VALUES, CIRCUMSTANCES, AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1993) Vol. XXXI, No. 3

VALUES, CIRCUMSTANCES, AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION Rosalind S. Simson Hobart and William Smith Colleges

“Evidentialism” is the traditional view that a person’s epistemic justification for a doxastic attitude is determined entirely by his or her evidence for the content of that attitude.1 In recent years various philosophers have argued that people’s values and situations are important in determining whether their doxastic attitudes are epistemically justified.2 Although some of these arguments have won considerable approval, the claim that values and circumstances properly influence epistemic justification is unsettling, in large part because it seems to undermine the distinction between epistemic justification, on the one hand, and moral and prudential justification, on the other hand.

In this paper I have two main goals. One is to argue that the evidentialist view of epistemic justification is untenable and should be abandoned, even as an epistemic ideal. The other is to outline a n alternative non-evidentialist theory of epistemic justification that preserves important distinctions between epistemic and other types of justification. I begin by identifying four tenets that I consider central to the evidentialist thesis. By means of an extended hypothetical example, I attempt to demonstrate that three of these tenets are false, but that a fourth tenet, dealing with a notion of “epistemic responsibility,” is true. I suggest that the truth of this one tenet alongside the falsity of the others indicates that one can reject evidentialism and still maintain that some morally or prudentially justified doxastic attitudes are not epistemically justified.

I

The term “evidentialism” has been used to refer to a variety of particular philosophical theories. To evaluate the position,

Rosalind S. Simson is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. She has published previously in the area of epistemology.

373

however, it is useful to try to offer a composite of the view- points that evidentialism comprises and to sort out its various elements. In the composite that follows, I have tried to capture the main features of evidentialist theories that have been influential historically. In addition, I have attempted to por- tray the position charitably-in a way that underlines its considerable intuitive appeal. (1) S’s epistemic justification a t time t for doxastic attitude d

toward proposition p is determined solely by a value-free and context-independent justificatory relation between p and S’s evidence for p at t.

(2) The justificatory relation described in tenet (1) is objective in the sense that all people who have the same evidence for p a t t will be equally epistemically justified in d.

(3) S has a n epistemic responsibility to try to exert control over doxastic attitudes by gathering and interpreting evidence conscientiously and open-mindedly.

(4) S has a n overriding responsibility to try to hold those doxastic attitudes that he or she recognizes are epistemically justified, even if he or she realizes that holding these attitudes is morally or prudentially unjustified.

Tenets (1) and (2) are basically self-explanatory, and I doubt that anyone would deny that they compose the core of the evidentialist position. The meaning of tenets (3) and (4), however, needs some explanation. In addition, since Richard Feldman and Earl Conee explicitly exclude tenets (3) and (4) from their statement of the position in their recent defense of evidentialism, some discussion of my reasons for including them is in order.

The concept of epistemic responsibility to which tenet (3) refers is a complex one, and I discuss it in detail in section IV. One example, however, should convey the general idea. Suppose that Jones is a scientist studying the reasons that boys generally outscore girls on math SAT’S. Jones would be epistemically irresponsible if he allowed a desire to find a biological basis for these differences to prevent him from seeking or seriously considering evidence that the basis might be cultural.

Conflicts of the sort addressed by tenet (4) sometimes arise when a person has moral or prudential responsibilities to act contrary to the doxastic attitudes that are for him or her epistemically justified. For example, suppose that Smith has a moral responsibility to treat Brown as an equal, but is epistemically justified in believing Brown to be her intellectual inferior. Smith’s moral responsibility coexists with her epistemically justified belief if she is able to act contrary to her

374

belief. A conflict arises, however, if Smith discovers that, despite her best efforts, she simply cannot act in the morally required way as long as she believes that she is superior to Brown. Tenet (4) states that in this case Smith’s ovemding responsibility is epistemic. She must make no attempt to change or suspend her belief in hopes of thereby being able to change the way in which she behaves toward Brown. Indeed, she must consciously try to ensure that her desire to fulfill her moral responsibility in no way interferes with her holding the epistemically justified belief.

Tenets (1) and (2) set forth conditions under which people who possess particular evidence are epistemically justified in particular doxastic attitudes. Tenets (3) and (4) address the issue of what kinds of control people should try to exert over doxastic attitudes. How should people deliberately go about collecting and interpreting the evidence upon which they base their doxastic attitudes? Should people always make an effort to hold those doxastic attitudes that they recognize are for them epistemically justified?

Feldman and Conee exclude tenets (3) and (4) from their formulation of evidentialism because, in their view, evidentialism has no implications for the normative issues these tenets address. With regard to tenet (3), Feldman and Conee equate being epistemically obligated with being epistemically justified. They argue that if a doxastic attitude is epistemically justified, then one ought epistemically to have it. Any responsibilities of the sort detailed in tenet (3) are, in their view, out- side the purview of evidentialism.3 As for tenet (4), they recognize that epistemic responsibilities may fail to coincide with, and may even conflict with, moral and prudential responsibilities. However, they take evidentialism to be neutral on the question of which of these responsibilities takes precedence.4

I have two main reasons for avoiding Feldman and Conee’s narrow construction of evidentialism. First, I am trying to evaluate a traditional conception of rationality, and the normative issues posed by tenets (3) and (4) were the most central concerns of such forceful traditional proponents of evidentialism as Descartes in the seventeenth century and W. K. Clifford in the nineteenth. Descartes undertook his Medita- tions in order to “rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foun- dation.”5 Clifford’s conviction that our beliefs influence our actions led him to admonish us that it is “wrong to believe on insufficient evidence, or to nourish belief by suppressing doubts and avoiding in~estigation.”~ To analyze evidentialism

375

without tenets (3) and (4) is to divorce the analysis from its historical context.

My second reason for including tenets (3) and (4) is that I want to examine the implications of rejecting tenet (1). Even if, as Feldman and Conee argue, accepting tenet (1)-and tenet (2) as well-does not commit us to accepting tenets (3) and (4), the latter tenets are compatible with the former and tradition- ally have been associated with them. I believe that a concern that rejecting tenet (1) may require rejecting tenets (2), (3), and (4) explains, at least in part, evidentialism’s continuing appeal.

I1 As a means of evaluating evidentialism, consider the follow-

ing hyp~the t ica l .~ John and Jane have been married for fif- teen years and have two young children. Until two months ago, John was persuaded that he had a good marriage. Lately, John has begun to wonder about Jane’s activities. She has been unusually distant toward him. Several times she has gone out a t hours when she normally would be home and has offered explanations that seem to John implausible. Moreover, she has returned late from work on a number of occasions, and a secretary who works in Jane’s office mentioned to John that she twice noticed Jane meet a man after work. John hires an experienced private investigator to follow Jane. The PI observes her on three occasions meet a man, go with him to an apartment building, enter an apartment and draw the win- dow shades. On one of these occasions the PI gains entry into the apartment by posing as a plumber sent to check for a leaky pipe. He observes both Jane and the man sitting on the sofa fully clothed, apparently listening to music.

What doxastic attitudes are the PI and John, respectively, epistemically justified in holding at this time about Jane’s activities? The most obvious option is to believe that Jane is having an affair. Both John and the PI would probably agree that the weight of the evidence points in this direction. It is unlikely, however, that either would consider the evidence “psychologically coercive.” Both, that is, would be psychologically able to interpret the evidence in more than one way: for example, perhaps Jane has gotten involved in a shady business venture that she is loath to tell her husband about. Thus, another option is to suspend belief about Jane’s activities, at least pending further investigation. To find further evidence the PI might investigate, for example, the background of the man Jane has been meeting.

I propose that, if the PI and John have sufficiently different

376

circumstances and values, the PI a t this time will be epistemically justified in believing that Jane is having an affair, whereas, based on the same evidence,B John at this time will be epistemically justified in suspending belief. Consider first the factors that I hypothesize enter into the PI’S determination. In doing so, assume two personal charac- teristics of the PI: first, that he finds it disturbing simply to present clients with evidence without offering his own opinion, and second, that he considers it improper to render to clients “expert opinions” of which he is not personally persuaded.

On the one hand are factors that exert pressure on the PI to suspend belief and continue his investigation in hopes of avoiding a mistake in this case. He realizes that it is very important to John to know whether Jane is having an affair, and he does not want to mislead John. In addition, the PI is worried about his business reputation. Making mistakes is bad for business. On the other hand are factors that exert pressure on the PI to form belief based on the available evidence in hopes of quickly generating true belief in this case and of soon turning to the project of generating true belief in other cases awaiting his investigation. Like everyone else, the PI has a psychological need to feel that he has his world “figured out.” He therefore wishes to form belief when the evidence seems to him strong, as it does in this instance. Moreover, the PI would like to turn to the pressing needs of other clients-a desire that is particularly potent because the PI’S financial solvency depends upon his handling a relatively large number of cases.

The PI just described almost certainly would place greater value in this situation on generating true belief than on avoiding mistake. Consequently, he would view the evidence thus far gathered as sufficient not only for rendering to John the “expert opinion” that Jane is having an affair, but for believing this himself. Is the PI epistemically justified in this view? I propose that he is. Avoiding mistake and generating true belief are both legitimate epistemic goals.9 The choice between them cannot be made in the abstract. It necessarily depends on an individual’s values and concrete situation. Of course, a PI with different values or with a different personal situation might appropriately suspend belief about Jane’s activities. My point is simply that the PI with the values described, in the situation described, would be epistemically justified in believing that Jane is having an affair.

Consider now the factors that I hypothesize enter into John’s determination. On the one hand are factors that exert pressure on John to try to generate true belief by believing, based on

377

the available evidence, that Jane is having an affair. Like the PI, John has a psychological need to feel that he has his world figured out. The uncertainty he experiences regarding Jane is difficult for him to tolerate. He also would very much like to avoid the financial burden of continuing the investigation. On the other hand, however, is a factor that strongly influences John to suspend belief in a n effort to avoid making a mistake about Jane: John is convinced that Jane’s having an affair would have a serious negative effect on their relationship and on their children, and preserving his own and his children’s happiness is for him of paramount importance.

Given John’s circumstances and values, he almost certainly would strike the balance in favor of avoiding error. As in the case of the PI, a husband with different values or in a different personal situation might weight the factors differently than John does. Given John’s values and situation, however, he would be epistemically justified at this time in suspending belief about whether Jane is having a n affair.

I believe that the above analysis demonstrates that tenets (1) and (2) of evidentialism are false. Contrary to tenet (I), values and circumstances play an important role in determining which doxastic attitudes are a t this time epistemically justified for John and the PI. Contrary to tenet (2), although John and the PI have the same evidence, they are a t the same time epistemically justified in different doxastic attitudes because of the differences in their values10 and situations.ll

I11 An evidentialist might respond to my analysis in section I1

by objecting that the sorts of factors that I have described no doubt in fact often influence people’s doxastic attitudes, but that doxastic attitudes influenced by such factors are not epistemically justified. For the evidentialist, considerations such as the value that the PI places on getting to other business or the value that John places on preserving his own and his children’s happiness might provide prudential or moral justification for acting on the assumption that Jane is or may be having a n affair. Perhaps they might even provide moral or prudential justification for believing or suspending belief in whether Jane is having an affair. But they are irrelevant to epistemic justification.

My reply to this objection is that the evidentialist notion of a “pure” epistemic justification that takes into account only “the evidence” is virtually empty of content, and therefore is untenable, even as an epistemic ideal. Any informative analysis

378

of the doxastic attitudes that John and the PI are epistemically justified in holding requires attention to non-epistemic factors. The concept of epistemic justification therefore needs to be redefined in a way that distinguishes it from moral and prudential justification, but that nevertheless takes account of moral and prudential considerations.

Close analysis of several possible evidentialist critiques of my example helps illustrate my point. Suppose, first, that the evidentialist suggests that both the PI and John would be epistemically justified in a particular doxastic attitude: for example, that both would be epistemically justified in suspending belief in the situation described. A problem for evidentialism with this proposal is that it is based on the value preference that avoiding mistake in this case is more important than generating true belief. By the same token, a sug- gestion that both John and the PI would be epistemically justified in believing that Jane is having an affair reflects a higher regard for generating true belief in this case than for avoiding mistake. Perhaps the evidentialist might reply that evidentialism need not deny a role for the epistemic values of attaining truth and avoiding error. To designate a particular doxastic attitude as epistemically justified for both John and the PI, however, it is necessary to choose between these epistemic values, and, as argued in section 11, such a choice cannot be made purely epistemically. I t must take into account what is a t stake morally and prudentially in the concrete situation.

Suppose instead that the evidentialist suggests that the measure of whether John or the PI is epistemically justified in believing that Jane is having an affair is whether a disinterested observer evaluating the evidence would reach this conclusion. This proposal is no more persuasive than the previous one. First, it is doubtful that there is such a thing as an entirely disinterested observer. Anyone evaluating the evidence is apt to identify with some aspect of the situation in a way that would influence his or her assessment. The os- tensibly disinterested observer might be affected, for example, by the value that he or she places on a relationship with a spouse or lover, by his or her own ways of dealing with time pressures a t work, or by old feelings about the divorce of his or her parents.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that there could be a truly disinterested observer, an analysis of the role that such an observer might play does not provide support for evidentialism. This observer might take either of two approaches. On the one hand, since he or she has no particular stake in

379

learning about Jane’s activities, he or she might use a medium level of caution in deciding how much evidence is sufficient for belief. One cannot reasonably decide, however, how much caution is appropriate without taking the stakes into account. Why is a person who does not care about the consequences of a belief in a privileged position for making this decision? If a matter is very important, a medium level of caution is not enough.

On the other hand, the disinterested observer might try to identify a reasonable standard of evidence for belief for someone in John’s or the PI’S situation. Although such a determination would be illuminating in certain respects,12 it hardly offers a defense for evidentialism. It tacitly recognizes that, based on the same evidence, John and the PI are epistemically justified in different doxastic attitudes. Moreover, the determination itself could not be value-neutral. Even if the observer could set aside his or her personal values, he or she would still appeal to values considered proper in our society.13

Suppose, lastly, that the evidentialist takes the rather different tack of arguing that the real issue in my example is simply how strongly the evidence supports the belief that Jane is having an affair. According to the evidentialist, if John and the PI assess the same evidence, they should reach the same conclusion as to how likely it is that Jane is unfaithful. They might agree, for example, that the likelihood is roughly 75% (or a t least that it is substantially greater than 50% but also substantially less than certain). For the evidentialist, agreement of this sort is all that is needed for evidentialism to be true. If asked what John and the PI are epistemically justified in believing, the evidentialist replies that both are epistemically justified in believing that the likelihood that Jane is having an affair is roughly 75% (or that it is substantially greater than 50% but also substantially less than certain). Moreover, if, as in my example, circumstances compel John and the PI to choose between believing that Jane is having an affair and suspending belief about her activities, then both would be epistemically justified in either option. When evidence is inconclusive, the evidentialist argues, more than one doxastic attitude may be epistemically justified.

The problem with this evidentialist response to my example is that the determination of how strongly the evidence supports the belief that Jane is having an affair cannot be entirely objective and value-neutral. Due to differences in their circumstances and values, John is likely to regard the support as weaker than the PI regards it. Alternative explanations of the evidence that are consistent with Jane’s having been

380

faithful will no doubt seem to John more plausible than they seem to the PI. Thus, John will require more evidence than the PI before believing that the likelihood that Jane is having an affair is roughly 75% (or substantially greater than 50% but also substantially less than certain). Is John epistemically justified in demanding as much evidence of infidelity as he does before accepting these beliefs? Once again, this question cannot be answered without reference to the stakes for John,

If determinations of the strength of the relationship between evidence and belief cannot be wholly objective, furthermore, then cases where evidence is inconclusive are in principle far more common than the evidentialist might suppose. Frequent- ly, evidence seems to people to have just one reasonable interpretation because the people examining it share circumstances and values. An alternative interpretation that seems to people far-fetched might seem to them more worthy of attention if their circumstances or values were different-for example, if their survival depended upon their interpreting the evidence correctly. If evidentialism can specify epistemically justified doxastic attitudes only when evidence is conclusive, it is basically uninformative. It tells us little about which doxastic attitudes rational beings concerned with epistemic ends are epistemically justified in holding in actual situations.

IV An evidentialist might object that my critique of the concept

of “pure” epistemic justification fails to establish that the sort of justification that I am proposing in its place deserves the label “epistemic.” I have argued that as a result of their different values and situations, the PI is epistemically justified in believing that Jane is having an affair, whereas John is epistemically justified in suspending belief. The evidentialist might question why John, depending on his values, could not be equally epistemically justified, under my analysis, in believing that Jane is not having a n affair. If this is so, the evidentialist might charge, my analysis implies that people are epistemically justified in interpreting evidence in any way that suits their value preferences and therefore the sort of justification that 1 am calling “epistemic” is not really distinct from moral and prudential justification.14

Suppose, for example, that John is extremely ambitious and has just been promoted to a highly demanding job that he has coveted for some time. He worries that he will be unable to work well if he becomes seriously distracted in any way. In short, John sees significant prudential value in putting out of

381

his mind any questions about whether Jane might be having an affair. (Since John would probably not hire a PI under these circumstances, suppose that he learns the information supplied by the PI in the earlier example from a n old friend who happens to live in the building that Jane has been visiting.) Due to the value that John attaches a t this time to pursuing his career without serious distractions, he dismisses out of hand the evidence presented to him and continues to believe that Jane has been faithful.l5

My account avoids acknowledging that John is epistemically justified in this belief by adding the concept of epistemic responsibility identified in tenet (3) of evidentialism to the account of epistemic justification that I proposed in section 11. In this section and the next I introduce the notion of epistemic responsibility and explain how it figures into a non-evidentialist theory of epistemic justification. In section VI I explain how epistemic justification understood in this way differs from moral and prudential justification for doxastic attitudes.

In the case just described, I would say that John’s belief that Jane has been faithful is epistemically irresponsible. In the example in section 11, John and the PI both were sincerely interested in learning about Jane’s activities. Their assess- ments of the evidence differed because, due to their different values and situations, John’s principal concern was avoiding mistakes while the PI’S was generating true beliefs. Both of these are epistemic ends. By contrast, John in the present case has no epistemic end. He has no desire to find out what really has been happening, and indeed prefers not to find out. He is epistemically irresponsible because he is simply believing what he considers it prudent to believe. Evidence is irrelevant to him.

Essentially the same analysis applies to a situation in which John, for moral reasons, dismisses the evidence described above and persists in believing that Jane is not having an affair. Consider the following example. John’s daughter has had serious emotional problems, and John is worried that she will suffer greatly from marital discord between her parents. John is persuaded that if he suspected Jane of having an affair, such discord would be both inevitable and impos- sible to hide from his daughter. Convinced that he has an overriding moral obligation to protect his daughter a t this time, John refuses even to consider the possibility that Jane has been unfaithful. Again, I would consider John epistemically irresponsible, because he is being governed by values that undermine any real interest in evidence. As in the previous example, he has no epistemic goal.l6

382

This is not to say that John would never be epistemically responsible in believing, based on the evidence described, that Jane has been faithful. Suppose, as in the two previous examples, that John perceives prudential or moral value in believing that Jane is not having an affair. It is conceivable that John could carefully attend to the evidence in hopes of learning about Jane’s activities, and yet, due to his values, regard as very high the stakes of mistakenly doubting Jane. John might therefore have an unusually high standard of sufficient evidence for suspending belief in Jane’s faithfulness; and holding the evidence up to this standard, he reasonably could conclude that it is simply insufficient.

In light of the quantity of evidence suggesting that Jane may be having an affair, the situation just described is unlikely to arise. If it does, however, John is epistemically responsible as long as two conditions are met. First, John must really have an epistemic goal. Second, John must be epistemically responsible in his view of the moral or prudential benefits that derive from continuing to believe that Jane has been faithful. The indispensability of the first condition has already been discussed. The second is essential, because if John is not epistemically responsible in gauging the stakes involved, he cannot be epistemically responsible in the eviden- tiary standard that he adopts based on his perception of these stakes. l7

It is not always easy to determine whether a person really has an epistemic goal. One difficulty is specifying how concerned with evidence someone must be in order to qualify as having such a goal. A second difficulty is identifying a person’s attitudes toward evidence. Asking people about these attitudes may well not prove fruitful. People often are insufficiently aware of these attitudes to explain them accurately. Even when they are aware, moreover, they may choose to mis- represent them in order to avoid appearing unreasonable.

I suggest that the appropriate standard for determining whether a person has an epistemic goal at a particular time is whether he or she at that time is as conscientious and open- minded in gathering and interpreting evidence as could reasonably be expected of someone who is in his or her situation, has his or her values, and is sincerely interested in evidence. It seems clear that a standard for epistemic responsibility cannot be less stringent than this. On the other hand, a higher standard-for example, one that required a person to gather and interpret evidence as conscientiously and open-mindedly as is humanly possible-would in effect give priority in all cases to the epistemic goal of avoiding error over the epistemic

383

goal of achieving true belief. As I explained in sections I1 and 111, such a generic ordering seems unwarranted.18

Various aspects of a person’s behavior can offer insight into whether he or she approaches evidence in a way that meets this proposed standard. Assume once again that for moral or prudential reasons John persists in believing, despite all the evidence described earlier, that Jane is not having a n affair. Does John make at least some effort to learn of additional evidence? Does he, for example, encourage the friend who gave him the evidence to inform him if she discovers anything further? Does John give serious thought to alternative inter- pretations of the evidence? Does he try to think about what sort of evidence he would consider sufficient to justify a different doxastic attitude?lg Is John willing to reflect on the values that make him so reluctant to believe that Jane is having a n affair? Is he willing to reconsider those values? Is he willing to contemplate seriously the possibility that he might have prejudices or biases that interfere with his ability to interpret the evidence fairly? For John to have an epistemic goal it is not essential that every one of these questions be answered in the affirmative. More than one or two “no’s,” however, would be a good indication that he does not.20

Consider now the second condition that I suggested must be satisfied for John to be epistemically responsible in believing, despite all the evidence, that Jane has been faithful-i.e., John must be epistemically responsible in his belief that suspecting Jane of having a n affair would have disastrous consequences. Analysis of this example would proceed along the same lines as the determination of whether John is epistemically responsible in believing that Jane has been faithful.

V

Under my approach, the relationship between being epistemically responsible in a doxastic attitude and being epistemically justified in that attitude is straightforward: The former implies the latter. Consider again the original fact situation in section 11. Suppose this time that while following Jane to her rendezvous, the PI noticed that Jane was carrying a newspaper open to the horoscope. Failing to see any particular significance in this fact, the PI promptly let it slip from mind. Later it suddenly occurs to the PI that the horoscope might somehow be relevant. After asking John the date of Jane’s birthday, the PI looks up the horoscope at issue and reads: “A new acquaintance will give your career new direction.” No longer confident of his assessment of the situation,

384

the PI suspends belief that Jane is having an affair and resolves to investigate further.

Of course, once the PI discovers the new evidence he is neither epistemically responsible nor epistemically justified in his original belief. Prior to this discovery, however, I would say that he was both. Although the PI originally overlooked potentially important evidence, it was the type of oversight that happens to reasonably conscientious people all the time. It was not the type of disregard for evidence that I have suggested would be epistemically irresponsible. That the PI’s original belief was epistemically justified may seem more questionable. After all, the evidence he originally overlooked proved significant enough to make him change his belief. As argued previously, however, a person need not consider all possible evidence in order to be epistemically justified in a doxastic attitude. How much evidence, then, must a person take into account to be epistemically justified? In my view, enough to be epistemically responsible.

Someone who is epistemically irresponsible in a doxastic attitude will usually be epistemically unjustified in that attitude, but not always. Suppose, as hypothesized earlier, that John’s desire to further his career leads him simply to dismiss any evidence that Jane may be having an affair. Under the circumstances, John is epistemically irresponsible in believing that Jane has been faithful. Also suppose that John sub- sequently learns of the horoscope evidence discussed in the preceding example and from that time on makes it the basis for his belief that Jane is not having an affair. If John is simply looking for an excuse to believe that Jane has been faithful and relies on the horoscope evidence because it points in the desired direction, he is still epistemically irresponsible. If, however, he is basing his belief on evidence that he would consider sufficient for it if he were epistemically responsible, then he is epistemically justified in his belief.21

It follows from my analysis that a person may conclude that another person is epistemically justified in a doxastic attitude without endorsing that person’s doxastic attitude. Sometimes this occurs as a result of a difference in values. Assume again that John’s concern for his daughter leads him to believe that Jane has been faithful and that the PI’s desire to get on with business leads him a t the same time, based on the same evidence, to believe that she is having an affair. The PI may criticize John morally for his view of parental responsibility. John may criticize the PI morally for being overly concerned with his business. If each concedes t h a t the other is epistemically responsible in his approach to evidence, each

385

would consider the other’s belief epistemically justified, despite being persuaded that he would not be epistemically justified in that belief if he were in the other’s situation.

Differences in situation may also lead people-even those who share values-to disapprove of doxastic attitudes that they admit are epistemically justified. For example, John may believe that the PI’S years of experience in investigating infidelity have made him unduly inclined to believe that spouses are unfaithful. The PI may believe that John’s emotional involvement with Jane has made him unduly inclined to believe in her fidelity. Thus, each may believe that the other’s situation is disadvantageous for interpreting the evidence con- cerning Jane’s activities. Each may admit, however, that the other treats evidence in a way that meets the standards for epistemic justification.

VI

The theory of epistemic justification that I have been ad- vancing is clearly distinguishable from moral and prudential justification for doxastic attitudes. It is quite possible to fail to meet my proposed criteria for epistemic justification and still be morally or prudentially justified in a doxastic attitude. By the same token, a person may be morally or prudentially unjustified in a doxastic attitude but still on my account be epistemically justified.

Consider again the two cases in which John’s desires to further his career and to protect his daughter lead him to the epistemically irresponsible belief that Jane is not having a n affair. If, as suggested earlier, John would not have this belief if he were epistemically responsible, then the belief is epistemically unjustified as well. Nevertheless, it is possible to hypothesize circumstances in which John might be either prudentially or morally justified in this belief, or both.

Suppose, as before, that if John suspends belief in Jane’s faithfulness it is very likely that his marriage, his career, and his daughter will be adversely affected. Suppose also that John comes upon evidence suggesting that the chances are good that Jane’s suspicious behavior will soon cease: He learns that the man Jane has been meeting lives in Europe with his wife and children and is in the area only on a short- term business assignment. In this situation, John might be both prudentially and morally justified in believing that Jane has been faithful.

Analogously, consider again the original case in which John is epistemically justified in suspending belief in whether Jane

386

has been having a n affair. In the circumstances hypothesized in the immediately preceding example, this doxastic attitude might be both prudentially and morally unjustified.

If one doxastic attitude is for John epistemically justified and a different one is for him morally and/or prudentially justified, which doxastic attitude should John hold? I disagree with tenet (4) of evidentialism, which says that the responsibility to try to be epistemically justified always takes precedence over responsibilities to try to be morally or prudentially justified. In my view, these responsibilities are too vari- able and complex to allow sensibly for categorical ordering. Their relative priority must somehow be assessed on a case- by-case basis, taking into account the importance generally of each form of justification and the force with which it comes into play in the particular case.

Consider again the case discussed in section IV in which John’s desire to protect his daughter leads him to the morally justified but epistemically irresponsible and epistemically unjustified belief that Jane is not having an affair. In light of the conflicting moral and epistemic justifications, should John be criticized or commended for not making a greater effort to attend to evidence? In part this depends on the values served by being epistemically responsible and, hence, epistemically justified. I suggest that there are principally two such values. One is reducing the long-term possibility of being surprised by and unprepared for future events. A second is furthering one’s humanity-in Hilary Putnam’s words, promoting “human flourishing.”22 A desire to see the world in a way that accords with and accounts for evidence lies at the core of what it is to be human. To decide which doxastic attitude John is justified in holding, all things considered, it is necessary to weigh the extent to which these values would be disserved by John’s believing that Jane has been faithful against the extent to which John’s holding this belief would serve the moral value of enabling him to protect his daughter. To decide how this balance should be struck, we would need more details about John and his situation. For present purposes it is enough to observe that the balance is a complicated one that does not necessarily tip in favor of holding the epistemically justified doxastic attitude.

It may be argued that the values identified above as central to epistemic responsibility are really prudential and moral values. If this argument is well taken, is epistemic justification really distinct from moral and prudential justification? I contend that I have shown that it is. Even if the epistemic responsibility to gather and interpret evidence in a reasonably

387

conscientious and open-minded manner is viewed as a moral and prudential responsibility to try to be a rational person, trying to be a rational person is not equivalent to trying to behave in a morally and prudentially desirable

VII

In selecting examples for this paper I have looked for ones that reveal clearly the role of values and circumstances in epistemic justification. Moreover, I have suggested that this role is often less apparent because people so often share circumstances and values. I have not tried to establish that there is not even a small class of justificatory relations that meets evidentialist standards. My inclination is to say that there is not, but even if I am wrong, I believe that I have shown that evidentialism is in any event inadequate as a model of epistemic justification. Very simply, it fails to offer an account of the doxastic attitudes that rational beings concerned with epistemic ends in actual situations are justified in holding. The anti-evidentialist model that I have outlined provides such an account. Moreover, it cannot be dismissed as simply a form of moral or prudential justification. It identifies core elements of epistemic justification.24

NOTES

Examples of philosophers who have used the term “evidentialism” are Jack W. Meiland (who attributes the term to Nicholas Rescher) in “What Ought We to Believe? or The Ethics of Belief Revisited,” American Philo- sophical Quarterly, 17 (January 1980), 15-24; and Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies, 48 (1985), 15-34. Examples of philosophers whom contemporary writers have classified as evidentialists are Plato’s Socrates, Descartes, and Locke. A classic proponent of evidentialism is William K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan, 1879) vol. 2; rpt. in The Ethics of Belief Debate, ed. Gerald D. McCarthy (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), pp. 19-36. See Feldman and Conee for a recent defense of evidentialism.

* For an early defense of this view see William James, “The Will to Believe,” New World, June 1896; rpt. in his Essays in Pragmatism, ed. Alburey Castell (New York: Hafner, 1948), pp. 88-109. Examples of more recent philosophers who might be classified as proponents of this general position are Meiland; Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 127-216; Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 315-394; and Alison Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” Inquiry: A n Interdisciplinary Journal o f Philosophy (June 1989); rpt. in Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explora- tions in Feminist Philosophy, ed. Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 129-155. I do not address in this paper philosophers who for different reasons might be classified as anti- evidentialists-e.g., reliabilists.

388

3 Feldman and Conee, pp. 19-22. Writing on his own, Feldman goes on to say that although it “may be a good idea” to “seek out and consider all relevant evidence,” such a consideration is “irrelevant to” the “core notion of epistemic obligation.” “Epistemic Obligations,” in Philosophical Perspec- tives, 2, Epistemology, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, California: Ridgeview, 1988), p. 250. Since this “core notion” is identified with epistemic justification, it addresses obligations to hold particular doxastic attitudes, rather than responsibilities to try to exert control over doxastic attitudes. Feldman responds a t length to the criticism that people cannot be epistemically obligated to hold doxastic attitudes that they cannot voluntarily control.

I argue in sections IV and V that a concept of epistemic responsibility along the lines of tenet (3) is essential to a theory of epistemic justification. I therefore would argue that insofar as Feldman identifies epistemic obligation with epistemic justification, his theory of epistemic obligation cannot divorce itself from tenet (3)’s concept of epistemic responsibility. Since in my view tenet (3) captures the “core notion” of epistemic obligation, I do not discuss in this paper whether one can be epistemically obligated to hold doxastic attitudes that one cannot control.

Feldman and Conee, pp. 22-23. Philosophers discussing normative issues in epistemology vary as to whether they speak about “epistemic responsibility” or “epistemic obligation.” Although it might be interesting to explore the differences in meaning between these terms, I do not believe that such an analysis would significantly contribute to my project in this paper.

R e d Descartes, “Meditation I,” in Descartes Selections, trans. E. S . Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, ed. Ralph M. Eaton (New York: Scribners, 1955), pp. 88-89.

Clifford, p. 22. I have borrowed the general idea of this example from Meiland, p. 16.

Various other writers have discussed it. * For present purposes I am stipulating that John and the PI are limiting

their deliberations to the same evidence-i.e., that John does not rely on any evidence from his past relationship with Jane that he has failed to tell the PI and that the PI has not neglected to inform John of any relevant evidence that he has observed. Many actual disputes about justified doxastic attitudes arise because people do not realize that they are basing their conclusions on somewhat different evidence.

This distinction between the ends of believing what is true and avoiding error has been widely acknowledged among philosophers. I t originated with William James, pp. 99-100.

lo Because John and the PI interpret evidence on the basis of different views of the important considerations, I say that they have different values. I have not specified whether their values differ only because they happen to be in different situations or in the broader sense that they would have different values even in the same situation. In section V I discuss an example in which John and the PI clearly have different values in this broader sense. My analysis here is the same regardless of which of these senses of “value differences” applies.

l 1 Although John and the PI in my example have the different epistemic goals of avoiding error and learning truth, a difference in epistemic goals is not an essential part of my analysis. As I suggest in section 111, it is possible to hypothesize a situation in which both John and the PI share the goal of avoiding error, but John’s greater stake in the matter leads him to require more evidence than the PI requires before being satisfied that error indeed has been avoided.

l2 In section IV I suggest that such a determination has some relevance

389

to a decision as to whether a person is epistemically responsible in a doxastic attitude.

13 My discussion of an appeal to a disinterested observer clearly disputes Feldman’s evidentialist view. According to Feldman, epistemic obligations “arise from a purely impartial and disinterested perspective.” “Epistemic Obligations,” p. 236. It also takes issue with Meiland’s brand of anti- evidentialism. Meiland argues that when the believer is disinterested, “belief should be determined solely by factual evidence.” Extra-factual considerations are relevant in two ways: they determine whether the believer in a given case is disinterested; when the believer is not disinterested they “will themselves be among the factors that should influence belief.” Meiland, p. 22. Although I agree with the last of Meiland’s claims about extra-factual considerations, I disagree that believers are ever disinterested and thus that belief can ever be determined solely by factual evidence.

1 4 Meiland’s account is subject to this objection. After arguing that extra- factual considerations properly have a role in determining what a person who is not disinterested should believe, Meiland places no limitations on this role. As a result, epistemic justification collapses into moral and prudential justification under his analysis.

l5 I am not suggesting that John necessarily contemplates the evidence and then deliberately dismisses it in order to promote his prudential end. John’s prudential concerns may simply have this effect.

16 My account of epistemic responsibility has various features in common with Lorraine Code’s in Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, N.H.: Univ. Press of New England, 1987). I disagree, however, with Code’s view that in the situation I have just described John would be epistemically responsible in believing that Jane had been faithful. “[C. I.] Lewis’s question is whether it can ever be epistemically responsible to avoid or shirk evidence. My answer is that, in personal relationships and in what [William] James calls ‘truths dependent on our personal action,’ it sometimes can; in more ‘detached‘ or objective contexts, it cannot” (p. 82). I find this approach troubling for two reasons. First, as Code admits, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between more and less “detached” contexts. Second, there is surely some epistemic problem with John’s belief, and I am unclear as to what Code would say it is. On my analysis, epistemic responsibility is determined by a person’s attitude toward evidence, regardless of context. In section VI I address Code’s concerns over “less detached‘’ contexts by suggesting that people may be prudentially or morally justified in holding epistemically irresponsible beliefs.

l7 If holding a particular doxastic attitude contributes to a person’s emotional well-being, then this consideration should be factored in when assessing the prudential benefits that for him or her derive from holding that attitude. Whether the person is epistemically responsible in holding that attitude then depends on whether the two conditions that I have just specified are met.

l 8 I am disagreeing here with Hilary Kornblith’s view that being epistemically responsible requires “doing the best one can in light of the innate endowment one starts from.” See “Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action,” The Philosophical Review, 92 (1983), 46. On the one hand, Kornblith’s standard seems to me too stringent in that “doing one’s best” tends to favor avoiding error over achieving true belief. At the same time, Kornblith’s standard seems to me insufficiently stringent in that it would consider epistemically responsible a person who did his or her best but nevertheless took evidence less seriously than could reasonably be expected of someone with his or her values in his or her situation.

19 Richard Feldman argues that considerations about the need to seek

-

390

additional evidence “are really relevant to some sort of practical obligations, not to any purely epistemic concerns.” His reason is that “even if it is true that I should seek more evidence or perform some other action in connection with some proposition, there always remains the question of what attitude I should take toward that proposition now, before (or while) I perform that action.” (“Epistemic Obligations,” pp. 250-251). I disagree with Feldman’s claim that a person’s responsibility to seek more evidence is unrelated to which doxastic attitudes are epistemically justified for him or her at the present. In the example I am discussing John is epistemically responsible and, as I argue in section V, epistemically justified in believing now that Jane has been faithful as long as he is sufficiently interested in ‘future evidence to do the sorts of things I have just described.

20 A person’s answers to these questions, of course, to some extent reflect his or her values and situation. There is apt to be far greater consensus on these answers, however, than on whether Jane is having an affair because the relevant values and situations are more likely to be ones that most people share.

21 I am in agreement here with Kornblith’s view that being epistemically responsible in a belief at time t implies being epistemically justified in that belief at t. I disagree with Kornblith, however, that being epistemically irresponsible in a belief at t implies being epistemically unjustified in that belief at t. See Kornblith, pp. 34-39.

22 Putnam, p. 134. 23 John Heil gives the label “consequentialism” to the view that “familiar

epistemic and nonepistemic reasons are weighed alongside one another in the calculation that determines what it is most reasonable for one to believe.” “Believing What One Ought,” Journal of Philosophy, 80 (1983), 754. He then criticizes consequentialism for ignoring “the distinction between something’s providing an incentive or motive and something’s providing epistemic support for a given belief” (p. 755). I have argued in this paper that one can be a consequentialist without ignoring this distinction.

24 I would like to thank Benjamin Daise, Carl Ginet, Susan Henking, Steven Lee, Thomas Morawetz, Ann Oaks, Lee Quinby, Linda Robertson, Paula Sage, and Susan Williams for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Gary Simson for his help on several earlier drafts.

39 1

Documents

VALUES, CIRCUMSTANCES, AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION