Занятие 2, 18.10, ОТиПЛ МГУ

Виталий Долгоруков

НИУ ВШЭ, фак-т философии, ИГИТИ

Наталья Зевахина,

НИУ ВШЭ, фак-т филологии (направление

лингвистики)

Введение в современную

лингвистическую прагматику

Часть I. Неограйсианство и

скалярные импликатуры

Нео-грайсианство

Реинтерпретация максим Грайса:

Максимы Хорна

Максимы Левинсона

Скалярные импликатуры

Сердце нео-грайсианства

Экспериментально тестируемые

Нет единой теории

Максимы Хорна Q Principle

Make your contribution sufficient; say as much as you can (given R)

Quantity-1, Obscurity Avoidance, and Ambiguity Avoidance

R Principle

Make your contribution necessary; say no more than you must (given Q)

Quantity-2, Brevity, Maxims of Relation, and Orderliness

Максимы Левинсона

Q-heuristic: What isn’t said, isn’t.

I-heuristic: What is expressed simply is stereotypically

exemplified.

M-heuristic: What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t

normal.

Скалярные импликатуры

Подмаксима-1 первой максимы количества/

информативности (Говори настолько информативно,

насколько это требуется)

Порождение скалярных импликатур основывается на

априори существующих шкалах, состоящих из

множества языковых выражений, ранжированных от

менее информативных к более информативным.

Например, <some, all>, <might, have to>, <warm, hot> и

др.

Стандартный рецепт для

порождения скалярных

импликатур

Bonnie took some of the pears.

i. Вместо того, чтобы произнести (1), Говорящий мог бы сделать более сильное утверждение:

(1*) Bonnie stole all the pears.

Почему же он так не сделал?

ii. Наиболее правдоподобное объяснение состоит в том, что Говорящий не верит, что (1*) истинно:

BelS (1*).

iii. Говорящий может иметь мнение о том, истинно ли (1*): BelS(1*) BelS ((1*)).

iv. Из (ii) и (iii) следует BelS ((1*)): Говорящий верит, что Бонни не взяла все груши.

Терминология

Шаг ii называется слабой импликатурой (weak

implicature);

Шаг iii – Competence Assumption

(предположение о компетентности

Говорящего);

Шаг iv называется сильной импликатурой

(strong implicature).

i. Weak implicature: BelS ()

ii. Competence: BelS () BelS ( )

iii. Strong implicature: BelS ( )

Pouscoulous 2006

Стандартный рецепт для других

количественных импликатур

A: Вышла ли книга Сидорова?

B: Он вычитал ее. (2)

i. Вместо того, чтобы произнести (2), B мог бы сделать более сильное утверждение:

(2*) Да, она вышла.

Почему же он так не сделал?

ii. Наиболее правдоподобное объяснение состоит в том, что B не верит, что (2*) истинно:

BelB (2*).

iii. B имеет мнение о том, истинно ли (2*) : BelB (2*) BelB ((2*)).

iv. Из (ii) и (iii) следует BelB ((2*)): B верит, что книга Сидорова еще не вышла.

Альтернативы Одна из проблем в теории скалярных импликатур

Как они порождаются?

Какой длины и сложности они должны быть?

Верно ли, что существуют контекстуальные и

дефолтные шкалы?

На уровне высказывания

Релевантность

Субституциональность

Релевантность

Дискурсивные цели – общие цели

собеседников;

Интересы Слушающего;

Общие интересы.

Субституциональность?

Horn

Chierchia, Fox, Katzir и др. (MIT группа)

Hirschberg, Geurts, Pouscoulous, Noveck и др.

Более общая проблема

Дефолтизм или контекстуализм?

Chierchia 2004, 2006

Chierchia 2004, 2006

Вложенные импликатуры?

Контекстуалисты: доказывают, что они не

существуют;

Дефолтисты: утверждают и доказывают, что

они существуют.

Монотонность

Проблема симметричности (3) Example

α: John read three books.

SI: (John read four books)

Potential alternatives:

β: John read four books.

γ: John read exactly three books.

Symmetry problem

For any sentence S for which we would like to derive a SI using an alternative S1, there is always another potential alternative, S2 = S & S1 which, if taken into account, would prevent the desired inference from arising.

Решения Horn (1972)

Alternatives are scale-mates. They are either monotonic, or non-monotonic.

To derive the SI in (3), we must be able to negate β but not γ. On Horn’s assumptions, this is accomplished by including the former but not the latter in the set of scale-mates: three and four are scale-mates; three and exactly three are not.

Gazdar (1979)

“Scales are, in some sense, ‘given to us’”.

Atlas & Levinson (1981)

Alternatives should be from the same semantic field, of the same brevity, and lexicalized to the same degree.

Hirshberg (1985)

Alternatives are salient in a particular context.

Conversational Condition

(Matsumoto 1995)

The choice of W instead of S must not be attributed

to the observance of any information-selecting

Maxim of Conversation other than the Quality

Maxims and the Quantity-1 Maxim (i.e., the Maxims

of Quantity-2, Relation, and Obscurity Avoidance,

etc.)

Matsumoto 1995

Informativeness requirement

S must entail W

Functional alternative requirement

S and W must belong to the same semantic field

(Atlas and Levinson 1981)

S and W must form a salient scale in a given

discourse (Hirshberg 1985)

Matsumoto 1995 Possible Horn scales

They satisfy the informativeness requirement

Or equally, the notion of Horn scale might refer to the

set of all scales that can license a Quantity-1

implicature at least in some context

Functional Horn scales

They satisfy both the informativeness requirement and

the functional alternative requirement in a given context

C

Logical entailment is neither a necessary condition

(<spaniel, dog>), nor a sufficient condition ({Sephardic,

Ladino, Spanish}) on Horn scales

Katzir 2007 CONVERSATIONAL PRINCIPLE (alternative-sensitive): do not assert if there is another sentence ’ A () such that both

a. , and

b. is weakly assertable

WEAK ASSERTABILITY

A structure will be said to be weakly assertable by a speaker S if S believes that is true, relevant, and supported by evidence. (i.e., following Maxims of Quality 1 and 2, and Relation).

Katzir 2007 Complexity is based on the idea that we can transform into a structure that is no more complex if we restrict ourselves to (a) deleting elements in , and (b) substituting elements in with other elements from an appropriately defined source.

SUBSTITUTION SOURCE (Katzir (2007))

Let be a parse tree. The substitution source for , written as L() is the union of the lexicon of the language with the set of all subtrees of .

Substitution source is a collection of objects that are available for further syntactic operations.

Matsumoto’s example

Matsumoto’s example is captured by Substitution

Source:

: It was warm yesterday, and it was a little bit more

than warm today.

Implicature: It was not a little bit more than warm

yesterday.

Matsumoto’s conclusion: Brevity is not an

information-selecting maxim. It does not choose

between statements with different meanings.

Fox and Katzir 2009 Let S, S1, S2 be three sentences. We will say that S1 and S2 are

symmetric alternatives of S if both S1, S2 S, and

S1 S S2

F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing scalar items in S with

their scale mates}

A = C F(S)

C is a set of contextually determined sentences.

F(S) restricts alternatives and is needed to avoid a symmetry

problem.

Fox and Katzir 2009

Relation of at-most-as-complex-as

S C S’ if S can be derived from S’ by successive

substitutions of sub-constituents of S’ with elements

of the substitution source for S’ in C, SS (S’, C).

SS (X, C), the substitution source for X in context

C, is the union of the following sets:

a. The lexicon

b. The sub-constituents of X

c. The set of salient constituents in C

Focus and scalar inferences

Alternatives for both SI and AF are determined in

the same way.

The set of alternatives in both cases is a

contextual restriction of the focus value of the

sentence (that is, computing SI involves AF).

Contextual restriction is subject to a constraint

that prevents it from breaking symmetry.

Focus values are determined based on structural

rather than semantic (type-theoretic)

considerations.

(4) John did some of the homework.

Implicature: (John did all of the homework)

SIA (S) = { Si: Si NSI (A,S)}

F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing scalar items in S with their scale mates}

(5) John only introduced Mary to Sue.

Inference: (John introduced Jane to Sue)

EXCA (S) = { Si: Si NAF (A,S)}

OnlyA (S) = S EXCA (S)

F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing focused items in S with their focus alternatives}

Claim: FSI (S) = FAF (S)

Differences between Focus and SIs Intonation: focus is always intonationally marked (in

spoken language).

Contextual dependency: focus alternatives are always context-dependent.

Scalar implicatures can be either weak or strong. When they are weak, they have nothing in common with focus.

Monotonicity does not hold for focus.

Psycholinguistic plausibility: focus assertion excludes other alternatives in 100% cases, it does not vary from speaker to speaker.

Focus is a semantic phenomenon whereas scalar implicature belongs to pragmatics.

Similarities between Focus and SIs

Substitution

In order to compute a scalar implicature, a hearer

has to ‘focus‘ on a constituent in question.

Zondervan (2010) experimentally showed that

focused items increase triggering scalar

implicatures compared to non-focused ones

though not drastically.

Литература Chierchia, G. (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena and the

syntax/ pragmatics interface. In A. Belletti (Ed.), Structures and beyond, pp.

39–103. Oxford University Press.

Chierchia, G. (2006). Broaden your views: implicatures of domain widening

and the “logicality” of language. Linguistic inquiry 37: 535–590.

Chierchia, G., D. Fox, and B. Spector (to appear). The grammatical view of

scalar implicatures and the relationship between semantics and pragmatics.

In C. Maienborn, K. von Heusinger, and P. Portner (Eds.), Handbook of

semantics. Mouton de Gruyter.

Fox, D. and R. Katzir (2010). On the characterization of alternatives //

Natural Language Semantics 19: 87–107.

Gazdar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition, and logical

form. New York: Academic Press.

Geurts, B. (2010). Quantity implicatures. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2010.

Harnish, R. (1976), Logical Form and Implicature. In T. Bever, J. Katz and T.

Langendoen (Eds.)(1976), An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Abilities, New

York: Crowell, pp. 464-479.

Литература Hirschberg, J. (1985). A theory of scalar implicature. Ph.D. thesis,

University of Pennsylvania.

Horn, L. R. (1972). On the semantic properties of the logical operators in

English. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles.

Horn, L. R. (1984). Towards a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-

based and R-based implicature. In D. Schiffrin (Ed.), Meaning, form, and

use in context: linguistic applications, pp. 11–42. Washington: Georgetown

University Press.

Horn, L. R. (2006). The border wars: a neo-Gricean perspective. In K. von

Heusinger and K. Turner (Eds.), Where semantics meets pragmatics, pp.

21–48. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Katzir, R. (2007). Structurally-defined alternatives // Linguist and Philos

(2007) 30: 669–690.

Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings. Cambridge,

Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Matsumoto, Y. (1995). The conversational condition on Horn scales.

Linguistics and philosophy 18: 21–60.

Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson

Часть II. Неограйсианство и

Релевантность

Introduction: 1. Pragmatics; Part I.

Relevance and Meaning: 2. The mapping

between the mental and the public lexicon;

3. Truthfulness and relevance; 4. Rhetoric

and relevance; 5. A deflationary account of

metaphors; 6. Explaining irony; Part II.

Explicit and Implicit Communication: 7.

Linguistic form and relevance; 8. Pragmatics

and time; 9. Recent approaches to bridging:

truth, coherence, relevance; 10. Mood and

the analysis of non-declarative sentences;

11. Metarepresentation in linguistic

communication; Part III. Cross-disciplinary

Themes: 12. Pragmatics, modularity and

mindreading; 13. Testing the cognitive and

communicative principles of relevance; 14.

The why and how of experimental

pragmatics; 15. A pragmatic perspective on

the evolution of language.

Истоки теории релевантности

Теория импликатур П.Грайса

«Модулярная теория сознания» Дж.Фодора

Grice -> Relevance theory

«Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to

work out in detail one of Grice’s central claims:

that an essential feature of most human

communication is the expression and recognition

of intentions (Grice 1989: Essays 1–7, 14, 18;

Retrospective Epilogue)» [Sperber D., Wilson D.

Relevance Theory // G. Ward, L. Horn (eds)

Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004,

p.607]

Недостатки грайсианства с точки

зрения теории релевантности

Слишком много принципов

Никак не объясняются систематические

нарушения максим

Анализ иронии и метафор как нарушения

максимы качества

«Relevance, and the maximisation of relevance,

is the key to human cognition.»

Кодовая и инференциональная

модели коммуникации

«The goal of inferential pragmatics is to explain

how the hearer infers the speaker’s meaning on

the basis of the evidence provided»

Effect\effort

Explicature\implicature

Echoic utterances and irony

Principles of relevance

«Мы считаем, что решающее значение в

обработке новой информации (в особенности

передаваемой с помощью языковых средств)

имеет объединение ее с контекстом —адекватно

избранным множеством фоновых допущений,

извлеченных из памяти дедуктивного

устройства». [НЗЛ,224]

Презумпция оптимальной релевантности

(а) Набор допущений {I}, который коммуникант намеревается довести до сознания адресата, является достаточно релевантным для того, чтобы потребовать от адресата приложения необходимых усилий для обработки остенсивных стимулов.

(б) Остенсивные стимулы, используемые коммуникантом, являются наиболее релевантными из тех, которые могли быть использованы для передачи {I}.

Принцип релевантности

«Любой акт остенсивной коммуникации

содержит презумпцию своей собственной

оптимальной релевантности».

a.Peter: How far is Nottingham from London?

b.Mary: 120 miles.

c.Mary: 118 miles.

Mary, of Peter, who has just tripped over his own

feet:

Peter’s just like Rudolf Nureyev

Peter is very clumsy.

Peter is not at all like Rudolf Nureyev.

a. Peter bought a paper before leaving.

b. Peter purchased a newspaper prior to

departure.

More generally, relevance theory sheds light on

the cognitive effects of style. Some stylistic

effects are not deliberately achieved: for example,

the speaker’s choice of vocabulary may betray

her social or political attitudes. Such attitudes

may also be deliberately communicated. To take

just one illustration, modern English speakers

who prefer the form of words ‘he or she to the

more economical form ‘he’ communicate that, for

them, choice of the more economical form would

carry unwanted implications

a. I have no brothers or sisters.

b. I have no siblings.

The differences between (a) and (b) are straight-forwardly

explained on the assumption that the relative brevity of the

word ‘sibling’ is not enough to offset the increase in

processing cost resulting from its infrequency, so that (a) is

more economical overall.

An anomaly in Grice’s framework is thus removed.

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Robyn Carston & Seiji Uchida (eds.) Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications.

John Benjamins, Amsterdam: 283-93.

Happe F. Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of

relevance theory // Cognition, 48.2, 1993 pp. 101–

19,http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/readinggroup/Happe%201993.pdf

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van Rooij R., Franke M., de Jager T. Relevance in Cooperation and Conflict,

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72,http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/project/wine/dosdevices/z:/mit/lugia/MacData/afs.cours

e/24/24.954/OldFiles/www/files/saul.gricecritics.pdf

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Press, 1986. (Second edition 1995. Blackwell, Oxford.)

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//Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Vol.10, 1987, pp. 697-75.

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25, http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Linguistic-form-and-

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Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson.(2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading //

Mind & Language 17: 3–23,http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-

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Stainton, Robert J.(1994). Using non-sentences: An application of relevance theory //

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