Problems of Proof in Elite Research

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PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ELITE RESEARCH*

BETH MINTZ PETER FREITAG

CAROL HENDRICKS MICHAEL SCHWARTZ

This paper reviews the two most prominent methodological pro- cedures used in the study of elites: social background investigations and decision-making analyses. Neither of these methodologies when used alone can resolve the power structure debate. Social background analyses do not take into account the possibility that individuals may not, in all cases, represent the social groups from which they are recruited. Decision-making analyses fail to investigate the process of policy formulation and therefore cannot identify which groups control government institutions. Two research strategies are offered in an attempt to cast new light on the controversy; however, researchers are cautioned to pay close attention to theory construc- tion and to the creation and expression of complete and sophisticated theories that admit to detailed analysis and empirical test. The valid theory will be that which remains unmodified through a series of tests, while the opposition theory is repeatedly revised because of its inability to explain new data.

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the concept and form of democracy as seen in modern society. Sociology has concentrated on the power dimension of political life - where does power rest and who has the ability to wield it? The government is the typical unit of analysis and two different theo- retical models have dominated research: a pluralist vs. a power elite or ruling class interpretation. (For a discussion of the distinction between power elite and ruling class interpretations see Balbus, 1971.) This paper focuses on the methodological problems and complications inherent

in power structure research. It points to several reasons why recent work has done little to resolve the debate, and emphasizes the need for new research strategies. Our purpose is to discuss the possibilities for resolving this controversy by tracing the logic of the debate and the impact of research findings on the general argu- ments. Since de Tocqueville, the question of democracy has been one important focus

of American political inquiry and academic debate. The focus of controversy has shifted back and forth from the practical to the academic, but has never faded for long. The longest interruption occurred just after World War II when a wave of anti-communism drove the dissenting ideas of the 1930's out of public life. The decade of the 1950's was a period when those academics who believed that America was indeed a democracy reigned over the intellectual domain with barely a dissenting voice. So confident were the pluralists that one of them, Daniel Bell, announced the "End of Ideology," in a collection of essays that

*This paper was supported by the National Science Foundation Grant Program under Award No. FOC 73-05606 and an earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Mathe- matical Social Science Board Conference in Boston in October, 1974.



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declared victory over those who questioned the fairness of the American political system. (Bell, 1957) Yet even as the pluralists celebrated, the beginnings of a new battle could be

discerned. In 1953, Floyd Hunter published a book which asserted that big businessmen, not the people, controlled the city of Atlanta, Georgia. (Hunter, 1953, 1959) His work was soon answered by Robert Dahl (1961), who attempted to demonstrate that New Haven, Connecticut was controlled by the people, not businessmen. While this interchange was developing, C. Wright Mills published The Power Elite (1956) which contended that the national government was controlled by neither the people nor business, but by a power elite which combined the resources of the business, military and political elites of the country. His work presented a further challenge to pluralist theory, and subse- quently triggered a series of responses in defense of the democratic tradition. (For a fair selection of the pluralists' responses, see Berle; Dahl; Kornhauser; Parsons; and Wrong; all in Domhoff and Ballard 1968:23-99.) Ultimately, Mills became the intellectual stimulus and rallying point of a new

generation of anti-pluralists. In the late 1960's many of these political activists emerged from graduate school and began attacking the heart of pluralism, pro- ducing a variety of theories which doubted or denied the ultimate democracy of the American governmental system. (Connolly, 1973; Gitlin, 1969; Mankoff, 1970.) It was this generagion of anti-pluralists who gave new life to the academic study of American elites.

DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY?

The pluralist analysis, as it is currently rendered, portrays the United States government as a neutral and extremely vulnerable body influenced by a wide variety of conflicting organizations and social groupings. Political candidates, in their desire to gain office and remain in office, promote themselves by per- forming a delicate balancing act among a multitude of interests; pleasing some, neutralizing others, and antagonizing still others. The most skillful and sensitive candidates remain in office by enacting or supporting policies which satisfy more people than they anger, and as a consequence, this system provides us with an imperfect, but basically democratic replica of popular desires. (Dahl, 1956, 1961, 1967; Key, 1964; Lowi, 1969; Polsby, 1963; Riesman, 1950; Rose, 1967; Truman, 1951) The Marxists and the power elite theorists disagree on many matters, but they

agree on certain fundamental points of a counter-portrait. The radical critique, as it evolved in the late 1960's, finds the source of governmental policy in the needs and desires of corporate owners and managers, often integrally tied to a social elite. These policies are developed and refined by the elite in informal collectives, formal meetings, special planning agencies, and foundations, and are then pressed upon the relevant governmental agency or agencies. (Domhoff, 1970a, 1970b; Schwartz and Schwartz, 1972) The pressure is made operative in a variety of ways, of which the most sinister is direct contact with government officials and/or the seeking of high governmental positions by members or repre- sentatives of the corporate elite. (Domhoff, 1974; Kolko, 1969; Milliband, 1969; Nichols, 1972; Progressive Labor Party, 1970) Ultimately, the policies adopted by government are precisely those favored by this elite. In short, the United States government is fundamentally a corporate dictatorship.



316 MINTZ ET AL

Which portrait is correct? It seems logical to assume that research could be designed which would test the two models to indicate which is more accurate in describing and predicting the behavior of American political institutions. How- ever, this has not as yet been the case. Even though the work of the 1960's has not been without impact, it has done little to resolve the debate. The reason for this can be seen by scrutinizing the logic of two major methodo-

logical strategies, namely, the investigation of who makes decisions, and the analysis of decision-making outcomes.

WHO MAKES DECISIONS?1

Beginning with C. Wright Mills (1956), anti-pluralists have been concerned with the social backgrounds of decision-makers. They have reasoned that if decision-makers can be shown to come from the same elite social or economic background, that they will exhibit a uniform orientation representing the needs of that small elite. (Domhoff, 1967; Freitag, 1975; Mintz, 1975) These efforts have been largely successful in demonstrating a rather extraordinary homogeneity of background among national decision-makers. Mintz, for example, found that nearly 90% of those who have served in presidential cabinets since 1897 have had secure ties to either the economic or social elites. However, these findings have done little to silence the exponents of pluralism.

The most direct response is a very simple one: individuals who come from the same social or economic stratum do not necessarily share the same political orientation. A.A. Berle stated this point succinctly in his rebuttal to The Power Elite; "Some 'big rich' corporate executives and Army Officers do act as Mills records. Others run museums of modern art, foreign aid programs, civic ser- vices, ad infinitum." (Berle, 1968) The antipluralists can contend that these are political positions and can be utilized to rally popular support for desired policies in other areas. The pluralist agrument, however, is direct: elite domination of officeholding has absolutely no policy implications. The important question then becomes not, "Which members of the elite are selected for officeholding?" but "What policy decisions are made by the elite and who do these decisions benefit?" Notice that the pluralist rebuttal hinges on a challenge to the assertion of elite

unity. Even if a broad ideological consistency within the ruling class could be demonstrated, the pluralists can argue that once an individual entered politics he or she would suppress individual political ideals in the interest of election and re-election. The existence of this logic virtually eliminates background data, by itself, as relevant material for resolving any fundamental issues in the democracy- dictatorship controversy. To underscore this point, consider the study of New Haven by Dahl (1961).

Dahl, although a pluralist, investigated the social backgrounds of the decision- makers in three policy areas: schools, political officeholding, and urban renewal.

1 Research into the social backgrounds of decision-makers and other elite groups in society has been carried out by elitists and pluralists alike. See, for example, Baltzell, 1962, 1966; Domhoff, 1967; Freitag, 1975; Keller, 1963; Lasswell, Lerner, Rothwell, 1952; Lundberg, 1937, 1968; Marvick, 1961; Matthews, 1954, 1960; Mintz, 1975; Stanley, Mann and Doig, 1967.



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He found that the middle class dominated education, ethnic groups dominated candidate selection, and the corporate elite dominated urban renewal. He therefore concluded that New Haven was not controlled by any one economic or social group. Rather, various groups were represented in the areas of most importance to themselves. There have been a variety of responses to this study (Bachrach and Baratz,

1962; Domhoff, 1970; Freitag, 1975; Mintz, 1975; Prewitt and Stone, 1973), but in this context we focus on a particular counter argument. There is no proof in Dahl's analysis that the "middle class" members of the Board of Educa- tion actually represented the "middle class." These individuals may have had their campaigns financed by business, might have been employees of businesses, or simply been pro-business in their attitudes. The same could be said for those involved in candidate selection. In other words, someone who comes from a middle class (or ethnic) background does not necessarily represent middle class (or ethnic) interest. (For example, Hunter, 1953:66 draws a distinction between the "men of independent decision" and the "executors of policy.") This does not mean that the social background studies have no utility whatso-

ever. Their impact has been and can be very great, when viewed in the proper perspective. Dahl concluded from his study that New Haven politics were not dominated by businessmen, and this was surely going far beyond his data. Yet, he did disprove one version of the dictatorship theory, at least for New Haven. This version can be summarized: business controls government by directly obtaining and holding positions in the major decision-making bodies.

The same sort of credit can be given to the Mintz study of presidential cabinets. The stark homogeneity of social origin does not prove that America is a dictatorship, and would not do so even if it were extended to cover all government officials. But it does disprove one version of pluralism implied by Dahl (1961: 11, 165, 169) and expressed by Lipset (1960:305-313): that representative government is obtained by placing people from a variety of social groups on important policy-making bodies. Thus, pluralists as well as anti-pluralists have overgeneralized from background

data. A decision-maker who is recruited from elite origins does not necessarily represent the elites; he or she could enact anti-elite policies in order to please the public and remain in office. A decision-maker recruited from a non-elite group does not necessarily represent that group; he or she may enact elite oriented policies in order to retain campaign financing or to move into business after serving in public office.

Therefore, we must conclude that investigations of social background have limited utility in relation to the power structure debate. This method, when used as a primary research strategy can neither resolve the debate nor address the general question of who wields power. The analysis of social backgrounds can, however, be useful in dealing with specific issues implicit in elite research. The value of this type of investigation is found in its ability to disprove certain subarguments used to describe the broader theories. This is certainly important. Yet, when this method is used alone, the researcher must come to grips with the question of who decision-makers represent and in whose interests they govern, and this is not an easy problem. We shall return to its use in conjunction with other methods below.



318 MINTZ ET AL

DECISION-MAKING OUTCOMES2

The limited pay-offs associated with background analysis suggest that research energy should be directed to more crucial tests of the competing theories. Dahl argued emphatically for a comparison based on policy outcomes:

The hypothesis of the existence of a ruling elite can be strictly tested only if: 1. The hypothetical ruling elite is a well defined group 2. There is a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions in which

the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested

3. In such cases, the preferences of the elite regularly prevail. (Dahl, 1968: 31)

This seems, at first, to be a straightforward and certain method to put the two theories to the test, but a closer scrutiny reveals the weaknesses of this approach. According to Dahl, his New Haven study applied this strategy successfully, but

he was nevertheless unsuccessful in laying the controversy to rest. One problem was the social background dilemma which we have already discussed. But even if we cast that aside, Dahl does not make his case. His argument against the existence of a ruling elite hinges on his perception that every important individual or group met defeat on one or another issue in New Haven. According to Dahl, this disproves the existence of a ruling elite because no specific sector was all powerful. However, his conclusions were disputed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) who pointed out that a controlling class could exercise power by prevent- ing issues antagonistic to its interest from ever arising. By that logic, the issues that Dahl studied were precisely those trivial ones in which the ruling class had little or no stake, or no unanimity. In other words, Dahl failed to prove that the issues he studied were ones in which the "preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite [ran] counter to those" of other groups. Indeed, Dahl's study had no possibility of measuring the preferences of the elite, except by the arbitrary assertion that one or another actor always represented their interest. The inadequacy of investigations of decision-making outcomes can be argued

from the other side as well. Recent work on the role of Washington superlawyers demonstrates their impressive success record in freeing business clients from the constraints of new laws and the prosecution of old laws. (Goulden, 1972) Moreover, in a substantial proportion of these court cases the victory is at the expense of important social groups. Can one then conclude that anytime a corporation desires, it can generate a favorable governmental policy by employ- ing a superlawyer? Not on this evidence alone! Such data do not take into account the possibility that superlawyers could have such a thorough know- ledge of government that they would know beforehand whether a case can be won. If this is so, then the success of superlawyers would be indicative of nothing more than a realistic assessment of their own limitations. The case of the superlawyers raises a further question: if business controls government, why are superlawyers necessary in the first place? The decision-making strategy, and particularly the test proposed by Dahl,

contains a more crucial problem - one often ignored by proponents of

2 See the following for some examples of the decision-making approach and for some survey articles on this research strategy: Banfield, 1961; Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963; Dahl, 1961; Fisher, 1962; Freeman, et. al., 1960; Martin, 1961; Miller, 1958; Polsby, 1963; Rossi, 1957.



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both sides of the power structure debate. A clear distinction must be made between power elite theory and ruling class theory. An investigation of outcomes of key political decisions would be an appropriate test of an elitist model, provided that the points raised by Bachrach and Baratz could be resolved. However, a ruling class perspective requires a fundamentally different research design - a strategy that does not address itself to an analysis of outcomes. Ruling class theory assumes an elite which is unified by common economic interests and reinforced by conflict with other classes. As in elitism, their power is by virtue of their positions, but the role of the masses is quite different. Rather than an impotent public unable to influence policy, the subordinate classes voice their interests through their power to disrupt the major institutions of society by means of strikes, sit-ins, or riots. This does not imply that the elite, as viewed in the ruling class model, have less control of these institutions than in power elite theory. In both cases, the elite exercise control, but in a Marxist framework class conflict is not only present but a potential threat.

The implications of this distinction are directly applicable to research strategies. Power elite theory tends to be a static model; the elite are often portrayed as all powerful, undaunted by public needs and victorious on every issue in which they have a stake. This is where this theory is most vulnerable to criticism, for any instance in which an investigation of outcomes of decision-making seems to be against the interests of the elite, pluralism is confirmed.

Ruling class theory, on the other hand, avoids the conservative tone of the power elite model in that it allows for change. The ruling class is aware of the sentiments of the public at large, as opposed to an image of policy formation without consideration of popular opinion. Decisions are often made as a reaction to the activities of the masses. Thus, concessions are won and change occurs. A study of outcomes as outlined by Dahl cannot tap this process. The preferences of the ruling class need not prevail regularly. In fact, it is precisely on the issues in which the public voices concern, that the ruling class will grant concessions in order to maintain their position. To make this clear, consider an absurd example. Suppose we were interested in discovering whether the personnel department

of General Motors was controlled by the management of General Motors or by the Black community of Detroit. By obtaining access to private files, we could ascertain management's attitude on any issue. The use of opinion polls would allow us to discover on which issues the Black community was in disagreement. Suppose we discovered that management and community disagreed on several matters relating to the hiring and preferential upgrading of Black employees. Suppose, further, that our study took place during the period 1967-1969, when the Black uprisings in Detroit and other cities led General Motors and other corporations to adopt policies of hiring and preferentially upgrading Black workers. Notice that

1. The elite is well defined as the management of General Motors 2. The memos reveal its preferences, including a desire to resist preferential

hirings and upgrading 3. These preferences did not regularly prevail, since preferential hiring and up-

grading were initiated

Therefore Dahl would be led to the absurd conclusion that the personnel department of General Motors was not controlled by the General Motors management. Instead, Dahl would have to argue, it is a democratic body which responds



320 MINTZ ET AL

to the wishes of the General Motors management, the Black community, and perhaps other groups.

It is easy to see the fallacy here. General Motors does, indeed, control its own personnel department, but this does not mean that the General Motors management can choose to adopt any policy it desires. Sometimes, despite its commitment to a certain personnel policy, General Motors management finds it impractical to continue that particular policy, and it orders the personnel divi- sion to change. There is no question of independence: the personnel department continues to enforce the old policy until such time as management instructs it to change.

In a similar manner, let us suppose then, that Dahl planned and executed a perfect research project on Federal decision-making. After identifying the united interest of big business on a large number of issues and isolating oppos- ing groups, he assessed the outcome of the various differences. In many cases the corporate elite did not prevail. This would not disprove the thesis of corporate control of government, because the possibility exists that these defeats were rendered outside of government, with the ruling class directing government to change its policy. The crucial missing link is the investigation of the process by which the elite

is defeated. If the elite decides to concede defeat, and then orders a change in government policy, it is a ruling class. If, on the other hand, the government decides upon an anti-elite policy and then the government forces elite accep- tance, the elite is not in control. Dahl fails to take this subtlety into account. He confuses "control of an institution" with "control over policy" and does not ever consider Marxist theory. Thus his research strategy cannot test for elite control of government. As it stands, Dahl's proposal is actually a test of elite control of every segment of society, and today, few would take this stance. We can now summarize this discussion of the decision-making strategy. It, like

the investigation of background data, has limited utility. Analyses of decision- making outcomes test for elite control of society as a whole, rather than control of government alone. Without consideration of the process by which decisions are made, this approach is as limited as the social background research in that it can only address absolute control. Either the elite is omnipotent or the elite is powerless. The rigidity of this approach can be modified by an investigation of process.

Implicit in this is an analysis of the role played by the general population in the particular decision in question. If the political decision-makers reject the position of the elite in day to day issues, then pluralism is demonstrated. On the other hand, if the general population takes a specific interest in an issue and through some form of civil disobedience applied pressure, the outcome would have to be interpreted in a different manner. Without proof that the government - rather than a strike, or a riot, or some other action - imposed the defeat on business, the question of control would remain unresolved.

CONCLUSION

The weaknesses cited above in reference to social background investigations and decision-making analyses illustrate the problematic nature of research approaches to power structure theory. Each individual approach has limited utility.



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Dahl's Who Governs (1961) did not prove that New Haven was a democracy, but it did demonstrate that ruling class control, if it existed, did not operate as an overt part of the candidate selection process and school board deliberations. The superlawyer data do not prove corporate control of government, but they do disprove the image of equal access for all societal groups. On the other side, they do not disprove elite control, but do indicate at least some disunity among the elite. Finally, if Dahl were successfully to execute his research design, it would not disprove corporate control of government, though it would disprove total corporate domination of social policy. Thus, no single research method as presently constructed can resolve the issues

raised in the power structure debate. Either strategy discussed can address certain aspects of the theory in its own right, but neither can deal with the problem in its entirety. Use of various methods in conjunction with one another can handle more facets of the debate than any one strategy alone. As an application of this general dictum, we offer two research strategies de-

signed to test specific disputes within the power structure debate. Consider the question generated by the discovery of elite domination of

Federal decision-making. Pluralists argue that this is a meaningless finding since the policies enacted by these elite policy-makers may be responsive to popular groups instead of corporate requirements. One method of testing this counter- theory is to investigate the social origins of the policies as well as the individuals involved. Policies enacted by governments are developed and refined in a number of possible arenas, including government legislative councils, lobbying groups, universities, and private planning agencies. If anti-pluralists can demonstrate that the elite individuals on the Cabinet and in other government bodies bring with them policies developed by a few groups who also represent the same interests, this would preempt the pluralist argument in its present form. Domhoff (1970b; 1974) has provided a postulated process which could be

tested in this way, and Shoup (1974) has initiated research into this "social origin of policies" approach. Attention has been focussed on a number of elite planning groups, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Committee for Economic Development and a handful of others; and the possibility exists for testing whether these groups are as intimately tied to government policies as the elite is tied to government decision-making. It should be forewarned, however, that successful execution of this grand

strategy would not end the debate, but again only alter its specific content. If these groups do dominate policy development, it will demonstrate that popular will is not expressed through the direct defeat of elite strategy in the arenas of government. But it will not demonstrate that the policies enacted are in the interest of the elite. The possibility exists that the CER-CED policies were themselves representative of popular opinion, whatever the nature of control of the groups themselves. The testing of this dispute would require yet another research design and successful execution would create yet another dispute.

Consider now the debate generated by Dahl's "decision-making" approach to the debate. If careful attention is paid to the process of decision-making. it too can be rehabilitated as an hypothesis testing device. Such a rehabilitation requires that students of power in America develop and refine their understanding of mass movements and social disruption. By identifying a set of policies which run counter to elite desires it is possible to investigate whether the government imposed them upon the elite or whether some extra-government power forced



322 MINTZ ET AL

the elite (and therefore the government) to relent. In pursuing this research the following criteria could be applied: If policy defeats for the elite occur without concurrent social disruption or the threat of militant mass action, this would severely test Marxist theory. If all policy changes involved such disruption, and many occur without concurrent government debate or electoral pressure, this would severely test pluralist theory. If all instances involved both electoral and militant struggle, more refined methods of deciding which was central would need to be developed, including tests of timing, investigations of the detailed process of decision-making, and so forth. Neither of the research strategies suggested here can resolve the power struc-

ture debate for good-and-all. Ultimately, it appears that the only way to move toward resolution is in a step by step process, in which each individual method addresses one particular segment of the argument. Our conclusion then is that the democracy/dictatorship dispute has a peculiar

elastic quality. Given any finite set of facts about American politics, it is possible to construct a pluralist theory which fits them. The same set of facts can also be fitted to a Marxist or power elite theory. This makes comparison of the theories difficult, but not impossible. Carefully defined research can be designed critically to test the most plausible version of pluralism against the most plausible anti- pluralist model. The true set of a valid theory is its ability to explain new data and predict future events. Researchers must pay close attention to theory con- struction, to the creation and expression of complete and sophicticated theories which admit to detailed analysis and empirical test. The valid theory will be that which remains unmodified through a series of tests, while the opposition theory is repeatedly revised because of its inability to explain new data.

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Problems of Proof in Elite Research