Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
1
TheEpistemicCircumstancesofDemocracy
FabiennePeter;[email protected]
InMirandaFrickerandMichaelBrady(eds.)TheEpistemicLifeofGroups.Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press2016,pp.133–149.
Abstract
Doespoliticaldecision-makingrequireexpertsorcanademocracybetrustedtomake
correctdecisions?Criticsofdemocracytendtoarguethatdemocracycannotbetrustedin
thiswaywhileadvocatestendtoarguethatitcan.Bothcampsagreethatitistheepistemic
qualityoftheoutcomesofpoliticaldecision-makingprocessesthatunderpinsthelegitimacy
ofpoliticalinstitutions.Inrecentpoliticalphilosophy,epistemicdemocratshaveembraced
thisinstrumentalistwayofthinkingaboutdemocracy.Inthischapter,Iarguethatthe
attempttodefenddemocracyonepistemicinstrumentalistgroundsisself-undermining.I
alsodevelopanalternative–procedural–epistemicdefenceofdemocracy.Drawingonthe
epistemologyofdisagreement,Ishowthatthereisaprimafacieepistemiccasefor
democracywhenthereisnoprocedure-independentepistemicauthorityontheissuetobe
decided.
I. Introduction
Doespoliticaldecision-makingrequireexpertsorcanademocracybetrustedtomake
correctdecisions?Thisquestionhasalong-standingtraditioninpoliticalphilosophy,going
backatleasttoPlato’sRepublic.Criticsofdemocracytendtoarguethatdemocracycannot
betrustedinthiswaywhileitsadvocatestendtoarguethatitcan.Whiletheycometo
differentconclusionabouttheepistemicvalueofdemocracy,bothcampssharean
2
epistemicinstrumentalistconceptionofdemocraticlegitimacyandofpoliticallegitimacy
moregenerally.ByepistemicinstrumentalismImeantheviewthatepistemicvaluederives
fromepistemicoutcomes.Appliedtodemocraticlegitimacy,theviewisthatthelegitimacy
ofdemocracydependsonitsinstrumentalepistemicvalue.Onthisview,ifthereisacorrect
decision–anoutcomethatistrulyjustortrulyforthecommongood,oratleastmorejust
orclosertothecommongoodthanothers–thenthelegitimacyofdemocracydependson
howwell-suiteditistotrackthisdecision.
Incontemporarypoliticalphilosophy,manyepistemicdemocratshaveembracedthis
epistemicinstrumentalistdefenceofdemocracyandarguedthatdemocracyisagood
means–oratleastagoodenoughmeans–toreachcorrectdecisions.Buthereisa
challengeforthisview,wellarticulated,Ifind,byHansKelsen(1955:2):
“[T]hedoctrinethatdemocracypresupposesthebeliefthatthereexistsan
objectivelyascertainablecommongoodandthatpeopleareabletoknowitand
thereforetomakeitthecontentoftheirwilliserroneous.Ifitwerecorrect,
democracywouldnotbepossible.”
Thechallenge,asIinterpretit,isthatanepistemicinstrumentalistdefenceofdemocracyis
self-underminingbecausetheepistemiccircumstancesitpresupposesareincompatiblewith
democracy.Specifically,asIshallexplain,theproblemarisesfromwhattheepistemic
instrumentalistconceptionofdemocraticlegitimacypresupposesaboutepistemicauthority.
Toillustratethechallenge,considerasituationinwhichthereseemstobenoepistemic
casefordemocracy.Supposeatownisconsideringtheplantobuildanewbridgeacrossthe
riverthatrunsthroughit.Thedecisiononwhetherornottobuildthebridgedependsonly
3
ononefactor,namelyonthestabilityoftheplannedbridge.Andsupposethetown
engineerhastheexpertisetoassesswhethertheplannedbridgeisstableandconcludes
thatitis.
Incasessuchasthebridgecase,theverdictofthetownengineerappearstobesufficientto
legitimizethedecisionthatthebridgeshouldbebuilt.Itwouldberedundant,orperhaps
evencrazy,toseekademocraticdecisiononwhetherornotthebridgeisstable.Thefact
thatthetownengineerenjoysepistemicauthorityoverthematterthusunderminesthe
epistemiccaseforademocraticdecisiononthisissue.
Thechallenge,asIinterpretit,isthis.Ifthereisacorrectdecisiontobemadeandif
someonehaslegitimateepistemicauthoritytomakeclaimsaboutwhatthecorrectdecision
is,theepistemiccasefordemocracycrumbles.Afirstaimofmychapteristoshowhowthe
epistemicinstrumentalistattempttomakedemocraticlegitimacyconditionalonthe
epistemicqualityoftheoutcomesofdemocraticdecision-makingrunsintoaversionofthis
challengeandshouldberejectedforthatreason.
Whatarethealternativestoanepistemicinstrumentalistdefenceofdemocracy?Thefirstis
toabandontheepistemicstrategyaltogetheranddefenddemocracyonpracticalgrounds.
Thiswayofrespondingtothechallengeleadsto“deepproceduralist”(Estlund2008)
conceptionsofdemocraticlegitimacy,accordingtowhichdemocracyislegitimatenot
becauseittracksaprocedure-independenttruth,butbecausethedecision-making-
procedureembodies(moral)valuessuchasequality,dignity,etc.whichconfervaluetoits
outcome.ThisisnotthestrategyIshallpursuehere.
4
Thesecondalternativeisanepistemicproceduralistapproach.Itpreservesacentralrolefor
epistemicconsiderationsinthejustificationofdemocracy.Butitbringssuchconsiderations
tobearontheevaluationofthedemocraticdecision-makingproceduredirectly,not
indirectlyviatheoutcomesitproduces.ThisisthestrategyIshallexploreinthischapter.
Ishalluseepistemicconsiderationstosaysomethingabouttheappropriatescopefor
democraticdecision-making.Questionsabouttheappropriatescopefordemocratic
decision-makingaretypicallyaskedinsocio-spatialterms:whoshouldbeincludedinthe
democraticcollective?1Butitseemstomethatweshouldalsoaskwhichissuesshouldbe
subjectedtodemocraticdecision-making.Thisquestion,Iwanttoargue,isinthefirstplace
anepistemicquestion:underwhatspecificepistemiccircumstancesisdemocraticdecision-
making–asopposedto,mostimportantly,decision-makingbyexperts–appropriateand
thuspotentiallylegitimate?
Incaseslikethebridgecase,thesecircumstancesarenotgiven;democraticdecision-making
willmostlikelybeillegitimateinthiscase.Criticsofdemocraticdecision-makinghavea
pointwhentheyidentifycaseslikethebridgecasetoarguefortheunattractivenessof
democracy.Butnotallcasesarelikethebridgecaseandthisleavesroomforadvocatesof
democracytodefendtheircause.Iwillarguethatwhenthereisnoprocedure-independent
epistemicauthorityaboutwhatthecorrectdecisionis,thenthereisaprimafacieepistemic
casefordemocraticdecision-making.
Thetitleofmychapter“theepistemiccircumstancesofdemocracy”borrowsfromDavid
Hume’sandJohnRawls’ideaofthe“circumstancesofjustice”andJeremyWaldron’sideaof
1Seetheliteratureonwhatiscalledthe“boundaryproblem”orthe“constitutionofthedemos”(e.g.
Goodin2007;Miller2009).
5
the“circumstancesofpolitics”.Hume(1978[1739])andRawls(1971)arguethatjusticehas
itsnaturalplaceincircumstancesofmoderatescarcityandlimitedaltruism.Waldron(1999)
arguesthatpoliticshasitsnaturalplaceincircumstancesinwhichthereisaneedfor
collectiveactionbutwherepeopledisagreeaboutwhattodo.Iacceptthischaracterization
ofthecircumstancesofpolitics.ButWaldronhasn’texplainedwhydisagreementsneedto
betakenseriously.Ishallmakeuseoftheepistemologyofdisagreementtohelpidentifythe
appropriatelocusofdemocraticdecision-making.
Mymainfocusshallbeondeliberativedemocracy.LetmeexplainbrieflywhatImeanby
thisterm.Deliberativedemocracyisusuallyunderstoodincontrasttoaggregative
democracy.Aggregativetheoriesofdemocracytakethekeyfeatureofdemocracytobethe
aggregationofindividualpreferencesorbeliefsthroughvoting,whereeachperson’svoteis
givenequalweight.Theoriesofdeliberativedemocracy,bycontrast,viewdemocratic
decision-makingasembeddedinanexchangeofreasonsforpreferringcertainoutcomesor
forbelievingcertainfacts.Theytakethedeliberationamongthemembersofthe
democraticcollective,againundersomeconditionsofequality,tobeanimportantjustifying
featureofdemocracy.Suchpublicdeliberationmaytakeplaceformally,forexample,in
parliament,inthemedia,inmeetingsandeventsofpoliticalpartiesandotherpolitical
organizations,and,informally,inpeople’sdiscussionswiththeirfriends,colleagues,and
familymembers.Sincesuchdeliberationisunlikelytoproduceaconsensus,however,even
adeliberativetheorywillassignsomeroletoaggregativedecision-making.Astarkcontrast
betweenthetwotheoriesofdemocracythusoverstatesthecase.AsIseeit,themain
differencebetweenthetwotheoriesisthatdeliberativedemocracydoeswhereas
6
aggregativedemocracydoesnotassignalegitimizingroletopublicdeliberation.Itisinthis
sensethatIshallrefertodeliberativedemocracy.2
II. PracticalandEpistemicAuthority
Myargumentagainstepistemicinstrumentalismhingesontherelationshipbetween
epistemicauthorityandthelegitimatepracticalauthorityofdemocracy.BeforeIcanget
intotheargument,IneedtosaysomethingaboutwhatImeanbytheseterms.
BylegitimatepracticalauthorityImeanheretherighttomakeclaimswhichgiveothers
sufficientreasonforaction.Whenalegitimatepracticalauthoritysaysyououghttox,you
havesufficientreasontox.Think,forexample,ofthelegitimateauthorityofparentsor
teachersoverchildrenintheircare.Merelydefactopracticalauthorityisthepowertomake
claimswhichotherstakeassufficientreasonforaction.Thedifferencebetweenthetwois
thattheclaimsinthefirstcasearejustifiedwhileinthesecondtheyarenot.Youmaytake
thesay-soofadefactoauthorityassufficientreasonforaction,butitisnottruethatyou
havethatreason.
Politicallegitimacyrelatestothejustificationofthepracticalauthorityofpolitical
institutionsanddemocraticlegitimacyrelatestothejustificationofdemocraticdecision-
making.Sodemocraticlegitimacyisanapplicationoftheconceptoflegitimatepolitical
authoritytodemocracy.Ifpoliticalauthorityislegitimate,thereisarighttorule.If
democraticdecision-makingislegitimate,thentherighttoruleisjointlyheldbythe
membersofthedemocraticcollective.Ifdemocraticdecision-makingislegitimate,thenthe
claimsthatcanbeassociatedwithdemocraticdecisions–thesay-soofthedemocratic
collective–giveeveryonesufficientreasonsforaction.
2I’vediscussedthetwotheoriesatlengthinPeter(2009).
7
BylegitimateepistemicauthorityImeantherighttomakeclaimswhichgiveothers
sufficientreasonsforbelief.3Ifyoulegitimatelyholdepistemicauthorityoverp,thenyour
claimthatpgivesmesufficientreasontobelievethatp.Justlikeinthepracticalcase,we
canalsodistinguishbetweenlegitimateanddefactoepistemicauthority.Epistemic
authorityismerelydefactoifsomeonesuccessfullypretendstohaveexpertisethattheyin
factlack.
Withthesetermsinplace,wecannowaddressthequestion:whatistherelationship
betweendemocraticlegitimacyandepistemicconsiderations?Wecandistinguishbetween
twomainapproaches.Accordingtothefirst,democraticlegitimacyisindependentof
epistemicconsiderationsandisestablishedongroundsofthemoralvaluesembodiedby
democracy.That’sthedeepproceduralistscenarioImentionedearlier.Alternatively,
epistemicconsiderationsareatleastonefactorinthedeterminationoflegitimatepractical
authority.Thisistheapproachepistemicdemocratstake.Themainfocusofmypaperison
thequestionhowepistemicconsiderationsshouldbebroughttobearonthejustificationof
practicalpoliticalauthority.Inthenextsection,Iwillcriticizetheinstrumentalistwayof
characterizingtherelationshipbetweenepistemicconsiderationsandthelegitimate
practicalauthorityofdemocracy.Intherestofthepaper,Iwillproposeanalternative–
proceduralist–wayofcharacterizingthisrelationship.
III. EpistemicInstrumentalism
Variantsofepistemicinstrumentalismarepopularamongepistemicdemocratstoday.
Accordingtothem,theepistemicqualityofthedecisionsmadejustifiestheauthorityof
3BybeliefIhearmeanbothfullandpartialbelief;thereasonforbeliefinquestionmaythuseitherbea
reasonforafullbelieforforadjustingyourbelief,e.g.forreducingyourconfidenceinyouroriginalbelief.
8
democracyorisatleastonejustificatoryfactor.Hereisatypicalcharacterizationofthe
epistemicconceptionofdemocracy:
“Forepistemicdemocrats,theaimofdemocracyisto‘trackthetruth.’Forthem,
democracyismoredesirablethanalternativeformsofdecision-makingbecause,and
insofaras,itdoesthat.Onedemocraticdecisionruleismoredesirablethananother
accordingtothatsamestandard,sofarasepistemicdemocratsareconcerned”(List
andGoodin2001:277).
Thischaracterizationallowsfordifferentconceptionsofdemocraticlegitimacy,depending
onhowmuchweightisgiventotheoutcomeofdecision-makingrelativetothedecision-
makingprocedureitself.OnepossibleconceptioniswhatDavidEstlundhascalledthe
“correctnesstheory”ofpoliticallegitimacy.Onthisconception,apoliticaldecisionis
legitimateifandonlyifitisthecorrectdecision.Withregardtothelegitimacyof
democracy,itsaysthatdemocraticdecision-makingisconducivetopoliticallegitimacyto
theextentthatitsuccessfullytracksaprocedure-independenttruth.
Butmakingpoliticallegitimacydependentonthecorrectnessofthedecisionspresupposesa
righttomakeclaimsaboutwhatthecorrectdecisionis,aswithoutthepossibilityofjudging
whatthecorrectdecisionis,itremainsindeterminatewhetheradecisionisorisnot
legitimate.So,ononewayofmakingsenseofthecorrectnesstheoryofpoliticallegitimacy,
someone,orasmallgroupofpeople,mustbeholdingtherighttomakeclaimsaboutwhich
democraticdecisioniscorrectand,assuch,legitimate.4Andthisrighttomakeclaimsabout
whatoughttobebelievedderivesfromprocedure-independentfactsorobjectsortruths.
Anotherwayofsayingthesamethingisthatthecorrectnesstheoryofpoliticallegitimacy
4Ishalllaterdiscussanalternativewayofcashingoutthecorrectnesstheory.
9
onlyworksifthereisthird-personalepistemicauthorityaboutthemattertobedecided–if
someone,orasmallgroupofexperts,holdsarighttomakeclaimsaboutwhatthecorrect
decisionisthatderivesfromaprocedure-independenttruth.Butthiswayofinterpreting
thecorrectnesstheorygivesrisetoaproblem.Foranyareaofdecision-makingwherethere
isaprocedure-independentrighttomakeclaimsaboutwhatthecorrectoutcomeis,
democraticdecision-makingiseitherredundantoritneedstobedefendedonother
grounds.
Theavailabilityofthird-personalepistemicauthoritypresentsthecorrectnesstheoryof
democraticlegitimacywiththefollowingauthoritydilemma:ifpracticalauthorityisjustified
onepistemicgrounds,thenlegitimatepracticalauthorityisnon-democratic.If,ontheother
hand,thepracticalauthorityofdemocracyistobelegitimate,itmustbejustifiedonnon-
epistemicgrounds.Inotherwords,forthoseareasofdecision-makingwherethereisthird-
personalepistemicauthority,weeitherfollowthosewhoknowwhatthecorrectdecisionis,
inwhichcaseourdecision-makingisnotdemocratic,orweinsistondemocraticdecision-
making,inwhichcasewecan’tdefendthelegitimacyofdemocracyonepistemicgrounds
butmustdefenditonpurelypracticalgrounds.Whattheauthoritydilemmashowsisthat
thiswayofconceivingoftherelationshipbetweenlegitimatedemocraticauthorityand
epistemicauthorityisself-undermining.
CantheepistemicinstrumentalistdefencesucceedifweadoptEstlund’s(2008)
proceduralistalternativetothecorrectnesstheoryofdemocraticlegitimacy?The
conceptionoflegitimatedemocraticauthoritythatheproposesretainsthetruth-tracking
aimfordemocraticdecision-making,whileputtingweightondemocraticproceduresaswell
astheiroutcomes.Ashecharacterizesdemocraticlegitimacy(2008:98),itrequiresthatthe
10
democraticdecision-makingprocedure“canbeheld,intermsacceptabletoallqualified
pointsofview,tobeepistemicallythebest(orclosetoit)amongthosethatarebetterthan
random.”Thethoughtisthatifthedemocraticdecision-makingproceduresatisfiesthis
criterion,itsoutcomes,whethercorrectornot,arelegitimate.Inotherwords,correctness
doesnotdirectlydeterminethelegitimacyofdecisionsmade;itonlyinfluencesthe
legitimacy-generatingpotentialofdemocraticdecision-makingprocedures.
Thisisastepintherightdirection,butIdon’tthinkthisconceptioncanavoidtheauthority
dilemma,atleastnotifwefollowEstlund’sinterpretationofhisrequirementofdemocratic
legitimacy.Muchhingesonwhatthequalificationthattheprocedureshouldbeheldtobe
epistemicallythebest,intermsacceptabletoallqualifiedpointsofview,issupposedto
entail.Iseetwopossibilities.5Accordingtothefirst,whatisacceptabletoallqualifiedpoints
ofview(howevertheyareunderstood)constituteswhatisepistemicallythebestprocedure.
Inotherwords,whatisepistemicallybestisdefinedintermsofwhatisacceptabletoallthe
participants.Idon’tthinkthatEstlundhasthisinterpretationinmindasitwouldclashwith
theideathatdemocraticdecision-makingshouldtrackaprocedure-independenttruth.This
leavesthesecondinterpretation,whichidentifiesthequalifiedpointsofviewasthosethat
acknowledgetheindependent–third-personal–epistemicmeritofadecision-making
procedure.Onthisinterpretation,theprocedurethatisheldtobeepistemicallythebestis
theonewhichbesttracksaprocedure-independenttruth,asidentifiedbythosewhoeither
holdthird-personalepistemicauthorityonthematterorwhoarepreparedtodefertoit.
5Gaus(2011)makessimilarpointsinhisdiscussionofhowto“test”whetherdemocracyisthe
epistemicallybestprocedure.
11
Thissecondinterpretationoftherelationshipbetweenthelegitimatepracticalauthorityof
democracyandepistemicconsiderationsagainpresupposesthird-personalepistemic
authorityand,assuch,leadsstraightbacktotheauthoritydilemma.ForEstlund’s
conceptionofdemocraticlegitimacytohaveanyjudgmentalbite,theremustbea
procedure-independentrighttomakeclaimsaboutwhichdecisionsarecorrectandwhich
decision-makingprocedureismostlikelytoproducecorrectdecisions.Interpretedinthis
way,theconceptionpresupposesthird-personalepistemicauthorityaboutthecorrectness
ofoutcomesandaboutwhichdecision-makingprocedurecanbestapproximateit.Butif
thereissucharight,democraticdecision-makingonceagainappearseitherredundantor,if
itisnotredundant,thenitsvaluemustbenon-epistemic.
Ifmyargumentsofariscorrect,itshowsthattheattempttodefenddemocracyfroma
third-personalepistemicstandpointisself-undermining.Third-personalepistemicauthority
cangroundnon-democraticformsofdecision-making,butitcannotestablishthelegitimacy
ofdemocracy.
Whichwayforwardfordefendingdemocracy?Theauthoritydilemmasuggeststwopossible
strategies.Thefirstistodroptheepistemicstrategyaltogetheranddefenddemocracyon
purelypracticalgrounds.Asmentionedabove,thisisnotthestrategyIshallpursuehere.
Theotheristofindanalternativeepistemicdefenseofdemocracy,onethatisnotaffected
bytheauthoritydilemma.ThisisthestrategyIshallpursuehere.
ButbeforeIcandothat,Ineedtoaddressapotentialobjectiontomyargumentsofar.I
havesaidnothingaboutthepopularepistemicdefenseofdemocracybasedonthe
CondorcetJuryTheorem(CJT)andrelatedresults.Theobjectionisthis:adefenseof
democracythatrestsontheCJTandrelatedresultsisnotvulnerabletotheauthority
12
dilemmaastheseresultsshowthatwecanrelyondemocracytodiscoverthecorrect
decision.
TheCJTsays,roughly,thatiftherearetwoalternatives–whereoneisthecorrectchoice
andtheotherthewrongchoice–andifeverymemberofademocraticcollectiveismore
likelytomakethecorrectchoicethanthewrongchoiceandtheyvoteindependentlyof
eachother,thenthemajorityisalsomorelikelytomakethecorrectchoiceandthe
probabilitythatitmakesthecorrectchoicesincreasesrapidlywiththesizeofthecollective.
Iftherelevantconditionsobtain,theCJTshowsthatlargergroupsaremorelikelytomake
correctdecisionsthansmallergroupsorindividuals;ademocraticcollectivemayeven
outperformagroupofexperts.TheCJTcanthusbeusedtodefenddemocraticdecision-
makingonthebasisoftheclaimthat–undercertainconditions–epistemicauthorityis
appropriatelyheldbyalargecollective.NotethattheCJTisonlyrelevantfortheprocessof
aggregation,notfordeliberation.Ithighlightsfeaturesoflarge-scaleaggregationofvotes,
wherevotesareunderstoodasexpressingbeliefsaboutthecorrectdecision.Itdoesnot
coverdeliberation,i.e.theprocessofexchangingreasonsforbelieforaction.
TherehasbeenmuchdiscussionofthelikelihoodthattheconditionsunderwhichtheCJT
holdsareevermetand,onthatbasis,whetheritcanbeusedaspartofadefenseof
democracy.6ButIshallnotgointothatdiscussion,asmypurposehereisneithertocriticize
nordefendtheCJTanditsapplicabilitytodemocracy.I’minterestedinthequestionwhatan
argumentfromtheCJTwouldimplyfortherelationshipbetweenepistemicconsiderations
andthelegitimatepracticalauthorityofdemocracy.
6SeeListandGoodin(2001)andDietrichandSpiekermann(2013)forrecentdiscussions.
13
TheanswertothisquestiondependsonhowtheCJTisinvokedtoexplainwhyan
appropriatelymadedemocraticdecisiongivesindividualssufficientreasonstoupholdit.The
CJTmaybeinvokedaspartofacorrectnesstheoryofpoliticallegitimacy.Inthiscase,itis,
asbefore,thecorrectnessofthedecision,notthedemocraticdecision-makingprocess
whichgenerateslegitimacyandtheauthoritydilemmalooms.Oritmaybeinvokedaspart
ofanargumentwhichshowsthatdemocraticdecision-makingisthemostlikelydecision-
makingproceduretoleadtocorrectdecisions.Inthiscase,too,theauthoritydilemmawill
reappeariftheargumentpresupposesknowledgeofwhatthecorrectdecisionsare.
Butifitcanbeavoidedinthissecondcase,itisbecausetheCJTisinvokedinanargument
thatstartsfromcircumstancesinwhichwedon’tknowwhatthecorrectdecisionis,i.e.
whenthethird-personalstandpointisunavailable.Understoodinthissense,anargument
fromtheCJTiscompatiblewiththethesisthatIwanttodefendhere,namelythatthereis
scopefordemocraticdecision-makingwhenthereisnoprocedure-independentepistemic
authorityintherelevantareaofdecision-making.Unliketheargumentsthatendupinthe
authoritydilemma,thiskindofargumentlinksthelegitimatepracticalauthorityof
democracynottoitsinstrumentalroleinreachingcorrectdecisions,buttoprocedural
epistemicconsiderations.Itshowsthatundercertainconditions,theclaimsmadeby
individualsorsmallgroupsofexpertslacktheepistemicauthoritythatthedemocratic
decision-makingprocesscanclaim.Inthiscase,ourreasontodefertoademocratically
madedecisionisnotbecauseitiscorrectorlikelytobecorrect,butbecausethereisno
procedure-independentwayforassessingclaimsaboutwhatthecorrectdecisionis.Ifthe
conditionsapply,thentheCJTshowsthatepistemicauthorityisappropriatelyheldjointly
andexercisedthroughademocraticdecision-makingprocess.
14
TheargumentIwanttodevelopinthischapterparallelsthiskindofargumentfromtheCJT.
Ishallfocusonthedeliberativecomponentofdemocraticdecision-making,ratherthanthe
aggregativecomponenttoshowthatthedeliberativeprocedureitselfmayhaveepistemic
value.
IV. TheProceduralEpistemicValueofDeliberation
TheargumentIdevelopinthissectionparallelstheargumentfromtheCJTjustsketchedin
thesensethatitalsoshowsthatthereisaprimafaciecasefordemocracywhenthereisno
procedure-independentwayofassessingepistemicauthority.Ishallfocusonthe
deliberativecomponentofdemocraticdecision-making,ratherthantheaggregative
component.Myaimistoshowthatthedeliberativedemocraticprocedureitself,i.e.the
processofexchangingreasonswithothersandofadjustingone’sbeliefsinresponsetothe
claimsmadebyothers,mayhaveepistemicvalue–aboveandbeyondthevalueofmaking
correctdecisions.
Iunderstandproceduralvalueincontrasttoinstrumentalvalue.Deliberativedecision-
makinghasinstrumentalepistemicvalueifitleadstomoreaccuratebeliefsamongthe
participants–forexamplethroughcomparingevidenceandopinionsandrespondingtothe
evidenceandopinionthatotherspresent–and/ortocorrectormoreaccuratedecisions.It
hasinstrumentalepistemicdisvalueifithinderstheformationofaccuratebeliefsand/orthe
makingofcorrectdecisions.Epistemicinstrumentalismreducestheepistemicvalueof
democraticdecision-makingtoitscontributiontoepistemicendssuchasaccuracyortruth.
Bycontrast,deliberativedemocraticdecision-makinghasproceduralepistemicvalueifits
epistemicvaluedoesnotreducetotheepistemicvalueoftheoutcome.Ishallfocushereon
theproceduralepistemicvalueofthedeliberativeprocess,notofdecision-makingassuch.If
15
publicdeliberationhasproceduralepistemicvalue,ithasepistemicvalueevenincases
whereitseffectturnsouttobethatithasdiminishedtheaccuracyofthebeliefsofthe
participants.Thismaysoundparadoxical,butIwillshowthatitispossibleandof
significanceforanepistemicdefenseofdemocracy.
Proceduralvaluecantakedifferentforms.Rawlshasidentifiedthefollowingthreemain
forms:pure,perfect,andimperfectproceduralism.7Withpureproceduralism,the
procedureisnecessaryandsufficientforthevalueoftheoutcome.Thereisthusno
procedure-independentstandardforwhatcountsasagoodoutcome.Withbothperfect
andimperfectproceduralism,thereisaprocedure-independentstandard.Withperfect
proceduralism,theprocedureisnecessarytorealizeagoodoutcome.Withimperfect
proceduralism,theprocedureisnecessarytoapproximateagoodoutcome,butitmayfail
torealizetheoutcomethattheprocedure-independentstandardenvisages.Forexample,in
atrial,thereisaprocedure-independentstandardforagoodoutcome:convicttheaccused
ifguiltyanddon’tifnotguilty.Thetrialisnecessarytoapproximatesuchgoodoutcomes.
Butjusticemaybeservedevenifanappropriatelyconductedtrialendsupmakinga
decisionwhich,withhindsightorfromsomeothervantagepointofprivilegedinformation,
turnsouttobewrong.
AsIwillexplainbelow,theproceduralepistemicvalueofdeliberationtakestheformof
imperfectproceduralism.Onthatinterpretationofproceduralepistemicvalue,accuracyof
beliefremainstheintrinsicepistemicvalueandsetsaprocedure-independentstandardfor
evaluatingdeliberation.Butwhatdistinguishesimperfectproceduralismfrom
7Rawls(1971:85);heintroducedthemwithregardtothevalueofjustice,butthedistinctionsapplymore
generally.
16
instrumentalismaboutepistemicvalueisthattheformercapturesthesituationinwhichthe
procedurehasvaluebecausethereisnoprocedure-independentaccesstothecorrect
outcome.Thedeliberativeprocedurethusgainsitsvaluefrombeingaproxyforgood
epistemicconductinsituationswhereitisnotpossibletoappealtotheprocedure-
independentstandarddirectlytoassessthisconduct.Andthisvalueofthedeliberative
proceduredoesnotreducetotheepistemicvalueofitsoutcomeasassessedbya
procedure-independentstandard.
Theideathatdeliberationhasproceduralvalueisfamiliarfromthepracticalcontext.Rawls,
forexample,takesreciprocitytobeafundamentalproceduralvaluethatshapesthecontent
oftheclaimsofjusticewehaveoneachother.Inmoralphilosophy,CharlesLarmore(2008)
focusesonequalrespectandStephenDarwall(2006)onmutualaccountability.Butwhat
I’mclaiminghereisthatproceduralvaluesplayaroleinthepurelyepistemicdimensionof
deliberationaswell.8
Howshouldwemakesenseoftheideathatdeliberationhasproceduralepistemicvalue?It
turnsoutthattheepistemologyofdisagreementshowsthatundercertaincircumstances,
epistemicagentshavereasontoengageindeliberationwitheachotherandadjusttheir
beliefsindirectionofeachother.Thisvalueofdeliberationdoesnotreducetothevalueof
theoutcomesofdeliberation,i.e.itis,tosomeextentatleast,independentofits
contributiontotheaccuracyofbelief.
Therelevantcircumstancesariseonlywithcertaintypesofdisagreement.Specifically,they
arisewithdisagreementsamongepistemicpeersthatarepersistinginthesensethat
deliberationfailstorevealevidencethatonepartyleftunexaminedoramistakeoneparty
8ThefollowingpassagesborrowfromPeter(2013).
17
madeintheinterpretationoftheavailableevidence.Anepistemicpeerissomeonewhoyou
taketobeequallylikelytomakeamistake.Thisisaweakdefinitionofwhatitmeanstobea
peer,sinceitonlytakestheformofanallthingsconsideredcriterionanddoesn’tinvolve
anyinputconditionssuchasequalformalqualificationsorequalcomputationalabilities.On
thisdefinitionofpeers,deliberationamongpartieswhoconsidereachotherpeerscanoccur
notjustinthecontextofacademicorexpertinquiry,butinanysmallorlargesocial
collective,forexampleonissueswhicharetoowide-rangingandcomplexforanyoneto
countasanexpert,orwhenrelevantinformationisdispersedacrossalldeliberativeparties.
Itturnsoutthatinthosecircumstances,eachpartytothedeliberationhasreasontoadjust
theirbeliefsindirectionofeachother.
ButbeforeIgointomoredetailonthis,itneedtoaddresstheobjectionthatthe
epistemologyofpeerdisagreementsisnotrelevantfordemocratictheorysincethe
participantsindemocraticdeliberationneitherdonorshouldconsidereachotheras
epistemicpeers.Therearemassiveepistemicinequalitiesamongthemembersofa
democraticcollectiveandthisrenderstheepistemologyofpeerdisagreementunsuitable.
Inreplytothisobjection,letmefirstconcedethattheseepistemicinequalitiesareoften
bothmassiveandjustified.Youmightverywellknowalotmoreaboutcertainsubjectsthan
othersandmayvalidlyclaimepistemicauthorityonthematter.I’mnotsuggestingthatthe
membersofademocraticcollectivegenerallyareepistemicpeers,northattheygenerally
oughttoregardeachotherassuch.ThequestionI’minterestediniswhendeliberative
democracy–someformofrulebyall–isappropriate.AndtheclaimthatIintendtodefend
isthatwhenthereisadisagreementamongpartiesthatdo,inanon-crazyway,takeeach
othersaspeers,thendeliberativedemocraticdecision-makingmaybeappropriate.By
18
contrast,whensomeholdlegitimateepistemicauthorityoveranissue,theepistemicpoint
ofviewsupportsaformofepistocracy–rulebyexperts.
Secondly,notethatthenotionofpeerhoodI’musingiscompatiblewithallsortsof
epistemicinequalities.Youmightconsidersomeoneapeer–withregardtoacertainsetof
issues–eventhoughyourformalqualifications,yourcomputationalabilities,oryouraccess
toinformationdiffer.Inaddition,thisnotionofpeerhoodisdomain-specific.Itispossibleto
acceptsomeoneasanepistemicauthorityonsomequestionsbutconsiderthispersona
peerwithregardtocertainpoliticalmattersatthesametime.
Thirdly,notethatwhileyoujudgeyourpeers,bydefinition,tobeequallylikelytomakea
mistakeinaparticularsituation,thisdoesn’tmeanthattwopeersalwaysperformequally
well.Sometimes,youhaveinformationaboutthecircumstancesofthedisagreementthat
makesitappropriateforyoutodiscounttheirjudgment,atleasttoacertainextent.For
example,oftwoscientificcolleagueswhocomparetheirdifferentconclusionsaboutthe
validityofahypothesis,onemayhavedouble-checkedthedataandthecalculationsand
askedanassistanttodothesamewhiletheotherwaspressedfortimeandadmitsthathe
onlyranwhathewasgiventhroughanoff-the-pegcomputerprogram.Inacontextofsocial
deliberation,imagineacaseofcommitteework.Supposethatalthoughallparticipants
regardeachothertobeequallyabletotakeuptheavailableevidence,somemayhave
carefullythoughtabouttheimplicationsoftheevidencepresented,asmanifestbythe
qualityoftheargumentstheycanofferinsupportoftheirbeliefs,whileothersrespondwith
19
agutreaction.Ifthereissuchinformationwhichsuggeststhatapeerisnotperforming
well,youareentitledtodiscounttheirview.9
Somuchforthenegativedefenseofusingtheepistemologyofpeerdisagreementsasa
starting-pointforunderstandingdemocraticdeliberation.Itshowsthatmyclaimisnota
verystrongone.10ButIhaven’tsaidanythingpositiveyetabouthowtheepistemologyof
peerdisagreementsmighthelp.Inowwanttogettothat.
Considerthefollowingcase.Anexpertcommitteepreparesapolicytogetherwithrelevant
politicians,forexampleanewminimumwagepolicy.Supposethereisadisagreementon
thequestionwhetheralltheevidence,appropriatelyinterpreted,supportsthepolicyornot.
9Youmightevenbeentitledtodiscounttheirviewcompletely,asthefollowingcaseillustrates(adapted
fromChristensen2007).SupposeyouandIregularlyhavedinnertogetheratarestaurantandwealwayssplit
thebill.Neitherofushasanyproblemswithmentalarithmetic,sothedecisionabouthowmuchweeachowe
isusuallystraightforward.Oneevening,however,Iclaimweeachowe£26andyouclaimthatweeachowe
£28.Inthiscaseweeachhavereasontosuspendourbeliefabouthowmuchweeachowe.Butnowsuppose
thatinsteadofclaimingthatweeachowe£28,youclaimweeachowe£280,waymorethanthetotalbill.
EventhoughIconsideryouapeerinthisregard,somethinghasclearlygonewrongandI’mentitledtostickto
mygunswithoutgivinganyweighttoyourbelief.
10Infact,itmaybeweakenedfurther.Theepistemologicalliteraturecurrentlyfocusesonpeer
disagreementandmyargumentisbasedoninitialfindingsofthisresearchandthussomewhathostagetothat
literature.Aswillbecomeclearbelow,whatiskeytomyargumentisthepossibilitythatyoufindyourselfina
disagreementwithsomeonetowhomyou’reattributingsomeepistemiccredibilityandtowhomyouowe
somesortofresponse.Thepeerhoodassumptionimposessymmetriccredibility.Butthatassumptionisnot
necessary,itseemstome.Aslongasallofthepartiesattributesomeepistemiccredibilitytoeachother,then,
everythingelseequal,somesortofresponsemaystillberequiredofeach,andthatwouldbesufficientformy
argumenttogothrough.
20
Willthepolicysignificantlyincreaseunemployment?Thiswouldspeakagainstthepolicy.Or
willitnotandhaveotherbeneficialaspects?Thiswouldspeakforthepolicy.Supposethe
disagreementisnotjustbetweenexpertsandpoliticians;theexpertsdisagreeamong
themselves.Alsosupposethedisagreementisnottheresultofonepartynotableorwilling
toconsidertheavailableevidence,drawappropriateconclusionsfromit,etc.Whatwehave
hereisapersistingdisagreementamongpartiesthatdotakeeachotheraspeers.Now
supposethatthedisagreementisn’tlimitedtothisparticularcommittee,butismirroredin
similarcommittees,inparliament,inacademia,inthemedia,etc.Anditisalsomirroredin
debatesamongfriendsandfamilymembers.Supposeyou’velookedattheavailabledata
andtheavailableargumentsbytheexpertsandformedthebeliefthattheproposed
minimumwagepolicywillsignificantlyincreaseunemployment.I’vealsolookedatthedata
theargumentsandformedthebeliefthatthepolicywillnotsignificantlyincrease
unemployment(andalsohaveverypositiveeffectsonworkingconditions).Through
deliberation,webecomeawareofourdisagreementandneithercandemonstratethatthe
otherobviouslymadeamistake.
Iwanttoclaimthatinacaseliketheminimumwagecase,whatwehaveisapeer
disagreementwritlarge,extending,potentially,totheentiredemocraticcollective.Whatis
characteristicofthissituation,fromanepistemicpointofview,isthateachsideofthe
disagreementdeservessomeweightfortheclaimitmakesandthereisnovantagepoint
fromwhichthedisagreementcouldberesolved.
Whatistheappropriateresponsetosuchadisagreement?Ifollowthemajorityviewhere
whichisthatitisappropriatethatbothsidestoapeerdisagreementdiminishconfidencein
21
theiroriginalbeliefs.11Differentepistemologicaltheoriesgivedifferentaccountsofwhythis
isso.AccordingtotheTotalEvidenceView(Kelly2010),ifadisagreementwithapeer
receivesanyweight,itisasapieceofevidencethatarationalepistemicagentneedsto
considertogetherwiththeotheravailableevidence.OntherivalingConciliatoryViews
(Christensen2011;Elga2010),thedisagreementwithapeergivesyouareasontoadjust
yourbeliefthatisatleasttosomeextentindependentofthereasonsthatyouhavehadto
formyouroriginalbelief.Onthisview,you’vedonethebestyoucouldgiventheevidence
etc.Butthatwasapparentlynotgoodenough,asyourpeerhasformedadifferentbelief.
Younowneedtoputthereasonsyou’vehadtoformyouroriginalbelieftothesideand
respondtothesituationthatthedisagreementhasrevealed.
Therearesignificantdifferencesbetweenthesetwomainviews,butforourpurposeshere,
thesedifferencesdonotmatter,asboththeoriesconcurthat,absentindependent
informationabouttheirrespectiveabilityorwillingnesstoperformintheparticular
instance,peersneedtoadjusttheirbeliefsindirectionoftheotherparty.Bothacceptthat
thefactthatsomeoneyouexanteregardedasapeernowdisagreeswithyouisnot
sufficientforyoutodismisstheiropinionoff-hand.Somesortofresponseisrequired.
Thisshowsthattherearecircumstancesinwhichtherearegoodepistemicreasonsfor
epistemicpeerstoberesponsivetowardseachother’sclaimsandtoconsidersomerevision
oftheiroriginalbeliefsonthebasisoftheseclaims.Ihavecalledthistheaccountability
11Some(e.g.Kelly2005)havearguedthatpeerdisagreementsdonotrequirearesponseatallbyclaiming
thatwhatjustifiessomeone’sbeliefistheirresponsetotheavailableevidenceandbydenyingthat
informationaboutthebeliefsofpeerscarriesindependentepistemicweight.Butmanyhaverejectedthis
“steadfastview”andIfollowthemhere.
22
thesisabouttheepistemicvalueofdeliberation(Peter2013).Epistemicpeers,inthese
circumstances,aremutuallyaccountabletoeachother,inadditiontobeingaccountableto
thetruththeyseek.Intherelevantcircumstances,yourclaim(thattheminimumwage
policywillincreaseunemployment)givesmeareasontorevisemybelief(thatitwillnot)
andvice-versa.Whattheaccountabilitythesiscapturesisthattherearesituationsinwhich
wearedoublyaccountable.Thereis,ontheonehand,thefamiliaraccountabilitytotruth.
Butthereis,ontheother,alsoanoftenoverlookedaccountabilitytoepistemicpeers.When
wefindourselvesinapersistingdisagreement,whereneitherpartycandemonstratethat
theotherissimplywrong,whatgiveseachofusreasontoadjustourbelievesindirectionof
theotheraretheclaimswebothmade,notjustfirst-orderevidenceaboutthefactortruth
inquestion.
Whatismore,inthosecircumstances,neitherofuscanvalidlyclaimthird-personal
epistemicauthority.Insofarasthereisanyappealtoepistemicauthority,ittakesona
second-personalform.Toseethepoint,contrastthedeliberativesituationherewithacase
oftestimony.Intestimony,wearealsoconsideringanepistemicrelationship–the
relationshipbetweenthetestifierandtheaddressee.Thisrelationshipishierarchical,
however,notdemocratic.Iftherelevantconditionsforsuccessfultestimonyaremet,your
testimonygivesmeasufficientreasonforbelief.Myreasonforbeliefisthussecond-
personal;itderivesfromyourclaim.Butyourauthoritytomakeclaimsthatgivemereasons
forbeliefisnot;itderivesfromyouraccountabilitytothetruthandisthird-personal.Inthe
caseofpeerdisagreementI’mconsideringhere,eachofushasasecond-personalreasonto
adjustourbeliefs.We’rebothaccountablenotjusttothetruththatwebothseek,butto
eachotheraswell.Goodepistemicagentsenterthisrelationshipofmutualaccountability
23
andletitbea–second-personal–sourceofreasonsforbeliefthatis,atleasttosome
extent,independentoftruthasasourceofreasonsforbelief.Tothisextent,epistemic
authority,too,takesonasecond-personalform.Myrighttomakeclaimsthatgiveyou
reasonforbeliefdependsonyouraccountabilitytomeassomeoneyouregardasapeer
andviceversa.
I’mnotdenyingthataccuracyortruthsarethesoleepistemicends.Butwhatmyargument
shows,Ihope,isthatitispossibletovaluethedeliberativedemocraticprocedureinnon-
instrumentalfashion.Thisopensthedoortoanalternativetotheepistemicinstrumentalist
defenseofdemocracy.Whenpeerscannotagreeonwhatbeliefiswarranted,andnothing
suggestsmalperformance,thenatleastsomereasonsforbeliefstemfromarelationshipof
mutualaccountabilitybetweenthem.Butmutualaccountabilityisaprocedural
consideration.Itsepistemicvaluecannotbecapturedbyapurelyinstrumentalapproach
because,iftherelevantconditionsapply,myreasontoadjustmybeliefinyourdirection
obtainsindependentlyofwhethertheadjustmentmakesmybeliefmoreaccurate.
V. TheLegitimateAuthorityofDemocracy
ThealternativetotheepistemicinstrumentalistdefenseofdemocracythatI’mproposingis
this.Thereisanepistemiccasefordemocracywhentheepistemiccircumstancesaresuch
thatthereisapeerdisagreementwritlargeonaparticularissue,onethatcannotbe
resolvedbyappealtothird-personalepistemicauthorityandonethatplacesthemembers
ofademocraticcollectiveinarelationshipofmutualepistemicaccountability.Inthisfinal
section,Iwantmakeafewbriefcommentsonhowthisclaimistobeunderstood.
ThesituationIhavefocusedonisoneinwhichdeliberationhasestablishedthatno
participantcanlegitimatelymakedecisiveclaimsaboutwhatothersoughttobelieveabout
24
whatthecorrectdecisionis.Thenecessaryadjustmentofbeliefmayhaveleadthemallto
suspendbelief.Oritmayhaveleadtoareasonabledisagreement,i.e.asituationinwhich
partiestoadisagreementholdincompatiblebeliefs,buteachhassomejustificationfor
holdingthebelieftheydo.
Ifadecisionisneeded,thensomeformofaggregationmayberequiredinthese
circumstancestoreachadecision.Whilealotmorewouldhavetobesaidaboutwhenand
howtoaggregate,somethingIcan’tdohere,whatwe’rebeginningtoseeishow
democraticdecision-making,understoodasacombinationofdeliberationandaggregation,
hasitsnaturallocusinasituationinwhichthereachofepistemicauthorityisinsufficientto
determinewhatthecorrectdecisionis.
Notethatmyaiminthistalkisamodestone.I’mnottryingtoestablishthesetof
requirementswhichisjointlysufficientfordemocraticlegitimacy.Instead,I’minterestedin
howtoidentifytheepistemiccircumstancesinwhichdeliberativedemocraticdecision-
makingispotentiallylegitimate.Inotherwords,I’mconcernedwithcircumscribingthe
logicalspaceinwhichdemocracybelongs.
TheviewthatIhaveoutlinedsuggeststhatdeliberativedemocraticdecision-makinghasits
appropriatespaceinsituationswheredisagreementscannotberesolvedbyappealtothird-
personalepistemicauthority.Whentheycan,thenthereisnoepistemicbasisfor
democracy.Tothecontrary.Iflegitimatepracticalauthorityispremisedonepistemic
considerationsandifthereisthird-personalepistemicauthority,thedecisionshouldbe
madebythosewhoknowwhatthecorrectdecisionis.Ifdemocracyhasanyvalueatallin
thoseepistemiccircumstances,itisfornon-epistemic,practicalreasons.Butifthese
disagreementscannotberesolved,thenthedecisionhastobemadeonothergrounds
25
ratherthanbyappealtothird-personalepistemicauthority.Epistemicconsiderations,inthis
case,helpidentifyingthescopefordemocraticdecision-makingandimposecertain
conditionsonthedeliberativedemocraticdecision-makingprocess.
Whatistheconnectionbetweentheproceduralepistemicvalueofdeliberationand
democraticlegitimacy?TheviewI’veoutlinedsupportsacombinationofimperfect
proceduralismaboutepistemicvaluewithpureproceduralismaboutthelegitimatepractical
authorityofdemocracy.Theepistemologyofdisagreementshowsthatincertain
circumstances,theepistemicvalueofdeliberationdoesn’treducetowhetheritproduces
moreaccuratebeliefs,butdependsonwhetherornottheprocessitselfisconducted
appropriately,i.e.onrespectoftherelationshipofmutualaccountabilitybetweenthe
participants.Sinceanappropriatelyconductedprocessofdeliberationisaproxyforaiming
atformingaccuratebeliefsincircumstanceswheredisagreementrevealsadifficultywith
determiningdirectlywhatthecorrectbeliefis,epistemicvalueinthiscaseconformstothe
structureofimperfectproceduralism.
Incircumstanceswherethereisnorecoursetoaprocedure-independentstandardfor
correctdecisions,thelegitimatepracticalauthorityofdemocraticdecision-makingcan’t
dependonthisstandard.Thissuggestspureproceduralismaboutthelegitimatepractical
authorityofdemocracy.Onthisconceptionofdemocraticlegitimacy,adecisionislegitimate
ifandonlyifithasbeenmadethroughappropriatedeliberativedecision-making
procedures.12
12Assuch,theviewIendorseherecontrastswithEstlund’simperfectproceduralismaboutdemocratic
legitimacyashis,butnotmyview,makesdemocraticlegitimacydependentontheepistemicqualityofthe
outcomesofthedemocraticdecision-makingprocess.
26
CantheviewI’veoutlinedhereavoidtheauthoritydilemma?Ithinkitcan.Theauthority
dilemmaarisesforepistemicinstrumentalismaboutdemocraticlegitimacybecauseofthe
tensionbetweenthelegitimatepracticalauthorityofdemocracyandprocedure-
independent,third-personal,epistemicauthority.TheviewIproposedistinguishesbetween
theimperfectproceduralismthatshapeslegitimaterelationsofepistemicauthorityandthe
pureproceduralismofdemocraticlegitimacy.Epistemicconsiderations,onthisview,
influencethedeliberativedecision-makingprocedure,buttheydonotsetaprocedure-
independentstandardfordemocraticdecision-making.Unlikeformsofepistemic
instrumentalism,itcanthusexplainunderwhatepistemiccircumstancesitisappropriateto
putpracticalauthorityinthehandsofademocraticcollective.
Acknowledgements
I’vebenefittedgreatlyfromcommentsandsuggestionsfromparticipantsatconferences,
workshops,andresearchseminarsinBasel,Belgrade,Geneva,Hull,Oxford,Rijeka,Stirling,and
Zurich,andI’mverygratefultotheorganizersoftheseevents.IparticularlywanttothankYann
Allard-Tremblay,ElvioBaccarini,ChrisBertram,RobinCelikates,BruceChapman,TomChristiano,
RowanCruft,StefanGosepath,AntonyHatzistavrou,ChandranKukathas,KatrinMeier,DavidMiller,
SnježanaPrijićSamaržija,HenryRichardson,BenSaunders,KitWellman,JoWolff,andZofia
Stemplowska.Inaddition,IwanttothankMichaelBradyandMirandaFrickerfordetailedandvery
helpfulcommentsonearlierdrafts.
References
Christensen,David.2007."EpistemologyofDisagreement:TheGoodNews."PhilosophicalReview
116:187-217.
Christensen,David.2011.“Disagreement,Question-Begging,andEpistemicSelf-Criticism,”
Philosopher’sImprint11(http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0011.006).
27
Darwall,Stephen.2006.TheSecondPersonStandpoint.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Dietrich,FranzandKaiSpiekermann.2013.“EpistemicDemocracywithDefensiblePremises.”
EconomicsandPhilosophy29(1):87-120.
Elga,Adam.2010.“HowtoDisagreeabouthowtoDisagree,”inRichardFeldmanandTedA.
Warfield(eds.)Disagreement.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress:pp.175–186.
Estlund,David.2008.DemocraticAuthority.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Gaus,Gerald.2011.“OnSeekingtheTruth(WhateverThatIs)throughDemocracy:Estlund’s
CasefortheQualifiedEpistemicClaim.”Ethics121:270–300.
Goodin,Robert.2007.“EnfranchisingAllAffectedInterests,andItsAlternatives.”Philosophy
andPublicAffairs35(1):40–68.
Hume,David.1978[1739].ATreatiseofHumanNature.2ndEdition;L.A.Selby-Biggeand
P.H.Nidditch(eds.).Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Kelly,Thomas.2005.“TheEpistemicSignificanceofDisagreement.”InGendler,TamarSzaboand
JohnHawthorne(eds.)OxfordStudiesinEpistemologyvolume1,pp.1167–196.
Kelly,Thomas.2010.“PeerDisagreementandHigherOrderEvidence,”inRichardFeldmanandTed
A.Warfield(eds.)Disagreement.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress:pp.111–174.
Kelsen,Hans.1955.“FoundationsofDemocracy.”Ethics66:1–101.
Larmore,Charles.2008.TheAutonomyofMorality.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
List,ChristianandRobertGoodin.2001.“EpistemicDemocracy:GeneralizingtheCondorcetJury
Theorem.”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy9:277–306.
Miller,David.2009.“Democracy'sDomain.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs37(3):201–228.
Peter,Fabienne.2009.DemocraticLegitimacy.NewYork:Routledge.
Peter,Fabienne.2013.“TheProceduralEpistemicValueofDeliberation.”Synthese190(7):1253-
1266.
Rawls,John.1971.ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.
28
Waldron,Jeremy.1999.LawandDisagreement.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
