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1 S. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations.NewYork2009.

2 OntheLeagueofNationsseeP.Clavin,Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946,Oxford2013,231–340.

3 The EFO was an ancestor of the InternationalMonetaryFund.

Bynaturewarsareinternationalandtheyalsoproduceaspecialkindofinternation-alismaimingnotonlyatorganisingthewaritselfbutalsoatplanningpeace.Theinternationalorganisationsborn in the twentiethcenturyarearesultof thiswar-timeinternationalismbut,becausetheyaremeanttopreservepeace,scholarshavegenerallyoverlookedtheroletheyplayedduringthewarsthemselves.

TheSecondWorldWaroffersagoodfieldinwhichtostudythisquestion.Trulyglobalinscope,theSecondWorldWarwasindeedaperiodofintenseinternational-ism.InJanuary1942,22nationalgovernments,amongthemLatinAmericancoun-triesthatwerenotfightingthewarbutthatwerecrucialfortheUnitedStateswareffort,agreedtosigntheshortUnitedNationsdeclaration,whichlaunchedthenewpost-warinternationalsystem.1Meanwhile,the«OldGenevaorganisations»didsur-vivethewar.UnderthedirectionoftheIrishmanSeanLester,theLeagueofNations(LoN)was leftmoreor lesshibernating inGeneva,but twoof itsspecialisedandtechnicalcommissionsmanagedtomovetotheUnitedStateswheretheycontinuedtobeactive.2ThePermanentOpiumBoardwashosted inWashingtonwhile theEconomic andFinancialOrganisationof theLeagueofNations (EFO)3 settled inPrincetonwiththegeneroussupportoftheRockefellerFoundation.InAugust1940mostof thealreadymuchreducedstaffof theInternationalLabourOrganisation(ILO)movedtoMontreal.WhilethetwoLoNsectionsdisappearedassuchafterthewar,theILOdidsurvive,becomingoneofthefirstspecialisedagenciesoftheUnitedNationsin1946.

Nevertheless,theILOwasnotpresentattheimportantinternationalmeetingsinwhichthenewworldorderwassetup.Itwasinvitedneithertothefoodandagri-cultural conference inHotSprings inMay-June1943nor toDumbartonOaks in

SandrineKott

FightingtheWarorPreparingforPeace?

TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

360 SandrineKott

4 ILO,The ILO and Reconstruction. Report by the Act-ing Director of the ILO to the Conference of the Inter-national Labour Organisation New-York, October 1941,Montreal1941,17–21.

5 OnthisissueforgeneralquestionsseeS.Kotkin,

«WorldWarTwoandLabor:ALostCause?», in:International Labor and Working-Class History 58(2000),181–191,andtheotherarticlesinthesamespecialissue.

August1944wheretheEconomicandSocialCouncilwascreated,norofficiallytoSanFranciscoin1945todiscusstheUNCharter.TheILOasanorganisationdidnoteven have a seat in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration(UNRRA)Council,anditsrelationshipwithUNRRAremainedveryweak.

ThiscontributionaimsatexplainingthisparadoxicalsituationbyfocusingonthewarperioditselfandshiftingthequestionfromwhytheILOsurvivedthewartohowitdidso.Insodoing,itfirstseekstounderstandhowaninternationalorganisa-tionaimedatpreservingpeacecouldfunctionduringthewarandwhatroleitsvari-ousconstituentscouldplay.ButbeyondthestoryoftheOrganisationitself,follow-ing the ILO allows us better to understand the shifting balance of power: thevanishing influence of Europe, the declining influence of Labour, the rise of aninternationalgroupofexpertsand,lastbutnotleast,theredefinitionoftheinterna-tional social and economic priorities linked to this new balance of power. I willthereforelookatthewarnotonlyasaperiodofinternationalcrisisbutasatimeof«peculiarinternationalism»duringwhich,facedwiththeemergenceofanewworldorder,theILOhadtoredefineitsmission.

Iwilladdressthesequestionsinthreesteps.Firstly,IwilllookatthematerialandgeopoliticalconditionsunderwhichtheILOwasabletosurviveandtheimpactthis had on the organisation itself between Europe and the Americas. Secondly,Iwilldiscuss therole that theILOplayedduringthewar inmobilisingtheworkforceandpreservingsocialpeaceinregionssuchasLatinAmerica.Lastly,IwilllookatthewarasaperiodduringwhichtheILOhadtoadjusttoanewgeopoliticalsitu-ationandtosetnewpriorities,whichwouldhavealong-lastingeffectonitsactivityinthepost-warperiod.

1. Surviving the War in Europe and the Americas

ThecontinuityofILOactivitieswasmadepossiblebythepositionadoptedbytheGoverningBodyoftheInternationalLabourOfficeinFebruary1939.Thegovern-ment, employers’ and workers’ representatives unanimously decided that in theeventoftheoutbreakofwar,theOfficeshouldcontinueitstask«atthehighestpos-siblelevel».Thegovernmentofficials,whorememberedtheFirstWorldWar,antici-patedthat theywouldhavetoorganisethewartimeeconomiceffortandthat thiswould require international planning.4 36 government representatives thereforegave their full support to the continuation of the ILO. They also knew that theywouldhavetorelyonthesupportoftheirpopulationandmobilisetheworkforce.5Socialpolicieswouldthereforebecomeanimportanttoolforforgingthis«sacred

361TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

6 M.Leimgruber/M.Lengwiler,Umbruch an der «in-neren Front»: Krieg und Sozialpolitik in der Schweiz 1938–1948.Zürich2008,33–42.

7 OnthisissueseeG.VanGoethem,«Labor’sSec-ond Front: The Foreign Policy of the AmericanandBritishTradeUnionMovementsDuringtheSecond World War», in: Diplomatic History 34(2010),663–680.

8 International Labour Office and Conference ofAmerican States Members of the InternationalLabourOrganisation.Recordofproceedings.Re-portI.Montreal.ILO1941,157.

9 This issue is best described in the correspon-dence between Viple and Phelan, ILO-ArchivesZ1/1/11.SeealsoV.-Y.Ghebali,Organisation inter-

nationale et guerre mondiale: le cas de la Société des Nations et de l’Organisation Internationale du Travail pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale,Grenoble1975,347–362.Ontheambiguousposi-tionoftheSwissauthoritiesseeM.Herren«‹Nei-therthisWaynoranyother›:SwissInternational-ismduringtheSecondWorldWar»,in:G.Kreis/E.Walliser-Schwarzbart (eds.),Switzerland in the Second World War: Responding to the Challenges of the Time,Zürich1999,171–192.

10 On that delay see the comments of the Frenchsocialist Adrien Tixier, who in 1942 joined theFrance libre; in ILO-Archives see his correspon-dencewithPhelaninMay–June1940.TixierPa-pers139,orPWR1/01Meeting16–17June1941.

union».6Attheinternationallevel,thetripartiteILO,encompassingrepresentativesofgovernments,employersandemployees,wasanimportanttoolforconductingthe negotiations. The employers, usually reluctant towards the organisation butfearingawaveofstrikes,unanimouslyproposedanincreaseofeachgovernment’sfinancialcontribution.Asfortheworkers,theyhopedthat,throughtheILO,theywould be represented in the post-war negotiations.7 Already in 1939, during thePan-AmericanILOconferenceinHavana,JamesB.Carey,theUSworkers’delegateandmemberoftheAmericanFederationofLabor,hadindicatedthat«[i]tisimpera-tivethatorganisedlaborshouldhaveadeterminingvoiceinfixingthetermsofthepeacesettlementwhichfollowsthepresentwar.Onlybygivinglaborsuchavoicecanweensurethatthepeacesettlement,unlikethatof1919,isbaseduponjusticefor all people of all nations».8 Without the very firm support of Walter Citrine,generalsecretaryoftheTradeUnionCongressandpresidentoftheInternationalFederation of Trade Unions, the British government would not have accepted toraise itscontributionfor theILOduringthewar.Tradeunions,andthetripartiteconstitution of the ILO in general, were therefore crucial for the survival of theOrganisation.

InGeneva,theILOwasunderthreatfromanopenlyhostileNaziGermany.Fear-ingGermanreprisals,theSwissauthorities,aswellasalargepartofSwisspublicopinion,werereluctanttohostanorganisationwhich,intheirview,couldendangerstrictSwissneutrality.9ThedirectorJohnWinantnegotiatedamovetoCanada,acountrythathadbeenatwarwithNaziGermanysinceSeptember1939.Asamatteroffact,withatransferofsomefunctionstothecityofMontreal,theILOhadchosensidesintheconflictevenifitsfirstopendeclarationagainstNaziGermanywasnotissueduntilearly1941.10

InAugust1940,areducedstaff(around40people)leftGenevainprivatecarstowardsLisbon,wheretheyboardedashiptoCanada.SomeofficialshadtroublefindinggasandalmostmissedtheirchancetoleaveEurope.Othershadalreadylosttheirnationalityandfacedgreatdifficultiesgettingvisas.Foranumberofthemthis

362 SandrineKott

11 ILO-ArchivesP-fileEmilSchoenbaumP3926. 12 C. Guinand, «Un fonctionnaire international en

France occupée (1940–1944)», in: H. Heinen /D. Hüser (eds.), Tour de France. Eine historische Rundreise. Festschrift für Rainer Hudemann,Stutt-gart2008,391–399.

13 A. Alcock, History of the International Labour Organisation, New York 1971, 160–163; Ghebali,Organisation internationale, 239–246.

14 ILO-ArchivesZ1/22/3/1 15 W.Jenks,The ILO in Wartime,Geneva1970.

move was a condition for their survival. It is difficult to evaluate the extent towhichtheOfficeconsciouslyplayedaroleintherescueoftheJewsinvolvedintheorganisation,butsomecasesaredocumented.InaletterwritteninJanuary1944afterthedeathofthedeputydirectorOswaldStein,thesocialsecurityexpertEmilSchoenbaumstated:«Iwaspersonallydeeplyindebtedtohimforhisdisinterestedeffort in saving me and my wife from occupied Czechoslovakia and our lives.»11Finally,someofficialsremainedtrappedinEurope,includingtheEnglishmanJamesNixon,headofthestatisticssection,whofoundhimselfinPariswhentheGermansinvadedFranceandwasheldincaptivityforfouryears.12AlltheseindividualstoriesdocumentthedifficultyofmaintaininganyindependentinternationallifeinNaziEurope.

And yet around twenty people stayed in Geneva under the direction of theFrenchmanMariusViplewho,likeallotherFrenchofficials,didnotgetpermissionfromtheVichyauthoritiestoleaveforCanada.TheykepttheILObuilding,whichremained the official headquarters of the Organisation throughout the Montrealperiod.13Althoughreduced, theactivityof theILOinGenevawasnotcompletelyinterrupted.MariusViple,acommittedILOofficialwhohadbeenaclosecollabora-torofAlbertThomas,thefirstsocialistdirectoroftheOrganisation,supervisedtheactivityoftheEuropeancorrespondentsandtriedtomaintainanILOpresenceinEurope.FromGeneva,ViplealsomanagedtogetinformationonpeopleaffiliatedwiththeILOwhoweredetainedorputinjail.WhilehedidnotsucceedinfreeingNixon,hewasable(withthesupportoftheUSEmbassy)tohelpsignificantlyeasethesituationoftheFrenchtradeunionistLéonJouhaux,whohadbeenalong-stand-ingworkers’representativeontheILOGoverningBodyandwhowasimprisonedinJanuary1942.14

TheofficialswhomovedtoMontrealfacedotherchallenges.TheOfficewassetupinthemainhallofMcGillUniversity,atemporarysolutionthatcomplicatedtheworkofthesecretariatimmensely.Travel,oneoftheveryconditionsofinternationalactivity,becamehazardous,particularlyinthecaseoftransatlanticrelations.15Duetoitsdual location,theILOoffersagoodinsightintotheprogressiveshiftoftheglobalcentreofgravityanditsimpactregardingtheroleof labourattheinterna-tionallevel.

363TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

16 D.Guérin,Albert Thomas au BIT: 1920–1932. De l’internationalisme à l’Europe,Genève1996,77.

17 OntheILO’snorm-settingactivity,seeL.-M.Bon-vin,L’Organisation internationale du travail: étude sur une agence productrice de normes,Paris1998.

18 O. Hidalgo, «Les réseaux américains et britan-niques à l’OIT dans l’entre-deux-guerres: l’éla-boration d’une spécial relationship sociale et éco-nomique»; presentation at a PhD conference,Lausanne,April2012.J.Jensen,«WhattheInter-national Labor Organization Means to America:DomesticLaborStandardsandU.S.EngagementwiththeInternationalLaborOrganization,1928–

1934», European Social Science History Confer-ence,Lisbon,February2008;J.Myers,«AmericanRelations with the International Labour Office,1919–1932»,in:Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 166(1933)135–145;D.T.Rodgers,Atlantic Crossings, Social Politics in a Pro-gressive Age,Cambridge,Mass.1998.

19 S.Hughes/N.Haworth,«AShiftintheCentreofGravity’The ILOunderHaroldButler and JohnWinant»,in:J.VanDaele/M.Rodriguez-Garcia/M.VanderLinden(eds.),The ILO: Past and Pres-ent,Bern2010,291–311.

2. Labour and the New Geopolitical Balance of Power

Duringthetwofirstdecadesofitsexistence,theILO–liketheLoN–waspredomi-nantlyaEuropeanorganisation.16Althoughalmosthalfof the51countriesrepre-sentedattheInternationalLabourConferenceof1930werenon-European,Euro-peanstates,andinparticularthosethathadwontheFirstWorldWar,dominatedtheILO.AllthechiefofficialswereeitherFrenchorBritish;until1934,fiveoftheeightcountriesrepresentedintheGoverningBodywereEuropean.TheILOactivitywasmainlyconcernedwithsettingupconventions inspiredbyEuropeanmodelsandaimedatsolvingEuropeansocialproblems.Nevertheless,bytheearly1930s,non-WesternEuropeanvoices,particularlycomingfromLatinAmericaandSouthEast-ernEurope,expressedincreasingscepticismtowardsthewaytheILOwasoperat-ing. They asked for more technical assistance programmes better suited to theirneedsthanthenorm-settingdimensionoftheILO’sactivity(basedontheelabora-tionofconventionsandrecommendations).17 InDecember1933,duringthePan-AmericansummitinMontevideo,LatinAmericancountriesevendiscussedthepos-sibilityofaPan-AmericanILOthatwouldbemoreusefulforthem.TheentryoftheUnitedStatesintotheOrganisationin1934putanendtothisplan,buttheneedsthathadbeenexpresseddidnotdisappear.TheUSentrywasnegotiatedbytheBrit-ishdirectorHaroldButlerandreliedonadensenetworkofpreviouscollaborationwiththeLaborDepartment,aswellaswithotheractorswhohadcoalescedwiththeILO’sWashingtonbranchofficesetupin1919.18TheroleofJohnWinant,aper-sonalfriendofRooseveltwhohadpreviouslybeenamemberoftheSocialSecurityBoard,bearswitnesstothequicklygrowinginfluenceoftheUnitedStatesintheILO.JohnWinant,whowasappointedButler’sassistantdirector,becametheILO’sfirstAmericandirectorin1939.19

Thewarcontributedtoaccelerateageopoliticalshiftthatwasalreadyunderway.TheprogressiveNazificationofEuropedeprivedtheILOofitsmainEuropeansup-port: liberal and progressive politicians and, above all, reformist trade unionistscould no longer be heard. The major Trade Union leaders involved in the ILOmachinerywereinhidingorimprisoned.WilhelmLeuschner,aGermanworkers’

364 SandrineKott

20 R. Tosstorff, Wilhelm Leuschner gegen Robert Ley: Ablehnung der Nazi-Diktatur durch die Internatio-nale Arbeitskonferenz 1933 in Genf, Frankfurt amMain2007.

21 On the IFTU see G. Van Goethem, The Amster-dam International: The World of the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), 1913–1945.Aldershot/Burlington, VT 2006, 229–246. See

alsoK.Pribram,«TheILO:PresentFunctionsandFutureTasks»,in:Foreign Affairs21(1942)1,158–167.

22 SeeViplecorrespondence,ILO-ArchivesZ1/1/11. 23 ILO-ArchivesZ1/1/1/11 variouslettersin1941. 24 The ILO and Reconstruction,75. 25 It consisted of six government representatives

and respectively three workers’ and employers’

delegateinthegoverningbody,wasunderarrestbetween1933and1934.Afterhisrelease,hebecameactiveintheresistanceandwasexecutedin1944.20LéonJou-haux, a long-standing member of the Governing Body, was placed under housearrest in theSouthofFrance in1940andthen imprisoned inGermanybetween1942and1945.TheInternationalFederationofTradeUnions whichhadbeenthebackboneoftheOrganisationwasdeprivedofanyrealinfluence.21

TheILOofficialswhoremained inEuropeexperienced fearandscarcity.TheParisbranchofficewasoccupiedbytheNazis;theLondonbranch,transformedintoameetingplaceforTradeUnionleadersinexile,wasbombed.InGeneva,MariusViplewas very isolated andhad to face thehostility ofSwisspublic opinionandofficials. Nevertheless, he tried to maintain the influence of the organisation inEurope inorder to counterbalanceNazi socio-political propaganda. Furthermore,bothVipleandAdrienTixier,theFrenchassistantdirectorwhowaslateracommit-ted«resistant»,wereconcernedabouttheriseofAnglo-AmericanpowerandsawinthecontinentalpresenceoftheILOawaytocounterbalancetheUShegemonytheyfeared.22InordertomaintainthisILOinfluenceinEurope,VipledesperatelytriedtomakethoseEuropeangovernmentsthatwerestillmembersoftheorganisationpay,andheevenenteredintoverycumbersomenegotiationswiththeVichygovern-ment.23

EvenifMontrealwasnotasubstituteforGeneva,24 themoveandthewardidspeedupa shift in theorganisation’s centreofgravity to theAmericas.Between1939and1941,thetwomostimportantfiguresoftheOrganisationcamefromtheUnitedStates:JohnWinantbecamedirectorin1939andCarterGoodrich,professorofeconomicsatColumbiaUniversityandrepresentativeoftheUnitedStatesGov-ernment, was appointed chairman of the Governing Body of the InternationalLabourOfficebetween1939and1945.Anglo-Americaninfluencewasalsopropor-tionaltotheirfinancialcontributiontotheorganisation.In1940,compensatingforall the governments which no longer contributed, two-thirds of the ILO budgetcamefromtheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,India,andtheCommonwealthcoun-tries. Anglo-American actors were overrepresented in the emergency committee,particularlyinthesecondsuchcommittee,whichacteduntil1943asakindofsub-stituteof thegoverningbody.25Meanwhile, theFrenchSocialist influence,whichhadbeenverystronginthefirsttwodecades,fadedaway.

365TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

delegates. The first was designated in 1939 andthen replaced in 1942.SeeEmergencyCommit-tee,Minutes of the First Session (April 1939), Second Session (May 1939), Third Session (September 1939), Fourth Session (October 1939), Fifth Session (April 1942, London).Geneva,Montreal.

26 InternationalLabourOffice,Conference of Ameri-can States Members of the International Labour Organisation, Havana, 21 November– 2 December 1939. Record of Proceedings. Report I. Montreal,ILO,1941,38.

27 See,fortheUSpointofview,C.Riegelman,«La-bor’sBridgehead:TheI.L.O.»,in:Political Science

Quarterly60 (1945)2,205–221,and for theILOinternal discussion: ILO-Archives Tixier papers139 and 140. Tixier’s letters to Winant May andJune1940.

28 Riegelman,«Labor’sBridgehead»,208. 29 C.Goodrich,«TheEffectoftheWaronthePosi-

tionofLabor»,in:The American Economic Review(Supplement,PapersandProceedingsoftheFifty-fourthAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanEconom-icAssociation)32(1942)1,Part2,416–425.

Symbolically, theGoverningBody,whichusedtomeetfourtimesayear,con-venedonlythreetimesonAnglo-Americansoil:inNewYorkin1943,Philadelphiain 1944 and London in 1945. The annual International Labour Conference tookplacetwiceintheUnitedStates,inJune1941inNewYork(asanextraordinarycon-ference)andasecondtimeinPhiladelphiain1944.InthiscontexttheILOtendedtobecomeakindofwarmachineonthesideoftheAnglo-AmericanAllies.

3. Mobilising for War on the «Democratic» Side

«Thetwentyyearsof theI.L.O.’sexistencehaveproventheusefulnessofsuchanorganisationintimeofpeace.Iamconfident that itcanandwillbeofservice toits members, indeed to society as a whole, in time of war»,26 the US presidentRooseveltstatedduringtheSecondPan-AmericanILOconferenceheldinHavanainNovember1939,as theshadowofwarwasalreadyspreadingoverEurope.FortheUSadministration,butalso formostof the remaining ILOofficials, theverynatureoftheOrganisationandinparticularitstripartitecompositionputitonthe«democraticside».27Infact,«theILOsurvivedtheoutbreakofwarinpartbecauseits own special function of labour policy was needed even more in war than inpeace».28In1940,USobserversanticipatedagrowingroleoflabourinthepost-warorder.Labourhad indeedasignificantvoicewithinthegovernments inexile: JanStanczykforPolandandOlavHindahlforNorway,whohadoftencometoGenevaasworkers’delegates,participatedinthe1941NewYorkconferenceasgovernmentdelegates.29

Theexceptional ILOconferenceheld inNewYork inOctober-November1941tookplaceinthisparticularcontext.Itfollowedthe«FourFreedoms»speechdeliv-eredbyRooseveltinJanuary1941andtheAtlanticCharterinAugust1941,andjustanticipated the US entry into war in December the same year. This speech wasaimed first and foremost at American citizens, but it had also formulated globalsocialobjectives,andinadditiontopoliticalfreedoms,ithadpromisedasocialpol-icythatwouldensurefreedomfromwant.On14August1941,theeightarticlesoftheAtlanticCharter co-signedbyRoosevelt andChurchill took thesebroadaims

366 SandrineKott

30 E.Borgwardt,A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights,Cambridge,Mass.2005,14–86.

31 P. Beck, «The League of Nations and the GreatPowers,1936–1940»,in:World Affairs,157(1995)4,175–189;Clavin,Securing,251–266.

32 On this Nazi internationalism see M. Herren,«‹Outwardly…anInnocuousConferenceAuthor-ity›:NationalSocialismandtheLogisticsofInter-national InformationManagement», in:German History20(2002)1,67–92.

33 Hughes / Haworth, «A Shift in the Centre ofGravity»,291–311.

34 ILO,Conference of the International Labour Organi-zation, 1941, New York and Washington, Record of Proceedings,Montreal,1941,listofdelegations,XI.

35 G.VanGoethem,«Phelan’swar:TheInternation-al Labour Organization in Limbo (1941–1948)»,in:J.VanDaeleetal.(eds.),ILO Histories: Essays on the International Labour Organization and its Impact on the World during the Twentieth Century,Bern/NewYork2010,319–320.

further;itsArticleFive,whichproclaimeda«desiretobringaboutthefullestcoop-erationbetweenallnations in theeconomicfieldwith theobjectofsecuring, forall,improvedlabourstandards,economicadvancementandsocialsecurity»,prom-isingakindof«NewDealfortheworld».30Inthiscontext,theNewYorkconferenceoffered a platform to mobilise US and international opinion against the NaziandFascistmodels,stating thesuperiorityof thesocialanddemocraticvaluesoftheWesternhemisphere.While theLoNwasretreating intoapositionofcarefulneutrality,31othertechnicalbodiesliketheInternationalBureauofEducationortheBank for InternationalSettlementswere collaborating with the Nazis.32 The ILOseemedtobe theonly internationalorganisationwhichstillembodied thedemo-craticinternationalspirit.Itsscopeandauthoritywerebythenattheirpeak.33

TheILOconferenceassembled35governmentdelegatesandwasstronglysup-portedbytheUSadministration.34TheconferencewaschairedbyFrancesPerkins,US Secretary of Labour, while its final speech was given by President RoosevelthimselfandclearlyaimedatmobilisingUSpublicopinioninfavourofthedemoc-racy and the war against Nazism.35 For European actors the conference was theplacewhereforcesthatstillresistedNazismcouldmeetandbeheard.AlthoughitwasextremelydifficultatthetimetocrosstheAtlantic, governmentsinexilewerestronglyrepresented.Theyusedtheconferenceasaplatformtoclaimtheirpoliticallegitimacyandmakeapleatotheworld.TheFrenchcaseisparticularlyrevealingaboutwhatwasatstake.TheVichygovernment,stillamemberoftheOrganisation,hadsentFrançoisdePanafieu,CounselloroftheUSEmbassy,asadelegatewhileLa France libre (FreeFrance)wasrepresentedbyHenryHauck,aFrenchsocialistappointedbyDeGaulleasDirectorofLabour.WhiledePanafieudidnottakethefloor,HenryHauckclearlyreclaimedthelegitimacyoftheFrenchRepublicinhispublicspeech:

ThereasonwhyFreeFranceissodeeplyinterestedinyourdiscussionsandinthewhole activity of the International Labour Organisation is that it is faithful towhathasbeenthesocialpolicyoftheFrenchRepublicfortwentyyears […].Theorganisationof theworkers infreeassociations, their increasingparticipationin

367TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

36 See ILO, Conference, 83–84; and J.Eisenberg,«Laquelle était la vraie France? France and theILO during the Second World War», in: J.VanDaeleetal.(eds.),ILO Histories, 341–365.

37 ILO,Conference,1941,131. 38 U.Lübken,««AmericansAll»:TheUnitedStates,

theNaziMenace,andtheConstructionofaPan-

AmericanIdentity»,in:Amerikastudien/American Studies 48 (2003) 3, 389–409; R. Newton, The «Nazi Menace», in Argentina, 1931–1947,Stanford1992.

theadministrationofnationalandinternationaleconomicaffairs,thereistheonlysolidbasisonwhichtobuildtheeconomicandsocialreconstructionoftheworldoftomorrow.36

WiththisspeechFreeFrancereclaimedthelegitimacyoftheFrenchRepublicandmarkedtheendofthetwistedVichycollaborationwiththeILO.EasternEuropeangovernments inexileused theconferenceasanarena tocall forhelp: theCzechpresident Masaryk read a joint declaration by the delegates of Czechoslovakia,Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia to inform the world of the «innumerable andunprecedentedatrocitiesthatarebeingdailycommittedbytheinvaders»to«encour-agethespiritofresistanceoftheworkingmassesthroughadoptingunityofalltheenslavedpeoples»,«paytributetothegreatandvaliantpeoplesoftheBritishEmpire,oftheSovietUnion,andthegreatAmericannation»andto«reaffirmtheirprofounddevotion to the democratic principle, and express their solidarity with the greatdemocracies».37

TheconferencewasalsocrucialinmobilisingLatinAmericancountrieswhoseinvolvementonthesideoftheAllieswasessentialforwinningthewar.Sincethe1930s,thesecountrieshadbeenexposedtoeconomicpenetrationandpoliticalpro-pagandaonthepartofthefasciststates.38Evenifthisthreatwasoverestimatedbythe US administration, the Argentine government, which did not join the Alliesuntil 1944, had sympathised with the Axis. The choice of José Domenech, theArgentineworkers’delegateasvice-presidentoftheconferencewasanimportantsymbolinthatcontext.

4. Fighting the War on Two Fronts

InadditiontoofferinganinternationalpublicplatformtotheAllies,theILOprovedtobeausefultoolforfightingthewar.Sinceitsfoundationin1919,theILOhadplayedtheroleofaninternational«clearinghouse»onlabourrelatedtopics.Infor-mationwascollectedthroughnationaloffices(branchoffices)andanetworkoflocalcorrespondents; it was then processed in the Office and disseminated through awiderangeofpublications.Thisknow-how incollecting informationprovedpre-cious.Thenumberofnationalcorrespondentsincreasedduringthewarperiodto24.Until1943,theGenevaheadquarterscontinuedtoreceiveverylongreportsfromEasternEuropeancorrespondents,whichweresentontoMontrealandeventually

368 SandrineKott

39 ILO-ArchivesC17–2–1(J.25–28)(J.25–28)Corre-spondentBranchofficePrague1940–1946.C10/Bulgaria, 1941, C 31/Hungary, 1923–1943. C31/1(J1)NationalCorrespondent:Hungary–Generalcorrespondence(1940–1948).

40 C.Goodrich,«TheI.L.O.atMontreal»,in:The Ca-nadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne d’Economie et de Science politique7(1941)2,267.

41 Ghebali,Organisation internationale, 213–215,and

ILO-ArchivesZ1/1/11CorrespondenceViple-Phel-an.

42 ILO-ArchivesZ1/1/11,GenevaMay13,1941VipletoPhelan.

43 P. Waelbroeck / I. Bessling, «Some Aspects ofGermanSocialPolicyundertheNational-SocialistRegime», in: International Labour Review 43(1941)2,127–152.

44 ILO-Archives MI-3–0. Letter Tixier to Stein May221941.

arrived inWashington.39Besidesbeinga«worldcentreof informationon labourquestions»,asCarterGoodrichputitin1941,40theILOtendedtoturnintoakindofannexoftheUSintelligenceservice.

TheOfficealsofoughtanideologicalwaragainsttheNaziswhotriedtousetheallegedsuperiorityofGermansocialpolicytogainsupportamongthepopulationoftheSouthernandtheNorthernpartsofEuropeaswellasinLatinAmerica.AftertheOfficehadmovedtoMontrealin1940,theGermanLabourFrontofficialstookstepsalongwiththeSwissauthoritiesinordertooccupytheformerGenevaheadquarters.Attheendofthesameyear,RobertLey,headoftheGermanLabourFront,intendedtotransformthe«CentralOfficeforJoyandLabour»,foundedin1933,intoasortofinternationalofficeforlabour(Zentralamt für internationale Sozialgestaltung).41

ThisnewofficepublishedaperiodicalcalledtheNeue internationale Rundschau der Arbeit,intendedbytheLabourFront’sofficialsasasubstituteforILO’sInterna-tionale Rundschau der Arbeit. Manyof the review’s collaboratorswere former ILOstaffmemberswhohadbeendismissedin1939,includingthesocialdemocratWilliDonau,aformerheadoftheBerlinbranchoffice.42Thearticlespublishedinthenewreviewsoughttopresentanalternativetotheinternationallabourpoliticspro-motedbytheILO.TheNaziinternationalpolicydidnotaimtoproposeuniversallabour standards, which were criticised by the Nazis as «utopian», but proposedinsteadtoorganiseaninternationalgeographicalredistributionofworkingpopula-tions and to mobilise the European work force to the benefit of Germany. In anarticlepublishedinFebruary1941,twoILOofficialsclearlydenouncedthispolicy,aimedatconsolidatingasinglenationalstate,as«totalitarian».43AlltheseplanswereindeedcloselyfollowedbytheILOstaff,particularlyinGeneva,andMariusVipleurgedhiscolleaguestocontinuedisseminatingILOpublicationsinEuropeinordertooffercounter-propagandaagainsttheNazisandtoprepareforthepost-warperiod.

TheILO’sactivismontheissueofsocialsecurityduringthewarandtheshiftfromsocialinsuranceinspiredbytheGermanmodeltosocialsecuritysupportedbytheAmericanandtheBritishauthoritieswaspartofthesamewareffort.Itwasalsoameansofprotecting the influenceof theOrganisationat a timewhen theveryaggressivePan-AmericanpolicyoftheUSadministrationwasendangeringtheroleoftheILOinthispartoftheworld.44Tryingtofulfilthepromisesmadeinthe«Four

369TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

45 S.Kott,«ConstructingaEuropeanSocialModel:TheFightforSocialInsuranceintheInterwarPe-riod»,in:VanDaeleetal.(eds.),The ILO, 173–195.

46 See, inparticular, J. Jensen,«U.S.NewDealSo-cialPolicy Experts and the ILO, 1948–1954», in:S.Kott/J.Droux(eds.),Globalizing Social Rights: the International Labour Organization and BeyondLondon,NewYork2013,172–189.

47 On Oswald Stein, see his personal file in ILO-ArchivesP1289and«OswaldStein»in:Interna-tional Labour Review46(1944)2,139–144.

48 O. Stein, «Building Social Security», in: Interna-tional Labour Review43(1941)9,248–27.

49 ILO,Approaches to Social Security.Studies and Re-ports,M, 18,Montreal 1942.This report formedthe basis of a 76-page memorandum written inApril1942thatSteinsubmittedtotheBeveridgeCommittee.ILO-Archives,SI2/0/25/2.

50 ILO-Archives,SI23/3. 51 ILO-Archives,MI3/0.OntheAmericanisationof

SocialSecurityundertheNewDealseeJ.Jensen,«FromGenevatotheAmericas:TheInternationalLabor Organization and Inter-American SocialSecurityStandards,1936–1948»,in:International Labor and Working-Class History80 (2011),215–240.

52 See the following correspondence in the ILO-ArchivesSI23/0.

53 ILO-Archives,SI23/0cablefromSteintoPhelan,21May1943.ThevisitofBeveridgetotheUnitedStates was financed by the Rockefeller Founda-tionandwasagreattriumph.

54 ILO-Archives SI 23/3 Note from Stein to Stack,19.6.1943.

Freedoms»speech, theAtlanticCharterand theUNdeclaration, theILOworkedhardtointernationalisethesocialsecuritymodelbyofferingtheAlliedcountriesitsexpertiseinthisfield.45Inthisrespect,ILOofficialscouldbuildonalong-standingcollaborationwithAmericanpartners.46DuringtheearlyyearsoftheSecondWorldWar,thesetiesintensified.OswaldStein,directorofthesocialsecuritysectionanddeputydirectorof theILOin1942and1943,playedanessentialrole inthispro-cess.47InanarticlepublishedinSeptember1941,butprobablywrittenbeforetheAtlantic Charter, he sketched out the broad lines of this new social security sys-tem.48Thisarticlewastheshortversionofalongreportpublishedin1942whichsetout thedetails foraneweraofplanningacomprehensivesocialsecuritysys-tem.49InJune1943Stein,withatouchofhumour,arguedinalettertooneofhisaides that«just like theCatholicChurch,socialsecurityshouldbeuniversal,and[itis]thereforenecessaryforallnationstogetsocialsecurityintotheirheads».50Itwasprecisely thisquestionofuniversality thatheworkedonduring thewar.HeregularlywenttoWashingtonwhereheprovidedveryeffectivetechnicalassistanceonsocialsecuritytovariousmembersoftheDepartmentofLabor.51Givenhisinter-nationalknowledge,hewasalsoinvitedtoparticipateintheworkoftheBeveridgecommitteeinthespringof1942.In1943SteininsistedthataconferenceofexpertsbeorganisedaroundBeveridge.52HewantedtomakethemostofBeveridge’svisittotheAmericancontinentandwiththesupportofCarterGoodrichheintendedtocontinuepublicisingtheBeveridgeReportaroundtheUnitedStates.53ThemeetinginMontrealinJuly1943wasclearlyintendedasameansofinternationalisingthesocialsecuritymodelasagifttothepopulationmobilisedinthewareffort.54

Alongsidetheprovisionofexpertisetodevelopedcountries,thewaryearsalsosaw an increase in technical missions to Latin American countries, which hadexplicitlyrequestedsuchassistanceattheconferencesinHavanain1939andNew

370 SandrineKott

55 ILO-ArchivesZ1/1/1/9CorrespondencebetweenPhelanandTixier1940–1944.

56 ILO-ArchivesP3926. 57 ILO-ArchivesMI30Stein’sMissionstoWashing-

ton. 58 D.Ekbladh,The Great American Mission: Modern-

ization and the Construction of an American World Order,Princeton2010,58–65.

59 ILO-ArchivesMI30SteinMissionreporttoWash-ington,March31–April41942.

60 ILO-ArchivesMI30SteinMissionreporttoWash-ington,December22–231942.

61 Van Goethem, «Labor’s Second Front», 668–669.

Yorkin1941.Onceagain,theILOofficialscouldmobiliseexpertiseaccumulatedinthe1930s.AdrienTixier,formerheadofthesocialinsurancesection,ledtechnicalassistancemissionsduringthewarfortheMexicanandPeruviangovernmentsonsocialsecurityandthelabourcode.55TheCzechexpertEmilSchönbaum,whohadconductedvariousmissionsintheBalkansonbehalfoftheILOinthe1930s,wroteasocialsecuritycodeforEcuadorandhelpedtheMexicanandChileangovernmentsestablishsystemsofsocialinsurance.HewasalsoactiveinParaguayandVenezuelaandsetupaminers’pensionschemeinBolivia.56Importantinstitutionaldevelop-mentsinthisfieldincludedthecreationofanInter-AmericanCommitteeonSocialSecurity,foundedin1940asareplicaoftheEuropeancommitteefoundedin1924,andtheorganisationoftheSantiagoconferenceonthewareffort,57aimedatpro-motingtheILO’sdemocraticmodeloftripartitesocialinsurance.Thiswasclearlyawayofsupportingsocialdemocraticsympathies inLatinAmericancountriesandfightingagainstanti-USandanti-capitalistfeelingsthatmighthaverenderedLatinAmericansmorereceptivetowardNazipropaganda.58

SincetheUSwareffortwasdependentontheminingresourcesofLatinAmeri-cancountries,andinparticularBolivia,itwascrucialtowinoverLatinAmericanactorstotheAlliedcause.TheILOwasthusassociatedwithasanitaryproject inBolivia,aimingatdevelopinghospitalsforminers.AndclearlytheILOhadto«makecertainthatthehelpprovided[was]beingasfullyaspossibleusedfortheexclusivebenefitofworkersengagedinactivitiesessentialforthewareffort».59InDecember1942, ILO officials were invited to the US Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) tosolveaveryseriousindustrialdisputeintheBoliviantinmines,whoseproductionwasessentialfortheUSwareffort.Inresponsetothestrike,theBoliviangovern-menthadsentinthearmy,worseningthesituation.TheUSexpectationwasthattheILOcouldquicklyinitiatenegotiationsand,bypromisingsocialbenefits(betterhousing,controlofcompanystores,healthprovisions),convincetheworkerstogobacktowork.OswaldStein,whowasnegotiatingonbehalfoftheILO,sawthissitu-ationasanopportunitytobringaboutarealimprovementoftheworkingconditionsandlivingstandardsintheLatinAmericanminingindustry.60

Nevertheless,assoonastheUnitedStatesenteredthewar,theroleoftheStateDepartmentandthemilitaryauthoritiesexpandedattheexpenseoftheinfluenceoftheDepartmentofLabor.61Theroleoftradeunionisminthewarwasinstitution-alisedthroughtheWarLaborBoard,butitincreasinglycameunderthecontrolofa

371TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

62 N.Lichtenstein,«ClassPoliticsandtheStatedur-ingWorldWarTwo», in:International Labor and Working-Class History58(2000),261–274,andB.Waddell,«EconomicMobilizationforWorldWarIIandtheTransformationoftheU.S.State»,in:Politics & Society22,(1994)2,165–194.

63 ILO-ArchivesMI30SteinMissionreporttoWash-ington,August10–131942.

64 The ILO and Reconstruction, 88–108. Some ofthese propositions (like full employment) weretakenupbytheEconomicandFinancialSectionoftheLeagueofNations.LeagueofNations,The Transition from War to Peace Economy, Geneva1943.Clavin,Securing, 285–294.

65 See in particular the PWR series of the ILO-Ar-chives.Mostof theundertakingswere frozenasearlyas1943.

66 V. -Y.Ghebali,«LatransitiondelaSociétédesNa-tionsàl’organisationdesNationsUnies»,in:The League of Nations in Retrospect/La Société Des Na-tions: Rétrospective: Proceedings of the Symposium Organized by the United Nations Library and the Graduate Institute of International Studies,Geneva,6–9.November1980.ActesducolloqueorganiséparlabibliothèquedesNationsUniesetl’InstitutUniversitairedesHautesEtudesInternationales,Berlin; New York 1983: 72–92 (here 73–76).Clavin,Securing,325–329.

statebureaucracyandlostitsautonomy.Mostimportantly,thewarwasamomentwhenthepowerofbothmilitaryandprivateinterestswithinthestateapparatusandAmericansocietywerereinforcedattheexpenseoftheNewDealplannersandtradeunions.62As early as 1942Stein expressed concernabout thepolicyof theStateDepartment,whichwasreluctanttoincludesocialclausesincommercialcontractssigned with Latin American countries.63 Although a useful actor in the war, theinfluenceoftheILOasanagencyforsettingsocialnormswasinfactwaning,aswasitsinfluenceonpost-warplanning.

5. Between New York and Philadelphia: From Social Protection to Economic Development

InOctober1941,theILOhadproposedthefirstsketchforaninternationalplanforreconstruction,inwhichtheimportanceofsocialpolicywasstatedandtenprioritieswerelisted,suchastheeliminationofunemployment,theestablishmentofmachin-ery for work placements, vocational training and retraining, the improvement ofsocialinsuranceinallitsfields,aminimumlivingwageforthosetooweaktosecureitforthemselves,andaninternationalpublicworkspolicyforthedevelopmentoftheworld’sresources.64InthespecialcontextoftheNewYorkconference,theILOandLabourhadreceivedamandatefromtheassemblytoorganisereconstructioninter-nationallyandhadbeenguaranteedrepresentationinpeaceandreconstructioncon-ferences.However,theILOwasratherabsentfrompost-warplanningconferences,anditsinvolvementinpost-warplanswasalmostnon-existent.65Therealsignifi-canceoftheinternationalconferenceheldinPhiladelphiafrom20Aprilto12May1944,ofteninterpretedbyscholarsandtheILOitselfasmarkingthesecondbirthoftheOrganisation,hastobereinterpretedinthecontextofthismarginalisation.

ThemarginalisationoftheILOasapost-waractorresultedfromawidearrayofcauses.ThedesiretoturnthepageontheGenevasystem,whichwasremem-bered in associationwith the crisis of the 1930s and the failureof theVersaillessystem,clearlyplayedarole,66butmorefundamentally, thedisappearanceof the

372 SandrineKott

67 VanGoethem,«Phelan’sWar»,315–317.Themys-teriousdeathofOswaldStein,deputydirectorofthe ILO in 1943 and very close to theAmericanadministration, constituted a significant loss fortheorganisationinthisrespect.

68 Hughes / Haworth, «A Shift in the Centre ofGravity»,294.

69 TheSovietUnionfirstjoinedtheILOin1934asanautomaticresultofitsadmittancetotheLoN,butitwasbarelyactivewithintheorganisation.In

1939theUSSRwithdrewfromtheLeagueandtheILO. It entered the UN from the moment of itsfoundation but did not re-join the ILO. Mean-while,Czechoslovakactorsinparticular,aswellassomePoles,wereveryactiveintheILOfrom1919onwards.H.-K.Jacobson,«TheUSSRandILO»,in: International Organization 14 (1960) 3, 402–428.

70 VanGoethem,«Labor’sSecondFront»,668–669. 71 Onthisissue,seeibid.,663–680.Ontheneces-

ILOreflectsthetransformationofsocialpowerrelationsbothgloballyandwithindifferentnationstates,aswellasthedecliningroleofthelabourmovementatinter-nationallevel.

Froma strictlydiplomaticpointof view, the ILOgradually lost theprivilegedsupportthatithadpreviouslyenjoyedfromthegreatpowers.Theactingdirector,theIrishmanEdwardPhelanwhosucceededJohnWinantinFebruary1941,didnotenjoyagoodrelationshipwiththeBritishadministration,andcomingfromaneu-tralstateheneverhaddirectlinkswiththeRooseveltadministration.67Moreover,theentryoftheUnitedStatesintothewarinDecember1941andtheUnitedNationsDeclarationinJanuary1942ledtoatriplerupture.First,theneedtoconductwaroperationsgavebackapreponderantinfluencetonationalpolicymakersandgloballeadershipclearlypassedtotheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion,furtherreduc-ingtheroleofinternationalorganisations.68Second,theUnitedNationsDeclara-tion ushered the Soviet Union into world diplomacy, from which it had beenexcluded(withtheexceptionofitsbriefadmittancetotheLoNbetween1934and1939)since1917.SovietofficialshadalwaysbeensuspiciousoftheLeague;inthecase of the ILO, a fundamental ideological antagonism added to this hostility.69Third,withinthestateapparatusoftheUnitedStates,theroleoftheStateDepart-mentandthemilitaryauthoritiesintheorganisationofproductionandthesettingoflabourstandardsincreasedattheexpenseoftheinfluenceoftheDepartmentofLabor.70

The division of the US labour movement contributed to its marginalisation.Domestically,theAmericanFederationofLabor(AFL),whichmonopolisedtheUSworkers’representationattheILO,foughtagainstthedevelopmentoftheCongressofIndustrialOrganizations(CIO),whichwasgrowingquickly.TheCIOwasmoreopen to communist influences and closer to most of the Latin American tradeunions. Internationally, theAFLopposedallprojects forrapprochementwith theSovietUnionwhich,supportedbytheBritishtradeunionistWalterCitrine,eventu-allyledtothefoundingoftheWorldFederationofTradeUnionsinFebruary1945,of which Citrine became president. The AFL, which did not join the new globaltradeunionfederation,waspreparingwiththeassistanceoftheOfficeofStrategicServicesfortheglobaltradeunionscissionthatwouldoccurin1949.71Thistrade

373TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

sityofrethinkingtheplaceofglobaltradeunion-ismseeK.Pribram,«TheILO:PresentFunctionsandFutureTasks»,in:Foreign Affairs21(1942)1,158–167.

72 OnthispointseethefilededicatedtothispolicyinILO-ArchivesCAT6B-7-4andL1/14/3.

73 K.Bertrams,«Uneinspirationtoutencontrastes»,in:Genèses, sciences sociales et histoire71(2008)2,64–83.

74 AsJillJensenpointedouttome,theNewDealersalsosawfreetradeasanimportantmeansofen-

suring social welfare to all. On this issue, seeS. M. Nystrom, Free Trade and the New Deal: The United States and the International Economy of the 1930s, 2010. This work, which focuses ontheachievementofCordellHull,isaccessibleon-line http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?-article=2864&context=etd,accessedMay2012.

75 ILO, International Labour Conference, Philadel-phiaRecords of proceedings,1944,274,recommen-dation73.PublicWorks(NationalPlanning).

union«coldwar», launchedin1943bytheAFL,clearlyweakenedthepositionoforganisedlabourandoftheILOinpost-warprojects.

Meanwhile,discussionsofpost-warplanswithintheILOitselfexposedideologi-calandgeopoliticalrifts.BetweenAprilandMay1941,duringmeetingsorganisedattheInternationalLabourOfficeinMontrealbetweenheadsofsection,twovisionswereputforward.SomeliketheFrenchSocialistAdrienTixier(aspecialistinsocialinsurance)or theBelgianPierreWaelbroeck (responsible forquestionsofunem-ployment) supported large coordinated economic projects and social protectivemeasures to reduce unemployment. They drew on the idea, developed by AlbertThomasintheearly1930s,ofimplementinginternationalplansformajorconstruc-tionprojectsfinancedbytheBankforInternationalSettlements.72Advocatesofthistrendstressedtheneedtoinventademocraticformofplanninginresponsetothemodels implementedbyfascistandcommuniststates.However,Anglo-AmericanactorsintheILO,includingtheheadoftheGoverningbodyCarterGoodrich,feltthatanylong-termeconomicplanningshouldbeavoided.FrederickLeggett,BritishgovernmentdelegatetotheILO,sharedthispositionasdidtheemployersgroup,increasinglyreticenttowardsanyformofinterventionismfrom1943onwards.ThisviewprevailedinboththeglobalarenaandtheUnitedStatesattheverymomentthateconomicplanningandtheorganisationofsocialdialogueweregaininggroundin national resistance movements in Europe. In August 1943, the US CongressdecidedbyanarrowmajoritynottorenewfundingfortheNationalResourcesPlan-ningBoard,therebyexcludingthepro-planningNewDealersfromtheUSadminis-tration.73InNovember1943,thelaunchoftheUNRRAmadereconstructionaprior-ity over long-term economic planning. The year 1943 therefore seems to mark ashiftawayfrominternationaleconomicandsocialregulationinfavouroforganis-ingtradeandeconomicgrowthasamotorforglobalwelfare.74

The 1944 Philadelphia conference witnessed the triumph of this trend ofthought.Thedelegatesunanimouslyadoptedarecommendationonnationalpublicworks,whichwereseenasonepossiblemeanstofightagainstunemploymentandto increaseproductivity.75However, in itsfinaldeclaration, following the interna-tionaltrendsince1943,theconferencealsopraisedthepromotionof«ahighand

374 SandrineKott

76 Philadelphia Records 523 and 529. See also thepublication in 1944 of C. Stevension, The Com-mon Interest in International Economic Organisa-tion,InternationalLabourOffice,Studiesandre-ports,1944.

77 For the full text of the Havana Charter: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm

78 R. Toye, «Developing Multilateralism: The Ha-vanaCharterand theFight for theInternationalTradeOrganization,1947–1948»,in:The Interna-tional History Review25(2003)2,282–305.

79 See C. N. Murphy, The United Nations Develop-ment Programme: A Better Way?, Cambridge,2006,34–37.

steadyvolumeofinternationaltrade»,«recognisingthegreatcontributionwhichtheinternationalexchangeofgoodsandservicescanmaketohigherlivingstandardsandtohighlevelsofemployment.»76

Clearly,PhiladelphiamarkedaturningpointfortheILO.Protectiveandredis-tributive measures, which had formed the backbone of the ILO policy up to the1930s, lost their priority in favour of productive measures aiming at increasingglobal wealth, whose redistribution would ensure prosperity for all. Nonetheless,thewaysandmeansofachievingthisredistributionwerenotresolvedinternation-ally.TheHavanaCharterdiscussedin1947envisionedaregulationoffreetradeinfavourofdevelopingcountries,77butitsdismissalbytheUSCongressin1950putanendtothediscussionoftheregulationoffreetradeandcloseddebateonpossiblewaysofchannellingthisglobalredistribution.78

ThediscussionssurroundingtheCharter,aswellastheUSdevelopmentpro-grammelaunchedduringthewarbytheInter-AmericanOfficeandlargelyfundedbyNelsonRockefeller,79 indicatednevertheless that theUSauthoritiesgrewcon-cernedwithglobalinequality.Underdevelopment,whichwasmademoreacutebythe trendtowardsdecolonisation,was increasinglyseenasanewthreat toglobalpeace.Meanwhile,undevelopedcountriescouldalsopresentanopportunityfornewmarkets.Thisopenedthewayfornewdevelopmentprogrammes.TheuniversalistandhumanrightsdiscourseofPhiladelphiahastobeunderstoodinthiscontext.Thisdiscoursealsomarkedadeclineintheinfluenceoforganisedlabourinfavourofeconomicexpertsondevelopment,manyofthemcomingfromtheformerNewDealadministration.

6. Conclusion

Iwouldliketogobacktothequestionsraisedinmyintroduction:towhatextentcantheSecondWorldWarbestudiedasatimeofpeculiarinternationalism?Whatroledid thevarious ILOactors andbodiesplay in this internationalism?HowdoesastudyoftheILO’sperspectivecontributetoabetterunderstandingoftheshiftingglobalbalanceofgeopoliticalpowerwhichoccurredduringthisperiod?

Undoubtedly,duringthewartheILOstoodforanalternative,democraticinter-nationalisminresponsetoNaziinternational/Europeanplans.TheOrganisationassuch succeeded (if not always) in protecting some of its own people – officials,

375TheILOduringtheSecondWorldWar

80 H.Obinger/C.Schmitt,«GunsandButter?:Re-gimeCompetitionandtheWelfareStateDuringtheColdWar»,in:World Politics63(2011)2,246–270.

expertsanddelegates–andwasabletoprovideandpublishinformationonwhatwasreallyhappeninginEurope.Morebroadly,theILOwasabletoserveasaninter-nationalplatformuntil1942; its tripartitestructurefacilitatedthemobilisationoflargesegmentsof internationalpublicopinionon«thedemocraticside».But theOrganisationwasalsoinvolvedintheinternationalwareffortthroughvariouschan-nelsandactors.Awebofinternationalcorrespondentswasabletoprovideimpor-tantandreliableinformation.Trainedandrecognisedexpertscouldtosupportalter-nativesocialpoliticalmeasuresaimedatfightingagainstNazipropaganda.FurtherresearchwouldmostprobablyrevealtherolethatseveralILOofficialsplayedinthesecretservicesonthesideoftheAllies.

Beyondthisdirectparticipationinwar,followingtheILOmakesitpossibletobetterunderstandthemulti-layeredprocessesleadingtothenewbalanceofpoweremergingfromthewar.TheduallocationoftheILOmirroredthegeopoliticalshiftof gravity: the vanishing influence of continental Europe and the rise of the USglobalpower.Thisgeographicalshiftwascloselylinkedtoaglobalsocialchange.ThelossofinfluenceoftheILOafter1942revealshow,inEuropeaswellasintheUSA, labour had to give ground in favour of a new group of economic experts.Betweenthe1941conferenceinNewYorkandthe1944conferenceinPhiladelphia,thesocialprioritiesshiftedfromtheprotectionoftheworkingpopulationandthedistributionofwealthtowardsdevelopmentandfreetradeasapromiseforabetterlifeglobally.Nevertheless,theroleofthelabourmovementandofinfluentialcom-munistpartiesinEuropeancountriesaswellasfearsofrevolutioninaColdWarcontextpromptedcompetition.80ThisfosteredakindofemulationthatcanexplaintherapidgrowthofsocialexpenditureduringtheColdWarperiod.Butonthegloballevel,theliberalagendawasalreadywellonitswayin1945.

376 SandrineKott

Fighting the War or Preparing for Peace? The ILO during the Second World WarDuringtheSecondWorldWartheILOstoodforanalternative,democraticinternational-isminresponsetoNaziinternational/Europeanplans.TheILOwasabletoserveasaninternational platform and was directly involved in the Allied war effort. Moreover,examining the ILO allows us to better understand the multi-layered processes andrationalesthatbroughtaboutashiftinthepoliticalandsocialbalanceofpowerduringtheSecondWorldWar.After the ILOmoved toMontreal inMay1940, thehandfulofFrench functionaries guarding the organisation’s deserted headquarters in Genevacould only look on helplessly as the reformist labour movement, together with thevisionofasocialEuropethatitpromoted,wasdefeated.Meanwhile,onthecampusofMcGill University in Montreal, the ILO underwent a twofold transformation in exile.DependentonBritishandNorthAmericanfundingandstaff,itbecamethechampionofthepragmaticsolutionstosocialissuesimplementedinthosecountries.ThroughitsworkfortheUnitedNationsallianceitexpandeditsactivitiesinthefieldsofexpertiseand technicalassistance, to thedetrimentof itswork insetting international labourstandards.Whileithadbeenfoundedin1919toprotectworkersandtoprovideaninter-nationalplatformforthereformistworkersmovement,theILOemergedfromthewarasanorganisationfocusingincreasinglyonprovidingeconomicandsocialexpertise.

Krieg führen oder den Frieden vorbereiten? Die ILO während des Zweiten WeltkriegesDieILOwarwährenddesKriegeseinHortundeinSymboldesdemokratischenInterna-tionalismus,dersichalsAlternativezunationalsozialistischenNeuordnungsversuchenvoralleminEuropainStellungzubringenversuchte.DieILOkonntesichzunächstalsPlattform für internationale Arbeiter- und Arbeitspolitik behaupten. Gleichzeitig warsieindieKriegsführungeinbezogen.SomiteignetsichdieILOalsGegenstand,umdenvielschichtigenProzesszuuntersuchen,derzuneuenMachtverhältnisseninderNach-kriegsordnungführte.NachdemdieILOimMai1940ihrenSitznachMontrealverlegthatte, blieb den wenigen französischen Funktionären, die in Genf zurückgebliebenwaren,nurnochdieRolledeshilflosenZuschauers.MitihnenwarauchdieVisioneinessozialenEuropas,getragenvoneinerreformistischenArbeiterbewegung,untergegan-gen.UnterdessenunterzogsichdieILOimExilaufdemCampusderMcGill-UniversitätinMontrealeinerzweifachenTransformation.Angewiesenaufbritischeundnordameri-kanische Finanzierung und personale Ausstattung setzte sie sich für pragmatischeLösungensozialerFragenein,dieindiesenbeidenLändernimplementiertwerdensoll-ten. Die ILO weitete ihre Aktivitäten auch im Bereich von Expertise und technischerUnterstützungaus.SieergänztedenvorherigenSchwerpunkt,derinderDurchsetzunginternationalerArbeitsstandardslag.DieILOwar1919alsOrganisationderreformisti-schenArbeiterbewegunggegründetworden.NachdemKriegverwandeltesiesich ineineOrganisation,diesichderökonomischenundsozialenExpertisewidmete.

Sandrine KottDépartementd’histoiregénéraleUniversitédeGenève5rueSaintOursCH-1211Genève4e-mail:Sandrine.Kott@unige.ch

ABSTrACTS