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‘‘WHAT DO BARBARIANS KNOW OFGRATITUDE?’’ — THE STEREOTYPE OF

BARBARIAN PERFIDY AND ITS USES IN TANGFOREIGN POLICY RHETORIC

SHAO-YUN YANG

University of California, Berkeley, USA

This essay argues that, in Tang foreign policy discourse, the stereotype of a moraldichotomy between barbarian perfidy and Chinese trustworthiness was primarily atool for rhetorical posturing, deployed to justify making war on foreign peoples withwhom the Tang had a prior peace agreement. This is demonstrated through closeanalysis of the political rhetoric surrounding Tang relations with neighboring steppeor Central Asian powers during the periods 625–645 and 734–739, with particularattention to contextualizing the rhetoric of the emperors Taizong and Xuanzong.The essay also presents a new interpretation of the famous 630 debate over theresettlement of the Eastern Turks, arguing that the rhetoric of perfidy, loyalty, andmoral or cultural transformation in which that debate was conducted obscures itsorigin in a pragmatic strategic dilemma that could not be openly expressed.

KEYWORDS: foreign relations, political rhetoric, stereotypes, barbarians, perfidy

One of the most distinctive claims made about barbarians (Yi 夷, Yi-Di 夷狄, orRong-Di戎狄) in Tang political rhetoric was that they were ‘‘faithless’’ (wuxin無信)— that is, given to treachery and therefore lacking trustworthiness (xin 信).1

Variations of this claim included arguments that barbarians lacked yi 義, a complexconcept that encompassed ideals of moral duty (i.e., ‘‘doing the right thing’’) in

1 In this essay, I have opted to leave ‘‘Yi,’’ ‘‘Yi-Di,’’ and ‘‘Rong-Di’’ untranslated in quotationsfrom primary sources. The reader should note that, although the terms ‘‘Yi,’’ ‘‘Rong,’’ and ‘‘Di’’originated as ethnonyms applied to specific peoples, they eventually acquired generic andsynecdochic properties, especially when combined as ‘‘Yi-Di’’ or ‘‘Rong-Di.’’ In imperial Chinesesources, they typically connote both foreignness and inferiority, thus making ‘‘barbarian’’ themost suitable translation in English. I use the term ‘‘barbarian’’ when discussing stereotypes anddiscourses about the Yi/Yi-Di/Rong-Di, and the terms ‘‘foreign’’ and ‘‘foreigner’’ when describingobjective realities or translating the neutral generic label fan 蕃. In so doing, I take a middle pathbetween the extremes recently represented by Beckwith, who insists that no Chinese word shouldbe translated as ‘‘barbarian,’’ and Abramson, who holds that ‘‘barbarian’’ accurately translates allChinese labels applied to foreigners. See Christopher I. Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: AHistory of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 2009), 355–62; Marc S. Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 3. See also further discussion in note 10 below.

Tang Studies, 31. 28–74, 2013

# T’ang Studies Society 2013 DOI: 10.1179/0737503413Z.0000000008

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general, but that referredmore specifically to ‘‘integrity’’ when it came to questions oftrust; or that they had no true understanding of enyi恩義, the sense of gratitude thatwas the right or dutiful (yi) moral response to exceptional kindness (en) from others.

The user of such an argument could also aim for added force and authority byinvoking the idea that barbarians had ‘‘the faces of men and the hearts of beasts’’(renmian shouxin 人面獸心). The locus classicus of this phrase was the Hanshu,where Ban Gu班固 (32–92 CE) used it to denigrate and dehumanize the Xiongnu匈奴. This denigration was part of a larger argument against continued war with theNorthernXiongnu; theHan court had only recently aborted an attempt at seizing theWestern Regions 西域 from Northern Xiongnu control, and Ban Gu was amongthose who believed any such expansion was ill-conceived and wasteful of resources.Ban’s ‘‘Appraisal’’ (zan 讚) on the Xiongnu thus attempted to show that they werecompletely different from the Chinese and not even fully human, and thus not worththe trouble of conquering. However, the ‘‘Appraisal’’ also claimed that the heqin 和親 peace covenant of the earlyWesternHan2 was not a viable solution either: ‘‘Whenone makes covenants with them, one buys them off at much cost, only to bedeceived’’ (約之則費賂而見欺).3 Tang users of the ‘‘hearts of beasts’’ motif generallyseized on this latter idea, using the motif to encapsulate an argument that barbarians,not having human hearts, therefore lacked something fundamental to proper humanrelationships: the ability to keep one’s word and remain loyal. In other words, thebarbarians’ innate nature supposedly made it inevitable that they would eventuallybetray their rulers, kinsmen, friends, and allies out of selfish greed or ambition.

Previous scholarship has tended to interpret this myth of barbarian perfidy as aproduct of ethnic or racialist prejudice, xenophobia, and an idealized, overinflated

3 Hanshu (hereafter HS; this and all subsequent references to the twenty-four dynastic historiesare to the Beijing Zhonghua shuju edition), 94.3834. Recent studies by Yuri Pines and Tamara Chinhave interpreted Ban Gu’s denigration of the Xiongnu as evidence of an emerging ‘‘exclusive’’ or‘‘phobic’’ side to Han discourse about foreigners. According to these interpretations, Ban saw nopotential for moral or cultural common ground between the Han and its Xiongnu enemy, althoughPines and Chin differ over whether he was indebted to pre-imperial models of thought and whether hewas an isolationist or a hawk. In light of the geopolitical context within which Ban wrote theHanshu,I read his ‘‘Appraisal’’ on the Xiongnu differently as an example of a rhetorical strategy that used theinferiority and otherness of barbarians as a justification for not waging expensive and potentiallyinterminable wars of territorial expansion. In an essay influenced by Pines, Paul Goldin attributes thisrhetorical strategy to the Western Han minister Zhufu Yan主父偃 (d. 126 BCE) but does not do thesame for Ban Gu. For Zhufu Yan’s memorial and other Western Han anti-war or anti-expansionistarguments that previously employed this strategy with regard to the Xiongnu and southern peoples,see Shiji (hereafter SJ), 112.2954; HS, 52.2398, 52.2401, 64.2777–85, 64.2801, 64.2830–34. BanGu’s anti-expansionist views are apparent in his ‘‘Appraisal’’ on the Western Regions atHS, 96.3928–30; he only shifted to endorsing war about ten years later, when his political patron’s future (and thushis own) appeared to depend on the success of an ambitious expedition to drive the Northern Xiongnuoff the steppe. See Yuri Pines, ‘‘Beasts or Humans: Pre-imperial Origins of the Sino-barbarianDichotomy,’’ inMongols, Turks, andOthers: EurasianNomads and the SedentaryWorld, eds. ReuvenAmitai and Michal Biran (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 79–81, 90–91; Chin, ‘‘Defamiliarizing the Foreigner,’’316–20. Paul R. Goldin, ‘‘Steppe Nomads as a Philosophical Problem in Classical China,’’ inMappingMongolia: SituatingMongolia in theWorld fromGeologic Time to the Present, ed. Paula L.W. Sabloff(Philadelphia: University of PennsylvaniaMuseum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2011), 228–34.

2 Under the heqin covenant, the Western Han gave princesses to the Xiongnu rulers in marriage,as well as a yearly gift of items including silk, wine, grain, and gold, and allowed theXiongnu to tradeat border markets. In return, the Xiongnu undertook not to raid Han territory. On this subject, seemost recently Tamara T. Chin, ‘‘Defamiliarizing the Foreigner: Sima Qian’s Ethnography and Han-Xiongnu Marriage Diplomacy,’’ Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 70.2 (2010): 337–52.

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self-image.4 The mainstream opinion, especially in Chinese-language historiography,has been that such sentiments ran counter to the supposed ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’ of theTang elite and were only held by a conservative minority. Marc Abramson’s recentEthnic Identity in Tang China takes the opposite stand, claiming that a ‘‘fundamentalbelief in non-Han treachery’’ was ‘‘the default stereotype in discourse on ethnicdifference’’ and that ‘‘[m]istrust of the outsider […] was deeply ingrained into Han[Chinese] society.’’5 In my view, both of these positions are too extreme. Ethnicprejudice and ethnocentric attitudes clearly did exist in the Tang and were morecommon than is often acknowledged; at the same time, we should not overestimatetheir pervasiveness and the extent of their influence on imperial policy. Abramson’sinterpretation raises the question of how the Tang empire was consistently able toemploy foreigners as commanders and auxiliary troops in its expeditionary and frontierarmies— as it is well known to have done—without worrying about their reliability.6

There is a clear disconnect between the frequently used rhetoric of barbarian perfidy

4 A notable exception is Michael Drompp, who points out that the Tang court also useddehumanizing rhetoric to accuse internal enemies of treacherous ingratitude, particularly by labelingthem as ‘‘xiao and jing’’梟獍— these being (respectively) owl-like and leopard-like animals believedto kill and eat their mothers. Drompp argues: ‘‘[This phrase’s] widespread use in the language ofpublic edicts reveals that in the Tang mind, a bestial, immoral nature was not the domain offoreigners alone. Indeed, the symbol was far too rich to be used on foreigners alone. It is important tonote this, particularly since so much has been written regarding the ‘bestialization’ of foreigners byChinese writers.’’ Drompp’s point is important in correcting assumptions that all dehumanizingrhetoric produced by the Tang court was rooted in racialist or ethnocentric thinking, but he perhapsgoes to the opposite extreme by seeing all such rhetoric as equally applicable to foreign enemies andrebels alike. For example, the ‘‘faces of men and hearts of beasts’’ trope seems to have appearedalmost exclusively in rhetoric directed at foreign peoples, thanks to the Hanshu precedent. I wouldalso argue that the association of barbarians with perfidy appears often enough in Tang rhetoric tobe interpreted as a distinct stereotype. See Michael R. Drompp, Tang China and the Collapse of theUighur Empire: A Documentary History (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 172–74.

5 Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China, 24–26. See also his discussion on 51, whichtakes this interpretation to the level of theory.

6 Passages in the Jiu Tangshu, Xin Tangshu, and Zizhi tongjian claim that during the reign ofTaizong, the court never appointed foreign generals — including even the talented and loyal Ashina*Zhanir (She’er)阿史那社爾 (ca. 609–655) and *Kibir *Garek (Qibi Heli) 契苾何力 (d. 677) — tothe highest command positions because of concerns that they might use their troops to rebel.(Hypothetical reconstructions of non-Chinese names and titles, which are based solely on writtenChinese transliterations and their reconstructedMiddle Chinese pronunciations, are indicated with apreceding asterisk on their first appearance in this essay. In cases where a reconstruction appears firstin a footnote and later in the main text, I have used the asterisk both times.) The same passages alsoclaim that foreign generals were overseen in the field by commissioners (shi 使) to ensure theirloyalty. However, there is no other evidence for the existence of such commissioners in the earlyTang, and the argument about command positions overlooks Zhanir’s appointment as anexpeditionary army commander (xingjun da zongguan 行軍大總管) (with Garek as his second-in-command) in the Kucha 龜茲 expedition of 648, as well as Garek’s appointment as one of twoequally ranked expeditionary army commanders in a 651 expedition against the Western Turks.Command of an expeditionary army was the most senior position in the early Tang military systembefore the post of military commissioner (jiedushi 節度使) was created in the early eighth century.See Jiu Tangshu (hereafter JTS), 3.60, 4.69, 106.3239–40, 109.3289, 109.3293; Xin Tangshu(hereafter XTS), 2.46–47, 3.53, 110.4115, 110.4119, 223.6348; Zizhi tongjian (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 1976 [hereafter ZZTJ]), 198.6250–51, 199.6274, 216.6888–89. See also the analysis in MaChi 馬馳, Tangdai fanjiang 唐代蕃將 (Xi’an: Sanqin chubanshe, 1990), 46–47. The most balancedtreatment of the Tang empire’s use of foreign generals and troops remains Zhang Qun章群, Tangdaifanjiang yanjiu 唐代蕃將研究 (Taipei: Lianjin chubanshe, 1986). Ma Chi’s study is slightly morecomprehensive than Zhang’s, but is overly influenced by official ideology.

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and the reality that the Tang was increasingly dependent on the services of generalsand soldiers who were of identifiably foreign origin or ancestry, even after theinfamous rebellion of An Lushan 安祿山 (Rokhshan, d. 757). While the Tang courtdid become less trusting toward its senior military commanders in the periodimmediately after the rebellion, there is no indication at all that this distrust wasspecifically directed at generals with foreign ancestry.7 In a recent study, Bi Bodemonstrates that Sogdians actually had an increased presence in the imperialguards after the rebellion, showing that the Tang court saw no difficulty inentrusting the emperor’s security to men from the same ethnic group as An Lushan.Bi Bo’s findings seem to contradict Rong Xinjiang’s influential theory that the AnLushan rebellion created a wave of anti-Sogdian sentiment, forcing Sogdiancommunities in the empire to migrate to the (supposedly) more foreigner-friendlyautonomousmilitary provinces in Hebei. Nonetheless, Bi continues to accept Rong’stheory and tries to resolve the contradiction by crediting the increase in the numberof Sogdian imperial guards to the Tang court’s magnanimity, broad-mindedness,and ‘‘cosmopolitanism.’’ I would suggest that the contradiction is better viewed as agood indication that Rong’s theory is incorrect.8

Abramson’s humorous comment that ‘‘Tang elites at best believed that theycould not trust some ethnic Others (particularly those beyond Tang control) all ofthe time and certainly could not trust all of them all of the time, but they couldtrust some of them some of the time’’ does not seem to bring greater clarity to theproblem — surely the Tang court could not have been satisfied with trusting manyof its generals and imperial guardsmen only some of the time. Much more useful isAbramson’s characterization of the ‘‘stereotype of the untrustworthy other’’ as oneof ‘‘Tang ethnic discourse’s wealth of ideologies in reserve, the repertoire of

7 Contra Fu Lecheng 傅樂成, ‘‘Tangdai Yi-Xia guan zhi yanbian’’ 唐代夷夏觀之演變, in HanTang shi lun ji 漢唐史論集 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1977), 214–18 and GeChengyong 葛承雍, Tangyun Huyin yu walai wenming 唐韻胡音與外來文明 (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 2006), 68–69, both of which are based on a highly selective reading of evidence. Fu’sarticle was originally published in 1962 and is still routinely cited in Chinese-language studies oflate Tang intellectual history. See also Jonathan Karam Skaff, ‘‘Barbarians at the Gates? The TangFrontier Military and the An Lushan Rebellion,’’ War and Society 18.2 (2000): 23–35; Zhang,Tangdai Fanjiang yanjiu, 247–46.

8 It should be noted that Rong Xinjiang’s theory was partly inspired by Fu Lecheng’s 1962article (see note 7 above). Neither Rong nor Bi has found strong evidence of an anti-Sogdianreaction in the decades after the An Lushan rebellion. Nonetheless, in a study published aroundthe same time as Rong’s, Etienne de la Vaissiere also asserts that an anti-Sogdian reactionoccurred. De la Vaissiere similarly supplies no direct evidence, apart from citing a massacre ofSogdians by ‘‘imperial troops’’ in 761. In fact, the massacre occurred during a clash between rivalfactions of rebel commanders and is thus irrelevant to the argument. Charles Holcombe has madethe first step toward correcting the prevalent but mistaken notion that there was a marked andlasting turn toward xenophobia after the An Lushan rebellion, not least by clarifying the natureof the 761 massacre. However, much more work on this question remains to be done. See Bi Bo畢波, Zhonggu Zhongguo de Sute Huren — yi Chang’an wei zhongxin 中古中國的粟特胡人—以長安爲中心 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2011), 148–61, 166–67; RongXinjiang 榮新江, ‘‘An-Shi zhi luan hou Sute Huren de dongxiang’’ 安史之亂後粟特胡人的動向,Jinan shixue 暨南史學 2 (2003): 102–23; Etienne de la Vaissiere (trans. James Ward), SogdianTraders: A History (Leiden: Brill, 2005 [originally published in French in 2002]), 220; CharlesHolcombe, ‘‘Immigrants and Strangers: From Cosmopolitanism to Confucian Universalism inTang China,’’ T’ang Studies 20–21 (2002–2003): 71–112.

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culturally accepted arguments, often mutually exclusive, that could be drawn uponto explain specific situations and justify particular policies’’ — although calling thestereotype an ideology probably still overstates its power to shape perceptions andbeliefs, rather than merely justify actions.9

This essay will argue that in the sphere of Tang foreign policy, at least, the ideaof a moral dichotomy between barbarian perfidy and Chinese trustworthiness wasmuch less an expression of deep-seated belief than a tool for rhetorical posturing.This tool was deployed most commonly by Chinese interlocutors seeking to justifymaking war on foreign peoples by representing the Chinese as innocent victims oftheir treachery, when in reality Chinese acts of bad faith were usually at leastpartly responsible for the conflict. In such cases, the Tang could retain the moralhigh ground, despite having done little or nothing to deserve it, through arhetorical strategy of emphasizing an equivalence between the ethnic orgeopolitical otherness of foreign peoples and the classical conception of‘‘barbarians’’ (Yi, Yi-Di, Rong-Di) as morally inferior.10 Instead of feeling a‘‘conviction that they were the exemplars of trustworthiness, even when theyhypocritically ordered the breaking of treaties and similar actions,’’ the men whosought to shape or influence Tang foreign policy were aware that their rhetoric ofmoral superiority was not an accurate reflection of reality, and therefore made allthe more effort to elide or excuse this inconsistency by playing up the stereotype ofbarbarian treachery.11 In essence, good faith was wasted on the faithless, so thetactic of declaring foreign peoples to be perfidious barbarians theoretically freedthe Tang from any obligation to honor prior peace agreements with them, as wellas any sense of guilt from having broken such agreements. My essay seeks todemonstrate this through a close analysis of the political rhetoric surroundingTang relations with neighboring steppe or Central Asian powers during the periods625–644 and 734–739. In so doing, I build on Jonathan Karam Skaff’s recent

9 Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China, 26, 38 (cf. other references to ‘‘ideologies inreserve’’ at xiii, xv, 27, and 104).

10 A key realization that has eluded most studies of Tang attitudes toward the foreign other isthat the Tang elite did not call foreigners ‘‘Yi,’’ ‘‘Yi-Di,’’ or ‘‘Rong-Di’’ as a matter of course.Rather, they did so selectively and strategically, as a conscious rhetorical move. There were otherways of talking about foreign persons and things — by ethnonym or toponym, or by the neutralgenerics fan 蕃 (for all foreigners) and hu 胡 (for ‘‘Westerners’’) — without invoking the classicalnotion of a Chinese-barbarian dichotomy. Unfortunately, the neutral semantic value of fan andhu is often obscured by indiscriminately translating them as ‘‘barbarian,’’ leading to themisconception that all Chinese generic labels for foreigners were semantically identical andequally derogatory. On the semantic difference between fan and Yi/Yi-Di/Rong-Di, see JonathanKaram Skaff, Sui-Tang China and Its Turko-Mongol Neighbors: Culture, Power, andConnections, 580–800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 55. An article-length treatmentof the subject by this author, titled ‘‘Fan and Han: The Origins and Uses of a ConceptualDichotomy in Mid-Imperial China, ca. 500–1200,’’ is forthcoming in Political Strategies ofIdentity-building in Non-Han Empires in China, eds. Francesca Fiaschetti and Julia Schneider(Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2014).

11 Quotation from Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China, 25. Sara Perley has recentlymade similar arguments relating to ancient Roman uses of the ideal of fides in foreign relations.Perley does point out, though, that at least one Roman historian (Appian) believed that to avengetreachery with treachery was to imitate the barbarians and thus to behave in a manner unworthyof a Roman. See Sara Perley, Fides Romana: Aspects of Fides in Roman Diplomatic RelationsDuring the Conquest of Iberia (MA thesis, University of Otago, 2012), esp. 131.

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work on the culture of covenants in medieval Eurasian diplomacy. While Skafffocuses on the functions and rituals associated with covenant-making in Tangforeign relations, my goal here is to subject the rhetoric of covenant-breaking tocritical scrutiny.12

ORIGINS OF THE STEREOTYPE AND ITS USES IN TANG-TURK RELATIONS

The earliest reference to the stereotype of the perfidious barbarian that I havefound is in an anecdote about Lord Xinling 信陵君 (d. 243 BCE), a prominentaristocratic minister in the state of Wei 魏 during the Warring States period (ca.476–221 BCE). Around 260 BCE, the king of Wei was contemplating making analliance with an erstwhile enemy, the state of Qin 秦, because Qin had recentlycome to his aid when Wei was attacked by two other states. The immediate resultof the alliance would be Wei participation in the ongoing Qin invasion of the stateof Han 韓. Lord Xinling feared that Qin would turn on Wei as soon as Han wasdestroyed, and therefore tried to convince his king that Qin could not be trusted.His arguments began with an attempt at likening the people of Qin to barbariansand predatory animals:

The Qin [people] have the same customs as the Rong-Di; they have thehearts of tigers and wolves. They are greedy and vicious, driven by a desirefor gain, and faithless. They have no understanding of ritual, moral duty,and good character. If there is some benefit in it, they will disregard thebonds of kinship and brotherhood, behaving just like birds and beasts. Thisis known to all under heaven; one cannot extend benevolence to them andhope to thus build up a store of gratitude.

秦與戎翟同俗，有虎狼之心，貪戾好利而無信，不識禮義德行。茍有利焉，不顧親戚兄弟，若禽獸耳。此天下之所同知也，非所施厚積德也。13

The association of faithlessness with both barbarism and animal behaviorreappears in a fictionalized account of the famous ‘‘salt and iron’’ debate at theHan court in 81 BCE. This account, which may have been written decades afterthe actual event, depicts Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊 (152–180 BCE) and otherministers who supported the continuation of Han Wudi’s 漢武帝 (r. 140–187BCE) expensive policy of war against the Xiongnu, sparring rhetorically (and

12 Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 192–97.13 There are two extant versions of this anecdote from the first century BCE, probably based

on the same source text: Zhanguo ce 戰國策 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2000), 24.275 and SJ, 44.1857.Gideon Shelach and Yuri Pines argue that the discourse of Qin barbarism and otherness was aproduct of the late Warring States and corresponded to ideological and cultural changes withinQin — see their ‘‘Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local Identity: Change andContinuity in the State of Qin (770–221 BCE),’’ in Archaeology of Asia, ed. Miriam T. Stark(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 217–19. I have reservations about the archaeologicalaspects of this theory, as the appearance of a different burial style in Qin may reflect the forcedimmigration of conquered Rong ‘‘barbarian’’ populations, rather than a concerted attempt at‘‘barbarizing’’ or localizing Qin culture. It does seem highly plausible, however, that Qin wassubject to derogatory rhetoric from other states only after its growing military strength made itthe greatest threat to them.

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largely unsuccessfully) with classicist critics who favored a reversion to theformer heqin peace treaty. At one point, Sang Hongyang dismisses the idea ofheqin as naıve and futile by claiming classical authority for the idea of barbarianperfidy:

The Chunqiu does not approve of Yi-Di capturing [rulers or ministers of]the Central Lands, because of their faithlessness.14 The Xiongnu are greedywolves who move to attack whenever an opportunity presents itself, risinglike a tempest and arriving like lightning. You wish to rely on a heart ofsincerity and trustworthiness, as well as gifts of gold and silk, and to trustthe devious ways of those without integrity. But that is like being friendlywith [the infamous bandits] Zhi and [Zhuang] Qiao, or rearing a ferocioustiger.

@春秋A不與夷狄之執中國，爲其無信也。匈奴貪狼，因時而動，乘可

而發，飆舉電至。而欲以誠信之心，金帛之寶，而信無義之詐，是猶親跖

蹻而扶猛虎也。15

It should be noted that the classicists in this account were, like Ban Gu later on, noless prepared to denigrate the Xiongnu in the interests of peace. Whereas the pro-war arguments dehumanized the Xiongnu in order to allege their perfidy and theimpossibility of lasting peace, anti-war arguments dismissed these tent-dwelling,fur-wearing nomads as ‘‘no better than the elaphures of the Central Lands’’ (如中國之麋鹿耳) in order to assert that they were not worth the effort and expense of

14 The line不與夷狄之執中國 is taken from two passages in the ‘‘Gongyang Commentary tothe Chunqiu’’ 春秋公羊傳: Lord Yin, Year 7 隱公七年 (716 BCE) and Lord Xi, Year 21 僖公二十一年 (639 BCE). In both cases, the ‘‘barbarians’’ are the kingdom of Chu 楚. The second partabout faithlessness is not found in the ‘‘Gongyang Commentary’’ and was tacked on in order toadapt the classical quotation to the argument that follows. See Chunqiu Gongyang zhuan zhushu春秋公羊傳註疏 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), 3.57, 11.243.

15 Yantie lun jiaozhu 鹽鐵論校註 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992 [hereafter YTL]), 8.508,cf. 8.514. David Honey argues that the stereotype of steppe nomads as motivated by greed‘‘appears early and often in Chinese historical literature,’’ citing statements made about theXiongnu by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (ca. 145–ca. 86 BCE), Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (ca. 198–ca. 107BCE), and Ban Gu at SJ, 110.2879 and HS, 94.3831 and 94.3834 respectively. It should benoted, however, that the stereotype of the avaricious nomad is not equivalent to that of theperfidious or disloyal barbarian, and Honey himself distinguishes between the two stereotypes. Inparticular, Dong Zhongshu’s argument assumes that despite Xiongnu disregard for ‘‘humanenessand moral duty’’ (renyi仁義), their greed was matched by their respect for oaths made to Heavenand their love for their sons. Hence his argument that peace with the Xiongnu could be securedthrough a combination of gift-giving, formal covenants, and exchange of princes as politicalhostages. The only Han-period instances of an overlap between stereotypes of Xiongnu greed andXiongnu perfidy are the arguments in the YTL and an Eastern Han memorial from 51 CE (HouHanshu [hereafter HHS], 8.695), both of which were aimed at justifying war with the Xiongnu.See David B. Honey, ‘‘History and Historiography on the Sixteen States: Some T’ang Topoi onthe Nomads,’’ Journal of Asian History 23–24 (1989–1990): 172–73; Honey cites Denis Sinor,‘‘The Greed of the Northern Barbarians,’’ in Aspects of Altaic Civilization II, eds. Larry V. Clarkand Paul Alexander Draghi (Bloomington: Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Studies, 1978),171–82.

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conquering.16 The fact that the idea of barbarian inferiority or animality could beused to either justify or oppose war strongly suggests that the rhetorical purposesfor which the idea could be employed were more important to the making offoreign policy than the idea’s existence per se. An in-depth analysis of the use ofbarbarian inferiority as a trope in anti-war or anti-expansionist rhetoric would liebeyond the scope of this essay, but it should suffice to say here that this rhetoricalstrategy had a very long history beginning in the Han.

The stereotype of barbarian perfidy again acquired importance in politicalrhetoric during the early seventh century, largely due to the early Tang court’sefforts to justify breaking peace agreements with the Eastern Turks by accusingthem of being incapable of honoring such agreements in the first place.17 TangGaozu is likely to have been one of several Chinese warlords who had submitted toEastern Turk overlordship in exchange for military support during the collapse ofthe Sui empire. But in 625 he decided to simultaneously assert suzerainty over theEastern Turks and prepare his armies for a military confrontation with them. TheEastern Turks would have perceived such an attempt at reversing the relationshipas a particularly provocative and presumptuous move, tantamount to a declarationof war.18 Gaozu justified this decision to his ministers with the followingpronouncement:

In the past, because the Central Plains remained unstable and the Turks werestill strong, I was concerned that they might raid the frontier, and thereforeaccorded them a ritual protocol equivalent to that of an equally-matchedstate. Now, since they have the faces of men and the hearts of beasts, andhave disregarded their covenant [with us], [I am] finally making plans toattack and conquer them; there is no place for further forbearance [toward

16 The elaphure is also known as Pere David’s Deer. The modern Chinese annotation to thispassage makes a point of alerting readers that this is ‘‘ethnic chauvinist speech that is insulting toethnic minorities’’ (侮辱少數民族的民族沙文主義的語言). See YTL, 7.444–45. Xiaoye You’srecent study of the ‘‘salt and iron’’ debate overlooks the fact that the ‘‘Confucian’’ pro-heqinparty’s rhetoric could be as ethnocentric as the pro-war party’s — see ‘‘Building Empire throughArgumentation: Debating Salt and Iron in Western Han China,’’ College English 72.4 (2010),376–77.

17 A slightly earlier precedent for the stereotype may exist in a memorial by the Sui generalDuan Wenzhen 段文振 (d. 612) at Suishu (hereafter SS), 60.1459, but this could well be a resultof editorial intervention by Wei Zheng 魏徵 (580–643). Much of the memorial’s rhetoric andreasoning are suspiciously reminiscent of Wei’s arguments from the Eastern Turk resettlementdebate of 630 (more on which below).

18 During the Sui-Tang transition, some of Gaozu’s warlord rivals received the title ‘‘khagan’’from the Eastern Turk khagan as a symbol of their submission to his suzerainty, but if Gaozu didso as well, Tang records avoided any mention of it. There has therefore been some debate overwhether Gaozu did submit to Eastern Turk suzerainty. See the recent discussions of this issue in LiDalong 李大龍, Han Tang fanshu tizhi yanjiu 漢唐藩屬體制研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2006), 329–31, 335–37; Wang Zhenping, ‘‘Ideas concerning Diplomacy andForeign Policy under the Tang Emperors Gaozu and Taizong,’’ Asia Major 22.1 (2009): 240–43;Chu Chen-hung 朱振宏, Sui Tang zhengzhi, zhidu yu duiwai guanxi 隋唐政治、制度與對外關係(Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 2010), 45–96; Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 195. On the Chinese ‘‘khagans’’of the Sui-Tang transition, see Michael R. Drompp, ‘‘Chinese ‘Qaghans’ Appointed by the Turks,’’T’ang Studies 25 (2007): 188–95.

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them.] From now on, state letters [to their khagan] are to be changed to theform of edicts.

往以中原未定，突厥方強，吾慮其擾邊，禮同敵國。今既人面獸心，不顧

盟誓，方爲攻取之計，無容更事姑息。其後，書改爲敕詔。19

Chinese sources, which are based on Tang court records, naturally give a distinctlyone-sided picture of the deteriorating relationship between the Tang and theEastern Turks during the years leading up to 625. They blame the Eastern Turks’*‘Il (Xieli) Khagan 頡利可汗 (d. 634)20 for constantly launching raids on Tang-controlled prefectures — often in concert with Chinese warlords on the northernfrontier — and for making arrogant and insatiable demands for tribute that Gaozualways bent over backwards to meet. Some sources also claim that both the ‘IlKhagan and his predecessor, the *Chora (Chuluo) Khagan 處羅可汗 (d. 620), hadhopes of restoring the Sui dynasty to power under one of Sui Yangdi’s grandsons,to whom the Eastern Turks had given asylum in 620.21 But a more likely rootcause for the downward spiral in relations is that Gaozu, after defeating hisstrongest Chinese rivals in 620–621, was no longer content to remain a vassal tothe Eastern Turks.22 He therefore began to cut back on symbolic but obligatorygestures of obeisance to the ‘Il Khagan and made efforts to secure a strategicalliance with the Eastern Turks’ strongest rival, the Western Turk khaganate.Moreover, there is good reason to suspect that Gaozu was not as cooperative withtribute payments as the sources claim: his last recorded payment was in the spring

19 Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜 (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2006 [hereafter CFYG]),990.11470. Cf. Tang huiyao 唐會要 (Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1989 [hereafter THY]), 94.1688; XTS,215.6033; ZZTJ, 191.5996. The second and third lines of this passage are wrongly punctuated inthe new Fenghuang edition of the CFYG. The THY misdates the pronouncement to 626.

20 I have followed Christopher Atwood’s recently proposed reconstruction of this title ratherthan the more common reconstruction Illig, which he finds ‘‘quite impossible.’’ Beckwith’s Helligand Ellig would seem to be variants of Illig. See Christopher P. Atwood, ‘‘The Notion of Tribe inMedieval China: Ouyang Xiu and the Shatuo Dynastic Myth,’’ in Miscellanea Asiatica:Festschrift in Honour of Francoise Aubin, eds. Denise Aigle, Isabelle Charleux, Vincent Goosaert,and Roberte Hamayon (Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica, 2010), 609 n. 52; Beckwith,Empires of the Silk Road, 125.

21 For the use of asterisks to indicate reconstructed spellings, see note 6 above. The ChoraKhagan set up a Sui ‘‘royal court’’ at Dingxiang 定襄 (modern Horinger 和林格爾 County), andallegedly made plans to seize Bingzhou 并州 (Taiyuan 太原) as a new base for it. This plan wasdisrupted by his sudden death, and the ‘Il Khagan— despite expressing agreement with the idea of aSui restoration — seems to have made no concerted effort to reestablish Sui rule further south thanDingxiang. It is interesting that the Chinese sources claiming a Sui restorationist agenda for the twokhagans represent their motivation as one of gratitude to Sui Wendi, who had given sanctuary andmilitary support to their father at a crucial point in a civil war among the Eastern Turks. This runscounter to Taizong’s later claims that the Eastern Turk khaganate’s collapse was divine retributionfor the Eastern Turks’ ingratitude in raiding the Sui frontier after Wendi’s death. See Du You 杜佑(735–812), Tongdian 通典 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988 [hereafter TD]), 197.5407–8; THY,94.1688; JTS, 194.5154–55, 194.5159–61; XTS, 215.6029–30, 215.6036, 215.6038; ZZTJ,188.5878, 188.5896, 189.5907, 193.6077. See also Chu, Sui Tang zhengzhi, 39–41.

22 Chu Chen-hung argues that Gaozu may have originally established a relationship ofvassalage to the Eastern Turks but unilaterally switched to one of diplomatic equality at a laterpoint, perhaps around 621; hence Gaozu’s reference to ‘‘a ritual protocol equivalent to that of anequally-matched state’’ in 625. See Chu, Sui Tang zhengzhi, 114–15.

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of 622, and only came at the end of a prolonged diplomatic standoff that beganwhen a Tang ambassador was suspected of having assassinated the Chora Khaganby poison. These various actions forced the ‘Il Khagan into a pattern of makingraids on the Tang, followed by offers of peace, in order to pressure Gaozu intohonoring the vassalage agreement. From 622 to 625, the Eastern Turks made anoffer of peace to the Tang at least once every year, usually after a major raid.23

The last straw for the ‘Il Khagan probably came in the late spring of 626, when aTang embassy was found plotting to assassinate him. That autumn, the EasternTurks’ last and largest raid on the Tang, which coincided with Gaozu’s abdicationand Taizong’s accession, left Taizong with no choice but to reverse the policy ofarmed confrontation and personally renew the vassalage relationship with the ‘IlKhagan via a formal covenant made on the banks of the Wei River 渭水.24 But thebalance of power between the two sides suddenly changed in the winter, whenunusually heavy snow on the steppe (the phenomenon later known to the Mongolsas a zud) made grazing impossible and thus wiped out large numbers of livestock.The resulting famine among the Eastern Turks forced the ‘Il Khagan to imposelevies of food on his vassals, the eastern *Tegreg (Tiele) 鐵勒,25 who werethemselves suffering from starvation. The resentful Tegreg rose in revolt, plungingthe Eastern Turk khaganate into a major crisis.26 In the autumn of 627, news ofthis crisis prompted calls at the Tang court for an attack on the Eastern Turks.Taizong summoned his chief ministers Xiao Yu 蕭瑀 (574–647) and ZhangsunWuji 長孫無忌 (d. 659) to a private consultation and asked them whether the

23 The Turks’ accusation that the Tang ambassador Zheng Yuanshu 鄭元璹 (d. 646)poisoned the Chora Khagan is intriguing, especially given the evidence of a later assassinationattempt on the ‘Il Khagan by a Tang embassy (see below). But the accusation is, unfortunately,unverifiable due to the absence of sources from the Turk side. The Turks later detained two otherTang ambassadors, at least one of them for refusing to perform ceremonial prostration before the‘Il Khagan. Gaozu detained at least two Eastern Turk ambassadors in retaliation, but in the springof 622, he released them and made a tribute payment in order to secure the return of the threeTang ambassadors. Gaozu also agreed to give a Tang princess in marriage to the ‘Il Khagan, butdid not follow through on this. Note that in the autumn of 622, when Zheng Yuanshu met the ‘IlKhagan to negotiate peace after one of the Eastern Turk raids, each accused the other side of badfaith, listing examples to substantiate his case. According to our sources, Zheng won theargument and reduced every Turk at the scene to a state of mortified speechlessness. We have noway of knowing what actually happened, since Zheng’s report to the Tang court was obviouslyprone to self-promotion and exaggeration. See TD, 197.5408–9; THY, 94.1688; CFYG,980.11344, 990.11469 (cf. JTS, 63.2397; XTS, 100.3930); JTS, 60.2350, 62.2379–80,194.5155–56; XTS, 1.16–19, 78.3525, 100.3938, 215.6030–32; ZZTJ, 189.5911–12,190.5948, 190.5954–55, 190.5973, 190.5991–93, 190.5997. See also Chu Chen-hung’s analysisof the reasons for the Eastern Turk raids in Sui Tang zhengzhi, 109–16. Christopher Beckwith isessentially correct that ‘‘there was usually a good reason for the Turk actions,’’ but I am not surewhat he means by the assertion, ‘‘When more historical information is available, it is clear thatthey were not raids’’ — see Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road, 125.

24 For the assassination plot, see ZZTJ, 191.6000. For recent revisionist assessments of theWei River incident, see Wang, ‘‘Ideas concerning Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,’’ 251–54; Chu,Sui Tang zhengzhi, 97–140.

25 Following Atwood’s reconstruction of the Turkic form in ‘‘The Notion of Tribe inMedieval China,’’ 602.

26 TD, 197.5411; JTS, 109.3289, 194.5158–59; XTS, 111.4114, 215.6034; ZZTJ,192.6037, 192.6045–46.

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empire should honor the recently renewed peace agreement or seize theopportunity to launch an attack. Xiao Yu favored the latter option, which bothhe and Taizong justified by invoking a line from the Shangshu and the Zuozhuan,‘‘conquer [enemy states when they are] weak and attack [them when they are]confused’’ (兼弱攻昧).27 Zhangsun Wuji, on the other hand, argued that it wasbetter to preserve the peace agreement and maintain a defensive strategy, as theTang army was not ready for a long range expedition to the steppe. Taizongaccepted Zhangsun’s advice.28

Soon afterward, the ‘Il Khagan led a large hunting expedition to the Tangfrontier prefecture of Shuozhou 朔州, incurring allegations that he was trying topre-empt a Tang invasion by keeping an eye on its most likely staging point. It isquite possible that the khagan simply wished to alleviate his people’s food shortageby hunting further south of the Gobi Desert, but if he did have concerns aboutTang intentions, these were not unfounded. Indeed, the same members ofTaizong’s court who had earlier urged an attack on the weakened Turks nowsought to use the Shuozhou incident as a pretext for it:

The Yi-Di are faithless, and [yet] they were the first to have groundlesssuspicions [toward us]. After making a covenant with us, they suddenlybrought an army to trample on our frontier territory. We can take advantageof this opportunity to rebuke them for breaking the agreement, and thenattack them.

夷狄無信，先自猜疑。盟後將兵，忽踐疆境。可乘其便，數其背約，因而討之。29

Despite having decided against such an expedition for pragmatic reasons, Taizongreplied to his courtiers’ warmongering with a stirring homily on the importance oftrustworthiness:

Even a commoner who makes a promise has to keep it — how much more sofor the lord of all under heaven! To make peace with [the Turks] in person,then seek to profit from their calamity, taking advantage of a time of crisisand danger to conquer them — how could this be done? You honorable sirsmay find it acceptable, but We will not do it. Even if all the divisions of theTurks revolt and all their livestock die, We will still show them good faith

27 The Shangshu chapter containing this line, ‘‘Zhonghui zhi gao’’ 仲虺之誥 (TheAnnouncement of Zhonghui), was actually a forgery from the early fourth century CE, but itsauthenticity went unquestioned in the Tang period. The forger copied this line from Zuozhuan 左傳, Lord Xuan, Year 12 宣公十二年 (597 BCE): ‘‘To conquer [enemy states when they are] weakand attack [them when they are] confused is a good military strategy’’ (兼弱攻昧, 武之善經也),and paired it with another phrase, ‘‘Conquer [enemy states when they are] in disorder and invade[them when they are close to] destruction’’ (取亂侮亡), which the same Zuozhuan passagedirectly attributes to Zhonghui. Tang Taizong’s initial question to Xiao Yu and Zhangsu Wujiuses the latter phrase as well. See Shangshu zhengyi (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999),8.197; Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhengyi (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), 23.638.

28 JTS, 65.2447; CFYG, 991.11475 (cf. XTS, 105.4018; ZZTJ, 192.6037).29 JTS, 194.5158 (cf. XTS, 215.6034; ZZTJ, 192.6046).

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and not attack them without cause. [We shall] wait until they show they lackproper decorum before taking them prisoner.

匹夫一言，尚須存信，何況天下主乎！豈有親與之和，利其災禍而乘危迫

險以滅之耶？諸公爲可，朕不爲也。縱突厥部落叛盡，六畜皆死，朕終示

以信，不妄討之。待其無禮，方擒取耳。30

That Taizong expressed no such noble convictions in the earlier conversation withhis chief ministers strongly suggests that this was all rhetorical posturing. We arefortunate that Zhangsun Wuji’s official biographies — in the interest ofdemonstrating his sense of prudence — preserved a record of that conversation,thus inadvertently revealing the reality behind the idealized image that Taizong’spublic rhetoric was designed to project.

Early in the summer of 628, the Tang court received a call for military supportfrom the *Tolis (Tuli) Khagan 突利可汗 (d. 631), a subordinate of the ‘Il Khaganwho had fallen out with him after being punished by flogging for a military defeatat the hands of the Tegreg. The ‘Il Khagan, who now saw the Tolis Khagan as noless a traitor than the Tegreg, had begun waging open war on him.31 Taizong hadsworn an oath of brotherhood with the Tolis Khagan in 624,32 and he sought hisministers’ advice on whether to honor this oath or to instead honor the peacecovenant with the ‘Il Khagan. Du Ruhui 杜如晦 (585–630), returning to the themeof barbarian perfidy, argued that oaths and covenants were simply irrelevantcompared to the just cause of vanquishing the Turks:

The Yi-Di are faithless and have long been so. Though our empire may keepfaith with them, they are sure to betray it. It would be better to use theirstate of disorder as an opportunity to conquer them; this is what [the

30 JTS, 194.5158 (cf. XTS, 215.6034; ZZTJ, 192.6046). In this essay, I follow ChristopherAtwood in translating the terms buluo 部落 and bu 部 as ‘‘division’’ instead of the more common‘‘tribe.’’ For the problems with the translation ‘‘tribe,’’ see Atwood, ‘‘The Notion of Tribe inMedieval China,’’ 593–95; also Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road, 14 n. 46.

31 The Tolis Khagan was a nephew of the ‘Il Khagan and the only other Eastern Turk leaderat the time to hold a khaganal title. His base of operations was the easternmost part of theEastern Turk khaganate, overseeing the Kitan 契丹 and the Qai/Qay (Xi) 奚. His inability toprevent the Kitan and Qai from transferring their allegiance to the Tang was another cause of the‘Il Khagan’s displeasure. See TD, 197.5411; CFYG, 991.11475; JTS, 194.5158, 5160–61; XTS,215.6034, 215.6038; ZZTJ, 192.6049.

32 Chen Yinke argued that the oath-swearing took place in 617, around the time that Gaozuseized control of Chang’an. Chu Chen-hung argues that it took place in 620–624, most probablymid-623. I see no compelling reason to reject the original account found in the JTS, XTS, andZZTJ, which states that the oath was sworn in the autumn of 624, when Taizong (then stillthe Prince of Qin 秦王) conducted peace negotiations with a large Eastern Turk raidingexpedition led by both the ‘Il Khagan and the Tolis Khagan. According to this account, Taizongfalsely claimed during the negotiations to have previously sworn an oath of brotherhood with theTolis Khagan, in order to sow distrust between him and the ‘Il Khagan. After the negotationsended, however, the Tolis Khagan chose to swear a real oath with Taizong. See JTS, 194.5156,194.5160; XTS, 215.6031; ZZTJ, 191.5991–93 (cf. TD, 197.5409, 197.5412); Chu, Sui Tangzhengzhi, 129 n. 116.

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Classics] call the way of ‘‘conquering [enemy states when they are] indisorder and invading [them when they are close to] destruction.’’

夷狄無信，其來自久。國家雖爲守信，彼必背之。不若因其亂而取之，所

謂取亂侮亡之道也。33

This time, Taizong was persuaded that the time was ripe to move against theEastern Turks.

On the military front, Taizong almost immediately launched an attack on the ‘IlKhagan’s last remaining Chinese warlord vassal, Liang Shidu 梁師都, perceivingthat the Tegreg revolt had severely reduced the Eastern Turks’ ability andwillingnessto protect him. A Tang army defeated Liang and a contingent of Eastern Turkreinforcements in the field, laid siege to his stronghold at the southern end of theOrdos plateau, and soon induced such despair within its walls that Liang’s owncousin murdered him and surrendered the city. On the diplomatic front, Taizongordered Tang forces to facilitate the Tolis Khagan’s defection, and also dispatchedan emissary to the steppe to make contact with the *Syr-Yanda (Xue-Yantuo) 薛延

陀 division and offer their leader, *Inanch (Yinan)夷男 (d. 645), the imperial court’sofficial recognition as khagan of the Tegreg.34 By the autumn of 629, with theTegreg revolt continuing to gain strength on the steppe and the Eastern Turks’ herdsfurther depleted by a string of bad winters, the ‘Il Khagan was in desperate enoughstraits to offer to submit to Tang suzerainty in exchange for aid against his enemies.Taizong, who had hitherto avoided a direct clash with the Eastern Turks, recognizedthis as a sign that the khaganate was on its last legs and came up with a convenientbut disingenuous reason to deliver the coup de grace: by sending troops to aid LiangShidu more than a year before, the ‘Il Khagan had breached the covenant of 626 and

33 JTS, 194.5158, 194.5160–61; CFYG, 991.11475 (cf. XTS, 215.6034; ZZTJ,192.6049–50). Like Xiao Yu and Taizong the year before, Du Ruhui is quoting a line fromthe Zuozhuan and the forged ‘‘Zhonghui zhi gao’’ chapter of the Shangshu (see note 27 above).We see from examples like these that the Classics could be used to provide ideologicaljustification for opportunistic military aggression, contrary to the prevalent stereotype of‘‘Confucian’’ pacifism.

34 For details and dates of Liang Shidu’s downfall, see JTS, 2.34, 56.2281; XTS, 2.29,87.3731; ZZTJ, 192.6050. On developments at Taiyuan and the Tolis Khagan’s eventualdefection to the Tang in the winter of 629–630, see TD, 197.5411–12; THY, 94.1689; CFYG,991.11475; JTS, 194.5158–59, 194.5161; XTS, 215.6034; ZZTJ, 193.6067. On Tangrecognition of Inanch as khagan, see THY, 96.1726; CFYG, 964.11167; JTS, 199.5344; XTS,217.6134–35; ZZTJ, 193.6061–62. Given the theme of this paper, it is somewhat ironic thatInanch, the Turkic name that best corresponds to the Chinese transliteration 夷男, means ‘‘trust,confidence, belief.’’ According to Chinese sources, the Syr-Yanda were formed from the mergingof two divisions. While the identification of 薛 with the Syr division is generally accepted, theoriginal Turkic form of the name transliterated as 延陀 remains uncertain. Bao Wenshengsuggests Yund (horse) as the Turkic form, but I have opted for a more conservative reconstructionbased on the Middle Chinese reading of 延陀. See Bao Wensheng 包文勝, ‘‘Xue-Yantuo bumingcheng yu qiyuan kao’’ 薛延陀部名稱與起源考, Neimenggu daxue xuebao 内蒙古大學學報42.4 (2010): 132–36; also the similar reconstruction Ser-Yianda at Atwood, ‘‘The Notion of Tribein Medieval China,’’ 602.

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thus rendered it void —never mind that it was almost certainly the Tang that hadfirst broken the covenant by attacking another Eastern Turk vassal.35

That winter, Tang armies began a general offensive on Eastern Turk positionssouth of the Gobi. The first to surrender were about ten thousand Turk familieswho had been living on the Ordos plateau since the end of the Sui.36 In the earlyspring, armies under Li Jing 李靖 (571–649) and Li Shiji 李世勣 (594–669)drove the ‘Il Khagan out of Dingxiang 定襄 and defeated his army at Baidao 白

道. The ‘Il Khagan then began negotiating terms of surrender with a team ofTang envoys that Taizong had sent to his camp in the Yin Mountains 陰山.Meanwhile, the two Tang generals and their troops — driven by a desire forglory and quite likely riches as well — made plans for an unauthorized surpriseattack on the Eastern Turk camp. They justified their perfidy by claiming that thekhagan’s surrender was merely a ruse to buy time for an escape into the steppe,and reasoned that the envoys were expendable for the sake of ensuring theEastern Turks’ total defeat. At dawn, under cover of fog, ten thousand Tangcavalrymen charged the camp without warning, slaughtering an equivalentnumber of Turks and capturing around one hundred thousand more. The Tangarmies took these prisoners and their livestock south to the Ordos plateau,where they could be guarded more closely. The ‘Il Khagan himself escaped fromthe attack but was later betrayed by a subordinate chieftain and handed over topursuing Tang forces.

Although the Tang envoys were not harmed during the assault, it soonemerged through an investigation by the Director of the Censorate (yushidafu 御史大夫) that Li Jing had given his soldiers full liberty to pillage theTurks’ treasures, none of which could be traced after the attack. Taizong wasinitially incensed at Li’s connivance in the looting, but soon dropped the matterfor fear that he would be seen as punishing a successful general. Taizongthen publicly dismissed the censorial charges as slander driven by jealousy, andsaw to it that Li Jing received ample reward for his victory over the EasternTurks.37

37 The Da Tang xinyu 大唐新語 (ca. 807) and the JTS identify the minister who headedthe censorial investigation against Li Jing as Wen Yanbo 溫彥博 (575–637), but the XTS andZZTJ (supposedly following the Taizong shilu 太宗實錄) identify him as Xiao Yu, whoreplaced Wen as the Director of the Censorate when Wen was appointed Director of theSecretariat (zhongshu ling 中書令, equivalent to the rank of Chief Minister) shortly after theYin Mountains attack. See Liu Su 劉肅 (fl. 820), Da Tang xinyu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,1984 [hereafter DTXY]) 7.106; TD, 197.5411–12, 197.5414; JTS, 3.39, 67.2479–80,67.2485–86, 83.2777, 194.5159; XTS, 2.31, 93.3814, 93.3818, 111.4137, 215.6034–35;ZZTJ, 193.6070–73, 193.6078.

35 TD, 197.5411; JTS, 62.2380, 194.5159; XTS, 100.3938; ZZTJ, 193.6065. See alsoDavid Graff’s critical assessment of Taizong’s casus belli at ‘‘Strategy and Contingency in theTang Defeat of the Eastern Turks, 629–630,’’ in Warfare in Inner Asian History, 500–1800, ed.Nicola Di Cosmo (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 48–49.

36 XTS, 215.6035; ZZTJ, 193.6066–67. On Eastern Turk occupation of the Ordos plateaufrom 618 to 630, see Chu, Sui Tang zhengzhi, 102–5, 149, 154–56.

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RHETORICAL ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN TURK RESETTLEMENT DEBATE

The sudden capture of one hundred thousand Eastern Turks set the stage for afamous debate at the Tang court on the question of how— and indeed, whether —they were to be integrated into the empire.38 A few recent studies have analyzedthe positions taken in this unusually well-documented debate, but surprisingly,none has noted the oddly dissimulating quality of the rhetoric with which it wasconducted.39 The participating ministers took care to maintain the official fictionthat the Eastern Turks were refugees whom the Tang had magnanimously receivedwith open arms, rather than prisoners of war who had lost their freedom andpossessions as the result of an opportunistic Tang assault. Thus, instead ofacknowledging that the Turks had legitimate grounds for grievance against theTang, the debate more often revolved around the red herring of whether they werecapable of repaying the empire’s supposed kindness with sincere gratitude andloyalty.

As a result, historical analyses of the debate that take its rhetoric at face valuetend to interpret it as a clash between exclusionist, multiculturalist, andassimilationist ideologies, somewhat anachronistically projecting modern debatesover immigration and national identity onto the early Tang context. At least onerecent Chinese interpretation also reads the debate as a contest between ethnicchauvinism and a more ‘‘enlightened’’ (kaiming 開明) vision of a unified, multi-ethnic Chinese nation.40 I would argue that the Eastern Turks’ status as a resentful,newly subjugated people, and not an immigrant or refugee community or a‘‘national minority,’’ meant that there were ultimately strategic rather thanideological issues at stake in the question of how they should be treated and howmuch they could be trusted. It is certainly possible that ethnic prejudices stemmingfrom the recent conflict with the Turks influenced some of the positions taken inthe resettlement debate, but I will attempt to show that differing strategic

38 It should be noted that, although every argument made in the debate refers to all hundredthousand prisoners as Turks, we know from other sources that they also included a large numberof Sogdian immigrants who had played important roles in the Eastern Turk khaganate. Alsocaptured, but presumably excluded from the prisoner count, were as many as eighty thousandChinese refugees and slaves, whom the Tang court later ‘‘redeemed’’ (shu 贖) from the Turks witha payment of gold and silk. Skaff points out that it is impossible to know how many of these hadjoined the Turks willingly. XTS, 215.6036; ZZTJ, 193.6087; E.G. Pulleyblank, ‘‘A Sogdiancolony in Inner Mongolia,’’ T’oung Pao 41.4/5 (1952): 323–24; Chen Haitao 陳海濤 and LiuHuiqin 劉惠琴, Laizi wenming shizi lukou de minzu — Tangdai ruhua Suteren yanjiu 來自文明十字路口的民族 – 唐代入華粟特人研究 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2006), 154–57; JonathanKaram Skaff, ‘‘Survival in the Frontier Zone: Comparative Perspectives on Identity and PoliticalAllegiance in China’s Inner Asian Borderlands during the Sui-Tang Dynastic Transition (617–630),’’ Journal of World History 15.2 (2004): 123 n. 8.

39 Pan Yihong, Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and its Neighbors(Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 1997), 183–87; PanYihong, ‘‘Integration of the Northern Ethnic Frontiers in Tang China,’’ The Chinese HistoricalReview 19.1 (2012): 10–15. Cui Mingde 崔明德 and Ma Xiaoli 馬曉麗, Sui Tang minzu guanxisixiangshi 隋唐民族關係思想史 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2010), 109–28; Skaff, Sui-TangChina, 55–57.

40 Fan Wenli 樊文禮, ‘‘Tangdai rujia shiren Hua-Yi guan yanjiu’’ 唐代儒家士人華夷觀研究,Tangshi luncong 唐史論叢 13 (2011): 33–36.

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assessments and understandings of history lay at the root of the disagreement,while barbarophilic and barbarophobic rhetoric served mainly to add force to thearguments.

One early proposal — the originator of which has gone unrecorded — calledfor the Turk divisions to be broken up and their members distributed toprefectures across the southern end of the North China Plain, where they wouldbe added to the tax registers and made to take up farming. This idea was initiallypopular at court, but suffered defeat at the hands of the new chief minister WenYanbo 溫彥博 (575–637). Wen argued that moving the Turks so far south andforcing them to give up their ‘‘native customs’’ (tusu 土俗) would be violating‘‘the innate nature of things’’ (wuxing 物性) and the ‘‘way of accommodating andnurturing’’ (hanyu zhi dao 含育之道); breaking up their divisions would alsodemonstrate that the court had a ‘‘distrustful heart’’ (caixin 猜心). It would bemuch better to let them continue their pastoral way of life on the Ordos plateau,as Guangwudi 光武帝 (r. 25–57 CE) had done with the Southern Xiongnu aftertheir submission to the Eastern Han in 48 CE. Wen Yanbo’s argument in turn metwith opposition from Wei Zheng 魏徵 (580–643), who reminded Taizong thatthe Eastern Turks were the Tang empire’s most dangerous enemy and suggestedthat the best way to deal with them was utter extermination. But since it might beconsidered immoral to massacre a people who had already surrendered, the nextbest option, according to Wei, was to send them back to the edge of the GobiDesert. By no means should they be left on the Ordos plateau, where their largenumbers and proximity to Chang’an were sure to make them ‘‘a disease of theheart and stomach’’ (xinfu zhi ji 心腹之疾), a direct threat to the empire’spolitical center.41

Wei Zheng attempted to strengthen his argument with stereotypes about theinherent faithlessness of barbarians, reinforced by equating the Turks with theXiongnu of Han times:

The Xiongnu have the faces of men and the hearts of beasts; they are not ofour kind. When strong, they are sure to raid and pillage us, and only whenweakened do they abase themselves and submit. They have no regard forgratitude – that is their innate nature.

41 Wang Fangqing 王方慶 (d. 702), Wei Zhenggong jianlu 魏鄭公諫錄 (Changsha:Shangwu yinshuguan, 1939 [hereafter WZG]), 2.16; Wu Jing 吳兢 (699/700–749), Zhenguanzhengyao 貞觀政要 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003 [hereafter ZGZY]), 9.499; THY, 73.1312–13; JTS, 61.2361, 194.5162; CFYG, 991.11475–76 (cf. TD, 197.5414; XTS, 215.6037; ZZTJ,193.6075–76).

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匈奴人面獸心，非我族類。強必寇盜，弱則卑服。不顧恩義，其天性也。42

Wei’s worries were not unfounded, although their expression in dehumanizingrhetoric may cause the modern reader to underestimate their practical basis. BoththeHan and Sui empires hadwitnessed the ability of steppe peoples like the Xiongnuand the Turks to free themselves from Chinese domination after periods of weaknessand subjection. This mainly reflects the considerable logistical, military, andadministrative challenges that Chinese empires faced in maintaining firm controlover such mobile communities, but during the Han period, some hawkish membersof the military attributed the strong Xiongnu desire for independence to some moraldefect that made them inherently rebellious and ungrateful. By Wei Zheng’s time,this idea had become an integral aspect of the stereotype of barbarian perfidy.43

Early Tang ethnographic descriptions of the Turks also highlight their culturalsimilarity to the Xiongnu, suggesting that early Tang ministers saw the two peoplesas essentially alike.44 This accounts in part for the tendency on both sides of theresettlement debate to use the history of the Xiongnu to make predictions aboutwhat the Turks would do.45

42 WZG, 2.16; ZGZY, 9.499; THY, 73.1312–13; JTS, 61.2361, 194.5162; CFYG,991.11475–76 (cf. TD, 197.5414; XTS, 215.6037; ZZTJ, 193.6075–76). The phrase ‘‘they arenot of our kind’’ originates from Zuozhuan, Lord Cheng, Year 4 成公四年 (587 BCE), where thefull statement is ‘‘if they are not of our zulei 族類, their hearts are sure to be different [fromours]’’ (非我族類，其心必異). Lydia Liu and Yuri Pines have recently rejected an ethnic orracialist interpretation of this line in the Zuozhuan, pointing out that in its original context zuleireferred to clan lineage, not ethnic or racial group. While this is a valid point, it is also importantto recognize that the practice of misinterpreting or reinterpreting the quotation has a long history,as seen from arguments attributed to late third-century Western Jin officials in the Jinshu 晉書(compiled in 646–648). Even if the language of the Jin officials’ arguments reflects rewriting bythe early Tang editors of the Jinshu, such rewriting and Wei Zheng’s arguments in theresettlement debate would still demonstrate that an ethnic interpretation of the term zulei existedby the early seventh century. It should be noted, however, that the phrase ‘‘their hearts are sure tobe different’’ is much more ambiguous than ‘‘they have the faces of men and the hearts of beasts,’’since the difference in one’s heart could lie in the object of one’s loyalty (e.g., one’s own kinshipgroup or ethnic group) rather than one’s capacity to remain loyal to anyone. Wei Zheng avoidsthe ambiguity by merging the HS and Zuozhuan quotations into one. Zuozhuan, 26.717; Jinshu(hereafter JS), 56.1531–32, 101.2646; Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention ofChina in Modern World Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 72–73;Pines, ‘‘Beasts or Humans,’’ 88–89 n. 94. See also Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China, 27;Tamara T. Chin, ‘‘Antiquarian as Ethnographer: Han Ethnicity in Early China Studies,’’ inCritical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, eds. ThomasS. Mullaney, James Leibold, Stephane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 2012), 130–35.

43 For Han precedents, see HS, 94.3803–4; HHS, 18.695–96.44 Zhoushu, 50.909; SS, 84.1864.45 For the use of the ‘‘Xiong-nu topos’’ in court rhetoric during the Uighur refugee crisis

more than two centuries later, see Drompp, Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire,184–95.

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Despite Wei Zheng’s harsh rhetoric about the Eastern Turks, his proposal ofreturning them to the edge of the Gobi seems on the surface to be highly charitableto them, since it would effectively have restored the status quo ante bellum andallowed the Turks to live relatively free of Tang control and interference. If WenYanbo’s priority really was to let the Turks keep their original way of life, thedebate would have ended at this point. In reality, however, Wen is likely to havebeen aware that given the Turks’ severely weakened and impoverished state, theywould ultimately be forced to join the Syr-Yanda khaganate if left to fend forthemselves at the edge of the Gobi. Wen’s recent experience of being held by theTurks as a prisoner of war in ‘‘the bitterly cold parts of the Yin Mountains’’ (陰山

苦寒之地) in 625–626 made him intimately familiar with that area’s inhospitableaspects.46 It was also known to the Tang court that a number of Turks whoescaped the Yin Mountains attack had returned to the steppe and submitted to theSyr-Yanda — perhaps a more palatable option to them than becoming prisoners ofthe Chinese.47 I would thus suggest that there was an unspoken dilemma at thecenter of the resettlement debate: while resettlement on the Ordos plateau wouldplace the Turks within striking range of Chang’an, it would also keep them beyondthe reach of the Syr-Yanda khaganate, thus ensuring that they did not end upbecoming a part of it.

As for the question of which was a worse possible outcome for the Tang —the Eastern Turks becoming an internal threat, or their merging with the Syr-Yanda to pose an external threat — we may infer that Wei Zheng focused onthe former, Wen Yanbo on the latter. Wen’s citing of historical precedent alsohinted that if the Eastern Turks were allowed to recover their strength on theOrdos plateau, they could eventually be used to fight the Syr-Yanda, just as theEastern Han had used the Southern Xiongnu to fight the Northern Xiongnu.Since the Syr-Yanda were still officially Tang allies, no one at court couldacknowledge such cynical considerations openly. But without understandingthis subtext, it is very difficult to discern any rationality in Wen Yanbo’ssubsequent insistence that the Ordos, and not the edge of the Gobi, was theright place for the Turks. Indeed, we can get some sense of Wen’s underlyingconcerns from a remark he reportedly made toward the end of the resettlementdebate: ‘‘Since we have taken [the Turks] in, it would be a great pity to sendthem away for no good reason!’’ (既已納之，無故遣去，深爲可惜).48 WeiZheng, who did not share Wen Yanbo’s rather hawkish views on foreign policy,

46 JTS, 61.2361; XTS, 91.3782. Skaff, Fan Wenli, and Pan Yihong argue that this experiencegave Wen ‘‘an optimistic attitude toward the Turks’’ and an ability to see them as human beingscapable of adopting Chinese ways. However, this counter-intuitive argument rests on the flawedassumption that most other Tang officials could not recognize the humanity and culturalassimilability of the Turks. In that case, the initial popularity of the equally ‘‘optimistic’’ proposalto convert the Turks into tax-paying farmers is difficult to understand. See Skaff, Sui-Tang China,57; Fan, ‘‘Tangdai rujia shiren Hua-Yi guan yanjiu,’’ 36. Pan, ‘‘Integration of the Northern EthnicFrontiers in Tang China,’’ 12.

47 WZG, 2.15; JTS, 194.5162; CFYG, 991.11475; XTS, 215.6037; ZZTJ, 193.6075.48 JTS, 61.2361.

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may also have realized this subtext and wanted to forestall future attempts atusing the Turks as an army.49

Wen Yanbo chose to rebut Wei Zheng by representing his own proposal as onemade both in the best interest of the Eastern Turks and in keeping with the highestclassical ideals. He claimed that Taizong, as the Son of Heaven, had a moralresponsibility to succor and protect the helpless Turks, rather than abandon themto their fate — a fate on which he conspicuously chose not to elaborate. The Turks,moved to gratitude by such beneficence, would surely not repay it with rebellion.Wei Zheng responded by pointing to the Xiongnu whose revolt had toppled theWestern Jin empire three centuries earlier, in spite of Guangwudi’s kindness totheir ancestors; the lessons of history had proven that to let the Eastern Turks stayon the Ordos plateau was tantamount to ‘‘rearing a tiger to create future dangerfor oneself’’ (養虎自遺患).50 Wen Yanbo then countered with an assertion thatTaizong, being a worthy successor to the sage-kings of old, possessed sufficient‘‘awe-inspiring strength’’ (wei 威) and ‘‘moral power’’ (de 德) to produce lastingloyalty in even barbarians like the Turks. Contradicting his earlier argument about‘‘native customs,’’ Wen claimed that if the Turks were taught Chinese ‘‘rites and

49 In an influential study of Wei Zheng, Howard Wechsler characterized him as a ‘‘zealot’’whose understanding of politics was based on narrow moral and ideological considerations. Iwould argue that this gives too little credit to the practicality of Wei’s positions on foreign andfrontier policy. Wechsler himself acknowledges at one point that ‘‘Wei’s abhorrence of aggressivewarfare had a very practical as well as an ideological basis’’ — namely, a strong desire to avoidthe kind of irresponsible expansionism that had only recently brought the Sui empire to adisastrous end. This anti-expansionist impulse, grounded in painful personal experience, wasshared by a significant number of Taizong’s officials, both civil and military, especially when itcame to relations with Goguryeo — although not, significantly, by Wen Yanbo. The argumentsused in Wei Zheng’s memorial of 630 on relations with the Western Regions states, and in hisremonstrance against the annexation of Gaochang in 640, also suggest that he had a sound andrealistic understanding of the problems involved in frontier logistics. WZG, 1.6, 2.17; ZGZY,9.506–7; THY, 95.1702; JTS, 71.2548, 198.5296; XTS, 97.3869, 221.6222; ZZTJ, 193.6083,195.6155–56; Howard J. Wechsler, Mirror to the Son of Heaven: Wei Cheng at the Court ofT’ang T’ai-tsung (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 117–18, 120–22, 171. See alsoWang, ‘‘Ideas concerning Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,’’ 258–60. For Wen Yanbo’s stance on theGoguryeo question, see TD, 186.5016; JTS, 61.2360, 199.5321; XTS, 91.3782, 220.6187;THY, 95.1705; CFYG, 990.11470.

50 All sources except the WZG have shou 獸 (‘‘wild beast’) in place of hu 虎 (‘‘tiger’’), due tothe Tang dynasty’s taboo on the name of Taizong’s great-grandfather Li Hu 李虎 (d. 551). Onemight surmise that the WZG does not follow the taboo because it was written during the fifteen-year Zhou interregnum of Empress Wu (r. 690–705). On the Western Jin events that Wei Zhengalluded to, see JS, 56.1529–34, 97.2549, 101.2643–52, 102.2658–59. The ‘‘Discourse’’ (lun 論)at JS, 103.2702–3, which comments on the causes and consequences of the Xiongnu revolt,begins with the line, ‘‘The Rong-Di have the faces of men and the hearts of beasts; they deserttheir rulers and kinsmen upon seeing [an opportunity for] profit, and forget humaneness andmoral duty upon coming across [an opportunity for] riches’’ (彼戎狄者，人面獸心，見利則棄君親，臨財則忘仁義者也). The ‘‘Discourse’’ then remarks on the perils of allowing Rong-Di tosettle within reach of the imperial capital. The similarity between these arguments and WeiZheng’s rhetoric in 630 suggests that his interpretation of the fall of Western Jin exercised someinfluence on the editors of the JS more than fifteen years later. The primary editor of the JS, FangXuanling 房玄齡 (579–648), is not on record as having expressed such sentiments during theresettlement debate of 630, even though he was then a chief minister and would have had theopportunity to do so if thus inclined.

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laws’’ (lifa 禮法) they would turn to agriculture on the Ordos within a matter ofyears. He supported these claims with a quotation from Confucius in the Analects,‘‘Where there is [good] teaching, [people] will no longer be divided into categories[of superior and inferior]’’ (youjiao wulei 有教無類).51 Moreover, the memory ofGuangwudi’s generosity had kept the Southern Xiongnu loyal to the Eastern Hanthroughout its history; surely, Wen Yanbo seems to be implying, Taizong was atleast Guangwudi’s equal in the art of rulership.52

Wen Yanbo’s strategy of flattering his primary audience was quite brilliant, sincefurther disputation would have forced Wei Zheng to question Taizong’s ownclaims to sageliness. But Wen went even further and turned Wei’s argumentsagainst him, asserting that it was much safer to keep the Turks divided betweenseveral chieftains on the Ordos than to let them rebuild their khaganate furthernorth. Wen reminded Taizong that Sui Wendi had protected a previous khaganfrom his enemies and helped him to gain control of the steppe in 599–603, but thatkhagan’s successor eventually turned against the Sui and besieged Sui Yangdi onthe frontier for more than a month in 615.53 This argument from precedentindicates that Wen Yanbo actually had no strong belief in Taizong’s greater abilityto induce gratitude and loyalty in the Turks. Du Chuke 杜楚客 (n.d.), a supporterof Wei Zheng’s arguments, pounced on the inconsistency and argued that,although the Turks had betrayed Sui Yangdi, Yangdi had brought it upon himselfby misruling his empire. How could one conclude from this that the same wouldhappen to Taizong if he restored independence to the Turks? Yet Du Chuke’smemorial also employed demonizing and dehumanizing tropes similar to thoseseen in Wei Zheng’s argument: ‘‘The northern Di are vicious and violent, with thefaces of men and the hearts of beasts’’ (北狄狠戾，人面獸心).54 By this point in thedebate, then, both sides seem to have agreed that the Turks were likely to rebelagainst Tang control at some point; the disagreement was only over where theywould do the least damage.55

51 Analects, 15:39. The pithy phrase youjiao wulei appears without context in the Analectsand has been variously interpreted. The most common modern interpretation is that all men havea right to education regardless of birth, class, social status, or ethnic origin. However, Xie Zhibinhas argued persuasively that the original meaning was that a good education should enablepeople to overcome their intellectual and moral deficiencies, so that no one is left intellectuallyand morally inferior. This seems to be Wen Yanbo’s interpretation as well, although he has fusedit with the notion that barbarians, in their original state, are morally inferior to the Chinese. SeeXie Zhibin 謝質彬, ‘‘‘Youjiao wulei’ jie’’ ‘有教無類’解, Wenshi zhishi 文史知識 1989 (11):79–82.

52 WZG, 2.16; TD, 197.5415; THY, 73.1313–14; JTS, 194.5162–63; CFYG, 991.11476;XTS, 215.6037; ZZTJ ,193.6076–77.

53 ZGZY, 9.503. On the 615 incident, see Chu Chen-hung 朱振宏, ‘‘Daye shiyinian (615)‘Yanmen shibian’ tanwei’’ 大業十一年（615）‘‘雁門事變’’探微, Dongwu lishi xuebao 東吳歷史學報 24 (2010): 51–107, which highlights the Sui court’s culpability for the breakdown inrelations. The khagan who received Sui protection was the father of the Chora and ‘Il khagans(see note 21 above); the successor who besieged Yangdi was their brother.

54 ZGZY, 9.503; THY, 73.1312–13.55 To the credit of the debate’s participants, genocide was never seriously considered as an

option; Wei Zheng mentioned it only to dismiss it as morally unacceptable.

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The ministers Li Baiyao 李百藥 (564–647) and Yan Shigu 顏師古 (581–645)and the senior Tang area commander on the Ordos plateau, Dou Jing 竇靜 (d.635), also submitted memorials in support of Wei Zheng.56 All three seem to haveresponded to Wen Yanbo’s use of the Sui Yangdi example by emphasizing that thestrategy of keeping the Turks divided was just as applicable at the edge of theGobi. Yan Shigu seems also to have sought to exploit the contradictions in WenYanbo’s rhetoric, arguing that any attempt to alter the Turks ‘‘innate natures’’(changxing 常性) and make them conform to Chinese ways was sure to fail. DouJing criticized the Ordos resettlement by echoing Wei Zheng’s warning about thesecurity risk it would entail, as well as Wei’s dehumanizing rhetoric: ‘‘Your subjecthas heard that Yi-Di are similar to birds and beasts; when desperate, they fight anddevour one another, and when they congregate, fathers and sons share the samemate’’ (臣聞夷狄者，同夫禽獸，窮則搏噬，羣則聚麀).57 Dou claimed that moralteaching and even laws could have no remedial effect on such brutes, contrary toWen Yanbo’s confident claims. It was not that Taizong’s moral power wasinadequate; rather, barbarians were simply incorrigibly unreliable.

According to our sources, Wen Yanbo’s renowned eloquence enabled him towin over Taizong and the majority of the court’s ministers, despite his self-contradictory arguments and the vehement criticism directed at his proposal.58 Butit is probable that Taizong also shared Wen’s unvoiced strategic considerationsregarding his ostensible allies, the Syr-Yanda. Taizong decided to establish threeautonomous prefectures for the ‘Il Khagan’s followers on the southern side of theOrdos plateau, as well as a prefecture for the Tolis Khagan’s followers in thenortheastern corner of the empire, and to appoint the Tolis Khagan and three otherchieftains as area commanders over these new prefectures.59 Following another ofWen Yanbo’s recommendations, Taizong appointed the ‘Il Khagan and more thana hundred Eastern Turk chieftains to positions as imperial guards officers andallowed their relatives and retainers to reside in Chang’an. Close to ten thousandTurk families are said to have moved to the Tang capital for this reason. Theseappointments were ostensibly a measure aimed at conciliating and integrating theTurks, but they were probably also aimed at weakening the cohesion of theirdivisions and lessening the risk of revolt by separating them from their elite.60

TAIZONG’S MANIPULATION OF THE STEREOTYPE IN 643

Wei Zheng and other critics of the Ordos resettlement are said to have kept uptheir debate with Wen Yanbo for several years after 630, to no avail.61 Then, in

56 Li Baiyao did not expliclity state which proposal he favored, but his strong advocacy forthe Eastern Turks to be supervised by a Protector-General (duhu 都護) based in Dingxiang showsthat he supported their settlement on the southern edge of the Gobi, and the XTS lists him amongthat proposal’s supporters.

57 THY, 73.1312–13; JTS, 61.2369–70; XTS, 95.3848–49, 215.6037–38; ZZTJ, 193.6075–76.

58 JTS, 61.2361, 194.5163; CFYG, 991.11476; THY, 73.1314.59 JTS, 194.5160–61; XTS, 215.6038–39; ZZTJ, 193.77.60 ZGZY, 9.503; TD, 197.5413; THY, 73.1311; JTS, 61.2361, 194.5164; XTS, 215.6038;

ZZTJ, 193.6078; Chu, Sui Tang zhengzhi, 156–59.61 JTS, 61.2361.

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639 (two years after Wen’s death), Taizong received a rude shock when more thanforty Eastern Turks from his entourage, including the deceased Tolis Khagan’s sonand younger brother, stormed his summer palace with the intention of killing him.The assassination attempt failed and all but one of the conspirators were punishedwith execution.62 Taizong’s ministers now reached a consensus that it was‘‘inexpedient’’ (feibian/bubian 非便/不便) to allow the Eastern Turks to remain onthe Ordos plateau, and Taizong was himself inclined to agree. A few months later,he appointed one of the Eastern Turks’ area commanders, Ashina *Semurg (Simo)阿史那思摩 (583–647),63 as their khagan and ordered them to begin preparationsfor a move back to the southern edge of the Gobi. The Eastern Turks werereluctant to comply due to fear of a Syr-Yanda attack, and Taizong had to reassurethem by issuing a letter to Inanch with a thinly veiled threat that his armies wouldpunish any aggression against the Turks. Anxious to cover up the embarrassingreason for his change of heart, Taizong also claimed in the letter that he wassimply demonstrating his regard for trustworthiness by keeping an old promise torestore the Eastern Turk khaganate.64

The decade-old strategic alliance between the Tang empire and the Syr-Yandakhaganate was soon under serious strain, as the Syr-Yanda saw the Eastern Turks’imminent return to the vicinity of the steppe as a direct challenge to theirsupremacy over the Tegreg divisions.65 Inanch expressed his displeasure withTaizong’s decision by withdrawing a prior offer to contribute a large contingent ofTegreg warriors to the imminent Tang expedition against Gaochang 高昌

62 The Tolis Khagan’s son was exiled to the far south on account of his youth. Chinesesources shed little light on the motives of the assassins. The THY and ZZTJ suggest that the TolisKhagan’s brother, whom all sources identify as the ringleader, resented a lack of advancement inhis career as an officer in the imperial guards. The ZZTJ further asserts that he was a ne’er-do-well and a troublemaker. But it is likely that at least some of the assassins hoped to provide theirpeople with an opportunity to break free from Tang domination. For a detailed analysis of theassassination incident see Chu, Sui Tang zhengzhi, 141–82.

63 For background and dates, see Ai Chong 艾沖, ‘‘Tang Taizong chao Tujue zu guanyuanAshina Simo shengping chutan — Yi ‘Li Simo muzhi’ wei zhongxin’’ 唐太宗朝突厥族官員阿史那思摩生平初探 – 以‘李思摩墓誌’爲中心, Shaanxi shifan daxue jixu jiaoyu xuebao 陝西師範大學繼續教育學報 24.2 (2007): 59–63.

64 In contrast to the detailed documentation for the debate of 630, sources are extremelyvague regarding the discussions that led Taizong to move the Eastern Turks back to the southernedge of the Gobi. The ZGZY, THY, and ZZTJ claim that Taizong expressed regret for not havingheeded Wei Zheng’s warnings in 630, thus incurring needless expenses and nearly forsaking ‘‘theway of lasting stability’’ (久安之道). Wei Zheng’s influence on Taizong’s decision is otherwiseunknown. Cui Mingde and Ma Xiaoli claim that there was another court debate involving WenYanbo and Wei Zheng, among other ministers; but there is no evidence for this, and Wen hadalready died in 637! See ZGZY, 9.499–500; TD, 197.5415–16; THY, 73.1314, 94.1690; CFYG,964.11168–69; JTS, 194.5163–64; XTS, 215.6039–40; ZZTJ, 195.6147–49; Cui and Ma,Sui-Tang minzu guanxi sixiangshi, 111–12.

65 Chu Chen-hung argues (citing a 1968 study by Arafune Yoshiko 荒船淑子) that Taizongactually hoped the restoration of the Eastern Turk khaganate would weaken the Syr-Yanda. Thereis no direct evidence for this, however, and it probably overestimates the rationality of Taizong’sresponse to the assassination incident. Chu, Sui Tang zhengzhi, 177.

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(Turfan).66 When Taizong issued a second warning for Inanch to leave the Turksalone or face military action, the Syr-Yanda khagan — who was clearly well-informed about the recent attempt on Taizong’s life — replied that the Turks didnot deserve such protection from the Tang, as they had betrayed the emperor’sgenerosity and shown they were a faithless people ‘‘with the hearts of beasts.’’ Hethen offered to demonstrate his own loyalty and gratitude to the Tang by attackingthem on Taizong’s behalf.67 Unfortunately for the Syr-Yanda, Taizong had alreadystaked his pride on the idea of returning the Eastern Turks to the southern edge ofthe Gobi, and remained unmoved by Inanch’s creative effort at using the Chinesestereotype of barbarian perfidy to turn him against them. In the spring of 641, theEastern Turks under Ashina Semurg finally left the Ordos and reestablishedthemselves at Dingxiang. That winter, a massive army of Syr-Yanda warriorscrossed the Gobi and drove the Turks south to Shuozhou, only to be roundlydefeated by an intervening Tang army and then nearly wiped out as they attemptedto retreat through a snowstorm.68

In 642 the *Kibir (Qibi) 契苾, a western Tegreg division that had submitted toTang suzerainty and resettled in Liangzhou 涼州 a decade earlier, decided totransfer its allegiance to the Syr-Yanda khaganate.69 The Kibir reached thisdecision without the knowledge of their chieftain *Garek (Heli) 何力 (d. 677),who was serving as an imperial guard general at the Tang court. But shortlyafterward, Garek made a visit to Liangzhou to inspect the condition of his peopleand quickly discovered what had happened.70 According to the account in Garek’sofficial biography — which, presumably being based on his own testimony, has to

66 CFYG, 973.11264; JTS, 198.5295; XTS, 221.6221; ZZTJ, 195.6146–47. According tothe ZZTJ, Inanch made his offer in the month before the assassination attempt on Taizong. Allsources agree that Taizong’s response to the offer was highly favorable. These sources give noexplanation for why the actual Gaochang expedition of 640 included Kibir and Eastern Turkcontingents, but none from the Syr-Yanda khaganate; the most plausible reason has to be that theSyr-Yanda had withdrawn from the expedition in protest against Taizong’s restoration of theEastern Turk khaganate.

67 It is unclear whether Inanch delivered this reply orally to the Tang envoy, or in writtenform. Either way, he would have had to rely on the services of a translator, who was presumablyfamiliar with the conventions of Tang court rhetoric. JTS, 194.5164; XTS, 215.6040; ZZTJ,197.6215.

68 CFYG, 982.11403–4; JTS, 194.5164, 199.5345; XTS, 215.6039–40, 217.6135–36;ZZTJ, 195.6148–49, 196.6165, 196.6170–72.

69 Before 632 the Kibir lived along the southern edge of the Tianshan 天山 range, under thesuzerainty of the Western Turks. Their submission to the Tang involved a voluntary migration tothe Gansu Corridor and was probably prompted by the Western Turk khaganate’s fragmentationafter 628. The Syr-Yanda themselves were originally western Tegreg under Western Turksuzerainty and only migrated eastward to submit to the Eastern Turks in 628. The Kibir and Syr-Yanda also had a history of particularly close association, having jointly led a brief revolt againstthe Western Turks in 605–612. SS, 84.1879–80; JTS, 109.3291, 199.5343–44.

70 Skaff states that Garek was sent back to Liangzhou for the purpose of convincing hisdivision to stay loyal to the Tang. This interpretation is not supported by Garek’s biographies,which state that he was making a routine visit and was greatly surprised to learn of his division’sdefection. Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 100; JTS, 109.3292; XTS, 110.4118.

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be read with some skepticism71 — he berated the elders of his people for theirdisloyalty and ingratitude to the emperor, and declared that he would never betraythe Tang. The elders then had him forcibly taken across the Gobi and presented toInanch, probably hoping that this would induce him to relent. Instead, Garek firstinsulted the Syr-Yanda khagan by sitting on the ground with his legs splayed out,then drew his sword, turned to face east, and loudly called on Heaven, Earth, thesun, and the moon to bear witness to his unwavering loyalty to the Great Tang. Heconcluded this defiant display by slicing off a piece of his left ear to make it clearthat he was not indulging in mere bravado. Inanch was infuriated by Garek’sdisrespect and nearly had him put to death, but was persuaded to reduce thepenalty to imprisonment, perhaps because killing one of Taizong’s generals wouldimmediately have handed the Tang a pretext for war.72

This incident came at a very inconvenient time for Inanch. Following thedisastrous losses suffered by his army the previous winter, he had decided to mendfences with the Tang, and perhaps also restore his battered prestige, by requestingthe hand of an imperial princess in marriage. In the late autumn, an embassy fromthe Syr-Yanda arrived at the Tang court to present Inanch’s marriage proposal, aswell as a large gift consisting of three thousand horses, thirty-eight thousand sablepelts, and a mirror made of agate.73 At some point, the chief ambassador alsoexplained the background to Garek’s detention by the Syr-Yanda. Taizong’sministers had earlier assumed that Garek must have been behind his people’sdefection, reasoning that the Tegreg chieftain was like a fish out of water at theTang court and would naturally long to return to the company of his own kind.Taizong, however, had refused to believe Garek was to blame and insisted, ‘‘Thisman has a heart [as immovable] as iron and stone; he would never betray me!’’ (此人心如鐵石，必不背我).74 Now, reportedly moved to tears upon finding that histrust in the Kibir chieftain had been vindicated, Taizong turned to his ministersand embarrassed them with a pointed rhetorical question: ‘‘So, what did KibirGarek do in the end?’’ (契苾何力竟如何).75

One account of this Syr-Yanda embassy in the Xin Tangshu claims that Taizongbrusquely rejected its request for a marriage alliance, and only relented after thearrival of a second embassy in 643. But this is contradicted by numerous other

71 Skaff notes the possibility that the story was embellished by later emperors, courthistorians, and descendants of Garek, but overlooks the likelihood that Garek himself laterpresented a self-promoting account of the encounter to the Tang court. That said, Skaff’sinterpretation of Garek’s loyalty to Taizong in terms of patron-client relations is much preferableto Ma Chi’s, which assumes that Garek’s service at the Tang court had acculturated him to‘‘Confucian’’ values and a Chinese cultural identity. In fact, the notion that loyalty to one’s ruler isa uniquely ‘‘Confucian’’ ideal is an ethnocentric myth that reflects the lingering influence of thestereotype of barbarian perfidy in modern Chinese historiography. Ibid., 345 n. 12; Ma, Tangdaifanjiang, 231–32. For an example of the equal importance of loyalty in steppe nomad societies,see Sechin Jagchid, ‘‘Traditional Mongolian Attitudes and Values as Seen in the Secret History ofthe Mongols and the Altan Tobci,’’ in Aspects of Altaic Civilization II, eds. Clark and Draghi,89–114.

72 JTS, 109.3292; XTS, 110.4118; ZZTJ, 196.6180.73 CFYG, 978.11325; JTS, 199.5345; ZZTJ, 196.6177.74 JTS, 109.3292; XTS, 110.4118.75 JTS, 109.3292; XTS, 110.4118.

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sources, including Garek’s Xin Tangshu biography, which state that Taizongagreed to betroth one of his daughters to Inanch on the condition that Garek bereleased. This was an exceptional honor for the Syr-Yanda khaganate, sinceTaizong had only given daughters of other imperial clansmen to the rulers of the*Tuygun (Tuyuhun) 吐谷渾 and Tibetans in 639–640.76 Taizong’s concern forGarek’s safety was probably not the decisive factor in his agreement to theproposed marriage alliance, however. Unbeknownst to the Syr-Yanda embassy,Taizong’s first response to its arrival in Chang’an had been to consult his ministersabout the possibility of invading the steppe and conquering the Syr-Yanda with ahundred thousand Tang troops — a move that would presumably have turnedGarek into a hostage and put his life in grave danger. Taizong seems to have feltthat destroying the Syr-Yanda confederation with military force was preferable toa marriage alliance, as he believed such an alliance would only ensure about thirtyyears (that is, a generation) of peace on the northern frontier. However, FangXuanling 房玄齡 (579–648) persuaded him to accept Inanch’s marriage proposalon the grounds that a full-scale war with the Syr-Yanda would be too costly andrisky for the Tang. Taizong thus based his response to the proposal on pragmatic,not sentimental, considerations; it seems reasonable to infer that he would haveproceeded with the war option if he had greater confidence of its producing a swiftvictory. The earliest extant account of Taizong’s consultation with his ministersalso shows him reasoning that given the tendency among steppe nomads for mento defer to their wives, the Princess of Xinxing would be able to restrain Inanchfrom threatening the Tang. Furthermore, if the princess bore Inanch a son, the nextkhagan would be Taizong’s grandson and would surely be friendly to the Tang.The latter argument rested on the flawed assumption, however, that Inanch wouldchoose the princess’s child as his successor instead of the adult sons whom healready had by his principal wife and at least one other consort.77

In the summer of 643, another Syr-Yanda embassy presented Taizong with animpressive bride price of fifty thousand horses, ten thousand cattle and camels, anda hundred thousand sheep.78 Garek, who had by then returned to the imperialcourt, urged Taizong not to go ahead with the marriage alliance. The sources donot explain Garek’s motivations, but we may surmise that they included bitternessover losing his people to the Syr-Yanda. Taizong, despite having just treated theSyr-Yanda ambassador to a lavish banquet, was apparently inclined to agree withGarek — an indication that his attitude toward to the Syr-Yanda khaganate hadcontinued to harden — but expressed concern about the unseemliness of a Son ofHeaven being seen to go back on his word. Garek proposed a cunning solution tothis problem: if the Syr-Yanda khagan was asked to come in person to the frontierprefecture of Lingzhou 靈州 to receive his bride from Taizong, he would surely notshow up for fear of a trap. The Tang would then have a legitimate excuse to cancelthe princess’s engagement to him. Garek also predicted that the resulting

76 ZGZY, 9.478–79; CFYG, 109.1191–92, 978.11325; THY, 94.1696, 96.1727; JTS,109.3292, 199.5345–46; XTS, 217.6136–37, 110.4118; ZZTJ, 196.6180.

77 ZGZY, 9.478–79; THY, 94.1696; JTS, 199.5345–46; XTS, 217.6138; ZZTJ, 196.6179–80, 198.6228.

78 THY, 94.1696; ZZTJ, 197.6199 (cf. XTS, 217.6136–37).

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embarrassment to Inanch would discredit his authority and encourage dissensionamong his followers, thus weakening the Syr-Yanda khaganate.79

Taizong adopted Garek’s proposal, but the accompanying predictions turnedout to be wrong. According to the most reliable sources, Inanch was so delightedby the honor of being bestowed a daughter of the Tang emperor, and also so eagerfor a chance to see the celebrated Taizong face to face, that he resolved to go toLingzhou in spite of his advisers’ objections that doing so would be bothdemeaning and dangerous for him.80 Unfortunately for Inanch, the process ofgathering large numbers of horses and sheep from his subject divisions toconstitute a new bride price took much longer than expected. Taizong used theresulting delay as a convenient pretext to cancel his trip to Lingzhou. Moreover,about half of the livestock eventually died of hunger or thirst while being drivenacross the Gobi Desert to the Tang frontier. Certain (unnamed) members ofTaizong’s court then called for the wedding to be postponed indefinitely untilInanch could produce the full bride price, arguing that ‘‘the Yi-Di/Rong-Di cannotbe reared using ritual and moral duty’’ (夷狄/戎狄不可以禮義畜) and mighttherefore ‘‘become contemptuous of the Central Lands’’ (qing Zhongguo 輕中國)if the Tang showed itself willing to compromise on matters of protocol.81 Giventhat the Syr-Yanda had already offered up a large bride price in the summer, thisreasoning seems spurious. There is a strong likelihood that these ministersrepresented a segment of the court that opposed peace with the Syr-Yanda; theymay even have been acting on instructions from Taizong himself. In any case,Taizong readily accepted their argument and sent the latest Syr-Yanda embassyhome without the promised imperial princess.

Some other ministers, however, argued that Taizong’s reputation among foreignpeoples would suffer more if he broke faith (literally ‘‘lost his trustworthiness,’’ 失信) with the Syr-Yanda than if he accepted an incomplete bride price. They alsourged him to seal the marriage alliance promptly for the sake of maintaining peaceon the northern frontier. These ministers seem to have surmised that Taizongremained interested in the idea of conquering the Syr-Yanda, and this must haveadded to their concern over his growing proclivity for initiating wars of conquest.Chu Suiliang 褚遂良 (597–658) submitted a memorial that began by expoundingon the importance of good faith in statecraft and diplomacy: Confucius had taughtthat he would sooner a state lack food than it lack trustworthiness; Lord Wen ofJin 晉文公 (d. 628 BCE), when advised to break a promise to his army in order to

79 THY, 94.1696; JTS, 109.3292; XTS, 110.4118; ZZTJ, 197.6199–200.80 Garek’s official biographies in the JTS and XTS claim that Inanch was indeed prevented

by fear from going to Lingzhou, but this is contradicted by all extant sources on Tang relationswith the Syr-Yanda. The biographies’ reliability is highly suspect, since they credit Garek with theuncanny ability to predict Inanch’s death from illness within two years. Of course, the othersources also contain a conversation between Inanch and his advisers that must have been inventedby the court historians. That conversation’s depiction of Inanch as a sincere and grateful, ifsomewhat naıve, admirer of Taizong, however, is unusually sympathetic and at odds withTaizong’s own attempts at representing the Syr-Yanda as faithless opportunists. See THY,94.1696; CFYG, 978.11326, 991.11478; JTS, 109.3292, 199.5346; XTS, 110.4119, 217.6137;ZZTJ, 197.6200.

81 THY, 94.1696 (cf. 96.1727); CFYG, 978.11326, 991.11478; JTS, 199.5346; XTS,217.6137; ZZTJ, 197.6200.

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capture a city, had refused to do so on the grounds that trustworthiness was hisstate’s greatest treasure. Significantly, these examples related to good faith betweena Chinese ruler and his subjects, but Chu evidently felt they were equallyapplicable to foreign relations. In fact Chu, employing his characteristically ironicstyle of indirect remonstrance, next ‘‘reminded’’ Taizong that throughout his reign,he had ‘‘used humaneness and kindness to build relations with alien peoples andused trustworthiness and integrity to care for the Rong-Yi’’ (以仁恩而結庶類，以信義而撫戎夷).82 The Syr-Yanda were already eternally indebted to Taizong andhis descendants for his generosity, but if he would only honor the marriageagreement, this would prove that he was no less than a sage. On a more pragmaticnote, Chu Suiliang noted that the nomadic peoples of the steppe were toonumerous to exterminate; the destruction of one khaganate would only lead to itsreplacement by another. The ancients therefore sought instead to gain theirgoodwill through moral power, taking care to ensure that any wrongdoing orbreach of faith was the fault of the Yi 夷 and not of the Chinese. Since Taizong’sachievements far surpassed those of the ancients, he should now give the empirerest from war and restrain himself from ‘‘being frequently angered by [thedisobedience of] remote lands’’ (常嗔絕域).

Taizong responded to this group of pro-peace ministers by belittling theirunderstanding of current strategic realities: ‘‘You gentlemen understand the pastbut not the present!’’ (君等知古而不知今). Boasting that the Tang was far strongermilitarily than the steppe nomads and had no need to appease them with marriagealliances, Taizong argued that the Syr-Yanda were only using the prestige gainedfrom Tang patronage to keep the other Tegreg divisions under control. Marriageto a daughter of the emperor would only strengthen Inanch’s authority over theTegreg, but it would not guarantee peace between the Tang and the Syr-Yanda:

What do Yi-Di people know of gratitude? If they are dissatisfied over even atrifle, they will lead their armies south [to attack us]. To do as you gentlemenpropose can well be called rearing a tiger only to be devoured by it.

夷狄之人豈只恩義？微不得意，勒兵南下。如君所言，可謂養獸[虎]自噬也。83

82 The most complete surviving text of Chu Suiliang’s memorial is found in the JTS and theCFYG; the THY, XTS, and ZZTJ contain condensed versions. See JTS, 80.2731–33; CFYG,543.6207–08; THY, 94.1696; XTS, 105.4027; ZZTJ, 197.6200–1. For the Confucius quotationsee Analects 12:7, where xin 信 refers to the people’s trust in their ruler. For the Lord Wenquotation, see Zuozhuan, 16.429 (Lord Xi, Year 25 僖公二十五年 [635 BCE]); Lushi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009), 19.534–35.

83 The TD and CFYG, which are the more reliable sources for this passage, render theproverb ‘‘rearing a tiger only to be devoured by it’’ (養虎自噬) as ‘‘rearing a wild beast only to bedevoured by it’’ (養獸自噬), because of the Tang taboo on the word hu 虎 (see note 50 above).The ZZTJ paraphrase changes the first line to ‘‘the Rong-Di have the faces of men and the heartsof beasts’’ (戎狄人面獸心), while the XTS paraphrase changes it to ‘‘the Rong-Di have wildhearts’’ (戎狄野心). Skaff follows the XTS version and translates 野心 as ‘‘ruthlessly ambitious,’’but this obscures the dehumanizing aspect of Taizong’s rhetoric. See TD, 199.5466; CFYG,978.11326, 991.11478 (cf. ZZTJ, 197.6201; XTS, 217.6137); Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 219–21.

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Only a year before, Taizong had expressed unshakeable confidence in Garek’sloyalty and chided his ministers for thinking otherwise. But he was now declaringGarek’s fellow Tegreg, the Syr-Yanda, to be barbarians and therefore innatelyincapable of good faith. Was Garek somehow an exception to the rule of barbarianperfidy? More likely, no such rule existed in Taizong’s mind; he was just using thestereotype of the perfidious barbarian as an expedient rhetorical device to justifyhis own bad faith toward the Syr-Yanda. Indeed, his rhetoric bears a strikingresemblance to Wei Zheng’s demonization of the Eastern Turks in 630 (Wei haddied only six months before). Taizong concluded his response by unveiling a newstrategy (perhaps inspired by Garek’s advice) for dealing with the Syr-Yanda:neither peace nor open war, but rather subversion by means of flagrant diplomaticsnubs. By denying their request for a marriage alliance and downgrading the ritualprotocol observed by Tang envoys in Inanch’s presence, the Tang empire wouldsend a message to the other Tegreg divisions that the Syr-Yanda no longer had itssupport. Indeed, Taizong predicted that these divisions would turn against the Syr-Yanda in no time, and confidently ordered his ministers to have this predictionnoted in the court records.84

TAIZONG’S DENIAL OF THE STEREOTYPE IN 645

Subsequent events proved Taizong’s powers of prescience to be no stronger thanGarek’s. Despite Inanch’s failure to secure the marriage alliance he had sought, hiskhaganate retained the support of the Tegreg divisions for the remaining two yearsof his life.85 It was instead the newly restored Eastern Turk khaganate that soonbegan to collapse because of Ashina Semurg’s ineffectual leadership. By thebeginning of 645, nearly all of the Eastern Turks had deserted Semurg and fledback to the Ordos plateau, where they petitioned Taizong for permission to

84 TD, 199.5466; CFYG, 978.11326, 991.11478 (cf. ZZTJ, 197.6201; XTS, 217.6137).85 THY (94.1696) claims that Inanch lost the loyalty of the other Tegreg divisions by levying

so much livestock from them for the second bride price. But all other sources (including anotherTHY passage) state that it was Inanch’s successor *Bashak (Bazhuo) 拔灼 (d. 646) whoseparanoia, poor leadership skills, and unsuccessful raids on the Tang frontier caused the otherdivisions to revolt against the Syr-Yanda khaganate. It should also be noted that in 644, Inanchmade a final attempt at reconciliation by offering to contribute Tegreg troops to Taizong’sGoguryeo expedition. Taizong, sticking to his new strategy of unmitigated hostility toward theSyr-Yanda, rebuffed the offer and even issued a pugnacious challenge for Inanch to use theexpedition as an opportunity to attack the Tang empire. After the expedition began, Goguryeoattempted to persuade Inanch to join forces with them against the Tang. Inanch refused to do so;Chinese sources claim that he was deterred by fear of Taizong’s military prowess. Taking the biasof these sources into account, it is more likely that his refusal was motivated by his consistentpreference for peace with the Tang. See TD, 199.5466; THY, 96.1727; JTS, 199.5346–47; XTS,217.6137–38; ZZTJ, 198.6227, 198.6236–37.

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remain. Taizong was then in Luoyang, en route to his expedition againstGoguryeo, and approved the petition as there seemed to be no other choice.86

Chu Suiliang and other ministers in the imperial entourage had gravereservations about the Goguryeo expedition and Taizong’s plan to command itin person; it reminded them too much of the events that had led to the collapse ofthe Sui empire. It is therefore no surprise that they seized on the Eastern Turks’return to the Ordos, and the danger that they might rebel and mount an attack onChang’an, as another reason for Taizong to cancel the expedition or at leastdelegate it to his generals. Taizong dismissed their warnings with a version of oneof Wen Yanbo’s arguments from the 630 resettlement debate — namely, that theEastern Turks could be trusted not to turn against the Tang because evenbarbarians would respond to a sagely emperor’s moral power with loyalty andgratitude. He also took the opportunity to assert that his Goguryeo expedition wasin no way similar to those of Sui Yangdi, despite his ministers’ attempts at usingYangdi’s fate as a warning against attacking Goguryeo.

Four different versions exist of this dialogue between Taizong and hisministers.87 The Zizhi tongjian version, which has the latest date of composition,is the one usually quoted in modern scholarship, but the two earliest versions,found in the Tang huiyao and the Cefu yuangui, are much more likely to preservethe original language of the court records. The Tang huiyao version is the mostheavily condensed of the four:

The ministers said, ‘‘YourMajesty has only just begun a long-range expeditionto the east of the Liao River. Yet you are resettling the Turks on the Ordosplateau, not far from the capital [Chang’an]. How could they not become athreat in the future?’’ The emperor replied, ‘‘The Yi-Di, too, are human beings.If they are governed with moral power, they can become like members of thefamily. Besides, [the Eastern Turks] did not flee north to the Syr-Yanda, andinstead returned to us; one can see their [loyal] sentiments from this.’’

群臣言：「陛下方遠征遼左，而置突厥於河南，距京師不遠。豈得不爲後

患？」上曰：「夷狄亦人，以德治之，可使如一家。且彼不北走延陀而歸

我，其情可見。」88

The Cefu yuangui version, in contrast, is the longest and thus probably the leastabridged. Here, Taizong’s reply quickly becomes an extended monologue that endswith another command for his ministers to record one of his bold predictions forposterity:

86 Semurg himself joined Taizong’s entourage shortly afterwards and served as a general inthe imperial guards during the Goguryeo expedition. Pan Yihong suggests, ‘‘Taizong’s real motive[in permitting the Turks’ return to the Ordos] may have been to preserve [them] so that they couldcontinue to function as a force defending the Tang frontier.’’ This overestimates the effectivenessof Semurg’s mutinous followers as a fighting force and the range of choices open to Taizong. SeeTD, 197.5416; THY, 94.1690; CFYG, 46.449; JTS, 194.5164–65; XTS, 215.6040–41; ZZTJ,197.6215–16; Pan, Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan, 189.

87 THY, 94.1690; CFYG, 46.499; XTS, 215.6041; ZZTJ, 197.6215–16.88 THY, 94.1690. The Ordos plateau was known in the Tang period as Henan 河南 (‘‘south

of the [Yellow] River’’), not to be confused with the modern Henan province.

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The ministers argued that the emperor had only just begun an expedition to theeast, and theOrdos plateau was not far from the capital. Now hewas resettlingthese formidable nomads near [the capital], and this was not a sound strategy.They asked the emperor to guard Luoyang and not [continue the] expeditionto the east.89 The emperor replied, ‘‘A ruler of men should rely on his moralpower and integrity, instead of suspecting and distrusting his subjects. Underthe transforming influence of the sage-king Yao’s moral power, everyhousehold in his realm was worthy of enfeoffment. Under the transforminginfluence of the evil King Zhou [of the Shang dynasty], every household in hisrealm deserved to be punished by death.90 In antiquity, King Tang [of theShang dynasty] and King Wu of the Zhou dynasty exerted their transforminginfluence on the former subjects of King Jie [of the Xia dynasty] and KingZhou [respectively], all of whom changed their ways to good because of thisinfluence. Confucius said, ‘‘Where there is [good] teaching, [people] will nolonger be divided into categories [of superior and inferior].’’ How could this bean empty claim? Formerly, when Sui Yangdi did not practice the Way [ofrulership], his people seethed and sighed with resentment. It was YangXuangan, and not the Yi-Di, who then rebelled against him.91 If a ruler willonly be free of distrust, then even Yi-Di can serve him loyally, but if a ruler isalways distrustful of his subjects, even his ablest ministers will surely [rebeland] cause disaster [for the realm].Wemay not have the quickest of minds, butWe are familiar enough with such principles of common sense.

群臣或以帝方東征，河南去京不遠，今近處强胡，非计之得。請帝鎮雒

陽，無東征。帝曰：「夫爲人君者，當從德義而無猜疑。比屋可封，化堯

之德也。比屋可誅，化紂之惡也。昔成湯、周武化桀紂之遺氓，各從其

化，無不遷善。孔子云：「有教无类。」豈徒言哉！昔隋煬帝無道，百姓

嗟怨。玄感作乱，非夷狄者也。但君無疑貳，夷狄可以效忠，君多猜嫌，股

肱必至構禍。朕雖不敏，頗識機宜。

Formerly when the Sui dynasty conscripted the people for expeditionsacross the Liao River, everyone cut off a hand or mutilated a foot [to avoidthe draft], or fled into the mountains and the wilderness. Now We areleading an expedition that recruits only willing volunteers. A call for ten

89 Cui and Ma, relying solely on the ZZTJ version of the dialogue, misinterpret the phrase‘‘Please stay and guard Luoyang’’ (願留鎮洛陽) (ZZTJ, 197.6215) as meaning that the ministersadvised Taizong to resettle the Eastern Turks in Luoyang as a military garrison. Thisinterpretation makes no sense from a strategic point of view — if it was too dangerous to letthe Turks stay on the Ordos plateau, would it not be much worse to leave them in the empire’seastern capital? Moreover, it is plainly contradicted by the CFYG version, which states that theministers ‘‘asked the emperor to guard Luoyang’’ (請帝鎮雒陽) (CFYG, 46.499). See Cui and Ma,Sui-Tang minzu guanxi sixiangshi, 112.

90 TheXinyu新語, written by the early Han classicist Lu Jia陸賈 (ca. 228–ca. 140 BCE), containsthe earliest known occurrence of this saying. See Xinyu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 1.65.

91 In the summer of 613, while Yangdi was engaged in his second expedition against Goguryeo,his minister Yang Xuangan楊玄感 (d. 613) — who had been put in charge of the expedition’s grainsupply – launched a rebellion and attempted to capture Luoyang. After repeated defeats by loyal Suiarmies, Yang committed suicide. However, Yangdi had to abort his expedition in a hurry because ofthe danger that Yang’s rebellion posed to his rear. See SS, 4.84, 70.1616–19, 81.1817.

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volunteers is answered by a hundred; a call for a hundred is answered by athousand. Those who need not join the army fill the roads with cries ofjubilation.92 That is what is called beginning an enterprise without goingagainst [the people’s wishes]. In Our heart,We tirelessly care for the welfare ofall human beings. Even though [the Turks now] reside on the Ordos plateau,We have relieved their poverty and provided them with sustenance when theywere weak. Their gratitude will surely have gone as deep as the marrow oftheir bones. Besides, the way of life of the Syr-Yanda is similar to theirs, yetthey did not flee to the Syr-Yanda who were close by and instead returned toWe who were far away. One can easily see their [loyal] sentiments from this.’’He then said to the Assistant Director of the Chancellery, Chu Suiliang, ‘‘Youare in charge of the Court Diary, and should record this: I guarantee that forthe next fifteen years, there will be no trouble from the Turks.’’

昔隋氏伐遼，徵發百姓，人皆斷手壞足，亡命山野。朕今征行，取其情

愿。募十得百，募百得千，不預從军者懽聲盈路，所謂創事而不違。朕但

憂念蒼生，心嘗不懈。虽居河南，濟貧贍弱，想其懷恩，入於骨髓。又延

陀嗜欲且同，今不近走延陀，而遠來歸朕，其情易见。」因謂黄門侍郎褚

遂良曰：「爾知起居，宜記之：我保十五年中，突厥无事矣。」93

Modern Chinese historians are nearly unanimous in praising Tang Taizong as anearly champion of the multi-ethnic model of Chinese nationhood now endorsed bythe Chinese state, and also in identifying that model as the foundation for the‘‘cosmopolitanism’’ (guojixing 國際性 or shijiexing 世界性) and ‘‘openness’’(kaifang 開放 or baorong 包容) commonly attributed to the early Tang empire.They invariably substantiate this interpretation by quoting Taizong’s statement that‘‘barbarians, too, are human beings,’’ together with his claim (made in 647) to be thefirst Chinese ruler capable of loving the Chinese and the barbarians equally.94 Only a

92 The ZZTJ version (197.6216) has the opposite: ‘‘Everyone who missed the chance to jointhe army sighs with disappointment and dismay’’ (其不得從軍者，皆憤歎鬱邑).

93 CFYG, 46.499. The last line has ‘‘fifty years’’ in the XTS version (215.6041) and ‘‘fifteenyears’’ in the CFYG and ZZTJ versions. It is unclear which is correct, since the CFYG is earlierthan the XTS but quite prone to errors of transcription. The ‘‘fifty years’’ prediction would seemto fit better with Taizong’s penchant for making grandiose claims, and it may have been scaleddownwards in some later sources as a result of its being proven wrong by subsequent history —namely, the Eastern Turks’ ultimately successful rebellion against the Tang in 679–682.Interestingly, the Sui Tang jiahua 隋唐嘉話 and the DTXJ contain another ‘‘fifty years’’prediction of this kind: Li Jing, after routing the Eastern Turks in the spring of 630, warnsTaizong that in fifty years’ time, they will again be a threat to the northern frontier. In this case,the prediction was spot-on, but the anecdotal nature of these two sources means we have muchreason to doubt that Li Jing ever delivered such a warning. See Liu Su 劉餗 (fl. 728), Sui Tangjiahua (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 1.5; DTXY, 7.111.

94 ZZTJ, 198.6247. I should note that the interpretation of Taizong as a paragon of earlyTang ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’ is not confined to mainland Chinese historiography. One of the earliestexamples of this interpretation is in an influential 1962 article by the Taiwanese historian FuLecheng. Charles Hartman’s study of Han Yu, which repeats Fu’s interpretation and cites hisarticle, was perhaps the first English-language work to highlight Taizong’s claims and take themas evidence of a coherent policy. See Fu, ‘‘Tangdai yixiaguan zhi yanbian,’’ 209–10; CharlesHartman, Han Yu and the T’ang Search for Unity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986),119–20, 314 n. 2.

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handful of historians have pointed out the seemingly irresoluble contrast betweenthe Taizong who claimed to trust in the Eastern Turks’ humanity and gratitude andthe Taizong who declared that the Syr-Yanda, as barbarians, could know nothing ofgratitude and were bound to repay kindness with treachery. Li Dalong admits that‘‘it is hard to imagine that [these statements] came from the mouth of the sameperson, Tang Taizong.’’ Cui Mingde and Ma Xiaoli attribute these ‘‘contradictionsin Tang Taizong’s thought on ethnic relations’’ to the ‘‘historical limitations’’ and‘‘pluralistic nature’’ of his ideas, which seems to be a way of admitting that theymake no sense. Li, Cui, andMa do attempt to rationalize Taizong’s inconsistency byarguing that his attitude toward foreign peoples depended entirely on whether theywere submissive toward the Tang, but this clearly does not cohere with his famousclaim to have gained their submission by loving them.95

While many Chinese historians are analytically hamstrung by a compulsion tointerpret Taizong’s every rhetorical assertion as evidence of his ‘‘thought’’ (sixiang思想) or ‘‘viewpoint’’ (guan 觀), it seems more likely to me that Taizong himselffelt no need to ground his rhetoric in consistent philosophical principles. Instead,he could alternate freely between barbarophilic and barbarophobic argumentsdepending on the pragmatic needs of the moment — needs that usually revolvedaround his expansionist ambitions. Recently, Jonathan Karam Skaff hasperceptively noted the following about Taizong’s claim to love barbarians asmuch as Chinese: ‘‘It is difficult to determine whether this rhetoric actuallyrepresented Taizong’s personal views, because his statements about nomads oftenvaried depending on the audience.’’ I would add that they also varied according tothe rhetorical strategy to which he was responding. When his advisers insisted onthe need to keep faith with the Syr-Yanda because they opposed his intention tomake war on them, he had no compunction about trotting out the image ofbarbarian perfidy in order to dismiss such arguments as naıve. But when the sameadvisers tried to exploit the trope of Eastern Turk perfidy in an effort at avertingthe invasion of Goguryeo, he could make them look small-minded and paranoidby declaring that barbarians were human too. Finally, when he needed morerhetorical firepower in 647 to pre-empt the anticipated arguments against hisplanned second invasion of Goguryeo, he declared that the idea of barbarianinferiority (a favorite trope of anti-expansionist rhetoric since Han times, as wehave seen) was only for small-minded rulers. He alone loved Chinese andbarbarian alike and was therefore worthy to rule them all. By considering thesecases together, we may recognize Taizong not as an exceptionally broad-minded or

95 Similarly, Zhou Weizhou attributes Taizong’s rhetoric about the Syr-Yanda to ‘‘sharpethnic contradictions,’’ specifically Taizong’s fear of the Syr-Yanda khaganate’s growing power.This implies that Taizong’s trust in the Eastern Turks was founded on neither their gratitude norhis magnanimity; instead, it was based on his belief that they – unlike the Syr-Yanda – could nolonger pose a credible threat to the Tang. If that were the case, the decision to move them out ofthe Ordos plateau after the assassination attempt in 639 seems an odd one. Li, Han Tang fanshutizhi yanjiu, 307; Cui and Ma, Sui Tang minzu guanxi sixiangshi, 106–8; Zhou Weizhou 周偉洲,‘‘Rujia sixiang yu Zhongguo chuantong minzuguan’’ 儒家思想與中國傳統民族觀, in Bianjiangminzu lishi yu wenwu kaolun 邊疆民族歷史與文物考論 (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe,2000), 228–39, esp. 236.

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‘‘cosmopolitan’’ individual, but rather as a master in the arts of self-promotion andpolitical rhetoric.96

RHETORICAL USES OF THE STEREOTYPE IN TANG-TURGESH-TIBETAN

RELATIONS

The unusually large body of administrative and diplomatic correspondencepreserved in Zhang Jiuling’s 張九齡 (673–740) collected works provides goodevidence that nearly a century after Taizong’s reign, the stereotype of barbarianperfidy continued to serve the Tang court as a rhetorical tool for self-justification.Zhang wrote this correspondence as the Director of the Secretariat in 734–736,and the fact that he did so in Xuanzong’s name may raise a question ofinterpretation: what degree of confidence can we have that its language representsevidence of Xuanzong’s own ideas? Zhang Jiuling’s role was primarily totransform Xuanzong’s oral statements into the literary prose of edicts and stateletters. Thus, while much of the language in these texts was certainly Zhang’s own,I believe it is reasonable to infer that the tenor and intent of their rhetoricoriginated with Xuanzong, especially since he would have read Zhang’s drafts andordered any necessary revisions before they were promulgated. In this period ofXuanzong’s reign, at least, he was too active and assertive a ruler to give theSecretariat a free hand with the content of his communications with frontiercommanders and foreign rulers.

Let us first consider the opening passage of an edict that Xuanzong issued to theMilitary Commissioner of Hexi (Hexi jiedu shi 河西節度使), Niu Xianke 牛仙客

(675–742), who had overall charge of Tang armies on the Gansu Corridor. Theedict can be dated to the autumn of 734,97 and begins:

96 Skaff’s view is partly inspired by Howard Wechsler’s argument that Taizong seems to have‘‘developed into a shrewd and artful manipulator of his public image… [whose] behavior andspeeches were conditioned less by his own personal convictions than by his ‘feel’ for his audienceof officials and scribes and by his goal of enhancing his place in history.’’ More recently, JackChen has borrowed Stephen Greenblatt’s concept of ‘‘self-fashioning’’ to explain ‘‘Taizong’sattempt to create himself through reference to the moral ideals of sagely rulership.’’ Chen arguesthat in some cases, Taizong’s desire to sustain this constructed image paradoxically served toconstrain his freedom of action as a ruler. While such constraints may indeed have existed inTaizong’s interactions with his court, I see no evidence that they extended to his foreign policy, inwhich he was quite prepared to claim to be surpassing, and not just emulating, the model of thesage-kings. Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 57–58, Howard J. Wechsler, Mirror to the Son of Heaven, 82;Jack W. Chen, The Poetics of Sovereignty: On Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), 4, 81.

97 I have followed the dating proposed by Chang Jih-ming and Guo Pingliang, which appearsmost plausible. Xiong Fei, who edited the most recent annotated collection of Zhang Jiuling’sworks, dates the edict to the autumn of 735 (following He Ge’en), while Beckwith seems to dateit to ‘‘the early winter of 735–736.’’ See Zhang Jiuling ji jiaozhu 張九齡集校註 (Beijing:Zhonghua shuju, 2008 [hereafter ZJL]), 8.538–39 n. 1; Chang Jih-ming 張日銘, TangdaiZhongguo yu Dashi Musilin 唐代中國與大食穆斯林, trans. Yao Jide 姚繼德 and Sha Dezhen 沙德珍 (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2002), 35; Guo Pingliang 郭平梁, ‘‘Tujishi Suluzhuan buque’’ 突騎施蘇祿傳補闕, Xinjiang shehui kexue 新疆社會科學 1998(4): 49;Christopher I. Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1987), 112–13.

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The Rong-Di have no integrity and are worse than birds and beasts. It is rightfor us to conquer them with military force; how can we treat them like humanbeings? The Turgesh have recently been sending ambassadors [to us], and Wehave always cared for them as if they were [Our] sons. Their envoys traveledto [Chang’an] and back, regardless of the season, and we gave generoustreatment to them all — not just to their ruler. Yet they spied out thevulnerabilities of our frontier [defenses] and schemed to capture Tingzhou;that is why the Kul Irkin was executed, and who in all under heaven can saythis was unjust? They have not reflected on their misdeeds, and have dared tomake us their enemy, leading their dogs and sheep to invade our towns andforts.98 This is the day when they court their own deaths; now is the timewhen Heaven will destroy them. Since they have come of their own accord, ifwe do not respond by using this crisis to adopt a decisive strategy, it will be toolate for regrets once we lose the opportunity!

戎狄無義，禽獸不若，但當以兵威取此，豈可人道論之？突騎施頃者通

和，朕每撫之如子。行李往來，不隔歲時，賜與優饒，非直君長。而窺我

邊隙，圖陷庭州，闕俟斤所以見誅，天下孰云不當？不思己過，仍敢我

讎，率其犬羊，犯我城堡。是其送死之日，可謂天亡之時。若不因其自

來，乘危決策，一失此便，後悔何追！99

At the time of this edict, the Turgesh confederation had recently gone to war withthe Tang empire in retaliation for the summary execution of an ambassador whomthey had sent to the Tang court. The ambassador, known only by his title of KulIrkin, had been passing through the Dzungarian Basin en route to Chang’an whenLiu Huan 劉渙 (d. 734), the Military Commissioner of Northern Tingzhou(Beiting) (Beiting jiedu shi 北庭節度使), put him to death.100 Liu Huan then

98 Beckwith writes, ‘‘It is not clear whether Hsuan-tsung meant ‘dogs and sheep’ literally,figuratively, or both.’’ I would argue that in this and several other edicts relating to the Turgeshattacks, ‘‘dogs and sheep’’ is used as a derogatory, dehumanizing reference to the nomadic Turgesh.Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 113 n. 27; ZJL, 8.542, 10.599, 10.621, 14.747.

99 ZJL, 8.537.100 Skaff interprets the Tingzhou incident as an actual armed clash arising from a trade dispute,

basing this on a letter from Xuanzong to the Turgesh khagan *Suluk 蘇祿 (d. 738) that wascomposed in the autumn of 735. Skaff reads the letter as stating that the Kul Irkin attacked Tingzhouand was killed by Tang troops after Liu Huan refused to buy livestock from him for a priceequivalent to the tax proceeds from an entire Tang prefecture.My own reading of the relevant lines isquite different: Xuanzong acknowledges that Suluk is entitled to compensation for the large numberof livestock and horses that LiuHuan confiscated from the Kul Irkin’s entourage after executing him,and comments that one prefecture’s tax payments for that year would easily cover much of the cost.Xuanzong then berates Suluk (not the Kul Irkin) for attacking Tang frontier garrisons instead ofmaking a proper request for compensation. I translate the text as follows: ‘‘If you, the Khagan, hadobserved ritual propriety and memorialized your complaint reasonably, even though the number ofcattle, sheep, and horses under the Kul Irkin was a little large, how could we have had any difficultyin making compensation for them? It would take only the tax revenue from one prefecture to payback most of it. But you made yourself our enemy without any sense of integrity, inflicting violenceon our frontier garrisons.’’ (可汗向若有禮，以理論奏，闕俟斤下牛羊馬數雖稍多，欲爲補答，亦何足難？惟費一州庸調，酬還則已大多。而乃無義爲讎，暴我邊鎮 ). See ZJL, 11.636, 11.639 n.1; Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 279.

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claimed to the imperial court that he had found the Kul Irkin plotting to seizecontrol of Tingzhou 庭州 by force.101 In the early summer of 734, Xuanzongsecretly ordered Liu Huan’s subordinates to arrest and execute him on a charge oftreason, and then had his head sent to the Turgesh khagan *Suluk (Sulu) 蘇祿

(d. 738) as reparation for the Kul Irkin’s death.102 Suluk, perhaps suspecting thatLiu had been made a scapegoat for some treachery ordered by Xuanzong himself,refused to be placated and launched attacks on Tang garrisons in the WesternRegions.

Immediately after Liu Huan’s execution under such irregular circumstances,Xuanzong issued edicts to Tang forces in Tingzhou and throughout the WesternRegions to assure them that Liu was not a scapegoat and had indeed been guilty ofplotting treason against the empire.103 Once the Turgesh attacks began, however,Xuanzong’s rhetorical focus shifted to justifying the execution of the Kul Irkin andaccusing the Turgesh collectively of treachery and ingratitude, as we saw from thepassage quoted above. At the same time, he began formulating an ambitiousstrategy for troops from the Tang garrisons and oasis states in the Tarim Basin tomount a surprise attack on the Turgesh home base at Suyab 碎葉, destroying thekhaganate in one fell swoop. Xuanzong hoped that this attack might becoordinated with a simultaneous assault by Arab Muslim troops of theUmayyad caliphate in Khurasan, who had been fighting the Turgesh over controlof Sogdiana and Fergana for more than a decade. Meanwhile, the Turgesh armiesattacking Xizhou 西州 (Gaochang) would be pinned down by a large army ofTang reinforcements from the Gansu Corridor (Hexi).

Thus, Xuanzong’s edict to Niu Xianke continues with the following instructions:

101 Xuanzong’s 735 letter to Suluk claims that a member of the Kul Irkin’s embassy hadrevealed his plot to Liu Huan, thus proving that his execution was ‘‘not a complete mistake’’ (未是全失). The name of this envoy-turned-informer, He Jieda 何羯達 (羯達 may be a transliterationof the Sogdian name Kart�ır), suggests an origin from the Sogdian city-state of Kushaniya (knownto the Tang as He 何). He Jieda apparently sought asylum at the Tang court two months after LiuHuan’s own execution and was given a position in the imperial guards. Most Chinese historiansassume that He only confirmed the existence of a plot after arriving at the Tang court. But a linein Xuanzong’s letter to the khagan reads, ‘‘What He Jieda said constituted his [i.e., the Kul Irkin’s]own man informing on him, and he was only executed when the traces [of his plotting] werealready exposed’’ (何羯達所言，即是彼人自告, 蹤跡已露，然始行誅). This strongly suggeststhat the tip-off came before the execution of the Kul Irkin. Among Chinese historians, only XueZongzheng has read this meaning from the letter, but his argument that He Jieda was an Arabagent working to sabotage Tang-Turgesh relations is entirely speculative. Given the limitedsources available, the question of whether the Kul Irkin was indeed guilty of a plot remainsunanswerable. Note that Xuanzong did not directly accuse Suluk of being behind the alleged plot,although his letter did offer this insinuating (but quite typical) explanation for the Kul Irkin’splotting: ‘‘It is customary for the Rong to lack integrity; when they see [an opportunity for] gain,[disloyal] thoughts [immediately] arise’’ (戎俗少義，見利生心). See ZJL, 11.636; Chang,Tangdai Zhongguo yu Dashi Musilin, 34; Guo, ‘‘Tujishi Sulu zhuan buque,’’ 47–48; XueZongzheng 薛宗正, ‘‘Daluosi zhi zhan lishi shuoyuan — Tang yu Dashi bainian zhengzhi guanxishulue (651–751)’’ 怛邏斯之戰歷史淵源 — 唐與大食百年政治關係述略, Zhongguo bianjiangshidi yanjiu 中國邊疆史地研究 10.4 (2000), 97.

102 ZJL, 8.523,11.636.103 ZJL, 8.523, 8.525, 8.533.

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You should secretly order the [Military Commissioner of the] Pacified Westto raise ten thousand foreign and Han (i.e., Tang) troops, and then sendsomeone posthaste to the Arabs to make plans with them for an attack onSuyab via the Yabgu, Bedel [Pass], and other routes. [Also] order [theMilitary Commissioner of the Pacified West] Wang Husi to lead his bestcavalry personally and capture the families [of the Turgesh]. From within theMilitary Commission of Hexi, send 20,000 foreign and Han troops toadvance westward via the Gaotong and Bozhang routes north of Guazhou.You are authorized to select a cavalry general to command them, and tomake plans beforehand with Xizhou and Tingzhou for them to advancetogether on a fixed date.

宜密令安西征蕃漢兵一萬人，仍使人星夜倍道，與大食計會，取葉護、勃

達等路入碎葉。令王斛斯自領精騎，取其家口。河西節度內發蕃漢二萬

人，取瓜州北高同、伯帳路西入。仍委卿簡擇騎將統率，仍先與西、庭等

計會，克日齊入。104

A comparison of these prosaic deployment orders with the dehumanizing rhetoricin the edict’s opening lines reveals that Xuanzong had no qualms about usingforeign auxiliaries and allies against the Turgesh, in spite of his claims about thefaithlessness of barbarians. Indeed, when in the summer of 735 Wang Husiforwarded to Xuanzong a letter from the Arab Amir (governor) of Khurasan,communicating his agreement to participate in the joint attack on Suyab,Xuanzong commented in reply, ‘‘They [i.e., the Arabs] may be a distant foreignpeople, but they are a powerful country as well, and judging from the meaning oftheir words, they seem to possess trustworthiness and integrity’’ (此雖遠蕃，亦是

強國，觀其意理，似存信義). Xuanzong did order Wang Husi to take steps toascertain the veracity of the Arabs’ commitment to the planned attack — notbecause he did not trust the Arabs, but because he was worried that the Tangenvoy who composed the letter for the Amir had exaggerated or misunderstood

104 Guo Pingliang correctly identifies the ‘‘Yabgu route’’ as Tokharistan, but his reading of勃達 as Baghdad is highly unlikely. Beckwith (following Chavannes) more plausibly identifies it asthe Bedel Pass, by which Tang troops in the Tarim Basin would cross the Tianshan range to attackSuyab. Chang Jih-ming’s ‘‘Bardal Pass’’ may be a variant of ‘‘Bedel Pass.’’ See ZJL, 8.537; Guo,‘‘Tujishi Sulu zhuan buque,’’ 49; Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 113 n. 25;Chang, Tangdai Zhongguo yu Dashi Musilin, 35–36. On the often bitter warfare between theArabs and Turgesh in 720–731, see H.A.R. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia (London:The Royal Asiatic Society, 1923), 60–76; Khalid Yahya Blankinship, The End of the Jihad State:The Reign of Hish�am Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads (Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1994), 125–28, 155–61.

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the Amir’s words.105 Around this time, Xuanzong also suddenly decided to recallan ambassador who was en route to peace negotiations with Suluk. Xuanzonglater claimed to Suluk that he recalled the ambassador because he had found outthat the Turgesh had no sincere desire for peace and were only using thenegotiations as a ruse, but given the timing of the decision, a more likely reason isthat the Amir’s letter had rekindled his interest in the plan for a joint Tang-Arabattack on Suyab.106

One possible reading is that Xuanzong was particularly prejudiced against theTurgesh and, despite expressing this prejudice in the generic language of barbarianinferiority, did not actually hold similarly negative perceptions of the Tarim Basinpeoples or Arabs. But it would then be difficult to understand why he later elevated*Kasho (Geshu) Han 哥舒翰 (d. 757) to overall command of Tang armies on theKokonor front, even entrusting this half-Turgesh general with the defense of thestrategically vital Tong Pass 潼關 during the An Lushan rebels’ attack onChang’an. I would therefore argue that Xuanzong used the stereotype of barbarianperfidy as a self-justifying explanation for the breakdown in relations with theTurgesh, and also as a way of maintaining the morale of Niu Xianke and histroops after the Kul Irkin episode and the sudden execution of Liu Huan. Theintent was to put the blame for these incidents entirely on the Turgesh, and toconvince the troops that the enemy did not have justice on their side and deservedto be punished with complete destruction.

I would further argue that for Xuanzong, the stereotype of barbarian perfidywas not only a tool for self-justification and morale-boosting, nor was it reservedsolely for a Chinese audience at court or on the frontier. Xuanzong’s letters to theTibetan Bstan-po 贊普, (‘‘king’’ or ‘‘emperor’’) in 736 also show the stereotypebeing used as a diplomatic weapon to foment distrust between the Tibetans andthe Turgesh, who had established a marriage alliance in late 734. In 735, theBstan-po had begun complaining to Xuanzong that Tang frontier officials wereinciting revolts among the Tibetans’ vassal peoples in Yunnan, in violation of the730 peace treaty that had ended the second major war between the Tibetan andTang empires. Xuanzong responded with letters (ghost-written, as usual, by ZhangJiuling) denying any Tang involvement in the revolts and in turn accusing the

105 Presumably, the envoy Zhang Shuyao 張舒耀 (n.d.) had composed the letter in Chinesebased on the Amir’s oral statements; he was either conversant in Arabic or, more likely, had theservices of a translator. Xuanzong seems to have suspected the letter’s reliability because it statedthat the Arabs would launch their attack on Suyab in the fourth lunar month, but it was alreadymid-summer and Wang Husi had heard no news of such an attack. Xuanzong commented that ifZhang were later found to have misrepresented or misinterpreted the Amir’s words, he should bepunished. I have followed Chang Jih-ming and Wang Xiaofu in dating Xuanzong’s reply to WangHusi, instead of Beckwith’s date (‘‘Shortly before 735’’) or Xiong Fei’s (the summer of 736). WangXiaofu also argues quite persuasively that the apparent delay in the completion of ZhangShuyao’s mission was due to the unrest in Khurasan caused by the revolt of al-H. �arith b. Surayj (d.746), which began in 734. In 735, al-H. �arith was defeated and driven to Tokharistan where hethen aligned himself with the Turgesh. See ZJL, 10.604–5; Guo, ‘‘Tujishi Sulu zhuan buque,’’ 60;Chang, Tangdai Zhongguo yu Dashi Musilin, 37; Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia,112; Wang Xiaofu 王小甫, Tang Tufan Dashi zhengzhi guanxi shi 唐吐蕃大食政治關係史(Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1992), 171. On al-H. �arith’s revolt see Gibb, The ArabConquests in Central Asia, 76–78; Blankinship, The End of the Jihad State, 176–80.

106 ZJL, 11.636–37.

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Tibetans of conspiring with the Turgesh to threaten Tang interests in the WesternRegions. Xuanzong had also learned that the Tibetans were attacking the kingdomof Little Pal �ur小勃律 in the Gilgit valley, control of which would give the Tibetansaccess, via the Pamir Mountains, to the Turgesh lands and the Tang-dominatedoasis states at the western end of the Tarim Basin. In a letter dated to the earlyspring of 736, Xuanzong attempted to represent these attacks as a violation of thetreaty of 730 on the grounds that Little Pal �ur was under Tang suzerainty. By theautumn of that year, the rhetoric of Xuanzong’s letters to the Bstan-po had growneven harsher due to reports that a Tibetan army had marched through a Tangmilitary colony near the Pamirs while heading westward into Turgesh-controlledterritory, possibly to aid the Turgesh against the Arabs.107

Tibetan intervention in the Turgesh-Arab conflict would pose a major obstacleto Xuanzong’s secret alliance with the Arabs, but he obviously could not revealthis concern to the Tibetans, especially since he had assented to a Turgesh requestfor peace shortly before.108 Xuanzong therefore seized the moral high ground byberating the Bstan-po for maintaining his alliance with the Turgesh despite havingpreviously claimed to have abandoned it, accusing him of deceitful and belligerentintent in the case of the intruding army, and lecturing him on the importance oftrustworthiness: ‘‘Human beings are superior [to animals] because they havetrustworthiness and ritual; countries, too, achieve strength through trustworthi-ness and integrity alone’’ (夫人之所以爲貴者，以其有信有禮；國之所以能強，亦云惟信與義).109 Xuanzong then tried to undermine the Tibetan-Turgesh allianceby claiming that the Turgesh were sure to turn against the Tibetans eventually. Thelanguage of this warning was clearly derived from the trope of barbarian perfidy,but its referents were specified as the Turgesh rather than as generic ‘‘barbarians,’’so as not to give offence to the Tibetans:

107 See ZJL, 11.647–48, 11.652–53, 11.655–56, 12.661, 12.664–65, 12.667–68. In an earlierincident in the spring of 735, Tang troops near the Pamirs captured a Turgesh embassy to theTibetan court that was returning north with gifts and a letter from the Bstan-po to Suluk — seeZJL, 11.636–37, 11.647. The Tang garrison involved in both incidents was probably the empire’swesternmost permanent garrison, the Pamir Outpost 蔥嶺守捉. This was established between 713and 727, following the Tang annexation of the *Khabandha (Jiepantuo/Hepantuo)羯盤陀/喝盤陀kingdom (modern Tashkurgan) — see XTS, 40.1048, 43.1150, 221.6234; Huichao (Hyecho)慧超(ca. 704–783),Wang wu Tianzhu guo zhuan往五天竺國傳 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), 146–53. On the Tang-Tibetan strategic competition for Little Pal�ur, see XTS, 216.6083, 221.6251;ZZTJ, 212.6752. Differing interpretations of the Turgesh-Tibetan alliance and the route takenby the intruding Tibetan army are presented in Beckwith,The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 110–11, 114; Guo, ‘‘Tujishi Sulu zhuan buque,’’ 55–59; Wang, Tang Tufan Dashi zhengzhi guanxishi,171, 180, 188 n. 47, 192 n. 111. Wang essentially follows Guo, but in my opinion, Beckwith islikely to be at least partly correct — this army was passing through the area of the Pamirs, not theTurfan-Hami region or the Tarim Basin. Guo’s interpretation rests on a line at ZJL, 12.669: ‘‘TheIron [Gate] Pass and Yushu [Outpost] guard the throat of the Four Garrisons, and should they beheld by the bandits, matters will become urgent’’ (鐵關、于術，四鎮咽喉，倘爲賊所守，事乃關切). Guo is correct to point out that the Iron Gate Pass and the Yushu Outpost were both in thevicinity of Agni 焉耆 (Karashahr), but here the label ‘‘bandits’’ (賊) probably refers to the Turgeshand not the Tibetans. There is therefore no solid basis for Guo’s argument that a Tibetan armyattacked Agni and Xizhou (Gaochang) in 736.

108 CFYG, 980.11345; ZZTJ, 214.6821 (cf. XTS, 5.139).109 ZJL, 12.664–65.

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Those Turgesh have the faces of men and the hearts of beasts. They live in aremote corner of the world and commit treachery as soon as they see [anopportunity for] gain. It is truly difficult to be their kin. You, the Bstan-po,have betrayed Our past kindness by establishing friendship with them. Thisis not a good strategy, and you should think about it carefully!

彼突騎施人面獸心，偏僻荒遠，見利則背，與親實難。贊普背朕宿恩，共

彼相厚，應非長策，可熟思之！110

A slightly later letter reiterated this point with barbarophobic rhetoric recycled fromthe edict to Niu Xianke, while emphasizing a contrast between the faithlessness ofthe Turgesh and Xuanzong’s good faith and forbearance toward them:

The Turgesh are birds and beasts from a foreign land and cannot be treatedlike human beings. You, the Bstan-po, have crossed over our borders toestablish kinship with them, but one fears that their wild hearts are difficult towin over. You may try maintaining ties with them, but [you can know] whatwill eventually happen fromwhat has already happened to Us. The right thing[for us] to do would be to sever relations [with them], but we have recentlymade a peace covenant [with them] and our affection [for them] is deep. Eventhough they have betrayed our kindness, how can we do likewise?

突騎施異方禽獸，不可以人道論之。贊普與其越境相親，只慮野心難得。但

試相結，久後如何，于朕已然。義則合絕，但爲誓約在近，親好又深。彼雖

背恩，我豈尤效？111

After a month or two, Ge Jiayun 蓋嘉運 (n.d.) — whom Xuanzong had appointedto replace Liu Huan at North Tingzhou — reported a rumor that the Arabs hadattacked Tokharistan and slain its pro-Turgesh ruler, known by his Turkic title asthe Yabgu 葉護.112 This was precisely the ‘‘Yabgu route’’ that Xuanzong had

110 ZJL, 12.665. The letter does go on to claim that since the Turgesh, being mere ‘‘Rong-Di,’’ can do only negligible damage to the Tang empire, Xuanzong is only making peace withthem for the sake of sparing his subjects on the frontier from further disturbances. Xuanzongseems to be hinting that his forbearance toward the Tibetans arises from the same benevolence.

111 ZJL, 12.668.112 Beckwith infers that the Yabgu was a Turgesh chieftain killed in a battle with Ge Jiayun’s

troops at Tingzhou. Wang Xiaofu points out the implausibility of this interpretation and notes thataccording to al-T.abar�ı, the Arabs successfully attacked Tokharistan in this year. However, al-T.abar�ıalso gives the impression that Arab operations in Tokharistan were mainly targeted at al-H. �arith’sremaining followers, and he does not mention the killing of the Yabgu. This suggests that the rumorGe Jiayun reported was inaccurate. In 737, the Arabs moved north from Tokharistan to invade theregion of Khuttal, but the Turgesh intervened and inflicted a major defeat on them as they attemptedto withdraw across the Oxus (Amu Darya) River. That winter, Suluk and al-H. �arith in turn joinedforces and invaded Khurasan, but were routed by the Arabs and driven back to Tokharistan. It ispossible that the Khuttal invasion was aimed at further opening up the route to Suyab, but the Arabicsources supply no evidence for this. See ZJL, 8.540 (cf. Xuanzong’s reply to a slightly earlier reportfromGe Jiayun atZJL, 10.611); Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 113, 116–18; Wang,Tang Tufan Dashi zhengzhi guanxishi, 173, 189 n. 49; Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia,81–84; Blankinship, The End of the Jihad State, 180–82. For a full translation of al-T.abar�ı’s accountof the events in 736–737, see Khalid Yahya Blankinship trans., The History of al-T.abar�ı, VolumeXXV: The End of Expansion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 126–28, 130–47.

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envisioned the Arabs using to strike at Suyab. Xuanzong’s edict in reply to Ge’sreport expressed regret that the news — which he felt confident was more than a‘‘wild rumor’’ — had come a little too late, along with a hope that the Tang mightstill take advantage of this development to destroy the Turgesh khaganate. Thenewly concluded peace with the Turgesh was of no consequence, since they surelydid not mean to honor it anyway:

Earlier, if the [Military Commission of the] Pacified West had sent out anarmy and seized the opportunity to attack, the fugitive caitiffs in Suyabcould all have been captured. It must be because they [feared being] deep inenemy territory without support, and therefore could not cross the border;that is the only reason why the rebel caitiffs escaped their blades. Now,although the bandits have requested peace, they are [merely] using us toincrease their strategic advantage, so as to prevent the Arabs from attackingand to stabilize the morale of the motley caitiffs. How could it be [based on]sincerity? This is their nefarious ploy! You can make plans with Wang Husito monitor their movements and seize a favorable opportunity [to attack].‘‘Conquering [enemy states when they are] in disorder and invading [themwhen they are close to] destruction’’ — now is the time to do it, why shouldyou wait any longer? If you should succeed in this, [our promise of] greatrewards and promotions is as trustworthy as the four seasons —they aresure to come.

向若安西出兵，乘虛討襲，碎葉逋虜，皆可成擒。應為懸軍，未能越境，逆

虜漏刃，莫不由玆。今賊雖請和，恃我長勢，以防大食之下，以鎮雜虜之

心。豈是真情？此其奸數！卿克與王斛斯計會，伺其動靜，因利乘便。取

亂侮亡，不以此時，知待何日？儻成功立事，重賞高班，信若四時，固必

然也。113

In the late spring of 737, the Tang court suddenly ordered its troops at Liangzhouto violate the Tang-Tibetan peace treaty by conducting a raid on Tibetan-ruledKokonor. Sources suggest that Xuanzong was at this time enraged that theTibetans had captured the highly strategic area of Little Pal �ur despite his repeatedefforts at deterring them from such a move. In that case, the Kokonor raid waspunitive in nature and aimed at pressuring the Tibetans into pulling out of LittlePal �ur. However, the Tang court had given the Tibetans no advance warning of

113 Ironically, Xuanzong’s letter to Suluk in the autumn of 735 used the same metaphor ofthe seasons to proclaim the Tang empire’s absolute trustworthiness: ‘‘Our empire keeps faith inthe same way that Heaven never deceives the plants and animals. One might say that Heaven hasno [notion of] faithfulness and that the plants and animals have no awareness of it, yet when itcomes to the four seasons, [Heaven] never errs [in ensuring their constancy]’’ (我國守信如天，終不欺物。謂天無信，物自無知，然於四時終無差也). See ZJL, 8.540, 11.637.

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such a reprisal. Instead, Tibetan forces at Kokonor had relaxed their defenses inresponse to previous assurances of goodwill and good faith from Cui Xiyi 崔希逸

(d. ca. 738), the new Military Commissioner of Hexi. The Tang raid thus caughtthem completely unprepared, killing over two thousand men. Xuanzongdisclaimed responsibility for the raid by asserting that the edict ordering it hadbeen forged, even while richly rewarding the two officials allegedly behind theforgery — a rather clumsy cover-up implying that even he doubted that the LittlePal �ur issue was a valid casus belli.114 Tang-Tibetan relations broke downcompletely as a result of the Kokonor raid: the Tibetans mounted an unsuccessfulretaliatory raid on the Gansu Corridor in 738. Xuanzong soon ordered Tangtroops on the Kokonor front to first destroy the stele that had marked the Tang-Tibetan border since 733, and then begin seizing territory from the Tibetans.115

As for the Turgesh, Ge Jiayun finally carried out Xuanzong’s orders and overranSuyab in the autumn of 739. This assault, conducted without Arab involvement,took advantage of a civil war between rival Turgesh factions that had begun afterSuluk’s assassination in 738 by a powerful chieftain, the Bagha Tarkhan 莫賀達干

(d. 744).116 Not long after the assassination, and almost exactly a year before GeJiayun’s attack, Xuanzong had sent an ambassador to Suyab with a message ofpeace and reconciliation for the faction supporting one of Suluk’s sons against theBagha Tarkhan. Xuanzong’s letter declared his fatherly affection toward the newkhagan, blamed ‘‘mean-spirited men’’ (xiaozi 小子) in the khagan’s retinue forfomenting discord and distrust in the Tang-Turgesh relationship, and emphasizedthe importance of trustworthiness to that relationship:

All rulers must observe trustworthiness and integrity; a ruler who isuntrustworthy thereby places himself in personal peril. If you should adornyourself with sweet words outwardly but harbor nefarious plans inwardly,you will fail to harm us and only injure yourself in the end. We think you,the Khagan, are certainly shrewd enough not to come to that! Glib wordscan appear to be true, and you would do well to investigate them carefully. Ifyour loyalty and trustworthiness remain unchanged, what more need you

114 The forging of an imperial edict was normally punishable by death. This glaringincongruity was the furthest that the court historians could go in identifying Xuanzong as the truemastermind of the Kokonor attack. The historians also made a point of noting Cui Xiyi’s intensemortification at having betrayed the trust of the Tibetan commander at Kokonor. See JTS, 9.208,196.5233; XTS, 5.139, 216.6085–86; ZZTJ, 214.6826–27, 214.6832; Beckwith, The TibetanEmpire in Central Asia, 114–15.

115 JTS, 196.5233–34; XTS, 216.6085–86; ZZTJ , 214.6832–33.116 Wang Xiaofu (partly following Gibb) suggests that the Tang may have been involved in

the conspiracy to assassinate Suluk, while Beckwith argues that there is no evidence of this. SeeTD, 199.5463–64; JTS, 9.212, 194.5192; XTS, 5.141, 215.6066; ZZTJ, 214.6833–34,214.6838; Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 112 n. 22, 118–20; Wang, TangTufan Dashi zhengzhi guanxishi, 175–76; Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia, 85.

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fear? We [and our descendants] can then both enjoy an abundance of goodfortune for ten thousand years!

凡爲君，須守信義，不信則身危。若外飾饰甘言，内藏奸計，未能有損，終

必自傷。想可汗通明，固不至於此！巧言似實，深宜察也。若忠信不易，更

復何憂？千秋萬岁，俱享多福！117

It should come as no surprise by now that this rhetoric was disingenuous. Weknow from the chronology found in the Zizhi tongjian that by the time of theambassador’s departure from Chang’an, Xuanzong had already ordered Ge Jiayunto work with the Bagha Tarkhan’s faction to prepare for a Tang invasion of theTurgesh lands.118 When that invasion finally occurred, Ge took the hapless newkhagan captive and brought him to Chang’an, where Xuanzong pardoned his‘‘crimes’’ (zui 罪) and appointed him to a sinecure in the imperial guards, just asTaizong had done with the Eastern Turk khagan and his chieftains a little over acentury before.119

CONCLUSION

The examples analyzed in this essay indicate that, while keeping faith was no morea cornerstone of Tang foreign policy than it was that of any other empire, Tangemperors and ministers found it necessary (or at least useful) to claim that it wasand to blame barbarian perfidy for any actions that contradicted such claims.Abramson writes that there was a ‘‘notion, strongly held at court, if not in thefrontier areas, that dealings with foreign peoples, like dealings with the commonpeople of China, should be held to a high moral standard.’’120 By reading betweenthe lines of the historical sources — paying closer attention to things left unsaid,comparing rhetorical pronouncements with actual actions, and comparing rhetoricdirected at different audiences — I have shown that such a moral standard carried

117 CFYG, 980.11345. This letter was not composed by Zhang Jiuling, since he was removedfrom the Secretariat in 736 after opposing Xuanzong’s decision to appoint Niu Xianke to theDepartment of State Affairs 尚書省. In 737, he was further demoted to a post in Jingzhou 荊州after a political client of his angered Xuanzong by using a prophetic text to attack Niu Xianke.See JTS, 99.3099; XTS, 126.4428–29; ZZTJ, 214.6822–25, 214.6827–28.

118 Chang Jih-ming is thus mistaken in assuming that the letter was addressed to Suluk butreached Suyab only after his assassination. See ZZTJ, 214.6833–34; Chang, Tangdai Zhongguoyu Dashi Musilin, 44.

119 XTS, 215.6066; ZZTJ, 214.6841. Despite capturing the new khagan, the Tang empirewas unable to exert more than sporadic and indirect influence over the Turgesh. The Turgeshconfederation’s permanent weakening by Tang interference removed the only serious obstacle toArab expansion in Sogdiana, as well as facilitating the Karluk 葛邏祿 people’s westwardmigration into the Turgesh lands. In the famous Battle of Talas in 751, Arab and Karluk armiesunexpectedly joined forces to defeat the last Tang attempt at projecting power into Turgeshterritory and Sogdiana. On developments in 740–751, see Chang, Tangdai Zhongguo yu DashiMusilin, 47–48, 53–79; Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 122–26, 137–40.

120 Abramson gets closer to the heart of the matter when he continues: ‘‘In theory, such anapproach assumed that Han — that is, Tang — behavior was constant and predictable. Thus allimproper behavior or breakdowns in relations were the fault of the non-Han.’’ Abramson, EthnicIdentity in Tang China, 26.

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enough ideological weight to be reflected in much of the Tang court’s rhetoric, butnot enough to determine its choice of policies. It was certainly never held stronglyenough to counteract considerations of realpolitik and strategic advantage.121

Skaff rightly dismisses Tang claims of absolute trustworthiness as ‘‘rhetoricallegerdemain,’’ but points to a case of a Western Turk khagan making similarclaims to the Byzantine empire. He concludes from this that in spite of the variousritual oaths involved in medieval Eurasian peace covenants and pacts, theopportunistic breaking of such agreements ‘‘was the norm, not the exception, inEurasian diplomacy.’’122 One might wonder, then, why the Tang court employedthe rhetoric of ‘‘trustworthiness and integrity’’ in both internal and externalcommunications when its audience could not be expected to believe it. After all,the court could have chosen to express itself in an amoral language of powerpolitics and strategic interests. Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have addressed thisproblem in the context of modern international relations, observing:

In sum, nations provide legal or moral justifications for their actions, nomatter how transparently self-interested their actions are. Their legal ormoral justifications cleave to their interests, and so when interests changerapidly, so do the rationalizations. At the same time, nations frequentlyaccuse other nations of violating international law and norms, as though todiscredit them. One must ask, what do leaders who talk this wayaccomplish? Since the talk is obviously self-serving, why would anyoneever believe it? And if no one believes it, why would anyone bother engaging[in] it?123

Goldsmith and Posner attempt to answer these questions in the context of rationalchoice and game theory. They argue that states have little to gain from claimingthat they are not motivated by a desire for power and domination over otherstates, since such claims are unlikely to be taken at face value. But a state also hasnothing to gain from not making such claims in its diplomatic communications,

121 Wang Zhenping’s most recent work has sought to absolve the Tang court of hypocrisy byarguing that the terms de 德 (moral power, which Wang translates as ‘‘virtue’’) and yi 義 (moralduty/integrity, which Wang translates as ‘‘righteousness’’) did not have strong moral connotationswhen used in Tang foreign policy rhetoric; instead, he claims, they carried the pragmatic,utilitarian meanings of ‘‘efficacy’’ and ‘‘appropriateness (to the situation)’’ respectively. However,Wang cites very little evidence for this argument, and his interpretation of that evidence tendstoward undercontextualization. Nor does he take into account the rhetoric of ‘‘trustworthinessand integrity.’’ Unlike Wang, I do not think there can be any serious doubt that the Tang court’srhetoric with regard to foreign relations was highly moral in emphasis. See Wang, ‘‘Ideasconcerning Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,’’ 268–78; a Chinese version of this argument has beenpublished as Wang Zhenping 王貞平, ‘‘Tang Gaozu, Tang Taizong liangchao waijiao sixiangchutan — Yi ‘de’ yu ‘yi’ wei zhongxin’’ 唐高祖、太宗兩朝外交思想初探 —以‘‘德’’與‘‘義’’爲中心,Tangshi luncong 13 (2011), 54–60. It is my understanding that Wang’s forthcoming book willcontain a further iteration of his theory on de and yi — Tang China in Multi-polar Asia: AHistory of Diplomacy and War (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013).

122 Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 197.123 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘‘Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International

Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective,’’ Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): S118.

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since that would immediately cause other states to suspect it of aggressiveintentions, and to take steps to guard against and even join forces against it.Therefore, states will choose to take their chances with directing moral rhetoric atone another, since it costs them nothing to do so.124 I would add that, in thecontext of pre-modern states, rulers customarily conducted their relations with oneanother in the language of personal ties, friendship, and symbolic kinship, even ifthey had never met face to face. We see this, for example, in the practice ofdiplomatic marriages: Xuanzong’s letters to the Bstan-po repeatedly reminded himthat one of his wives was a Tang princess whom he had received as part of anearlier peace settlement in 710, and that one of his predecessors had enjoyed thesame privilege in 640.125 Within this type of diplomatic culture, attempts to coercefellow rulers through the threat of force or retaliation were almost certain to beresented as breaches of decorum and thus prove counterproductive.

As for the moral rhetoric on foreign policy that emperors directed at a domesticaudience, mainly the imperial court, one could explain this by relating it toideologies of political legitimacy. Here, the thesis proposed by Goldsmith andPosner has some relevance as well. By Tang times, Chinese political ideology haddeveloped a general consensus that the empire’s prestige and preeminence amongthe countries of the world was a good reflection of the ruling dynasty’s legitimacy,but only if such prestige and preeminence were founded on moral superiority andnot just military power and wealth. The emperor, in particular, had to be a moralexemplar for not only his own subjects but also foreign rulers and their subjects.This was, in effect, the ‘‘high moral standard’’ to which Abramson refers.126

Michael Drompp’s incisive study of Tang foreign policy rhetoric from a later reign— that of Wuzong — identifies it as a distinctly ‘‘Confucian’’ understanding offoreign relations:

In the Confucian concept of sovereignty, the Son of Heaven was charged touphold morality in his government; the greater his success in doing so, thegreater his ability to draw foreign peoples to him. This was known ashuairou — attracting outsiders through kind and proper (i.e., moral) actions— and was a very important concept in the rhetoric of Tang diplomacy. Ofcourse, the fact of foreigners’ attraction to the Tang court, which couldrange from diplomatic and military cooperation to complete submission,was generally a function of power and policy rather than one of morality:Realpolitik rather than huairou. But the Confucian conceptualization of

124 Ibid., S115–25.125 Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 209–24, interprets Tang marriage diplomacy as part of a larger

Eurasian diplomatic culture of patron-client ties.126 The question of how and why this moral standard came to be is too large and challenging

to be treated adequately here. My suspicion is that it originated with idealistic philosophers whohad no political experience or governing responsibilities, but eventually transformed into apractical rhetorical strategy for ministers to constrain their emperors’ freedom of action in waysconducive to dynastic and bureaucratic stability.

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the emperor’s role required the rhetorical acknowledgment of the power ofmorality.127

Both ideology and convention thus necessitated that Tang emperors demonstrateto their courtiers through rhetoric that their policies conformed to principles ofmoral superiority and just war, even when pursuing policies dictated purely byself-interest and a desire to dominate other states.128 To make no attempt to do so,no matter how unpersuasive the rhetoric might be, was to show blatant disregardfor the ideology of dynastic legitimacy, and thus to invite questions — at bestannoying and embarrassing, at worst potentially dangerous — about whether theemperor still held the kind of moral authority that had allowed the dynasty to gainthe Mandate of Heaven in the first place. Conversely, an emperor who couldsuccessfully combine ruthlessly pragmatic strategic decisions with morally soundrhetoric stood to gain the admiration of posterity, Tang Taizong being the bestexample of this — although Taizong was perhaps lucky to die before hisexpansionist tendencies, burgeoning ego, and newfound obsession with Goguryeotook him down the same road as Sui Yangdi.129

Drompp’s analysis of Li Deyu’s 李德裕 (787–850) memorials during the Uighurrefugee crisis of 840–843 shows that he was adept at using ‘‘Confician’’ ideologicalconventions to his advantage, framing pragmatic policy recommendations inappropriately moral rhetoric in order to make it easier for Wuzong to justify theiradoption on moral grounds:

[Li Deyu’s] morality was tinged with a pragmatism that some might evenconsider cynicism, for he argued that even if the court planned to attack the

127 Drompp, Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire, 163. I place the term‘‘Confucian’’ in quotation marks because of the problems involved in defining it, which AnthonyDeBlasi has outlined within the specific context of Tang intellectual history. In a recent article,Michael Loewe argues that no single ideology that can be termed ‘‘Confucianism’’ existed in theHan period, but suggests that such an ideology did exist by Tang times. Even for the Tang,however, it might be advisable to translate ru 儒 as ‘‘Classicist’’ (compare DeBlasi’s ‘‘classical’’) inorder to avoid giving the inaccurate impression that people who self-identified as ru believed theclassical tradition to originate with Confucius rather than the ancient sage-kings. See AnthonyDeBlasi, Reform in the Balance: The Defense of Literary Culture in Mid-Tang China (Albany:State University of New York Press, 2002), 13–16; Michael Loewe, ‘‘‘Confucian’ Values andPractices in Han China,’’ T’oung Pao 98 (2012), 1–30.

128 As Pan Yihong notes, ‘‘Chinese expansionist rulers did not openly glorify conquest as alegitimate ambition for its own sake; they always sought to give moral justification for theirconquests.’’ See also Nadine Godehardt’s recent analysis of the ‘‘Chinese tradition of Just War,’’which builds on Alastair Iain Johnston’s insightful but brief discussion of the classical Chinesediscourse of ‘‘righteous war.’’ Pan, Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan, 58; Nadine Godehardt,‘‘The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People’s Republicof China,’’ working paper no. 88, German Institute of Global and Area Studies [GIGA](September 2008), 13–26; Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and GrandStrategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 68–71.

129 By Song times, Tang Taizong’s aura had faded somewhat, and literati who read thehistorical sources carefully enough were increasingly willing to criticize him for being lessconcerned with moral principles than he frequently claimed to be. On this, see most recentlyLeung Sze-lok 梁思樂, ‘‘Fan Zuyu dui Tang Taizong xingxiang de chongsu’’ 范祖禹對唐太宗形象的重塑, Jungguksa yeongu 中國史研究 70 (2011): 25–45.

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Uighurs, it should first lull them into a sense of security through acts ofkindness. Thus we should not take our notions of Li Deyu’s adherence toConfucian morality too far. He could make effective use of Confucianrhetoric when it furthered his cause, but he was too shrewd a politician to letthe language of morality blind him to the political and military realities ofthe day.130

I would argue that this blend of pragmatic (or cynical) policy-making and moralrhetoric was far from exceptional even in earlier centuries. Almost any official whohad lasted long enough in Tang court politics to rise to the position of chiefminister would have accumulated years of experience in the art of soundingidealistic and morally principled without being politically naıve and unrealistic.131

By looking beyond the court rhetoric of ‘‘Confucian morality’’ and huairou 懷柔,we may arrive at a more clear-eyed understanding of the realism and, in manycases, opportunism on which Tang imperial power was actually built.

When writing The Prince, a brutally honest manual for survival and success as aruler in the political world of Renaissance Italy, the Florentine diplomat andpolitical philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) devoted the eighteenth ofits twenty-six chapters to the problem of whether rulers should keep faith in theirpolitical and diplomatic dealings. Machiavelli’s personal experience of theturbulent times in which he lived led him to deliver cynically amoral advice likethe following:

Therefore a prudent lord cannot, nor should he, observe faith when suchobservance turns against himself, and when the reasons that made himpromise it are eliminated. And if men were all good, this precept would notbe good, but because they are wicked, and they would not observe faith foryou, you too do not have to observe it for them. Nor does a prince ever lacklegitimate reasons for painting over his inobservance. Of this one could giveinfinite modern examples, and show how many peaces, how many promiseshave been made void and vain by the faithlessness of princes.132

130 Drompp, Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire, 164–65.131 On this I differ from Skaff, whose use of the analytical category ‘‘moralistic Confucian’’

or ‘‘literati Confucian’’ (an approach inspired by Wechsler) would seem to preclude the capacityfor moralistic rhetoric and pragmatic (or ‘‘realpolitik’’) thinking on foreign policy to coexist in thesame individual. See Skaff, Sui-Tang China, 52–53; also his ‘‘Tang Military Culture and Its InnerAsian Influences,’’ in Military Culture in Imperial China, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 2009), 170–79.

132 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. William J. Connell (Boston: Bedford/St.Martin’s, 2005), 94. This is the most notorious chapter in all Machiavelli’s writings, but arecent biography of Machiavelli argues perceptively that he himself ‘‘was the least Machiavellianof men’’: ‘‘What has tarnished his reputation is not any dishonesty on his part but excessivecandor. Everyone knows that politicians employ deception, that in fact they could hardly functionwithout resorting from time to time to prevarications, half-truths, and outright lies. Few,however, are so open about this peculiar tool of statecraft as [Machiavelli], whose reputation asan evil man is due in large part to admitting what everyone knows to be true.’’ See Miles J. Unger,Machiavelli: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 132.

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I would argue that similar reasoning, only with ‘‘men’’ replaced by ‘‘barbarians’’and ‘‘prince(s)’’ replaced by ‘‘emperor(s),’’ was central to the conduct of Tangforeign policy. The only significant difference is that imperial Chinese politicalphilosophy never produced a Machiavelli willing to expose the hollowness of itsmoral idealism and describe the reality of political practice — a reality in whichcynical understandings of statecraft and the manipulation of political rhetoric werefar more pervasive than anyone cared to admit openly.133

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR

Shao-yun Yang is a PhD candidate in History at the University of California, Berkeley. Hisdissertation project, from which this essay originated, analyzes the rhetorical andphilosophical uses of the Chinese–barbarian dichotomy during the Tang and Song periods.

Correspondence to: Shao-yun Yang, 1612 Walnut Street, Apartment 1, Berkeley, CA94709, USA. Email: yangsy@gmail.com

133 The closest Chinese analog after the pre-imperial ‘‘Legalist’’ philosophers might be thekind of situational ethics found in Zhao Rui’s 趙蕤 (fl. 716) Changduan jing 長短經, on whichsee Anthony DeBlasi, ‘‘Contemplating Rulership: The Changduan jing and Tang PoliticalThought,’’ T’ang Studies 25 (2007): 203–32. But the political philosophy of the Changduan jingis pragmatically moral rather than amoral.

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