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“6 Rules for a Successful Marriage: Louise Dupin’s Feminist Writing on Marriage & Love”: by Angela Hunter SEASECS 2015 Louise Dupin drafted her major work, called the Ouvrage sur les femmes, from the 1740s through the early or mid-1750s. This work remained ultimately unfinished and unpublished, although parts of it were in final draft form (thanks in part to Jean-Jacques Rousseau who served as her secretary before he began his own philosophical career). Dupin’s project is a formidable contribution feminist philosophy and history. A brief summary of the Ouvrage is difficult to produce, not only because it remained incomplete but because the manuscript drafts to which we now have access are fragmented. Broadly speaking, though, it surveys and critiques the history of women’s social, economic and political status, while also arguing for women’s equality with men. It was projected to contain at least 47 discrete articles. In this paper I will investigate Dupin’s views on love, which she analyzes in relation to education, socialization, and marriage institutions that have been controlled by men. Throughout a number of different articles, article drafts or 1

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“6 Rules for a Successful Marriage: Louise Dupin’s Feminist Writing on Marriage & Love”: by Angela Hunter

SEASECS 2015

Louise Dupin drafted her major work, called the Ouvrage sur les

femmes, from the 1740s through the early or mid-1750s. This work

remained ultimately unfinished and unpublished, although parts of

it were in final draft form (thanks in part to Jean-Jacques

Rousseau who served as her secretary before he began his own

philosophical career). Dupin’s project is a formidable

contribution feminist philosophy and history. A brief summary of

the Ouvrage is difficult to produce, not only because it remained

incomplete but because the manuscript drafts to which we now have

access are fragmented. Broadly speaking, though, it surveys and

critiques the history of women’s social, economic and political

status, while also arguing for women’s equality with men. It was

projected to contain at least 47 discrete articles.

In this paper I will investigate Dupin’s views on love,

which she analyzes in relation to education, socialization, and

marriage institutions that have been controlled by men.

Throughout a number of different articles, article drafts or

1

other fragments, Dupin describes the conditions necessary to

found an egalitarian marriage and allow a love relation that

would support a mutually-enriching union.i While discussing love,

Dupin touches on religious institutions and various types of law

(both historical and contemporary), practices of polygamy, the

ongoing differences in women’s and men’s education, and commonly

held beliefs. There is no way to provide exposition and analysis

of these various critiques and propositions, so I will instead

simply state that Dupin turns out to be a strong advocate for

marriage, but her multiple interventions into this institution

turn out to provide a very different image of marriage and

marital love than that which she sees prevalent in her time. So,

today I will present you with what I am calling “Louise Dupin’s

Six Rules for a Successful Marriage.”

Before working through each rule in turn, I will lay the

groundwork for Dupin’s discontent with the unjust principles

underpinning marriage. First, we must acknowledge that the desire

for romantic love is a part of human nature, but so is the desire

for independence and freedom, which Dupin says “sont du gout des

femmes aussy bien que de celuy des hommes.” When it comes to

2

love, Dupin argues that women and men are both under the sway of

the same feelings: “l’amour dans les f. est le même que dans les

h. il a pour objet ce qui leur plait” (RG). This is also the case

for sexual desire, which Dupin sees as equally affecting men and

women:

Il seroit cependant beaucoup plus simple de parler que les h.et les f. sont a but sur le point [sexual congress] et que lanature les solicite egalement et par un desir egal puis qu’ilfaut qu’ils ayent un degré egale de détermination pour agir. Les h. en plus d’une occasion prennent la coutume pour la nature et sont aisés a prendre en contradiction principalement dans leur sisteme sur les f. On leur entend dire quelque fois que les f. dans leur jeunesse et avant d’estre accoutumée a commercer intimement avec les h. en ont une sorte d’appréhension naturelle tres remarquable. Cela estaparement fondé dans l’envie de se croyre capable de les déterminer contre leur propre gré, ou dans l’envie de leur supposer une sorte de crainte et de respect par leur personne. Les f. se regardent peutestre comme peu digne de l’honneur qu’on veut leur faire, mais et cela la nature, si les h. et les f. etoient [eleves] sans qu’on leur enseignât des manieres differentes ne se recherceroient ils pas egalement, et n’écouteroient ils pas ce qu’ils se demanderoient avec la simplicité d’un desir qui naturellementne paroitroit ni coupable ni redoutable a l’un ni a l’autre.

Here Dupin sees that men can be quick to call natural what is, in

fact, social whenever it confers upon them some distinction, such

as that of women having a natural fear of men’s sexual powers.

Dupin repeatedly argues that if men and women were not educated

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and treated so differently in such matters, the differences

regarding their approach to desire would matter very little if at

all. While a man’s ego may be stroked by the fact that a girl has

been brought up to see it as an honor to be pursued by him, a

more natural relation would be reciprocal sexual pursuit.

Naturally, then, there are no such differences that matter, but

we don’t live in nature; nor would Dupin want us to -- but she

would like us to live in a state in which the dominance of men

over women is not seen as natural and where women are able to

access some of the same advantages that men have held for

themselves.

Dupin argues that social structures act upon and change

human nature, as evidenced by the different customs found in

different countries: “Dans les pays policés les loix donnent la

forme generale aux nations, mais dans les memes nations ou

l’esprit est un peu plus formé qu’ailleurs, les gens raisonnables

font un choix de ces loix et s’en donnent de particulieres, pour

leur propre conduitte.” (RG) Importantly, Dupin believes that

people need laws just as they need moral rules, and that the most

4

advanced peoples use reason to select the best of these for

themselves (collectively and individually).

Before we can lay out the best guidelines for marital love

we need to investigate the dominant sentiments currently

regulating the interactions between men and women. Dupin writes

about this in myriad places, but the most succinct in terms of

feelings is the following:

Les sentimens des h. pour les f. se réduisent a 4 principaux: le mépris, l’envie, la jalousie, et l’adoration. [...] Les principaux sentimens des f. pour les h. sont la crainte, la confiance, et l’amour. La crainte leur est inspirée dans l’education: elles sont accoutumées a voir les h. les maitres et a les voir user de leur autorité assés durement[.] (RG)

Clearly a loving relationship cannot exist if contempt, envy and

jealousy make up the trinity of men’s feelings toward women. More

unsettling, however, is that Dupin puts dread first in the list

of principles that guide women’s feelings, especially since this

dread is not natural but learned. As Dupin writes in another

article:

On a encore appliqué la crainte politique au menage, et tellement qu’il y a peu de maris qui n’aient fait entendre plus ou moins poliment à leurs f. qu’elles devoient les craindre. Ce principe, très bon en police nationalle parce que

5

la crainte est une voix qui se fait entendre de loin, est-il appliquable à la politique des menages? (IIIC 4e)

In this passage, as in many others, we see that Dupin is thinking

through what we now call the public/private divide, wherein the

marriage relation is seen both as an institution that the state

and religions have a stake in regulating, as well as an intimate

connection between two people who should both ideally receive

pleasure and comfort from it. The politics of fear are not

appropriate to marriage. The loudest and most commanding voice,

one that relies on fear, however, cannot call forth a truly

intimate and equal love relation. What, then, should come to

substitute in the place of a politics of dread? Without further

ado, I present to you in the form of 6 rules some of the most

salient aspects of Dupin’s ideas for creating an equitable

marriage between two loving equals.

Rule #1: The best model for governing relations between a husband

and wife is that of a republic.

Monarchy is quickly discarded as a fitting model for power

relations within a marriage based on the abuses that it too

easily allows:

6

Les idees republicaines ne conviendroient-elles pas mieux a l’union de deux personnes non seulement creees egales, mais qui contractent l’engagement de rendre leurs interets, leurs biens et leur maux communs? [...] Qu’est-ce que le pouvoir monarchique peut produire de bon, de grand et d’utile entre un mari et une f.? on voit asses son effet aujourd’hui pour (en connoitre l’abus) pouvoir en juger. (196)

While Dupin sees the potential promise of republican ideals as an

analogy for marriage relations, her lengthy analysis of classical

Rome elsewhere makes it clear that she understands that even

republican ideals can be perverted if one party seeks to dominate

the other.

As if it needed saying, Dupin finds that a tyranny or a

master-slave relationship is an even worse model than a monarchy,

although this type of tyranny is still too often the norm, both

in matters of state and matters of the heart.

[La femme], supportant difficilement son esclavage, veut faire entendre qu’il est extrême pour augmenter son droit de s’en plaindre et pour se justifier de s’y soustraire. On se met d’abord à son aise en disant qu’on ne sauroit avoir le moindre sentiment pour un Tyran qui vous a enchainée et vous fait entendre toutte la journée le bruit de la chaïne[.]. L’esprit a encore plus d’espace pour se mettre à son aise: car pour peu qu’on réfléchisse sur l’injustice de l’arrangement du ménage, on en est fort scandalisé, fort choqué, et on sent même du mépris pour cette autorité et pourceux qui l’exercent, comme on en sent pour toutte l’injusticeen général, à quoi on ajoûte le sentiment particulier qu’on apour celle qui nous regarde.

7

Dupin argues that one should obey properly grounded authority,

but she cannot find in philosophy nor in history a convincing

reason for why men have all the authority and women only the

subjection to it. Freely-given consent to any authority is key.

Dupin puts it this way:

Le charme que l’égalité, le conssentement volontaire [...] mettent dans les actions de la societé est autant de perdu pour les ménages; l’egalité ne sçauroit subsister entre 2 personnes dont l’un veut estre le maitre, et le plaisir d’unevolonté sage et même ce mérite du conssentement est detruit par son authorité.

Furthermore, the way that marriages are conducted do nothing to

deny the image of women subjugated to and under the complete

authority of men. Dupin mockingly writes:

Les définitions ordinaires du mariage disent que c’est un sacrement entre deux personnes libres, dont les mariés sont eux-mêmes les ministres, et dont le Curé n’est que le temoin.Mais quel Ministre et quels ministres ceux cy arrivent, tous deux, égaux et libres à l’autel, et l’un s’en retourne avec les biens et la liberté de l’autre, qui retourne depouillé etassujeti ; et le Curé par son ministre, témoin de cet étrangemarché l’a rendu solemnel et inéfaçable par quelques paroles prononcées de part et d’autre, qui ne sont cependant aucune mention de ce qui arrive.

Rule #2: In order to form a more perfect union, women need to be

educated and to have their minds cultivated.

8

Like other feminists of her time, Dupin is a staunch advocate for

a vibrant education for women, one that would help form the basis

for a civil and romantic partnership between 2 equals.

Le commerce et même la conversation entre un mari et une f. auxquels l’éducation et consequemment les moeurs ont assigné des idées différentes sur un fond de nature qui est absolumentle même, doivent être bien peu sincéres et bien bisarres en plusieurs occasions, et le sont effectivement.

L’Etude et les connoissances sont necessaires ; non seulement pour être savant, mais pour être sociable et aimable : Non seulement pour avoir de la Science, mais pour savoir se conduire, pour savoir vivre, et pour savoir s’amuser. [...] Les idées des f. ne sont pas éxercées parce que les idées ne s’éxercent pas sans secours ; leur sentimens le sont trop parce que les sentimens s’éxercent d’eux memes[.] C’est pour cela que les f. jugent de presque tout part sentiment. [...]ii Tous ceux des différentes connoissance, et même du raisonnement leur sont interdits par la difference de l’éducation, il ne leur reste que le seul sentiment pour les raprocher ; encore est-il altéré autant qu’il est possible, ettellement qu’on pourroit dire sans éxageration qu’à la façon dont les h. et les f. sont élevés ils devroient être insuportables les uns pour les autres, si la Nature n’y avoit mis bon ordre.

Interestingly, Dupin here suggests that it is once again nature

that comes to the rescue of the couple, making it such that women

and men still seek each other out despite a lack of comparable

and compatible spirits. Women’s education is so limited that they

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rely primarily on emotion for all judgment, leaving them unable

to understand even what education men have received and that they

have been denied. Moreover, both are changed by socialization

even at the level of sentiment, further contributing to the

difficulty of a married couple to understand each other and

communicate.

Rule #3: Wives should retain control over the money that they

bring to the marriage as well as have the right to designate

their own inheritors.

According to Dupin a woman’s dowry was given over entirely

to the husband, including any future inheritances she might

receive. While true that a woman could stipulate “une separation

de biens”, this was only for the revenue on what she brings;

anything access beyond that must be authorized by her husband.iii

Dupin spends quite a lot of time excavating specific laws

throughout regarding women’s dowry and her ability to access or

control it in various types of cases as well as the history of

inheritance laws. She comes down in strong favor of women’s

ability to designate her own inheritors, choosing the husband

10

and/or any or all of her children and even those outside the

family.

One of Dupin’s ideas about how to regulate marital finances

is that if wives and husbands were each in charge of making all

decisions about (at least) their own revenue then they should

each trust each other with the duty and the honor to serve as

head-of-household (“bon Pere de famille”) in managing their own

portion; if this trust were not possible, then each would have to

receive authorization from the other for any major actions

relevant to those finances (198).

Rule #4: Spouses should make themselves agreeable to each other

through friendship and consideration, and, inasmuch as possible,

should hide their own faults and tolerate those of the spouse.

This is perhaps the least revolutionary of Dupin’s

suggestions, and yet she calls these the two major goals of

spouses which are interrelated. She heartily believes that

couples should avoid complaining about and satirizing each

other’s conduct to others. In fact, she argues that, in their

feelings and attitudes towards women, most men have unthinkingly

11

renounced without consideration the best thing that their wives

have to offer: friendship.iv

Rule #5: A space of one’s own leads to a sweeter shared life.

In the 20th-century Virginia Woolf will call for a “room of

one’s own,” but Dupin calls for something like “a wing of one’s

own”; that is, she argues for a residence of one’s own within the

same shared house as an ideal situation for a marriage. While

this could only apply to those with a house or a chateau large

enough to create two independent living spaces, Dupin argues that

not only would the couple in such a situation come together with

real pleasure to spend time (and nights) together, they would

each strive to set an example for the other in the proper

management of their own little household.v

Rule #6: Marriages should last for a contractually set period of

time and then either expire or be renewed based on the couple’s

wishes.

Controlling one’s own fortune, choosing one’s inheritors,

having equal right to and authority over children, having a space

to call one’s own, giving women an equal education to men, all of

12

these recommendations on Dupin’s part seem to have to come to

pass in most western societies. This final rule is one that is

more progressive than most current marriage laws allow. Perhaps

what Dupin recommends here is most akin to what we call common-

law marriage. In 2 different drafts Dupin makes slightly

different suggestions, but, in general, she states that women who

marry between the ages of 15-25 could be required to stay with

their husbands for 12-18 years, or that those who marry between

20 and 30 be required to stay for 15 years only. This time-range

is, Dupin says, to help guarantee posterity, thus I assume to

give couples time to have and raise children. No matter the

specific time allotted, any decision to stay together beyond that

would be up to the mutual agreement of the husband and wife. It’s

not clear if Dupin actually foresees a limited-time contract or

rather that the marriage would continue without any requirement

for a shared life of any kind between the spouses; but what is

clear is that the guiding principle is freedom of choice. This

freedom strengthens a chosen relationship whereas constraint

weakens it.

13

In case her reader doesn’t understand the seriousness of the

injustices plaguing the marriage institution, Dupin warns her

reader to worry about women refusing to enter into marriage. What

would happen if unmarried women, she asks, even those who want to

be married in “an honest way” conforming with and legitimated by

law, decide that the current marriage relationship is “too much

of a disadvantage” to them? While these women might regret that

they must live separately from the men who could be their

intimate friends, they may still make such a decision. However,

if society listens to the voice of reason and reforms its customs

and its laws, perhaps one would see a new kind of equality and a

new kind of harmonious marriage and love relationship (and I

conclude here with Dupin’s hope for that future):

En un mot : avec des principes et des arrangemens qui parleroient tous de l’esprit d’égalité, on rameneroit les mariages à la pureté et à la douceur de leur origine auxquelles les choses acquises prêteroient un nouvel agreement. La societé des gens marié auroit tout l’avantage de la societé de deux amis qui, non seulement se sont choisispour s’aimer, mais se préférent tous les jours à tous les autres objets, et il y auroit de plus dans la societé du mariage l’intéret et le plaisir particulier que la Nature a voulu mettre entre les humains de différent séxe. (42, EM)

14

i

ii Les f. n’ayant communément aucune notion de ce qui a fait l’occupation principale des h. jusqu’à l’âge de vingt ans, chacque pointd’étude, d’art ou de Science que les h. ont appris, est pour elles une langue étrangére au moyen de quoi des gens qui sont necessairement faits pour se lier par l’estime par l’amitié et par la communication de leurs idées n’en ont presque aucuns moyens. iii “Aujourd’hui en France, la Loy remettant la dot d’une femme a son mari, et en lui livrant par avance tous les heritages qui pourront echoir a la f. a oblige les biens du mari d’en repondre” (190); “Il est vrai que les f. sont libres de stipuler en se mariant une separation de biens qui leur laisse la jouissance de ce qui leur appartient: mais seulement au revenu; car pour faire ou recevoir le plus petit remboursement (...) et le plus petit remplacement, il fautencore une autorisation du mari” (191).iv Le premier principe de cette société dervroit être de chercher tousles moyens de se rendre agréables. Le second par rapport aux autres devroit être de supporter et de cacher ce qu’on pourroit avoir de defectueux. L’obligation du premier principe entraîneroit celle du second; on doit sentir qu’il soit méprisable d’êtr Satyrique sur quelcun et de relever ses defauts, quand ses bonnes qualités regarderoient principalement sa bonne conduite avec vous. (IIIC 4e)v Il nous semble même qu’il seroit avantageux que dans la même maisonchacun eut la sienne à part pour son service particulier que chacun regleroit à sa fantaisie. Deux ménages de cette espéce coûteroient sûrement moins qu’un seul. Chacun veilleroit mieux aux abus qui le regarderoient. Celui qui se conduiroit le mieux seroit l’éxemple de l’autre. Cela ne leur ôteroit ni le droit ni le plaisir de vivre ensemble, et seroit un moyen d’y vivre beaucoup plus agréablement. Ily auroit de la gloire et de la douceur à se chercher et à se procurerréciproquement des choses agréables[.]

REFERENCES

Dupin, Louise Marie-Madeleine. Ouvrage sur les femmes. 1) Ms. Rousseau-Dupin Papers, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas. 2) Ms. Manuscrits de Dupin, Bibliothèque des Études Rousseauistes, Musée Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montmorency, France.

Dupin, Louise Marie-Madeline. “Du marriage” and “Du Viol,” presented by Sylvie Dangeville, in “Duex ‘articles’ inedits de l’Ouvrage sur les

femmes De Mme Dupin,”

French transcriptions above are my own, sometimes verified through consultation from transcriptions made by Dr. Louise Manley or Dr. Frédéric Marty (with their permission). Translations are mine. The spelling, syntax and grammar are not corrected from the original, although all abbreviations except “m” for mari and “f” for femme, arechanged. Some punctuation is added to aid in clarity of expression.

Support was provided for this research by an American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies and Andrew W. Mellon Foundation fellowshipfrom the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, the University of Texas at Austin, and by a summer research grant from the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences at UALR to conduct archival research at the Bibliothèque d’Etudes rousseauistes, Musée Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montmorency, France.

“Six Rules for a Successful Marriage” QUOTE SHEET

Angela Hunter SEASECS 2015

1: Draft of Article 3, "Du Tempérament" MJJR Il seroit cependant beaucoup plus simple de parler que les h. et les f. sont à but sur le point [sexual congress] et que la nature les solicite également et par un désir égal puisqu’il faut qu’ils ayent un degré égale de détermination pour agir. Les h. en plus d’une occasion prennent la coutume pour la nature et sont aisés a prendre en contradiction principalement dans leur sisteme sur les f. On leur entend dire quelque fois que les f. dans leur jeunesse et avant d’estre accoutumée à commercer intimement avec les h. en ont une sorte d’appréhension naturelle tres remarquable. Cela est aparement fondé dans l’envie de se croyre capable de les déterminer contre leur propre gré, ou dans l’envie de leur supposer une sorte de crainte et de respect par leur personne. Les f. se regardent peutestre comme peu digne de l’honneur qu’on veut leur faire, mais et cela la nature, si les h. et les f. étoient [élevés] sans qu’on leur enseignât des manieres differentes ne se recherceroient ils pas également, et n’écouteroient ils pas ce qu’ils se demanderoient avec la simplicité d’un desir qui naturellement ne paroitroit ni coupable ni redoutable à l’un ni à l’autre[?]

It would be simpler to say that men and women share a goal on this point and that nature calls them both equally, and with equal desire, since they each need an equal degree of determination to act. On more than one occasion men mistake what is

custom for nature and can easily be caught in contradictions, especially when it comes to their views of women. You sometimes hear them say that when women are still young and not yet acquainted with intimate congress with men they have a verystrong natural apprehension of it. Apparently, this is based men’s desire to see themselves as capable of convincing a woman against her own will, or their desire to attribute to women a dread and respect for men’s persons. In this view, women see themselves as hardly worthy of the honor men want to give them, but – and this is nature – if men and women were raised without being taught different manners, wouldn’t they seek each other out equally, and wouldn’t they solicit each other with a simple desire which naturally appears neither guilty nor terrifying to either of them?

2: "Réflections Générales", MJJR (found with pages relevant to articles 41-42)On peut conclure de tout cecy que la nature humaine est pliable et suceptible de touttes sortes de formes. On peut aussy conclure du mérite de chaque usage par l’effet qu’il produit. Dans les pays policés les loix donnent la forme generale auxnations, mais dans les memes nations ou l’esprit est un peu plus formé qu’ailleurs,les gens raisonnables font un choix de ces loix et s’en donnent de particulieres, pour leur propre conduitte. […]Les sentimens des h. pour les f. se réduisent a 4 principaux: le mépris, l’envie, la jalousie, et l’adoration. [...] Les principaux sentimens des f. pour les h. sontla crainte, la confiance, et l’amour. La crainte leur est inspirée dans l’education: elles sont accoutumées à voir les h. les maitres et à les voir user deleur autorité assés durement[.]

We can conclude from this that human nature is pliable and can be shaped in all kinds of ways. We can also judge the merit of each custom by the effect it produces. In regulated countries laws give form to nations, but in nations where ideas are better formed than in others, reasonable people choose these general lawsand give themselves particular ones for their own conduct. [….]Men’s feelings towards women can be reduced to 4 principles: contempt, envy, jealousy, and adoration. […] The principle feelings that women have for men are dread, confidence, and love. Dread is inspired in them as part of their education: they are accustomed to viewing men as masters and even to seeing men use their own authority quite harshly.

3: IIIC. 4e: Mariage et instructions féminine, HRC [classification of Thieleman] On a encore appliqué la crainte politique au menage, et tellement qu’il y a peu de maris qui n’aient fait entendre plus ou moins poliment à leurs f. qu’elles devoientles craindre. Ce principe, très bon en police nationalle parce que la crainte est

une voix qui se fait entendre de loin, est-il appliquable à la politique des menages? (IIIC 4e)

The politics of fear have even been applied to home life, and so much so that thereare few husbands who haven’t made it known to their wives, more or less politely, that they should fear their husbands. Fear is a good principle for national order because it is a voice that can make itself heard from afar, but is it applicable tothe politics of the home?

4: Article 30: "Réflexions sur la puissance des maris," published by Sylvie Dangeville Les idées republicaines ne conviendroient-elles pas mieux a l’union de deux personnes non seulement créées égales, mais qui contractent l’engagement de rendre leurs intérets, leurs biens et leur maux communs? [...] Qu’est-ce que le pouvoir monarchique peut produire de bon, de grand et d’utile entre un mari et une f.? On voit asses son effet aujourd’hui pour (en connoitre l’abus) pouvoir en juger. (Dangeville 196)

Aren’t republican ideas a better fit for a union between two people created not only equal, but who also make a contract to share their interests, their goods, andtheir difficulties? […] Is there anything good or great or useful that could be provided by a monarchical power arrangement between a husband and a wife? We see well enough to judge the effect of that kind of power (and recognize its abuses) inour own time.

5: IIIC. 4e: Drafts on Mariage et instruction féminine, HRC[La femme], supportant difficilement son esclavage, veut faire entendre qu’il est extrême pour augmenter son droit de s’en plaindre et pour se justifier de s’y soustraire. On se met d’abord à son aise en disant qu’on ne sauroit avoir le moindre sentiment pour un Tyran qui vous a enchainée et vous fait entendre toutte la journée le bruit de la chaïne: Ainsi qu’on ne prêche point contre son coeur. L’esprit a encore plus d’espace pour se mettre à son aise: car pour peu qu’on réfléchisse sur l’injustice de l’arrangement du ménage, on en est fort scandalisé, fort choqué, et on sent même du mépris pour cette autorité et pour ceux qui l’exercent, comme on en sent pour toutte l’injustice en général, à quoi on ajoûte le sentiment particulier qu’on a pour celle qui nous regarde.

Because the wife can hardly tolerate her enslavement, she wants to make known how it is so that she has even more right to complain and also can justify submitting herself to it. At first she makes peace with it by saying that she could never feelanything at all for the Tyrant who put her in chains and who ensures that she hearsthem rattling all day long: thus she doesn’t go against her heart. Then her mind can find more room to be put at ease. But we should be scandalized and shocked at how little we reflect on the injustice of marriage relations. We even feel contemptfor the authority of marriage and for those who exercise it, the same as we feel for all injustices in general; to this we add that particular feeling one has for this specific injustice that affects us.

6: Draft of L'Education des femmes, MJJRLe charme que l’égalité [et] le conssentement volontaire [...] mettent dans les actions de la societé est autant de perdu pour les ménages; l’egalité ne sçauroit subsister entre 2 personnes dont l’un veut estre le maitre, et le plaisir d’une volonté sage et même ce mérite du conssentement est détruit par son authorité.

The charm that equality [and] voluntary agreement have in a society is lost in a household; equality can’t exist between two people when one wants to be master. Thepleasure of a wise desire and even the merit of one’s agreement [on the part of thewife] are destroyed by the master’s authority.

7: IIIC. 4e: Mariage et instructions féminine, HRCLes définitions ordinaires du mariage disent que c’est un sacrement entre deux personnes libres, dont les mariéssont eux-mêmes les ministres, et dont le Curé n’est que le temoin. Mais quel Ministre et quels ministres ceux cy arrivent, tous deux, égaux et libres à l’autel, et l’un s’en retourne avec les biens et la liberté de l’autre, qui retourne depouillé et assujeti ; et le Curé par son ministre, témoin de cet étrange marché l’a rendu solemnel et inéfaçable par quelques paroles prononcées de part et d’autre, qui ne sont cependant aucune mention de ce quiarrive.

The ordinary definition of marriage is that it's a sacrament between two free people and of which the spouses themselves are the ministers whereas the priest is only a witness. But what a Ministry and what ministers are these two who arrive free and equal at the altar. One of them then leaves with the property/goods and freedom of the other who leaves dispossessed and subjected. And the priest, throughhis ministry, is witness to this strange commerce which he renders solemn and unbreakable through a few words pronounced just like that, without any mention of what else is actually happening.

8: Draft of Article 3, "Du Tempérament" MJJRLe commerce et même la conversation entre un mari et une f. auxquels l’éducation et consequemment les moeurs ont assigné des idées différentes sur un fond de nature qui est absolument le même, doivent être bien peu sincéres et bien bisarres en plusieurs occasions, et le sont effectivement.

When education and consequently manners have given very different ideas to men and women, despite there being the same natural foundation, relations and even conversation between a husband wife must be very little sincere and quite bizarre on many occasions; and this is just the way it is in point of fact.

8bis: Draft of L'Education des femmes, MJJRL’Etude et les connoissances sont necessaires ; non seulement pour être savant, mais pour être sociable et aimable : Non seulement pour avoir de la Science, mais pour savoir se conduire, pour savoir vivre, et pour savoir s’amuser. [...] Les idées des f. ne sont pas éxercées parce que les idées ne s’éxercent pas sans secours ; leur sentimens le sont trop parce que les sentimens s’éxercent d’eux mêmes, et d’autant plus qu’ils sont moins moderés par les operations de l’esprit. C’est pour cela que les f. jugent de presque tout part sentiment. [...]Tous ceux des différentes connoissance, et même du raisonnement leur sont interdits par la difference de l’éducation, il ne leur reste que le seul sentiment pour les

raprocher ; encore est-il altéré autant qu’il est possible, et tellement qu’on pourroit dire sans éxageration qu’à la façon dont les h. et les f. sont élevés ils devroient être insuportables les uns pour les autres, si la Nature n’y avoit mis bon ordre.

Study and knowledge are necessary, not just to be wise, but to be sociable and lovable. Not only to be knowledgeable, but to know how to conduct oneself, how to live, and how to entertain oneself. […] Women’s thinking is not exercised because it can’t be exercised without help; their feelings are used too often because feelings work all by themselves (especially when they are not moderated by the mind). This is why women judge almost everything by feeling. […] For those who havedifferent styles of discernment and for whom reasoning together has been forbidden due to the different types of education, there is only feeling to bring them together. But even their sentiment has been changed so much that one can say without exaggerating that, given the way men and women are raised, they would find each other completely intolerable if Nature didn’t have a hand in it.

9: Article 30: "Réflexions sur la puissance des maris," published by Sylvie Dangeville, p. 198Si la loy ordonnoit que une f. qui se marieroient depuis 15 ans jusqua 25 du necessairement demeurer avec son mary 18 années conssecutive et au-dela seulement ason gré, et que celles qui se marieroient depuis 20 jusqua 30 fassement le meme engagement seuleument de 15 ans[...]

What if the laws required that any woman between the ages of 15 and 25 who would marry would necessarily live with her husband for 18 consecutive years and beyond that, only at her wish, and that those between the ages of 20 and 30 would make thesame commitment but for 15 years only[…]

10: Draft of article 42, "Education dans le mariage," MJJREn un mot : avec des principes et des arrangemens qui parleroient tous de l’esprit d’égalité on rameneroit les mariages à la pureté et à la douceur de leur origine auxquelles les choses acquises prêteroient un nouvel agrément, la societé des gensmarié auroit tout l’avantage de la societé de deux amis qui, non seulement se sont choisis pour s’aimer, mais se préférent tous les jours à tous les autres objets, etil y auroit de plus dans la societé du mariage l’intéret et le plaisir particulier que la Nature a voulu mettre entre les humains de différent séxe. (EM)

In a word: with principles and arrangements that would speak in the name of equality, we would bring back to marriages their original purity and tenderness. For these marriages would acquire a new satisfaction, and the relationship between married people would have all the advantages of that of two friends who not only chose each other to love but prefer each other to all other objects every day.

Furthermore the marriage relation would have the interest and the particular pleasure that Nature intended between humans of different sexes.

_____________________________________________________________________________MJJR = Musée Jean-Jacques RousseauHRC = Harry Ransom Center

Transcriptions in French are my own, occasionally verified through consultation with transcriptions made by Dr. Frédéric Marty (with hispermission). The spelling, syntax, and grammar are not corrected fromthe original, although all abbreviations except “m” for mari and “f” for femme are changed. Some punctuation added to aid in clarity of expression. Translations mine.

Support was provided for this research by an American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies and Andrew W. Mellon Foundation fellowshipfrom the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, the University of Texas at Austin, and by a summer research grant from the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences at UALR to conduct archival research at the Bibliothèque d’Etudes rousseauistes, Musée Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montmorency, France.

REFERENCES

Dangeville, Sylvie. "Deux 'articles' inédits de l'Ouvrage sur les femmes De Mme Dupin," Etudes Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 7 (1995): 183-204.