additional ten

days of his occupancy after the epiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this

request. 0e said the lessee still owed him for other char#es, includin# the electricity

and water bills and the sum of "%,/. for repaintin# of the leased premises to

restore them to their ori#inal condition.1

The private respondent sued in the *etropolitan Trial Court of *aati. After thesubmission of position papers by the parties, a summary jud#ment was rendered on

)ctober $$, $&+/, sustainin# the complainant and holdin# that the repaintin# was not

char#eable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of

"1,1/., representin# the balance of the deposit after deductin# the water and

electricity char#es. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of "$,%/. as attorney2s

fees, plus the Costs.2

This decision was appealed to the 3e#ional Trial Court of *aati and was affirmed

by ud#e ose C. de la 3ama on anuary $4, $&+1. This was done in a memorandum

decision readin# in full as follows5

*6*)3A789* 86C(S()7

After a careful and thorou#h perusal, evaluation and study of the

records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the

findin#s of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of

the *etropolitan Trial Court of *aati, *etro *anila, !ranch :-

and finds that there is no co#ent reason to disturb the same.

;0636


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elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a hi#her tribunal.


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heard by a fair and responsible ma#istrate before jud#ment is

rendered. (t is this perception, coupled with a clear conscience,

which enables the members of the judiciary to dischar#e the

awesome responsibility of sittin# in jud#ment on their fellowmen.

There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizin# the memorandum

decision is to epedite the termination of liti#ations for the benefit of the parties as

well as the courts themselves.

Concerned with the mountin# problem of delay in the administration of justice, the

Constitution now contains a number of provisions aimed at correctin# this serious

difficulty that has caused much disaffection amon# the people. Thus, Section $: of

the !ill of 3i#hts reiterates the ori#inal provision in the $&1- Constitution

#uaranteein# to all persons the ri#ht to a speedy disposition of their cases before all

judicial, quasi=judicial or administrative bodies. Section $4?%@ of the same Article

((( retains the rule that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that shall not only be

public and impartial but also speedy. (n Article '(((, Section /?-@, the Supreme Court

is epressly permitted to temporarily assi#n a jud#e from one station to another when

the public interest so requires, as when there is a necessity for less occupied jud#e to

help a busier collea#ue dispose of his cases. (n para#raph / of the same section, it is

stressed that the rules of court to be promul#ated by the Supreme Court shall

provide a simplified and inepensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases.

(n Section $/, of the same article, maimum periods are prescribed for the decision

or resolution of cases, to wit, twenty=four months in the case of Supreme Court and,

unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower colle#iate courts

and three months for all other lower courts.

The courts of justice are really hard put at copin# with the tremendous number of

cases in their docets which, to mae matters worse, continues to #row by the daydespite the efforts bein# taen to reduce it. (n the Supreme Court alone, an avera#e

of 4 cases is received every month as a#ainst the avera#e of - cases disposed of

durin# the same month, leavin# a difference of $ cases monthly that is added to

some /, still unresolved cases that have accumulated durin# the last two decades

or so. At this rate, the baclo# will increase by $,% cases every year on top of the

earlier balance, much of which, despite its a#e, is still viable and have still to be

resolved. Considerin# that the Court spends four days of the wee for studyin# and

deliberatin# on these cases in its en bancand division sessions, one can appreciate

the limited time allowed its members for the actual writin# of its decisions. ?This

particular decision, while etended, happens fortunately to be less complicated than

many of the other cases submitted to it, which require more time to write, not to

mention the antecedent research that may have to be made.@

'iewed in the li#ht of these practical considerations, the memorandum decision can

be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealin# epeditiously with the case

load of the courts of justice, !ut epediency alone, no matter how compellin#,

cannot ecuse non=compliance with the Constitution or to put it more familiarly, the

end does not justify the means. (t is plain that if Section 4 of !.". !l#. $%& isunconstitutional, it must be struc down.

(n the case at bar, we find that a jud#ment was made by the metropolitan trial court

in compliance with the rule on summary procedure. The decision consisted of three

typewritten pa#es, sin#le space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law

on which it was based. (t was a concise and well=written decision, and a correct one

to boot, for which ud#e "aciano !. !alita is to be commended.

The problem, thou#h, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirmin# this jud#ment, the

re#ional trial court of *aati rendered a mere memorandum decision that simply

adopted by reference the findin#s of fact and law made by ud#e !alita and then

concluded, without sayin# more, that there was no co#ent reason to disturb the

same. (t is claimed that as ud#e de la 3ama did not mae his own statement of the

facts and the law as required by the Constitution, his memorandum decision was a

total nullity. ;orse, when the appeal was taen to the respondent court, what it

reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the re#ional trial court but the

decision rendered by the metropolitan trial court which, le#ally speain#, was not

before the appellate court.

(t is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the

memorandum decision of the re#ional trial court which was the subject of thepetition for review. A readin# of its own decision will show that it dealt etensively

with the memorandum decision and discussed it at some len#th in the li#ht of the

observations > and reservations > of this Court in the Romerocase. *oreover, in

reviewin# the decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of Appeals was

actually reviewin# the decision of the re#ional trial court, which had incorporated by

reference the earlier decision rendered by ud#e !alita.

The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference was a valid act

that effectively elevated the decision of the metropolitan trial court for eamination

by the Court of Appeals.


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To be fair, let it be said that when ud#e dela 3ama availed himself of the

convenience offered by Section 4 of !.". !l#. $%&, he was only actin# in

accordance with the rulin# announced inRomeropermittin# the use of the

memorandum decision. (t must also be observed that even if the respondent court

appeared to be partial to the reservation rather than the rule in the said case, it

nevertheless had the duty > which it dischar#ed > to abide by the doctrine

announced therein by the hi#hest tribunal of the land. The respondent court could not

have acted otherwise.

This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re=eamine our own

rulin#s and modify or reverse them whenever warranted, we tae a second loo at

the memorandum decision and the 3omero case and test them on the touchstone of

the Constitution.

The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply su##ests that the

court may adopt by reference the findin#s of fact and the conclusions of law stated in

the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. 7o particular form is prescribed

the conditions for its use are not indicated. (n fact, !.". !l#. $%& does not even

employ the term memorandum decision in Section 4 or elsewhere in the rest of

the statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this jurisdiction not by

that law but by Section %4 of the (nterim 3ules and Duidelines, readin# as follows5

Sec. %4.Memorandum decisions. -The jud#ment or final

resolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt by reference the

findin#s of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or

final order appealed from.

(t is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the

findin#s of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandumdecision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the

memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it

incorporates by reference the findin#s of fact or the conclusions of law contained in

the decision, order or rulin# under review. *ost liely, the purpose is to affirm the

decision, althou#h it is not impossible that the approval of the findin#s of fact by the

lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the hi#her court. At any

rate, the reason for allowin# the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the

cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in

the decision of the hi#her court. The (dea is to avoid havin# to repeat in the body of

the latter decision the findin#s or conclusions of the lower court since they are bein#

approved or adopted anyway.

"arenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the 9nited States, but

its form ?at least@ differs from the one under consideration in this case. Such a

decision is rendered in that country upon a previous2 determination by the jud#e that

there is no need for a published opinion and that it will have no precedential effect.

The jud#ment is usually limited to the dispositive portion but a memorandum is

attached containin# a brief statement of the facts and the law involved, mainly for the

information of the parties to the case.

;hen a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the presumption in favor of

its constitutionality. As we said inPeralta v. Commission of Elections, to justify the

nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the

Constitution, not a doubtful and ar#umentative implication.&Courts will bend over

bacward to sustain that presumption. (n case of doubt, it is the duty of the judiciary

to eert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the

will of the le#islature that enacted it and the eecutive that approved it. This norm is

based on a becomin# respect that the judiciary is epected to accord the political

departments of the #overnment which, it must be assumed in fairness, thorou#hly

studied the measure under challen#e and assured themselves of its constitutionality

before a#reein# to enact it.

The Court has deliberated etensively on the challen#e posed a#ainst the

memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Tain# into account the salutary

purpose for which it is allowed, and bearin# in mind the above=discussed restraint we

must observe when a law is challen#ed before us, we have come to the conclusion

that Section 4 of !.". !l#. $%&, as we shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.

;hat is questioned about the law is the permission it #ives for the appellate court to

merely adopt by reference in its own decision the jud#ment of the lower court on

appeal. (t is easy to understand that this device may feed the suspicion feared byustice


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. . . True it is that the Court of


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was rendered by ud#e de la 3ama and produced bindin# le#al effect. ;e also affirm

the findin# of the respondent court that the summary jud#ment without a formal trial

was in accord with the 3ule on Summary "rocedure and that the award of attorney2s

fees is not improper.

0enceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein

set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be

rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article '(((, Section$4 of the Constitution and strie down the flawed jud#ment as a lawless

disobedience.

;0636


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G.R. No. 1010$1 No'()*(+ 1#, 1991

!ON. U-GE A-RIANO R. VILLAMOR,petitioner,vs.

!ON. U-GE ERNAR-O LL. SALAS an GEORGE CARLOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 101296 No'()*(+ 1#, 1991

!ON. U-GE A-RIANO R. VILLAMOR,petitioner,vs.

ANTONIO T. GUERRERO an !ON. PEAR/ G. ALEONAR, P+(n 3(o4 RTC, +an5 21, R(on VII, C(*3 C7y, respondents.

Ramon ,e *ala(ar for petitioner.

Antonio !. Guerrero for private respondent.

'enr R. *avellon for respondent.

GRIOA:UINO,J.:p

(n $&11, Civil Case 7o. !=-&+ ?Dloria 7aval vs. Deor#e Carlos@ for recovery of

ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala

of the petitioner, ud#e Adriano 'illamor. ;hile the civil case was pendin# there,

respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases 7os. 7=&+&, 7=&&, 7=&&$, 7=&&% and 7=

&&- for qualified theft a#ainst Dloria 7aval and her helpers. The criminal cases werealso assi#ned to the sala of ud#e 'illamor.

8ue to the pendency of Civil Case 7o. !=-&+, the criminal cases were temporarily

archived.

After trial in Civil Case 7o. !=-&+, a decision was rendered in favor of 7aval who

was declared the lawful owner and possessor of the disputed land. Carlos was

ordered to vacate the land.

Thereafter, respondent Carlos, throu#h counsel, moved to activate the archivedcriminal cases. 0avin# declared 7aval the lawful owner and possessor of the

contested land in Civil Case 7o. !=-&+, ud#e 'illamor dismissed the criminal cases

a#ainst her and her co=accused.

ud#e 'illamor liewise #ranted eecution pendin# appeal of his decision in Civil

Case 7o. !=-&+. This order was challen#ed by Carlos in the Court of Appeals and in

this Court, both without success.

Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.*. 7o. 3T=+1=$/, a#ainst ud#e

'illamor, char#in# him with havin# issued ille#al orders and an unjust decision in

Civil Case 7o. !=-&+. )n 7ovember %$, $&++, this Court, in an En )ancresolution,

summarily dismissed the administrative case.

8issatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a

civil action for dama#es ?Civil Case 7o. C6!=:41+@ a#ainst ud#e 'illamor for

nowin#ly renderin# an unjust jud#ment when he dismissed the five ?/@ criminal

cases a#ainst 7aval, et al.

The summons in Civil Case 7o. C6!=:41+ was served upon ud#e 'illamor on

8ecember $, $&+1. The net day ?8ecember $$, $&+1@, instead of answerin# the

complaint, ud#e 'illamor issued in Criminal Cases 7os. 7=&+& to &&- an order of

direct contempt a#ainst Carlos and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T. Duerrero, for

de#radin# the respect and di#nity of the court throu#h the use of dero#atory and

contemptous lan#ua#e before the court, and sentenced each of them to suffer the

penalty of imprisonment for five ?/@ days and to pay a fine of "/.

Carlos immediately filed in this Court a petition for certiorariwith a prayer for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction a#ainst the ud#e ?D.3. 7os. +%%-+=4%@.

;e promptly restrained ud#e 'illamor from enforcin# his )rder of Contempta#ainst Carlos and Attorney Duerrero. )n 7ovember $-, $&+&, we annulled the

contempt order. ?See pp. %:=-4,Rolloof D.3. 7o. $$4$.@

!ac to Civil Case 7o. C6!=:41+ ud#e 'illamor filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint for lac of jurisdiction. The trial court #ranted the motion. The order of

dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals ?CA=D.3. C' 7o. %:/1, une %:,

$&&@. Carlos appealed to this Court which also denied the petition. ?p. $%/, Rolloof

D.3. 7o. $$%&:.@


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9nfazed by these setbacs, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Duerrero, filed

separate complaints for dama#es a#ainst ud#e 'illamor for nowin#ly renderin# an

unjust order of contempt.

Attorney Duerrero2s complaint for dama#es ?Civil Case 7o. C6!=++%@ was raffled

to !ranch %$, 3e#ional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by ud#e "eary D.

Aleonar. Carlos2 complaint for dama#es was doceted as Civil Case 7o. C6!=++%-

and raffled to !ranch +, 3e#ional Trial Court of Cebu City presided over by ud#e!ernardo EE. Salas.

)n *arch -, $&&, ud#e 'illamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case 7o. C6!=

++% but it was denied by ud#e Aleonar ?p. --,Rolloof D.3. 7o. $$%&:@.

0ence, this petition for certiorariand prohibition with restrainin# order doceted as

D.3. 7o. $$%&:.

)n September $&, $&&$, this Court issued a temporary restrainin# order a#ainst

ud#e Aleonar to stop him from proceedin# in Civil Case 7o. C6!=++% ?pp. 4/=

4:,Rolloof D.3. 7o. $$%&:@.

)n *ay %, $&&$, a *anifestation was filed by ud#e 'illamor prayin# ud#e Salas

to dismiss Civil Case 7o. C6!=++%- but the motion was denied by respondent ud#e

on uly %, $&&$ ?pp. $-=$:,Rolloof D.3. 7o. $$4$@.

0ence, this second petition for certiorariand prohibition with restrainin# order ?D.3.

7o. $$4$@.

)n Au#ust %$, $&&$, a 3esolution was issued by this Court5 $@ temporarily

restrainin# ud#e Salas from further proceedin# in Civil Case 7o. C6!=++%- and %@#rantin# the petitioner2s prayer that this case be consolidated with D.3. 7o. $$%&:

?pp. -1=-&,Rolloof D.3. 7o. $$4$@.

The sole issue here is5 whether or not ud#es Aleonar and Salas may tae co#nizance

of the actions for dama#es a#ainst ud#e 'illamor for alle#edly havin# rendered an

unjust order of direct contempt a#ainst Carlos and Attorney Duerrero which this

Court subsequently annulled.

The answer is no.

As very aptly held by this Court in a 3esolution it issued in connection with a

previous case filed by respondent Carlos a#ainst ud#e 'illamor, over a similar

action for 8ama#es and Attorney2s


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A jud#e is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wron#ful

conduct in renderin# it ?!arroso vs. Arche, :1 SC3A $:$@.

;0636


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;G.R. No. 1188#0. F(*+3a+y 2$, 200#. %%, ..The lower court, after havin# the case dismissed for

improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set

aside the previous order of dismissal$ supra, statin#,inter alia, that5

JThe mistae or deficiency in the

ori#inal complaint appears now to have been

cured in the Amended Complaint which can stillbe properly admitted, pursuant to 3ule $ of the
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$&&1 3ules of Civil "rocedure, inasmuch as the

)rder of dismissal is not yet final. !esides, there

is no substantial amendment in the Amended

Complaint which would affect the defendantsH

defenses and their Answers. The Amendment is

merely formal, contrary to the contention of the

defendants that it is substantial.K

8issatisfied, petitioners, to#ether with defendants Capt.


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(t is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alle#ed in

the complaintsince the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts

constitutin# the plaintiff2s causes of action.F$$G (n the case at bar, after eaminin# the

ori#inal complaint, we find that the 3TC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the

case was filed before it.


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G.R. No. 1&0$&8 May 22, 2008SPS. TERESITO /. VILLACASTIN an LOUR-ES FUAVILLACASTIN,petitioners,vs.

PAUL PELAE",respondent.- E C I S I O NTINGA,J.=A conflict of jurisdiction between the 8epartment of A#rarian 3eform Adjudication

!oard ?8A3A!@ and the re#ular trial courts is at the core of the present case.

"etitioners question the 8ecision$of the Court of Appeals dated


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was rendered in the forcible entry case, the tenants of the property already filed a suit

with the 8A3A! for the annulment of the real estate mort#a#e eecuted by

respondent over the same in favor of 8!" and the subsequent foreclosure and

auction sale in favor of petitioners. The 8A3A!2s decision declarin# the mort#a#e,

foreclosure and auction sale null and void became final as re#ards petitioners who

did not appeal from the decision. 3espondent asserts that the complaint for forcible

entry filed by petitioners had lost its le#al basis after the 8A3A! declared that the

foreclosure and auction sale of the subject property were null and void.

"etitioners filed a 3eply$dated uly %+, %:, insistin# that the tenant=farmers

involved in the 8A3A! case were not parties to the forcible entry case, the only

defendant therein bein# respondent in this case. 3espondent, in turn, raised the

defense of ownership, thereby joinin# the issues re#ardin# possession and

ownership.

"etitioners further note their ar#ument in their *otion for 3econsideration $$of the

8ecision of the Court of Appeals that the subject property had been declared as

wilderness area and the same had been classified as alienable and disposable on

8ecember %%, $&+1. (n support of this contention, they submitted a 8epartment of

A#rarian 3eform )rder$%dated September $%, $&&1 to the effect that the subject

property falls within the administrative authority or competence of the 8epartment of6nvironment and 7atural 3esources ?8673@. The order directed the "A3) of Cebu

and the *A3) of !antayan, Cebu to cease and desist from further activities

affectin# the subject property under )peration Eand Transfer, and to refer the matter

to the 8673.

urisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the alle#ations of the

complaint.$-(n ascertainin#, for instance, whether an action is one for forcible entry

fallin# within the eclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the

complaint and the character of the relief sou#ht are to be eamined.$4

A review of the complaint reveals that the pertinent alle#ations thereof sufficiently

vest jurisdiction over the action on the *CTC. The complaint alle#es as follows5

(((

That the plaintiffs are the owners and le#al as well as actual possessors of a

parcel of a#ricultural land more particularly described as follows5

('

That the defendant, sometime in the second wee of *arch $&++, by

strate#y and throu#h stealth entered the above=described land of the

plaintiffs and too possession thereof thus, deprivin# said plaintiffs of the

possession thereof

'

That several demands were made the plaintiffs upon the defendants torestore to them the possession of the above=described parcel of land but,

defendants refused and still refuse to restore possession of said property to

the plaintiffs$/

(t has not escaped our notice that no landowner=tenant vinculum urisor juridical tie

was alle#ed between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would

characterize the relationship as an a#rarian dispute.$:3ule (( of the 8A3A!

3ules$1provides that the 8A3A! shall have primary jurisdiction, both ori#inal and

appellate, to determine and adjudicate all a#rarian disputes, cases, controversies, and

matters or incidents involvin# the implementation of the Comprehensive A#rarian

3eform "ro#ram under 3epublic Act 7o. ::/1, 6ecutive )rder 7os. %%&, %%+ and

$%&=A, 3epublic Act 7o, -+44 as amended by 3epublic Act 7o. :-+&, "residential

8ecree 7o. %1 and other a#rarian laws and their implementin# rules and

re#ulations.

"etitioners2 action is clearly for the recovery of physical or material possession of the

subject property only, a question which both the *CTC and the 3TC ruled

petitioners are entitled to. (t does not involve the adjudication of an a#rarian reform

matter, nor an a#rarian dispute fallin# within the jurisdiction of the 8A3A!.

Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involvin# public or private

a#ricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is

independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which shouldbe threshed out in the 8A3.$+Thus, jurisdiction was ri#htfully eercised by the

*CTC and the 3TC.

;0636


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;G.R. No. 9262% = -(5()*(+ 26, 1990.< 192 SCRA &68OSE OR-A an IMEL-A LO"A-A, Petitioners, '. T!E !ONORALECOURT OF APPEALS an GIL GALANGRespondents.

- E C I S I O N

GANCA/CO,J.:

The question presented in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals may refer

a petition for habeas corpus ori#inally filed with it to the 3e#ional Trial Court for a

full=blown trial due to conflictin# facts presented by the parties.

)ri#inally, private respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus with the 3e#ional

Trial Court of San "ablo City to re#ain custody of his minor dau#hter, oyce, who

continued stayin# with her maternal #randparents, petitioners herein, her mother

bein# already deceased at the initiation of the action. The case was eventually

dismissed for lac of jurisdiction because petitioners, as defendants therein, had

moved to !ataan and any writ of habeas corpus to be issued by the trial court may

not be enforced a#ainst them.

Subsequently, private respondent, on the basis of his bein# the sole survivin# parentof his dau#hter, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the respondent Court of

Appeals doceted as CA=D.3. 7o. $-&$%=S", an ori#inal action to compel petitioners

to produce the body of minor oyce )rda Dalan# and eplain the basis of their

custody. "etitioners herein filed their )ppositionRAnswer $ alle#in# that private

respondent abandoned his wife and child, had no source of livelihood and therefore

could not support his dau#hter, they prayed that care and custody of the child be

awarded them.5 rd

)n $- April $&++, respondent court issued its assailed decision, as follows5

The conflictin# thesis ?sic@, however, of petitioner Fprivate respondent

hereinG and respondents Fpetitioners hereinG require a full=blown trial of the

facts alle#ed by the parties. This could be shown by the initial discussions

aforestated.

The records show that Fprivate respondentG had already filed a similar

petition before the 3e#ional Trial Court,


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to transmit to the 3e#ional Trial Court the ori#inal record of case AC=D.3. 7o.

$-&$% immediately upon receipt of this order. ?p. $:, 3ollo@ ?sic@ !ut no records

can be transmitted bac to the lower court simply because no records were elevated

in that, as aforesaid, the case was filed here as an ori#inal action.

The FpetitionersG have manifested in their motion that they were not #iven an

opportunity to answer or at least comment on the petition. 7ow the same is in the

lower court as directed in the decision sou#ht to be clarified. (ndeed, issues cannot be

joined if the lower court will deprive the FpetitionersG ?of@ their ri#ht to respond to

the petition.

;0636


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There is merit in the contentions of petitioners.

6ssentially, petitioners ar#ue that the Court of Appeals has no power to issue the

decision remandin# the proceedin#s to the trial court and the two subsequent

resolutions clarifyin# the same.

The assailed decision and the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals are not

supported by law and the 3ules of Court. The provisions of the udiciary

3eor#anization Act ?!.". !l#. $%&@ cited by the respondent Court of Appeals in its

resolution dated $- *arch $&& are not in point. Sections &?$@ and %$ thereof merely

provide that the Court of Appeals and 3e#ional Trial Courts, respectively, eercise

ori#inal jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, amon# others. ;hile

reco#nizin# the concurrent ori#inal jurisdiction of both courts over habeas corpus

cases as special proceedin#s, these provisions are not authority for remandin# or

referrin# to the latter ori#inal actions filed with the former.

)n the contrary, the Court of Appeals is specifically #iven the power to receive

evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in

cases fallin# within its ori#inal jurisdiction. $$


22/84

;G.R. No. 1291#2. 3?y 8, 1998>(??a7( Co3+7F,G theSupreme Court . . . cate#orically pronounced the 3TCHs

jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the 7;3!

consistent with Article +& of ".8. 7o. $:1 and ratiocinated in thiswise5

.

The lo#ical conclusion, therefore, is that

jurisdiction over actions for annulment of 7;3C

decisions lies with the 3e#ional Trial Courts, particularly,

when we tae note of the fact that the appellate

jurisdiction of the 3e#ional Trial Court over 7;3C

decisions covers such broad and all embracin# #rounds as

#rave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and questions
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40/84

of fact and law ?Art. +&, ".8. 7o. $:1@. This conclusion

is also in eepin# with the udiciary 3eor#anization Act

of $&+, which vests 3e#ional Trial Courts with ori#inal

jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus, etc. ?Sec. %$ F$G, !.". !l#. $%&@ relatin# to

acts or omissions of an inferior court ?Sec. 4, 3ule :/,

3ules of Court@.

.

Similarly, in TanDay Wa7(+ -7+57 '. P(+o Ga*a7on,the Supreme Court conformably ruled, vi(5

J(nasmuch as Civil Case 7o. +$44 involves the

appropriation, utilization and control of water, ;e hold

that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in the

first instance, pertains to the ;ater 3esources Council as

provided in "8 7o. $:1 which is the special law on the

subject. The Court of 7on 7o 7( D3+57on o4 7( Co3+7 o4 A>>(a?o'(+ a>>(a? o+ >(77on 4o+ 5(+7o+a+ o4 7( (5on o4 3aD35a? *o(. This finds harmony with "ara#raph %, Section 4,3ule :/ of the 3ules of Court wherein it is stated that, J2f it

involves t"e acts of a quasi-udicial agenc$ unless ot"er1ise

provided b la1 or t"ese rules$ t"e petition s"all be filed in andcogni(able onl b t"e Court of Appeals.? 6vidently, not all

petitions for certiorari under 3ule :/ involvin# the decisions of

quasi=judicial a#encies must be filed with the Court of

Appeals. The rule admits of some eceptions as plainly provided

by the phrase >unless ot"er1ise provided b la1 or t"ese

rules?and Article +& of ".8. 7o. $:1 is verily an eample of

these eceptions. ?italics and emphasis partly in the ori#inal

underscorin# supplied@

"etitionerHs motion for reconsideration havin# been denied by the appellate

court by 3esolution of


41/84

a#encies, lie petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what 3ule :/ of the 3ules

imposes for procedural uniformity. The only eception to this instruction is when

the law or the 3ules itself directs otherwise, as cited in Section 4, 3ule :/. F$%G The

appellate courtHs construction that Article +& of "8 $:1, which reads5

A3T. +&. The (5on of the F7;3!G on water ri#htscontroversies may bea>>(a?( to the;RTCG of the provincewhere the subject matter of the controversy is situated within

fifteen ?$/@ days from the date the party appealin# receives a copyof the decision, on any of the followin# #rounds5 ?$@ +a'( a*3(o4 5+(7on ?%@ question of law and ?-@ questions of fact andlaw ?emphasis and underscorin# supplied@,

is such an eception, is erroneous.

A+75?( 89 o4 P- 106& a ?on *((n +(n(+( no>(+a7'( *y 7(>aa( o4 P 129. Aside from delineatin# the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals

and the 3TCs, Section 41 of !" $%& repealed or modified5

. FtGhe provisions of 3epublic Act 7o. %&:, otherwise

nown as the udiciary Act of $&4+, as amended, of 3epublic Act

7o. /$1&, as amended, of the 3ules of Court, and of a?? o7(+7a737(, ?(77(+ o4 n7+357on an (n(+a? o+(+ o+ >a+77(+(o4, n5on7(n7 7 7( >+o'on o4 7 A57 .?emphasis and underscorin# supplied@

The #eneral repealin# clause under Section 41 Jpredicates the intended repeal under

the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in eistin# and prior acts.KF$-G

(n enactin# !" $%&, the)atasang Pambansa was presumed to have

nowled#e of the provision of Article +& of ".8. 7o. $:1 and to have intended to

chan#e it.F$4G The le#islative intent to repeal Article +& is clear and manifest #iven the

scope and purpose of !" $%&, one of which is to provide a homo#eneous procedure

for the review of adjudications of quasi=judicial entities to the Court of Appeals.

*ore importantly, what Article +& of "8 $:1 conferred to the 3TC was the

power of review on appealthe decisions of petitioner. (t appears that the appellate

court #ave si#nificant consideration to the #round of J#rave abuse of discretionK to

thus hold that the 3TC has certiorarijurisdiction over petitionerHs decisions. A

readin# of said Article +& shows, however, that it only made J#rave abuse of

discretionK as another #round to invoe in an ordinarappeal to the 3TC. (ndeed,

the provision was unique to the Dater Codeat the time of its application in

$&1:.

The issuance of !" $%&, specifically Section & ?urisdiction of the Court of

Appeals, then nown as (ntermediate Appellate Court@, and the subsequent

formulation of the 3ules, clarified and delineated the appellate

and certiorarijurisdictions of the Court of Appeals over adjudications of quasi=judicial bodies. Drave abuse of discretion may be invoed before the appellate court

as a #round for an error of jurisdiction.

(t bears notin# that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitionerHs

order via certioraribefore the 3TC, invoin# #rave abuse of discretion amountin# to

lac or ecess of jurisdiction as #round=basis thereof. (n other words, it invoed

such #round not for an error of jud#ment.

;hile Section & ?-@ of !" $%&F$/Gand Section $ of 3ule 4- of the 3ules of

Court

F$:G

does not list petitioner as Jamon#K the quasi=judicial a#encies whose finaljud#ments, orders, resolutions or awards are appealable to the appellate court, it

is non sequiturto hold that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over

petitionerHs jud#ments, orders, resolutions or awards. (t is settled that the list of

quasi=judicial a#encies specifically mentioned in 3ule 4- is not meant to be

eclusive.F$1G The employment of the word Jamon#K clearly instructs so.

)F &ort"1est 'omeo1ners Association v. 2ntermediate Appellate Court$F$+Ga $&+1 case cited by the appellate court to support its rulin# that 3TCs have

jurisdiction over jud#ments, orders, resolutions or awards of petitioner, is no lon#er

controllin# in li#ht of the definitive instruction of 3ule 4- of the 3evised 3ules of

Court.

!ana Dater 3istrict v. GabatonF$&Gis not in point either as the issue raised

therein was which between the 3TC and the then 7ational ;ater 3esources Council

had jurisdiction over disputes in the appropriation, utilization and control of water.

IN FINE, 5(+7o+a+ an a>>(??a7( D3+57on o'(+ aD35a7on o4>(77on(+ >+o>(+?y *(?on 7o 7( Co3+7 o4 A>>(a? .

W!EREFORE, the challen#ed 8ecision and 3esolution of the Court ofAppeals are REVERSE- an SET ASI-E. The April $/, %/ )rder of the
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42/84

3e#ional Trial Court of !acolod City dismissin# petitionerHs petition for lac of

jurisdiction is 9"06E8.

7o costs.

G.R. No. 1%%01$CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LT-.,

P(77on(+,P+((n7=

P3no,J.,

'(+3 Ca+)an, A37+aMa+7n(,

Ca??(Do, S+., Tna, an

BC5oNaa+o,JJ.MHV LOK MA!ES!WARI,J

T!E S!IPPING CORPORATIONOF IN-IA, an PORTSERV LIMITE- P+o)3?a7(=anHo+ TRANSMAR S!IPPING, INC.,

R(>on(n7. No'()*(+ 11, 200% -ECISIONPUNO,J.= This petition for review on certiorari under 3ule 4/ sees the ?a@ reversal of

the 7ovember %+, %$ 8ecision of the Court of Appeals in CA=D.3. 7o. C'=/4&%,

;1


43/84

respondents 'essel and SC(, throu#h "ioneer (nsurance and Surety Corporation

?"ioneer@, filed an ur#ent e=parte motion to approve "ioneerHs letter of undertain#,

to consider it as counter=bond and to dischar#e the attachment. )n *ay %&, $&&:,the trial court #ranted the motion thus, the letter of undertain# was approved as

counter=bond to dischar#e the attachment.


44/84

1. "etitioner has le#al capacity to sue before "hilippine

courts as it is suin# upon an isolated business

transaction

+. 3espondents were duly served summons althou#h

service of summons upon respondents is not a

jurisdictional requirement, the action bein# a suit quasi

in rem

&. The trial courtHs decision has factual and le#al bases

and,

$. The respondents should be held jointly and solidarily

liable.

(n a nutshell, this case is for the satisfaction of unpaid supplies furnished

by a forei#n supplier in a forei#n port to a vessel of forei#n re#istry that is owned,

chartered and sub=chartered by forei#n entities.

9nder !atas "ambansa !ilan# $%&, as amended by 3epublic Act 7o. 1:&$,

3TCs eercise eclusive ori#inal jurisdiction J?i@n all actions in admiralty and

maritime where the demand or claim eceeds two hundred thousand pesos

?"%,@ or in *etro *anila, where such demand or claim eceeds four hundred

thousand pesos ?"4,@.K Two ?%@ tests have been used to determine whether a

case involvin# a contract comes within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of a

court = the ?o5a7ona? 7(7and the 3*D(57 )a77(+ 7(7. The 6n#lish rule follows thelocational test wherein maritime and admiralty jurisdiction, with a few eceptions, is

eercised only on contracts made upon the sea and to be eecuted thereon. This is

totally rejected under the American rule where the criterion in determinin# whether a

contract is maritime depends on the nature and subject matter of the contract, havin#

reference to maritime service and transactions.;$


45/84

Sec. %-. 7otice to "erson ?a5( o4 7( +on43? a57 @2 ?a o4 7( 4?a @# a??(an5(o+ o)5?( o4 7( nD3+( @$ a??(an5( o4 7( (4(nan7 >on(+ @% >?a5(o4 5on7+a57 @6 na55(*?7y o4 4o+(n 4o+3) an @& ?a o4 7( 4o+3).

Several years after Eauritzen, the 9.S. Supreme Court in the case

of Ro)(+o '. In7(+na7ona? T(+)na? O>(+a7n Co. ;22>?5a*?( no7 on?y 7o >(+ona? nD3+y 5?a) a+n 3n(+ 7( on( A57*37 7o a?? )a77(+ a+n 3n(+ )a+7)( ?a n (n(+a?.;2# A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. (t

is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of durin# the

pendency of the main action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is

dependent upon the result of the main action.

- E C I S I O N

NOCON,J.=

This is a petition for certiorariand prohibition with restrainin# order and preliminary

injunction to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated *arch

$$, $&&$ $ dismissin# petitionerHs petition for certiorariand prohibition which

assailed the )rders % dated une $, $&& - and une %&, $&& 4 of the trial

court.chanrobles lawlibrary 5 rednad

(t appears on record that on uly /, $&+&, the administrator of the Dalleria de*a#allanes Condominium discovered that petitioner 7ilo 3aymundo, who was an

ownerRoccupant of 9nit A!=$%% of said condominium, made an unauthorized

installation of #lasses at the balcony of his unit in violation of Article (', Section -

para#raph ?d@ of the *aster 8eed and 8eclaration of 3estrictions of the Association,

which states that5j#c5chanrobles.com.ph

d. 7othin# shall be done or placed in any unit or in the common areas which is

beyond or will impair the structural stren#th of the buildin#s or alter the ori#inal

architecture, appearance and specifications of the buildin#, includin# the eternal

facade thereof. /

Thereafter, the administrator of said condominium reported said violation to the

!oard of 8irectors of the private respondent Dalleria de *a#allanes Association, (nc.

in a special meetin# held on uly +, $&+& and the former sent a letter dated uly $%,

$&+& : to the petitioner demandin# the latter to remove the ille#al and unauthorized

installation of #lasses at his unit.

"etitioner refused, consequently, private respondent filed a complaint for mandatory

injunction a#ainst petitioner on


51/84

)n *arch $%, $&&, petitioner filed a *otion for etension of time to file an Answer

1 as well as a *otion for production of document + which were #ranted in an )rder

dated *arch $:, $&&. &

0owever, on *arch %-, $&&, instead of an Answer, petitioner filed a *otion to

8ismiss with the trial court on the #round that said court has no jurisdiction over the

present case since a complaint for mandatory injunction is within the eclusive

ori#inal jurisdiction of the *etropolitan Trial Court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The *otion to 8ismiss was denied in the )rder of une $, $&&, the pertinent portion

of which reads5j#c5chanrobles.com.ph

This is a suit for mandatory injunction. 9nder Sec. %$ of !" $%&, as amended, it is

the 3e#ional Trial Court which has the le#al competence to issue the same.

Corollarily, the second #round must be denied. The action is essentially one which

falls within the jurisdiction of the 3e#ional Trial Court.

;0636 3e#ional Trial Courts shall eercise eclusive

ori#inal jurisdiction5chanrob$es virtual $aw library

?$@ (n all civil actions in which the subject of the liti#ation is incapable of pecuniary

estimation

# # #

Sec. %$. )ri#inal jurisdiction in other cases. > 3e#ional Trial Courts shall eercise

ori#inal jurisdiction5chanrob$es virtual $aw library

?$@ (n the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo

warranto, "abeas corpusand injunction which may be enforced in any part of their

respective re#ions

A civil action in which the subject of the liti#ation is incapable of pecuniary

estimation has invariably been held to be within the eclusive ori#inal jurisdiction of

the 3e#ional Trial Courts.chanrobles law library

(n determinin# whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capableof pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertainin# the

nature of the principal action or remedy sou#ht. (f it is primarily for the recovery of a

sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether

jurisdiction is in the municipal courts Fnow municipal trial courtsG or in the courts of

first instance Fnow re#ional trial courtsG would depend on the amount of the claim.

0owever, where the basic issue is somethin# other than the ri#ht to recover a sum of

money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the

principal relief sou#ht, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the

subject of the liti#ation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are co#nizable

eclusively by courts of first instance Fnow re#ional trial courtsG. $%


52/84

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the question for resolution is whether or

not the petitioner violated the provisions of the *aster 8eed and 8eclaration of

3estriction of the corporation, and if so, to remove the ille#al and unauthorized

installation of #lasses at 9nit A!=$%% of the Condominium. Clearly, the issue is

incapable of pecuniary estimation.

(n the instant case. the claim of attorneyHs fees by the private respondent in the

amount of "$,. is only incidental to its principal cause of action which is for

the removal of the ille#al and unauthorized installation of the #lasses made by thepetitioner and therefore, said amount is not determinative of the jurisdiction of the

court.

7ote should be taen. however, that the trial court had erroneously considered the

complaint as one for mandatory injunction, misled perhaps by the caption of the

complaint.chanrobles.com5cralaw5red

A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. (t is provisional because it

constitutes a temporary measure availed of durin# the pendency of the main action

and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of

the main action. $-

;0636


53/84

;G.R. No. 119#$&. Ma+5 1&, 1999+)a+yconsideration in an epropriation suit iswhether the #overnment or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the

requisites for the tain# of private property. 0ence, the courts determine the

authority of the #overnment entity, the necessity of the epropriation, and the

observance of due process. (n the main, the subject of an epropriation suit is the

#overnmentHs eercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary

estimation.

JTrue, the value of the property to be epropriated is estimated in monetary terms,

for the court is duty=bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however,

is merely incidental to the epropriation suit. In((, 7a7 a)o3n7 (7(+)n(on?y a47(+ 7( 5o3+7 a74( 7 7( >+o>+(7y o4 7( (>+o>+a7on.J

J'erily, the Court held inRepublic of t"e P"ilippines v. Hurbanothat condemnation

proceedin#s are within the jurisdiction of Courts of


58/84

the liti#ation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. The $&&1 amendments to the

3ules of Court were not intended to chan#e these jurisprudential precedents.KF$4G

To reiterate, an epropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the 3TC

re#ardless of the value of the land, because the subject of the action is the

#overnmentHs eercise of eminent domain == a matter that is incapable of pecuniary

estimation.

S(5on I3(=

R( 35a7a

"etitioner claims that the *TCHs dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent

domain was with prejudice, since there was no indication to the contrary in the )rder

of dismissal. She contends that the filin# of the second Complaint before the 3TC

should therefore be dismissed on account of res udicata.

Res udicataliterally means a matter adjud#ed, judicially acted upon or

decided, or settled by jud#ment.

F$/G

(t provides that a final jud#ment on the meritsrendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the ri#hts of the

parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions

involvin# the same claim, demand or cause of action.F$:G

The followin# are the requisites of res udicata5 ?$@ the former jud#ment must

be final ?%@ the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the

parties ?-@ it is a jud#ment on the merits and ?4@ there is == between the first and the

second actions == an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.F$1G

Since the *TC had no jurisdiction over epropriation proceedin#s, the doctrine

of res udicatafinds no application even if the )rder of dismissal may have been an

adjudication on the merits.

T+ I3(=

*e'alit o +ntr 3nto Premises

"etitioner ar#ues that the CA erred when it i#nored the 3TCHs ;rit of

"ossession over her property, issued despite the pendin# *otion for 3econsideration

of the rulin# dismissin# the Complaint. ;e are not persuaded.

The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an epropriation

case are epressly and specifically #overned by Section % of 3ule :1 of the $&&1

3ules of Civil "rocedure.F$+G)n the part of local #overnment units, epropriation is

also #overned by Section $& of the Eocal Dovernment Code.F$&G Accordin#ly, in

epropriation proceedin#s, the requisites for authorizin# immediate entry are as

follows5 ?$@ the filin# of a complaint for epropriation sufficient in form and

substance and ?%@ the deposit of the amount equivalent to $/ percent of the fair

maret value of the property to be epropriated based on its current ta declaration.F%G

(n the instant case, the issuance of the ;rit of "ossession in favor of respondent

after it had filed the Complaint for epropriation and deposited the amount required

was proper, because it had complied with the fore#oin# requisites.

The issue of the necessity of the epropriation is a matter properly addressed to

the 3TC in the course of the epropriation proceedin#s. (f petitioner objects to the

necessity of the taeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the

Complaint. F%$GThe 3TC has the power to inquire into the le#ality of the eercise of

the ri#ht of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a #enuine necessity

for it.F%%G

Fo3+7 I3(=

4orum 5hoppin'

"etitioner claims that respondent is #uilty of forum shoppin#, because it

scouted for another forum after obtainin# an unfavorable 8ecision from the *TC.

The test for determinin# the presence of forum shoppin# is whether the

elements of litis pendentiaare present in two or more pendin# cases, such that a final

jud#ment in one case will amount to res udicata in another.F%-G

!e it noted that the earlier case lod#ed with the *TC had already been

dismissed when the Complaint was filed before the 3TC. 6ven

#rantin# arguendothat both cases were still pendin#, a final jud#ment in the *TC

case will not constitute res udicatain the 3TC, since the former had no jurisdiction

over the epropriation case.

W!EREFORE, the "etition is3E&2E3and the assailed

8ecisionAFF2RME3. Costs a#ainst petitioner.

SO OR-ERE-
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59/84

SO OR-ERE-.

Puno$ 4C"airman5$ *andoval-Gutierre($ Corona$ andCarpio-Morales$

%%.$ concur.


60/84

G.R. No. 16#021 A>+? 2&, 200&

PATRICIO A. VILLENA, "etitioner,vs.

PATRICIO S. PA/O/O,3espondent.

8 6 C ( S ( ) 7

:UISUMING,J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the 8ecision $dated 7ovember %$, %-

of the Court of Appeals in CA=D.3. C' 7o. 1/$- and its 3esolution %dated *arch

$+, %4, denyin# petitionerHs motion for reconsideration. The appellate court had

affirmed with modification the 8ecision-dated April %:, % of the 3e#ional Trial

Court ?3TC@ of Muezon City, !ranch 1+.

The facts are undisputed.

)n )ctober %+, $&&1, respondent "atricio "ayoyo and 7ovaline, (nc., throu#h its

president, petitioner "atricio 'illena, entered into a contract for the delivery and

installation of itchen cabinets in "ayoyoHs residence. The cabinets were to be

delivered within ninety days from downpayment of /W of the purchase price. )n

)ctober %&, $&&1, "ayoyo paid 'illena "$//,$+- as downpayment.

)n 8ecember &, $&&1, "ayoyo entered into another contract with 'illena for the

delivery of home appliances. )n the same day, "ayoyo paid /W of the purchase

price equal to "%&,:-+./ as downpayment.

0owever, 'illena failed to install the itchen cabinets and deliver the appliances.

"ayoyo made several demands upon 'illena but the latter failed to comply.

(n a letter dated *arch $%, $&&+, "ayoyo demanded the cancellation of the contracts

and the refund in full of the downpayments amountin# to "$+4,+%$./. 'illena

promised to install the itchen cabinets on or before *ay $, $&&+ and to deliver the

appliances. 8espite repeated demands, 'illena a#ain failed to do so.

"ayoyo sent 'illena two demand letters on une %4, $&&+ and on uly %+, $&&+

asin# the latter to either deliver all items or return the downpayments.

)n )ctober %:, $&&+, "ayoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and

dama#es a#ainst 'illena. 'illena moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

cause of action. 0e ar#ued that there was no #round to cancel the contract thus,

there was no basis for refund. The trial court denied his motion. 'illena thereafter

filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim citin# as an affirmative defense

"ayoyoHs failure to state a cause of action.

)n une $, $&&&, immediately after the trial court issued a pre=trial order, 'illenafiled a second motion to dismiss on the #round of lac of jurisdiction over the subject

matter but it was denied. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The trial court decided in favor of "ayoyo, reasonin# that the power to rescind is

implied in reciprocal obli#ations. Considerin# that 'illena repeatedly failed to

comply with his obli#ation, "ayoyo had the ri#ht to rescind the contract and demand

a refund. The trial court ordered petitioner to pay respondent "$+4,+%$./ as actual

dama#es plus $%W interest per annum from the date of filin# of the complaint

and "%, as moral dama#es plus le#al interest from judicial demand until fully

paid.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the 3TC decision with the followin# modifications5

$@ F"etitioner 'illena isG hereby ordered to pay Frespondent "ayoyoG actual

dama#es in the amount of "$//,$+-. with $%W interest per annum from

the date of the filin# of the complaint

%@ F"etitioner isG liewise ordered to deliver the (ndesit *ultifunction )ven

and (ndesit 0ob in favor of FrespondentG within thirty ?-@ days from the

finality of this decision and

-@ F3espondentG is hereby ordered to pay the purchase price of the (ndesit

*ultifunction )ven and (ndesit 0ob in favor of FpetitionerG on the day the

delivery is made.4

The appellate court reasoned that while there was delay in the delivery and

installation of the itchen cabinets, there was none in the delivery of the appliances.

The contract for said appliances did not specify the date of delivery but that delivery

should be made upon payment of the /W balance of the purchase price. Considerin#

that "ayoyo failed to pay the balance, 'illena did not incur delay.

0ence, the instant petition, where petitioner raises the followin# issues5 ?+@ (n all other cases in which the demand, eclusive of interest, dama#es of
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61/84

0ence, the instant petition, where petitioner raises the followin# issues5

(.

;06T063 )3 7)T T06 T3(AE C)93T 0A8 93(S8(CT()7 )'63 T06

S9!6CT *ATT63 )< T06 CAS6.

((.

;06T063 )3 7)T FT06G 86


62/84

, p

order from their Australian supplier was made only on $/ 8ecember $&&1.

8efendant promised plaintiff Fdelivery ofG the three ?-@ Pitchen Cabinets on or

before $ F*Gay $&&+, and the three ?-@ home appliances were considered fully paid

applyin# the ?/W@ downpayment of ?" %&,:-+./@ for home appliances only. !ut

defendant did not fulfill his promise

$-. 8espite all these, repeated demands for the installation of the ?-@ three itchen

FcGabinets and complete delivery of home appliances were made, but defendants didnothin#

$%?6mphasis added.@

A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or

rescission of contracts.$-An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an

action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore

falls under the jurisdiction of the 3TC.$4(n the present case, the averments in the

complaint show that "ayoyo sou#ht the cancellation of the contracts and refund of

the downpayments since 'illena failed to comply with the obli#ation to deliver the

appliances and install the itchen cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then

must eamine the facts and the applicable law to determine whether there is in fact

substantial breach that would warrant rescission or cancellation of the contracts and

entitle the respondent for a refund. ;hile the respondent prayed for the refund, this is

just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the

contracts.

W!EREFORE, the petition is -ENIE- for lac of merit. The 8ecision dated7ovember %$, %- of the Court of Appeals in CA=D.3. C' 7o. 1/$- and the

3esolution dated *arch $+, %4 are A


63/84

-AVI- LU,"etitioner,

= versus =

PATERNO LU /M, SR., PATERNO LU /M, R.,VICTOR LU /M, ET. AL. LU/M -EVELOPMENT

CORP.,3espondents.

PATERNO LU /M, SR., PATERNO LU /M, R.,VICTOR LU /M, O!N LU /M, KELL/ LU /M, anLU-O LU/M -EVELOPMENT CORP., "etitioners,

= versus =

-AVI- LU,

3espondent.O!N LU /M an LU-O LU/M -EVELOPMENTCORPORATION, "etitioner,

=versus=

T!E !ON. COURT OF APPEALS OF CEU CIT/@4o+)(+ T(n7(7 -'on, -AVI- LU, ROSA GO,

SILVANO LU-O CL CORPORATION, 3espondents.

G.R. No. 1%#690

G.R. No. 1%Q

G.R. No. 1&0889

"resent5

B7A36S=SA7T(AD),

Chairperson,CA3"()=*)3AE6S,

C0(C)=7ANA3(),

7AC093A, and

!3()7,%%.YY

"romul#ated5

Au#ust 4, %&=========================================================================================

NAC!URA,J.=


64/84

j p

implementation of the *arch $, %4 decision based on the

followin# #rounds5

a@ The *arch $, %4 decision of the 3TC was null and

void for denyin# petitionersH ri#ht to due process.

b@ The *ana#ement Committee or#anized by the 3TC in

the *arch $, %4 decision was unlawfully constituted.

c@ Supervenin# event has made the mana#ement

committee functus oficio.F4G

To resolve the motion judiciously, it is necessary to restate, albeit briefly,

the factual and procedural antecedents that #ave rise to these consolidated petitions.

)n Au#ust $4, %, 8avid Eu, 3osa Do, Silvano Eudo and CE Corporation

filed with the 3e#ional Trial Court ?3TC@ of Cebu City a complaint a#ainst "aterno

Eu Bm, Sr., "aterno Eu Bm, r., 'ictor Eu Bm, ohn Eu Bm, Pelly Eu Bm, and

Eudo I Euym 8evelopment Corporation ?EE8C@ for3eclaration of &ullit of

*"are 2ssue$ Receivers"ip and 3issolution. The case was doceted as Civil Case 7o.

C6!=%//%. The plaintiffs, shareholders of EE8C, claimed that the Eu Bm father

and sons, as members of the !oard of 8irectors, caused the issuance to the latter of

:, of the corporationHs unsubscribed and unissued shares for less than their

actual value. They then prayed for the dissolution of the corporation and the

appointment of a receiver durin# the pendency of the action.

The defendants therein moved to dismiss the complaint for non=compliance

with the requirement of certification of non=forum shoppin#, and for failure of theplaintiffs to eert efforts towards a compromise. The trial court denied the motion

and placed EE8C under receivership.

8efendants Eu Bm father and sons elevated the matter to the Court of

Appeals throu#h a petition for certiorari, doceted as CA=D.3. S" 7o.

:4$/4. 0owever, the same was dismissed for insufficient si#natures on the

verification and certification of non=forum shoppin#. Subsequently, they re=filed a

petition, which was doceted as CA=D.3. S" 7o. :4/%-. )n 8ecember %, %$,

the CA #ranted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. A##rieved,

8avid Eu ?8avid@, et al., came to this Court via D.3. 7o. $/-:&.

# # y

where the case was initially raffled, inhibited himself on motion of the Eu Bm father

and sons. The case was re=raffled to !ranch $$. The "residin# ud#e of the latter

branch directed the parties to amend their respective pleadin#s in order to conform to

the requirements of 3epublic Act 7o. +1&&, and the case was re=doceted as S3C

Case 7o. %$=C6!.

The Eu Bm father and sons then filed with the trial court a motion to lift the

order of receivership over EE8C. !efore the matter could be heard, 8avid instituteda petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA on the issue of the motion to

lift order of receivership, doceted as CA=D.3. S" 7o. 1--+-. )n


65/84

)n Au#ust %:, %+, this Court rendered jud#ment as aforesaid. Eu Bm

father and sons filed the instant *otion for 3econsideration. ;e required 8avid, et

al., to submit their Comment thereto. ;ith our directive complied with, we now

resolve the *otion for 3econsideration.

(n our Au#ust %:, %+ 8ecision, we declared that the subject matter of the

complaint filed by 8avid, et al., was one incapable of pecuniary

estimation. *ovants be# us to reconsider this position, pointin# out that the casefiled below by 8avid, et al., had for its objective the nullification of the issuance of

:, shares of stoc of EE8C. The complaint itself contained the alle#ation that

the Jreal value of these shares, based on underlyin# real estate values, was )ne

!illion 6i#hty Seven *illion


66/84

object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in

that province affected thereby. )nly from the time of filin# such

notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the

property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of

the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency a#ainst the

parties desi#nated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendenshereinabove mentioned may becancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showin# that

the notice is for the purpose of molestin# the adverse party, or that

it is not necessary to protect the ri#hts of the party who caused it to

be recorded.F$-G

A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a

particular real property is in liti#ation, servin# as a warnin# that one who acquires

interest over said property does so at his own ris, or that he #ambles on the result of

the liti#ation over the said property. The filin# of a notice of lis pendenschar#es all

stran#ers with notice of the particular liti#ation referred to therein and, therefore, any

ri#ht they may thereafter acquire over the property is subject to the eventuality of the

suit. Such announcement is founded upon public policy and necessity, the purpose of

which is to eep the properties in liti#ation within the power of the court until the

liti#ation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the jud#ment or decree by

subsequent alienation.F$4G

As a #eneral rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendensmay be by recent pronouncements which stemmed
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67/84

availed of are as follows5 ?a@ an action to recover possession of real estate ?b@ an

action for partition and ?c@ any other court proceedin#s that directly affect the title to

the land or the buildin# thereon or the use or the occupation thereof. Additionally,

this Court has held that resortin# to lis pendensis not necessarily confined to cases

that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation also applies to

suits seein# to establish a ri#ht to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real

property or to enforce a lien$ a c"arge or an encumbrance against it.F$/G

7onto the #eneral rule becauseof the presence of ?a5(5

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned

acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous

to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the

subject matter of the action is a matter of law and

may not be conferred by consent or a#reement of

the parties. The lac of jurisdiction of a court

may be raised at any sta#e of the proceedin#s,

even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified

principally from the rulin# in the cited case

of FTijamG. (t is to be re#retted, however, that the

holdin# in said case had been applied to

situations which were obviously not

contemplated therein. The eceptional

circumstance involved in FTijamG which justified

the departure from the accepted concept of non=

waivability of objection to jurisdiction has beeni#nored and, instead a blanet doctrine had been

repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed

rulin# in FTijamG not as the eception, but rather

the #eneral rule, virtually overthrowin#

alto#ether the time=honored principle that the

issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or

by estoppel.

(n !iam, the lac of jurisdiction was raised for the first

time in a motion to dismiss filed almost 447((n @1% y(a+after the

questioned rulin# had been rendered. 0ence, the Court ruled that

the issue of jurisdiction may no lon#er be raised for bein# barred

by laches.

The circumstances of the present case are different

from !iam. Spouses 'ar#as raised the issue of jurisdiction before

the trial court rendered its decision. They continued to raise the

issue in their appeal before the Court of Appeals and this

Court. 0ence, it cannot be said that laches has set in. The

eception in !iamfinds no application in this case and the #eneral

rule must apply, that the question of jurisdiction of a court may beraised at any sta#e of the proceedin#s. Spouses 'ar#as are

therefore not estopped from questionin# the jurisdiction of the trial

court.F$1G

The ehortations of this Court in the above=cited case have constrained us

to loo more closely into the nature of the participation of the movants in the

proceedin#s, to determine whether the eceptional principle of estoppel may be

applied a#ainst them. The records show that the very first pleadin# filed by the Eu

Bm father and sons before the court a quowas a motion to dismiss, albeit anchored

on the #round of insufficiency of the certificate of non=forum shoppin# and failure of

the plaintiffs to eert efforts towards a compromise. ;hen the trial court denied this, is GRANTE-. The 8ecision of this Court dated Au#ust %:,
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68/84

they went up to the CA on certiorari$where they were sustained and the appellate

court ordered the dismissal of the complaint below.

7et, the Eu Bm father and sons filed a motion for the liftin# of the

receivership order, which the trial court had issued in the interim. 8avid, et al.,

brou#ht the matter up to the CA even before the trial court could resolve the

motion. Thereafter, 8avid, et al., filed their *otion to Admit Complaint to Conform

to the (nterim 3ules Dovernin# (ntra=Corporate Controversies. (t was at this pointthat the Eu Bm father and sons raised the question of the amount of filin# fees

paid. They raised this point a#ain in the CA when they appealed the trial courtHs

decision in the case below.

;e find that, in the circumstances, the Eu Bm father and sons are not

estopped from challen#in# the jurisdiction of the trial court. They raised the

insufficiency of the docet fees before the trial court rendered jud#ment and

continuously maintained their position even on appeal to the CA. Althou#h the

manner of challen#e was erroneous they should have addressed this issue directly

to the trial court instead of to the )CA they should not be deemed to have waived

their ri#ht to assail the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The matter of lac of jurisdiction of the trial court is one that may be raised

at any sta#e of the proceedin#s. *ore importantly, this Court may pass upon this

issue motu proprio.

0ence, notwithstandin# that the petition in D.3. 7o. $1++& is a special

civil action for certiorariand prohibition assailin# an interlocutory resolution of the

CA, we have the power to order the dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of

ori#in and render all incidents herein moot and academic.

;ith the fore#oin# findin#s, there is no more need to discuss the other

ar#uments raised in the *otion for 3econsideration.

(n summary, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for

failure of 8avid, et.al. to pay the correct docet fees. Consequently, all interlocutory

matters pendin# before this Court, specifically the incidents subject of these three

consolidated petitions, must be denied for bein# moot and academic. ;ith the

dismissal of the main action, the ancillary motions have no more le# to stand on.

W!EREFORE,in view of the fore#oin#, the *otion for 3econsideration

filed by ohn Eu Bm and Eudo I EuBm 8evelopment Corporation

%+ is RECONSI-ERE- an SET ASI-E. The complaint in S3C Case 7o. %$=C6!, now on appeal with the Court of Appeals in CA D.3. C' 7o. +$$:-,

is -ISMISSE-.

All interlocutory matters challen#ed in these consolidated petitions

are -ENIE-for bein# moot and academic.

SO OR-ERE-.

CEFERINA -E UNGRIA ;-ECEASE-


69/84

3*7737( *y (+ !EIRS, +(>+((n7( *yLOLITA UNGRIA SAN UANAVIER, anR!O-ORA R. PELOMI-A a 7(+ A77o+n(yn4a57, "etitioner,

- versus -

T!E !ONORALE COURT OF APPEALS,T!E !ONORALE REGIONAL TRIALCOURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CIT/,RANC! #%, ROSARIO -I-ELES V-A. -ECASTOR, NEPT!ALIE CASTOR ITUCAS,FEROL/N CASTOR FACURI, RAC!EL -ECASTOR, LEA CASTOR -OLLOLOSA, anROSALIE CASTOR ENE-ICTO,3espondents.

P+((n7=

CA3"(),Y%.,

'6EASC), 3.,%.$ C"airperson$

"63AETA, A!A8, and

*678)NA,%%.

P+o)3?a7(=

uly %/, %$$

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =- E C I S I O N

PERALTA,J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorariare the 8ecisionF$Gdated *ay

%:, %4 and the 3esolution F%Gdated September $1, %4 of the Court of Appeals

?CA@ in CA=D.3. S" 7o. :1:4.

)n Au#ust %:, $&&&, respondents 3osario 8ideles 'da. de Castor ?3osario@,

7epthalie Castor (tucas,


70/84

"etitioner filed an )mnibus *otionF$Gasin# the 3TC to resolve the issues of

?$@ whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or epun#ed from the records

pursuant to Supreme Court ?SC@ Circular 7o. 1 ?%@ reconsiderin# the findin#s

contained in the )rder dated


71/84

filin# of the complaint, thus, the 3TC had acquired jurisdiction over the case despite

the failure to state the amount of dama#es claimed in the body of the complaint or in

the prayer thereof. The CA found that the 3TC did not commit #rave abuse of

discretion amountin# to lac of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner2s motion to

dismiss. (t noted that the 3TC2s Clarificatory )rder dated *arch -, %, which

stated that Jif after hearin# the Cler of Court determines that the filin# fee is still

insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the jud#ment that may be

enteredK was in accordance with the rule laid down in *un 2nsurance /ffice$ 0td. v.Asuncion.F$1G The CA proceeded to state that a judicious eamination of the

complaint pointed to a determination of the respective ri#hts and interests of the

parties over the property based on the issues presented therein which could only be

determined in a full=blown trial on the merits of the case.

"etitioner filed a *otion for 3econsideration, which the CA denied in a

3esolution dated September $1, %4. The CA ruled, amon# others, that the

defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were liewise unavailin#. (t found

that the subject property is covered by a Torrens title ?)CT 7o. '=$&//:@ thus, it is

aiomatic that adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of

ownership for the period fied by law is ineffective a#ainst a Torrens title that unless

there are intervenin# ri#hts of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a

decision directin# the return of the lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of laches

will not apply as a#ainst the re#istered owner.

0ence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the

followin# assi#nment of errors5

T06 C)93T )< A""6AES 63368 (7 7)T


72/84

eercise5

?-@ 6clusive ori#inal

jurisdiction in all civil actions

which involve title to, or

possession of, real property, orany interest therein where the

assessed value of the property

or interest therein does not

eceed Twenty Thousand

"esos ?"%,.@ or, in civil

actions in *etro *anila, where

such assessed value does not

eceed


73/84

of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has

adopted the criterion of first ascertainin# the nature of the principal

action or remedy sou#ht. (f it is primarily for the recovery of a

sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary

estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in

the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the

claim. 0owever, where the basic issue is somethin# other than the

ri#ht to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purelyincidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sou#ht, this

Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the

liti#ation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are

co#nizable eclusively by courts of first instance ?now 3e#ional

Trial [email protected]%%G

Thus, respondents correctly filed their Complaint with the 3TC.

(t is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the

complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docet and filin#fees.F%-G (t is not simply the filin# of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleadin#,

but the payment of the prescribed docet fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction

over the subject matter or nature of the action.F%4G

Section 1?b@?$@ of 3ule $4$ of the 3ules of Court provides5

S6C. 1. Clers of Regional !rial Courts. = ?a@


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?a@ )rderin# the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay

plaintiffs actual and compensatory dama#es such as are proved

durin# the hearin# of this case

?b@ )rderin# the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay

plaintiffs attorneys2 fees and moral dama#es, all to be proveddurin# the hearin# of this case.F%+G

Thus, the 3TC should have dismissed the case, since respondents did not specify the

amount of dama#es in their prayer.

;e are not persuaded.

SC Circular 7o. 1 was brou#ht about by our rulin# in Manc"ester

3evelopment Corporation v. Court of Appeals,F%&Gwhere we held that a pleadin#

which does not specify in the prayer the amount of dama#es bein# ased for shall not

be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be epun#ed from the record and that the

Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribeddocet fee.

0owever, in *un 2nsurance /ffice$ 0td. v. Asuncion,F-Gwe laid down the

followin# #uidelines in the payment of docet fees, to wit5

$. (t is not simply the filin# of the complaint or appropriate

initiatory pleadin#, but the payment of the prescribed docet fee,

that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or

nature of the action. ;here the filin# of the initiatory pleadin# is

not accompanied by payment of the docet fee, the court mayallow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case

beyond the applicable prescriptive or re#lementary period.

%. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third=

party claims and similar pleadin#s, which shall not be considered

filed until and unless the filin# fee prescribed therefor is paid. The

court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time

but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or

re#lementary period.

by the filin# of the appropriate pleadin# and payment of the

prescribed filin# fee but, subsequently, the jud#ment awards a

claim not specified in the pleadin#, or if specified the same has

been left for determination by the court, the additional filin# fee

therefor shall constitute a lien on the jud#ment. (t shall be the

responsibility of the Cler of Court or his duly=authorized deputy

to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Subsequently, in'eirs of )ertuldo 'inog v. Melicor,F-$G we said5


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"etitioner claims that the action is barred by etraordinary acquisitive

prescription and laches. "etitioner contends that she too possession of the land in

the concept of an owner

Documents

(02)Civpro - Jurisdiction Part 1