PEACE FOR COLOMBIA

- ENDING A 50 YEAR

OLD CONFLICT

EUROPA UNIVERSITÄT VIADRINA

SEMESTER 2014/2015

SUBMISSION DATE: 30. JANUARY 2015

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT

IHL 110A

MR. MARTIN WÄHLISCH

HESTER SAMORAY

hestersamoray@aol.de

STUDENT-NO.: 65471

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS II

INTRODUCTION 1

BACKGROUND OF COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT 2

HISTORY OF COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT 2

PEACE TALKS IN COLOMBIA 5

ACTORS OF COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT AND THEIR

INTERESTS 8

FARC 8

COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT 10

PARAMILITARY AND RURAL ELITE 10

INTERNATIONAL NVESTORS 11

VICTIMS OF THE CONFLICT 12

REMAINING ISSUE IN COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT 13

APPROACHING SOLUTIONS FOR COLOMBIA 16

CONCLUSION 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY III

MONOGRAPHS III

JOURNAL ARTICLES IV

INTERNET RESOURCES IV

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ELN - National Liberation Army

FARC - Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia

ICC - International Criminal Court

UN - United Nations

U.S. - United States

USA - United States of America

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1. INTRODUCTION

The following essay is about the peace negotiation

between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

(FARC) and the Colombian government. Interestingly, this

conflict has been going on for over 50 years where all

sides in the conflict are stuck to their opinions and roles.

Now, the fourth round of peace talks has started and,

contrary to all expectations, it seems that it will be

successful. How it happened that the oldest conflict in the

world seems to be so close to an end, and what kind of

challenges Colombia will face after the FARC has

demobilized? These topics will be discussed in the

following chapters. In order to solve the conflict in

Colombia one must understand the roots of the problems

and know all actors.

First, we will be looking at the background of the conflict

in order to understand the roots: why did the conflict

emerge in the first place and how did it develop during the

50 years of duration? Then, we will look at the current

situation of the peace talks and we will find out why they

are so important now. In the fourth chapter, I am going to

discuss which actors are involved in the conflict, what kind

of interests they pursue, and in what kind of relationship

they stand with one another. I will then analyze the

remaining issues of the peace talks and the challenges that

would await Colombia if the FARC and the government

find an agreement. The sixth chapter will be about possible

solutions how to solve the remaining issues and

challenges. Finally, I will outline my personal conclusion.

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2. BACKGROUND OF COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT

2.1 HISTORY OF COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT

When Colombia gained independence in 1810, the country

had already suffered from social inequality which would

later lead to violent uprisings with hundreds of thousands

killed.12 In the beginning of the 20th century ideological

differences between the Liberal and Conservative parties

escalated.3 Colombian resources have always been very

lucrative for the world market and have attracted big

business associations.4 The Colombian government, its

rural elite and powerful investors took advantage of the

abundant resources5 while suppressing the laborers - low

wages, rising prices and weak access to basic food, health

and education.6 Peasants and the Liberal lower class

started to revolt against the Conservatives.7 A large

outbreak of violence called La Violencia followed and

afflicted rural Colombia.8 Large landowners evicted small

farmers from their properties; self-defense groups as well

1 GARCÍA-GODOS, Jemima/WIIG, Henrik/(2014:14), The Colombian Land Resitution Programme: Process, results and challenges, with special emphasis on women. (Norway: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research), pp. 8. 2 GARCÍA-GODOS, WIIG, 2004, pp.44. 3 LEECH, Garry (1999), ‘Fifty Years of Violence’, in Colombia Journal [internet] 1 May. (Available at: http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence [Accessed 14 January 2015]). 4 SCHNEIDER, Ben Ross (2004), Business politics and the State in twentieth-century Latin America. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 4, 16. 5 SCHNEIDER, 2004, pp. 128, 130, 148. 6 CHOMSKY, Aviva (2008), Linked Labor Histories: New England, Colombia, and the making of global work class. (Durham: Duke University), pp. 183. 7 LEECH, http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence, [Accessed 14 January 2015]). 8 INSIGHTCRIME, (2013), ‘FARC’, [Online] (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015].

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as left-wing guerillas were founded and fought against the

Conservative paramilitary.9 La Violencia lasted until 1958

and cost 200,000 lives and hundreds of thousands were

forcibly displaced.10 Liberals and Conservatives unified as

the National Front but still had to contend with the armed

peasants.11 In the 1960’s, Communist guerillas, such as the

FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), took up

arms against the government.12

The FARC was financed by drug trade, kidnapping and

extortion of large and small businesses.13 They became

more powerful and gained influence in local politics.14 In

1984, the FARC established the Patriotic Union (UP).15

Paramilitaries then systematically killed over 4,000 UP

members what the Organization of American States even

9 LEECH, http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence, [Accessed 14 January 2015]); CHOMSKY, 2008, pp. 182 – 184; INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 10 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; RENWICK, Danielle/HANSON, Stephanie (2014), ‘Backgrounders. FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left –Wing Guerillas’, in Council on Foreign Relations [Internet] 1 December. (Available at http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 11 LEECH, http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence, [Accessed 14 January 2015]); RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 12 GARCÍA-GODOS, WIIG, 2004, pp. 8; INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; LEECH, http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence, [Accessed 14 January 2015]); CHOMSKY, 2008, pp. 188; RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 13 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; DRAEGER, Sebastian (2011), “Narco-Guerilla” gleich “Narco-Jihad”?: Über den Einfluss der ökonomischen Grundlage auf die Handlungsratio von FARC und Taliban. (Berlin: Lit), pp. 39. 14 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 15 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 40.

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characterized as a political genocide.16 The FARC returned

to the mountains to continue its meteoric rise.17

Intensive Human Rights violations - death squads,

massacres, forced displacements and killings - occurred

between FARC, paramilitaries and Colombian armed

forces.18 The FARC managed to control large parts of

Colombian territory where they established a quasi-state.19

This was the FARC’s most powerful period in history20

In 2002, President Álvaro Uribe started an U.S.-backed

offensive against the FARC which weakened the FARC

significantly.21 Civilians, unions and social movement

activists were also targeted.22 Later, Uribe began to

demobilize paramilitary groups whose ex-members then

regrouped into smaller, illegal armed units called Bandas

Emergentes (BACRIM). They continued operating in drug

trafficking as well as causing displacements,

disappearances, sexual violence and killings.23

16 ZELIK, Raul (2009), Die kolumbianischen Paramilitärs: “Regieren ohne Staat?” oder terroristische Formen der Inneren Sicherheit. (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfdepot), pp. 27; DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 40. 17 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 18 CHOMSKY, 2008, pp.184. 19 DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 40. 20 MCDERMOTT, Jeremy (2013), ‘Could Colombia’s FARC rebels Break Apart?’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 20 May. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/could-colombia-farc-rebels-break-apart [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 21 DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 40, 42; INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, Jeremy (2013), ‘Criminalization of FARC Elements Investible’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 21 May. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/future-farc-after-peace [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 22 ZELIK, 2009, pp. 34; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/could-colombia-farc-rebels-break-apart [Accessed 10 January 2015]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2014), ‘World Report 2014: Colombia’ [Online] (Available at: http://www.hrw.org/world- report/2014/country-chapters/colombia [Accessed 15 January 2015]). 23 ZELIK, 2009, pp. 33, 40; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/world- report/2014/country-chapters/colombia [Accessed 15 January 2015]); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2012), Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law. An Amnesty International Analysis (London: Amnesty International Publication).

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Today, more than five million people have fled their

homes during the course of the conflict and over 220,000

have been killed.24 The government and the international

community have failed to condemn and prevent atrocities

by paramilitary groups and the FARC.25

2.2 PEACE TALKS IN COLOMBIA

In 2012, peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian

government started for the fourth time in history - this time

in Cuba.26 In the past few years, the FARC lost much of its

territory and some of its top leaders.27 The rebels seemed

to be weakened enough to start serious negotiations with

the government.28 In a careful and methodical manner, the

negotiating partners began their talks which focused on the

24 BBC NEWS (2015), ‘What is at stake in the Colombian peace process?’ [Online] 15 January. (Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19875363 [Accessed 16 January 2015]); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2014), ‘Colombia: Peace talks fail to stop human rights abuses ahead of UN review.’ [Online] (Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/colombia-peace-talks-fail-stop-human-rights-abuses-ahead-un-review-2014-03-25 [Accessed 15 January 2015]). 25 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL , http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/colombia-peace-talks-fail-stop-human-rights-abuses-ahead-un-review-2014-03-25 [Accessed 15 January 2015]). 26 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (November 15, 2013), ‘Hope for Peace in Colombia: Reasons for Optimism, Awareness of Obstacles (September 06, 2012)’ [Online] (Available at: http://colombiapeace.org/2012/09/06/hope-for-peace-in-colombia- reasons-for-optimism-awareness-of-obstacles/ [Accessed 07 January 2015]); MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/could-colombia-farc-rebels-break-apart [Accessed 10 January 2015]; RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (August 28, 2012), ‘Prospects for renewed peace talks in Colombia’ [Online] (Available at: http://colombiapeace.org/2012/08/28/prospects-for-renewed-peace-talks-in-colombia-2/ [Accessed 09 January 2015]). 27 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/08/28/prospects-for-renewed-peace-talks-in-colombia-2/ [Accessed 09 January 2015]). 28 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015].

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ending of the conflict.29 As soon as the Final Agreement is

reached the peace building process can begin.30

There are five substantial points on the peace talks agenda

and a sixth point about how to implement the peace deal.31

On the five-point agenda, there are the following subjects:

land reform, political participation, drug trafficking,

victims’ rights and disarmament of the rebels.32 So far the

FARC and the government have reached agreements on

the land reform, political participation and drug

trafficking.33 The victim’s rights and the disarmament of

the rebels have been much more difficult to reach solutions

for.34 However, because a deal has not been reached on all

five major points, nothing has been finalized.35 Within the

country, everything has stayed the same; there is no

ceasefire and the attacks continue as usual.36 Only with the

Final Agreement the conflict will be over.37

29 ISACSON, Adam (April 2014), Ending 50 Years of Conflict: The Challenges Ahead and the U.S. Role in Colombia. (Washington: WOLA), pp. 2. 30 ISACSON, 2014, pp. 2. 31 ISACSON, 2014, pp. 2. 32 RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 33 PACHICO, Elyssa (2014), ‘The Questions as Colombia’s Peace Talks Resume?’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 10 November. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/three-questions-as-colombia-peace-talks-resume [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 34 RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]; BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19875363 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 35 RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]; CAWLEY, Maguerite (2013), ‘Santos Invites FARC to Join Drug Fight as First Peace Agreement Signed’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 27 May. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/colombia-govt-farc-reach-1st-agreement [Accessed 10 January 2015]; BBC NEWS (2013), ‘Colombia and Farc rebels reach agreement on land reform’ [Online] 27 May. (Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22676049 [Accessed 09 January 2015]); BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19875363 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 36 ISACSON, 2014, pp. 2. 37 ISACSON, 2014, pp. 2.

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So far the peace talks have been proceeding slowly. The

parties try to reach agreements step by step.38 Meanwhile

President Santos has applied military pressure on the

guerillas even though the FARC has asked for a bilateral

ceasefire.39 The FARC moves back and forth from

unilateral ceasefires and intensification of their attacks.40

They suspended kidnapping for ransom but took soldiers

and army generals as hostages.41 Santos suspended the

peace talks until the FARC released the hostages again.42

This shows how fragile the nature of the talks is, but also

how much the FARC wants the conflict to stop.43 Today,

the parties are even considering a bilateral ceasefire - a

sign to have managed to rebuild trust and respect for each

38 ISACSON, 2014, pp. 1. 39 MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/could-colombia-farc-rebels-break-apart [Accessed 10 January 2015]; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/08/28/prospects-for-renewed-peace-talks-in-colombia-2/ [Accessed 09 January 2015]); INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19875363 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 40 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 41 MCDERMOTT, Jeremy (2013), ‘Colombia Peace Process Suspended: Action of Rouge FARC Unit?’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 17 November. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-peace-process-suspended-action-of-rogue-farc-unit [Accessed 10 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-peace-process-suspended-action-of-rogue-farc-unit [Accessed 10 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-peace-process-suspended-action-of-rogue-farc-unit [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 42 BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19875363 [Accessed 16 January 2015]; RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 43 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (December 24, 2014), ‘At Year’s End, It’s Clear: This Peace Process I For Real’ [Online] (Available at: http://colombiapeace.org/2014/12/24/at-years-end-its-clear-this-peace-process-is-for-real/ [Accessed 09 January 2015]).

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other.44 These peace talks are unique and maybe the last

opportunity for Colombia to end this 50 year old conflict.45

3. ACTORS OF COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT AND THEIR

INTERESTS The main actors in the peace talks are the FARC, the

Colombian government and the facilitator states: Cuba,

Venezuela, Norway and Chile. However, several other

actors play an important role. The paramilitary and the

rural elite are considered as the biggest opponents of the

talks, along with international investors and the victims of

the conflict.46

3.1 FARC Initially the FARC wanted to fight against the social

inequality between Colombia’s wealthy and the rural poor;

they represented the interests of small scale farmers.47

When the FARC became more powerful they started to

focus more on their profit and not on the political cause

anymore.48 Nowadays, they even conduct business with

44 BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19875363 [Accessed 16 January 2015]; MAHNCKE, Dieter (1987), Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen als Instrument der Sicherheitspolitik: Ursprung, Entwicklung, Perspektiven. (Melle: Knoth), pp. 11. 45 BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22676049 [Accessed 09 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/future-farc-after-peace [Accessed 10 January 2015]; ISACSON, 2014, pp. 10. 46 As a matter of limited space, I will concentrate on the main actors (leave aside the ELN, the neighboring states, United State on their War On Drugs). 47 DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 35, 36; RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 48 INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22676049 [Accessed 09 January 2015]; RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, Jeremy (2013), ‘Criminal Activities of the FARC and Rebel Earnings’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 20 May. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-criminal-activities-income [Accessed 10 January 2015]; DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 1, 49.

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international drug traffickers and paramilitaries.49 After 50

years of fighting, there has been a shift in the younger

generation - while the older generation still believes in its

ideologies, the younger generation doesn’t understand

anymore what they were really fighting for.50 After the

FARC’s weakening, due to president Uribe’s crack down,

the FARC realized they would not be able to overthrow the

government and therefore started negotiations.51 Although

the FARC is divided into several units, there seems to be

widespread unification.52 Still, they hold on to their initial

ideologies to support the poor against the wealthy.53 “From

this big balloon of land, at least 20 million hectares could

be taken,” FARC negotiator Iván Márquez said.54 For the

FARC, the uneven distribution of land led to structural

inequalities that caused the armed conflict in the first

place.55 To create more justice in Colombia they want to

disempower the rural elite once and for all.56

49 MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/could-colombia-farc-rebels-break-apart [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 50 DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 54, 57; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/future-farc-after-peace [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 51 DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 42; INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/could-colombia-farc-rebels-break-apart [Accessed 10 January 2015]; RENWICK, HANSON, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 52 MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/future-farc-after-peace [Accessed 10 January 2015]; BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19875363 [Accessed 16 January 2015]. 53 MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/future-farc-after-peace [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 54 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (January 26, 2013), ‘Colombia Peace Process Update (January 26, 2013)’ [Online] (Available at: http://colombiapeace.org/2013/01/26/colombia-peace-process-update-january-26-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]). 55 GARCÍA-GODOS, WIIG, 2004, pp. 11. 56 GARCÍA-GODOS, WIIG, 2004, pp. 41.

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3.2 COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT Colombian government has always been involved in the

business sector, sided with those who invested in the

country and ignored its role of protecting civilians.57

President Santos has a strong will to continue negotiations

with the FARC. When public complaints grew louder, he

said: “[T]he people should understand that we are

conversing in the midst of conflict, that this is difficult,

often contradictory, but that it is the route that we

deliberately chose, […] I’m going to make every possible

effort.”58 The guerillas are controlling large areas with

natural resources which Santos has a great interest in.59

This might explain his persistence. The Colombian

military is distrusting of the peace process and fears a loss

of influence and budget cuts.60

3.3 PARAMILITARY AND THE RURAL ELITE The paramilitary has always had economic interests and

maintained close relationships to entrepreneurs.61 The

BACRIM does not follow a political agenda and have no

interests in fighting the guerillas. They are concerned only

with personal enrichment and therefore do business with

the guerillas and continue to spread terror among the

civilian population, especially those who are opponents to

the government. They have close bonds to members of the

57 CHOMSKY, 2008, pp. 192; SCHNEIDER, 2004, pp. 16, 128, 148. 58 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (March 08, 2013), ‘Colombia Peace Process Update (March 8, 2013)’ [Online] (Available at: http://colombiapeace.org/2013/03/08/colombia-peace-process-update-march-8-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]. 59 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/08/28/prospects-for-renewed-peace-talks-in-colombia-2/ [Accessed 09 January 2015]). 60 MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-peace-process-suspended-action-of-rogue-farc-unit [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 61 REDDY, Peter (20122), Peace Operations and Restorative Justice: Groundwork for post-conflict regeneration. (Burlington: Ashgate), pp. 10; ABSCOLOMBIA (May 2012), Colombia the Current Panorama: Victims and Land Restitution Law 1448. (London: ABColombia).

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Colombian Congress as well as to former president

Uribe.62 “As we have already started to kill each of them

without mercy we will not allow them to harm the policies

of our president by making demands on the victims and

land law”, stated Rastrojos from the Comandos Urbanos

paramilitary group.63 Colombia’s armed forces, agro-

industrial organizations and Álvaro Uribe are opponents to

the ongoing peace talks.64 “Peace is not in Havana. The

national agenda isn’t up for negotiation with the FARC,”

said Oscar Iván Zuluaga, who was Uribe’s finance

minister.65 Also, they are against economic and political

reforms and want direct influence in the state apparatus.66

3.4 INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS Colombia has rich natural resources that attract

international investors.67 Primarily Chinese, European and

62 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/world- report/2014/country-chapters/colombia [Accessed 15 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-criminal-activities-income [Accessed 10 January 2015]; BALANTA MORENA, Xiomara Cecilia (March 2014), ‘Victims and Reparations: Limitations and Challenges Colombia Victims Law (Act 1448 of 2011)’, in International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 4, No 5 (1), pp. 152-164. (pp. 153); Zelik, 2009, pp. 40; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/world- report/2014/country-chapters/colombia [Accessed 15 January 2015]. 63 ABSCOLOMBIA , 2012) 64 MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-peace-process-suspended-action-of-rogue-farc-unit [Accessed 10 January 2015]; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2014/12/24/at-years-end-its-clear-this-peace-process-is-for-real/ [Accessed 09 January 2015]; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/01/26/colombia-peace-process-update-january-26-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/09/06/hope-for-peace-in-colombia- reasons-for-optimism-awareness-of-obstacles/ [Accessed 07 January 2015]). 65 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (November 15, 2013), ‘Colombia Peace Process Update (November 15, 2013)’ [Online] (Available at: http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]). 66 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2014/12/24/at-years-end-its-clear-this-peace-process-is-for-real/ [Accessed 09 January 2015]; SCHNEIDER, 2004, pp. 14, 148. 67 ABSCOLOMBIA, May 2012.

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U.S. companies operate in Colombia.68 Low wages and a

lack of regulations are also very attractive for these

companies.69 They recruit private security companies and

paramilitaries to protect their farms and mining areas.70

Many companies are polluting the environment and cause

mass displacement, especially under the Afro-Colombian

and Indigenous communities.71 The U.S. also had military

interests in Colombia during the Cold War with the

intention of fighting the communists, and later, when the

country was engaged in “The War On Drugs”.72 The USA

shared important goals with the paramilitary: regional

exploitation for world trade, investment security,

elimination of the guerilla and political control over the

population.73 The Obama administration has changed the

USA’s course: Support of the peace process, advances to

Cuba and downplaying its War On Drugs.74

3.5 VICTIMS OF THE CONFLICT The victims of Colombia’s armed conflict are laborers,

farmers, Human Rights defenders, women, Afro-

Colombians and Indigenous people.75 However, none of

68 CHOMSKY, 2008, pp. 228. 69 CHOMSKY, 2008, pp. 265. 70 ABSCOLOMBIA, May 2012; BELLAMY, Alex J./WILLIAMS,

Paul/GRIFFIN, Stuart (2010), Understanding Peacekeeping. (2nd edn., Cambridge: Polity)., pp. 321, 325, 331. 71 ABSCOLOMBIA, May 2012; CHOMSKY, 2008, pp. 272. 72 ZELIK, 2009, pp. 24; DRAEGER, 2011, pp. 36. 73 ZELIK, 2009, pp. 255. 74 BELLO (2015), ‘The dragon an the gringo’, in The Economist [Internet] 17 January. (Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21639549-latin-americas-shifting-geopolitics-dragon-and- gringo?fsrc=scn%2Ffb%2Fwl%2Fpe%2Fthedragonandthegringo [Accessed 17 January 2015]; ISACSON, Adam (April 2014), Ending 50 Years of Conflict: The Challenges Ahead and the U.S. Role in Colombia. (Washington: WOLA), pp. 3; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/09/06/hope-for-peace-in-colombia- reasons-for-optimism-awareness-of-obstacles/ [Accessed 07 January 2015]). 75 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/09/06/hope-for-peace-in-colombia- reasons-for-optimism-awareness-of-obstacles/ [Accessed 07 January 2015]).

13

these groups are negotiating in Havana.76 After all

massacres, displacements, tortures and killings many

Indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizations have raised

their voices and see the issue more deeply in Colombian

history.77 The Afro-Colombian Social Movement stated

that: “We have hope in the search for peace and social

justice, and the recognition of our people as historic

victims of slavery and colonialism and as the largest

victims of the economic, social and political internal armed

conflict in the country.”78

4. REMAINING ISSUES IN COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT

The last points on the peace talks agenda are the victim’s

rights, demobilization of the FARC and the

implementation of the Final Agreement. Serious Human

Rights violations by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and

the military must be brought to justice in order for the

victims to get reconciliation and dignified treatment - as

individuals and as communities.79 The 2011 Victims and

Land Restitution Law is a framework for the victims of the

conflict to receive their stolen and abandoned properties.80

76 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/09/06/hope-for-peace-in-colombia- reasons-for-optimism-awareness-of-obstacles/ [Accessed 07 January 2015]). 77 ZELIK, 2009, pp. 328. 78 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (June 26, 2014), ‘ANAFRO Afro-Colombian Social Movement Statement on the Peace Process and President Elections’ [Online] (Available at: http://colombiapeace.org/2014/06/26/anafro-afro-colombian-social- movement-statement-on-the-peace-process-and-presidential-elections/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]). 79 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/world- report/2014/country-chapters/colombia [Accessed 15 January 2015]; ISACSON, 2014, ), pp. 6. 80 ABCOLOMBIA (November 2012), Giving It Away: The Consequences of an Unsustainable Mining Policy in Colombia. (London: ABColombia), pp. 8; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (10 June 2011), ‘Colombia: Victims Law a Historic Opportunity. Bold Measures needed to Protect

14

But not all victims are being fully addressed, many are not

officially registered as forcibly displaced and can’t prove

that they owned the stolen land.81 Millions of hectares will

remain in the hands of those who unlawfully took over the

land during the conflict - also because the victims are too

scared to return.82 The Colombian government refuses to

acknowledge that paramilitary groups continue to operate

in these regions.83 The Victim’s Law can only function

when the conflict is over and all victimizers are

demobilized.84

In order for the conflict to end, the FARC must

demobilize.85 However, they will not lay down their

weapons if the government will not offer them some type

of amnesty.86 “We haven’t fought our entire lives for peace

with social justice and the dignity of Colombians only to

end up locked up in the victimizers’ jails,” said Iván

Márquez.87 Colombia is party to the 2002 Rome Statute of

the International Criminal Court (ICC) which prohibits

amnesty for serious Human Rights violations and crimes

Beneficiaries.’ [Online] (Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/10/colombia-victims-law-historic-opportunity [Accessed 15 January 2015]). 81 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2012; ABSCOLOMBIA, May 2012. 82 GARCÍA-GODOS, WIIG, 2004, pp. 35; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2012; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (20 February 2013), ‘Colombia: Landmark Ruling for Land Restitution. Protect Santa Paula Beneficiaries From Threats and Intimidations.’ [Online] (Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/20/colombia-landmark-ruling-land- restitution [Accessed 15 January 2015]). 83 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2012. 84 ISACSON, 2014, ), pp. 6. 85 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]. 86 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/09/06/hope-for-peace-in-colombia- reasons-for-optimism-awareness-of-obstacles/ [Accessed 07 January 2015]). 87 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015].

15

against humanity.88 If the government of Colombia will

not sufficiently punish those responsible for these crimes

the ICC will intervene.89 Another problem for the

demobilization is to control the entire network of the

FARC, whose members can break down into autonomous

groups and continue with criminal activities.90

Even if an agreement is found there are still be several

factors that need to be solved. The Colombian government

must start negotiating with the ELN - who are still

attacking Colombian pipelines and holding hostages - as

well as solve the problem with the BACRIM.9192 Also,

worldwide corporations are committing Human Rights

violations in Colombia - intimidations, forced

displacements and even killings.93 President Santos stands

behind the investors and stops protests of small farmers

with the words: “the so-called farmer strike doesn’t

exist”.94 Large companies are exploiting the natural

88 ISACSON, 2014, ), pp. 7, 8, 9; WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2012/09/06/hope-for-peace-in-colombia- reasons-for-optimism-awareness-of-obstacles/ [Accessed 07 January 2015]); WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]; 89 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]; ISACSON, 2014, ), pp. 7. 90 MCDERMOTT, Jeremy (2013), ‘Possible Scenarios for the FARC’s Fragmentation’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 20 May. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/scenarios-farc-fragmentation [Accessed 10 January 2015]; INSIGHTCRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile [Accessed 10 January 2015]; MCDERMOTT, http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/could-colombia-farc-rebels-break-apart [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 91 GURNEY, Kyra (2014), ‘Colombia Legal Reform to Aid Mass Surrender of Criminal Groups’, in InSightCrime [Internet] 13 October. (Available at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/colombia-proposes-legal-framework-for-surrender-of-criminal- groups [Accessed 10 January 2015]. 92 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015]. 93 ABCOLOMBIA, November 2012, pp. 25; CHOMSKY, 2008, pp. 183; SCHNEIDER, 2004, pp. 5. 94 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, http://colombiapeace.org/2013/11/15/colombia-peace-process-update-november-15-2013/ [Accessed 08 January 2015].

16

resources, causing severe harm to the nature, health

problems to the people and push local communities away

from their land.95 The FARC is not the only problem of the

conflict – indeed, the conflict started with La Violencia,

not with the creation of the FARC.96

5. APPROACHING SOLUTIONS FOR COLOMBIA

The negotiation parties in Cuba already have achieved a lot

and are expected to actually sign a Final Agreement. After

the agreement is reached, the international community can

help with the implementation by providing not military but

financial support.97 In order to be able to reestablish peace,

the conflict on Colombian soil must end:98 All perpetrators

have to stop violating Human Rights and all actors – illegal

armed groups, victims, and civil society – must work

together and find a solution.99 The victims must be fully

protected when they return to their properties and have the

right to truth - to find out what happened to them and their

loved ones and to understand why. Reappraising the past

and providing answers to the victims is always a major

task for a state. Nevertheless, it is necessary in order to

underline what has happened and to prepare for a new

beginning.100 The importance of confession, apology and

forgiveness should not be underestimated. As a symbolic

message, the perpetrators could make a public declaration

and apologize to the victims. Besides, it would have a

strong affect if victims and perpetrators face each other in

public trials, for example. The state could establish ad-hoc

tribunals for transitional justice as was done in Rwanda 95 ABCOLOMBIA, November 2012, pp. 11. 96 LEECH, http://colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence, [Accessed 14 January 2015]). 97 BALANTA MORENA, 2014, pp. 162. 98 BALANTA MORENA, 2014, pp. 162. 99 BALANTA MORENA, 2014, pp. 162. 100 ISACSON, 2014, pp. 8.

17

with the Gacaca Courts. These tribunals were held in the

communities and both perpetrators and victims faced each

other. In my opinion, this is important in order for the

perpetrators to feel regret, and for the victims to be able to

forgive. This will lead to clarification as well as to prevent

repetition of crimes.

Another difficult task for the Colombian government is to

address the roots of the conflict. Inequality, poverty and

discrimination lead to social struggle, revolts and war. In

Colombia where 1.5 % of the land-owners hold 52.2 % of

the land suitable for cultivation there is clearly

inequality.101 Economic growth is very important for

Colombia, and international corporations should continue

to invest in the country, but only if its outcome is

distributed fairly and Human Rights are protected. The UN

should continue to work on binding frameworks to make

non-state actors responsible for Human Rights abuses if

the state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens.102

Moreover, the home state of the corporations - in this case

the United States, the European Union and China - must

respect the universal Human Rights.

6. CONCLUSION An essential aspect of the conflict is its long duration. A lot

has happened since the social struggle found its beginnings

in La Violencia. Particularly, the FARC has changed, from

its foundation as a rural self-defense group to the

establishment of a quasi-state where their power went even

beyond Colombian borders. Currently, they are so weak

that all they want is to end the fighting and integrate into

normal life. Their willingness to find agreements to all the

101 ABSCOLOMBIA, May 2012. 102 ABCOLOMBIA, November 2012, pp. 2.

18

points on the peace talk agenda is an indication for this

change. It also seems as if they have given up most of its

radical communist demands and moved over to a more

social left-wing manifesto. The interests of the rural elite,

on the other hand, have not changed, as they still follow

their economic goals and reject the social demands of the

FARC. The challenge of providing the victims with

appropriate justice and convincing the FARC to lay down

their weapons, still must be worked out. I can not imagine

that the FARC, particularly those members that are still

operating in the jungle, will lay down their weapons to

face the rest of their lives in prison. Of course, it is

important for the victims to see justice. However, I believe

the choice is to have either justice or peace. Colombia’s

people have suffered enough and the country has earned

peace forever. The Colombian government should be

aware that it has a responsibility to all of its citizens and

that it must protect, respect and fulfill its Human Rights

obligations. It has to control the FARC, the rural elite, the

BACRIM and international corporations, not with military

but with judicial means and negotiation. War and violence,

as we have seen in this long-lasting conflict, only causes

harm and does create solutions.

iii

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