Organized complexity: conventions of coordination and the composition of economic arrangements

ORGANIZED COMPLEXITY: Conventions of coordination and the composition of economic

arrangements

Laurent THÉVENOT

2001, European Journal of Social Theory 4(4): 405-425.

Laurent Thévenot is Professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes enSciences Sociales (Paris) and Director of the Groupe de SociologiePolitique et Morale. His recent publications include Les objets dansl'action (with Bernard Conein and Nicolas Dodier); Cognition et information ensociété (with Bernard Conein). A recently co-edited book with MichèleLamont presents the results of a four years comparative research:Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the UnitedStates. Address: EHESS, Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale, 105, bdRaspail, 75006 Paris. [e-mail: [email protected]]

ABSTRACTThis article introduces a framework which aims at capturing the

complexity of economic organizations. The analysis of most legitimateconventions of coordination results in a new approach to the firm as acompromising device between several modes of coordination which engagedifferent repertoires of evaluation. This contribution to the"Economies des convention" offers an analytical tool to operate comparativeresearch on firms, intermediate regulatory comities or publicpolicies.

Laurent THEVENOT ORGANIZED COMPLEXITY 2.

The view on organizations that I shall present here draws on aresearch program which has been investigating both theoretically andempirically the fundamental notion of coordination.1 Building on arealist and pragmatist approach to problematic coordination, itexplores the cognitive and evaluative forms which govern differentmodes of coordination (part 1). 2 The analysis of most legitimateconvention of coordination results in a new approach to the firm as acompromising device (part 2). This framework offers an analytical toolto operate comparative research on firms, market and otherorganizational arrangements such as regulatory committees which take agrowing place in the way the European Union is governed (part 3).

1. MODES OF COORDINATION: THE BEDROCK OF ORGANIZATIONSWhich notion of coordination for which complexity ?

What kind of notion of coordination do we need to study thedynamics of organizations ? A common acceptance of the notion links itfirmly to an idea of stable and collective order. Different types ofconstraints are viewed as maintaining this order: rules, hierarchicalprescriptions, rationalizing and bureaucratic methods, socialstructures, shared representations or common cultures, etc. ContinuingWrong's and Granovetter's statements about over-socialized1 A first version of this paper was presented at the conference on"New Economic Sociology in Europe 2000", organized at StockholmUniversity, by Jens Beckert and Richard Swedberg, June 2-3, 2000. Inaddition to the two anonymous referees, I thanks the participants ofthis conference for their critiques and observations, and especiallythe organizers who made possible such an open and fruitfuldiscussion.

2 I shall here limit myself to the modes of coordination which arebased on most legitimate conventions, and give only some hint onfurther research dedicated to more bounded "pragmatic regimes ofengagement" (Thévenot, 1990, 2001a, 2001b). The notion of"convention" is at the center of a recent trend in French socialsciences which pervades both the sociology of economics andinstitutional economics and which is viewed as "Economie desconventions". A series of books have developed this trend, attestingthe dynamics of this growing intersection between economics andsociology: Salais et Thévenot, 1986; Thévenot, 1986; Revue économique,1989; Boltanski et Thévenot, 1989, 1991; Orléan, 1994; Eymard-Duvernay et Marchal, 1997; Storper and Salais, 1997. For adiscussion in an economical perspective, see: Wilkinson, 1997.


representations in sociology, I would say that the previous notionsbring about an "over-coordinated" vision of organizations. Socialresearch on organizations reacted to over-ordered visions of the firmand disclosed a more complex and conflicting universe (Gouldner)Interactionists brought to the fore a negotiated order (Strauss), thestrategic utilization of rules by rational individuals who manœuverwithin their limits (Crozier and Friedberg), fields of conflicts(Bourdieu) or competing interests groups which hide behindinstitutionalization (Fligstein). The sociology of practice uncoveredinformal practices which challenge formal and rule-like prescriptions(Cicourel).3

From this experience, I shall draw two conclusions.- First, we need a notion of coordination which is much more open

to uncertainty, critical tensions and creative arrangements than theideas of stabilized and reproductive orders. I feel suspicious of theuse of such notions as values, collective representations, rules orhabitus, when they serve to ascertain order. The characterization ofmodes of coordination should point to their dynamics, not to theresulting orders.

- Second, we need to account for a variety of modes ofcoordination. Sociologists frequently discard the most formalizedmeans of coordination and bring to the fore alternative means in termsof interests or corporeal dispositions. My contention is that weshould acknowledge modes of familiar accommodation without dismissingthe role of formal means. Then we shall have a better view on thecomplexity of coordination.4

Many sociologists view complexity as the result of a plurality ofcontrasted social milieus. Coordination is then based on categoricalcharacterizations of human beings in terms of identities, interestgroups, habitus, etc. Complexity and conflict result from theconfrontation of different social groups. Although quite fruitful insocial sciences, this approach misses a problem which is the dualversion of the previous one. And this problem is getting more an moresignificant in contemporary societies: the "same" human being has toengage into different modes of conduct which vary from one situationto the other. Several trends in sociology have exploreddifferentiation either in the macro-terms of system differentiation(Parsons, Luhmann), or micro situational frames (Goffman). One way toescape this alternative would be to follow sociologists who paid close

3 For an up-to-date presentations of the "Practice turn" incontemporary theory, see: Knorr-Cetina, Schatzki and Savigny, 2001.

4 For a recent contribution to the approach of complexity in science,technology and medicine, see: Law and Mol, 2001.


attention to the shift between public and private modes of conduct(Elias) and to the variety of affiliation ties (Simmel). More recentlyGiddens examined the tension between globalizing influences andpersonal disposition. How can we refine the basic conception of socialcoordination to capture this pragmatic versatility ?A cognitive, realist an pragmatist approach of coordination

Organizations are obviously devised to generalize, both in terms oftemporal and spatial validity, certain forms of relation between humanbeings and their environment. Some sociological reductions topractices and local situations miss the relevance of theses forms ofgeneralization, and the kind of transformation which is needed tobuild them out of more localized and personalized relationships."Investment in forms" support this generalization of coordination, andpave the way to make people and things more similar and more generalacross contexts (Thévenot, 1984). An investment in form is costly anddemands negotiation and material equipment, but the cost may be offsetby returns in coordination which depend on the extension of the domainof time and space within which it is accepted.

If we investigate the general cognitive forms that actors use andwhich allow them to coordinate their conducts, we first have toconsider categorization and codification. The making of statisticalforms of equivalence plays a central role in the kind ofgeneralization that sustain social sciences (Desrosières et Thévenot,1988; Desrosières, 1998). Furthermore, we need to explore a widevariety of ways of creating equivalences between human beings, orbetween things, through standards or other conventional qualities.

Durkheimian cognitive sociology offers a strong help to makevisible the social significance of categorization (Durkheim et Mauss,1971 [1903]), as shown by Mary Douglas' further work on boundaries.5

Rather than relating cognitive forms to the collectivity of a socialgroup (as the central coordinative unit), I would rather relate themto a certain mode of coordination which involves a certain "format" ofinformation. Durkheim offered some valuable insight into the relationbetween social cognition and objects. But objectivity was, in hiswork, strongly tied to the collectivity of the social group. We needmore refined views on forms of cognition, objectivity and realism than5 Boltanski (1970), Bourdieu and Boltanski (1974), relatedclassification struggles to class conflicts and were also quiteinfluential in the renewal of Durkheim-Mauss cognitive sociology.Boltanski's further work on "Les cadres" departed from this firstorientation and developed a thorough analysis of the process ofsocial categorisation (Boltanski, 1987). On symbolic boundaries,see: Lamont and Fournier (1992).


the ones provided by the classical notions of social objectivity.Different investments in forms generate different ‘forms of the probable’which constrain what can be proved and offered as relevant evidence.For instance statistical probability is quite different from evidencebased on proximity to a prototype. Objects in series are needed forlaw-like probability, whereas personalized and localized things areinvolved in the kind of plausibility which is anchored in proximity.This leads us to explore different kind of access to reality andrealism.

Research on social cognition is not generally concerned by the linkbetween cognition and action which I situate at the core of myapproach of modes of coordination (Thévenot, 1998b). However, theAmerican pragmatist philosophy focused on this link (Dewey, James,Pierce), and influenced several trends in the contemporary philosophyof knowledge and science (Hacking, Rouse). Sociological interactionismalso greatly benefited from this philosophical lineage. Lamont andWuthnow (1990) observe that a distinct American approach to the studyof cultural codes has differed from its European counterpart, becauseof this influence of American pragmatism.6 Although James wasinterested in differentiating kinds of knowledge and worlds ofexperience, the notion of action which is so crucial in pragmatismtends to be unique and uniform from one situation to the other. 7

My purpose is to identify a plurality of modes of "engagement",each of them implying a distinct cognitive format related to adifferent notion of realism, i.e. a kind of access to the humanenvironment of nature and artifacts. The fine grained analyses ofsymbolic interactionism, or ethnomethodology, have illuminated subtledynamics of local adjustment, but they tend to overemphasize anagreement regarding meaning, and they underestimate or ignore therequirements of a material engagement with the environment.8 We want anotion of coordination which takes into account the commerce withthings as well as the commerce with people. In this respect, theadvances of social studies of science and technology have been mostprofitable, especially those which pay full attention to theinvolvement of objects. Latour's and Callon's actor-network theory is

6 See, in particular: Swidler, 1986; DiMaggio and Powell, 1990;DiMaggio, 1997.

7 Joas' interesting focus on the creativity of action (Joas, 1999)explicitly deals with a general model of action, and not adifferentiation of such models. It strongly opposes Habermas on thispoint.

8 On the shortcomings of this meaning-oriented way to treat objectsin ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, see Conein, 1997.


particularly relevant because of its radical and extremely innovativeinclusion of non-human entities in social sciences. The notion ofnetwork is very compelling because of its power to embrace in thedescription a potential list of entities which is much broader thanthe one offered by models of action and practice. But this notiontends to overlook the heterogeneity of links for the benefit of aunified picture of interconnected entities. The work presented hereaims at figuring out this heterogeneity, in order to clarify the workof compromise which agents have to do (what ANT somehow refers to as"translation").

For instance, "calculus centers" (Latour, 1987) and "calculativeagencies" (Callon, 1998) depend on the prior construction of forms ofequivalences. Such forms are plural and all of them do not fit thekind of calculus which is assumed by rational optimization. A form ofequivalence which is based on common recognition (broadly visual) andwhich implies the realism of signs (logo, trademark, etc.) does notoffer the same possibility of calculus than the one based on therealism of technical and functional tools. The comparison of theseforms of equivalence demonstrates that time and space take differentconfigurations in each of them, with significant consequences oncalculus or, more generally, judgement.Relating cognition and evaluation : the genesis of orders of worth

Although the analysis of different form investments along differentcriteria (time, space, objectivity) brings some light on the pluralityof modes of coordination, a step further is needed to relate cognitionto evaluation. This is what we have done with Luc Boltanski, buildingoriginally on the empirical evidence brought by experimentalobservations on categorization tasks (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1983).Our further work focused on most legitimate forms of characterizationof people and things which are used in public critiques andjustifications. We examined the relation between such cognitive formsand the constructions of the common good. Such relations sustainorders of "worth" which people refer to in disputes and which have tomeet certain political and moral requirements (Boltanski et Thévenot,1991).9 Each of these conventional and most legitimate principles ofevaluation that we called "worth" support a different mode ofcoordination by means of a process of ‘qualification’ of people andthings.10 9 For concise presentations of the argument of the book in English,before the translation is completed, see: Boltanski and Thévenot,1999, 2000.

10 For an introduction to this notion of "qualification" andillustrations from a fieldwork concerning an economic planning


In De la justification (id.) we made explicit these orders of worth andcompared them to philosophical constructions of the polity. Amongstsocial scientist, this presentation "from above" inevitably raisessuspicion towards categories which are viewed as floating in air.Where do these principles come from? Is the list closed? Are theyhistorically constructed? Going in the direction indicated by thesequestions, I shall here offer another view on orders of worth, "frombelow". It will suggest a genetic process which brings about newconventions of coordination. I find another benefit in this geneticpresentation. It gives an insight into ways of engaging the worldwhich do not result in generalized coordination but which have beendeveloped for more local and bounded adjustments, on the basis of agreater proximity. And these modes of engagement are prior toconventionalized modes of coordination. My statement is more precise :Most legitimate conventional regimes of coordination are fabricated onmore basic regimes of engagement. They are raised on the limits onthese regimes when there is a need for extended coordination with adistant environment and therefore, for publicity.

I will suggest the following steps to sketch the genesis of a neworder of worth.

(a) The basic situation corresponds to some elementary form ofattachment between human beings and their environment (both human andmaterial). I use the term "attachment" to leave open thecharacterization of the relation with the environment. Suchattachments enhance human capacities and lead to some asymmetry ofpositions. However, a further step is needed to consider "resources"in general, to compare them and take note of inequalities. The highlylocalized familiar engagement with the world, for instance, preventsthe possibility of attributing clear-cut and distinct capacities topeople and things and, a fortiori, to make them comparableanyhow (Thévenot 1994). A personal and bodily way to accommodate tosomeone or something, an idiosyncratic visual clue for identification,a recurrent emotion in the presence of something: none of these modesof attachment are already shaped in a way that would allow a generalmode of coordination.

Human beings constantly experience the benefits and shortcoming ofnew kind of attachments, exploring new ways to relate to the world.The relationship between human agents and a computerized informationalenvironment is an example of these newly explored attachments. But therelationship to nature is another. Therefore, this exploration is farfrom being reduced to technical progress. On the other hand, new

development, see: Thévenot, 2001b.


configuration of links do not emerge without the identification anddevelopment of some sort of new equipment of humanity.

(b) The second step consists in the extension of the attachmentwhich is strengthened and made more general by the specialization anddevelopment of this equipment. This extension is the result of humanstriving for comparison. And the comparison is made possible by thecrafting of a material environment in a way which systematizes morelocal or idiosyncratic attachments, and builds equivalence betweenentities across situations. For instance, the relation of visibility,although anchored in a human perceptual faculty, became a generalizedrelation - and finally originated a new order of worth - via thedevelopment of a proper equipment of visibility : a world of thingswhich are specifically designed and Â to be treated as signs.

(c) In the third step which corresponds to the political and moralrequirements of a public space, the systematized relationship betweenhuman and non human beings brings about issues of justice : It createsobservable asymmetries of capacities amongst people who are members ofa common humanity. The construction of some form of equivalence isneeded to assess these asymmetries. But once the assessment ofinequality is made possible through some form of equivalence, itcreates tensions with the idea of common humanity and equal dignitythat we find at the core of the everyday sense of justice.

Orders of worth are moral and political artifacts which result fromthe questioning about unjust power with regards to a systematicrelationship between human and non human beings. But this questioningin terms of justice is prepared by the generalization of some of theways human beings engage with their ‘equipped environment’.

2. COMPOSITE ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPROMISING DEVICESWe have explored a view on complexity which results from the

variety of modes of coordination. They are in critical relationship toone another but compromises can bring local and temporal compatibilitybetween them. We can then theorize organizations as arrangements whichhave been specifically designed for such a compromised complexity.Therefore, their members have to engage in different modes ofcoordination, depending on the configuration of the situation in whichthey find themselves. We do not see organizations or institutions in astrict correspondence to each orders of worth : the civic worthcorresponding to the state, the inspiration worth to the church, orthe domestic worth to the family.11 All organization have to cope withcritical tensions between different orders of worth.

11 This would be Walzer's view in Spheres of justice (Walzer, 1983).


Critical tensions between modes of coordination and the firm as acompromising device for complex coordination

The fact that each order of worth is in a critical relation withall the others is actually a main source of everyday criticisms.Situations in which different orders of worth are brought forwardsimultaneously result in disagreement which concerns not only theassessment of states of worth, but also the decision about theappropriate order of worth which is to govern the assessment. Thus thecontroversy over the "competitiveness of the public services" may tendtowards two different tests, one of civic worth, the other market-oriented. It leads to the operation of criticism, or revelation("dénonciation"). This operation has two stages: first, a certain commongood is discredited and denounced as a particular good (revelation inthe sense of the exposure, the showing up of a false worth); then thecommon good of another order of worth is exhibited and valorized(revelation in the sense of the showing off of a real worth). Thecomplete operation succeeds in reversing the situation by swinging itinto another world: the so-called "citizen" is simply thejuxtaposition of clients with particular interests, or, symmetrically,the so-called "client" is in fact a citizen entitled to a publicservice open to all.

Composite situations involve entities which qualify for differentorders of worth. But they do not all turn into controversies. We thususe the term "compromise" in a specific way to designate the kind ofcomposition between orders of worth (and not only between particularinterests) which suspends controversy, without having resolved it byrecourse to a test in a single order of worth. Thus, in the compositesituation already mentioned, that of a "competitive public service",the compromise between the civic and the market-oriented orders of worthcan be shored up. The notion of the "user" subsumes the contradictionbetween the "citizen" and the "client". Nonetheless, compromises arebreakable and subject to criticism because they entail the comingtogether of these two competing orders of worth.

At the level of the firm, the analytical framework outlined heremakes it possible to identify the main conventions of coordinationwhich are implemented, to account for their critical relations and forthe composition of the entities which qualify for different orders ofworth. This composition calls for an intense work at adaptation aimedat managing the tensions between the different coordinationconventions. My contention is that the firm should be treated as acompromising device between several modes of coordination, involvingat least the market and the industrial modes. This definition emphasizesthe plurality of the worlds entangled in the making of the firm. By


contrast, settings that mainly involve one order of worth do not needthe kind of composite arrangements which give substance to the firm.They are subjected to a reality test which may lead to dispute andreadjustment, but not to critical uncertainty (Thévenot, 2001c).Without the necessity of compromising market coordination with othermodes of coordination, there is no need for the firm. As Coasenoticed, there is no a priori rationale for replacing the price systemwith another "integrating force" originating in the firm (Coase, 1937:149). Compromising critical tensions between market and industrial modes ofcoordination

In its overgrowing expansion, the market order of worth raisestensions with other kinds of worth. In her penetrating analyzes ofthe extension of market relationships to domains which are distantfrom the marketplace, Viviana Zelizer demonstrated the tension thatthe creation of new market goods might cause, as when life itself cometo be given particular economic value (Zelizer, 1994). Here, I shallprimarily focus on one main source of tension which is internal to theeconomic sphere, the tension between the market and industrial ordersof worth, the first order being based on market competition while thesecond is established on technical performances. Economists are notalways aware of such an internal tension because the Arrow-Debreupresentation suggested, on the opposite, a conceptual integrationwhich treats similarly the production function and the consumerfunction.

Apart from this formalized model, several conceptual categories,such as efficiency or rationality, serve to build bridges betweenthese two orders. A concern for the distinction between the twoorders, and for the various ways compromises are built between them,may contribute to the understanding of various conceptions of"rationality" rather than presenting a uniform model ofindustrialization (both in the usual sense and in the more specificsense of the industrial order of worth). Thus Dobbin observed that"price homogeneity was interpreted as a failure of policy to inducecompetition in America, while it was read as a success of policy tostabilize the industry in Britain" (1994, p.12).The future and the critical relation between the market and the industrial orders ofworth

The simplest way of bringing in the critical relation between boththe market and industrial forms of coordination, is no doubt to payattention to a series of consequences due to the introduction of time.Reduced to the present in the market order, the formation of timetakes the shape of a future warranted by investment, in the industrial


order of worth. Time is entrenched in the expected stability ofmethods and reliable technical equipment upon which the futuredepends.

From the point of view of the market coordination, criticism of theindustrial form of coordination most often calls into question therigidity of industrial arrangements. An typical formulation of such acritique can be found in Von Mises' assaults on technocratic devicesand in the way he presents profit as the justified reward for thesacrifice of stability (Von Mises, 1944). He emphasizes the divergenceof perspective between people who behave according to one or the otherprinciple of action: the businessman will come into conflict with theengineer, interfere with his plans and incur his scorn (id.)12. This isa very current critical tension inside firms when the market immediatesatisfaction of customers' wishes -- which means a "just-in-time"delivery -- depreciate the planning resources belonging to theindustrial coordination (Eymard-Duvernay 1987, 1989).

The symmetrical criticism consists of dismissing the beings whichare qualified for the market worth, by stressing the fact that theirunpredictable character disrupts the industrial worth of investment andplanning, as market opportunism hinders temporal commitment. In thiscase, it is the stabilizing tools and methods that count asinvestments in a broad sense (Thévenot, 1984), and the disturbancecomes from the temporal incoherence of behaviors optimized at eachmoment (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), against which it would beefficient in the long run to "tie one's hands" (Elster, 1979).

In taking up Marshall's distinction between short-term market-oriented opportunism and long-term industrial commitment, Keynesbrought out the tension resulting from two incompatible rationales,and presented the reciprocal criticisms concerning, on the one hand,the individual who demands prompt success and rapid enrichment,attributing excessive importance to the short-term fluctuations of themarket and, on the other hand, the individual who makes long-terminvestments (Keynes, 1936). Keynes has demonstrated the central roleof the "convention" of stability in business which allows investments,although they are fixed for the community, to be liquid for theindividual and which thus effects a compromise between the industrialand market natures.

12 . It is noteworthy that both Hayek (1952) and von Mises (1944)refer, in the course of the previous critical denunciation, to thepolitical philosophy of Saint-Simon, which offers a particularlysystematic development of the industrial worth (Boltanski et Thévenot,1991).


In the very functioning of the firm, an entire set of disparatetechnical or organizational tools brought out by economic andhistorical studies on the efficiency of corporate firms becomecoherent if we think of them as mechanisms of compromise betweenmarket-oriented and industrial natures. Such compromises between amarket rationale which is naturally deprived of a future, and anindustrial action which is naturally stabilized through investments, canbe fostered by such material devices as diverse as refrigerationfacilities (Chandler, 1977; Thévenot, 1989b), stocking procedures, orsuch organizational arrangements as long-term buying contracts whichmake it possible to stabilize the demand through mass productionorganization (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Studies concerning theregulation of the "Fordian model" (Aglietta, 1976; Boyer, 1986) haveshown how much the latter organization deviates from thespecifications of a market arrangement. The critical confrontation ofthis model with a market competition environment characterized by theinstability of demand and the diversification of products has shakenthis compromise by bringing back a purely market-oriented realitytest.How spatial arrangement differ

The functional economy of industrial methods does not only dependupon a temporal equivalence but also upon a spatial equivalence whichgoes through standardization, as Veblen already suggested (1978[1904]). Chandler characterized the administrative coordination whichensures the success of large firms and of mass production through thecapability of programming the flow of raw materials and of finishedgoods and the standardization of the process (Chandler, 1980).Investment in forms are needed to maintain this temporal regularityand this spatial standardization which both ensure the economies ofscale of mass production. Inversely, following the changes incustomer's demand as closely as possible, just in time, upsets theindustrial requirements of stabilization and of planning: a conductjustified according to a form of coordination results in dramaticflaws and failures for another form of coordination.

Let us take the example of a new equipment is an expert systemenabling the rationalization of credit allocations in the branches ofa bank. Such equipment is efficient only insofar as it is congruentwith other instruments and resources already available. It requiresprior investments in forms which allow the constitution of informationin a criterial and serial format adjusted to an industrial productionfunction for credit. It is linked together by a standard dossier withfigures enabling the calculation of ratios, with the type of expertiseprovided by specialized credit technicians, and with a data base. For


instance, a "perfect" credit dossier points to a firm that is "verywell structured at a technical, financial and human level", thatmanufactures products which "conform to European Economic Communitystandards" and that is applying for credit truly aimed at covering"investment for an increase in activity" (Wissler, 1989).

In the perspective of a market test, the pertinent system fordeciding about a credit changes completely: there no longer are anyexperts, instead there are salesmen going from door to door; there areno more big dossiers that take a long time to circulate, but instead adirect contact with the client, which should correspond immediatelyand as closely as possible to a subjective need to buy. As far as theclient's motives are concerned, they no longer imply an effectiveinvestment regarding planning for the future. The credit action lendsitself to a market coordination and considers a passing whim as apertinent opportunity which one must be able to seize by beingattentive to the client. Attention must also be paid to competingbanks in order to be able to offer competitive interest rates.Objects and conventions of the 'domestic' [patrimonial] mode ofcoordination

The domestic order of worth grounds trustworthiness on a triplegradient: a temporal gradient through ingrained usage and precedent, aspatial gradient through local proximity, a hierarchical gradientthrough authority.

Like the industrial form of coordination, the domestic one allows theaction to be oriented in a time perspective. But the domestic timeformation is completely different from the link between the presentand the future built by industrial investment: the past informs thepresent through custom and precedent. The domestic space does nothave the homogeneity of Cartesian references in the industrial spaceeither: it is a neighboring space, polarized by the oppositionbetween, what is far or close, what is here or there, who areassociates or strangers. Faithfulness and loyalty is materiallysupported by engaging a combination of objects which reserve thememory of the precedent and the similarity of what is close (Lafaye,1989, 1990). By using this combination, in other words by beingascribed to durable relations of proximity the actions are coordinatedaccording to this domestic worth. This is noticeable in localrecruiting (Eymard-Duvernay et Marchal, 1997), the familiarity ofbodies, clans and ethnic groups which "facilitates the acquisition oflocally adapted know-how" and the apprenticeship to "cues relevant tothe environment" (Storper and Scott, 1988).

A good number of elements discerned in the mechanism of "internalmarkets" (Doeringer and Piore, 1985), and which are in opposition to


the mechanism of the competitive market, become coherent when they arerelated to the kind of trustworthiness which characterized thedomestic order of worth. The identified rules are, as Olivier Favereauproved, veritable "substitutes for market mechanisms" (Favereau,1986). These rules which create internal markets belong to a domesticorder and find their sources in, specific skills, apprenticeship onthe job and custom.

The analysis of domestic evaluation and reality test, shows that thethree previous features are closely connected (Thévenot, 1989;Wissler, 1989). The establishment of trust, which expresses thedomestic worth, requires a relation of generation with a precedentwhich engenders and constitutes a consolidated past, a relation ofproximity ensuring closeness and affinity, and a relation ofconsideration allowing for authority which covers and guarantees13.What the mode of coordination based on the domestic worth clearlyshows, if one captures its original features without trying to reduceit to the market coordination, is the relationship between these threeaspects: precedent which endures, closeness which specifies, andauthority which encompasses. Domestic worth is distinct both from,industrial hierarchy which is built according to technicalprofessional competencies, and the hierarchy of importance measured byprices: it is ascribed to reevaluated reputations at each test ofconfidence. Also, by remaining attentive to this test and to thereevaluation of a reputation, we depart from the idea that this worthis rigid, an idea which seldom results from a critical reduction ofthe market relation.

In his search for the means to prevent opportunism and ensureenduring relations, Williamson highlights a number of elementsbelonging to the domestic worth: the integration into the same"house", the territorial exclusiveness or the constraints of mutualdependence by pledges which guarantee promises and restrict freedom(Williamson, 1985). The specific nature of the assets and the

13 . Some authors acknowledge a large set of elements relevant to thedomestic world while seeming reluctant to consider the specificityof a principle of coordination which maintains trust. They statethat these resources "do not produce trust but rather a functionalsubstitute for trust" (Granovetter, 1985: 489). Akerlof, inspiredby Weber (1978), explains that Quakers, in spite of theirtrustfulness and low economic rationality, are usually consideredone of the wealthiest minority group on the U.S.: "it pays personsto bond themselves by acquiring traits that cause them to appearhonest. And the cheapest way to acquire such traits according to ourmodel is, in fact to be honest" (Akerlof, 1983: 55-56).


customary character of the relations, which he finds as the maincharacteristics of the situation, are particularly relevant, as wehave seen, for distinguishing domestic from market forms ofcoordination. In the same way, conceptualizing an "implicitcontract", Klein proves that time is irrelevant for the application ofan explicit contract, whereas it is of crucial importance in the caseof an implicit contract, because the only possible sanction is thebreaking of the engagement which depends on the compared advantages ofthe reputation and the opportunity of a hold-up coming from thespecificity of the investment agreed to by the partners (Klein, 1984:333). How can one imagine that the model of market coordination canintegrate this temporal stability based upon confidence, withoutcompromising with other modes of coordination ? Human and materialbeings qualified for market worth do not allow for memory whichcharacterises the domestic patrimonial objects and conventions.Trust and the critical relation between the market and domestic modes of coordination

The worth of domestic objects, assets, heritages, patrimony dependsgreatly on the links tying it to its owner as his/her belongings, andon the amount of reputation he or she is endowed with, i.e., his orher own domestic worth. The market test, on the contrary, presupposesthat goods be detached from people so the latter can be free to graspany opportunity. Mauss highlighted the process through which domesticgoods are transformed into market goods, particularly the rituals toprevent livestock from going back to their previous master (Mauss,1950: 259).14 The market rules for the management of the workforceconsisting in staff turnover, are intended to avoid attachment,prejudice and lasting influences (Wissler, 1989) and imply a rejectionof beings of a domestic nature. This detachment from the domesticworld is particularly difficult to operate in the case when the marketgood is a service. Thus von Mises deplores that in the servicesectors, attractions and aversions to people play a role and thatrelations have a more human character" (von Mises, 1944).

The distinction of orders of worth helps to clarify the uses of theterm "commercial". It may just as well designate a market devicedesigned for "looking for clients everywhere" as a compromise withdomestic resources which suppose specialization in specific productsand lasting relations with the clientele. Generally, the devicesdeveloped within the "commercial" function of firms do not confinethemselves to elements of a market competition nature. They alsoinclude domestic objects and relations based on sales representativesor "local" branches that contribute to customer "loyalty" and whichboth belong to a domestic topography and temporality. One may expect

14 On this point, see also: Appadurai, 1986.


such domestic facilities to upset market coordination between thefirm's sales representatives and the very localized network ofretailers. Richard Tedlow (1990) found the following statement in theFord archives of 1921: "[they] threaten their status asrepresentatives of our firm by accepting the hospitality of theretailers, even sometimes going so far as to accept a dinnerinvitation at their homes, or to accept being put up for the nightinstead of going to a hotel, which is what they should do". Thedisturbance is caused by the dinner invitation instead of going to arestaurant, or the host's home instead of an anonymous hotel. Toenlarge upon this critique, other actions by Ford have contributed toquestioning the domestic elements of the sales setup. He thuseliminated exclusive rights over a territory, conducted a policy ofuniform multiplication of outlets ("at each crossroads..."), rejectedterms of payment for the dealers and refused to consult with them(id.). These different actions, which Tedlow believes considerablyhindered Ford's adaptation, are absolutely coherent if one considerselements from the domestic world crucial. Inversely, the attempt atreaching a compromise with this other world widens the range ofavailable resources and therefore the capacity of the firm to adapt.

Another advantage of the analysitical framework proposed here isthat it takes into account the differences between the format ofinformation which is relevant to each coordination convention, withoutreducing the differences to quantitative inequalities, or toasymmetries in the access to the same kind of general information.Thus the problems of "moral hazard" typically arise when a mode ofdomestic knowledge supposing the proximity meets with a mode of marketknowledge embodied in the prices of goods which are commonlyidentified. One can reinterpret in this way the critical situation ofa second hand "market" (Akerlof, 1970) or of Geertz's bazaar, when"intensive" search for the ties of the good to the different previousowners strongly contrasts the information require for a competitivemarket (Geertz, 1978). This critical confrontation is well illustratedin our credit example. Stiglitz and Weiss have studied these complexsituations as though they were problems of adverse selectiondemonstrating the efficiency of a rationing of credit (1981) in thesame way as a rationing of job offers was the response to the moralhazard weighing upon the employees' efforts (Shapiro and Stiglitz,1984).

The complexity of the situation gains from a more symmetricaltreatment in terms of different conventions of coordination. In thesame way as we described the arrangement for granting credit qualifiedfor an industrial test, and then the one qualified for a market test,


we can sketch out the domestic arrangement. With a network of brancheswell implanted locally, personal contacts maintained with a loyalclientele who have had accounts in the branch for a long time, andoral information, the bank is able to rely upon domestic forms ofprobabilities in order to appreciate a credit application with totalconfidence (Wissler, 1989). However another bank may look for a marketcompetition arrangement by approaching the same client. But, asStiglitz and Weiss point out, "if a bank wants to attract clients awayfrom its competitors by offering them lower interest rates, it willfind that its offer will be countered by an interest rate which isjust as low for a "good" client (a "good" credit risk), and will notfollow if the borrower is not this type of client. That is why banksseldom try to steal clients away from the competitors" (Stiglitz andWeiss, 1981). The relations between domestic and industrial coordination

The above illustration of a domestic worth and coordination showsthat it does not simply boil down to an archaic paternalistic firmmanaged in a conservative way. This depreciative characterization isalready the result of a critical reduction in relation to theindustrial or market worths.

The domestic form of coordination generalises the kind of trust andauthority relationship which pertain to family kinship. Williamson'sapproach identifies several characteristics of this coordination inthe way a firm works, and it is not surprising that work based upon itshould find within the family relations bearing these characteristics,which are therefore interpreted in terms of the cost of transaction(Ben Porah 1980). By regarding industrial and domestic coordinationson an equal footing, one discerns more clearly the compromise devisedto reconcile these two requirements. These complex arrangements remainmore often absent in surveys on firms which tend to give priority tostrictly industrial or market elements. They only appear in approacheswhich stress upon customary or collective social embeddedness ofeconomic relations (Granovetter 1985). The framework for analysisproposed here makes it possible to systematically study the making ofcompromises. A wide ranging group of these compromises manages thetension between standardisation requirements and the decentralisationof local practices. In the example of the bank many elements ofinterface are noticeable between the personnel in the local branchesfamiliar with the area and close to the established clientele, and thetechnicians who maintain the standardised requirements of head office(Wissler, 1989).


3.AN ANALYTICAL TOOL FOR A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVEIn this last section, I will briefly offer an outlook into the ways

our framework might serve comparative work, both in spatial orhistorical perspectives. It offers analytical tools for comparisons intime and space at very different levels, from the level of the firm tothe level of societal changes. It also challenges the classical macro-micro distinction since judgements of worth are precisely ways ofenlarging the scope of an evaluation from a local context and ofcrafting generalized statements.THE LEVEL OF THE FIRM

A first level of variation corresponds to the unequal weight ofeach mode of coordination within the organization. From thisframework, we can derive a typology of firms or organizationsaccording to the order of resources which is the most developed.Since the orders of worth have a general validity, they provide asound foundation for a typology. From the preeminence of resourcesthat are congruent with market coordination, or with industrialcoordination, or with domestic coordination grounded in trust, etc.,one may refer to "production models" or "firm models" (Eymard-Duvernay1987). The use of this framework allows fine -grained distinctions inthe ways the quality of goods and services is assessed. Against asimple industrial qualification, it shows the additional performanceof more composite firms which, in the agricultural and food industriesin particular, design compromises between a domestic quality ofproducts, which is anchored in tradition and locality, and anindustrial qualification which opens to a certainstandardization (Thévenot, 1989, 1998a).

This analysis of compromises and composite firms offers a usefulapproach of flexibility. The opening up of the firm to a diversity ofform of coordination makes it possible to absorb a criticaluncertainty coming from the encounter of several modes of coordination(Thévenot, 2001c). In the symmetrical approach which we have adopted,it is understandable that an industrial coordination can ensure theflexibility of the market order (what Simon notes as a paradox: Simon,1981: 51), just as the reverse is true. Favereau has investigated thetwo species of rigidity which stem from a limitation either of themarket structure or some organizational structure (Favereau, 1988).On the basis of a comparison between two ways of ensuring flexibilityin the North American and Hungarian economies, Stark likewise proposesto make symmetrical the opposition between the market and industrialorganization. With respect to a predominant market coordination, therecourse to the mechanisms of "bureaucratic" organization contributesto reducing uncertainties; symmetrically, in a predominantly


bureaucratic regulation, the introduction of market mechanisms ofinternal subcontracting also contributes to diminishing productionuncertainties (Stark, 1986). A plurality of modes of coordinationmakes an economic organization more adaptable, ensuring a kind ofdynamic efficiency (Stark, 1996).THE LEVEL OF SOCIETAL CHANGES

With another focus, the same framework can bring some light onanother level of comparison, which corresponds to societal differencesfrom one period of time to another, or from one country to theother (Lamont and Thévenot, 2000). It offers a way to escape the useof extremely general categories (rationalization, modernity), ortautological national characters, or pure contextual stories.

We still analyze differences in the importance of different ordersof worth, and among the ways they are compromised. But at this macro-level, the compromises are supported by stabilized institutions andamong them, by the arrangements of public and legal action. Theframework helped to clarify, in particular, the shift in the Stateapparatus and public policies which occurred during the 80s, from acivic-industrial compromise to arrangements which are more open tomarket and opinion worth (Bessy, Eymard-Duvernay, Gomel et Simonin,1995; de Foucauld et Thévenot, 1995; Simonin, 1995).

But at the level of societies, we are also occupied with anothertask: exploring the genesis of new legitimate modes of coordinationand their being compatible or not with the grammar of orders of worth.The work is on progress concerning the "green" modes of coordinationand worth both in France and the USA (Lafaye et Thévenot, 1993;Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye, 2000), and the "information" order ofworth (Thévenot, 1997). Boltanski and Chiapello investigatedextensively the possible genesis of a new order of worth based onnetworks and project management (Boltanski et Chiapello, 1999).

This framework can also bring light on the EU construction. Theconstitutive texts of the EU promote a notion of Single Market whichis based on a unique notion of common good corresponding to the marketorder of worth. The European court accept very few exceptions to thisprinciple which are actually pointing to other orders of worth: publichealth and the protection of consumers or the environment. Thispresent unidimensional constitution dangerously limits the range ofcommon goods which are viewed as most legitimate in the EU. However,new organizational devices have been developed to govern EU economicrelations, which are neither firms nor state apparatus and which leavesome place, although insufficiently acknowledged, to non market ordersof worth. In order to reach the common certification of health andsafety standards, European wide standard setting committees bring


together technical experts, representatives of industry and ofconsumers. These committees play nowadays a crucial role in the EUgoverning. They also constitute a new major inter-firm coordinativedevice. This kind of composite coordination device is expresslydesigned to foster deliberation in the elaboration of decisionsregarding the public. Our framework allows to study the way thesecoordination devices include a wide range of goods or interests ofdifferent scope, and not only private interests (Thévenot, 1997,1998a).

* **

Among sociologists, there is a tendency of dealing with issues ofvalues in the vocabulary of "resource" or "tool". But values orconceptions of the common good are not "resources" as others. Here, Iconsidered the possibility of taking seriously into account thepolitical and moral orientations of the agents because they occupy acentral part in the dynamics of coordination. This perspective on aproblematic coordination helps to clarify the link between cognitionand evaluation, and the need to elaborate a political and moralsociology of economy. We should break with the uneasiness of socialsciences towards moral issues, and even towards political issues aslong as they are not framed in terms of a game of power. However, ourorientation does not imply that we neglect cases of power abuse anddomination, such as the situations of rigidified qualifications whichare not put to a test. Or that we ignore the strategical use ofconventions (Moody and Thévenot 2000). Or that we ignore the place ofindividual interests. But we need to clarify the grammars of thesecommon or individual goods, and their mutual relationship.

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Organized complexity: conventions of coordination and the composition of economic arrangements