Schlaile et al. (2016) - From Bounded Morality to Consumer Social Responsibility: A Transdisciplinary Approach to Socially Responsible Consumption and Its Obstacles

This is the authors’ accepted version. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3096-8

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3096-8

From Bounded Morality to Consumer Social Responsibility 1

From Bounded Morality to Consumer Social Responsibility:

A Transdisciplinary Approach to Socially Responsible

Consumption and its Obstacles

Michael P. Schlaile Katharina Klein Wolfgang Böck (corresponding author) E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Department of Business Ethics, Institute of Economic and Business Education (560), University of Hohenheim, Wollgrasweg 23, 70593 Stuttgart, Germany

Abstract

Corporate social responsibility has been intensively discussed in business ethics literature, whereas the social responsibility of private consumers appears to be less researched. However, there is also a growing interest from business ethicists and other scholars in the field of consumer social responsibility (ConSR). Nevertheless, previous discussions of ConSR reveal the need for a viable conceptual basis for understanding the social responsibility of consumers in an increasingly globalized market economy. Moreover, evolutionary aspects of human morality seem to have been neglected despite the fact that private consumers are undoubtedly human beings. In addition to that, empirical studies suggest that many consumers believe themselves to be responsible but do not act according to their alleged values or attitudes. This raises the question of what deters them from doing so. Therefore, the contribution of this conceptual paper is threefold: we (i) (re-)conceptualize ConSR in terms of a combination of a Max Weber-inspired approach (social action and the ethic of responsibility) with the social connection approach to shared responsibility proposed by Iris Marion Young; (ii) shed light on the previously neglected implications of an evolutionarily induced bounded morality for ConSR, and (iii) identify potential obstacles to socially responsible consumption, particularly against the backdrop of shared social responsibility and bounded morality. In this latter respect, the paper focuses specifically on the obstacles of low moral intensity, moral stupefaction, informational complexity, and the lack of perceived consumer effectiveness. In sum, the paper advances knowledge in the field of ConSR by using a transdisciplinary, literature-based approach.

Keywords bounded morality, bounded rationality, consumer ethics, consumer social responsibility, ethical consumption, evolutionary ethics, moral intensity, moral stupefaction, perceived consumer effectiveness, socially responsible consumption

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Abbreviations

ConSR consumer social responsibility CSR corporate social responsibility EoPC (the) ethic of principled conviction EoR (the) ethic of responsibility GDP gross domestic product IMF The International Monetary Fund PCE perceived consumer effectiveness SRC socially responsible consumption

Acknowledgments: We have benefited from presenting an earlier version of this paper at the Annual Conference of the European Business Ethics Network (EBEN) on “Business Ethics in a European Perspective,” June 12-14, 2014, at the ESMT European School of Management and Technology in Berlin. We are grateful for helpful questions, criticism, and suggestions from participants of our session. Special thanks to Michael Schramm for valuable advice, comments, and support. Moreover, we would like to thank Lisa Angerer, Elisabeth Berger, Jessica Kuntz, Mark Newman, Michael Volz, Adrian Walton, and four anonymous reviewers (two for the EBEN submission, two for this journal submission) for contributing to the evolution of this paper in various, often substantial ways. It should go without saying that all remaining confusion and mistakes are exclusively our own responsibility.

Introduction

The focus on social responsibility of corporations has a relatively long history. Purposeful

research on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) concept originated more than 60 years

ago in the United States (see Carroll, 2008; Crane and Matten, 2010; or chapter 4 in Paine,

2003). The social responsibility of (private) consumers has, by contrast, received less

attention from business ethicists and other scholars (see, for instance, Heidbrink and Schmidt,

2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Schmidt, 2016; Vitell, 2003, 2015),1 despite the fact that arguments in

favor of that subject have a similarly long history: Hartley Withers, the editor of The

Economist at the beginning of the 20th century, already spoke out in favor of “the consumer’s

responsibility” almost a century ago (Withers, 1920). Strikingly, some of his assertions have

not lost any topicality: “As we are all consumers so we all have this consumer's

responsibility, and nearly all of us ignore it” (Withers, 1920, p. 231). To a certain extent, this


neglect is also reflected in the academic literature. As Steve Tammelleo and Louis Lombardi

have recently observed:

“Unfortunately, discussions of ethics in economic activities have focused almost entirely

on the responsibilities of businesses ... Those on the other side of the transaction are

often viewed primarily as beings acted on” (Tammelleo and Lombardi, 2014, p. 99).

However, there slowly seems to be an increasing awareness of consumer ethics in general

and consumer social responsibility (ConSR) in particular.2 It is important to note that early

work on ConSR has focused almost exclusively on aspects of environmental or ecological

sustainability and policy implications (e.g., Antil, 1984; Fisk, 1973). These are

unquestionably important perspectives, but we can also observe that the power of consumers

to sanction, positively influence, and eventually change morally questionable practices seems

to be larger than ever before (see also Schmidt, 2016, p. 19). This concerns more of the social

and economic aspects rather than just the environmental dimension of sustainability.

Some publications discuss ConSR biased toward some kind of corporate perspective,

ranging from viewing ConSR as a driver of CSR (Caruana and Chatzidakis, 2014) to

exploring the role of corporate communications in constructing consumer responsibility

(Caruana and Crane, 2008). Alternatively, it has often been argued that consumer ethics and

ConSR should be treated equally to business ethics and CSR (especially when business ethics

is understood in the more narrow sense of corporate ethics) to adequately address ethical

aspects of both demand and supply side (see, for instance, Knobloch, 1994; Neuner, 2001,

2006; Scherhorn, 2000; Schmidt, 2016).3 A decade ago, Allan Williams (2005) took a similar

stance by stating that, despite some success in driving more sustainable forms of business,

there is arguably a need for CSR to be accompanied by a corresponding notion of ConSR in

order to succeed in achieving more sustainable forms of consumption. However, there seems

to be no agreement on how such a corresponding concept of ConSR may be substantiated.


Therefore, the first aim of this paper is to explicitly address one of the research

directions proposed by Scott Vitell (2015), namely to demonstrate how ConSR could be

conceptualized. Our contribution builds on parts of the recent work by Imke Schmidt (2016)

and develops a (re-)conceptualization of ConSR in terms of a combination of two central

elements: a) a Max Weber-inspired perspective (social action and the ethic of responsibility)

and b) the notion of a shared (social) responsibility. This understanding sheds another light

on contexts where some societal actors may simply not have the ‘power’ to act responsibly.

Hence, the question of a reasonable concept of ‘power’ in the context of ConSR will also

have to be addressed.

Additionally, in line with Withers (1920), empirical research on ConSR has identified

a so-called value-action gap or attitude-behavior gap: Many consumers claim (or believe

themselves) to be responsible but often do not act according to their alleged values or

attitudes (e.g., d’Astous and Legendre, 2009; White et al., 2012; Yeow et al., 2014). This may

provoke the question: Are consumers, after all, part of the utility maximizing ‘species’ homo

economicus, just focusing on price tags and their own selfish interests? Answering with ‘yes’

surely oversimplifies the complex nature of consumers as human beings and their capacity

for altruism (e.g., Batson, 2011, 2014, 2015) and moral interests (Schramm, 2006, 2008,

2010, 2013). Private consumers are much more likely to be Homo sapiens which brings us to

our second research objective: Previous publications on ConSR have neglected evolutionary

aspects or limitations of human morality and, hence, consumers’ responsibility. Therefore,

the second aim of our paper is to shed light on the implications of an evolutionarily induced

bounded morality for ConSR. This aim is clearly transdisciplinary in nature and scope and

prompts us to leave paradigmatic boundaries behind and include findings from various

disciplines such as (behavioral and evolutionary) economics, evolutionary ethics, psychology,

marketing, and neuroscience among others.


The third aim of our conceptual paper again relates to Vitell’s recent request for

research that identifies “the characteristics of those who are already socially responsible as

well as the characteristics of those who are not” (Vitell, 2015, p. 772). Although we do not

explicitly focus on ‘characteristics,’ we address this by discussing potential obstacles to

socially responsible consumption in the light of shared social responsibility and bounded

morality.

In order to adequately address these three objectives, our approach is structured as

follows:

In the (second) section directly following this introduction, we concentrate on the

notion of (consumer) social responsibility. Due to a focus on the relational (i.e., social)

aspects of consumption as well as responsibility, we propose a Weberian approach as one

possible starting point for conceptualizing ConSR. Subsequently, we build upon this

Weberian approach and connect it with the notion of shared (social) responsibility (see, for

instance, Barnett et al., 2011; May, 1992, Young, 2011). This approach and connection can

be regarded as the first conceptual novelty in our paper. Additionally, we aim to carve out a

potential ‘responsibility territory’ in terms of reasonable spheres of activity and domains

where the consumers’ responsibility plays a major role. These spheres and domains have

never before been used as a framework for locating alternative approaches and definitions in

the context of ConSR.

In the next (third) part, we use these spheres and domains to compare several

definitions in the literature and, ultimately, introduce a (novel) definition of socially

responsible consumption (SRC) which is fit for our purpose. This definition conceives of

SRC as a viable means for consumers to meet their otherwise rather abstract social

responsibilities.


In the following (fourth) part, we discuss the question of how potential change agents

could be identified among consumers. This is done by addressing the importance of power to

engage in SRC and clarifying which concepts of power may be suitable in this context.

Subsequently, in the fifth part, we highlight possible obstacles to SRC and introduce

the concept of bounded morality as a central limiting condition previously neglected in the

literature.

Part six consists of suggestions for reducing some of these previously identified

obstacles.

Following this, section seven serves as a summarizing paragraph where we explicitly

outline our propositions and visualize the proposed relations of conditions, obstacles, and

SRC.

Finally, in the last section, we draw our conclusion and suggest directions for further

research.

(Consumer) Social Responsibility

Max Weber Revisited: Social Action and the Ethic of Responsibility

In an era of increasing globalization, it is no simple task for anybody to develop some kind of

(social) responsibility or even conceive the concept on a global scale or with an eye to

consumers (see also Barnett et al., 2011, on a related note). As Schmidt (2016, chapters 3 and

4) lucidly and thoroughly illustrates, responsibility can have a variety of different meanings

(see also Bayertz, 1995, or McKeon, 1957, on the development of the responsibility concept)

and it is therefore crucial to establish an expedient understanding of social responsibility for

the given context in order to avoid arbitrary arguments and misunderstandings (see also

Schmidt and Seele, 2012, section 2, in this regard). For this reason, we have decided to start

from a Weber-inspired approach to the notion of social responsibility that seems to be


reasonable (and expandable) for the context of consumption. However, we do not claim that

this is the only plausible perspective for starting ConSR-related discussions.

So, why Max Weber? We would argue that, in general, consumption is a phenomenon

which is deeply embedded in a social context. Put differently, there are several parties

involved in and affected by decisions and actions of consumers. Moreover, as Gary Gardner

and his coauthors have explained:

“Consumption is in part a social act through which people express their personal and

group identity ... Social motivators can be insatiable drivers of consumption ...” (Gardner

et al., 2004, p. 12).

Beyond that and particularly by incorporating the relational aspects of social

responsibility, it can undoubtedly be stated that we are concerned with social action in a

Weberian sense (see, for instance, Weber, 1922, 2013). Another argument for taking up

Weber again is that his contribution to the discussion of ethical aspects stresses the increasing

importance of responsibility as an orientation toward consequences in opposition to an

orientation merely toward basic convictions and duty (Weber, 1919; see also Schmidt, 2016,

p. 90, on a related note). This focus on consequences also plays an important role in the

context of responsible consumption, as it is the consequences of consumers’ actions (and not

their convictions) that can cause or mitigate harm to people or environment. Hence, a

synthesis of the Weberian concept of a social action with his ethic of responsibility may be a

suitable starting point for our approach.

According to Weber (1922, 2013), an action is to be termed “social” if the spirit

intended by the actor(s) is related to the behavior of others so that, by virtue of this subjective

spirit or meaning, the course of action is in turn oriented toward that behavior. Following this

notion, it can be seen as a prerequisite for the actors (or agents) to be social themselves they

have to take into account the actions as well as the reactions of others. In this context, it is


also worth mentioning that for Weber (1922, 2013) there is a distinction, albeit a rather vague

one, between a (meaningful) social action – where objective opportunities are realized

through observing others’ behavior – and ‘mere’ imitation (Tarde, 1890). Additionally, we

have to keep in mind that social by itself does not necessarily mean that a social action

somehow has to be beneficial, altruistic, or in any other way morally desirable. With respect

to the general topic of this paper, it is also noteworthy that Weber (1922) specifically

mentions past (e.g., revenge for a previous offense), present (e.g., resisting a current offense),

and future behavior (e.g., defensive measures in anticipation of future offenses) of others as

an orientation basis for social actions (see also Weber, 2013, p. 22). Furthermore, social

action may also imply the ‘action’ of (consciously) deciding not to act, that is, the action of

inaction or forbearance (including boycott actions etc.).4

Despite the fact that Weber (1922, 2013) also addresses the topic of social action in

the context of norms, rites, traditions, fashion, and conventions, it is not until we turn the

spotlight on “responsibility” that ethics starts to play a major role. Following Weber’s

thoughts further, we can draw on his distinction between the “ethic of principled conviction”

(Gesinnungsethik) and the “ethic of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik) (Weber, 1919, p.

359), where the former can basically be considered to be deontological and the latter means

“that one must answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one’s actions” (ibid., p. 360,

italics in original). We could, therefore, state that the archetypical or radical ethicists of

principled conviction are rigorist idealists who bear in mind nothing but the immediacy of

goodwill, neglecting the foreseeable consequences of their actions in a given context. Hence,

one of the biggest problems with respect to the ethic of principled conviction (EoPC) is that

people who subscribe to EoPC pass on “responsibilities” for their actions’ negative

consequences to others, such as “the world, ... or the stupidity of others, or the will of God”

(ibid., p. 360). Although the elements of the Weberian approach do not necessarily constitute


a stringent and sophisticated philosophical theory (see also Nida-Rümelin, 2011, p. 180, in

this regard), the distinction between EoPC and the ethic of responsibility (EoR) can serve as a

lucid classification in the present context, for it highlights the difficulties accruing from strict

deontological ethics. It can thus be considered unrewarding to solely assess the ‘moral

goodness’ of an actor. It is thereby important to note that EoR should not be regarded as

being strictly instrumental or rationally goal-oriented (zweckrational) but rather as a

purposive ethic which indeed implies a deontological aspect by taking into account the

actor’s moral quality based on the ‘goodness’ of the telos.

However, one major problem with respect to EoR is that usually the attribution of

responsibility is linked to some causality, intentionality, or – at least – acceptance of

consequences (Heidbrink, 2010). This might allow for people shuffling out of responsibility

on the grounds that, mostly due to imperfect knowledge, they cannot take into consideration

every possible consequence. In other words, although Weber (1919) has stated – inside the

parentheses – that consequences have to be foreseeable, there also seems to be a gray area of

responsibility under uncertainty, where, according to Ludger Heidbrink (2010), the crucial

question is “to what extent are actors capable of influencing or overcoming their nescience”

(Heidbrink, 2010, p. 23, own translation). In this case, accountability is shifted away from the

consequences toward the circumstances under which actors can be expected or even obliged

to influence their nescience (ibid.). This extension toward the element of contingency renders

the notion of responsibility even more complex (see also Heidbrink, 2003, 2007).

It is, therefore, also consistent with this train of thoughts to quote Friedrich August

von Hayek (1960) who has stated that “to be effective, responsibility must be both definite

and limited, adapted both emotionally and intellectually to human capacities” (Hayek, 1960,

p. 83). Hence, for the purpose of an interim conclusion of this paragraph, we can already infer


that responsibility may not only be a question of foreseeable consequences but also of power

or capability to act responsibly.5

With recourse to Weber’s (1922, 2013) reference of past, present, and future action as

an orientation basis for social actions, we can clearly see that, by finally bringing together the

Weberian notion of a social action with (the ethic of) responsibility, the resulting compound

expression, social responsibility, yields a conception of responsibility with respect to past,

present, and future behavior (of others) that goes beyond an etymologically derivable ex post

justification. However, the ex post dimension of social responsibility still remains in effect

and functions as an obligation to avoid previous mistakes as well as to learn from the

mistakes of others and to reverse damage that had been caused by past behavior. The present

or status quo dimension consequently entails critical reflection on direct and indirect effects

of current decisions, including the decisions of others. Lastly, the ex ante dimension involves

anticipation of future behavior – which also implies future generations (see also Birnbacher,

1988, on a related note) – whereby social responsibility can be viewed as a superordinate

concept, consequently partially overlapping with the notion of sustainability, which is future-

oriented by definition.

Conceptualizing and Contextualizing Consumer (Social) Responsibility

Having the topic of our paper in mind, the above conflation also implies that social

responsibility is to be assumed by all societal actors, albeit depending on their respective

capacity for acting responsibly. However, this implication is not as straightforward as it may

seem at first glance. As markets are becoming increasingly globalized, interconnected, and

complex, there are no clear-cut and generally applicable allocations of responsibility.6 More

specifically, aside from potentially unknown causalities (or unintended consequences), it is

often collective action and not some clearly definable individual action that has a positive or

negative impact on others. This issue has been acknowledged by several authors who have


discussed more relational and extended concepts of responsibility in order to better address

these (societal) complexities (e.g., Barnett et al., 2011; Bovens, 1998; Brinkmann, 2007,

2013; Heiß, 2011; Isaacs, 2011; Lübbe, 1998; May, 1992; Young, 2007). Iris Marion Young

has, for example, proposed a so-called social connection model of responsibility, which

implies that “our responsibility derives from belonging together with others in a system of

interdependent processes of cooperation and competition” (Young, 2011, p. 105). With

reference to May’s (1992) concept of shared responsibility,7 Young (2011) further explains

that

“[s]hared responsibility ... is a personal responsibility for outcomes or the risks of

harmful outcomes, produced by a group of persons. Each is personally responsible for

the outcome in a partial way, since he or she alone does not produce the outcomes; the

specific part that each plays in producing the outcome cannot be isolated and identified,

however, and thus the responsibility is essentially shared” (Young, 2011, p. 110).

According to Clive Barnett and his coauthors (2011), this understanding can

“negotiate between an undifferentiated claim of individual responsibility and an

undiscriminating claim about collective responsibility” (Barnett et al., 2011, p. 8, emphasis

added). Moreover, the authors bring forward the following argument in favor of shared

responsibility:

“The advantage of the concept of shared responsibility is that it allows a more

discriminating analysis of the partial ways in which actors might understand themselves

to be responsible, where this in turn is not just a matter of liability or blame but is closely

related to an analysis of the capacity to act” (ibid., p. 8).

Johannes Brinkmann (2004, 2007) has also argued along these lines when he has

stated that it seems more fruitful to consider ethical issues such as child labor, fair trade,

social and environmental sustainability, or consumer dishonesty (and related problems) as a


“shared responsibility of business and consumers” (Brinkmann, 2004, p. 129, italics in

original; see also Brinkmann and Peattie, 2008, p. 22, in this regard).

In this context, Schmidt (2016) argues with reference to May (1992) and Kutz (2000)

that there is even an extended way in which social responsibility can be attributed to and

shared by consumers:

“Consumers contribute to the emergence of ecological and social damages from

consumption and production not only through their individual actions but also through

being involved in the collective reproduction of those structures that underlie, perpetuate,

and multiply these damages” (Schmidt, 2016, p. 196, own translation).

However, Schmidt also states that there is an important difference between the approaches of

May (1992) and Kutz (2000), on the one hand, and Young (2011), on the other hand, as the

former two look for a possible moral liability or blame, whereas the latter is solely interested

in the actors’ participation or contribution to “blamable” social structures in order to establish

a prospective concept of responsibility (see Schmidt, 2016, p. 209 and p. 222, and Young,

2011, p. 111, in this regard). Hence, for Young (2011),

“[r]esponsibility in relation to structural injustice derives ... from being positioned in the

structures in relation to others and acting within these positions. This responsibility is

general and shared rather than particular and individualized, as in the liability model.

Responsibility from social connection says that those who act within unjust structures

have a responsibility to try to make them more just” (Young, 2011, p. 180).

With an eye to the previous Weberian elements, we are now able to see that in this Youngian

sense social action leads to shared social responsibility due to social interconnectedness.

Moreover, Schmidt makes the convincing argument that consumers and corporations

share not only responsibility but also stakeholders in terms of ‘addressees’ of socially

responsible actions (see Schmidt, 2016, p. 237). Therefore, she (ibid.) also proposes to

incorporate the approach presented by Irene Antoni-Komar and her coauthors (2012), who


argue in favor of a reconceptualization of the interaction between companies and consumers

in order to foster engagement of both companies and consumers in so-called “communities of

responsibility” (Antoni-Komar et al., 2012, p. 297, italics in original) in the context of

sharing responsibility for sustainable development. For Antoni-Komar et al. (ibid.) this

shared responsibility also includes creating opportunities and circumstances for consumers to

be able to act in a responsible way. Moreover, their communities of responsibility focus on

reciprocal empowerment of both consumers and corporations to take on responsibility.8

Without drifting off into the minutest details of discussions that have been and should

be intensified elsewhere,9 we can now attempt to map the consumers’ potential

‘responsibility territory’ in terms of a reasonable sphere of activity or scope of action (see

Figure 1).

++ [Figure 1 approximately here]

First of all, Michael Neuner (2001, 2004, 2008) identifies three “spheres” where the

consumers’ responsibility plays a role (see also Heidbrink and Schmidt, 2011c):10

• First, in the social environment where the actions of consumers have to

conform to the norm of “social compatibility” (Sozialverträglichkeit). That is,

consumers have to take into consideration the consequences of their actions

with regard to their impact on other people.

• Second, in the natural environment where the actions should conform to the

norm of “natural compatibility” (Naturverträglichkeit). According to Neuner,

a preserving mode of appropriating nature places consumers under the

obligation to design intervention and exploitation in a way that necessities of

life (e.g., natural resources) will not be destroyed.


• Third, according to Neuner, there is also a “duty of care” (Fürsorgepflicht) for

oneself. This dimension of responsibility covers being able to succeed in one’s

own individual life in terms of individual well-being.

We can also argue that responsible decision-making of consumers is particularly achievable

in the following domains:11

• ConSR-Domain 1: Responsibility for information procurement: This domain

includes thinking independently and being attentive and observant of available

information regarding products, services, and companies (e.g., see Heidbrink

and Schmidt, 2012; Heidbrink, 2014, 2015; Schmidt, 2016). This domain of

ConSR could also be extended to include the responsibility for sharing reliable

information with other consumers and goes beyond the traditional “three

facets of consumer behavior—obtaining, use and disposal” (Vitell, 2015, p.

768, italics in original).

• ConSR-Domain 2: Consumer citizenship:12 There is also a general political

dimension to ConSR in terms of taking an active role via civic engagement

(e.g., in non-governmental organizations), protesting, and exerting influence

on market structures, corporations, policy, and other consumers, among

various other options.13

• ConSR-Domain 3: Demand-side responsibility (Nachfrageverantwortung):

This domain can be further divided into the elements of a) pre-purchase

decisions, which include consumer involvement in the supply chain through

(responsible) co-production14 and co-creation of value,15 b) consumption as

voting by means of selecting which products and suppliers remain in the

market,16 and c) the critical reflection on the actual purchase decision (e.g.,

taking into account consequences, alternatives, quantity and type of goods or


services, and eventually changing consumption patterns; see also Heidbrink

and Schmidt, 2011c; Schmidt, 2016).

• ConSR-Domain 4: Responsibility for usage (Nutzungsverantwortung): Here,

we can directly refer to Neuner’s spheres presented above. With regard to the

social environment, consumption of goods and services has to be in

accordance with the norm of “social compatibility” such that the consequences

for third parties will be taken into consideration during use. With regard to

“natural compatibility,” it is evident that this responsibility also involves

resource-efficient use (see also Heidbrink and Schmidt, 2011b; 2012).

Moreover, Neuner’s “duty of care” for oneself may, for example, include

responsible eating in the form of cooking healthy meals.

• ConSR-Domain 5: Responsible disposal (Entsorgungsverantwortung): The

fifth and last domain that has been identified by Heidbrink and Schmidt

(2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2012) is the responsibility for disposal. This domain is

particularly connected with the previous two domains and involves recycling

as well as avoiding unnecessary (food) waste and litter.17

Note that Neuner as well as Heidbrink and Schmidt focus on consumer responsibility in

general, whereas our paper is primarily concerned with the social responsibility of

consumers. With reference to our Weber-inspired reflections on social responsibility

presented above, it is evident that our view of ConSR is primarily focused on Neuner’s first

sphere as it places an emphasis on social relations and the relevance of consequences for

others. However, our understanding of ConSR does not exclude responsibility for the natural

environment despite the fact that Neuner’s norm of “natural compatibility” is not our primary

concern.18


Socially Responsible Consumption as (Responsible) Social Action

After having delineated that ConSR should be regarded in the context of shared social

responsibility, we now have to shift the focus toward actions that represent a viable way for

consumers to meet their otherwise rather abstract and impalpable social responsibilities and –

metaphorically speaking – find their place in the ‘responsibility territory’ mapped above. In

other words, a concise and workable definition seems to be in order.

++ [Table 1 approximately here]

In this regard, Table 1 shows a selection of relevant definitions that have been

proposed by other authors.19 We can clearly see that the definitions vary considerably in their

focus and scope. With reference to our previous section, we can, for example, locate the

conceptions of Antil (1984) and Fisk (1973) primarily in Neuner’s second sphere (i.e., the

sphere of the natural environment). Moreover, Antil’s definition explicitly mentions the

purchase decision and can, therefore, be assigned to ConSR-Domain 3 (b and c). The other

behaviors mentioned by Antil are too general to be assigned to any of the above domains in

particular, whereas Fisk’s focus on the “use of resources” can be assigned to ConSR-Domain

4. In this manner, the third column of Table 1 proposes a way of positioning or relating the

definitions to the respective spheres and domains (i.e., the ‘responsibility territory’) presented

at the end of the previous section (Figure 1).

With an eye to our focus on social responsibility and, therefore, on the first sphere

(the social environment), we can already see that the definitions of Antil and Fisk are not

completely sufficient for our aim due to their focus on the second sphere. While these and all

of the other definitions presented in Table 1 are suitable for their respective purposes, they

are not completely fit for our purpose: Even the definitions that could be considered more

relevant to our approach – as they also address the first sphere – are either too broad or too

narrow or rather unspecific with regard to the ConSR-Domains they cover.


Therefore, as a first definitional step, we argue that consumer citizenship (i.e.,

ConSR-Domain 2) should better be addressed separately and independently from socially

responsible acts of consuming. While consumer citizenship is an important domain of

responsible consumer activity in its own right, we would overstress the meaning of

consumption if we were to incorporate this second domain into a concept of responsible

consumption. Hence, we should first differentiate between socially responsible consumer

actions in general, which also address ConSR-Domain 2 (consumer citizenship), and a (more

narrow) socially responsible act of consuming. Based on the definition presented by James

Muncy and Scott Vitell (1992) (see also Table 1), we can argue that the act of consuming

primarily means obtaining, using, and disposing of something (in their definition: goods and

services). While Lois Mohr and her coauthors (2001) focus solely on products, we do not

want to confine ourselves to material commodities and argue that this ‘something’ may just

as well be resources, energy, or services. Moreover, from this it follows that ConSR-Domain

3a (i.e., responsible pre-purchase decisions) will also have to be addressed separately by

means of other actions such as responsible co-production or responsible co-creation of value.

However, ConSR-Domain 1 (responsibility for information procurement) is in turn

incorporated as it can be seen as an important part of the consumption decision in general.

With this (and our previous section) in mind, we can now introduce our definition of

socially responsible consumption (SRC), which can be seen as a (factual) means to

particularly address Neuner’s first sphere (social environment) and the ConSR-Domains 1,

3b, 3c, 4, and 5 presented above. SRC is thus defined as a social action that involves the act

of consuming and simultaneously entails (i) taking into account, (ii) gathering information

about, and ultimately (iii) avoiding the (foreseeable) negative consequences the current

action engenders with regard to past, present, and future behavior of others.


In other words, while the initial motivation for consuming ‘something’ might be

entirely egoistic or self-interested – including silencing one’s (bad) conscience or generating

a feeling of “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990) – there is also an altruistic element or positive

externality that now enters into the equation.20 This altruistic element is related to what

Michael Schramm (2006, 2008, 2010) has termed moral interests (moralische Interessen)

(see also Schramm, 2013, p. 837). Following this train of thoughts, in addition to merely

economic self-interest, consumers need to have moral interests in order to incorporate moral

aspects into their consumption decision in the first place. These moral interests should be

presupposed at this point (see also Schramm, 2015, pp. 106 et seq., on moral interests in the

economic approach and in the behavioral ethics approach). Due to the fact that the usual

definitions of altruism involve creating benefits to others at some cost to the agent (see also

D. S. Wilson, 2015, p. 4), this implies that SRC may be more costly than ‘regular’

consumption. However, ‘more costly’ does not necessarily (or not only) mean additional

expenditure caused by a higher price or higher operating and disposal costs for SRC (see also

Göbel, 2015, pp. 221 et seq., on a related note). More importantly, SRC rather implies higher

transaction costs accruing from information procurement or opportunity costs due to

abstention from consumption of a ‘regular’ good or service in favor of some fairly traded,

environmentally friendly, or fairly produced good or service, which, on top of that, might yet

be unable to satisfy the consumer’s needs as extensively as the ‘regular’ one. One current

example might be the smartphone produced by the social enterprise FairPhone. The aim has

been to develop a smartphone “that is designed and produced with minimal harm to people

and planet” (FairPhone, 2013). As a downside consequence, the smartphone is relatively

more expensive than many phones that are technically better equipped but have been

produced conventionally.


At this point, it seems important to point out again that the above definition of SRC

targets ConSR-Domains 1, 3b, 3c, 4, and 5. However, prior to responsible usage and disposal

(i.e., ConSR-Domains 4 and 5), consumers usually have to make a purchase decision, which

can, therefore, be seen as the first step to focus on. Hence, for the sake of brevity, our

following deliberations may sometimes concentrate on the purchase element of SRC by way

of example, which does, however, not imply any intention to downplay the importance of the

other elements.

With Power Comes Responsibility?

With special reference to shared (social) responsibility, it is evident that too strong a focus on

CSR may also entail the danger of asking too much of corporations (see also Palazzo, 2010,

p. 77, on a related note), resulting in (regulatory) overreach or some futile displacement

activity of pressured managers. With an eye to “communities of responsibility” (Antoni-

Komar et al., 2012), this is where consumers have to be empowered to recognize and accept

their ‘share’ in social responsibility. However, this empowerment of consumers can in turn

only to some extent be the task of corporations as part of their ‘share’ in social responsibility

(in terms of CSR).21

With reference to Young’s (2007, 2011) ‘social connection’ approach to shared

responsibility, Barnett et al. (2011) elucidate

“that responsibility does not, in theory or practice, arise simply from being connected to

events, people, places and processes. It is differentiated according to capacities that

actors can bring to bear to change things. For example, the question of power is one

crucial dimension of this sense of shared responsibility – it is important to be able to

discern the degree and type of influence that different actors have to change a situation”

(Barnett et al., 2011, p. 8, italics in original).


In this respect, we can argue that the extensive access of consumers to new information and

communication technology – especially the Internet – has ‘empowered’ them in a way that

they can really become change agents (see also Rezabakhsh et al., 2006).22 In a sense,

particularly social media and also smartphones facilitate socially responsible actions of

consumers which has recently been demonstrated by a variety of mass actions ranging from

traditional boycotts to so-called carrotmobs23 (Hoffmann and Hutter, 2012) or activities like

“Fitch the Homeless”24 (Glazek, 2013). Hence, we can argue that consumers exhibit a

growing power due to their increasing networking capabilities that they also (slowly) seem to

become aware of. Therefore, a well-known saying that has been made famous by popular

culture appears to be appropriate also in this context, namely that “with great power there

must also come great responsibility” (Lee and Ditko, 1962, p. 11; see also Lamb, 1817, p.

1227). This is perfectly in line with what Hans Jonas has stated, namely that “responsibility is

a correlate of power, so that the scope and kind of power determine the scope and kind of

responsibility” (Jonas, 1984, p. 128; see also Jonas, 1979, 1992). It may, therefore, be

reasonable to try and identify potential change agents among consumers that can de facto be

expected to have the ‘power’ to assume their social responsibility.25

Now, an important question arises, which has also been posed by Grégoire

Wallenborn, albeit in a different context: “How to attribute power to consumers?”

(Wallenborn, 2007, p. 57). Probably one of the most commonly used notions of ‘power’ in

the context of consumption is purchasing power (which has also been used in the definition

of Webster, 1975, presented in Table 1). We can, therefore, start with the observation that, for

instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies countries’ economies into two

main groups, namely emerging market and developing economies on the one hand and

advanced economies on the other (e.g., IMF, 2015). This classification takes relative size of

gross domestic product (GDP) into account, among other criteria. These two categories are


also valid for GDP per capita, which measures GDP relative to the size of the population.

Under the assumption that a higher GDP per capita correlates with a higher average

purchasing power, the average consumer in a developing nation is normally much more

limited in his or her consumer behavior than the average consumer in an advanced,

industrialized economy.

Although there are other perfectly plausible ways of categorizing consumers

according to their purchasing power, such as the “global consumer class” (Bentley and de

Leeuw, 2009; G. Clark, 2006; Dobers and Strannegård, 2005; Gardner et al., 2004), it may

make sense to stick to the ‘regional’ grouping mentioned above for mainly three reasons:

• First, in industrial countries (advanced economies) a vast majority of the

regional population belongs to this consumer class, whereas in developing

countries it is only a very small share of the regional population (Gardner et

al., 2004).

• Second, it can be observed that there are certain opinion leader effects with

respect to patterns of consumption in “Western” economies (Dombos, 2008),

meaning, for example, that “concepts of quality of life in developing countries

are strongly affected by the aspirations and goals of consumers and business in

developed countries” (United Nations Environment Programme, 2002, p. 8).

• Third, being wealthy enough to belong to any kind of consumer class does not

necessarily mean that the local infrastructure or other basic conditions actually

enable those consumers to fulfill their social responsibilities. This is mainly

due to the fact that, especially in developing regions, even wealthier people

may be faced with serious issues in terms of social stability and security or a

limited access to markets and information.


With regard to the second and third aspect, we can now clearly argue that purchasing power

seems to be an insufficient concept of power in the context of ConSR. Having said this, the

potential opinion leadership mentioned in the second bullet point can be seen as one facet of

the more general concept of influence, which has also been mentioned in the quote by Barnett

et al. (2011) cited at the beginning of this section. In this respect, we can take up Young’s

(2011) approach again:

“An agent’s position in structural processes usually carries with it a specific degree of

potential or actual power or influence over processes that produce the outcomes. Where

individuals and organizations do not have sufficient energy and resources to respond to

all of the structural injustices to which they are connected, they should focus on those

where they have a greater capacity to influence structural processes” (Young, 2011, p.

144).

Furthermore, Schmidt also favors ‘influence’ over the term ‘power’ in the context of ConSR

for several reasons (see Schmidt, 2016, pp. 216 et seq.). Moreover, this approach seems

promising, not least because the notions of influence and social connection may be

approached by means of network science or, more specifically, social network analysis,

where we can find various measures for influence (e.g., micro measures such as centrality;

see, for instance, chapter 2.2.4 in Jackson, 2008, or chapter 7 in Newman, 2010).26

With regard to the third bullet point, we may now argue that another aspect should be

taken into account when trying to identify potential change agents, namely the extent to

which basic needs have been satisfied. As Len Doyal and Ian Gough (1991) have put it:

“[S]ince physical survival and personal autonomy are the preconditions for any

individual action in any culture, they constitute the most basic human needs – those

which must be satisfied to some degree before actors can effectively participate in their

form of life to achieve any other valued goals” (Doyal and Gough, 1991, p. 54, emphasis

removed).


In this respect it may be tempting to take up Abraham Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs.

However, by doing so, we would be neglecting the downsides of a hierarchical approach for

the sake of simplification, having in mind Archie Carroll’s (1991) “pyramid of corporate

social responsibility” and the resulting revision by Mark Schwartz and Carroll (2003) in the

course of their “three-domain approach.” Moreover, we should be aware that often, in reality,

“the ranking of needs is not as simple as Maslow suggests” (Gazzaniga et al., 2012, p. 392).27

Therefore, it may be helpful to see that, according to Geoffrey Hodgson (2013), there is much

commonality “between Doyal and Gough’s theory of needs and the capabilities approach of

Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (1993)” (Hodgson, 2013, p. 178, with reference to Doyal

and Gough, 1991, and Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; italics in original). More specifically,

according to Hodgson (ibid.), Nussbaum (2000) lists several essential capabilities which

“broadly concur with Doyal and Gough’s ‘basic needs’” (Hodgson, 2013, p. 179). The

different perspectives on human needs – and especially the weaknesses of Maslow’s

hierarchy of needs as well as the relationship between Nussbaum and Sen’s capabilities and

Doyal and Gough’s basic needs – have also been lucidly presented by Laurie Michaelis in the

context of the ethics of consumption (Michaelis, 2000).28

With regard to social connection, shared responsibility, and networks, as well as with

an eye to the aforementioned capability approach (see also Kuklys, 2005; Robeyns, 2005; and

Sen, 1999),29 we can now take up the concept of power proposed by Carsten Herrmann-

Pillath (2013). Herrmann-Pillath writes (with prior reference to Sen, 1999):

“The theoretical concept of ‘power’ relates to patterns of causation in network evolution

and is a property of network configurations of actors that is only assigned to (but not

ontologically manifest in) actors because it is reflected in successful interactions of

actors. ... [P]ower relates with capabilities of actors that are emergent in network

configurations. For example, an actor might control essential gateways in information

flows, and possesses the capacity and knowledge to exploit this configuration”

(Herrmann-Pillath, 2013, p. 326).


For the remainder of our paper we adopt this concept of power. Moreover, as we have

argued above, it may also make sense for practical purposes to (preliminarily) stick to the

‘regional’ grouping, as it is plausible to assume that the average consumer of an advanced

economy is more likely to have the power necessary for being an agent of change by means

of responsible social action. However, this is just a simplified perspective for the sake of

brevity and should by no means imply that consumers in developing regions should be

exempt from ConSR. Nevertheless, it may be unrewarding to include too many actors,

especially if one wants to be capable of providing policy implications.

If we were to derive a more general conjecture, however, we would certainly not want

to give the impression that ConSR and, for that matter, SRC were solely a matter for affluent

Western consumers. We would rather state that one should try and identify all those

consumers with sufficiently high levels of power (in terms of influence or capabilities).

Identifying Obstacles to Socially Responsible Consumption30

Bounded Morality

Drawing upon the quote by Hayek (1960) (see end of section ‘Max Weber Revisited’), where

he has stated that responsibility must be (or rather is) limited by “human capacities,” and the

fact that a consumer is much more likely to be Homo sapiens than some kind of perfectly

rational, purely self-interested homo economicus (see also Hodgson, 2013, on a related note),

we can utilize a vast amount of findings from biology, sociology, and social psychology,

among other fields, to supplement our analysis. We have decided to use the expression

bounded morality, which was inspired by the notion of “bounded rationality” (Gigerenzer

and Selten, 2001, and references herein; Simon, 1955, 1959, 1972, 1997) in order to frame

this limiting condition. However, although Gerd Gigerenzer (2010) has presented convincing

arguments for looking at moral behavior from the perspective of bounded rationality, as


“much (not all) of moral behavior is based on heuristics” (Gigerenzer, 2010, p. 529, italics in

original), our understanding of bounded morality goes somewhat beyond the notion of

bounded rationality and should rather be regarded as a complementary viewpoint that does

not necessarily share the exact same conceptual history or framework as its source of

inspiration. For example, according to Herbert Simon (1997),

“[t]he term ‘bounded rationality’ is used to designate rational choice that takes into

account the cognitive limitations of the decision maker—limitations of both knowledge

and computational capacity. Bounded rationality is a central theme in the behavioral

approach to economics” (Simon, 1997, p. 292).

Our understanding of bounded morality deviates from this notion in at least two ways: first,

we do not necessarily require an explicit reference to rational choice theory, and, second,

bounded morality as understood in this paper transcends methodological individualism in a

way that it aims to take into account also limitations accruing from evolutionary aspects and

forces that are of systemic nature and, therefore, ‘external’ to the individual agents, including

differential cultural evolution31 and evolved properties or features of social networks (e.g.,

clusters, community structure, strength of (interpersonal) ties, etc.).32 Most importantly, as

we can see in Simon’s (ibid.) definition quoted above, bounded rationality may often have an

economic connotation, whereas in the present context we want to use the term bounded

morality to stress that we are focusing on decisions that involve a moral issue, which is the

moral component of a problem that is “present where a person’s actions, when freely

performed, may harm or benefit others” (Jones, 1991, p. 367, with reference to Velasquez

and Rostankowski, 1985).33 This allows us to argue that bounded morality also encapsulates

the view that human beings are driven by a plurality of interests (Schramm, 2006, 2008,

2010, 2013), consequentially displaying a conflict of interest between self-interest and moral

interests.


Quite a lot has been written and argued about evolutionary approaches to the origins

and development of morality (e.g., Boehm, 2012; Brosnan, 2011; Cela-Conde and Ayala,

2004; Greene, 2013; Joyce, 2006; Mohr, 1987; 2014; Stent, 1978; Tufts, 1912; D. S. Wilson,

2015; E. O. Wilson, 2012). In this context, the (evolutionary) biologist and epistemologist

Franz Wuketits has stated: “Morality is a particular aspect of ‘mentality’—the quest for

‘good’ and ‘evil,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ is due to our specific mental capacities” (Wuketits,

1993, p. 255). Hence, although according to John Rawls “there are no moral facts,” (Rawls,

1980, p. 519) we can still argue that this “particular aspect of mentality,” that is, a faculty of

morality, has evolved in all humans similar to the faculty of speech.34 In other words, as

Francisco Ayala has put it:

“The need for having moral values does not necessarily tell us what the moral values

should be, like the capacity for language does not determine which language we shall

speak” (Ayala, 1987, p. 236).

That way morality can be seen as a human universal much in the same way as language, but

just as there are different languages and dialects, the specific moral rules, norms, and values

clearly depend on the cultural evolution of the respective group or society (see also Wuketits,

1993). This issue is also closely related to Gigerenzer’s assertion that “moral behavior is a

function of mind and environments rather than the consequence of moral reasoning or

character alone” (Gigerenzer, 2010, p. 537).

Moreover, as it is also long known among social scientists, there are various layers or

levels of a group, where the level of intimacy or sympathy decreases with an increase in

group size (e.g., Cooley, 1909; Pollet et al., 2011; Schäfers, 1999; Wuketits, 1993; Zhou et

al., 2005). Although there are countless terms for describing and delineating these levels or

layers that might be useful for the respective context, it seems more important to point out the

common finding that morality virtually decreases with an increasing social network or group


size. Put in simple terms, as Paul Slovic and his coauthors have lucidly illustrated: “Our

capacity to feel is limited” (Slovic et al., 2013, p. 132).

As we have suggested that morality may, inter alia, be limited by cognitive capacity,

it should also be rewarding to look at findings from neuroscience for further insights. Here,

we can primarily draw upon the works of Robin Dunbar who has famously studied the social

group size of primates, including humans, thereby identifying a positive correlation between

brain size – more specifically neocortex volume – and group size which has become known

as the social brain hypothesis (Dávid-Barrett and Dunbar, 2013; Dunbar, 1993, 1995, 1998,

2003, 2011; Dunbar and Shultz, 2007; Hill and Dunbar, 2003; Lewis et al., 2011; Roberts and

Dunbar, 2011). According to Dunbar, the “social brain hypothesis implies that constraints on

group size arise from the information-processing capacity of the primate brain, and that the

neocortex plays a major role in this” (Dunbar, 1998, p. 184). With regard to our own species

Dunbar explains further that we could easily predict a value for group size in humans based

on these findings, which produces a value of approximately 150 (see ibid., p. 186 et seq.).

This value (of around 150) has, therefore, also become widely known as Dunbar’s number.

Despite the fact that one can argue about the exact number, depending on the ‘layer’ of the

group, this proposal has vast implications for the moral capacity of our consumer (see also

Wuketits, 2010, p. 78, on a related note). One rather straightforward implication might be that

an exploited worker in a sweatshop at the other end of the world simply does not fall within

the inner circles of the respective consumer’s social group. Economists might, therefore, tend

to regard the group or the brain size as some kind of budget constraint on an agent’s morality.

Another widely accepted cognitive basis of human sociality is the “ability to infer the

mental states of other individuals, commonly known as Theory of Mind” (Lewis et al., 2011,

p. 1624). Here, the essential findings are that the cognitive skills needed for complex

intentionality tasks (e.g., to understand others’ beliefs) are limited, which in turn might also


be due to the volume of gray matter (Lewis et al., 2011; Stiller and Dunbar, 2007).

Furthermore, Penelope Lewis and her coauthors (2011) have jointly analyzed Theory of Mind

and the social brain hypothesis together by using a certain neuroimaging technology, thereby

providing data implicating that “both mentalizing competence and social network size ...

[have] a shared neural basis” (ibid., p. 1624, italics in original). The implication for our

consumer is therefore similar to the one derived above: The volume of gray matter in certain

brain regions limits the consumer’s ability to infer others’ thoughts and feelings and thus the

ability for assessing the impact a certain consumption decision may have on others.

In sum, we can now understand bounded morality as the boundary or limiting

condition that an agent’s (here: a consumer’s) morality and in-group may be limited due to

internal (e.g., neocortical volume and information processing capacity) and external (e.g.,

pluralistic world views and moral codes due to social learning and integration into a complex

networked society) factors that can be regarded as the results of biological and cultural

evolutionary processes.35

Low Moral Intensity

Thomas Jones (1991) has developed an issue-contingent model of moral decision making and

behavior. Therein, he identifies six dimensions or characteristics of a moral issue (see

definition of ‘moral issue’ in previous section) which are collectively called moral intensity,

and that can be positively related to moral decision making. Thereby, it is important to note

that moral intensity focuses on the moral issue and not on the traits of a moral agent, which is

very much in line with the above Weberian arguments in favor of EoR as opposed to EoPC.

These six components or dimensions proposed by Jones (1991) are: magnitude of

consequences, social consensus, concentration of effect, probability of effect, temporal

immediacy, and proximity.36 Jones further clarifies that


“people tend to become much more concerned about moral issues that affect those who

are close to them rather than those with whom they have little or no contact. Individuals

also seem to react more strongly to injustices that have immediate effects as opposed to

those that have effects in the distant future” (Jones, 1991, p. 371).

This seems to be particularly important with regard to SRC and is also in line with the notion

of ‘bounded morality’ developed above: consumers need to feel ‘close’ to those affected by

the consequences of their action in order to take these consequences into account during their

decision-making process. Moreover, they also need to perceive a certain degree of

effectiveness of their action in order to perform it (which is closely related to what we later

refer to as perceived consumer effectiveness). Moreover, the ‘proximity’ and (to a certain

degree) also the ‘concentration of effect’ components are supported by findings with respect

to the so-called identifiable victim effect (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; Loewenstein and

Small, 2007; Schelling, 1968; Small and Loewenstein, 2003; 2005), which also addresses the

element of vividness or definiteness that may increase the willingness to help someone in

need. In short, this effect primarily describes the finding that “society is willing to spend far

more money to save the lives of identifiable victims than to save statistical victims” (Jenni

and Loewenstein, 1997, p. 236) which has first been discussed by Thomas Schelling (1968).

This basically means that “[w]hen it comes to eliciting compassion, the identified individual

victim, with a face and a name, has no peer” (Slovic et al., 2013, p. 131).

Once we apply Jones’ idea to our notion of SRC, it becomes clear that SRC can be

regarded as an act of consuming that involves moral decision-making, which is issue-

contingent. Consequently, low moral intensity of a moral issue can be considered an obstacle

to SRC.

Moral Stupefaction

A further issue that may render consumers rather impervious to the suffering of others has


also been addressed by Heidbrink (2008), with reference to Gehlen (1986), in another

context:

“[T]elevision that brings the unhappy population of a faraway country directly into our

houses creates an even more difficult to disregard and certainly grave change of our

feelings of obligation and perhaps even leads to our becoming stunted towards actual

suffering” (Gehlen, 1986, p. 56, as cited in Heidbrink, 2008, p. 10).

Although it might be disputable whether television does indeed have this kind of effect, we

could assert that nowadays smartphones and social media may also distract the ‘moral

attention’ in a similar way by bringing the exploited worker of a faraway country into our

trousers pocket on an almost daily basis. One could, therefore, argue that “permanent

confrontation with the world’s misery makes sure that our moral sense of duty loses its edge”

(Heidbrink, 2008, p. 10). Moreover, there are also various examples of companies advertising

with the misery of others as in the recent case where “Kellogg’s UK has been forced to

apologise for the ‘wrong use of words’ after posting a message on Twitter offering to give a

vulnerable child breakfast each time the message was retweeted by a user” (Bennett, 2013).

There might also be a similar kind of moral or emotional stupefaction due to a

seemingly increasing number of scandals such as the 2013 meat adulteration scandal

(Lawrence, 2013) or reports of Amazon using “neo-Nazi guards to keep immigrant workforce

under control” (Paterson, 2013). Another recent report by the ‘Fairtrade, Employment and

Poverty Reduction in Ethiopia and Uganda research team’ adds fuel to the fire by stating that

they were

“unable to find any evidence that Fairtrade has made a positive difference to the wages

and working conditions of those employed in the production of the commodities

produced for Fairtrade certified export in the areas where the research has been

conducted” (Cramer et al., 2014, pp. 15 et seq.).


We can, therefore, assume that various consumers have simply resigned due to the perception

that their previous SRC efforts have been in vain, conceivably asking themselves questions

like ‘if we cannot change anything anyway, then why should we even make an effort?’

Moral stupefaction may thus also be seen as a defense mechanism that can be linked

to the notion of “psychic numbing,” a term originally coined by Robert Lifton (1967) in

another context (see also Slovic et al., 2013, p. 133).

A recent example that may point to some other kind of moral stupefaction has been

presented by Armin Falk and Nora Szech (2013), who have conducted an experiment where

“subjects decide between either saving the life of a mouse or receiving money” (Falk and

Szech, 2013, p. 707). The authors claim that they “have shown that market interaction

displays a tendency to lower moral values” (ibid., p. 710).37 While it may be rather disputable

whether saving the life of a mouse can be considered to involve a ‘moral issue’38 or to be in

any way comparable with alleviating human pain or suffering by means of SRC, there is still

one striking finding with a potential relevance to the topic of our paper: in their experiment

the willingness to kill the mouse has increased with more complex market structures (i.e., for

a given monetary amount, the willingness to kill was higher in the market conditions than in

the individual condition) despite the fact that “subjects were fully aware of the consequences

of their decisions” (ibid., p. 710). Here, the latter part supports the implication that being

aware of the foreseeable consequences of one’s actions does not necessarily mean that moral

intensity is sufficiently high in other respects. Moreover, this finding also points to the issue

that (more complex) market structures may ‘erode’ social responsibility (see also Bartling et

al., 2015; or Irlenbusch and Saxler, 2015, on a related note).

Attitude-Behavior Gap and Cognitive Dissonance

Several studies in the field of ConSR and ethical consumption have shown that the

consumers’ actual behavior often seems to deviate from their attitude or alleged intention to


consume (socially) responsibly (e.g., d’Astous and Legendre, 2009; White et al., 2012; Yeow

et al., 2014, and references herein). Although acknowledging the possibility that this

phenomenon of a so-called attitude-behavior gap (also called value-action gap) may indeed

exist (see also Carrington et al., 2010), we share the opinion that the actual ‘gap’ might not be

as large as some surveys may suggest due to social desirability bias (e.g., Auger and

Devinney, 2007; Carrigan and Attalla, 2001). Moreover, we propose to approach the attitude-

behavior gap from the perspective of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964; see

also Cooper, 2007). We can thereby argue that the ‘gap’ can be seen as a result of cognitive

dissonance, which is an inevitable outcome of many decision-making processes, especially

decisions involving a moral issue. As Wolfgang Tschacher and his coauthors have explained:

“Dissonance is defined as an aversive motivational state caused by conflict and

imbalance among the different cognitions (e.g. beliefs, attitudes) of an individual.

Dissonant relationships between relevant beliefs and attitudes were found to induce

behavior capable of reducing the dissonance” (Tschacher et al., 2003, p. 193).

Hence, as individuals ‘strive’ to eliminate or reduce dissonance, this aspect needs to

be considered when trying to overcome the consumers’ attitude-behavior gap. More

specifically, according to the theory, people (in our case the consumers) tend to seek or prefer

information that confirms and justifies their attitudes and decisions, while giving less

attention to contradictory evidence. This phenomenon is also widely known as confirmation

bias (see, for example, Zimbardo et al., 2012, p. 8). Having said this, we can now start to ask

what role information-related problems play in inhibiting consumers from actually translating

their professed concern into SRC.

Informational Complexity

It is rather easy to assert that in order to be capable of engaging in SRC, consumers need to

be well informed, meaning they need to possess all the information that is relevant for their


consumption decision. According to Hannah Berry and Morven McEachern (2005), such

information involves ‘background data’ (i.e., for example, information about the general

problems of climate change) as well as specific ‘product data’ (e.g., details about the country

of origin, the supply chain, the materials processed, labels and certifications) (Berry and

McEachern, 2005, p. 70). However, when it comes to information availability, quality, and

processing, there are several obstacles consumers face (not only but especially) with respect

to SRC.

First, due to information asymmetries on markets, consumers do not possess complete

information regarding a product or service and the consequences of using this particular

product or service with respect to others or the environment.39 One could argue that with the

evolution of information and communication technology, and especially the Internet as a

platform for stakeholders to exchange information, information is available much quicker,

more transparent, and in a much wider spectrum, thus, indirectly contributing to the reduction

of information asymmetries (see also Harrison et al., 2006; Pires et al., 2006; and Rezabakhsh

et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it remains difficult for consumers to find relevant information.

This leads us to the next and second information-related problem: information overload.

Consumers face ubiquitous information overload, not just in their role as consumers

but as citizens in general. Hence, even if there were no information asymmetries in the

market, that is, all information were available, consumers might still not possess all relevant

information due to limited time and also a limited information processing capability in

general. In this respect, several authors, including Kristina Nolte (2005) and Lilian Weng

(2014), argue with reference to Simon’s (1971) seminal paper that the attention of individuals

could be regarded as a scarce resource (see also Weng et al., 2012, on a related note). In

Simon’s (1971) words:


“[I]n an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something

else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes

is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of

information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently

among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it” (Simon, 1971,

pp. 40 et seq.).

Nolte (2005) explains further that an individual’s information processing depends on

biological factors, emotional preferences, and social values. Among the biological factors, we

can clearly list the aforementioned findings with regard to the social brain hypothesis and

Theory of Mind: Weng (2014) explains, with reference to Dunbar (1998), Huberman et al.

(2009), and Gonçalves et al. (2011), that

“there is a cognitive limit on the number of stable social relationships that one can

sustain and the amount of information an individual can produce and process is finite.

Hence, the abundance of information to which we are exposed through various socio-

technical systems is exceeding our capacity to consume it” (Weng, 2014, p. 16).

Moreover, efficiency (in the above quote by Simon, 1971) is to be understood as subjective

efficiency which leads to the conclusion that, although information might be available, only

consumers to whom engaging in SRC seems to be relevant will process that information.

Consequently, and with reference to Berry and McEachern (2005), it can be stated that “there

is not a lack of information on ethical issues, but that its quality and complexity may be of

concern in some areas” (Berry and McEachern, 2005, p. 87).

Third, the reliability of information available to consumers is in question. In

accordance with Akerlof’s (1970) idea of information asymmetry, consumers “are in a

vulnerable position ... [where] the act of purchasing is strongly dependent on the belief that

the seller is going to maintain its promises (trust)” (Pivato et al., 2008, p. 7). Or, as Schmidt

(2016) puts it (with reference to Hansen and Schrader, 2004, and Neuner, 2001):


“Sustainable supply chain aspects are usually subject to trust since they are not tangible

for the consumer. That is why the consumer depends on reliable and high-class

information which are not often provided at the market” (Schmidt, 2016, p. 246, own

translation).

Moreover, it may be the case that misinformation issued by some information sources

– especially corporations and (their own) labels – negatively affects the reputation and

credibility of others: In the case where a corporation is the information provider, we can

argue that due to manifold deceptions and greenwashing40 consumers might develop a

fundamental distrust with respect to the credibility of corporate information and their CSR

efforts in general (see also Belz, 2006, p. 215, and Schmidt, 2016, p. 391, in this regard).

We can clearly see that all information-related obstacles deterring consumers from

engaging in SRC are interrelated. Labeling is a widespread attempt to overcome some if not

all of these problems by trying to dissolve information asymmetries, reduce information

overload and complexity, and increase reliability and credibility (see also Schmidt, 2016, p.

244). However, one major problem concerning labeling is that a vast number of labels (or

certificates) has been developed and issued by a variety of institutions so that by now there

are myriads of fair trade certifications, ethical quality seals, and labels, resulting in consumers

being overwhelmed and uncertain about the trustworthiness of many labels (see also

Aßländer, 2011, p. 66; Dahl, 2010; von Meyer-Höfer and Spiller, 2013). This again relates

back to the problem of information overload and distrust in the information provided.

With reference to Pitt et al. (2002), Tina Harrison and her coauthors (2006) conclude

that “information incompleteness and information asymmetries do not provide conditions

where individuals feel they have all the information to act, in a sense rendering them

powerless” (Harrison et al., 2006, p. 975, emphasis added).


Lack of Perceived Consumer Effectiveness

Schmidt identifies the “missing confidence in the effectiveness of the own action” (Schmidt,

2016, p. 300, own translation) as a problem in the context of ConSR. She (ibid.) ascribes this

problem to complex interrelation and processes in a global market structure where

consequences of one’s action arise not only with geographical distance but also with time

lags (note that these are also two of the six ‘moral intensity’ characteristics of a moral issue

that Jones, 1991, has suggested to have a negative relation to moral decision making and

behavior).41

In their study, Outi Uusitalo and Reetta Oksanen (2004) have investigated the views

of Finnish consumers about ethical consumerism. They have found that one half of the

respondents were of the opinion that their choice did not matter with respect to the promotion

of ethical trade (Uusitalo and Oksanen, 2004, p. 218). Moreover, using fair-trade products for

their study, Katherine White and her coauthors (2012) have also found that the

unresponsiveness of consumers to ethical attributes “is unlikely due to indifference to

injustice, but rather to a lack of confidence that fair-trade products have the potential to

actually restore justice” (White et al., 2012, p. 114; see also Vitell, 2015, p. 772).

This may be linked to the concept of ‘perceived consumer effectiveness’ (PCE),

known from marketing literature. It was first introduced by Thomas Kinnear and his

coauthors (1974) in the context of ecologically concerned consumers and was defined as “a

measure of the extent to which a respondent believes that an individual consumer can be

effective in pollution abatement” (Kinnear et al., 1974, p. 21). Although initially applied to

environmental concerns (i.e., sphere 2), we could argue that PCE might also be a relevant

variable within the social environment (sphere 1), or, vice versa, that its absence might deter

consumers from engaging in SRC. Hence, we propose that the lack of PCE could be regarded

as another obstacle to SRC.


Reducing Obstacles to Socially Responsible Consumption

As we have repeatedly stated above, ConSR should be regarded in the context of shared

responsibility of all societal actors. Above all, it is the aim of this section to give suggestions

and propose ideas for reducing some of the obstacles identified above. Therefore, the

measures presented now may be read as implications for public policy rather than suggestions

that can be realized by consumers on their own; and the examples should not be considered

exhaustive. Moreover, for the sake of brevity, we still assume that we are dealing with

consumers that otherwise have the ‘power’ (see definition above) to engage in SRC. On top

of this, we only touch upon some aspects concerning the issues of moral stupefaction and low

moral intensity as we can argue that most aspects of both moral stupefaction and moral

intensity are too specific, situation-related, or issue-contingent to be amenable to influence in

a generalizable way.42

Improve Altruistic Attitude

We have seen that brain size (esp. neocortical volume) seems to be an important limiting

factor to the consumers’ capacity for morality; hence, we face the problem of being unable to

influence this ‘obstacle’ directly (for obvious reasons). However, we might be able to find

other ways of promoting what we will refer to as altruistic attitude. This altruistic attitude is

related to “moral interests” (Schramm, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013) and Daniel Batson’s (2011,

2014) notion of an “altruistic motivation.”43 However, for the purpose of this paper, we have

decided to use the term ‘altruistic attitude,’ particularly in order to establish a link to the

‘attitude-behavior gap’ (and cognitive dissonance theory) mentioned above. As we have

explained in the section on ‘Socially Responsible Consumption as (Responsible) Social

Action,’ there is an altruistic element or aspect to our notion of SRC, which leads us to the

assumption that consumers need a certain ‘altruistic attitude’ in order to take into account,

gather information about, and avoid the (foreseeable) negative consequences their action


engenders with regard to past, present, and future behavior of others. While, on the one hand,

there seem to be evolutionary limits to morality and the in-group, there are, on the other hand,

many examples of people helping or supporting strangers (e.g., in the current refugee crisis in

Europe) and others in need that are clearly outside their stable social network that would be

predicted by ‘Dunbar’s number.’ We may thus want to look for factors that have the potential

to improve a consumer’s altruistic attitude toward ‘the others’ that are affected by the

consequences of his or her acts of consuming.

First, we can see that several authors have proposed a link between empathy and

altruism (e.g., Batson, 2011, 2014, 2015; de Waal, 2008, Eisenberg and Miller, 1987).44

However, the term ‘empathy’ has a variety of diverse meanings (see, for instance, Maibom,

2014a, and references herein) and the same also applies to ‘altruism’ (see, for instance,

Batson, 2011, or D. S. Wilson, 2015, and references herein).45 Without getting caught up in

terminological confusion and details that clearly go beyond the scope of the present

discussion, we confine ourselves to pointing to the discussions and contributions presented in

the recently published volume on empathy and morality edited by Heidi Maibom (2014b).

Second, and with an eye to the ‘cultural evolution’ part of bounded morality, we can

argue that there may also be another way to improve the altruistic attitude of consumers: For

example, Americus Reed II and Karl Aquino (2003) quote the example of a group of

concerned American citizens who voluntarily provided comfort and protection for Arab and

Muslim neighbors against the background of an otherwise widely spread hostility toward out-

group members fitting the terrorist prototype in the aftermath of the attacks on the World

Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11th, 2001. Drawing mainly on established

explanations and concepts from sociology and social psychology, including Peter Singer’s

(1981) metaphor of The Expanding Circle as well as social identity theory (see, for instance,

Tajfel, 1981), the same authors even go so far as to suggest that the sociopsychological


concept of a so-called moral self may be able to “collapse the mental barriers separating in-

groups and out-groups, thus highlighting the possibility that in some ‘simple, perfectly

impenetrable’ way, we are all brothers” (Reed and Aquino, 2003, p. 1284). Another way to

phrase this aspect may be that – as we have argued that morality can also be linked to cultural

evolution – in order to reduce out-group hostility there has to be a way to foster some kind of

cultural kinship. The latter might then support altruism in a similar way as kin selection

(Hamilton, 1964) does, though in this case not on the basis of genetic kinship but based on

shared cultural traits. All those familiar with the concept of memetics may also want to refer

to Evers (1998) and chapter 12 in Blackmore (1999) in this regard.

Reduce Informational Complexity

As delineated above, the existence of information asymmetries on the market can be regarded

as an obstacle for consumers to trust in the information provided and further to engage in

SRC. For Schmidt (2016, p. 246) consulting and seeking advice from third parties is one way

to overcome information asymmetries. Berry and McEachern (2005) identify non-

governmental organizations as playing a crucial role with regard to the provision of

information, especially “in providing ‘point-of-sale’ data to consumers via involvement in

labelling schemes” (Berry and McEachern, 2005, p. 77). However, the problem with labeling

is that, as already mentioned above, there are myriads of certifications and labels which in

turn results in information overload and distrust. Therefore, establishing a central certification

system – where certifiers (such as Fair Trade, Blue Angel, etc.) can apply for and, after

assessment, are granted an umbrella certificate – could be a means to mitigate information-

related problems (such as information asymmetries, information overload, reliability on and,

in sum, complexity of information). Thereby, it needs to be ensured that this umbrella

certificate has a widespread recognition value. Richard Dahl (2010, p. 248) shows that private

certifiers are more likely to act opportunistically out of monetary motives or self-interest.


Berry and McEachern (2005) state (with reference to Cowe and Williams, 2001; Shaw and

Clarke, 1999; and Tallontire et al., 2001) that “self-certified company labels are widely

mistrusted” (Berry and McEachern, 2005, p. 71). Thus, the organization being in charge of

the central certification system should ideally be (financially and politically) independent.

The establishment of a universally accepted umbrella certificate could decrease the current

distrust in certificates as presented in the study by Marie von Meyer-Höfer and Achim Spiller

(2013). Furthermore, such an umbrella certificate would virtually reduce the number of labels

and, hence, choices consumers are faced with and may thus mitigate the “paradox of choice”

(Schwartz, 2004),46 thereby preventing consumers from making arbitrary decisions and

ultimately enabling them to make a decision at all (Ahaus et al., 2009, p. 11). One challenge

umbrella labels face is to provide sufficient information and data while at the same time

avoiding oversimplification (Berry and McEachern, 2005, p. 83).47

In addition to this, the provision of specific shopping guides by third parties (e.g.,

government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations) including ‘product data’

and/or ‘background data’ as suggested by Berry and McEachern (2005) could support

consumers to better evaluate a purchase, usage, and disposal decision.48

Another means to counteract information-related problems – especially trust-related

problems due to (previous) greenwashing by companies – could be to more intensely monitor

advertising statements of companies with respect to green or social promises in order to

expose false statements and, thereby, also (to some extent) address the issue of moral

stupefaction. This could again be done via national or transnational agencies. Dahl (2010)

shows that the respective government agencies have been successfully established in Canada

(Canadian Competition Bureau), Australia (Australian Competition and Consumer

Commission) and the United Kingdom (U.K. Committee of Advertising Practice).49


Enhance Perceived Consumer Effectiveness

As proposed above, the lack of PCE could be considered as one of the obstacles to SRC.

Consequently, in order to increase the chance that consumers engage in SRC, we may have to

develop measures for enhancing PCE. How could this be realized? First, a study undertaken

by Iris Vermeir and Wim Verbeke (2006) seems to present some ideas. The authors have

investigated the influence of PCE on the attitude toward and the behavioral intention to buy

sustainable food products. They have found that “consumers who believe in their personal

consumer effectiveness are more positive towards sustainable products and have more

intentions of purchasing them” (Vermeir and Verbeke, 2006, p. 184) and that PCE “can be

successfully influenced through communication efforts and the provision of information”

(ibid., p. 188). According to Vermeir and Verbeke (ibid.), it is the stakeholders involved in

the sustainable food chains that can (and maybe should) care for the provision of information.

Second, according to Pam Scholder Ellen and her coauthors (1991) an attempt to increase

PCE “must be two-pronged, convincing the consumer of his viability in effecting change and

providing information and a means to implement the action” (Ellen at al., 1991, p. 113). In

this respect, they, too, identify third parties as having the power to (take on the responsibility

to) enhance PCE of individual consumers:

“Groups promoting ‘green behavior’ should provide regular positive feedback to show

that individuals are making a difference and reinforce behavior through emphasis on the

successes rather than the failures. In their marketing programs, governments, businesses,

and environmental groups need to demonstrate vividly that the problem is being affected

by individual changes in consumption or disposal ...” (ibid., p. 113, italics in original).

Hence, it seems that this obstacle can only be overcome in the context of a shared

responsibility as sketched above.

However, it should also be noted that the Internet is one strong medium (not only for

organizations but also for individuals) for sharing success stories that have been realized due


to SRC efforts. With an eye to ConSR-Domain 1, consumers can, thereby, share information

very quickly and might, step by step, take an active role in promoting achievements and,

consequently, take on or accept a larger share of responsibility when it comes to enhancing

PCE themselves (see, for instance, Rezabakhsh et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2006; and Rha et

al., 2002, on the relation between the Internet and consumer empowerment).

Summarizing Propositions

From our previous deliberations, we can compile the following propositions:

• Proposition 1: Power (as understood in terms of patterns of causation in network

evolution) is a necessary condition for SRC.

• Proposition 2: Bounded morality constitutes a general boundary or limiting condition

regarding socially responsible action and, therefore, also for SRC.

• Proposition 3a: Low moral intensity is an obstacle to SRC. Hence, increasing moral

intensity increases the ability or aptitude of consumers to engage in SRC.

• Proposition 3b: Moral stupefaction is an obstacle to SRC. Hence, alleviating moral

stupefaction increases the ability or aptitude of consumers to engage in SRC.

• Proposition 3c: Informational complexity is an obstacle to SRC. Hence, reducing

informational complexity increases the ability or aptitude of consumers to engage in

SRC.

• Proposition 3d: The lack of PCE is an obstacle to SRC. Hence, enhancing PCE

increases the ability or aptitude of consumers to engage in SRC.

• Proposition 4: Improving a consumer’s altruistic attitude can have a positive influence

on the probability that this consumer will engage in SRC.

• Proposition 5a: There is a positive relationship between empathy and altruistic

attitude.


• Proposition 5b: A feeling of cultural kinship improves altruistic attitude.

For a schematic visualization of propositions 1 to 4 see Figure 2.

++ [Figure 2 approximately here]

Conclusion and Directions for Further Research

This conceptual paper has addressed three research objectives, which have been i) to propose

an answer to the question of how ConSR can be conceptualized, ii) to shed light on the

previously neglected issue of bounded morality, and iii) to identify potential obstacles to SRC

(against the backdrop of shared responsibility and bounded morality).

In order to meet the first objective, we have (re-)conceptualized ConSR in terms of a

relational and, essentially, shared social responsibility. This approach has been based

primarily on a combination of Weberian social action and EoR with the Youngian social

connection approach to shared responsibility. In addition to that, we have condensed several

arguments that can be found in the ConSR literature in order to map a ‘responsibility

territory’ in terms of three spheres and five ConSR-Domains (see Figure 1). These spheres

and domains have then been used to locate and relate existing definitions in order to establish

the argument for an alternative definition of SRC that specifically aims at the first sphere and

ConSR-Domains 1, 3b, 3c, 4, and 5. Moreover, we have attended to the question of how

consumers could be considered to have ‘power’ (with an eye to the relational aspects of

shared responsibility due to social interconnectedness). In this regard, we have argued that

the notion of ‘influence’ as well as the concept of power proposed by Herrmann-Pillath

(2013), which also establishes a connection to the capability approach, can be considered

suitable also in the context of a relational ‘shared responsibility approach’ to ConSR.

The discussion with regard to the second objective has been located at the beginning

of the ‘Identifying Obstacles to Socially Responsible Consumption’ section because bounded


morality can be seen as one of the major obstacles to (or limiting conditions of) human

morality and – as private consumers are human beings – also SRC. More specifically, we

have addressed the importance of internal/biological (especially: limited information

processing capacity of the human brain) and external/cultural (complex networked society,

divergent moral codes and rules due to differential cultural evolution) factors.

In order to meet the third objective, we have further illuminated the obstacles of low

moral intensity, moral stupefaction, informational complexity, and the lack of PCE.

Moreover, we have touched the attitude-behavior gap with the intention of establishing a

bridge to cognitive dissonance theory.

Finally, our literature-based discussions have yielded five clear and testable

propositions (some of them further divided into subpropositions) that have been outlined in

the previous section (see Figure 2) and can be used as a starting point for further empirical

work.

We can now recapitulate the limitations of our approach and suggest directions for

further research that go beyond the five propositions above:

i. Whereas we have developed our conceptualization primarily on the basis of Weber

and Young, it might be interesting to further examine if alternative conceptions of

ConSR would have different implications than the ones derived above.

ii. As already proposed above, the notion of influence and social connection may open

the door to a network science approach to (shared) social responsibility, where it

would be particularly interesting to utilize social network analysis in order to deduce

which centrality measures (and other measures for ‘influence’) are suitable for which

responsibility context or, more specifically, for which of the five ConSR-Domains.


iii. Another line of research may also want to focus on the role of capabilities or

investigate more thoroughly what scope and kind of power is sufficient for (or

addresses / relates to) which of the ConSR-Domains.

iv. Moreover, we have made the simplifying assumption that we are dealing with

consumers in an advanced economy with sufficient ‘power’ to act responsibly.

Further research will thus have to address how consumers in developing regions can

be ‘empowered.’

v. We have explicitly focused on SRC as a means for consumers to ‘address’ ConSR-

Domains 1, 3b, 3c, 4, and 5, thereby separating socially responsible acts of consuming

from the other relevant domains of ConSR, namely consumer citizenship (domain 2)

and pre-purchase decisions (i.e., responsible co-production and co-creation of value;

domain 3a). Hence, further research is needed in order to investigate other roles of

consumers (e.g., as citizens or workers since ‘the consumer’ is an abstraction) and

conceptualize responsible actions that explicitly address these remaining two

domains. Moreover, it may be interesting to see whether the above obstacles to SRC

also represent obstacles to – or conditions relevant for – responsible actions in

ConSR-Domains 2 and 3a.

vi. We have explicitly focused on obstacles to the ‘altruistic element’ of the SRC

definition, thereby neglecting ‘economic’ and other obstacles that have been

addressed by other authors. Further research may thus want to combine our proposed

obstacles with other potentially relevant obstacles (e.g., price ratios, transaction costs,

opportunity costs, etc.) in order to investigate the relationships and relative

importance of obstacles to SRC in a more integral way.

vii. Some of the obstacles we have proposed seem to be amenable to influence only to a

certain degree. Moreover, some of them can be reduced or overcome by consumers


themselves, others seem to require support from other stakeholders and societal actors

in terms of their ‘share’ in responsibility. Therefore, future research may want to

delve deeper into the roles of consumers versus other societal actors and stakeholders

in reducing or overcoming the obstacles, that is, increasing moral intensity, improving

the altruistic attitude, preventing moral stupefaction, reducing informational

complexity, and enhancing PCE.

viii. We have proposed to look at the attitude-behavior gap from the perspective of

cognitive dissonance theory. This suggestion opens the door to a well-established

branch of research that may be utilized in future studies in order to investigate how

consumers reduce dissonance during SRC-relevant decisions, or what kind of

information prompts them to reduce dissonance by changing their (altruistic) attitudes

instead of their behavior and vice versa.

ix. Moreover, regarding the above propositions outlined in the previous section, one can

argue that the proposed relationships and obstacles can also be seen in terms of

‘conditions,’ which explain SRC. This may be subject to what Charles Ragin has

referred to as “causal complexity” (e.g., see Ragin, 1987, pp. 23-30; or chapter 4 in

Ragin, 2000).50 For example, ‘power’ has been proposed as a necessary but –

arguably – insufficient condition for SRC and the same could be argued for the

altruistic attitude: Without reliable information, proper PCE, and sufficiently high

moral intensity, which in turn can be regarded as a set of six conditions (namely

magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal

immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect), consumers may still not engage in

SRC despite having ‘power’ and an altruistic attitude. We may, therefore, want to

investigate further if SRC is subject to causal complexity.


x. It should also be worth having a closer look at policy implications stemming from the

‘obstacles discussion’ and particularly at the suitability of (libertarian) paternalism in

this regard.

xi. Another line of research may want to investigate the role of image motivation (also

called signaling motivation) (e.g., Ariely et al., 2009) or cultural aspects – such as

culturally contingent peer pressure or social nudges (chapter 3 in Thaler and

Sunstein, 2008) – with respect to SRC.

xii. Due to the fact that there is also a social root to consumption habits in general

(Gardner et al., 2004), it should be particularly interesting to illuminate social

motivators in terms of an SRC-related consumer identity and consumer culture (for an

overview of research in “consumer culture theory” see, for instance, Arnould and

Thompson, 2005) in subsequent works.

xiii. As it seems that information-related problems can only be overcome partially or with

high involvement of third parties, one might also ask how consumers can still make a

decision. Hence, it might be interesting to investigate the following question in future

research endeavors (inspired by Schmidt, 2016, p. 246): how (and under which

circumstances) can the consumer develop a schema, heuristic, or rule of thumb for

SRC (e.g., ‘renounce animal products’ as their production is more likely to negatively

influence climate change)?

However, despite these and other possible directions, this paper already gives rise to a novel

and multifaceted understanding of SRC whilst taking into account bounded morality;

moreover, it illustrates which obstacles may exist, and most importantly, how ConSR can be

conceptualized in the context of social action and shared social responsibility, thereby

offering a genuinely transdisciplinary perspective for further work in this field.


Endnotes

1 Some authors even assert that consumer social responsibility is an “under-researched area” (e.g.,

Vitell, 2015, p. 773).

2 See, for example, Brinkmann (2004), Brinkmann and Peattie (2008), Devinney et al. (2006, 2012),

Hansen and Schrader (1997), Heidbrink (2014, 2015), Schmidt (2016), and Vitell (2003, 2015).

3 These terminological nuances are, for example, also reflected in the German distinction between

Wirtschaftsethik and Unternehmensethik.

4 Please note that non-German-speaking readers might also want to refer to H. P. Secher’s translation

of Weber’s Basic Concepts in Sociology (Weber, 1962) on this.

5 We come back to this in the section ‘With Power Comes Responsibility?’.

6 In this regard, Heidbrink recently stated that there were constant controversies about the role and

status of ConSR in the context of a globalized market economy: “On the one hand, there is the

opinion, which is supported by strong ethical and social arguments, that consumers are even

responsible for their consumption’s harmful consequences if they have no bad intentions and the

harmful contributions of individual consumers are negligible. On the other hand, and with equally

strong empirical and psychological arguments, consumers are denied responsibility since they are

neither willing nor able to overview the consequences of their actions, and they would also be

hopelessly overburdened with taking a stand against the supremacy of corporations and resisting

market temptations. Both views are not just wrong due to their one-sidedness but also theoretically

narrow” (Heidbrink, 2014, p. 2, own translation).

7 See also Mellema (1985, 1988) and Offe (2011, 2012) on related deliberations.

8 In this regard, it is also interesting to note that another (practically oriented) approach to

operationalize shared social responsibility has been proposed by Gneezy et al. (2010) in Science.

9 See also alternative concepts and various definitions of ConSR in Caruana and Chatzidakis (2014),

p. 582.


10 Note that we follow the order presented by Heidbrink and Schmidt (2011c, p. 35), whereas Neuner

himself often lists the second sphere (of the natural environment) before the sphere of the social

environment.

11 See also Brinkmann and Peattie (2008), Heidbrink (2014, 2015), Heidbrink and Schmidt (2009,

2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012), Vitell (2015), and especially chapter 4.4 in Schmidt (2016).

12 As Timothy Devinney and his coauthors (2010) note, the idea of ConSR can be expanded “to

discuss the social responsibility of the citizen ... Social consumption then becomes part of the role

of the individual in a monitory form of democracy ... We can therefore speak about the individual

as having a variety of social responsibilities – as consumer, citizen, worker, investor, and so on –

each of which gives us a different angle on the complex embodiment of the individual in the

different roles and contexts ... [L]ooking at consumption is only one window on the individual. But

it is a window worth looking through” (Devinney et al., 2010, p. 187).

13 See, for instance, Heidbrink and Schmidt (2011b) with reference to Kneip (2010) and Lamla

(2007). See also Barnett et al. (2011), Brinkmann and Peattie (2008), and Heidbrink (2014, 2015).

14 According to Anna Coote (2011), “[c]o-production embodies shared responsibility ... Co-

production extends beyond user involvement and citizen engagement to foster the principle of

equal partnership. It is not just consultation, nor even just participation. It is, quintessentially,

about shared responsibility between people who are regarded – and treat each other – as having

equal worth and being able to make contributions of equal value to a shared enterprise” (p. 291).

See also Parks et al. (1981) on a related note.

15 See also Lusch and Vargo (2006, p. 284) on a possible distinction between those two concepts.

16 See also Heidbrink and Schmidt (2011b, p. 98) and Schmidt (2016, p. 219) with reference to Shaw

et al. (2006).

17 This connection to the previous domains results from the fact that the element of disposal can have

a feedback on the decisions related to (pre-)purchase as well as to usage.


18 This is due to the prospective ex ante dimension of social responsibility which includes taking into

account (and avoiding) the (negative) impact of one’s actions on future generations. Moreover,

with respect to the third sphere, we can also identify a social element related to this duty of care for

oneself. We can easily imagine cases where unhealthy or unaffordable consumption habits will

also be at the expense of others (e.g., family, healthcare system, creditors), not just the respective

consumers themselves.

19 Note that the examples presented in Table 1 are an extension of the ones outlined by Webb et al.

(2008) and should be considered non-exhaustive.

20 According to Schmidt (2016), “it seems important to stress that, basically, consumption serves

one’s own interests which should also be its primary goal. It cannot be the objective of an

economic or business ethics that individuals consume for moral ends. This would reduce the

discussion to absurdity” (Schmidt, 2016, p. 295, own translation with corresponding emphasis). In

a similar manner, Neuner (2004) argues that “[t]he motivation in responsible consumer behaviour

... exclusively originates from the satisfaction of individual needs” (Neuner, 2004, p. 210; see also

Neuner, 2006, on an ethics of needs (Bedürfnisethik) based approach to consumer ethics).

21 It should be noted that it may additionally require institutional support (e.g., through consumer

education) for consumers to develop the capability for taking on responsibility in some of the

ConSR-Domains.

22 However, note that the power concept used by Rezabakhsh et al. (2006) is based on French and

Raven (1959).

23 As an alternative to boycotts (i.e., punishing certain corporations for unacceptable behavior by not

buying their products or services) Monroe Friedman (1996) has discussed the “buycott” as a

positive strategy of consumer activists trying to “induce shoppers to buy the products or services

of selected companies in order to reward them for behavior which is consistent with the goals of

the activists” (Friedman, 1996, p. 440). Recently, according to Stefan Hoffmann and Katharina

Hutter (2012), “the carrotmob evolved as a new subtype of buycott. … More specifically, a group


of consumers swarms a predefined store at a predefined time and collectively buys its products. In

return, the company engages in actions the activists ask for” (Hoffmann and Hutter, 2012, p. 216,

italics in original).

24 #FitchTheHomeless (https://twitter.com/search?q=%23fitchthehomeless) is the Twitter hashtag of a

campaign that went viral in 2013 after a video posted by Greg Karber where he urged “the public

to donate any unwanted Abercrombie & Fitch clothes to the homeless, after one of the brand’s

district managers said that its collections weren’t intended for ‘poor people’. The company

reportedly burns faulty clothing, rather than giving it to charity” (Alexander, 2013).

25 Note that although the focus of this paper lies on private consumption, this does not imply that

public and governmental institutions or business organizations could not be change agents in the

context of a shared social responsibility.

26 See also Banerjee et al. (2013) on the diffusion of information on and participation in microfinance

in Indian villages and the respective importance of centralities of leaders (in this case especially

eigenvector centrality; see also Banerjee et al., 2012).

27 Nevertheless, despite all criticism (see, for instance, Zimbardo et al., 2012, p. 372 et seq.), it is

worth mentioning that Douglas Kenrick and his coauthors have recently proposed a revised version

of Maslow’s pyramid of needs based on findings from evolutionary psychology (Kenrick et al.,

2010). Although their approach has been rather controversial as well (Ackerman and Bargh, 2010;

Kesebir et al, 2010; Lyubomirsky and Boehm, 2010; Peterson and Park, 2010), the pyramid /

hierarchy of needs still has its supporters that present valid arguments for a hierarchical approach

to human needs (e.g., Schaller et al., 2010).

28 For another discussion of the basic needs approach as well as its potential weaknesses and its

relationship to the capability approach, we would also like to refer to Stewart (2006) and D. A.

Clark (2006); for an overview see also van Staveren (2008).

https://twitter.com/search?q=%23fitchthehomeless


29 According to Ilse Oosterlaken (2012), “[c]apabilities are often described as what people are

effectively able to do and be or the positive freedoms that people have to enjoy valuable ‘beings

and doings’. These beings and doings are called ‘functionings’ by Sen” (Oosterlaken, 2012, p. 4).

30 Introductory note: As the primary purpose of this paragraph is to shed light on a new perspective on

obstacles to SRC, we include only the major components that can be regarded as obstacles to the

altruistic element of the above SRC definition. Obstacles to the ‘economic’ part of SRC are

neglected (e.g., pricing, transaction costs, etc.), as are some other ‘obstacles’ (e.g., issues regarding

the economic growth imperative, etc.) that other scholars have adequately made the case for (see,

for instance, Ahaus et al., 2009, 2011).

31 For a brief overview of theory, discussions, and findings with regard to cultural evolution, see

Mesoudi (2011, 2015) and Mesoudi et al. (2006), including commentaries, as well as the

contributions in Richerson and Christiansen (2013).

32 Moreover, with an eye to the above Weberian paragraph, we may remember that Weber (2013, p.

24 et seq.) states that social action may be oriented in four ways, namely instrumentally rational

(zweckrational), value-rational (wertrational), affectual (especially emotional; i.e., determined by

the agents’ affects and feelings), and traditional (i.e., determined by ingrained habituation). We

could, therefore, argue that bounded rationality may be considered to focus primarily on decision-

making related to the first two (ideal) types of social action, whereas bounded morality also leaves

room for focusing on affectual and traditional social action.

33 In an economic context, which is the case when we are studying consumption, this moral issue may

also be conceived as what Josef Wieland (2014) has called the moral dimension of an economic

transaction (e.g., see Schramm and Seid, 2008, p. 225, or chapter 2 in Wieland, 2014, in this

regard).

34 However, although we are inclined to support the ontological assumption that there are no moral

facts, we have to acknowledge that various scholars, especially theologians, also adduce good

reasons for a position called “moral realism,” that is, the metaphysical point of view that does not


regard the universe as being inherently devoid of value and thus argues that morality and virtue

cannot solely be treated as some kind of human invention (Schramm, 2013). However, we can also

see that “despite this moral realism in a theistic ethics, epistemically there is no difference to any

other ethical approach. ... [Hence,] the point of ‘moral realism’ does not obviate the need for

rational deliberation about ethical issues” (Schramm, 2013, p. 830, italics in original).

35 Note that these two evolutionary processes and their interrelation are also the subject of dual

inheritance theory or gene-culture coevolution. See, for example, Boyd and Richerson (1985),

Richerson and Boyd (2005), and, most recently, Paul (2015) and references herein.

36 Note that an alternative model of ethical decision-making, which, to a certain degree, also overlaps

with Jones’ (1991) model (e.g., especially with regard to the probability and desirability of

consequences as well as the relative importance of victims/beneficiaries/stakeholders) has been

proposed by Hunt and Vitell (1986, 2006).

37 For a criticism of this conclusion and arguments against Falk and Szech’s (2013) interpretation of

the results see the comment by Friedrich Breyer and Joachim Weimann (2014). For Falk and

Szech’s reply to that comment see Falk and Szech (n.d.).

38 Probably not for those who regard mice as pests and kill them with deathtraps and pesticides;

however, this may still be an issue for Neuner’s norm of natural compatibility.

39 For example, George Akerlof (1970) has shown that in a market without informed consumers no

optimal decisions can be made.

40 The term ‘greenwashing’ is often used “to describe the practice of making unwarranted or

overblown claims of sustainability or environmental friendliness in an attempt to gain market

share” (Dahl, 2010, p. 247).

41 Moreover, it may make sense to differentiate between a) the case of primarily self-interested SRC,

where there is often a direct and immediate gratification in terms of a “warm glow” (Andreoni,

1990) or a sense of belonging to a ‘more responsible’ group (cf. signaling / image motivation;

Ariely et al., 2009), and b) the case where the positive impact of genuinely ‘morally interested’


SRC in terms of an observable improvement for others (e.g., of working conditions of exploited

workers, or living conditions of future generations, etc.) often remains rather abstract or deferred

(which also holds true for many of the negative consequences of non-SRC).

42 For example, it may often be impossible to avoid ‘bad’ news (thereby ‘avoiding’ moral

stupefaction) or increasing spatial proximity, temporal immediacy, or probability of effect (thereby

increasing moral intensity).

43 Batson challenges “the common Western presumption that humans are always motivated by self-

interest by providing experimental evidence that altruism does exist, and that it arises from feelings

of empathic concern” (Batson, 2015, p. 15, emphasis removed). Batson defines “altruistic

motivation” as “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare”

(Batson, 2011, p. 20, and Batson, 2014, p. 43, italics in original) and hypothesizes that “empathic

concern produces altruistic motivation” (Batson, 2011, p. 11). This “empathic concern” is in turn

defined as “other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of a

person in need” (Batson, 2011, p. 11, and Batson, 2014, p. 41, italics in original).

44 On a very general level, it can also be argued that “[e]mpathy and moral reasoning have in common

that both reflect a concern for others” (Bierhoff, 2002, p. 109).

45 For example, empathy can further be distinguished into a) cognitive empathy, which is not an

emotion but an understanding of others (see also Maibom, 2014a, p. 2) that is closely related to

Theory of Mind – in fact, according to Rogers et al. (2007), cognitive empathy and Theory of

Mind “are often used synonymously” (p. 710), and b) affective empathy and empathy-related

emotions (see also Maibom, 2014a, p. 3).

46 The Paradox of Choice is the title of a book by the American psychologist Barry Schwartz where

he argues that people can feel overwhelmed when having too many options to choose from. Hence,

Schwartz (2004) argues, for instance, that reducing and prioritizing (consumer) choices may

mitigate the problems of anxiety, regret, and dissatisfaction the choices entail.


47 Other examples that specifically aim at the provision of (reliable) information on labels include

smartphone apps such as the German “Label-App” (http://label-online.de/label-app/), which allows

consumers to get quick and easy access to information on various labels, as well as websites with

information on eco-labels (http://www.greenerchoices.org/eco-labels/), among other things.

48 For example, the Ministry of the Environment, Climate Protection and the Energy Sector Baden-

Württemberg has published a cookbook that, next to many CO2-neutral recipes, gives consumers

sound information on the relationship between food (production and consumption) and climate

change (https://um.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/presse-service/publikation/did/primaklima-

kochbuechle-nachhaltig-geniessen-und-co2-sparen/).

49 Note: if ConSR is implemented and understood in the context of a shared social responsibility,

trust-related information problems would be rather irrelevant as the information provider (e.g.

corporation) has the responsibility to provide accurate and reliable information to the consumer.

50 According to Ragin, “[w]hen a causal argument cites a combination of conditions, it is concerned

with their intersection. It is the intersection of a set of conditions in time and in space that produces

many of the large-scale qualitative changes, as well as many of the small-scale events, that interest

social scientists, not the separate or independent effects of these conditions ... The basic idea is that

a phenomenon or change [nota bene: in our case SRC] emerges from the intersection of

appropriate preconditions—the right ingredients for change. In the absence of any one of the

essential ingredients, the phenomenon—or the change—does not emerge. This conjunctural or

combinatorial nature is a key feature of causal complexity” (Ragin, 1987, p. 25).

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Consumer Responsibility Territory


Figure 2: Schematic Visualization of Proposed Relationships


Table 1. Examples of SRC-relevant definitions

Author(s)a Definition Responsibility ‘territory’

Antil (1984) “has defined socially responsible consumption as those behaviors and purchase decisions made by consumers that are related to environmental-resource problems and are motivated not only by a desire to satisfy personal needs, but also by a concern for the possible adverse consequences of their consequent effects” (p. 20).b

Sphere: 2 (natural environment)

ConSR-Domains: focus on 3b, 3c (explicitly), others implicitly/unknown (definition unspecific)

Devinney et al. (2006)

define consumer social responsibility as “the conscious and deliberate choice to make certain consumption choices based on personal and moral beliefs” (p. 32, emphasis removed). Moreover, according to Devinney et al. (2006), ConSR “shows up in two ways: as expressed activity in terms of purchasing or nonpurchasing behavior; and as expressed opinions in surveys or other forms of market research” (p. 32, italics in original).

Spheres: unknown or 3 (personal well-being), depending on “personal and moral beliefs”

ConSR-Domains: 1, 3b, 3c

Fisk (1973): “‘Responsible consumption’ refers to rational and efficient use of resources with respect to the global human population” (p. 24).

Sphere: 2 (natural environment)

ConSR-Domain: 4

Heidbrink and Schmidt (2011c):

“Responsible consumer action can be defined as an act of consuming where concerns of the social and natural environment as well as of the own well-being have priority” (p. 36, own translation).

Spheres: 1 (social environment), 2 (natural environment), and 3 (personal well-being)

ConSR-Domains: 1-5 (implicitly)

Mohr et al. (2001) “define socially responsible consumer behavior (SRCB) as a person basing his or her acquisition, usage, and disposition of products on a desire to minimize or eliminate any harmful effects and maximize the long-run beneficial impact on society ... A socially responsible consumer would, therefore, avoid buying products from companies that harm society and actively seek out products from companies that help society” (p. 47).

Spheres: 1 (social environment, explicitly), and 2 (natural environment, implicitly / especially due to consideration of long-run-impacts)

ConSR-Domains: 3b, 3c, 4, 5

Muncy and Vitell (1992)

define consumer ethics “as the moral principles and standards that guide behavior of individuals or groups as they obtain, use, and dispose of goods and services” (p. 298, emphasis removed).

Spheres: unknown / depending on “moral principles and standards”

ConSR-Domains: 3, 4, 5

Roberts (1993) defines the socially responsible consumer as “one who purchases products and services perceived to have a positive (or less negative) influence on the environment or who patronizes businesses that attempt to effect related positive social change” (p. 140).

Spheres: part one: 2 (natural environment), part two: 1 (social environment)

ConSR-Domains: 2 (partially), 3b (explicitly), 3c (implicitly)

Webster (1975) defines the socially conscious consumer as “a consumer who takes into account the public consequences of his or her private consumption or who attempts to use his or her purchasing power to bring about social change” (p. 188).

Sphere: 1 (social environment)

ConSR-Domain: 3c (explicitly), others implicitly/unknown (definition unspecific)

a This table builds upon (and expands) the sample of definitions presented by Deborah Webb and her coauthors (2008). b See also the previous definition by Antil and Bennett (1979, p. 51).

Documents

Schlaile et al. (2016) - From Bounded Morality to Consumer Social Responsibility: A Transdisciplinary Approach to Socially Responsible Consumption and Its Obstacles