Responsible Belief and Epistemic Justification

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SyntheseAn International Journal forEpistemology, Methodology andPhilosophy of Science ISSN 0039-7857 SyntheseDOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1038-8

Responsible belief and epistemicjustification

Rik Peels

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SyntheseDOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1038-8

S.I . : DOXASTICAGENCY

Responsible belief and epistemic justification

Rik Peels1

Received: 30 March 2015 / Accepted: 18 December 2015© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract For decades, philosophers have displayed an interest in what it is to have anepistemically justified belief. Recently, we also find among philosophers a renewedinterest in the so-called ethics of belief: what is it to believe (epistemically) responsiblyandwhen is one’s belief blameworthy? This paper explores how epistemically justifiedbelief and responsible belief are related to each other. On the so-called ‘deontologi-cal conception of epistemic justification’, they are identical: to believe epistemicallyresponsibly is to believe epistemically justifiedly. I argue that William Alston’s criti-cism of a deontological conception of epistemic justification in terms of our influenceon our beliefs is unconvincing. Moreover, such a conception meets three criteria thatonemight put forward in order for an account of epistemic justification to be plausible:it shows a concern with the Jamesian goal of having true rather than false beliefs, it isrelevantly similar to accounts of justification in non-doxastic realms, such as action,and there is good reason to think that, if spelled out in sufficient detail, it may wellprovide a necessary condition for knowledge. I conclude that the deontological con-ception of epistemic justification is stronger than is often thought: it is worth exploringwhether epistemically justified belief is epistemically responsible belief.

Keywords William Alston · Deontologism · Doxastic control · Doxastic influence ·Epistemic justification · Epistemic obligations · Intellectual obligations ·Knowledge ·Responsible belief

B Rik [email protected]

1 Philosophy Department, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105,1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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1 Introduction

For decades, philosophers have been discussing what it is to hold a belief that isepistemically justified. We find internalist accounts, such as Earl Conee and RichardFeldman’s evidentialism (roughly, whether one’s belief is epistemically justified is amatter of the extent to which it fits one’s evidence),1 and we find externalist accounts,such as Alvin Goldman’s reliabilism (roughly, whether one’s belief is epistemicallyjustified is a matter of whether it was produced by a reliable doxastic mechanism).2

Recently, epistemology also shows a renewed interest in the ethics of belief. Oneof the core questions in the ethics of belief debate is what it is to believe responsibly.Philosophers such as Jonathan Adler and Nikolaj Nottelmann have addressed thisquestion in detail.3 Both individual and collective doxastic responsibility have beenput on the agenda.4

The focus of this paper is on the relation between the two, that is, between epis-temically justified belief on the one hand and responsible belief (or, more specifically,epistemically responsible belief) on the other. For, there is a particular account of epis-temic justification that explicitly relates the two to each other by claiming that they areidentical. On the so-calledDeontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ),epistemic justification is best understood in terms of obligations, permissions, require-ments, responsibility, praise, and blame. Epistemically justified belief is epistemicallyresponsible belief.5

Now, William Alston has provided a well-known argument against DCEJ. Accord-ing toAlston, we are obligated to believe certain propositions only if we have sufficientvoluntary control over our beliefs, but we do not have such control over them. In thispaper, I consider a specific response to Alston’s argument that aims to save DCEJ.This response grants that we lack control over our beliefs and, therefore, have noobligations to have particular beliefs. However, on this approach we nevertheless haveinfluence on our beliefs: we can influence what we believe by performing such belief-influencing actions as gathering evidence, working on our intellectual virtues andvices, and improving the functioning of our cognitive mechanisms.

That (epistemically) responsible belief can be understood in terms of doxastic influ-ence has been argued by Murray Clarke, Fred Dretske, Hilary Kornblith, Mark Leon,andMichael Stocker.6 However, according to these philosophers, such influence savesdoxastic responsibility (responsibility for our doxastic attitudes), not necessarily alsothe deontological conception of epistemic justification. Their point is that we are

1 See Feldman (2004).2 See Goldman (1986).3 See Adler (2002), Nottelmann (2007). For my own account, see Peels (2013a, 2014, 2016).4 For a recent edited volume on these issues, see Matheson and Vitz (2014).5 According to BonJour (1985, p. 8), for instance, the core of the concept of epistemic justification isepistemic responsibility.6 See Clarke (1986), Dretske (2000), Kornblith (1983), Leon (2002), Stocker (1982). Kornblith usesthe word ‘justification’, but he does not seem to have in mind what epistemologists mean by ‘epistemicjustification’ and he does not address Alston’s argument against understanding epistemic justification interms of doxastic influence.

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responsible for our beliefs in virtue of the influence we have on them. They have notclaimed that such influence also saves the idea that epistemic justification should beunderstood in terms of praise, blame, and responsibility. They either agree with Alstonthat it does not do so or they do not address the issue. In this paper, I assess the thesisthat our influence on our beliefs saves DCEJ.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I sketch Alston’s argument against DCEJand briefly show how the approach in terms of doxastic influence can be spelled out(Sect. 2). Subsequently, I consider Alston’s argument against this approach (Sect. 3)and Hamid Vahid’s response to that argument (Sect. 4). Next, I argue that Alston’sargument begs the question by assuming that the account of epistemic justification interms of doxastic influence should be extensionally equivalent to the main externalistor internalist accounts of epistemic justification that we find in the literature (Sect. 5).This raises the question of which criterion the account should meet in order to be aviable account of epistemic justification. Without taking a position on which criteriaare correct, I spell out three criteria that one could plausibly propose and argue that theaccount at hand meets all three of them. First, the account shows a concern with theJamesian goal of having true rather than false beliefs (Sect. 6). Second, the accountis relevantly similar to accounts of justification in non-doxastic realms, such as therealm of action (Sect. 7). Third, there is reason to think that on the account, epistemicjustification is a necessary condition for knowledge (Sect. 8).

2 Epistemic justification and doxastic influence

Alston has provided the following well-known argument against DCEJ:

(1) We are obligated to believe certain propositions only if we have sufficientvoluntary control over our beliefs.

(2) We do not have sufficient voluntary control over our beliefs.(3) We do not have doxastic obligations.7

Alston does not defend premise (1)—the idea that doxastic obligations require doxasticcontrol—in any detail. He thinks it follows from the principle that ought implies can.

Alston’s argument for (2) proceeds by way of enumerative induction. He distin-guishes between different kinds of control and asks us for particular propositionswhether we have control over our doxastic attitude towards them. Can we choose tobelieve that the United States is still a colony of Great Britain? Can we choose not tobelieve that it is raining when we look out our window and see rain falling? Can wechoose to believe that God exists or that materialism is true? In each case, it seems theanswer has to be negative.

Alston does not actually say howwe are to derive from (3) that DCEJ is untenable. Itseems tome that there are at least two options. IfDCEJ says that one believes justifiedlyonly if one hasmet one’s doxastic obligations, then one never believes justifiedly, sinceone cannot meet one’s doxastic obligations if there are no such obligations. If DCEJ

7 Of course, the same applies mutatis mutandis to the other two doxastic attitudes, those of disbelief andsuspension of belief. For this argument, see Alston (1989d, pp. 115–136; 2005, pp. 58–60).

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says that one believes justifiedly if one has not violated one’s doxastic obligations,then one always believes justifiedly, for if there are no doxastic obligations, then onecannot violate them. Both options would surely count as a reductio of DCEJ, for it iswidely agreed among philosophers that some of our beliefs are justified while othersare not.

Elsewhere, I have argued that (1) and (2) are indeed true.8 The strategy that I wouldlike to focus on in this paper, therefore, is that which grants (3), but denies that itfollows that DCEJ is inviable. More specifically, the idea is that we do have direct orindirect control over such belief-influencing factors as evidence gathering, workingon our epistemic virtues and vices, and improving the functioning of our doxasticmechanisms—briefly, our evidence bases and our belief-forming habits. One couldargue that, because we sometimes have control over these things, we have obligationswith respect to our evidence and our belief-forming habits. Since these obligations arenot obligations (not) to have a particular belief, but meeting or not meeting them doesmake a difference to our beliefs, we could call them intellectual rather than doxasticobligations.

The responsibility that we bear for our doxastic attitudes would then count asderivative rather than original responsibility: we are responsible for our doxasticattitudes, not because we control them (rather, we lack such control), but because theyare (often) relevantly related to our evidence bases and belief-forming dispositionsover which we do have control. We, therefore, have indirect voluntary influence onour beliefs. On this view, justification for our beliefs is to be understood along thefollowing lines:

(4) S justifiedly believes that p iff it is not the case that if S had fulfilled all herintellectual obligations, then S’s belief-forming habits would have changedor S’s access to relevant adverse considerations would have changed, in sucha way that S would not have believed that p.9

There is a lot to be said about intellectual obligations. For one thing, it seems thatone can have epistemic, but also moral or prudential obligations to perform somebelief-influencing action. For instance, I might have a moral obligation not to spy onmy niece and I might have a prudential obligation to gather evidence on the weatherconditions before setting out on a mountain climb. Presumably, epistemic intellectualobligations will have something to do with acquiring true rather than false beliefs (Ireturn to this below). Henceforth, when I use the expression ‘intellectual obligations’I mean epistemic intellectual obligations.

In the literature, we find different proposals as to what our intellectual obligationsare. It has been suggested, for instance, that one has an intellectual obligation to doone’s best to bring it about that for any proposition pwhich one considers, one believesthat p if p is true and one disbelieves that p if p is false,10 that one has an intellectualobligation to gather further evidence on p if p is less than certain on one’s evidence or

8 See Peels (2016).9 See Alston (1989d, p. 143).10 See Chisholm (1977, p. 14).

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if one is not certain about p,11 and that one has an intellectual obligation to criticallyreflect on one’s beliefs.12 It would require a separate paper, if not more, to provideand defend an account of what our epistemic intellectual obligations are. Here, I haveonly indicated what kinds of obligations intellectual obligations are and how, on theaccount under consideration, they relate to being epistemically justified in holding abelief.

We should note that a DCEJ in terms of intellectual obligations à la (4) meets quitea few worries that we find in the literature. Let me give an example. Nikolaj Nottel-mann objects against DCEJ that if it is understood as epistemically permissible belief,there will be nothing specifically deontological about that conception of epistemicjustification. This is because if a belief is epistemically permissible, it is permitted byone’s epistemic reasons, that is, by one’s evidence. And one can cash out the idea thatone’s belief is permitted by one’s reasons or evidence without appeal to any deonticnotions, such as blame, responsibility, or obligation.13 Whether or not this objection issound, the account of epistemic justification under consideration—proposition (4)—circumvents it, because (4) is not cashed out in terms of epistemic reasons, but in termsof intellectual obligations, and, clearly, whether or not one has met such obligationsis a deontological matter.14

3 Alston’s argument against (4)

Alston argues that a deontological conception based on voluntary influence, such as(4), is deficient as a conception of epistemic justification for reasons other than thatprovided by the argument above (the argument constituted by (1)–(3)).Most adherentsof DCEJ have denied either (1) or (2).15 It is widely acknowledged, though, that suchdenials of (1) and (2) face serious difficulties. It would, therefore, be important if itturned out that (4) might be a viable conception of epistemic justification after all.

The structure of Alston’s argument against (4) is as follows:

I shall point out ways in which one can be justified according to (II) [that is, theabove (4); RP], and yet not justified in any way that is crucial for epistemologicalconcerns; and, conversely, that one canbe justified in an epistemologically crucialway and yet not deontologically justified, as spelled out by (II).16

Alston specifies the issue under consideration as epistemic rather than moral or pru-dential justification for beliefs. If, as William James famously argued, the epistemic

11 See Hall and Johnson (1998, p. 133).12 See BonJour (1985, p. 42), Kim (1994, p. 284).13 See Nottelmann (2013, p. 2229).14 Alternatively, Nottelmann may object that if the deontological conception of epistemic justificationis cashed out in terms of intellectual obligations, it is not clearly a conception of distinctively epistemicjustification. I return to this worry below.15 For denials of (1), see Chrisman (2008, pp. 358–370), Chuard and Southwood (2009, pp. 601, 614–619),Feldman (2008, p. 346). For denials of (2), see Ginet (2001, pp. 64–75), Ryan (2003, pp. 70–76), Steup(2008, pp. 379–391).16 Alston (1989d, p. 143).

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goal is to have true rather than false beliefs, then a belief’s being epistemically justifiedshould have to do with reaching the goal of having true rather than false beliefs andnot so much with goals such as having beneficial beliefs or having beliefs that makeus happy.17

Now, as Alston points out, there are two main strands of concepts of epistemicjustification, those of externalism and internalism. Since each kind admits of manyvarieties that Alston cannot all discuss, he focuses on two popular accounts. On theexternalist account that he treats, to be justified in believing that p is both to be in aposition that is favorable toward reaching the epistemic goal by having a belief thatis based on an adequate ground, that is, a ground such that basing one’s belief on itrenders it likely that one’s belief is true, and to have a belief that is based on a groundthat is fairly readily accessible to one. On the internalist account that he discusses, tobe justified in believing that p is for it to be true that from one’s perspective, one’sbelief is based on an adequate (truth-conducive) ground. Thus, Alston’s presentationof externalist and internalist accounts of epistemic justification can be summarizedslightly more formally as follows:

(5) S justifiedly believes that p iff (i) S’s belief that p is based on an adequateground (its being based on that ground is truth-conducive) and (ii) that groundis fairly readily accessible to S.

(6) S justifiedly believes that p iff from S’s perspective, S’s belief that p is basedon an adequate ground.18

Alston criticizes (4) by arguing that it is co-extensional neither with (5) nor with (6).19

First, a subject can be justified on (4) and yet not form a belief in a truth-conduciveway and, therefore, fail to be justified on (5). One example he gives that illustrates thispoint is this:

Tribesman case. S has lived all his life in an isolated primitive community whereeveryone unhesitatingly accepts the traditions of the tribe as authoritative. Thesehave to do with alleged events distant in time and space, about which S and hisfellows have no chance to gather independent evidence. S has never encounteredanyone who questions the traditions, and these traditions play a key role in thecommunal life of the tribe. Under these conditions it seems clear to me that S isin no way to blame for forming beliefs on the basis of the traditions. He has notfailed to do anything he could reasonably be expected to do. His beliefs about, forexample, the origins of the tribe, stem fromwhat, so far as he can see, are the bestgrounds one could have for such beliefs. And yet, let us suppose, the traditionshave not been formed in such a way as to be a reliable indication of their owntruth. S is deontologically justified, but he is not believing in a truth-conduciveway.20

17 See Alston (1989b, pp. 83–84; 1989d, p. 116).18 I think (5) and (6) are somewhat problematic; few externalists and internalists would be willing toembrace these accounts as they stand. My criticisms, however, do not hinge on these issues.19 For the entire argument, see Alston (1989d, pp. 145–152).20 Alston (1989d, p. 145).

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Since the tribesman cannot reasonably have been expected to form a different belief,his belief is deontologically justified on (4), even though his belief is clearly not formedin a truth-conducive way and, therefore, fails to meet (5). Here is a second case Alstonpresents:

Cognitive deficiency case. (…) a college student (…) doesn’t have what it takesto follow abstract philosophical exposition or reasoning. Having read parts ofBook IV of Locke’s Essay, he takes it that Locke’s view is that everything is amatter of opinion. He is simply incapable of distinguishing between that viewand Locke’s view that one’s knowledge is restricted to one’s own ideas. There isnothing he could do, at least nothing that could reasonably be expected of him,given his other commitments and obligations, that would lead him to appreciatethat difference. Hence he cannot be blamed for interpreting Locke as he does;he is doing the best he can. But surely this belief is outrageously ill grounded,based as it is on the student’s dim-witted impressions of Locke.21

This is a case of cognitive deficiency, in which it seems the student is justified on (4),but clearly his belief is not formed in a truth-conducive way and he, therefore, failsto meet (5). However, as Alston points out, the point is not confined to such extremecases. Daily life cases of testimony in which we lack the time and resources to lookinto a manner in a fashion that is epistemically ideal also illustrate the point:

Testimony case 1. For the same reason that I cannot engage in astrophysics onmy own, I am in no position to determine who is a competent authority in thefield, except by taking the word of other alleged authorities. Thus in most casesin which I uncritically accept testimony I have done as much as could reasonablybe expected of me. And now let us consider those cases in which the authorityis incompetent or the witness is unreliable. There we are forming a belief on anobjectively unreliable basis, though deontologically justified in doing so. Onecould hardly deny that this happens significantly often.22

Alston goes on to mention four other (kinds of) cases that illustrate the point.23 Hethen concludes:

We may take it that our deontological formula, (II) [again, the above proposition(4); RP], fails to capturewhatwe are looking for in epistemology under the rubricof ‘justification’, when we are looking for something in the neighborhood of“being in a favorable position in believing that p”, favorable from the standpointof the aim at believing the true and avoiding believing the false.24

21 Alston (1989d, pp. 146–147).22 Alston (1989d, p. 148).23 They are: (a) Someone who believes that socialism is contrary to Christianity, for the reasons that areoften given by the New Right, and he is incapable intellectually to figure out how bad these reasons are. (b)People form perceptual beliefs in deceiving circumstances. (c) People form irresistible beliefs, for instance,because of strong emotional attachments. (d) I am deontologically justified in holding beliefs that it takes(much) time to scrutinize, even though they might not be held on truth-conducive grounds (see Alston1989d, pp. 147–149).24 Alston (1989d, p. 149).

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Now, as Alston rightly points out, the opposite is also possible. It is possible to believeon the basis of a truth-conducive ground while not being deontologically justified,namely if one’s belief is based on a truth-conducive ground, but if it is true that ifone had critically reflected on that belief, as one should have, one would have hadgood reasons to doubt the adequacy of the ground and, thus, would not have formedthe belief. Remarkably, here Alston gives only one example (rather than seven) toillustrate the point:

Testimony case 2. An acquaintance, Broom, tells me that Robinson, whom weare considering for a position in my department, has just been made an offer byPrinceton. The press of affairs and my instinctive confidence in Broom lead meto neglect my duty and accept Broom’s report uncritically. If I had looked into thematter, I would have found strong evidence that Broom is untrustworthy in suchmatters. This evidence, however, would have beenmisleading, and in fact Broomis extremely scrupulous and reliable in reporting such things. Thus I formed thebelief on an objectively adequate ground, but had I done my intellectual duty Iwould have mistrusted the ground and hence not formed the belief.25

He then turns to internalist accounts of epistemic justification, which do not requirethat the ground actually is truth-conducive but only that it is truth-conducive from thesubject’s perspective. Here are two (kinds of) examples that he gives that show thatone can be justified on (4) and yet not on (6):

Irresistible beliefs case. If a belief is irresistible, then no matter how intellec-tually virtuous I am, I will form that belief whether or not I am justified insupposing its ground to be an adequate one.26

Lack of cognitive powers case. It seems plausible to suppose thatmany cognitivesubjects are simply incapable of engaging in rational consideration of whetherthe grounds of their beliefs (at least many sorts of beliefs, for instance, thoseinvolving complex inductive grounds) are adequate ones. Even if they raise thequestion, they are not capable of coming to well-grounded conclusions. Thesepeople might have done everything that could reasonably be expected of themin an intellectual way, and yet, because of their inability to effectively submitthe grounds of their beliefs to a critical assessment, would not be justified insupposing the ground of a certain belief to be sufficient.27

He also gives one example of being justified on (6)—having internalist justification—without being justified on (4):

Hostages case. Consider one who is justified in supposing the ground of herbelief that the hostages are in Iran to be an adequate one. That is, the informationand general principles at her disposal indicate her evidence to be sufficient. Sheis internalistically justified in this belief about the hostages. Yet had she engagedin further investigation, as she should have done, her internal perspective would

25 Alston (1989d, pp. 149–150).26 Alston (1989d, p. 150).27 Alston (1989d, p. 151).

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have been enlarged and corrected in such a way that she would no longer bejustified in this higher level belief. Her total knowledge and justified belief wouldthen have indicated that her evidence for this proposition is not sufficient.28

He concludes that a DCEJ à la (4) matches an internalist conception of justification nobetter than an externalist one. Thus, Alston’s argument against (4) is that it matchesneither an externalist conception of epistemic justification—(5)—nor an internalistconception of epistemic justification—(6)—in that, on the one hand, a belief can meet(4) and yet not be based on a truth-conducive ground and it can be based on a truth-conducive ground and yet notmeet (4), and, on the other hand, a belief canmeet (4) andyet not be based on a ground that is truth-conducive from the subject’s perspective anda belief can be based on a ground that is truth-conducive from the subject’s perspectiveand yet not meet (4).

In what follows, I will assume that Alston’s examples, as I presented them in thissection, convincingly establish the desired conclusions.

4 Vahid’s response to Alston’s argument against (4)

This argument of Alston has gone largely unnoticed in the literature. By far mostepistemologists have focused on the argument fromour lack of control over our beliefs,as I sketched it in Sect. 2. Hamid Vahid, however, has paid explicit attention to theargument as I presented it in the previous section. His response can be summarizedas follows. First, on the basis of an earlier article of Alston,29 Vahid defines DCEJ asfollows:

(7) S is justified in believing that p iff (i) S believes that p, (ii) S believes thatshe has adequate evidence for p, and (iii) S’s belief that she has adequateevidence for p is based on adequate grounds.30

Subsequently, he convincingly argues that by definition, meeting (7) does not meanthat one’s belief is formed in a truth-conduciveway. For, clearly, one can have adequateevidence that one has adequate evidence for p, even if one’s evidence for p is in factinadequate (adequacy does not entail truth). But why, Vahid asks, would that countagainst (7)? That seems to be the case only if we assume that truth-conduciveness isan essential part of epistemic justification and that seems to beg the question. Whatwe rather seem to have in epistemology is a variety of different but equally valuableconceptions of epistemic justification. Trying to reduce this plurality is a project thatis unlikely to succeed.

For two reasons, Vahid’s response to Alston does not seem fully satisfying to me.First, Vahid’s response may or may not save (7) from Alston’s argument. We shouldremember, however, that Alston’s argument is explicitly directed against a DCEJ that

28 Alston (1989d, p. 152).29 See Alston (1989b).30 See Vahid (1998, p. 289). My (7) is a fully spelled out version of his (DJd ).

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bases doxastic responsibility on indirect voluntary influence31 and, (7), in oppositionto (4), does not do that. For all we know, therefore, (7), to the extent that it is trulydeontological, falls prey to the argument from doxastic involuntarism (lack of controlover our beliefs) that I presented at the outset of this paper. That as such does notcount against Vahid’s criticism of (7), but it does mean that Vahid’s criticism maymiss the target, which is (4)—an account of epistemic justification in terms of doxasticinfluence, one that is crucially different from (7).

Second, Alston’s point is not merely that (4) can come apart from truth-conduciveness, but that it gives different verdicts from those given by the mainexternalist and internalist conceptions of justification. That (4) can come apart fromtruth-conduciveness is only one of the four arguments that he provides by comparing(4) on the one hand with (5) and (6) on the other—the others being that a belief canbe based on a truth-conducive ground and yet not meet (4), that meeting (4) does notmean that one’s belief is based on a ground that is truth-conducive from one’s ownperspective, and that a belief can be based on a ground that is truth-conducive fromone’s own perspective and yet not meet (4).

Nevertheless, I believe that there is a grain of truth in what Vahid says, viz. that acertain arbitrariness is displayed in Alston’s argument against (4). I will explain thispoint in the next section.

5 The problem with Alston’s argument against (4)

Alston seems to acknowledge that in order to answer the question ofwhether (4) countsas a viable conception of epistemic justification, we need some way of identifyingwhat we have in mind by being ‘epistemically justified’ in holding certain beliefs.In addition to explaining ‘epistemic’ in terms of the Jamesian goal of having truerather than false beliefs, Alston provides the required specification by assuming thateither (5) or (6)—or something close to it—gives the correct account of epistemicjustification.

It seems to me that this strategy begs the question. For, the deontological concep-tion of epistemic justification, as spelled out in (4), can plausibly be interpreted as arival view of what it is to be epistemically justified in having some particular belief.Depending onwhether the intellectual obligations we are presumed to have are spelledout externalistically or internalistically—that is, in terms of such objective features astruth-conduciveness or in terms of such subjective features as people’s beliefs abouttruth-conduciveness—(4) is a specific externalist or internalist account of epistemicjustification that is to be considered as an alternative to (5) and (6). That (4) does notmatch (5) or (6) nor the main intuitions about epistemic justification of those whoembrace (5) or (6)—such as that an epistemically justified belief should be based on atruth-conducive ground or that it should be based on a ground that is truth-conducivefrom one’s own perspective—does not count against (4).

31 See Alston (1989d, p. 143).

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The point can be strengthened by noting that something similar applies to certainother accounts of epistemic justification that we find in the literature. Take RichardFeldman’s and Earl Conee’s account of epistemic justification:

(8) S is justified in believing that p iff believing p fits S’s evidence.

They stress that this does not require that S bases her belief that p on the evidencethat she has that fits her belief that p—that, they say, would be an instance of a well-founded belief, which is stronger than epistemically justified belief. Nor is it requiredthat from S’s perspective her belief is based on an adequate grounds—the cognitivesubject in question may have no opinion on that matter, not even dispositionally.All that is required is that one’s belief does fit one’s evidence.32 Like (4), (8) isbest interpreted as a rival account of epistemic justification. That it gives verdictsdifferent from those given by (5) and (6), therefore, does not count against it. But thenit also does not count against (4) or any other account of epistemic justification interms of our doxastic influence that it gives different verdicts from those given by (5)and (6).

One might respond that Alston has criticized DCEJ not only in his article “Thedeontological conception of epistemic justification”, but also in his piece “Conceptsof Epistemic Justification.” This is true, but we should notice that in that article herejects DCEJ because meeting something like (4) does not render it likely that one’sbelief is true. According to Alston, only a belief that is likely to be true can count asepistemically justified.33 And, as I said, this begs the question, for adherents of DCEJmight very well maintain that DCEJ is a rival conception of epistemic justificationand that likelihood of truth or truth-conduciveness is not a necessary condition forepistemic justification. Moreover, we should notice that an internalist conception ofepistemic justification à la (6) also does not always render it likely that one’s beliefis true—as we saw in Sect. 3, there are situations in which one’s belief meets (6) butin which that fact does not render it likely that one’s belief is true. For, it may wellbe that from one’s perspective, one’s belief that p is based on an adequate ground (aground that renders it likely that one’s belief is true), while in fact it is not. It is evenpossible that one believes on the basis of an adequate ground that one’s belief thatp is based on an adequate ground, even though it is not. After all, being adequatelygrounded does not imply being true.

Another response might be that, elsewhere, Alston has defended a particular con-ception of epistemic justification—his so-called internalist externalism.34 However,in defending that position, Alston again assumes that a belief is epistemically justifiedonly if it is based on a ground that is favorable relative to the aim of having true ratherthan false beliefs, which he explains as: “it must be sufficiently indicative of the truthof the belief it grounds. In other terms, the ground must be such that the probabil-ity of the belief’s being true, given that ground, is very high.”35 As I said, however,

32 See Feldman (2004).33 See Alston (1989b, p. 84).34 See Alston (1989a).35 Alston (1989a, p. 232).

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that begs the question. It implies, for instance, that any internalist conception whichresembles (6) is untenable. Alston, therefore, fails to provide a theoretically neutralcriterion—that is, a criterion that does not depend on a particular analysis of epistemicjustification—that an account of epistemic justification must meet in order to be aviable account of epistemic justification.

Is there another standard? I can think of three such standards. These are all standardsthat we can find in the literature in one form or another. I would like to emphasize thatI do not contend that these are in fact correct criteria for epistemic justification. Someof them might even be to some extent question begging—I will not take a stance onthat. I give these three criteria, because they are the most important candidates thatI can think of. What I want to argue is that whether or not they are correct, we havegood reason to think that (4) meets them. If one finds none of them convincing, thenit is up to the opponent of DCEJ to come up with a more convincing criterion forepistemic justification. These are three criteria that a viable conception of epistemicjustification should meet. It does not follow that if it meets one or all of these criteria,the conception in question is the correct conception of epistemic justification—theremay be several conceptions of epistemic justification that meet these criteria. The pointis rather that a conception of epistemic justification should meet these criteria in orderto be viable, that is, in order to be a serious contender in the debate on what the correctconception of epistemic justification is.

6 First criterion: showing a concern with the Jamesian goal

First, one could stress Alston’s point that a conception of epistemic justification shouldmanifest a certain concernwith the Jamesian goal of having true rather than false beliefsand that (4) fails to do so, since epistemic justification as spelled out in (4) does notguarantee true belief nor does it make true belief likely.36

My reply is twofold. First, why should one think that showing a concern with theJamesian goal of having true rather than false beliefs should guarantee or make itlikely that one holds true beliefs? Take the Cognitive deficiency case that I mentionedin Sect. 3: a student who is cognitively unable to grasp an argument of Locke may bedeontologically justified in believing that, according to Locke, everything is a matterof opinion, although, given his cognitive capacities, he is unlikely to form true beliefson these matters. Thus, even though he might be justified on (4), his belief on Locke’sphilosophy is neither true nor likely to be true. Still, it seems the student, if he fulfillshis intellectual obligations, such as gathering the relevant evidence by reading Locke’sbooks and critically reflecting on them, thereby displays a concern with the Jamesiangoal. His aim is to find out—i.e. hold a true belief—about Locke’s philosophy. Thus,DCEJ as spelled out in (4) does after all show a concern with the Jamesian goal ofhaving true rather than false beliefs.

Second, there is more to be said about the relation between (4) and the Jamesiangoal. In order to see that, let us first turn to (5) and (6). How do these concepts ofepistemic justification satisfy the requirement of showing a concern with the Jamesian

36 This view is widely shared, as rightly noticed by Riggs (2003, pp. 342–345).

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goal? (5) does so in virtue of the fact that, by definition, a justified belief is one thatis likely to be true. For, on (5) a justified belief is one that is based on an adequateground and a ground is adequate only if it is such that basing a belief on that groundmakes it likely that that belief is true. Notice that it is not required that one’s groundis fully adequate, that is, that it entails that one’s belief is true. It is widely agreedthat false beliefs can be justified. What (5) says is that a justified belief B is a beliefbased on a ground G such that in a sufficiently large portion of cases (presumably,across possible worlds) in which B is based on G, B is true. Therefore, the relationbetween justification and the Jamesian goal of having true rather than false beliefs thatis implicit in (5) is that of rendering attaining it likely.

As to (6), the fact that from S’s perspective B is based on an adequate groundG clearly does not always render it likely that B is true rather than false. G may infact be wholly inadequate, so that, no matter what S believes about G, it remainshighly unlikely that in having B she reaches the Jamesian goal. Here, Alston doesnot take this to count against anything like (6) and that, I think, is because there issome important relation between (6) and the Jamesian goal. For, most of the timewe do have an accurate idea of whether or not our beliefs are based on an adequateground. We know that believing something on the basis of an encyclopedia article isa generally reliable way of forming beliefs, whereas hallucination and tarot readingare generally inadequate grounds to base one’s beliefs on. The relation between (6)and the Jamesian goal, therefore, amounts to something along the following lines: ifa belief B is justified on (6), then, generally—that is, assuming the falsehood of evildemon scenarios and the like, in a large portion of cases—it is likely that B is true.

One might object that assuming the falsehood of evil demon scenarios is questionbegging, for if, say, truth-conduciveness (being based on a ground that is truth-conducive) is a necessary condition for epistemic justification, then, in assessingvarious accounts of epistemic justification, evil demon scenarios, in which all ourbeliefs are not based on a truth-conducive ground, are relevant. However, the issuehere is merely whether (6) displays the relevant relation to the Jamesian goal, not toassess whether it is the correct account of epistemic justification. After all, if we actu-ally live in evil-demon scenarios, then it will not be the cases that meeting (6) makesit likely that one’s belief is true. In any case, if this is a problem for (4), then it is alsoa problem for (6), so we have not found a reason to reject (4) that would not also be areason to reject other main accounts of epistemic justification. And my point has beento argue that (4) should be taken seriously as a rival account of epistemic justificationand that Alston’s argument to reject it is not convincing. Again, my point in this paperis not to argue that (4) actually is the correct account of epistemic justification—ifthat were the case, assuming the falsehood of evil demon scenarios might indeed bequestion begging.

Finally, how should we think of the relation between (4) and the Jamesian goal?Clearly, gathering more evidence, reflecting on one’s beliefs, and exemplifying partic-ular intellectual virtues, such as thoroughness and open-mindedness, generally renderit likely that one reaches the Jamesian goal concerning some particular proposition.Of course, this will not always be the case. Alston’s Cognitive deficiency case, hisTribesman case, and his Testimony case 1, that I spelled out in Sect. 3, nicely illus-

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trate this point.37 In these cases one’s meeting rather than violating one’s (epistemic)intellectual obligations does not make it any more likely that one reaches the Jamesiangoal.

I submit that it will nevertheless be true that generally—in a large portion of cases—meeting one’s (epistemic) intellectual obligations is a reliable means of reaching theJamesian goal concerning the propositions in question. Thus, if the tribesman had notsuffered from cultural isolation, he most likely would not have believed in witchcraft.If he still had, his belief probably would have been blameworthy. If the student hadnot been cognitively limited, he most likely would not have believed that, according toLocke, everything is a matter of opinion. If he still had, his belief probably would havebeen blameworthy. Generally, it seems, deontological justification renders it likely thatone attains the Jamesian goal. In this regard, doxastic responsibility is not any differentfrom responsibility for our actions. Surgeonsmay act responsibly by doingwhat seemsbest to them in situations that aremedically so complicated that they are highly unlikelyto perform that action which is most beneficial. Politicians may act responsibly intaking certain measures that seem to them the best ones available, although, given thecomplicated economical circumstances, they are unlikely to provide a good solution tothe problem at hand. From such exceptional situations it does not follow that, generally,to perform that action which seems best to one, is not a reliable way of bringing abouta state of affairs that is objectively good (beneficial). If circumstances are sufficientlyfavorable, acting responsibly and believing responsibly are reliable ways of reachingthe objective good (the moral good, the truth, etc.).38

This relationship between (4) and the Jamesian goal is significant for the issue athand, for it means that if one pursues the Jamesian goal, then one should generallyvalue a belief’s being justified on (4). Again, the relation between (4) and the Jamesiangoal is a complicated one rather than the straightforward relation of entailment. Butso are the relations between (5) and (6) on the one hand and the Jamesian goal onthe other. (4) and (6) are especially similar in that they render the attainment of theJamesian goal likely only if certain conditions are met.

One may worry that, although (4) shows some concern with the Jamesian goal ofhaving true rather than false beliefs, beliefs that satisfy (4) need not count as epistem-ically rather than practically (morally, prudentially) justified beliefs. Imagine that onecould take a pill that induces true beliefs on some topic. It seems that (4) implies thatthe beliefs that issue from such an action are epistemically rather than pragmaticallyjustified.

In response, let me point out that the adherent of (4) is not committed to the idea thatwe have an intellectual obligation to perform just any action that somehow favors theJamesian goal, let alone an epistemic intellectual obligation to do so.As I said, preciselywhat counts as an epistemic intellectual obligation is something to be developed by theadherent of (4). She could agree, though, that if we had pills that induce true rather than

37 There has been some discussion about whether the cognitive subjects in these examples, as described byAlston, are in fact blameworthy for their beliefs. See, for instance, Steup (1988, pp. 78–79). For present pur-poses I assume that the examples do indeed show that there are or could be subjects who are deontologicallyjustified in holding certain beliefs, although their beliefs are not justified on (5) and (6).38 Thus also Heil (1983, pp. 362–363).

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false beliefs on certain topics, we would have a prudential rather than an epistemicintellectual obligation to take those pills. She might say that only belief-influencingactions that non-deviantlybring it about that one believes that p are actions thatwe havean epistemic obligation to perform, where non-deviant belief-influencing actions areactions such as gathering evidence and working on our intellectual virtues and vices.These favor the Jamesian goal in a non-deviant way, for they raise the likelihood thatone acquires true rather than false beliefs in a way that is not independent of one’sevidence base.

7 Second criterion: being analogous to justification in other realms

Asecond criterion for judging a conception of epistemic justification is that it should berelevantly analogous to conceptions of justification in other domains,most importantlythat of action. For, one might think that it is implausible that when it comes to actionsjustificationmeans one thing,whereaswhen it comes to beliefs it amounts to somethingcompletely different.

Let us assume that this is correct. What important characteristics of justified actionscan we then distinguish? I think there are at least two such characteristics.

First, it seems that for an action to be justified is for it to be such that in performingthat action, one does not violate any rules, duties, or obligations—whether those rulesare legal, moral, or prudential. An action’s being justified is, therefore, a matter of itsbeing permitted by the relevant rules of principles.

Second, one might think that an action’s being justified implies that one is blame-less for it—at least, if one is justified because one has violated neither objective norsubjective obligations (where the former are understood, roughly, externalistically, interms of objective badness, and the latter, roughly, internalistically, in terms of whatthe person believes to be bad). If Jim was justified in pulling the trigger, then it isinappropriate for someone fully informed about the situation to blame him for that.We should notice that it is not necessary for one’s being blameworthy for some actionthat one had an obligation not to perform that action itself. Imagine that I am an ambu-lance attendant and that it is one of my tasks to put enough bottles of oxygen in theambulance. However, out of laziness I fail to do so. One day, someone involved ina serious car crash needs oxygen, but since I have run out of oxygen, I am unableto provide it. Then, it seems, I am blameworthy for not providing him with oxygen,although, given my absence of control over doing so, I do not have an obligation to doso. I am derivatively rather than originally blameworthy for not providing him withoxygen,39 because I had control over factors that were relevantly related to my (not)providing him with oxygen.40

39 Thatwe can distinguish betweenoriginal andderivative responsibility is accepted bymanyphilosophers.See, for instance, Alston (1989d, pp. 137–140), Rosen (2004, pp. 298–299), Zimmerman (1988, pp. 50–61).Given that this distinction is widely accepted, I will not discuss objections that might be levelled against it(that would require a separate paper, if not more).40 On an alternative construal of the situation, one that is not endorsed by Alston, I do have an obligationto do so in that situation, since I am blameworthy for the absence of the relevant kind of control. On thisconstrual, having an obligation to φ does not entail having voluntary control over ϕ-ing.

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Let us now see whether (4) satisfies these two requirements.First, on (4), there are certain rules, duties, or obligations that I am subject to, viz.

intellectual obligations, and those obligations are relevantly related to my beliefs. Infact, it is clear that on (4), I justifiedly believe that p if and only if my believing thatp is permitted because I have not violated any relevant obligations.

Second, as I said above, the relevant intellectual obligations can be spelled out indifferent ways, externalistically or internalistically. It is important for the present pointthat it seems that they can be spelled out in such a way that one’s being subject tothem renders one responsible for (not) meeting them and for the consequences of (not)meeting them, so that one is blameworthy if one fails to meet them or if something is aconsequence of failing tomeet them. Here, I do not want to commit myself to a specificview on whether that would amount to spelling out one’s intellectual obligationsexternalistically or internalistically (or perhaps, if that is possible, a combination ofthese). Rather, I want to point out that it seems plausible that there is a way of spellingthemout such that if one fails tomeet one’s intellectual obligations, one is blameworthy.

I conclude that (4) alsomeets this second standard of judging a concept of epistemicjustification for beliefs.41 Whether (5) and (6)meet this requirement is something that Iwill not discuss here. For all that I wanted to show is that if one demands that epistemicjustification for beliefs be relevantly analogous to justification for actions, (4) meetsthis requirement.

One may worry that an action’s being permitted by the relevant rules and one’sbeing blameless may each be necessary for epistemic justification, but that each ofthese two conditions is not sufficient and that they are not even jointly sufficient forepistemic justification. Someone suffering from a mental disorder like schizophreniamay be blameless for holding a belief and may be blameless for violating certainepistemic obligations in coming to hold that belief or be blameless since she has nosuch obligations. It clearly does not follow that her belief is epistemically justified.I think this is correct. But the same applies to actions. A person suffering from anepileptic seizure may make a bodily movement that is permitted by the rules and beblameless for doing so. It does not follow that she is justified in making that bodilymovement. What we should add, perhaps, is that one has obligations of the relevantkind. This means that (4) should be understood as follows:

(4') S justifiedly believes that p iff (i) S has intellectual obligations, and (ii) itis not the case that if S had fulfilled all her intellectual obligations, then S’sbelief-forming habits would have changed or S’s access to relevant adverseconsiderations would have changed, in such a way that S would not havebelieved that p.

Thus, (4), properly understood, might very well meet the criterion of being relevantlyanalogous to justification in other realms in that it satisfies two conditions that areconsidered necessary for justification, namely permission by the relevant rules andblamelessness.

41 And it seems that Alston, given his acknowledgment that the term ‘justified’ ismost naturally understooddeontologically, both with respect to actions and with respect to beliefs (Alston 1989d, pp. 115–116, 143),would have to agree with this.

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8 Third criterion: being necessary for knowledge

Third, one could claim that the aim of epistemology is to give an account of knowledgeand that epistemic justification should be necessary for knowledge in order to berelevant to epistemological concerns.My response to this line of reasoning is threefold.

First, I agree that an important aim of epistemology is to analyze knowledge, butthere does not seem to be a reason to think that that is its sole aim. Recent literature inepistemology shows an interest in all sorts of phenomena that do not have directly to dowith knowledge—epistemologists work on them, whether or not they are relevantlyrelated to knowledge—issues such as the aim of belief, understanding, intellectualvirtues like open mindedness and thoroughness, memory, and testimony.

Second, several epistemologists take it that there is such a thing as epistemic jus-tification which is not necessary for knowledge and which should nevertheless beanalyzed by epistemologists. In fact, Alston himself is an adherent of this view.42

The criteria provided in the two previous sections and particular examples of whatone takes to be cases of justified belief could perhaps serve to identify this kind ofepistemic justification.

Third, even if epistemic justification is necessary for knowledge, there is some rea-son to think that (4) might be able to meet this standard, that is, that it is a necessarycondition for knowledge. Imagine that I believe a true proposition p on some evidencebase E and that I have an intellectual obligation—again, I mean an epistemic intel-lectual obligation rather than, say, a moral intellectual obligation—to gather evidenceE* concerning p. Imagine also that if I were to gather E*, my total evidence basewould change in such a way that I would no longer believe that p. Imagine, finally,that I am lazy and, therefore, culpably violate an intellectual obligation to gather E*.Then, do I know that p? It is not clear that I do. In nearby possible worlds, in which Imeet my obligation, I do not believe that p. If my belief is that accidental, one mightdoubt whether my belief could count as an instance of knowledge.

The same seems true for intellectual obligations with respect to the functioning ofmy doxastic mechanisms. Imagine that I believe that there is a mountain goat at thetop of the hill. Imagine also that I have an intellectual obligation to squint in suchcases, since I correctly believe that I have often been mistaken about such things inthe past and that squinting makes my perceptual beliefs more likely to be true in suchcircumstances. Imagine finally that if I were to squint, I would come to believe that itis a heap of snow rather than a mountain goat. Then, if I am lazy and do not squint, itis not clear that I know that there is a mountain goat, even if there happens to be one.And it seems that mutatis mutandis the same could be said about all other intellectualobligations that we are subject to.

The point here is that epistemic intellectual obligations are obligations all peoplehave in virtue of the twofold Jamesian goal of acquiring true belief and avoidingfalsehood. If someone violates an epistemic intellectual obligation, then she performsan action or fails to perform an action such that as a result of that, that person fails to dowhat she should do from an epistemic point of view. Now, of course, that individual

42 See Alston (1989c, pp. 172–182; 1989d, p. 144). This view is also defended by Robert Audi; see Audi(2011, pp. 270–282).

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may end up with a true belief, but if she does, that is merely accidental, for if shewould have met her obligations, she would not have held that belief. Beliefs, however,that one holds merely because one failed to do what one should have done from anepistemic point of view, it seems, cannot count as knowledge. Instances of knowledgeare epistemically more robust than that.

I know of one example, concocted by Alvin Plantinga, which is meant to refute theclaim that deontological justification, as spelled out in (4), is necessary for knowledge,so let me discuss that example here. Imagine that I falsely, but blamelessly, believethat any time I seem to see something red, there really is nothing red present. Everytime I seem to see something red I remind myself of this and disbelieve that I seesomething red, but one time, being tired, upon seeing a red London bus, I give in andblameworthily believe that there is a red bus in front ofme.According to Plantinga, thisbelief is epistemically blameworthy, because it does not satisfy (4), but neverthelesscounts as knowledge.43 I agree that such a belief would be blameworthy on (4), but Ihave to admit that I fail to see why it would count as an instance of knowledge ratherthan mere true belief. For, if I had so much as thought about whether my grounds tobelieve that there is a red bus in front of me are adequate, I would have been awareof the defeater. And being aware of the defeater, I would have withheld this belief. Ina wide class of close possible worlds, therefore, I lack this belief. But if my belief isthat accidental, it is hard to see how it could count as an instance of knowledge.

Let me stress that this is plausible only if we understand the intellectual obligationsmentioned in (4) as epistemic intellectual obligations. As I suggested above, it seemsthat we are sometimes subject tomoral or prudential intellectual obligations. Imaginethat I have a moral intellectual obligation not to gather any evidence on the love affairsofmyniece. If I nevertheless culpably spyonmyniece, Imayverywell be blameworthyfor the ensuing beliefs. Obviously, it does not follow that those beliefs do not countas instances of knowledge.44 Therefore, let me stress again that we should understandthe intellectual obligations involved in (4) as epistemic intellectual obligations, thatis, obligations that in some sense ‘aim’ at the Jamesian goal of having true rather thanfalse beliefs. Perhaps we should, therefore, say that there are (at least) two concepts ofjustifiedbelief basedon indirect voluntary influence, onewhich involves only epistemicintellectual obligations and another which also involves, say, moral or prudentialintellectual obligations. One may wonder whether in the former case we can speakof blameworthiness and blamelessness in a full-blooded deontological sense. Afterall, in daily life we are often excused and, hence, blameless for not meeting ourepistemic intellectual obligations by moral and prudential factors. One may think that,therefore, in the strict sense of the word, there is no such thing as purely epistemicblameworthiness. Here, I need not take a stance on this thorny issue. Perhaps (4)concerns only epistemic blameworthiness in this contrived sense. Fortunately, thatwould not count against (4) as a conception of epistemic justification. For, what I havetried to show here is that there is a plausible interpretation of (4) on which it can countas a necessary condition for knowledge.

43 See Plantinga (1993, p. 45). For a highly similar example, see Alston (1989d, p. 179).44 That the violation ofmoral obligations does not entail the absence of knowledge has been rightly pointedout by Bergman (2000, p. 93). Only, his view is cast in terms of doxastic rather than intellectual obligations.

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A lot will depend here on precisely how the epistemic intellectual obligations toperformbelief-influencing actions are spelled out. Imagine, for instance, that S believesthat p on some evidence base E . And imagine that more investigation would turnup counter-evidence E*, so that S would no longer believe that p. Imagine finally,however, that S has no good reason to think that further investigation will turn up suchcounter-evidence. It seems that in this situation S may very well know that p, althoughS could have gathered further evidence on p such that if S had done so, S would nolonger have believed that p. Adherents of (4), therefore, should not contend that wehave an obligation always to gather further evidence on any proposition and alwaysto work on our intellectual virtues and vices. But there is no reason to think that theadherent of (4) is committed to such a strong view on our intellectual obligations. Onemight say, for instance, that one has an obligation to gather further evidence only ifone has good reason to think that one can gather such evidence and that that evidenceis sufficiently likely to make a crucial difference to what one believes. Again, a lotwill depend on precisely how one spells out the epistemic intellectual obligations wehave concerning belief-influencing factors. Here, I have just attempted to show that(4) is the kind of account of epistemic justification—an account in terms of intellectualobligations rather than doxastic obligations; an account based on doxastic influencerather than doxastic control—that may very well provide a necessary condition forknowledge.

9 Conclusion

I would like to stress that in this paper I have not attempted to defend a DCEJ basedon indirect voluntary influence against any objection that has been or could be leveledagainst it. Also, I have not attempted to defend (4), a specific version of a DCEJ basedon indirect voluntary influence, against any charge. For example, (4) seems to falselyimply that if one meets one’s intellectual obligations and consequently believes thatone has done so, that belief is blameworthy, for, presumably, one would not havehad that belief if one had not met one’s intellectual obligations. Thus, there may beproblems with (4) and perhaps even problems with any other version of a DCEJ basedon indirect voluntary control.45

In this paper I have attempted to defend a DCEJ based on indirect voluntary influ-ence against the specific and widely influential objection that it cannot count as aconception of epistemic justification. If my arguments in this paper are convincing,then what many accept as a decisive rebuttal is in fact no reason to reject a DCEJ basedon indirect voluntary influence.

Let me draw the threads of this paper together. We have seen that Alston’s argu-ments against (4) crucially beg the question, for his criterion for identifying epistemicjustification fails to be theoretically neutral. In addition, I have argued that (4) meetsthree alternative standards that one might come up with: (a) it manifests a concern

45 Elsewhere, I have addressed in detail some further objections that one might level against (4), such asobjections that have to do with problems that seem to arise from its counterfactual formulation. See author’spaper. See Peels (2013b, 2016).

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with the Jamesian goal of having true rather than false beliefs, (b) it can explain howjustified actions and justified beliefs are relevantly analogous, and (c) there is reasonto think that it can serve as a necessary condition for knowledge.

I conclude that it is worthwhile to explore a DCEJ based on indirect voluntaryinfluence on our beliefs. If the DCEJ is to be rejected, the opponent of it should comeup with a plausible criterion for epistemic justification that DCEJ fails to meet. Thisconclusion is important, for it means that, given the many objections that have beenleveled against the denials of (1) and (2), the option of basing epistemic justificationon indirect voluntary influence deserves much more attention than it has been given sofar. Spelling out what our epistemic obligations are concerning actions and omissionsthat influence what we believe would be among the first things that ought to be doneto give this deontological conception of epistemic justification the attention that itdeserves.

Acknowledgments For their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, I would like to thankAnthony Booth, Jan Bransen, Sanford Goldberg, Amy Flowerree, Christopher Hookway, Joel Katzav,Andrea Kruse, Miriam McCormick, Anne Meylan, Philip Nickel, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Michael Pauen,Herman Philipse, Hans Rott, Matthias Steup, Krist Vaesen, Hamid Vahid, Verena Wagner, René vanWoudenberg, Heinrich Wansing, David Widerker, Jan Willem Wieland, and two anonymous referees forthis journal. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton WorldCharity Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the Templeton World Charity Foundation.

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Responsible Belief and Epistemic Justification