Operation Coordination Sub-Committee (OCC) meeting of

2

Minutes of 137th Operation Coordination Sub-Committee (OCC) meeting of NRPC held on 17th & 18th July, 2017 at NRPC New Delhi.

137th Operation Coordination Sub Committee (OCC) meeting of NRPC was held on 17.07.2017 & 18.07.2017 at New Delhi. The list of participants is at Annexure A

1. Confirmation of Minutes:

The minutes of the 136th OCC meeting held on 14.6.2017 and 16.6.2017 at New Delhi were issued vide letter of even number dated 30.06.2017.

i. Comments received from NTPC

In respect of outage of Dadri-Panipat-2 line at Sr.No.11 of the Agenda Point No 38 (Frequent Forced Outage of Transmission Elements) NTPC has request to add following para in the minutes.

“NTPC informed that DT (Direct Trip) command is being received from Panipat end without any switching operation of the line leading to frequent trips. NRPC directed PGCIL NR-II and BBMB to look into the matter for corrective action immediately.”

Members agreed for addition of above para at the end of the minutes of Agenda point No. 38.

ii. Comments received from NHPC

In respect of Agenda Point No 41 Frequency Response Characteristic: NHPC representative requested for incorporating following:

“NRLDC representative informed that during discussion in TCC-NRPC meeting, confirmation was received from NHPC representative about implementation of governor in all the hydro machines of NHPC. In ROR schemes, generating units are run in Power Control Mode due to constraints in maintaining constant water level at Barrage /Dam”

Members agreed for addition of above para at the end of the minutes Agenda item No 41.

The minutes were confirmed with above modifications.

2. Maintenance Programme of Generating Units and Transmission Lines:

2.1. Maintenance Programme for Generating Units.

The maintenance programme for Generating Units for the month of August, 2017 was discussed on 17.7.2017. The approved/deferred outages of generating units as per deliberations in OCCM were issued vide letter of even number dated 21.7.2017.

2.2. Outage Programme for Transmission Elements.

The Outage programme of transmission assets for the month of August 2017 was discussed on 17.7.2017. The approved/deferred outages of transmission assets as per deliberations in OCCM were issued vide letter dated 21.7.2017.

3

3. Planning of Grid Operation for August 2017:

3.1 Anticipated Power Supply Position in Northern Region during August, 2017:

Anticipated Power Supply Position in Northern Region during August, 2017 (As per LGBR) was discussed in the meeting. Committee members observed that the Power Supply position in the Northern Region would be comfortable. Representatives of Punjab, Haryana and Uttrakhand stated that the real time deficit, if any, would be met through Power Purchase on long term/Short term basis. 3.2 Anticipated vis-à-vis Actual Power Supply Position (Provisional) for June, 2017. Sub Committee was informed that there was vide variations (i.e. > 5.0%) in the Anticipated vis-à-vis Actual Power Supply Position (Provisional) for the month of June, 2017. It was observed that in the terms of Energy requirement variation was for Delhi, Haryana, HP, Punjab and Rajasthan and in the terms of Peak demand for Punjab.

Delhi, Haryana, HP, Punjab & Rajasthan explained that the variation in anticipated and actual energy requirement and peak demand was due to unexpected rain fall (i.e. lowering of temperature) in the State during the month of June, 2017.

MS, NRPC emphasized that there was a need to improve the demand estimation taking into account weather conditions/ monsoon records of previous years. Members were advised to take help of IMD forecast.

3.3 Power Supply Position:

The Sub-Committee was informed that the provisional Power Supply Position and Notified Power Cuts for the month of June, 2017 were available on CEA website.

All SLDCs were requested to furnish the provisional and final power supply position in prescribed formats by 2nd and 15th day of every month, respectively regularly.

(Action: All SLDCs)

4. Power Supply Position for NCR:

The Sub-Committee was informed that the NCR Planning Board (NCRPB) is closely monitoring the power supply position of National Capital Region. Monthly power supply position for NCR till the month of June, 2017 is placed on NRPC website.

Members were requested to furnish the data on regular and time bound manner. (Action: All SLDCs)

5. Monitoring of schemes funded from PSDF(Agenda by NPC)

The status of grant sanctioned from PSDF for the schemes in Northern Region (list at ANNEXURE-I of the agenda of the 137th OCC meeting) was reviewed. Utilities were requested to expedite implementation of the schemes and submit information of physical as well as financial progress in the prescribed format by first week of every month on regular basis to Member Convener, PSDF Project Monitoring Group (AGM, NLDC and POSOCO)

4

with a copy to NPC Division. The information received from DTL & PSTCL has been updated 6. Information about variable charges of all the generating units in the Region.

All generating utilities were required to furnish the rates for variable charges of their generating units on monthly basis to NRPC secretariat. SLDCs would submit the rates of variable charges of the generating units located in their control area. The rates of variable charges submitted by utilities till June, 2017 have been posted on NRPC website.

103rd OCC meeting.

Members of the Sub-Committee were again requested to update information on regular basis.

7. Sub-stations likely to be commissioned in next 6 months.

All utilities are to submit regularly details of substations at 220 kV and above level, likely to be commissioned within next 6 months in the prescribed format. The available status as submitted till date stands updated on the NRPC website.

Sub Committee was informed that Annexure II of the Agenda of the 137th OCC meeting contains the details /status of the substations of Power grid along with the associated downstream networks. All the concerned States were requested to specifically update the status of the downstream network of the Power Grid upcoming Assets before the next OCC meeting positively.

8. Cleaning and Replacement of porcelain insulators:

The updated status of cleaning and replacement of porcelain insulators as received till date is available on NRPC website. All utilities were again requested to submit the detailed status of Replacement of Porcelain Insulators carried out during outages taken during recent months.

9 Recommendation of Enquiry Committee for grid disturbances on 30th July, 2012 & 31st July, 2012:

Discussions on implementation of recommendations pertaining to operational aspects made by the Enquiry Committee for grid disturbances on 30th July, 2012 & 31st July, 2012 are as under:

9.1 Healthiness of defense mechanism: Self- certification A

i) In the 27th meeting of NRPC held on 30th November, 2012 it was decided that all STUs would ensure settings of UFR and df/dt relays and load relief as per target.

ii) Report of Mock exercise for healthiness of UFRs carried out by utilities themselves on quarterly basis is to be submitted to NRPC Secretariat and NRLDC. All utilities

5

have been advised to certify specifically, in the report that “All the UFRs are checked and found functional”. Any discrepancy should be detailed upon and the time line for rectification of the same should also be intimated.

iii) In the 31st meeting of NRPC held on 24.7.2014 it was decided that the quarterly test report of UFR and df/dt would be uploaded on the website of respective SLDC.

iv) In the 136th OCC meeting all utilities were informed that UFRs testing by the NRPC secretariat is in progress and were requested to update any change in the name of officers assigned for UFR testing,

Sub Committee was informed that the report of the UFR testing for quarter ending June 2017 has been received from Himachal Pradesh, UP, BBMB, Rajasthan and Haryana. All the other utilities were reminded to submit the report at the earliest and to update the contact details.

Sub Committee was informed that during the testing of UFR carried out at PTCUL substations, it was observed that at the substations no record for quarterly mock testing has been maintained nor any separate register for maintaining the record of actual tripping through UFR was available. PTCUL representative was requested to take note and confirm that the necessary action is being taken. All other utilities were also asked to ensure that the above detailed records are available on their substations where UFR are installed.

MS NRPC once again reiterated that mapping of UFR has to be done in the

SCADA of SLDC & NRLDC for better visibility of relay status and feeder load relief. B

BBMB had informed that replacement of static relays by numerical relays at 7 sub-stations (2 sub-stations in Punjab at Jamalpur & Sangrur and 5 stations in Haryana at Panipat, Dhulkot, Kurukshetra, Jagadhari & Hissar) by PSTCL and HVPNL was pending.

HVPNL, in the 134th OCC meeting, had intimated that the LOA for procurement of

22 UFR relays has been placed. In the 136th OCC meeting, representative of HVPNL informed that relays will be replaced by 31.07.2017. Representative of PSTCL informed that the relays have been replaced however there were some issues pending regarding the setting which was being sorted out after consulting BBMB.

137th OCC meeting:

HVPNL representative informed that the relays will be replaced by 31.08.2017. Representative of PSTCL request that the pending issue to be resolved in 33rd PSC meeting scheduled to be held on 04.08.2017.

(Action: HVPNL; Time line: 31.08.2017) (Action: PSTCL & BBMB)

6

9.2 Strengthening of Intra-State transmission system

Recommendation of the Enquiry Committee: “Intra-State transmission system needs to be planned and strengthened in a better way to avoid problems of frequent congestion.”

In the NRPC meeting held on 30th November, 2012, it was decided that SLDCs should give half yearly feedback to STU regarding bottlenecks, constraints and overloading in the State transmission network for proper transmission planning. Accordingly all SLDCs were requested to submit advice regarding constraints, to their STUs, regularly at half yearly intervals i.e. on 1st January and 1st July of every year.

In the 132nd OCC meeting, it was noted that all utilities had submitted the report ending December 2016. All the members were requested to submit the information regarding the action taken/action plan of the STU on the feedback given by respective SLDCs. The desired information stands received from UPPTCL, PTCUL, HPSEB, PSTCL and RVPNL.

In the 136th OCC meeting, all the SLDCs were advised to submit the next half yearly feedback ending June 2017 with more details in line with the feedback given by NRLDC in the various OCC Meetings

137th OCC meeting:

DTL, HVPNL were again reminded to update the status specifically regarding the action taken/action plan of the STU on the feedback given by the SLDCs.

(Action: DTL & HVPNL Time line: 16.8.17)

Further all the SLDCs were again advised to submit the next half yearly feedback ending June 2017 in detail, in line with the feedback given by NRLDC in the various OCC Meetings, to their STUs with a copy to the NRPC Secretariat

(Action: All utilities Time line: 16.8.17)

9.3 Installation of adequate static and dynamic reactive power compensators.

9.3.1 Based on the studies carried out by POWERGRID for identifying compensation required in intra-State network at 220 kV level, discussions held in the 29th Meeting of NRPC and subsequent discussions, reactors were to be installed at 9 locations, out of which 6 have been installed. The updated status of remaining 3 reactors is as under:

S.No. SUBSTATION MVAR Implementation by

Updated Status in 137th OCC

1 HINDAUN 125 RVPNL Expected by 31.08.2017.

2 MANESAR 125 POWERGRID Expected by 30.09.2017 3 MERTA 125 RVPNL Expected by 31.08.2017

(Action: RVPNL & POWERGRID; Time line: 31.08.2017& 30.9.2017)

7

9.3.2 Study by POWERGRID for reactive compensation at 220 kV level:

The proposal for installation of bus reactors 12 nos at 400 kV and 17 nos at 220 kV sub-stations was discussed in the 29th meeting of NRPC held on 13th September 2013. After deliberations, NRPC had approved installation of reactors at 400 kV sub-stations of POWERGRID and RVPNL. As regard 220 kV bus reactors, POWERGRID had stated that the requirement would be firmed up in consultation with the States. Subsequently, POWERGRID, vide email dated 30.09.2016 had submitted report of the study. In this report, reactors at 13 locations at 220 kV levels and at 24 locations at 400 kV level had been proposed. The report was discussed in 34th TCC/38th NRPC meeting held on 24th /25th October, 2016 wherein Delhi had requested to review the system study for thier system. POWERGRID agreed for the same. Subject to review of requirement for Delhi, NRPC approved the report. In the 135th OCC meeting, representative of Delhi informed that the report would be finalized shortly. 35th TCC/39th NRPC meeting held on 1-2.05.2017 decided that the report of the POWERGRID and the study by RVPNL to be referred to the Standing Committee on Power System Planning of NR. OCC advised Power Grid and RVPNL to take action in this regard.

136th OCC meeting Representative of DTL informed that as per the second study conducted by POWERGRID the requirement of reactor for DTL has increased significantly which may not be in line with the actual requirement. Therefore, it was informed to OCC that DTL will again be conducting the study determining the requirement of the reactors. 137th OCC meeting:

DTL representative informed that they have planned to install the reactors as per the requirement arrived in their own study which was conducted by CPRI. DTL was requested to submit the plan for the same. Representative of PSTCL & RVPNL informed in the meeting that the minutes of Standing Committee meeting are still awaited.

(Action: DTL)

All utilities were requested to submit the action plan regarding implementation of the reactive compensation as proposed in the study at the earliest.

10. System Protection Schemes (SPSs) in Northern Region:

10.1 SPS for Interruption of import by NR at 765 kV Agra (from WR).

The revised SPS for meeting contingency of 765 kV Agra-Gwalior was approved in 32nd TCC/36th NRPC meeting held on 23rd /24th December, 2015. It was also agreed in the

Review of SPS for 765 kV Agra-Gwalior line

8

36th NRPC meeting that POWERGIRD would implement the revised scheme within 06 months after the receipt of the feeder details from the States.

In the 129th OCC POWERGRID stated that the scheme would be commissioned by 31.05.2017. 129th OCC had recommended that the cost of implementation of revised SPS for 765 kV Agra-Gwalior lines could be booked in any ongoing project/ work of Northern Region. In the 132nd OCC meeting representative of POWERGID proposed that provision of AMC of the scheme for 05 years could also be included in the scope of the work for implementation of the revised scheme. Members agreed to the proposal of POWERGIRD. POWERGRID representative informed that they were waiting for NRPC approval in this regard. After detailed deliberation it was decided that keeping in view urgency of the work, POWERGRID should carry out tendering activities for timely implementation of the revised scheme. The recommendation of the OCC would be put up for concurrence of NRPC in next meeting.

In 133rd OCC meeting, POWERGRID representative stated that tendering activities were in process. The POWERGRID representative submitted that as the tendering process takes time, the implementation would be done till August/September 2017. NRLDC representative stated that all out efforts should be made to complete the work before Paddy season, as per earlier schedule of implementation.

39th meeting of NRPC held on 2.5.2017 approved the proposal given in the 129th OCC meeting by POWERGRID for booking the cost of revised SPS including 05 years AMC in some other on-going project/work.

Sub Committee stressed that in view of the criticality of 765 kV Agra-Gwalior line for NR, POWERGRID may commission the scheme as per the agreed schedule. POWERGRID had intimated that scheme would be commissioned by October, 2017.

POWERGRID representative informed that the implementation of the scheme may be delayed by few weeks. However, OCC pursued POWERGRID to complete the same within the stipulated time.

(Action: POWERGRID; Time line: 31.10.2017)

135th OCC meeting:

The concern was expressed about no progress made by the state utilities so far regarding mapping of feeders in SCADA, identified for the SPS load relief. OCC advised all concerned utilities in the meeting to take action in this regard at the earliest and inform the action taken.

136th OCC meeting:

The Sub-Committee was informed that mapping of feeders in SCADA, identified for SPS load has been implemented by HVPNL and partly by Rajasthan. Other utilities were requested to implement the same at the earliest.

137th OCC meeting:

Utilities were again requested for mapping of feeders in SCADA at the earliest.

(Action: All utilities concerned)

9

Mock Testing of SPS for 765 kV Agra-Gwalior line

POWERGRID representative had stated that in view of recent multiple tripping at Agra Sub Station, the Mock Testing of SPS for 765 kV Agra-Gwalior line was required. After deliberation it was decided that the same may be done on 1.6.2017 from 7:00 to 11:00.

136th OCC meeting:

POWERGRID informed that the testing was successfully performed and some modifications have been done in the logic. OCC asked POWERGRID to submit the report of the testing and the changed logic to the NRPC sect.

137th OCC meeting: POWERGRID representative submitted the information regarding the

changed logic. It was requested to POWERGRID to submit the same along with the detailed report of the testing done

(Action: POWERGRID)

10.2 SPS for ICTs at 765 kV Unnao sub-station:

A discussion was held on 06.05.2015 in NRPC secretariat with the officers from UPRVUNL in the presence of officers from NRLDC, POWERGRID and NRPC sect. UPRVUNL was briefed about the basic philosophy along with the hardware requirement of the System Protection Scheme (SPS) for evacuation of Anpara-D generation. It was agreed that UPRVUNL along with UP SLDC would prepare the SPS for safe power evacuation of Anpara-D. Further the scheme would be submitted to the OCC for approval. Thereafter, the matter was under discussion in meetings of OCC without much progress.

121st OCC meeting

It was decided that, the scheme was to be implemented by UPPTCL.

34th TCC/38th NRPC meeting:

UPPTCL informed that LOA would be placed by 25.10.2016 and scheme would be implemented in next 3 months

135th OCC meeting:

UPPTCL representative informed that the implementation of the scheme has started and would be completed by 15.6.2017.

136th OCC meeting:

UPPTCL informed that implementation of the scheme will be done by 10.07.2017.

137th OCC meeting:

UPPTCL informed that implementation of the scheme will be done by 31.07.2017

(Action: UPPTCL; Time limit: 31.07.2017)

10

10.3 SPS for Kawai – Kalisindh - Chhabra generation complex:

SPS for Kawai-Kalisindh-Chhabra generation complex was recommended in 122nd OCC meeting held on 22nd April, 2016. RVPNL, vide email dated 26.07.2016 has confirmed that the SPS for Kawai-Kalisindh-Chhabra generation complex has been put into operation. However, it is observed that the automatic load shedding recommended in part (c) of the scheme has not been implemented by RRVPNL. The scheme was discussed in 34th TCC/38th NRPC meeting held on 24th/25th October, 2016 wherein RRVPNL stated that feeders have been identified and the scheme would be completed by March 2017.

129th OCC meeting:

Rajasthan representative intimated that, the part of the scheme related to load shedding would be completed by March, 2017.

131st OCC meeting:

Rajasthan representative intimated that load shedding part of the scheme has been installed on trial basis for 100 MW load. Mock testing of the SPS would be done for the shortlisted load and if successful the scheme would be extended for complete 700 MW load. OCC advised RVPNL to implement the SPS scheme for the identified load at the earliest and submit the report to NRLDC and NRPC Secretariat.

133rd OCC meeting:

Rajasthan representative submitted that the administrative approval for implementation of the Automatic Load shedding for identified feeders have been obtained and the NIT for the work would be floated soon. Regarding revision in SPS scheme after commissioning of Chhabra stage - II (Unit 5), RVPNL representative stated that the same is under consideration and information in this regard would be submitted shortly.

134th OCC meeting:

Rajasthan representative intimated that the scheme has been revised upon the commissioning of Chhabra stage – II. On the query regarding quantum of backing down of generation with N-1 contingency of 400 kV Kawai-Anta Ckt.- 1 & 2 and 765 kV Anta-Phagi Ckt.- 1 & 2, representative of RRVPNL intimated that generation will be reduced to 65 % of the installed capacity. OCC suggested RRVPNL that the reduction in generation up to 60 % of the installed capacity in the above mentioned contingency may be considered. RRVPNL agreed to review the scheme.

135th OCC meeting:

RVPNL representative intimated that the issue was being discussed with the Generation Company. As per the letter received from CE PP&D RRVPNL a meeting was held on 24.5.2017 in light of the issue of revision in existing SPS scheme for Kawai, Kalisindh & Chhabra complex due to addition of Chhabra SCTPS Unit 5. In the meeting representatives of the four generating companies opined that technically it is not possible to

11

reduce the generation up to 60%. They insisted that backing down may not be reduced beyond 65% because it may result in instability. After deliberation it was decided that 65% backing down of generation may be considered for SPS at Kawai, Kalisindh, Chhabra & Chhabra Super Critical Complex. Till the new scheme is implemented the existing approved scheme will stay in operation.

136th OCC meeting:

Members were of the view that this complex being very important for the power supply of Rajasthan, the recent incident of complete generation loss of the complex needs to be avoided. Keeping in view the importance of the complex, the members advised Rajasthan to go forward with their proposed backing down for the time being. However, it was cited in the meeting that as per new regulations prepared by CERC, the generators will be required to back down their generation up to 55%.

137th OCC meeting:

Rajasthan representative informed that NIT would be floated in July 2017 and the scheme will be implemented by Dec 2017.

(Action: RVPNL)

11. System Study for Capacitor Requirement in NR for the year 2016-17 & 2017-18.

In 34th TCC and 38th NRPC meetings, held on 24th & 25th Oct, 2016 the matter was discussed and it was decided that LOA should not be cancelled and the study should be carried out for the year 2017-18 and 2018-19 through CPRI. It was also decided that all the States would submit the data by 31.10.2016 for carrying out study for the period 2017-18. Subsequently, the data would be submitted for carrying out study for 2018-19.

133rd OCC meeting:

Sub-Committee was apprised that data for 2017-18 had been received from all the utilities and the same has already been sent to CPRI. Based on the data submitted by the utilities CPRI carried out the capacitor study. The report submitted by CPRI for 2017-18 is available on NRPC website (www.nrpc.gov.in).

135th OCC meeting:

Sub–Committee was informed that the proposal of installation of capacitor by Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and J&K through PSDF funding was approved in the 35th TCC/39th NRPC meeting held on 1st & 2nd May, 2017 as per recommendation of OCC and the same has been referred to the Convener, Techno Economic Sub Group & Consultant –NLDC for PSDF Funding on 17.5.2017. Utilities noted the information.

136th OCC meeting:

All the utilities were requested to submit the comments if any to the proposed capacitor requirement in the report by CPRI. Only Rajasthan has submitted the comments.

http://www.nrpc.gov.in/�

12

137th OCC meeting:

Utilities were asked to submit the action plan for the implementation of the requirement as recommended in the report.

(Action: All utilities)

12. Status of data through Automatic Meter Reading (AMR)

In the 13th NRPC meeting held on 27th June 2009, scheme of Automatic Meter Reading from Interface Meters in Northern Region was approved. NRLDC and POWERGRID were to submit the joint status report of AMR at the end of every month.

In the 34th TCC meeting, held on 24th Oct, 2016, NRLDC stated that out of 1235 interface meters, data from 973 meters was being received and being regularly used by NRLDC for 764 interface meters. POWERGRID informed that the data from all the meters will be available by January 2017. TCC and NRPC expressed concern over tardy progress of the implementation of AMR. The progress of installing AMR is being regularly mentioned in OCC meetings.

133rd OCC meeting:

POWERGRID updated that the work would be completed by April, 17.

134th OCC meeting:

POWERGRID representative raised their concern over lack of support from site in matters regarding AMR implementation. He informed that site personnel are downloading SEM data manually by removing wiring and in many case not plugging it in, despite of provision for downloading the data manually even when meter is plugged in. The issue has also been communicated to the site, but still not resolved.

136th OCC meeting:

The joint report of NRLDC & POWERGRID was submitted. Sub-Committee had advised all the transmission and generation Utilities to co-operate with the vendor to resolve the issues regarding ORU removal for manual downloading of data from SEMs.

137th OCC meeting:

Status updated by POWERGRID & NRLDC is placed at Annexure IA.

13. Planning, procurement and deployment of Emergency Restoration System.

The issue was discussed in the 33rd meeting of NRPC held on 11.11.2014 and it was suggested that CEA should evolve guidelines regarding ERS. Later, Secretary (Power), GoI vide letter dated 05.12.2014 addressed to Chief Secretaries of all the States, had requested to issue directions to transmission utilities / transmission licensees to procure adequate number of Emergency Restoration Systems. The guidelines formulated by CEA for planning, procurement and deployment of Emergency Restoration System were also enclosed with that letter. The matter was discussed in 34th TCC and 38th NRPC meetings, held on 24th & 25th Oct, 2016 and the subsequent meetings.

13

The latest status as updated by the members is as under:

DTL:- Order had been placed for 02 nos. of ERS. Delivery started.

PSTCL: - Order has been placed. Supply expected by October, 2017.

UPPTCL:- 02 nos. of ERS have been received.

RRVPNL:- Will not be procuring ERS.

HVPNL:- In place of ERS, spare towers would be procured worth Rs Two Crore. PO issued in this regard

PTCUL- NIT placed. Supply expected in 3 month.

HPSEBL – No progress

BBMB:- Partner states have agreed to provide the ERS as and when required by BBMB.

J&K- Order has been placed for 2 nos. ERS.

14. LVRT issues of wind/solar generation

36th NRPC meeting:

The LVRT issue of wind generation was raised wherein representative of RVPNL stated that LVRT is being enforced for wind stations. He agreed to submit the status of LVRT for wind stations

133rd OCC meeting:

Members expressed concern over long pending issue. RVPNL representative intimated that the issue has been taken up with the RE generators. Sub-Committee desired that the information to be submitted at the earliest.

134th OCC meeting:

RVPNL submitted that LVRT was not installed in many wind generating stations in Rajasthan. OCC advised Rajasthan to take up the issue with wind generators for ensuring compliance of CEA Regulations and CERC orders in this regard.

135th OCC meeting:

Sub-Committee again advised Rajasthan to take up the issue with wind generators for ensuring compliance of CEA Regulations and CERC orders in this regard

14

136th OCC meeting:

Rajasthan representative informed that the matter is being pursued with the wind generators. Sub-Committee was of the view that, with the current focus being shifting towards renewable energy, the security and stability of the grid will require some proactive task to be done by power engineers. In light of the above, the LVRT issue of the wind generators needs to be taken with utmost seriousness and at a fast pace.

137th OCC meeting:

RVPNL representative informed that no progress has been made even after regularly pursuing for the same. Sub-Committee advised RVPNL to submit a petition to the State Regulatory Commission for the non-compliance of the regulations.

(Action: RVPNL)

15. Long Outage of generating units and transmission assets.

The updated status is available at Annexure IIA.UPSLDC to update the information.

16. The Frequent Tripping of 400 kV Sikar - Ratanagrh ckt-2 on Direct Trip received (Agenda by Power Grid with RRVPNL): Frequent Outage of 400 kV Sikar - Ratangarh Ckt-2 line is observed on account of

direct rip received without any line fault. While analyzing the tripping in above case, there was no line fault, however it

is.observed that in all above case, 50 MVAr Bus Reactor (Owned by RVPNL) also tripped at Ratangarh (RRVPNL) end. 50MVAr Bus Reactor is in same dia with 400 kV Sikar-Ratangarh Ckt-II and during any switching operation (switching of any other feeder), current re-distribution in this dia, leads to tripping of 50 MVAr Bus Reactor which is a mal-operation. Furthermore, tripping of 50 MVAr Bus Reactor leads to tripping of Sikar-Ratangarh Ckt-II by sending direct trip to Sikar end due to wiring problem at Ratangarh end.

Rajasthan representative intimated that was issue with R-Phase CVT at

Ratangarh end and the same has now been resolved.

17 Technical Minimum Schedule for Dadri-Coal (Agenda by NTPC) :

NTPC Dadri Station is not being provided Technical Minimum Schedules of 55% in line with the provisos of IEGC 4th Amendment. The problem is more predominant in Dadri-Coal Stage-1 units where only Delhi and UP have power allocation of 90% and 10% respectively.

NTPC is adhering to NRLDC instructions for closing down or bringing up the unit(s) as per grid requirement. However, once unit is brought on-bar, technical minimum of 55% is not being ensured. With the result, NCR-RCC shift executive constantly gets engaged in

15

perusing the matter with SCE NRLDC for getting the schedule corrected and in the process, couple of blocks is missed out with lower than Technical Minimum schedules. NRLDC control room often cites software related problems regarding the issue.

At times, conflict of opinion regarding stopping/starting of units between Delhi SLDC and NRLDC is also being observed. NTPC reiterates that since Dadri-Coal is ISGS station, unit(s) will be started/stopped only on instructions from / channelized through NRLDC.

MS NRPC submitted to the members of Sub Committee that giving schedule less than normative would be costing the utilities in terms of compensation that they have to pay. As such they should take into account their requirement as well as the compensation that they have to pay while giving scheduling ISGS..

18. RGMO/FGMO compliance by generators in the region ( Agenda based on letter

by CERC)

CERC (IEGC) Regulation, 2010, 5.2(f) provides that generators should provide RGMO/FGMO response. Further vide 5th amendment of IEGC dated 12.04.2017, it has been provided at Regulation 5.2(h) that ‘RLDCs/SLDCs should not schedule the generating station or unit(s) thereof beyond ex-bus generation corresponding to 100% of the installed capacity of the generating station or unit(s) thereof and that the generating station shall not resort to Valve Wide Open operation of units” so that primary response is ensured.

CERC in its letter dated 05.06.2017 has directed to obtain the status of availability of

RGMO/FGMO response from the generators (ISGS as well as intra-state generators) in the region.

136th OCC meeting:

All utilities were requested to submit the status of actual response being provided by generators under the primary response. SLDCs may also provide the region report by 15.7.2017.

137th OCC meeting:

All SLDCs were again requested to submit the detailed status of actual response being provided by generators under the primary response by 10.8.2017.

MS, NRPC asked NRLDC to map availability of FGMO/RGMO at every generator in their SCADA system so that proper monitoring of RGMO/FGMO could be done in line with the practice being followed in WR.

19. Availability of HVDC Biswanath –Alipurduar –Agra in the interest of grid

security

With the likely onset of monsoon, the hydro generation in Sikkim, Bhutan and North Eastern Region has picked up leading to high line loadings. Recently, few hydro generators namely Teesta III (1200 MW), Dikchu (96 MW), Jorethang (96 MW) have been

16

commissioned and Tashiding (97 MW) is likely to be commissioned shortly. The construction of 400 kV Rangpo- Kishenganj D/C which was planned for evacuation of these generators has got delayed. As a result, the surplus generation is getting pooled at Binaguri and further evacuated to Northern Region (NR) via Eastern Region (ER) through 400 kV Binaguri – Purnea D/C, 400 kV Binaguri- Kishanganj D/C, 400 kV Purnea-Muzaffarpur – Gorakhpur D/C and other inter regional lines between NR and ER. Also kV Patna – Kishanganj D/C and 400 kV Purnea – Biharshariff D/C lines (which also falls in this corridor and are under outage since July-Aug 2016 due to tower collapse), have not been revived till date.

Under this scenario, HVDC BNC- Agra bi pole availability is extremely important as power flow from BNC to Agra reduces the flow on chicken neck axis as well as impacts transfer to NR. Outage of HVDC BNC- Agra bi pole, either planned or unplanned would further stress the system. On the 20th June 2017 when BNC- Agra bi pole was under planned outage, around 3000 MW power flow on chicken neck axis placed the grid in a critical situation. Based on the past record, outage of double circuit on chicken neck axis is a credible contingency which may lead to collapse of North Bengal, Sikkim, Bhutan and North Eastern Region. Further, the power flow on chicken neck axis and beyond towards NR is expected to be 4000 MW and above in coming days. Under these circumstances, the availability of HVDC BNC- Agra,400kV Binaguri- Purnea D/C ,400 kV Binaguri – Kishanganj – Purnea D/C and 400 kV Purnea- Muzaffarpur D/C along with Fixed Series Compensation (FSC) needs to be ensured till the end of September 2017. Planned outages, needs to be planned after September and line patrolling may be undertaken thoroughly to avoid any forced outage.400 kV Kishenganj – Patna D/C lines also needs to be restored on priority. Further, any testing of HVDC BNC-ALPD- Agra should be planned after September 2017 as the same would impact availability of BNC-Agra HVDC Bi pole & impact grid security as well as water spillage.

Sub Committee noted the importance of the network for evacuation of power from ER. Power Grid ensured that efforts are being made to expedite the commissioning of the crucial lines associated with the system.

20. Evacuation of Paricha TPS and bus split at 400 kV G.Noida

A. Evacuation of Paricha TPS:

The following elements are under outage:

i. 400 kV Paricha – Orai - Mainpuri ii. 400 kV Paricha - Mainpuri

iii. 220 kV Orai– Orai - Kanpur

The current generation at Paricha TPS (Uni t#5,#6) is getting evacuated through two no. of 400/220 kV, 315 MVA ICTs. Such operation is non-compliant for N-1 contingency in case of outage of any ICT. Moreover, the outage of 220 kV Orai (220 kV) – Orai - Kanpur

17

and commissioning of only single 400 kV bus & single 400/220 kV ICT at Banda (UP) is further affecting the reliable evacuation of generation at Paricha.

B. Bus split arrangement at Gr. Noida(UP) is leading to critical loading of lines around Ballabgarh (PG). In addition to above, Delhi ring is also weakened.

In view of above issues, the following actions are required:

• Expedite the restoration of 400 kV paricha – Orai – Mainpuri, 400 kV Paricha – Mainpuri, 220 kV Orai– Orai – Kanpur. In case of tower collapse the provision of revival of line on Emergency Restoration System (ERS) to be looked into.

• Expedite the commissioning of upcoming network at 400 kV Banda(UP). • Expedite the commissioning of 400 kV Gr. Noida(765 kV) – Gr. Noida(400

kV) D/C so that the normal bus operation at 400 kV Gr. Noida be restored which would also strengthen the Delhi ring.

• Upgrade the switchgear at 400 kV Gr. Noida (UP) from existing 2000 A rating to the level corresponding to quad-conductor line. Further, at other locations also the compatibility of switchgears corresponding to the conductor may be looked into.

UPPTCL representative ensured that all efforts are being made to restore the lines connected with Paricha and it is expected that the same will be done by 31.7.17. He also intimated that the second circuit of 400 kV Gr. Noida (765kV) – Gr. Noida(400 kV) D/C would come up by 31.8.17

21. Review of Grid Operations for last month (June, 2017):

Representative of NRLDC made a presentation on grid operation during June, 2017 and highlighted the following:-

Frequency remained within the normal band 75.49% of the time during June, 2017

which is better than last year during same month (June, 2016) when frequency (within normal band) remained 74.03% of the time. Utilities were requested to take necessary action to further improve the frequency regime viz. staggering of load at hourly boundaries, primary response from the generators etc.

Peak demand met, average demand met and minimum demand met for the region during June, 2017 was 55137 MW, 46327 MW and 32797 MW respectively. The maximum and minimum frequencies were 50.24 Hz and 49.74 Hz respectively.

Maximum deviation was observed in Rajasthan, HP, Uttarakhand followed by UP during June, 2017.

Average consumption of the Region for June, 2017 increased by 0.77% (8.5 MU per day) of corresponding month in previous year.

Average Thermal generation in June, 2017 decreased by 2.63% (15.52 MU/Day) of corresponding month in previous year.

Average Hydro generation in June, 2017 increased by 2.66 MU/Day of corresponding month in previous year.

18

Average Renewable generation in June, 2017 decreased by 8%(1.85 MU/Day) of corresponding month in previous year.

Average nuclear generation in June, 2017 increased by 3.23 MU/day per day as compared to corresponding month in previous year.

Net Average Inter-Regional import increased by 22.90 MU/day during June, 2017 as compared to corresponding month in previous year.

Net Average Import from WR increased by 09 MU/Day during June, 2017 as compared to corresponding month in previous year.

Net Average Import from ER increased by approx. 6.44 MU/day during June, 2017 as compared to corresponding month in previous year.

Net Average Import from NER was 7.46 MU/day higher during June, 2017. Total availability during June, 2017 had increased by 12.24 MU/day as compared to

corresponding month in previous year. Total outages during June, 2017 were 627 including Planned S/downs (223) and

Forced S/downs (Trippings-240+Emergency S/Ds-164 = 404). The no. of emergency shutdowns were very high considering this was high demand period. OCC asked members to minimize the outages specially the emergency shutdowns.

NRPC/NRLDC/NLDC representative asked constituents to stagger their load at hourly boundary to avoid frequency excursions.

There was record break in term of maximum demand met of UP(18061), Delhi(6552) and Northern Region(54890) during the month June-2017.

Total outages of generating Units due to less demand/less gas availability were 8166 MW as on 13.07.2017(CS 2211 MW+ SS 5955 MW).

The difference between data, received from SCADA and SEM in terms of % age was shown as- Punjab (1.7), Rajasthan (2.25), Delhi (0.39), Uttarakhand (10.07), UP (1.02), HP (0.37) & UT Chandigarh (1.44).

Tripping of single element multiple times was also discussed. NRLDC representative mentioned that now demand forecast is being received from

most of the states but accuracy is quite poor. He mentioned that all SLDC shall make concerned efforts to bring forecasting error within 2% which is almost a standard now for load forecasting. This would help utilities in managing their deviations from the grid.

The issue of Availability verification of lines was also discussed The transmission losses was also discussed in the month of June 2017 V/s June 2016

19

Transmission Losses

The issue of change in Variable cost was also highlighted as below:

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

SIN

GRA

ULI

STPS

ANPA

RA-A

RIHA

ND-

IIIRI

HAN

D -I

RIHA

ND

-II

Gira

l LTP

PO

BRA

BN

APS

OBR

A A

LAN

CO A

NPA

RA C

RAJG

HAT

HARD

UAG

ANJ

EXT

ANTA

GPS

Chab

raTP

PKA

HALG

AON

-2KA

HALG

AON

-1Ra

jpur

a-II

RAJP

URA

-1FA

RAKK

A -1

DADR

I GPS

TAN

DA T

PSBa

wan

a G

asFA

RAKK

A -2

RAPS

-ARA

PS -B

FARI

DABA

D G

ASU

NCH

AHAR

-I T

PSU

NCH

AHAR

-III T

PSU

NCH

AHAR

-II

TPS

PARI

CHA

JHAJ

HAR

DADR

I CO

ALII

YAM

UN

A N

AGAR

Talw

andi

SABO

KALI

SIN

DH TP

PDA

DRI C

OAL

-IHA

RDU

AGAN

J RA

MG

ARH

GT

KOTA

TPS

KHED

ARPA

NIP

ATLE

HRA

MHT

PAN

KI

AURA

IYA

GPS

PRAG

ATI G

AS …

BHAT

INDA

BADA

RPU

R TP

SRO

SA-1

ROSA

-2Dh

olpu

rCCP

PDe

lhi G

TPS

SURA

TGAR

H TP

SRO

PAR

MAG

NU

M D

IESE

L (IP

P)AN

TA (R

LNG

)DA

DRI(R

LNG)

AURA

IYA

(RLN

G)

AURA

IYA

(L)

DADR

I (L)

FARI

DABA

D (L

)FA

RIBA

BAD

(RLN

G)

ANTA

(L)

Variable Cost - Last

Variable Cost - Present

The summary of STOA for the month of June 2017 was also highlighted:

20

Summary of STOA – June’2016 vs June’2017

CATEGORISED ON THE BASIS OF 'TRANSACTION TYPE'No. of approvals

jUNE-16 June -17

DAIntra-regional 92 99

Inter-regional 171 335

ContingencyIntra-regional 191 117


FCFSIntra-regional 17 20

Inter-regional 0 5

ADIntra-regional 20 17


TOTAL 628 943

Energy approved (MUs)

DAIntra-regional 59.19 46.14

Inter-regional 158.32 114.46

ContingencyIntra-regional 95.18 70.07


FCFSIntra-regional 589.81 695.69

Inter-regional 0 29.67

ADIntra-regional 747.07 1054.97


TOTAL 2661.01

2. CATEGORISED ON THE BASIS OF INTRA/INTER REGIONAL TRANSACTIONS

No. of approvals

June- 16 June -17

Intra-regional 320253

Inter-regional 308690

TOTAL 628 943

Energy Approved (MUs)

Intra-regional 1491.241866.86

Inter-regional 774.39794.15

TOTAL 2265.63 2661.01

59.1995.18

589.81

747.07

46.14 70.07

695.69

1054.97

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

DA Cont FCFS AD

June'16june'17

Ene

rgy

app

rove

d

Category

Summary of STOA – Intra - Regional Approvals(Energy Approved in MUs)

21

158.32123.96

0

492.12

114.46 125.51

29.67

524.5

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

DA Cont FCFS AD

June'16June'17

Ene

rgy

app

rove

d

Category

Summary of STOA – Inter - Regional approvals(Energy Approved in MUs)

22. High demand in Northern region:

As expected, anticipated & discussed in previous OCC meetings and other fora, Northern Region is meeting highest ever demand for now a days due to weather beating loads as well as agricultural demand. The demand met has crossed 55 GW and 1200 MU a day consumption barrier(highest demand met being 55866 MW and net energy consumption being 1212 MUs on 10.7.2017). In the meeting it was again emphasized that in view of high demand scenario, it is very important that system security be maintained during high demand period from June to September.

NRLDC representative stated that they have been raising various system security issues and actions for its enhancement & to improve the reliability during various discussions and meetings. Following actions have been emphasized and reiterated below for kind information of stake holders:

1. Alertness at all control centers during the period. 2. Meticulous forecast of demand and renewable generation and plan to meet this

demand without deviation from schedule. 3. Keeping more units on bar to have enough reserves in the system (at least

equivalent to 50% of the largest unit in the system as per Hon’ble CERC orders). 4. Keeping governors of the generating units in frequency responsive mode. 5. Monitoring of Area Control Error (ACE) of respective control areas and keeping it

zero as well as it should cross zero frequently. 6. Reactive power control and usage of reactive power devices including generators to

control system voltages. 7. Keeping system N-1 compliant and proper upkeep of all protective schemes in the

system.

22

8. Procurement and maintenance of ERS by all transmission utilities.

However, it was emphasized that there are regular violations of above principles e.g. very high over drawals for sustained period of time, Non adherence to N-1 security leading to outages of large area, frequent tripping of trunk corridors and long outages of transmission lines on tower collapse. Most of the major states (Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Delhi and Punjab) of Northern Region were over drawing from the grid including smaller States like Uttarakhand, Himachal and J&K.

In case of hydro generation, silt flushing is major concern and sudden large hydro generation outage causes mismatch in load generation balance and leads to deviations in drawl, voltages, frequency, and line loading etc. causing threat to the grid security.

On 18th 2017 also large hydro stations like Karcham, Jhakri and Rampur HEP [apart from Bairasuil HEP (3x60 MW= 180 MW) & Salal HEP (6x115MW= 690 MW)] went under forced outage due to high silt. On 18th July 2017, at 11:58 hrs, 800 kV HVDC Champa- Kurukshetra pole-1 (Inter-regional link with WR) carrying 1500 MW tripped on DC over current. This resulted in reduced import capability of NR and subsequent revision of ATC/TTC. This led to the alert situation in the system.

NRLDC informed each Control area along with other entities in NR about this alarming situation and asked them to manage the load-generation in respective control areas. Request was made to increase internal generation and bring units on bar from RSD. Overall, there was contingency of about 5000 MW in NR. NRLDC apprised the forum about this critical situation which incidentally happened on the day of OCC.

137th OCC Meeting:

All the users in the meeting were once again requested to adhere to above suggestions including early revival of lines under long outages for safety and security of the system. The details discussed are placed at Annexure I.

All the entities agreed about the critical situation of the grid and assured that all control room executives have been advised to take prompt action on above suggestions.

23 Multiple element tripping in Haryana control area:

On 27th June 2017, 00:15 hrs multiple elements tripped in Haryana control area leading to load loss of ~ 1700 MW of Haryana. Tripped element were 400/220 kV 3x315 MVA ICTs at Kirori, 400/220 kV 2x315 MVA ICTs at Kaithal (PG) apart from number of 220 kV lines/220 kV substations such as Jind, Safidon, Narwana, Hissar, Mund, Bata, Kaithal, Chika and running unit-7 of Panipat TPS. As per preliminary analysis, it emerges that this tripping is a case of cascading outages due to tripping of single element either on protection mis-operation or a protection setting related issue.

23

On 26th June 2017, at 13:08 hrs all 400/220 kV ICTs at Kirori also tripped indicating a load loss of around 1000 MW. Such power supply interruption to large area can also escalate to larger areas and therefore, these need to be addressed immediately.

NRLDC representative stated that they have been raising the concern of high loading of ICTs at Kaithal, Panipat, Gurgaon, Panchkula and Bhiwani (BBMB), frequent tower collapse for 400, 220 and 132 kV transmission lines, lower isolator rating at 400 kV Nawada & Dhanonda and no underlying network at 400 kV Jind, Bhiwani and Kurukshetra in its quarterly feedback, monthly OCC meetings as well as run up to this current high demand period. However, it was evident that requisite attention towards N-1 security criteria is need of hour and must be ensured in all operating conditions for safe and secure operation of the grid.

In addition, the outage of 400 kV Jhajjar-Dhanonda on 14th June 2017 due to tower collapse has not only reduced the reliability of evacuation of MGTPS but has also weakened vital loop in the 400 kV system further putting constraints in loading of Mundra-Mahendragarh HVDC link during this high demand period of Haryana as well as that of NR. These outage as well as last year’s outages of transmission lines on tower collapse indicate the need for availability of Emergency Restoration System (ERS) apart from tackling design and operation issues of transmission lines.

Representative from Haryana informed that after this incident, internal generation in Haryana specially at Panipat (Th) has been increased so that loading on the 400/220 kV transformers remain N-1 compliant. Units at Panipat TPS and DCRTP-Yamuna Nagar have started for reliable and secure operation in high demand period of Haryana.

137th OCC meeting:

The incident of multiple elements tripping in Haryana control area was discussed at length and it was observed that there is utmost necessity to have a detailed analysis of the event(s), taking up issues of planning horizon and issuing strict guidelines for operation of the system keeping N-1 security all the time. It was further observed that the reasons for tripping of the Kirori ICTs and the 220 kV lines needs to be analyzed. Also the information about any radial operation/opening of downstream network in Haryana is required. Also the issue regarding overloading of Kaithal ICTs needs to be looked into. Separate PSAG (Protection Analysis sub-group) meeting was already scheduled to be held on 20th July 2017. The details discussed during PSAG meeting is attached as Annexure-II. A line of confirmation of the actions taken in the form of a detailed report covering all above aspects was requested by the Haryana.

OCC also requested POWERGRID to expedite the commissioning of third ICT at Kaithal (PG) to control the loading on Kaithal ICTs and better reliable and secure operation.

After discussions, concerned entities agreed for above actions.

24

24 Multiple element tripping at 765/400 kV Fatehabad (UP) and Oscillations in the system:

Lalitpur TPS is being evacuating through following interconnection:

• 765 kV Lalitpur-Agra Fatehabad Ckt-1 & 2 • 765/400 kV Agra Fatehabad ICT-1 & 2 • Five outlet from 400 kV Agra Fatehabad (400 kV Agra Fatehabad-Agra (UP)

ckt-1 & 2, 400 kV Agra Fatehbad-Mathura, Agra Fatehabad-Agra) PG) & Agra Fatehabad-Muradnagar)

• 765/220 kV Lalitpur ICT-1 &2 (220kV Lalitpur-Jhansi D/C)

On 24th June 2017, 20:04 hrs, in antecedent condition 400 kV Agra(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt-2 was under planned outage, 220 kV Lalitpur-Jhansi double circuit was also in open condition and Lalitpur generation was around 1850 MW.

Tripping of 400 kV Agra(PG)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt and 400 kV Mathura(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt leads to Lalitpur TPS evacuation through only remaining 400 kV Fatehabad (UP)-Agra (UP) Ckt-1 & Fatehabad (UP)-Muradnagar (radial line). Consequent to this tripping, oscillation were observed for ~ 30 sec in the system. Incidentally, oscillations have died down in 30 seconds time and no other untoward incident occurred in the system before, Lalitpur TPS reduced its generation based on advice from NRLDC during this high demand period in UP as well as that of NR. However, this may not be case during all the events and therefore, corrective action shall be taken both at planning and operational level including protection related issues. It is understood that UP has put in place some System Protection Scheme (SPS) at Lalitpur for taking care of tripping of 765 kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad line(s) though the scheme has neither been put forth in NRPC nor has been shared with NRLDC. However, it appears from the event that the SPS if any available at Lalitpur TPS does not take care of depletion of network from Fatehabad (UP) onwards. A separate PSAG meeting was called by NRPC on 11th July 2017. The details discussed during PSAG meeting is attached as Annexure III

137th OCC meeting

NRLDC requested that the current event including previous outages in Lalitpur Parichha complex (where 400 kV Parichha-Orai-Mainpuri D/C lines are under outage since 17th May 2017 due to tower collapse) should be analyzed in detail and both planning as well as operation safe guards should be put in place to avoid such incidents in future. A copy of such analysis and action points may please be sent to the NRLDC/NRPC at the earliest. A presentation in this regard was made by the representative of Lalitpur Thermal Power Plant, which is placed at Annexure A

OCC suggested to keep the connectivity of 220 kV Lalitpur-Jhansi lines in operation for increasing the stability of the Lalitpur generating station but the same shall not jeopardize the stability/reliability of the Parichha TPS. OCC also suggested

25

following modifications in the SPS scheme at Lalitpur TPS. Following are the suggestion points:

• Lalitpur SPS shall also take input for N-1-1/ N-2 contingency of 765/400 kV ICTs at Fatehabad (UP). This contingency is similar to tripping of both 765 kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad ckt. Action points for the above contingency as well as N-1-1 of 765 kV Lalitpur-Agra lines includes tripping of two units of Lalitpur TPS and backing down of generation at remaining one unit to 400 MW. In order to take care of contingency beyond Parichha due to this injection of 400 MW from Lalitpur, a measurement/action signal at Parichha shall also be generated to trip the 220 kV Lalitpur-Jhansi or Parichha-Jhansi section. After this tripping of 220 kV section, Lalitpur unit shall island with the radial load of the area. For taking care of failure of SPS action at Lalitpur, tripping of 220 kV Lalitpur-Jhansi lines on over current shall also be implemented.

• Lalitpur SPS shall also respond for N-1-1/ N-2 contingency of 400 kV transmission loop lines (400 kV Fatehabad-Agra PG and Fatehabad-Agra UP lines) from 765/400 kV Fatehabad (UP) onward. Action point for this contingency would be to back down generation Lalitpur TPS Generation to 1200 MW. Reporting of automatic signal to the Lalitpur TPS to be ensured.

• In order to increase the chances of the survival of the Lalitpur after N-1-1 contingency, the generation at Lalitpur TPS shall be backed down to 1200 MW after N-1 contingency of either 765/400 kV ICT at Fatehabad or 765 kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad line. Reporting of automatic signal to the Lalitpur TPS to be ensured.

• In order to take care of line opening only from one end and thus breaker trip signal not being available to the SPS, logic shall also include, condition of current/power reduction below a small threshold as equivalent to the outage of the line.

After detailed discussions, all entities agreed to take above actions.

25 Reliability Issues:

NRLDC presented the present scenario of summer. Northern Region had experienced heat wave, thunderstorm and hail, rainfall scenario quite frequently during this summer. As the temperature increased, demand of Northern region has also increased especially in UP, Delhi, Haryana and Rajasthan.

It was again emphasized that as per CERC congestion procedure, each state control area has to assess its import capability in coordination with respective RLDCs. NRLDC/NRPC has been requesting to states since long in OCC, TCC meetings to compute and inform the respective ATC/TTC to NRLDC/NRPC. It was also requested to share the likely arrangement to mitigate the constraints observed in importing the power from the Grid.

NRLDC has assessed the import capability of each state control area based on the information available at NRLDC. All the states were requested to share their feedback.

26

Some of important issues that were highlighted and discussed in the meeting were as under:

Punjab: Critical loading of 400/220 kV Amritsar, Ludhiana, Malerkotla, Makhu has been observed during high import from grid. 400/220 kV Dhuri ICTs were N-1 non-compliant for most of the time (shown from graphs). 3rd 500 MVA ICT has been commissioned at Dhuri (on no load) although the same got tripped shortly after charging. 400/220 kV 500 MVA ICT#3 at Rajpura is also out since 18.6.2017. In one incident, Rajpura ICT Tripped on overload due to trippings of 220 kV Nallagarh-Mohali Ckt-1 & 2 (Tree fall on line-2) leading to load loss of ~360 MW in Punjab and ~100 MW in Chandigarh (13.7.17 at 13:13hrs).

Punjab SLDC representative informed that

• Dhuri ICT had some wiring issue and would be shortly charged and taken on load subsequently.

• ICT-3 at Rajpura had issues in bushing and would take more than one month for revival.

PGCIL representative informed that high Acetylene (4 ppm) was observed in 500 MVA ICT at 400/220 kV Patiala S/s which is being monitored regularly.

High MVAr drawal at Amritsar and Makhu has been experienced which has been highlighted in previous OCC meeting also. Underlying network of Amritsar, Ludhiana, Dhuri & Jallandhar are also loaded and need attention to take care of any N-1 contingencies in this area.

Haryana: 400/220 kV Kaithal, Gurgaon ICTs and 220 kV interconnection of Hissar have been observed to be N-1 non-compliant. Recently, multiple tripping on 26th & 27th June again exposed the reliability of Gurgaon/Kaithal/Kirori interconnections. Underlying network at Jind and Kurukshetra is yet to be commissioned and their commissioning would strengthen the 220 kV interconnections of nearby area. Isolator rating issues at Dhanoda & Nawada, outage of 400 kV Dhanoda – Daulatabad on tower collapse also pose challenge to evacuation of HVDC Mundra-Mahindergarh / CLP Jhajjar.

Rajasthan: 400/220 kV Jodhpur, Sikar and Akal ICT are N-1 non-compliant in Rajasthan. N-1-1 non-compliance of Kawai-Kalisindh-Chhabra complex has been continuously flagged and discussed in regular OCC/TCC meeting. N-1 non-compliance at 765/400 kV Phagi ICTs has also been observed for considerable time, third ICT is still to be commissioned. High voltage at Suratgarh, Akal & Jodhpur area has also been observed and reported continuously.

3*315MVA and 1*500MVA ICT have been commissioned at 400/220 kV Akal, though the loading still remains high due to high wind generation injection from 220 kV side of Akal. N-1 non-compliance has been observed during last quarter which is further expected to rise during coming months when wind would increase.

27

Uttar Pradesh: 400/220 kV ICT loading of Agra (UP), Moradabad, Azamgarh, Obra, Meerut, Gorakhpur, Lucknow (PG) etc is N-1 non-compliant. Evacuation issues of Lalitpur/ Paricha & Bara TPS under N-1-1 contingencies and Anpara-D/Anpara-C under N-1 contingency of 765 kV AnparaC-Unnao were once again presented. Limitation of Isolator rating at 400 kV Gr. Noida leading to bus split operation at Gr. Noida. With the Commissioning of one ckt of 400 kV Gr. Noida-Gr. Noida D/C reliability of Gr. Noida load has been enhanced. However, tripping of only commissioned 765/400 kV ICT at Gr. Noida or 400 kV Gr. Noida- Gr. Noida would result in very high loading on 400 kV Dadri-Gr. Noida section as was happening earlier. Therefore, in view of reliability & security of this area, second ckt of 765 kV Bara-Mainpuri, 400 kV Mainpuri-Aligarh, 400 kV Gr. Noida- Gr. Noida and 765/400 kV Gr. Noida second ICTs must be expedited to take care of N-1 contingencies in this complex.

Delhi: Bus split at Bamnoli leads to asymmetrical loading and thus ICTs are N-1 non-compliant. Due to radial feeding of Najafgarh, Peeragarhi and Kanjwla from ICTs of Mundka, 400/220 kV ICT loading at Mundka was observed to be N-1 non-compliant. N-1-1 contingency of Dadri-Maharani Bagh & Maharanibagh-Ballabhgarh would affect the 400/220 kV Maharanai bagh load. Tower collapse of Bamnoli-Jhatikara one ckt (other ckt is on ERS), outage of 400 kV Bawana-Mundka D/C is affecting the reliability of 400 kV Delhi ring. High loading on 220 kV Harsh Vihar- Preet Vihar line have also been observed this year.

Uttarakhand: Loading on 400/220 kV Kashipur ICTs is not N-1 compliant in case of high import (Gas generation at interconnection of 220 kV Kashipur would relief the loading of Kashipur ICTs) & Loading on 220 kV Roorkee (PG) – Roorkee. Uttarakhand SLDC informed that there are some issues related to telemetry at their end.

Jammu & Kashmir: N-1 non-compliance of 400/220 kV Wagoora ICT, underlying 220 kV network of Wagoora, Kishenpur in Kashmir area.

After discussion, all entities agreed to take care of above security issues in short –term as well as long term scenario.

26 Outages of transmission elements on account of inclement weather

A number of transmission lines tripping in the Northern Region are being observed in the area experiencing bad weather. It was observed that during such bad weather condition wherein the system is already under stress, the outage of multiple elements in same area further reduces the reliability/security of the system. All the constituents were requested to investigate such outages in the same area during such inclement weather conditions and provide the report along with the remedial actions taken to minimize the outages.

OCC discussed that such outages are mainly due to trees coming in contact with the transmission lines at some of the locations during such weather conditions.

28

MS, NRPC suggested all the utility to follow better pre-summer maintenance practices of the transmission system to reduce the HVAC line tripping.

All entities agreed to take care of such tripping in future.

27 Complete station outage of 765/400 kV Balia and 400/132 kV Mau (UP)

An incident of complete station outage at 765/400 kV Balia (PG) and 400/132 kV Mau (UP) occurred at 08:41hrs on 09-July-2017. It resulted into load loss in Mau area. Due to tripping of all 400 kV connected lines of Balia, power flow on HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi became zero, which would have resulted into SPS operation. As per preliminary information, bus bar protection was under outage at 400 kV Balia (PG) station. Preliminary report issued by NRLDC was attached at Annexure-IV of the Agenda of the 137th OCC meeting.

Major issues of concern discussed in the meeting were as under:

• Delayed clearance of fault and non-compliance of CEA Grid Standard 3.1.e and CEA Transmission Planning Criteria

• Operational issues during planned shutdown of transmission line, which caused bus fault.

• Operational Practices and periodicity of healthiness checking for Protection system.

• At 08:29 hrs, non-operation of pole discrepancy for Balia-Patna ckt-4 ckt at Balia end to be checked.

• At 08:41 hrs, non-operation of bus bar protection/Zone-4 in case of bus fault at Balia (PG) to be checked.

• ±500kV HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi SPS operation details to be provided. Generation backing down details from Rihand, Singrauli and Kahalgaon needs to be forwarded.

• Reason of tripping of 400 kV Anapara-Mau line immediately during fault (Protection over reach).

• Reason of non-tripping of 400 kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 & 2 from Mau end. • Reason of tripping of 400 kV Azamgarh-Mau ckt from Azamgarh end. • Frequent bus fault occurred during planned outage of transmission line. This

issue needs to be looked into. The detailed report of the tripping including major concern and suggestive

measures is attached as Annexure-IV. All concerned were requested to look into the major issues and resolve the same on priority

NRPC also expressed concern about complete outage of major station (Agra-PG,

and Balia PG) in a short span of four month. Both these tripping were due to operation error, poor maintenance practices and outage of bus bar protection. NRPC suggested to all the utilities to follow better operation and maintenance practices and conduct

29

internal training for technical empowerment of O&M (Operation and Maintenance) staff.

28 Complete 400 kV and above station outage in NR from April 2017 onward:

NRLDC representative stated that the events of complete station outage of 400 kV and above stations have been discussed in this forum regularly and have also been mentioned in operational feedback of Northern Region. However, still number of such events is taking place and he expressed concern over such situation as these could escalate into major crisis in the grid.

Sub- Committee members discussed the above and shared the concern of possibility of complete station outages resulting into multiple contingencies & posing serious threat to the system.

All Utilities agreed to share the corrective actions already taken or to be taken along with time frame before the next OCC meeting.

29 Frequent forced outages of transmission elements

Issue was discussed and deliberated that the frequent outages of such elements affect the reliability and security of the grid. OCC advised concerned Utilities to look into such frequent outages and take the remedial measures in this respect to avoid tripping in future.

30 Details of tripping of Inter-Regional lines from Northern Region for June’17:

A total of 25 inter-regional lines tripping within a month occurred in the month of June’17. The list was attached at Annexure-VI of the Agenda of the 137th OCC meeting. The status of receipt of preliminary reports, DR/EL within 24 hrs of the event and fault clearing time as per PMU data was given in the Annexure. The non-receipt of DR/EL & preliminary report within 24 hrs of the event is in violation of various regulations. As per regulations, all the utilities are required to furnish the DR/EL, flag details & preliminary report to RLDC/RPC within 24 hrs of the event. They are also required to furnish the detailed investigation report within 7 days of the event if fault clearance time is higher than mandated by CEA (Grid Standard) Regulations. The summary of the Annexure was discussed and the same is as below:

• Preliminary Report and DR/EL received within 24 hrs: 5 events • DR/EL received after 24 hrs: 7 events • Fault clearance time(based on PMU data) more than CEA grid standard: 4

events • Line tripping without any fault (based on PMU data): 8 events

In the meeting Members were requested to take note and advise the concerned for taking corrective action to avoid such tripping as well as timely submission of the information.

30

MS, NRPC expressed serious concern about large number of IR lines trippings and advised all the NR utilities to make target of zero mis-operation/ mal-operation of protection system for IR lines.

31 Multiple element tripping events in Northern region in the month of Jun- 2017:

A total of 16 grid events occurred in the month of Jun-2017. Out of these, 5 no. of events were of GD-1 category. The preliminary report of all the events have been issued from NRLDC. A list of all these events along with the status of details received was attached at Annexure-VII of the 137th OCC meeting

It was observed that a fault clearance of the order of 1500ms has been observed which is very much exceeding the standard value of 100ms. Further, despite persistent discussions/follow-up in various OCC/PCC meetings, the compliance of the regulations is still much below to the desired level. Following are the summary of discussion:

• Preliminary report received within 24 hrs: 9 events • DR/EL received within 24 hrs: 4 events • Delayed clearance of fault: 3 events • Detailed report received: 2 events • No fault observed as per PMU data: 7 events • %GD of total events: 31% • Maximum fault clearance time: 1500 ms (30th Jun 2017 at 08:54 hrs: Multiple

element tripping at 220 kVSitarganj (PG))

OCC asked concerned entities to take expeditious actions to avoid such tripping in future. Utilities to impress upon all concerned for providing the Preliminary Report, DR/EL & Detailed Report of all tripping events should be submitted in time.

All sub-Committee members agreed for the same.

32 Frequency response characteristic: NRLDC representative mentioned that two FRC based event have occurred since last

OCC meeting. Description of the events has been given in the Agenda Item. The Hon’ble CERC approved procedure has already been shared with all concerned

during previous OCC meetings. In order to give more focus on the poor FRC, in 134th OCC meeting, a scheduled interaction with individual constituents was finalized. The following is the status interactions so far:

S. No. SLDC

Participating Generators(in addition to other State control area generators and SLDC)

Date Status

1 Punjab Rajpura, Talwandi Sabo, GVK-Goindwal Sahib, Dehar, Pong, Bhakra, Kotla, Ganguwal

02.05.2017 Conducted successfully

31

2 Haryana APCPL-Jhajjar, Faridabad Gas 09.05.2017 Conducted successfully

3 Delhi Dadri stage-1&2, Dadri Gas, Bawana CCGT, Badarpur 16.05.2017

Conducted successfully on 19.05.2017

4 Uttar Pradesh

Singrauli, Rihand Stage-1,2&3, Unchahar stage-1,2&3, Tanda, Auraiya Gas, Vishnuprayag, Alaknanda, Anpara-C, Anpara-D, Roza, Lalitpur, Bara

23.05.2017 Postponed

5 Rajasthan Kawai, Sh. Cement, Rajwest, VSLPP, Barsinghsar 30.05.2017 Conducted

successfully

6 Uttarakhand

Dhauliganga, Tehri, Koteshwar, Gamma Infra 06.06.2017 Postponed

7 Himachal Pradesh

Jhakri, Rampur, Karcham, Chamera-I, Chamera-II, Chamera-III, Sewa-II, Parbati-III, Koldam, Baspa, AD Hydro, Malana, Malana-II, Budhil

06.07.2017 Conducted successfully

8 J&K Uri-I, Uri-II, Bairsasuil, Dulhasti 16.06.2017 Based on the one-on-one interaction with States, the following is the summary of discussions:

Punjab • After detailed deliberation in various OCC meeting, Actual response from

Punjab was still very less than the Ideal response. • RGMO/FGMO was not implemented in Rajpura, Talwandi Sabo. These

generators informed that RGMO/FGMO would be implemented by July-2017. • Punjab was asked to submit the status of Implementation, healthiness of

Governor System (RGMO/FGMO) of Punjab control area generators. • Response from Ropar TPS was good. • Recently notified IEGC 5th

Amendment: http://www.cercind.gov.in/2017/regulation/130.pdf

was also discussed.

Haryana, APCPL-Jhajjar and NTPC-Faridabad

• Actual response from Haryana was very less than the ideal response. • As per SCADA data frequency response from Panipat TPS, Khedar TPS and

CLP-Jhajjar was almost negligible. • Post-response ramp back operation of APCPL generators within 1 minute of

frequency response was discussed. APCPL informed that the existing RGMO setting of APCPL with NTPC-Dadri. RGMO setting would be modified accordingly to give ideal response.

http://www.cercind.gov.in/2017/regulation/130.pdf�

32

• RGMO/ FGMO was not implemented in Faridabad. The station representative said that the gas generation was not in the ambit of frequency response in earlier grid code. However, after IEGC 5th amendment, gas generation has also come in the purview of frequency response and the possibility of providing primary response would be explored.

• RGSTPS, Khedar informed that the RGMO/FGMO is put in service only when machine is running on full load.

• SCADA data of DCR TPP, Yamuna Nagar was not coming to RLDC. Haryana said that the issue has been resolved and data would come in future.

Delhi, NTPC- Dadri, Badarpur and Dadri-Gas

• No response from Badarpur generation observed. NTPC informed that in one unit of Badarpur TPS, governor would be implemented by November-2017 and in other unit governor would be implemented with R&M of the machine.

• FGMO/ RGMO scheme was not implemented in Dadri-Gas. • Bawana CCGT representative informed that FGMO/RGMO was implemented

in Bawana-Gas and it was responded properly. NRLDC requested Delhi SLDC to review the same.

• NTPC representative informed that Dadri stage-2 response was good. • Dadri stage-1 response was observed to be inadequate. NTPC stated that the

same would be taken up with OEM for proper response. • In case of Gas plant, the output response would be in reverse direction of that

to desired frequency response because of characteristics of plant equipment’s viz. motors etc.

Rajasthan

• Response was not adequate from the State generators. • Representative from Kota TPS elaborated about CMC Scheme: When unit

runs in CMC, it controls in a way to maintain the desired Load set point by controlling the turbine control valve through load controller. Simultaneously controlling the “Throttle Steam Pressure” as per the CMC LOAD demand and to achieve a preset “Throttle steam pressure set point”. Within the ±1kg variation from set point is balanced by control correction of Boiler firing rate through Boiler Master. Beyond this a temporary Correction of load reference to load controller is done to immediately bring back the throttle steam pressure within this band of ±1kg/cm2. Another correction in this load reference may be due to RGMO effect to maintain the desired grid frequency.

• In view of above scheme it was discussed during VC that when machine is running in CMC (Coordinated Master Control), then during contradictory conditions of “RGMO correction in unit load set point” and “steam pressure correction in unit load set point” (beyond ± 1 kg/cm2 difference from pressure

33

set point), may squeeze or enhance the reduction/overloading for RGMO correction as decided by the droop characteristic.

• Representative from Kalisindh informed about time synchronization error with GPS clock. Plant stated that time synchronization issue would be resolved by June-2017.

• Representative from Chhabra TPS informed that, governor control is taking input from machine speed control i.e. response was sluggish. Remedial action were ensured by Chhabra to improve the governor response.

• Representative from Suratgarh TPS also informed about time synchronization error and slow response from governing system. Plant stated that time synchronization issue would be resolved by June-2017 and governor response would also be continuously monitored for improvement.

• Representative from Rajwest, Kawai, Shree Cement didn’t attend the meeting. • Giral TPS units were under outage for more than two years. • NRLDC representative informed that details were pending from SLDC-

Rajasthan for most of the incident related to FRC. NRLDC representative also shared the FRC calculation for better understanding of all the members.

• SLDC representative assured to calculate the FRC response for future FRC incident and send the details to RLDC within 3days of the incident.

Himachal Pradesh

• HP requested to calculate the FRC response of their control area and for the generators come under their control area. HP ensured to carry out the same.

• HP stated that most of the plants in their control area are with less than 3hrs pond age.

• It was emphasized that the Grid code doesn’t restrict or hold the exempted generators for giving any response rather it would be beneficial for the grid to get the appropriate response from the exempted generators as well, within their capability.

• Nathpa Jhakri: delayed response observed in few cases. NJPC ensured to get it checked.

• Rampur:SJVNL stated that Rampur runs in tandem operation with Jhakri. It would be worrisome to operate the plant in RGMO/FGMO mode. Hence, the RGMO/FGMO mode is in OFF condition. It was requested to explore the possibility to run the plant with RGMO/FGMO ON as: Both Jhakri and Rampur would be responding to the same frequency

change and hence would be having nearly similar response. Slight variation may not pose that much of a problem for the machine. The plant operating in tandem is not exempted from giving response as

per the grid code. SJVNL ensured to look into the issue.

• Karcham: Droop setting = 5%.Above average response observed for Karcham in most of the cases.

34

Karcham stated that the machine runs in FGMO mode with a dead band of 49.95 to 50.05Hz i.e. the machine would respond to any decrease in frequency less than 49.95Hz and an increase in frequency beyond 50.05Hz.It was stated that as per the grid code there should not be any dead band in the governor mode of operation. The only restriction is as stated under the RGMO mode in the grid code. Karcham ensured to change the governor settings in line with the IEGC grid code.

• Budhil: No representative of Greenko Budhil was present at SLDC-HP or at NRLDC.

• Koldam: Droop setting = 5%.Koldam confirmed that the RGMO/FGMO was in manual mode. The same has been put in auto mode from 04-Jul-17. Koldam ensured to provide the recent frequency based response characteristics after the RGMO/FGMO was put in auto mode.

General action points

• Healthiness of FGMO/RGMO of generators. If not implemented or out of service/order, the date from when the FGMO/RGMO is out along with the date by which the same be put in operation.

• Governor droop setting for each generators to be shared. • Inclusion of action taken for improving the frequency response in FRC event details

provided. Further, reason for poor frequency response to be indicated against each control area response.

• Post-response ramp back criteria of generators. • Governor being put in service when machine running on full load. • Margin for frequency response shall be available every time in the stipulated units as

per IEGC 5th Amendment. • Discussion on CMC scheme (As in the case of Kota TPS) and its limitation on

frequency response. • The generating station shall not resort to Valve Wide Open (VWO) operation of units

whether running on full load or part load, and shall ensure that there is margin available for providing Governor action as primary response.

• State generators shall submit frequency response graph and data along with detailed outcome to SLDC. Analysis for state generators, IPPs and load response shall be prepared by SLDC and submitted to NRLDC/NRPC along with reason of poor response and remedial measures for the same.

All the utilities were again requested to review the above points and submit the

actions being taken to report and improve the primary response.

All members agreed to submit actions being taken for improving FRC.

35

33 Deviation Violation

All utilities were requested to avoid these violations. It was observed that the total no of violations were higher for States whose load size is small and as such these states were advised to plan more accurately and avoid such violations

34. Updation of Operating Procedure of Northern Region:

The NRLDC Representative stated that in line with IEGC regarding updation of the

Operating procedure, the issues have been under discussion for last 3-4 OCC meeting. Based on above and feedback received, the operating procedure of NR has been revised. The revised portion was discussed in the meeting. Following are major area of changes: • List of regional entities • Incorporation of the procedure of CERC & NRLDC for approving start up

power of generating units under commissioning phase. • Chapter-5:Frequmecy control

– As per IEGC 5th amendment • Governor for primary response • Schedule upto IC less auxiliary consumption • AGC Pilot project of Dadri stage-II

– Deviations limits for renewable rich state and other states – To control high frequency, ISGS generation backing down to 55% – Physical feeders for demand regulation is updated

• Demand estimation – Load forecast & its format – Load ramp rate forecast – Deviation limit for Renewable rich state and other state – Load crash during thunderstorm

• Scheduling & Dispatch – Scheduling of regional entities generator in view of IEGC fifth amendment: ),

“ For the purpose of ensuring primary response, RLDCs/SLDCs shall not schedule the generating station or unit (s) thereof beyond ex-bus generation corresponding to 100% of the Installed capacity of the generating station or unit (s) thereof.

– Scheduling in case of Reserve shutdown – Time for information exchange as per fifth amendment of IEGC – Scheduling of Solar & wind Generator as per CERC framework & procedure

• Defence mechanism – Mapping of UFR and df/dt as per CERC order – UVLS scheme updated – SPS updated

• PMU list update

36

NRLDC representative once again requested that, the operating procedure of NR has been revised; members shall give any feedback/suggestion for further improvement of the operating procedure.

All members agreed for the same.

35. Power Network Map book

The NRLDC representative informed that the Power Map book for Northern Region was due for updating. The details were asked from the constituents in 134th, 135th& 136th OCC meetings. Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, HP, Uttarakhand, Delhi submitted the details. The document has been updated based on the information received and available.

36 Scheduling Requirement for Commissioning of Condensate Throttling System at NTPC Dadri Coal Stage-II(Agenda by NTPC)

Renewable energy sources are getting integrated rapidly in Indian Grid system. In order to prepare to meet up the challenges, NTPC has installed AGC (Automated Generation Control) system at NTPC Dadri in association with POSOCO. Condensate Throttling Control System is another innovative way to improve PRIMARY FREQENCY of the unit. It is pertinent to mention that the same is already implemented in many Western countries.

At NTPC Dadri, the Condensate Throttling Control System is going be installed in

association with Siemens, Germany. For installing the system, team from Siemens & BHEL are already at NTPC Dadri. The commission is to be carried from 19.07.2017 to 31.07.2017. As a requirement for commissioning the system, Dadri-Coal-II needs to operate the units as per following loading between 08:00 and 18:00 hrs of each day

Figures in MW

Date Capacity Load Required for Expected APC Required SG #-5 #-6

19-07-2017 980 275 441 46 670 20-07-2017 980 275 441 46 670 21-07-2017 980 275 416.5 46 645.5 22-07-2017 980 275 416.5 46 645.5 24-07-2017 980 275 490 46 719 25-07-2017 980 275 490 46 719 26-07-2017 980 275 441 46 670 27-07-2017 980 275 441 46 670 28-07-2017 980 275 490 46 719 29-07-2017 980 275 490 46 719 30-07-2017 980 275 441 46 670 31-07-2017 980 275 441 46 670

37

In order to facilitate commissioning of the aforesaid system NTPC representative

requested to the beneficiaries and NRLDC that scheduling of Dadri-Coal Stage-II units may please be done as per above requirement.

Delhi & UP agreed to give the required schedule.

37. Compensation w.r.t Partial Loading of Gas Based Stations

With regard to working out compensation for Gas Stations, the following is provided in IEGC (Fourth Amendment):

Quote:

In case of gas based Central Generating Station or inter-State Generating Station, compensation shall be decided based on the characteristic curve provided by the manufacturer and after prudence check of the actual operating parameters of Station Heat Rate, Auxiliary Energy Consumption, etc.

Unquote:

According to above, NRPC had asked NTPC to provide OEMs wise HBD diagram along with degradation curves in respect of its Gas Stations located in NR. As Gas Station norms are station specific, Station specific Heat Rate and APC figures at loading intervals of 5% from 55% to 85% have been worked out by NTPC by extrapolating HBD values, which are available for full module at 100% and 80% loading and up to 60% loading for some of the station.

Degradation of Heat Rate in respect of full module operation (2GT+ST or 3GT+ST – as the case may be) have been tabulated by multiplying average degradation factor based on Heat Rate Deterioration Curves provided by OEMs to Heat Rate figures as per HBD i.e.,

Degradation Heat Rate = Average Degradation Factor x Heat Rate as per HBD

APC figures have been tabulated as per HBD diagrams.

Since there is no degradation curve for half module operation (1GT+ST or 2GT+ST – as the case may be), Heat Rate and APC figures have been tabulated as per Actual.

NTPC representative requested that NRPC may please approve the Heat Rate and APC figures, specific to individual gas station. Members of the sub-Committee were of the opinion that giving schedule below 85% would cost them and they should before giving schedule should be aware on the compensation that they have to pay. MS NRPC stated that the matter is already being looked into a committee would be formed to visit the site and verify the figures submitted by NTPC

38. TSOP UPGRADATION

The TSOP up gradation is being done by the NRPC Secretariat. The Business Analyst, Invetech Solutions LLP explained the working of the new software in the OCC meeting. The members present discussed and deliberated on the software and it was assured

38

by the NRPC that all suggestions for improving the up gradation of software would be got incorporated. NRPC requested all the OCC members to directly mail their queries on email id [email protected]. Further NRPC requested all the members to ensure that they check the data uploaded on the link mailed to them and any discrepancies to be intimated by 31.7.17 positively.

Meeting ended with the note of thanks to the chair

mailto:[email protected].%20Further�

SL. No Element Name Type Voltage

Level Owner Outage Expected

Revival Date

Reason / Remarks Date Time

1 Makhu 80 MVAR B/Reactor 1 Bus Reactor 400 kV PSTCL 2/5/2017 12:37 30.09.2017 --- periodical testing and maintenance

and summar preparedness.

2 Merta 50 MVAR (400kV) B/Reactor 1

Bus Reactor 400 kV RRVPNL 23-06-2017 9:01 31-09-2017

Construction of new element --- for dismantling this 50 MVAR Bus Reactor(this reactor shall be shifted to 400kv Bhilwara) and replacing/commissioning with new TEBA make 125 MVAR Bus Reactor at Merta .

3 FSC of Pampore-2 at Kishnpr FSC 220 kV PGCIL 30-10-2012 12:00 No

requirement as on date

Line length has reduced after LILO work completion

4 FSC of Pampore-1 at Kishnpr FSC 220 kV PGCIL 30-10-2012 12:00 No

requirement as on date

Line length has reduced after LILO work completion

5 765 kV (3*110) 330 MVAR Line Reactor (Non-Switchable) of Unnao ckt 1 at Anpara D TPS

Line Reactor 765 kV UPPTCL 13-04-2017 18:19 No update from

UP SLDC Due to not completion of 765 kV Line Anpara D

6 Bamnauli(DTL)- Jhatikara(PG) 1 Line 400 kV DTL 22-05-2016 20:29 31.08.2017

Tower damage (First dead end tower from Bamnauli S/S) / Ckt-II charge through ERS tower

7 Bawana-Mundka 1 Line 400 kV DTL 14-05-2017 9:03 31.07.2017 Fire below 400kV tower no. 116, in the line

8 Bawana-Mundka 2 Line 400 kV DTL 14-05-2017 9:50 31.07.2017 Manually Opened due to Fire below 400kV tower no. 116, in the line leading to Insulator damage and Tower bend

9 Mainpuri(PG)-Paricha(UPPTCL) -2 Line 400 kV UPPTCL 17-05-2017 13:51 30.07.2017 Tower collapsed

10 Orai 400-Paricha TPS-1 Line 400 kV UPPTCL 17-05-2017 13:51 30.07.2017 Tower collapsed Tower collapse

11 Dhanonda-Jhajjar CLP-1 Line 400 kV HVPNL 14-06-2017 15:00 15.09.2017 Tower collapsed Tower No. 12 to 17

SL. No Element Name Type Voltage

Level Owner

Outage Expected

Revival Date

Reason / Remarks Date Time

12 Dhanonda-Jhajjar CLP-2 Line 400 kV HVPNL 14-06-2017 15:00 15.09.2017 Tower collapsed Tower No. 12 to 17

13 Kalisindh 315 MVA ICT-1 ICT 400/220 kV RRVPNL 4/6/2016 15:50 30.09.2017 Buchholz relay operated.

14 Anpara 100 MVA ICT 2 ICT 400/132 kV UPPTCL 15-02-2017 20:25 No update from UP SLDC DGA test values are poor

15 Panki 240 MVA ICT 2 ICT 400/220 kV UPPTCL 27-05-2017 3:13 No update from UP SLDC

R phase LA and CT blast of ICT-II at Panki

16 Auraiya 315 MVA ICT 1 ICT 400/220 kV PGCIL 7/6/2017 4:51 31.07.2017 Oil leakage in Transformer

17 Rajpura (400kV) 500 MVA ICT 3 ICT 400/220 kV PSTCL 18-06-2017 7:02 31-08-2017 Bucholz relay operated / Detail inspection work.

18 Sarnath 50 MVAR B/R Bus Reactor 400 kV UPPTCL 16-02-2009 6:14

125 MVAR B/R is being installed in

place of it which is expected to be

commissioned by 31.07.2017.

Failure of Reactor

19 Wagoora 50 MVAR B/R Bus Reactor 400 kV PGCIL 22-04-2015 18:56 No requirement as

on date Take out due to low voltage.

20 FSC (40%) of Fatehpur-II at MainpurI(PG) FSC 400 kV PGCIL 7/5/2017 13:13 15.07.2017 B-ph Capacitor unbalance

21 Kishenpur(PG)-Mirbazar(JK) Line 220 kV PDD JK 8/2/2017 15:23

Tower collapsed (Tower no.175) /Line tripped on R-Y-N fault.{11Km from Ramban (towards Kishenpur direction) }.

SL. No Station Location Owner Unit No Capacity Reason(s)

Outage Expected Revival

Date

Date Time

1 Dehar HPS HP BBMB 5 165 Rotor Earth Fault 2/5/2017 10:31 03.09.2017

1 Giral (IPP) LTPS RAJASTHAN RRVUNL 1 125 Bad materials leakage. 11/7/2014 8:20 30.06.2018

2 Giral (IPP) LTPS RAJASTHAN RRVUNL 2 125 Boiler tube leakage 27-01-2016 15:27 30.06.2018

3 Paricha TPS UP UPRVUNL 2 110 Boiler tube leakage 30-05-2017 19:16 No update

from UP SLDC

4 Bara PPGCL TPS UP Jaypee 2 660 Generator Transformer protection operated 1/6/2017 11:47 31.07.2017

5 Anpara TPS UP UPRVUNL 5 500 Turbine Problem 2/6/2017 10:23 No update

from UP SLDC

Annexure 1:

Punjab

Punjab

07-07-2017 to 14-7-2017

Haryana

Rajasthan:

07-07-2017 to 14-7-2017

07-07-2017 to 14-7-2017

Delhi:

11.7.2017 – 17.7.2017

UP:

Fifth Protection Analysis Sub-Group (PSAG) meeting

Action Points Date: 20.07.2017

The fifth meeting of Protection Analysis Sub-Group (PSAG) held on 20.07.2017.

Outage of complete area nearby Kaithal, Kirori, Jind and Panipat in Haryana

control area was discussed during the meeting.

Members from SLDC-Haryana, STU-Haryana, HPGCL, POWERGRID, NRLDC and

NRPC secretariat attended the meeting and attendance sheet is attached as

Annexure-I.

Representative from NRLDC briefed about the incident which affected area of

Haryana consisting of 220kV Kaithal, Jind, Panipat TPS, Kirori, Cheeka, Mund,

Narwana, Hissar IA (industrial area), Masudpur, Samain, Rohtak, Safidon, Nissing

and 400/220kV ICTs at Kaithal (PG), Kirori (HVPNL) [Presentation by NRLDC is

attached at Annexure-2]. In this incident Panipat unit-7 also tripped due to

tripping of GT (Generator Transformer) on back up over current protection.

From the discussions, it emerged that this tripping is a case of cascading outages

due to tripping of single element either on protection mis-operation or a

protection setting related issue.

Representative from SLDC-Haryana informed that bus splitting has been done at

many substations in Haryana in order to manage the load. Apart from above bus

splitting/radialisation following antecedent conditions were also understood by

PSAG:

Forced outage of, 220 kV Rohtak-Sampla and 220 kV Rohtak-Kabulpur.

Forced outage of one 400/220 kV Kirori ICT. There is doubt on the

availability of other 400/220 kV ICT availability as well. Thus probably only

one 400/220 kV ICT at Kirori was in service. However, this needs to be

confirmed from station record, DR and EL etc.

Thus for affected area power source were mainly, one unit at PTPS, 2x315 MVA

400/220 kV Kaithal ICT, 1x315 MVA Kirori ICT and 220 kV Hissar (HVPNL) which

cascaded after single event. PSAG also observed that initiating cause seems to be

tripping of ICT at Kirori. HVPNL also informed that except for the tripping of bus

coupler at Hissar, most of 220 kV did not trip and there was only low voltage due

to loss of supply.

HVPNL representative also informed that immediately after the incident, GCC

(Grid Co-ordination Committee) meeting was called by SLDC and internal

generation has been increased in that area for secure grid operation. At present

four units (Unit-5, 6, 7 & 8) of Panipat TPS-II and two units of DCRTP, Yamuna

Nagar is running in that area of Haryana.

Representative of POWERGRID informed that 400/220kV 315MVA ICT-1 & 2 at

Kaithal (PG) tripped on back up over current protection. Setting is 1.5 times of full

load current with 500ms time delay, characteristic is IDMT-IEC SI (Inverse Definite

minimum time). Over loading of transformer was observed by the shift personal

and the same was also communicated to HVPNL for controlling the loading at

Kaithal ICTs. The PSAG observed continuous over load alarm from EL details of the

substation.

Following other issues were also raised during the discussions:

Representative from NRLDC also raised concern about non-submission of

details in case of multiple elements tripping in Haryana control area despite

the point being already raised in various OCC and PSC meetings. Detailed

Report and DR/EL submission status is tabulated at the last. On 26th June

2017, at 13:08hrs all 400/220 kV ICTs at Kirori tripped wherein a load loss of

around 1000MW took place. In this event 400kV Khedar-Kirori ckt-1 & 2

also tripped along with tripping of Kirori ICTs.

At 400/220kV Kirori and Nuhiyanwali station, in last six month, many times

ICTs tripping have occurred on over flux protection operation.

NRLDC also informed that high loading of ICTs at Kaithal, Panipat, Gurgaon,

Panchkula and Bhiwani (BBMB), frequent tower collapse for 400, 220 and

132 kV transmission lines, lower isolator rating at 400 kV Nawada &

Dhanonda and underlying network at 400kV Jind, Bhiwani and Kurukshetra

etc is being raised in various OCC/TCC meetings as well as in its quarterly

feedback to the planners. Action on these points would help in secure grid

operation.

Connectivity Diagram of the area is as given below:

PSAG suggested following action points for Haryana and POWERGRID:

1. Haryana-

Detailed report along with Disturbance Recorder (DR) output, station

Event Logger (EL)forevent on 26th June 2017 (13:08hrs) and 27th June

2017 (00:15hrs) needs to be shared.(Action: STU-Haryana; Time frame:

3 days)

Protection setting (Line, Bus Bar and ICTs) of 400/220kV Kirori station

needs to be checked, corrected and submitted to NRPC and NRLDC.

(Action: STU-Haryana; Time frame: 3 days)

Healthiness of isolators at 400/220kV Kirori station to be ensured.

(Action: STU-Haryana)

Non-availability of SCADA analog and digital data needs to be checked

and corrected. (Action: STU-Haryana; Time frame: 5days)

GPS time synchronization of DR/EL of 400/220kV ICTs at Kirori station

needs to be corrected. (Action: STU-Haryana; Time frame: 5days)

Single Phase Auto reclosing in 400kV Kirori-Khedarckt-1 & 2 needs to be

checked at both end. (Action: STU-Haryana; Time frame: 5days)

Clear SLD (Single Line Diagram) depicting the affected area and

antecedent connectivity to be drawn. (Action: SLDC-Haryana; Time

frame: 5days)

SLDC Haryana would plan a protection audit of 400/220kV Kirori station

and submit the Audit report. NRPC audit format is attached as

Annexure-3. (Action: SLDC-Haryana; Time frame: 5days)

Exact generation loss and load loss details to be computed and

submitted. (Action: SLDC-Haryana; Time frame: 5days)

Prepare a detailed report of the incident including the time stamped

sequence of event along with remedial measures report and submit it to

NRPC and NRLDC. (Action: SLDC-Haryana; Time frame: 7days)

Status of analog and digital data of affected area needs to be ensured.

(Action: SLDC-Haryana; Time frame: 10days)

Increase in the internal generation of affected area to control over

loading on 400/220kV ICTs at Kaithal and Kirori etc such that N-1 event

does not result in cascading. Connectivity from the grid at more 220kV

station shall be restored for secure and reliable grid operation of

affected area. (Action: SLDC-Haryana; Time frame: 5days)

SLDC may kindly compile the DR/EL and detailed report of multiple

element tripping (list is tabulated in the last) and submit the same to

NRPC & NRLDC. (Action: SLDC-Haryana; Time frame: 7days)

2. POWERGRID-

Back up over current and earth fault setting if 400/220kV ICTs at Kaithal

(PG) to be shared with NRLDC and NRPC. (Action: POWERGRID; Time

frame: 5days)

Sensitive back up over current setting of 400/220kV ICTs at Kaithal

needs to be checked and corrected. Backup over current setting shall be

coordinated with Z-3 setting of the transmission line (at least 1000ms)

time delay. (Action: POWERGRID; Time frame: 5days)

Expedite the commissioning of third ICT at Kaithal (PG). (Action:

POWERGRID)

GPS time synchronization of DR/EL of 400/220kV ICTs at Kaithal (PG)

station needs to be corrected. (Action: POWERGRID; Time frame: 5days)

List of total ten multiple elements tripping in Haryana control area from Jan 2017

onward along with report submission status is tabulated below:

Date Timewithin

24hrs

after

24hrs

Not

Received

within

24hrs

after

24hrs

Not

ReceivedReceived

Not

Received

1 12-Jan-17 12:10 400/220kV 315 MVA ICT 2 & 3 of Kirori station GI2 Yes Yes Yes

2 23-Jan-17 2:25 400/220kV 315 MVA ICT 1& 2 of Nuhiyawali GI2 Yes Yes Yes

3 19-Feb-17 16:30

1) 220kV Fatehabad(HVPNL)-Fatehebad (PG) ckt

1

2) 220kV Fatehabad(HVPNL)-Fatehebad (PG) ckt

2

3) 220kV Hissar - Fatehebad (HVPNL) Ckt 1

4) 220kV Hissar- Fatehebad (HVPNL) Ckt 2

GI1 Yes Yes Yes

4 20-Mar-17 10:22

1) 220kV Samaypur-Ballabgarh-1


3) 220kV Samaypur-FGPP-2

4) 220kV Samaypur-Ch Dadri

5) 400/200kV 315MVA ICT-II at Ballabgarh(PG)

6) 400/200kV 315MVA ICT-IV at Ballabgarh(PG)

7) 220kV Samaypur-Palli-1

8) 220kV Samaypur- Palwal-1


10) 220kV Ballabgarh- BTPS ckt- 1

11) 220kV Ballabgarh- BTPS ckt- 2

GD1 Yes Yes Yes

5 26-Mar-17 16:27

1) 220kV Panipat-Charkhi Dadri

2) 220kV Panipat TPS(HVPNL)-Panipat(BBMB)

3) 220kV Panipat-Narela 2

4) 400/220kV 450MVA ICT 2 at Panipat

GI2 Yes Yes NA

6 03-Apr-17 16:151. 400/220kV ICT 2 at Daulatabad

2. 400/220kV ICT 3 at DaulatabadGI2 Yes Yes Yes

7 11-Apr-17 13:171. 400/220kV 315MVA ICT 1 at Kirori

2. 400/220kV 315MVA ICT 2 at KiroriGI2 Yes Yes Yes

8 21-Apr-17 12:46

1. 220kV Safidon-Jind-1

2. 220kV Safidon-Jind-2

3. 220kV Safidon-Mund-1

4. 220kV Safidon-Mund-2

5. 220kV Safidon-Bastra

6. 220kV Safidon-PTPS-1



GI2 Yes Yes Yes

9 09-May-17 22:10

1.220kV Chhajpur-Panipat 2

2.220kV Panipat (Thermal)-Panipat 4

3.100MVA 220/132kV ICT 2

GI1 Yes Yes Yes

10 27-Jun-17 0:15

1.400/220 kV ICT-I & 2 at Kaithal

2.400/220 kV ICT-1& 2 at Kirori

3.220kV Khedar-Kirori ckt 1 &2

4.220kV Kirori-Jind ckt 1 &2

5.220 kV PTPS -Jind 1 &2

6.220 kV PTPS safidon 1,2 & 3

7.220kV Jind-safidon 1&2

8.220 kV Narwana Bata 1 &2

9.220 kV Hissar Narwana

10.220 kV Sofoda Mund 1 &2

11.220 kV Kaithal(PGCIL) Kaithal1 &2

12.220 kV Kaithal(PGCIL) Chika 1 &2

GD1 Yes Yes Yes

Preliminary Report DR/EL Detailed Report

S.

NO.

Outage

Elements Tripped/Manually opened

Category as

per CEA

Grid

Standards

List of participants of the meeting held on 20.07.2017 to discuss multiple elements tripping at 400/220kV Kaithal,400/220kV Kirori and multiple 220kV lines in Haryana control area.

Sr.No.

Name Designation Organization Mob.No. Email

1. Upendra Kumar SE NRPC 9910180485 [email protected] 2. D.K.Srivastava Director NPC 9560763305 [email protected] 3. Rajeev Porwal DGM NRLDC 9871581133 [email protected] 4. B.S. Meena EE NRPC 8750251805 [email protected] 5. Nitin Yadav Deputy

Manager NRLDC 9560050257 [email protected]

6. Praveen Kumar Manager POWERGRID 9419245474 [email protected]

7. M.K.Vats SE Haryana(SLDC) 9313472674 [email protected] 8. N.K.Makkar EE Haryana(SLDC) 9350278204 [email protected] 9. Rajesh Kumar

Jhangra XEN M&P,HSR

HVPNL 9354689298 [email protected]

10. Raman Sobti XEN PTPS(HPGCL) 9355084410 [email protected] 11. Amit Dilbagi XEN/EMD PTPS(HPGCL) 9355084888 [email protected] 12. Akshay Dubey AEE NRPC 9599179744 [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]














Multiple element tripping in Haryana control area including 400/220kV ICTs

at Kirori and Kaithal

27.06.2017 at 00:15hrs

Annexure-2

Connectivity of affected area:

Complete outage of 220kV Jind, Safidon, Cheeka, Kaithal, Mund, Narwana, Hissar, Mund, Bata, Hissar IA, Masudpur, Samain, Nissing, Rohtak and ICTs at Kirori and Kaithal (PG)

SLD Kaithal

2x315MVA ICTs

SLD Kirori

3x315MVA ICTs

3rd ICT was already under outage on 27th June 2017

List of the tripped elements• 400/220 kV 315 MVA ICT-I & 2 at Kaithal (PG)• 220kV Kaithal (PG)-Kaithal (Haryana) ckt-1 & 2• 220kV Kaithal (PG)-Cheeka ckt-1 & 2 • 400/220 kV 315 MVA ICT-1& 2 at Kirori ( 3rd ICT was already out) • 400 kV Khedar Kirori I &2 (line did not tripped but power flow was 0) • 220 kV Kiriori-Jind ckt-1 & 2 • 220 kV Panipat TPS-Jind ckt-1 & 2• 220 kV Jind-Safidon 1, 2 • 220 kV PTPS-Safidon 1, 2 & 3 • 220 kV Narwana Bata 1 & 2 • 220 kV Hissar Narwana ckt• 220 kV Safidon Mund ckt-1 & 2 • Unit-7 at 220kV Panipat TPS

PMU data of Frequency & df/dt

df ~ 0.19

Approx Load loss = 1900MW

PMU Plot of Phase Voltages

00.15.22.520hrs

00.15.39.600hrs

00.15.40.960hrs

No significant voltage dip

SCADA data of Haryana demand met

SCADA data of Kaithal ICT Flow

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

23:3

0:00

23:3

4:10

23:3

8:20

23:4

2:30

23:4

6:40

23:5

0:50

23:5

5:00

23:5

9:10

0:03

:20

0:07

:30

0:11

:40

0:15

:50

0:20

:00

0:24

:10

0:28

:20

315MVA 400/220kV Kaithal ICT-1 315MVA 400/220kV Kaithal ICT-2

Power flow (in MW)

Time

SCADA SoETime (in ms) Station Name Voltage level

(in kV) Equipment Name Equipment type Status

00:14:39 KIRORI 400kV 6T2 CB Open00:14:39 KIRORI 400kV F_5 (HISAR-2 XFMR- CB Open00:15:27 KIRORI 220kV FE_T1_S CB Open00:15:29 KIRORI 400kV FE_T1_P Protection Trip App

00:15:32,510 NISSING 11kV DA_T2_S CB Open00:15:39,050 KAITHAL 400kV 2T1HI1 CB Open00:15:39,650 KAITHAL 400kV 5T2HI2 CB Open00:15:39,655 UKLNA_H 11kV DA_T1_S CB Open00:15:39,660 KAITHAL 400kV 6T2 CB Open

00:15:40 KARNAL 132kV DA_T3B_P Protection Trip App00:15:41 NISSING 220kV NISNG-SALEMPUR1 CB Open

00:15:41, 635 DHAND_H 132kV DA_T2_P CB Close00:17:31 KAITHAL 220kV KAITHAL-KAITHAL2 CB Open

00:21:14, 285 NISSING 132kV ED_T7_S CB Open00:21:28,900 NISSING 132kV DB_T4_P Protection Trip App

00:23:02 KARNAL 132kV DA_T3B_P Protection Trip Disp

00:27:40,785 KNTLI_H 132kV DA_T2_P BusBar Isolator 1 Close

00:27:40,820 KNTLI_H 132kV DA_T2_P BusBar Isolator 1 Open

00:28:16 NISSING 220kV NISNG-SALEMPUR1 CB Close

PTPS details27.06.2017 (Tuesday) • Station Supply failed at 00:15 Hrs. Unit #7 also tripped along with (on HV backup

over current). • All the outgoing feeders in SY 5&6 and SY 7&8 tripped from remote end.

• All the outgoing feeders tripped manually after the supply failure.

• Station Supply Restored at 01:02 Hrs through Nissing-2 feeder (SYD 5&6).

Other CBs were closed as per following detail Switchyard 5&6 Switchyard 7&8

Feeder CB Closed at Feeder CB Closed at Nissing-1 01:03 Jind-2 01:04 Rohtak-1 01:06 Jind-1 01:05 Rohtak-2 01:07 Safidon-3 01:06 Karnal 01:20 Bastara 01:10 Safidon-1 01:29 Safidon-2 01:30

• Unit #7 Synchronised at 03:32 Hrs.

On 26.06.17 & 27.06.17 Grid voltage was running low i.e. around 200 kV. At 00:15 hrs. all of a sudden, the grid voltage dropped down to 145 kV leading to abnormal increase in generator current causing the tripping of 250 MW unit #7, PTPS, on HV Backup over current protection.

PTPS details

EL details for Kaithal ICTs:

00:15:36,412hrs: Kaithal ICT-2 tripped

00:15:37,026hrs: Kaithal ICT-1 tripped

DR of 400/220kV 315MVA ICT-1 at KaithalTripped on backup over current protection

DR of 400/220kV 315MVA ICT-2 at Kaithal

Difference of 100ms in opening of blue phase and other phase CB

Meaning of Signal for Kaithal (PG) ICTsConfiguration of DR Channels (MICOM P-633) of ICT-1 and ICT-2 at Kaithal S/Stn (23.02.2007)

Input-1--------------------------- output 3--------- REF Protn.

Input-2&3 ---------------------- Output 1--------- Dir O/C & E/F ( 400 KV)

Input- 4------------------------- Output 5---------- Main CB LBB

Input 5&6---------------------- Output 2---------- Over Flux (400 KV & 220 KV)

Input 9,10,11,13,14---------- Output 4

HARYANA DETAILS26.06.2017

DR of 400kV Khedar-Kirori (end) ckt-2

DR of 400/220kV 315MVA ICT-1 at Kirori

DR of 26th June 2017 at 23:56hrs


df ~ 0.106

Approx Load loss = 1000MW


13.08.02.320hrs

13.08.12.160hrs

13.08.09.640hrs13.08.17.080hrs

Demand graph

~1200MW

Tripping in Haryana on 27-Jun-17• On 27th June 2017, 00:15 hrs multiple elements tripped in Haryana control area

leading to load loss of ~ 1700 MW of Haryana.• Tripped element were 400/220kV 3x315 MVA ICTs at Kirori, 400/220 kV

2x315 MVA ICTs at Kaithal apart from number of 220 kV lines/220 kVsubstations such as Jind, Safidon, Narwana, Hissar, Mund, Bata, Kaithal, Chikaand running unit-7 of Panipat TPS.

• From Preliminary information, it emerges that this tripping is a case of cascadingoutages due to tripping of single element either on protection mis-operation or aprotection setting related issue.

• On 26th June 2017, at 13:08hrs all 400/220 kV ICTs at Kirori also trippedindicating a load loss of around 1000MW.

• NRLDC has been raising the concern of high loading of ICTs at Kaithal,Panipat, Gurgaon, Panchkula and Bhiwani (BBMB), frequent tower collapse for400, 220 and 132 kV transmission lines, lower isolator rating at 400 kV Nawada& Dhanonda and no underlying network at 400kV Jind, Bhiwani andKurukshetra in its quarterly feedback, monthly OCC meetings as well as run upto this high demand period.

• N-1 security criteria is need of hour and must be ensured in all operatingconditions for safe and secure operation of the grid

• Status of ERS procurement in Haryana as many lines on tower collapse.

Observations Event Category: GD-1 Generation Loss: 250MW (Panipat TPS unit tripping) Load Loss: 1900MW (Haryana may confirm)

Triggering Incident and Event Description : As per POWERGRID report ICTs at Kaithal (PG) tripped on over load protection.

POWERGRID already informed HVPNL about continuous over load alarm on ICTs. No report and concerned DR/EL received from Haryana control area. As per HPGCL report, On 26.06.17 & 27.06.17 Grid voltage was running low

i.e. around 200 kV. At 00:15 hrs. all of a sudden, the grid voltage dropped down to145 kV leading to abnormal increase in generator current causing the tripping of 250MW unit #7, PTPS, on HV Backup over current protection.

Action taken informed by Haryana during 137th OCC meeting: DCRTP unit -2& 3 started after this incident Panipat TPS unit-5, 7&8 also started after the incident. Paddy load in this area.

As per PMU and SCADA SoE: No fault observed. Rise in the voltage corroborated the load loss Kirori SCADA data suspected

As per DR details: DR received for POWERGRID ICTs Preliminary report, DR/EL and Detailed report still awaited from Haryana.

Points for Discussion• Location of fault.• Reason of multiple element tripping at 400/220kV Kirori station and Kaithal

(PG) station?• Kaithal(PG) ICT tripping on which protection, when over load alarm started

in Kaithal (PG) EL and setting of ICT back over current?• Sensitive over current setting of Kaithal ICTs needs to be looked into.• Sequence of tripping?• Exact sequence of protection operation/non-operation.• Primary protection operation/non-operation.• Availability of digital and Analog data of all 220kV and above tripped

elements?• Kirori station Analog data was suspected?• Unavailability of Station Event logger and disturbance recorder details ?• Time synchronisation issues for Kaithal ICT DR?

Status of Report

Constituents

Preliminary Report DR/EL Analysis Report

Received

Not Received

Received

Not Received

Received

Not Received

Within 24hrs

More than 24hrs

Within 24hrs

More than 24hrs

Within 24hrs

More than 24hrs

Haryana Yes Yes Yes

POWERGRID Yes Yes Yes

Northern Regional Power Committee

Report of the Protection Audit A. General Information:

i. Name of utility ii. Name of Voltage level of sub-station:

iii. Date of commissioning iv. Type of bus-switching scheme:

v Name and Organization of Audit Team vi. Name of representative from utility whose audit is being

carried out B. Check List for Protection Audit

S.No Check Functional/Non-functional/Enabled/Disabled

Type of relay * (Numerical/Static/Electromechanical)

Setting as found in field*/**

Compliance status w.r.t. regulatory provisions

1. DC system No. of independent DC Sources 1/2/3/4 Potential between +ive & earth (Source-1) ------V Potential between -ive & earth (Source-1) ------V Potential between +ive & earth (Source-2) ------V Potential between -ive & earth (Source-2) ------V Potential between +ive & earth (Source-3) ------V Potential between -ive & earth (Source-3) ------V Potential between +ive & earth (Source-4) ------V Potential between -ive & earth (Source-4) ------V 2. Event Logger panel Yes/No 3. Event Logger Time Synchronised Yes/No Disturbance Recorder Yes/No DR Time Synchronised Yes/No 4. Transformer Protection Panel: Tripping by Buchholz relay(Alarm) Yes/No Differential Protection Yes/No 2nd Harmonic Block(Setting) Event Logger operation Yes/No Restricted Earth Fault Protection (HV side) Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No REF Protection (LV side) Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No

Backup over current Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No Earth Fault protection Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No Over Flux Protection Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No Local Breaker Back up Yes/No Retrip Yes/No Current and Time setting Seperate single and three phase initiation Yes/No Earth fault Yes/No Event Logger Yes/No 5. Reactor Protection Panel: Tripping by Buchholz relay(Alarm) Yes/No Differential Protection Yes/No 2nd Harmonic Block (Setting) Event Logger operation Yes/No REF Protection (HV side) Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No REF Protection (LV side) Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No Backup over current Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No E/F protection Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No Over Flux Protection Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No LBB/BFR Yes/No Retrip Yes/No Current and Time setting Seperate single and three phase initiation Yes/No Earth fault Yes/No Event Logger operation Yes/No 6. Distance Protection Panel: M-I/II Pole discrepancy relay Yes/No PLCC panel Yes/No Zone-1/2/3/4/5 (Settings) Yes/No Time check-Z-1/2/3/4/5 (Settings) Yes/No SOTF Yes/No Aided schemes Yes/No Fault Locator Yes/No Power swing (Settings R and X)

* This column is applicable for relays only

** Method and Calculation to arrive at this setting has to be submitted by the utility to NRPC secretariat within 07 days of the

protection audit.

** Purpose is to check whether the operation of that protection relay energises the breaker Trip coil.

C. Observation w.r.t. compliance to NRPC protection philosophy

D. Any other Observation/Suggestion by the team of protection expert:

(Name, Signature and Contact Number of Members of team comprising for carrying out protection audit and the representative of the utility whose audit is being carried out)

Copy to: (i) Station In-charge where audit has been carried out (ii) Representative of the utility present with the protection audit team (iii) SE (O), NRPC

All Zone block Yes/No DR Yes/No Binary Inputs Breaker Contacts Yes/No Carrier Receive Yes/No Time Synchronization Yes/No 7. Bus Bar Protection Yes/No Stability Check EL output for this event Yes/No DR if available Yes/No 8. Single Phase Auto Recloser Scheme Yes/No 9. CT Suitable as per fault level 10. DG Set Yes/No Auto/Manual 11. Mock Testing of a sample protection

associated with transmission line*** Yes/No i. If Yes then observation

……….. ii. If no, the reason for the same ……….

/

'+fmI" fHA'l I '(

Government of India f'aq'Qa tH:;jI(>j'Q .. ~

Ministry of Power ~~~~

Northern Regional Power Committee

No. NRPC/OPR/1 07/201718320 - 326

To: As per List

Subject: Minutes of PSAG meeting held on 11.07.2017

Date: 20.07.2017

A PSAG meeting was held on 11.07.2017 to discuss multiple element tripping at

765kV Lalitpur station on 21.06.2017 and Multiple lines tripping 765/400kV

Fatehbad(UP) on 24.06.2017. The minutes of meeting is enclosed as Annex to this

letter. Concerned utilities are requested to resolve the action points as mentioned in

the minutes and submit its compliance within 7 days.

Encl:- Ala

\.) _I..---f} -:---o-A LVl- ~q+ (.-B. S. Meena

EE(O)

18-11;, ~i%fu iiffif hi%' 1lTif, ifiiiiii"tiiT"ffil<I', "<1't M"#ff- 110016 'lif.f:011-26967842 m : 011-26865206 "t-ifu': [email protected] ~: www.nrpc.gov.in 18-A, Shaheed Jeet Singh Marg, Katwaria Sarai, New Oelhi-ll 0016 Phone: 011-26967842 Fax: 011-26865206 e- mail: [email protected] Website: www.nrpc.gov.in

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-III

Third Protection Analysis Sub-Group (PSAG) meeting

Action Points Date: 11.07.2017

The third meeting of Protection Analysis Sub-Group (PSAG) held on 11.07.2017. A

total of two tripping events of Lalitpur STPS and Fatehabad area were discussed

during the meeting.

Members from LPGCL, UPRVUNL, POWERGRID, NRLDC and NRPC secretariat

attended the meeting and attendance sheet is attached as Annexure-I.

Representative from NRLDC briefed about the connectivity of Lalitpur STPS.

765/220kV Lalitpur station is connected with two 765kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad ckts

(circuits) and two 220kV Lalitpur-Jhansi ckts along with two interconnection

feeding local load of Lalitpur. 220kV Jhansi is further connected with 400/220kV

Parichha TPS and 765/400kV Fatehabad station is further connected with 400kV

D/C Agra (UP), S/C Agra (PG), S/C Mathura and S/C Muradnagar (New) ckt.

Connectivity Diagram is as below:

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-III

Detailed presentation of multiple elements tripping on 21st June 2017 and 24th

June 2017 is attached as Annexure-2.

Following are the action points for Lalitpur (LPGCL), UPPTCL and POWERGRID:

1. 765/220kV Lalitpur Tripping (21.06.2017)-

DR/EL of tripping of 765kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad ckt-1 & 2 to be checked

for GPS time synchronization as there was difference of ~900ms

between PMU timing and Lalitpur end breaker tripping. (Action: LPGCL

and UPPTCL; Time frame: 5days)

Single Phase Auto reclosing in 765kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad ckt-1 & 2 shall

be enabled at both end. (Action: LPGCL and UPPTCL; Time frame:

5days)

SPS (Special Protection Scheme) implemented at 765/220kV Lalitpur

STPS needs to be approved in NRPC forum. LPGCL may kindly prepare

Agenda on SPS scheme in next OCC meeting for approval and further

modification. (Action: LPGCL, UPPTCL, SLDC-UP; Time frame: 2days)

SPS needs to be reviewed for tripping at far end (Fatehabad end) of

Lalitpur STPS. It resulted into zero power flow in 765kV Lalitpur-

Fatehabad ckt-1 & 2 and SPS would not be triggered as it take input of

CB status. (Action: LPGCL, SLDC-UP; Time frame: 15days)

LPGCL may kindly share the incident details of multiple element tripping

and multiple faults at 765/400kV Fatehabad (UP) station and its impact

on Lalitpur machine. LPGCL may also kindly submit the result of PSS

tuning by BHEL and transfer function details. (Action: LPGCL; Time

frame: 15days)

Multiple times (9 times) tripping of 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-2 after

charging in Apr-2017 needs to be checked for line maintenance, ground

clearance and strengthening of tower. (Action: UPPTCL; Time frame:

15days)

Revival of 400kV Paricha-Mainpuri circuit and 400kV Paricha-Orai circuit

needs to be expedited. (Action: UPPTCL)

2. 765/400kV Fatehabad Tripping (24.06.2017)-

400kV Fatehabad (UP)-Mathura circuit tripped on DEF (Directional Earth

Fault) protection pick up. Tripping was wrongly configured in the relay

on pickup of DEF protection. Configuration has been changed and

corrected. Further tripping would not be occurred.

Time Synchronization issue for M-2 REL relay at Agra (PG) end of 400kV

Agra (PG)-Fatehabad (UP) circuit needs to be checked and corrected.

(Action: POWERGRID; Time frame: 5days)

In this incident, at 765/400kV Fatehabad (UP) station, only two

evacuation path was available namely 400kV Fatehabad-Muradnagar

(New) and Fatehabad-Agra (UP) ckt-1. Among these two, 400kV

Fatehabad-Muradnagar (New) was radial in nature and only 400kV

Fatehabad-Agra (UP) ckt-1 was connected with rest of the grid.

Oscillations also occurred in the system due to transmission constraints.

Lalitpur SPS needs to be reviewed to cater multiple elements tripping

from 765/400kV Fatehabad (UP) onwards.

Other points related to SPS are commonly mentioned in multiple

elements tripping of 21st June 2017 at 765/220kV Lalitpur STPS. (Action:

LPGCL, UPPTCL, SLDC-UP)

Detailed report for both the incidents needs to be submitted in desired

format attached as Annexure-III. (Action: LPGCL, UPPTCL, SLDC-UP;

Time Frame: 7days)

On 29th May 2017, 220kV Lalitpur-Jhansi circuit was connected and

Paricha TPS was also connected with Lalitpur generation. At 06:39hrs,

during charging of 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1, ckt-2 was also

tripped. It resulted into generation evacuation through Paricha TPS. It

further resulted into tripping of 220kV lines from 400/220kV Paricha TPS

onwards and complete generation of 765kV Lalitpur and Paricha TPS

affected. After this incident, 220kV Lalitpur-Jhansi D/C kept open. SPS

needs to be planned for Lalitpur/ Paricha complex for reliable and

secure operation.

List of total six multiple elements tripping in Parichha/Lalitpur complex from Feb

2017 onward is tabulated below:

S.No. Name of Elements (Tripped/Manually

Outage Event

(As reported) Generation Loss (MW)

Load Loss

Category as per CEA

opened)

Date Time

(MW) Grid Standards

1 Lalitpur TPS Unit 1 &

2

26-Feb-17

0:24 Both running units at Lalitpur tripped. No fault observed from PMU data.

800 NIL GD1

2

1. 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1

2. 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-2 3. 765/400kV

1500MVA ICT-1 at Fatehabad

4. 240MVAr Fatehabad Bus

Reactor 5. 400kV Fatehabad-

Mathura

29-Apr-17

15:55

765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 & 2, 765/400kV 1500MVA ICT-1 at Fatehabad, 240MVAr Fatehabad Bus Reactor and 400kV Fatehabad-Mathura line tripped.

640 90 GD1

3

1.400kV ParichaTPS-Orai-1

2.400kV Paricha-Mainpuri 2

3.400kV Unit#5 of Paricha TPS

4.400kV Unit#6 of Paricha TPS

5. 400/220kV 315MVA ICT-1 at Orai

06-May-

17 17:32

400/220kV 315MVA ICT-1 of ORAI station tripped by DEF (directional earth fault). Lines were ended up with lightly loaded, resulted into tripping of 400kV ParichaTPS-Orai-1 and 400kV Paricha-Mainpuri ckt-2 on over voltage and Unit#5 & #6 of Paricha tripped due to Boiler tube leakage.

500 NIL GD1

4

1.765kv Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt 1&2 2.220kV Paricha-

Bharthana 3.220kv Paricha-Orai

ckt 1, 2,3 4.220kV Paricha-

Jhansi 1,2 5.220kV Jhansi-Lalitpur ckt 1, 2

6.220kV Lalitpur-Laltipur ckt 1 &2

7.220kV Orai-kanpur 8. Unit-1,2 (660MW)

at Lalitpur TPS 9. Unit-2

(110MW),3&4 (210MW) ,5&6

(250MW) of Parichha TPS

29-May-

17 6:40

765kV Fatehabad 765(UP)-Lalitpur TPS 2 tripped by phase to earth fault. Due to loss of major evacuation path, Lalitpur TPS and Paricha TPS Units were also tripped. From PMU, multiple dips observed, and fault clearing time approx 500msec

1362 300 GD1

5



3. Unit-2 & 3 of Lalitpur TPS

21-Jun-17

14:14

765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 & 2 tripped. Lalitpur Unit-2 & 3 also tripped due to evacuation constraint

930 0 GD1

6

1. 400kV Fatehabad-Agra (PG)

2. 400kV Fatehabad (UP)-Mathura ckt 3. Low Frequency

Oscillation for 30second

24-Jun-17

14:14

In antecedent condition, the 400kV Agra(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt-2 was under planned outage, 220kV Lalitpur-Jhansi double circuit was also in open condition and Lalitpur generation was around 1850MW. After tripping of 400kV Agra (PG)-Fatehabad ckt and Fatehabad-Mathura ckt, 400kV Agra(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt-1 and radial load of 400kV Fatehabad-Muradnagar (New) left as main evacuation path for Lalitpur TPS causing Low Frequency Oscillations in the system. Oscillation subsided in 30second.

0 60 GD1

List of Participants of the meeting held on 11.07.2017 to discuss multiple element tripping at 765kV Lalitpur station on 21.06.2017 and Multiple lines tripping 765/400kV Fatehbad(UP) on 24.06.2017.

Sr.No.

Name Designation Organization

Mob.No. Email

1. M A K P Singh Member Secretary

NRPC [email protected]

2. Rajeev Porwal DGM NRLDC 9871581133 [email protected] 3. B.S.Meena EE NRPC 8750251805 [email protected] 4. Nitin Yadav Deputy Manager NRLDC 9560050257 [email protected] 5. M.S.Hada Manager POWERGRID 9650555997 [email protected] 6. Kavindra Singh Tech.Advisor UPPTCL 9412749803 [email protected] 7. Shekh Salim UPRVUNL 9415900086 Se.omc_3.parichha@uprvunl.

org 8. Vikas Saxena President(PS) LPGCL 9971200857 [email protected] 9. G.M.Agrawal EE UPPTCL 7290059643 [email protected] 10. Akshay Dubey AEE NRPC 9599179744




Multiple Element Tripping at 765/220kV Lalitpur TPS

21.06.2017 at 14:14hrs

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-2

NITIN

Typewritten Text

SLD of 765/220kV Lalitpur STPS

765kV

220kV

Connectivity Diagram

Tripped Elements

• 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 & 2.• 765kV Unit-2 & 3 of Lalitpur TPS• Unit-1 at Lalitpur station was already under outage.• Antecedent Generation of Lalitpur TPS was

~~930MW

PMU data of Frequency & df/dt at 12:19hrs

Δf= 0.09Hz

Probable generation loss 900MW

PMU Plot of Phase Voltages at Kanpur

14.14.10.440hrs

14.14.10.600hrs

14.14.20.320hrs

At 14:14:10.440hrs: Maximum dip in Y&B-phase voltageAt 14:14:20.320hrs: Maximum dip in R&B-phase voltage

14.14.20.400hrs14.14.11.120hrs

PMU Plot of Phase Voltages at Kanpur

765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-2 tripped from Fatehabad end

765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-2 tripped

from Lalitpur end

765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 tripped from Fatehabad end

765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 tripped

from Lalitpur end

Uttar Pradesh SOETime Station

NameVoltage

LevelElement

NameDevice Type Status Remarks

14:14:10,621 AGRA7_U 765kV 08LALT2 CB Open 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-2 tripped fromFatehabad end14:14:10,636 AGRA7_U 765kV 07LALIT2 CB Open

14:14:11,461 LALIT_UP 765kV 12AGRA72 CB Open 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-2 tripped from Lalitpurend, Lalitpur end Line Reactor also tripped14:14:11,461 LALIT_UP 765kV 11TIE CB Open

14:14:12,015 LALIT_UP 765kV LRAGRA72 CB Open14:14:20,421 AGRA7_U 765kV 11LALT1 CB Open 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 tripped from

Fatehabad end14:14:20,438 AGRA7_U 765kV 10LALIT1 CB Open14:14:20,498 LALIT_UP 765kV 08TIE CB Open 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 tripped from Lalitpur

end14:14:21,263 LALIT_UP 765kV 09AGRA71 CB Open14:15:24,198 LALIT_UP 765kV 10U03 CB Open Lalitpur STPS, Unit-3 tripped14:15:24,348 LALIT_UP 21kV 10U03 CB Open14:23:23,852 LALIT_UP 220kV 10ST1 CB Open Lalitpur STPS, Station Transformer-1 tripped14:24:02,103 LALIT_UP 220kV 09ST2 CB Open Lalitpur STPS, Station Transformer-2 tripped

14:24:43,613 LALIT_UP 220kV 02LALIT1 CB Open 220kV Lalitpur-Lalitpur ckt-1 tripped/ opened from765/220kV Lalitpur end

14:25:36,346 LALIT_UP 220kV 03LALIT2 CB Open 220kV Lalitpur-Lalitpur ckt-2 tripped/ opened from765/220kV Lalitpur end

14:28:00,023 LALIT_UP 765kV 06T1 CB Open 765/440kV ICT-1 breaker tripped/opened from 765kVand 220kV side14:28:00,026 LALIT_UP 765kV 05TIE CB Open

14:28:00,040 LALIT_UP 220kV 01T1 CB Open14:28:38,866 LALIT_UP 765kV 03T2 CB Open 765/440kV ICT-2 breaker tripped/opened from 765kV

and 220kV side14:28:38,869 LALIT_UP 765kV 02TIE CB Open14:28:38,885 LALIT_UP 220kV 04T2 CB Open14:29:28,926 LALIT_UP 765kV 01U01 CB Open 765kV Unit-1 CB opened at Lalitpur

765kV line flow at 765/220kV Lalitpur Station

765kV Bus Voltage of 765/220kV Lalitpur STPS

220kV Bus Voltage of 765/220kV Lalitpur STPS

Unit MW flow of 765/220kV Lalitpur STPS

Extract of UP Flash Report

Extract of Lalitpur Report Unit-2




ObservationsEvent Category: GD-1Loss of Load: Nil (UP may confirm)Loss of Generation: 930MW (UP may confirm)As Reported: 765kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad ckt-1 & 2 tripped at 14:14hrs. After tripping of both 765kV line, only evacuation path was 220kV

Lalitpur-Lalitpur D/C line as 220kV Lalitpur-Jhasi circuits wereunder open condition in antecedent condition.

Due to evacuation constraints, two running unit of 765kV LalitpurSTPS also tripped.

ObservationsAs per PMU and SCADA data: At 14:14:10.440hrs: Maximum dip in Y&B-phase voltage. Fault

clearance time was ~680ms At 14:14:20.320hrs: Maximum dip in R&B-phase voltage. Fault

clearance time was ~960ms Dip in the Frequency: 0.09Hz due to generation loss. Probable Generation loss was ~930MW

Points for Discussion• Exact sequence of event.• Exact location of fault.• Reason of delayed clearance of fault.• Non-auto reclosing of 765kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad ckt-1 & 2 in

case of single phase to earth fault.• Lalitpur SPS logic to be checked and corrected.• DR/EL of Lalitpur STPS, Fatehabad (UP) end are still awaited

from UPPTCL and LPGCL. Detailed report is still awaited.

Multiple Element Tripping at 765/220kV Lalitpur TPS

24.06.2017 at 20:04hrs

Connectivity Diagram


df ~ 0.398

Load loss of approx 300MW would have happened

PMU Plot of Phase Current

Oscillation occurred for 30second


From PMU, two fault observed

20.04.04.520hrs 20.04.07.800hrs

20.04.04.600hrs 20.04.07.880hrs

Line auto reclosed successfully Fault again occurred in breaker reclaim time

PMU Plot of Phase Voltages Angle

02.22.04.880hrs

02.22.07.920hrs

SCADA data of Line Flows from Fatehabad (UP) station

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

19:3

0:00

19:3

2:00

19:3

4:00

19:3

6:00

19:3

8:00

19:4

0:00

19:4

2:00

19:4

4:00

19:4

6:00

19:4

8:00

19:5

0:00

19:5

2:00

19:5

4:00

19:5

6:00

19:5

8:00

20:0

0:00

20:0

2:00

20:0

4:00

20:0

6:00

20:0

8:00

20:1

0:00

20:1

2:00

20:1

4:00

20:1

6:00

20:1

8:00

20:2

0:00

20:2

2:00

20:2

4:00

20:2

6:00

20:2

8:00

20:3

0:00

400kV Fatehabad-Agra(UP) ckt-1 400kV Fatehabad-Agra(PG) ckt400kV Fatehabad (UP)-Mathura ckt 400kV Fatehabad (UP)-Muradnagar New

Powe

r Flo

w (in

MW

)

Time

Line Flows

SCADA data of Lalitpur unit generation

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

650

700

19:3

0:00

19:3

2:00

19:3

4:00

19:3

6:00

19:3

8:00

19:4

0:00

19:4

2:00

19:4

4:00

19:4

6:00

19:4

8:00

19:5

0:00

19:5

2:00

19:5

4:00

19:5

6:00

19:5

8:00

20:0

0:00

20:0

2:00

20:0

4:00

20:0

6:00

20:0

8:00

20:1

0:00

20:1

2:00

20:1

4:00

20:1

6:00

20:1

8:00

20:2

0:00

20:2

2:00

20:2

4:00

20:2

6:00

20:2

8:00

20:3

0:00

Unit-1_MW Unit-2_MW Unit-3_MWPo

wer

Flo

w (i

n M

W)

Time

Lalitpur Generation


02.22.04.880hrs

02.22.07.920hrs

400kV Agra PG (end)-Fatehabad ckt

Line auto reclosed successfully from both end


Line finally tripped due to fault in breaker reclaim time


During charging of line Y-B phase to phase fault occurred

POWERGRID detailsName of the element From TO Details

400KV AGRA-FATEHABD(UP)-I

24/06/17 20:04

24/06/17 20:26

Tripped on Y-N fault. FD=16.6kM from Agraend. FC=13.94kA at Agra. Fault in UPPCLjurisdiction. Successful Autoreclosure butrecurring fault in reclaim time

400KV AGRA-FATEHABD(UP)-I

24/06/17 20:34

25/06/17 08:42

Tripped on Y-B fault. FD=24.6kM from Agraend. FC: Iy=15.11kA, Ib=15.90kA at Agra. Faultin UPPCL jurisdiction.Phase to Phase Fault

Time Station Name

Voltage Level

Element Name Device Type Status Remarks

20:04:07.914 AGRA7_U 400 4AGRPG Circuit Breaker Open Line 400kV Fatehabad UP-

400kV Agra PG

NRLDC SoE

ObservationsEvent Category: GD-1Loss of Load: 60MW (UP may confirm)Loss of Generation: Nil (UP may confirm)As Reported: Tripping of 400kV Agra(PG)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt and 400kV Mathura(UP)-

Fatehabad(UP) ckt at around 20:04hrs of 24.06.2017 in which oscillation foraround 30second were observed in the system.

In antecedent condition, the 400kV Agra(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt-2 was underplanned outage, 220kV Lalitpur-Jhansi double circuit was also in open conditionand Lalitpur generation was around 1850MW. Thus tripping of referred lines leftonly 400kV Agra(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt-1 as main evacuation line for LalitpurTPS causing Low Frequency Oscillations in the system

Oscillations have died down in 30 seconds time and no other untoward incidentoccurred in the system before, Lalitpur TPS reduced its generation based onadvice from NRLDC during this high demand period in UP as well as that of NR

As per DR details, 400kV Agra (PG)-Fatehabad ckt tripped on Y-phase to earthfault due to reoccurrence of fault in breaker reclaim time. (Successfully autoreclosing occurred at 20:04:04hrs)

765kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad ckt-1 & 2 tripped at 14:14hrs.

ObservationsAs per PMU, SCADA and DR details: At 20.04.04.560hrs: Maximum dip in Blue-phase of PMU phase

voltages however as per Dr details, maximum fault current was inY-phase Fault clearance time was within 100ms. At 20:04:05.820hrs: Y-phase of 400kV Agra (PG)-Fatehabad circuit

auto reclosed successfully At 20:04:07:840hrs: As per DR, Again Y-phase to earth fault

observed in 400kV Agra(PG)-Fatehabad (UP) ckt and all thee phaseof the line tripped. Fault was in 400kV Agra (PG)-Fatehabad ckt and line finally tripped

due to reoccurrence of fault in breaker reclaim time.

Points for Discussion• Reason of tripping of 400kV Fatehabad (UP)-Mathura circuit.• Status of 400kV Fatehabad (UP)-Muradnagar (New) ckt (tripped

or not)• Time Synchronisation issue for M-2 REL relay at Agra (PG) end

of 400kV Agra (PG)-Fatehabad (UP) circuit.• UP has put in place some System Protection Scheme (SPS) at

Lalitpur for taking care of tripping of 765kV Lalitpur-Fatehabadline (s) though the scheme has neither been put forth in NRPCfora nor has been shared with NRLDC/ NRPC.

• Lalitpur SPS logic to be checked and shared.• DR/EL of Lalitpur STPS, Fatehabad (UP) end are still awaited

from LPGCL and UPPTCL. Detailed report is still awaited fromUPPTCL/ UPRVUNL.

List of the tripping in Lalitpur/ Paricha area:

S.No. Region Name of Elements(Tripped/Manually opened)

Owner / Agency

OutageEvent

(As reported)

Generation

Loss(MW)

Load Loss(MW)

Category as per CEA Grid

StandardsDate Time

1 NR Lalitpur TPS Unit 1 & 2 UTTAR PRADESH 26-Feb-17 0:24 Both running units at Lalitpur tripped. No fault observed from

PMU data. 800 NIL GD1

2 NR

1. 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-12. 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-23. 765/400kV 1500MVA ICT-1 at

Fatehabad4. 240MVAr Fatehabad Bus Reactor

5. 400kV Fatehabad-Mathura

UTTAR PRADESH 29-Apr-17 15:55

765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 & 2, 765/400kV 1500MVA ICT-1 at Fatehabad, 240MVAr Fatehabad Bus Reactor and 400kV Fatehabad-Mathura line tripped.

640 90 GD1

3 NR

1.400kV ParichaTPS-Orai-12.400kV Paricha-Mainpuri 2

3.400kV Unit#5 of Paricha TPS4.400kV Unit#6 of Paricha TPS

5. 400/220kV 315MVA ICT-1 at Orai

UTTAR PRADESH 06-May-17 17:32

400/220kV 315MVA ICT-1 of ORAI station tripped by DEF (directional earth fault). Lines were ended up with lightly loaded, resulted into tripping of 400kV ParichaTPS-Orai-1 and 400kV Paricha-Mainpuri ckt-2 on over voltage and Unit#5 & #6 of Paricha tripped due to Boiler tube leakage.

500 NIL GD1

4 NR

1.765kv Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt 1&22.220kV Paricha-Bharthana

3.220kv Paricha-Orai ckt 1, 2,34.220kV Paricha-Jhansi 1,2

5.220kV Jhansi-Lalitpur ckt 1, 26.220kV Lalitpur-Laltipur ckt 1 &2

7.220kV Orai-kanpur8. Unit-1,2 (660MW) at Lalitpur TPS

9. Unit-2 (110MW),3&4 (210MW) ,5&6 (250MW) of Parichha TPS

UTTAR PRADESH 29-May-17 6:40

765kV Fatehabad 765(UP)-Lalitpur TPS 2 tripped by phase to earth fault. Due to loss of major evacuation path, Lalitpur TPS and Paricha TPS Units were also tripped.From PMU, multiple dips observed, and fault clearing time approx 500msec

1362 300 GD1

5 NR1. 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-12. 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-2

3. Unit-2 & 3 of Lalitpur TPS

UTTAR PRADESH 21-Jun-17 14:14 765kV Fatehabad-Lalitpur ckt-1 & 2 tripped. Lalitpur Unit-2 & 3

also tripped due to evacuation constraint 930 0 GD1

6 NR

1. 400kV Fatehabad-Agra (PG)2. 400kV Fatehabad (UP)-Mathura ckt

3. Low Frequency Oscillation for 30second

UTTAR PRADESH/ POWERGRI

D

24-Jun-17 14:14

In antecedent condition, the 400kV Agra(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt-2 was under planned outage, 220kV Lalitpur-Jhansi double circuit was also in open condition and Lalitpur generation was around 1850MW. After tripping of 400kV Agra (PG)-Fatehabad ckt and Fatehabad-Mathura ckt, 400kV Agra(UP)-Fatehabad(UP) ckt-1 and radial load of 400kV Fatehabad-Muradnagar (New) left as main evacuation path for Lalitpur TPS causing Low Frequency Oscillations in the system. Oscillation subsided in 30second.

0 60 GD1

Annexure-3

Detailed Analysis Report

A. Introduction

1. Time & Date of Event.

2. Substation(s)Affected along with voltage level.

3. Brief Event Summary.

B. Antecedent Conditions

1. Weather Information.

2. Additional relevant information viz. power flow, shutdowns etc.

C. Event data

1. Change in Frequency.

2. Generation Loss/Load Loss.

3. Single Line Diagram (SLD) of affected Area: SLD depicting bus

scheme/configuration of all the affected stations along with digital

open/close status of all CB/Isolator of affected voltage level buses

indicating availability of various elements viz. Buses, Lines, ICT, Reactor

etc.

4. Name and time of the tripped elementsin time chronology: Based upon

time stamped event log, DR etc.

5. Location and type of fault.

6. Flag Details, DR and EL for each affected element: To be filled in Format-

1

7. Appropriate Graphical Plot: Including SCADA data/ print out of DR and EL

details. It may be separately annexed.

8. Equipment failure (if any):

S. No.

Name of the Element (along

with voltage level

Details to be filled in case of Equipment failure Reason

Element

type Rating Make

Year of Manufacturing

Year of Commissioning

1

2

3

4

D. Event Description/ Analysis of the Event

9. Description:Detailed description including the reference of DR/EL and

explanation based onpt. C. Event data.

E. Restoration

10. Restoration time of tripped elements in time chronology.

11. Special finding/ issues identified during restoration

F. Remedial Action

12. Remedial Action Taken.

13. Remedial Action to be taken along with time frame.

G. Lesson Learnt

H. Any other Information

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-IV

Annexure-A

Detailed report Complete station outage of 765/400kV Balia (PG) and

400/132kV Mau (UP) station on 09thJuly 2017 at 08:41hrs

A. Event Summary:

At 08:29hrs,400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4 was taken under planned shutdown. During shutdown of the line, Patna end breaker were handtripped and DT received at Balia (PG) end. Blue-phase breaker at Balia end did not trip due to faulty trip coil circuit-1 and circuit-2. This breaker “ON” condition was overlooked and at 08:41hrs, while opening of the isolator of the line with circuit breaker ‘ON’ conditions caused fault at 400kV Balia (PG) station. 400kV bus bar protection at 400kV Balia(PG) was not in service. All 400kV lines tripped either from remote end in Z-2 or from 765/400kV Balia (PG) station in reverse zone or over voltage stage-2 protection. 765kV lines tripped either from remote end or from Balia end on transient earth fault protection. 765/400kV 1500MVA ICT-1 & ICT-2 of Balia (PG) did not trip on back up protection.Due to tripping of all 400kV and 765 kV connected lines of Balia, power flow on HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi became zero. 400/132kV Mau (UP) station became dead due to tripping of all 400kV connected lines from Mau (UP). Event Category :GD-1 Load Loss :420MW (SLDC Punjab, Haryana. Rajasthan, UP, Delhi shall confirm about load loss due to SPS operation of HVDC Balia-BhiwadiBipole tripping) Generation Loss :Nil (Generation backing down details due to SPS operation of HVDC Balia-BhiwadiBipole tripping to be shared by NTPC) Energy Unserved :0.7MU(States shall confirm)

B. Antecedent conditions (at 05:50hrs): Grid Frequency : 50.04Hz NR Demand Catered : 47305MW Net Inter Regional Export : 8152MW HVDC Rihand-Dadri Flow : 700MW (towards Dadri, Pole-1 was under planned S/D) HVDC Mundra-Mohindergarh : 1200MW (towards NR) HVDC BNC-Agra : 1200MW (towards NR)

HVDC Champa-Kurukshetra : 1500MW (towards NR) HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi Flow : 1000 MW (towards Bhiwadi) VindhyachalBtB Flow : 500MW (North to West)

C. Connectivity Diagram:

D. Event Details (Inferences from PMU/SCADA): From PMU (attached in Annexure-1):

o Fault clearance time was ~1480ms o Maximum dip in Blue-phase. o 400kV Balia Bus Voltage became zero

From SCADA SoE and Analog data(attached in Annexure-2) :

o At 08:41:51.411hrs, 400kV Sohawal-Baliackt 1 tripped from Sohawal end. o At 08:41:51.479hrs, 400kV Sohawal-Baliackt 2 tripped from Sohawal end. o At 08:41:51.497hrs, 400kV Anpara-Mau ckt tripped from Anpara end. o At 08:41:52.509hrs, 765kV Lucknow-Baliackt tripped from Lucknow (PG) end. o At 08:42:28.503hrs, 400kV Azamgarh-Mau ckt tripped from Azamgarh end.

o At 08:29hrs, power flow on 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4 became zero as planned

shutdown was taken for this line. o At 08:41hrs all the 400kV and 765kV connected elements power flow became

zero

A consolidated sequence on the basis of PMU, SCADA data and other Analog data is tabulated below:

Time (in ms) Reference time

Name of the line Facts Source of

Information Inferences Remarks

08:29:06,692 -12 minutes

400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4

DT received at Balia B-phase voltage: ~237kV Charging current: 160A (90degree leading)

DR of Balia end

B-phase breaker didn’t trip from Balia end.

Blue-phase of 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4 manually opened from Patna end due to planned shutdown. DT received at Balia end. However Blue-phase main CB breaker of Balia end stuck.

08:29:07,162 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4

Trip coil circuit-1 &2 faulty alarm Balia EL

Trip coil supervision circuit and its alarm visibility to the operator??

08:41:51,080 0ms Fault time from PMU data

Dip in the Blue-phase voltage

PMU reference time

08:41:51,110 30ms 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4

1. Z-1 initiated. 2. Fault current: 32.5kA in B-phase

DR of Balia end

As breaker didn’t open on tripping command by Z-1, LBB shall have operated.

Both the bus bar protection at 400kV Balia (PG) was not in service as informed by PG.

08:41:51,181 101ms 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1

1. B-phase If: 3.2kA 2. Fault feeding: 100ms 3. All three phase current ~0

DR of Balia end

All three phase of 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 tripped within 100ms from Mau end. It seems line tripped in Z-1 from Mau end.

Z-1 setting and tripping of all three phase in Z-1 from Mau end? Mau end DR is important for further clarity.


TOV (Transient over voltage) stage-2

DR of Balia end

TOV stage-2 was not picked up by Main-II protection of 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2. It means actually there was no over voltage in the system, it may be due to problem in secondary circuit.

Neutral shifting and multiple earthing needs to be checked?


Blue-phase breaker 1 pole open signal

DR of Balia end

It seems 1 pole open signal detection may be from voltage and current logic

Pole open signal shall be considered the physical opening of the breaker


All CB opened from Balia end except tie CB of Y-phase.

Balia EL

Current and voltage became zero during tripping of remaining breaker within 150ms of occurrence of fault

It may be the signal problem in DR, it needs to be looked into

08:41:51,426 346ms 400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-1

Z-2 tripping DR of Sohawal end

400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-1 didn’t trip from Balia end

From DR Sohawal end tripped after 320ms of fault feeding


1. Reverse zone picked up 2. 1 pole open signal received after current became charging current

DR of Balia end

It seems line tripped from Patna end as charging current shown in DR.

08:41:51,496 416ms 400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-2

Z-2 tripping DR of Sohawal end

400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-2 didn’t trip from Balia end

From DR Sohawal end tripped after 390ms of fault feeding

08:41:51,497 417ms 400kV Anpara-Mau ckt

NRLDC SoE 400kV Anpara-Mau ckt tripped from Anpara end

DR/EL not received from UPPTCL


400kV Balia-Patna ckt-3 all CB opened from Balia end

Balia EL


400kV Balia-Patna ckt-3 tripped on which protection? As reverse zone protection dropped after tripping from Patna end.

08:41:51,525 445ms 765kV Balia-Gaya ckt

Transient earth fault protection

DR of Balia end

It seems Gaya end also tripped

765kV Gaya end DR didn’t receive

08:41:51,560 480ms PMU data of phase voltages

Slight improvement in Blue-phase voltage

PMU reference time

PMU has 40ms time sampling, slight fault clearance includes tripping till 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-2

08:41:51,564 484ms 765kV Balia-Gaya ckt

765kV Balia-Gaya line all CB opened from Balia end

Balia EL

08:41:51,580 500ms

765/400kV 1500MVA ICT-2 at Balia (PG)

765/400kV ICT-2 of Balia (PG): Over current stage-1 started

Balia EL

Why Balia ICT backup over current protection didn’t operate before remote end back up earth fault protection? ICT DRs were also not shared


1. TOV stage-1 picked up 2. No tripping from Balia end 3. Fault current persisted for 500ms

DR of Balia end

400kV Balia-Mau ckt-2 tripped from Mau end in Z-2 within 500ms

400kV Balia-Mau ckt-2 tripped from Mau end in Z-2 within 500ms


400kV Balia-Patna ckt-1 , Z-5 (reverse zone) trip signal initiated

DR of Balia end

It seems this line also tripped from Patna end in Z-2, 500ms

08:41:51,651 571ms 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1

DR of Balia end

400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 tripped from Biharshariff end in Z-2

Biharshariff end DR didn’t receive


DR of Balia end

400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 tripped from Biharshariff end in Z-2

Biharshariff end DR didn’t receive

08:41:51,671 591ms 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-1 Balia EL



PMU reference time

Further slight improvement in Blue-phase voltage



DR of Balia end

There was no over voltage in the system, it may be due to

problem in secondary circuit.

On 24th Sep 2016, during fault in 400kV

Balia-Mau ckt-1. 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1

& 2 tripped on TOV stage-2.



DR of Balia end


All CB opened from Balia Balia EL


All CB opened from Balia Balia EL

08:41:52,333 1253ms 765kV Balia-Varanasi ckt DR of Balia

end

It seems, 765kV Balia-Varanasi ckt tripped from Varanasi end

765kV Balia-Varanasi ckt tripped from Varanasi end

08:41:52,509 1429ms 765kV Balia-Lucknow ckt

Main & Tie CB of 765kV Lucknow-Balia ckt tripped from Lucknow end

NRLDC SoE

Main & Tie CB of 765kV Lucknow-Balia ckt tripped from Lucknow end


PMU reference time

Finally fault cleared

08:41:52,635 1555ms 765kV Balia-Lucknow ckt

DEF (Directional earth fault) stage-1

DR of Lucknow end

765kV Balia-Lucknow ckt tripped from Lucknow end on DEF

operated stage-1

08:42:22,817 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2

Y-phase Tie CB of 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2 opened

DR of Balia end

It may be the signal problem in DR, it needs to be looked into

08:42:28,503 400kV Azamgarh-Mau ckt

Azamgarh-Mau line tripped from Azamgarh end

NRLDC SoE

As per flag details of UPPTCL, Azamgarh-Mau line tripped in Z-2 from Azamgarh end. Digital data time needs to be looked into.

Protection operation summary inferred from DR details:

±500kV HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi SPS may have operated. Planned SPS details is attached as Annexure-3

DR (Disturbance recorder) snapshot details is attached as Annexure-4.

Preliminary report received from POWERGRID and station event logger details of Balia (PG) is attached as Annexure-5

Preliminary report received from UPPTCL is attached as Annexure-6

E. Restoration:

S. No. Tripped element Tripping Time

(09.07.17) Restoration Time (09.07.17)

1 765kV Balia -Sasaram 08:41 10:36

2 765kV Balia -Varansi 08:41 10:48

3 765kV Balia–Lucknow 08:41 11:38

4 HVDC Balia –Bhiwadi Pole 1 08:41 11:59

5 HVDC Balia –Bhiwadi Pole 2 08:41 12:11

6 400 kV Balia- Sohawal 1 08:41 09:49

7 400 kV Balia- Sohawal 2 08:41 09:51

8 400 kV Balia- Patna 1 08:41 10:03

9 400 kV Balia- Patna 2 08:41 10:05

10 400 kV Balia- Patna 3 08:41 11:53

11 400 kV Balia- Patna 4 08:29 Under Planned S/D. Blue phase breaker was not

opened

12 400 kV Balia- Mau 1 08:41 10:43

13 400 kV Balia- Mau 2 08:41 10:51

14 400 kV Balia-Biharsharif 1 08:41 11:28

15 400 kV Balia-Biharsharif 2 08:41 11:29

16 400 kV Mau-Anpara 08:41 10:13

17 400 kV Mau-Azamgarh 08:41 09:58 F. Operational and Protection issues:

1. For 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4, isolator opening with circuit breaker ON (status) and electric

interlocks status?? Is Procedure for isolator opening was put in place and properly followed at site?

2. Outage of both trip coils simultaneously needs to be looked into. Status of Trip coil supervision circuit and its alarm visibility to the operator?? From when, trip coil circuit faulty alarm persisted in the system and why it was not attended?

3. Pole Discrepancy protection was out of service inadvertently during installation of CSD (Control Switching device) relay. Is after commissioning of CSD protection all the protections were checked by the site engineer?

4. One of the 400kV bus bar protection for 400kV Balia (PG) was out of service due to fiber cut and other one was not in service due to suspected firmware problem From when bus bar protection was out of service due to fiber cut, status of its alarm in the control room and action taken by the site engineer?

5. 400kV Bus Bar Protection for 400kV Balia (PG) station was not in service without intimation to RLDC.

6. 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 & 2 and 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2 tripped from Balia end on O/V (over voltage) stage-2 protection.

7. TOV stage-2 was not picked up by Main-II protection of 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2. It means actually there was no over voltage in the system, it may be due to problem in secondary circuit.

8. On 24th Sep 2016, during fault in 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1, 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 & 2 was also tripped on over voltage stage-2 protection. Multiple elements tripping report was forwarded to POWERGRID at that time also. Tripping report is once again attached as Annexure-7. Why action was not taken by POWERGRID on the suggestions mentioned in the NRPC report? Also share the action taken report by POWERGRID?

9. 765/400kV 1500MVA ICT-1 & 2 of Balia (PG) was not tripped. 765kV lines tripped from remote end or from Balia end. Reason of non-tripping of ICTs to be checked and shared?

10. 765kV Balia-Gaya line tripped from Balia end on transient earth fault protection within 450ms of occurrence of fault. Transient earth fault protection setting to be checked for sensitive setting and directionality in the setting?

11. 765kV Balia-Lucknow circuit continuously feeding the fault. This line was tripped from Lucknow end after 1500ms on IN>1. Setting of transient earth fault protection needs to be checked and its co-ordination with Z-3 setting?

12. ±500kV HVDC Balia-BhiwadiSPS operation details to be provided by Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. (Load shedding in A,B,C& D load group).Generation backing down details from Rihand, Singrauli and Kahalgaon needs to be forwarded.

13. In many DR (Disturbance recorder) details from Balia (PG), one pole open signal was captured. Reason of the same needs to be looked into.Pole open signal shall be considered the physical opening of the breaker?

14. 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-3 tripped on which protection from Balia end aftertripping from Patna end in Z-2?

15. As per DR of 400kV Balia (end)-Patna ckt-2, Y-phase of tie CB of 400kV opened after 45second however current and voltage became zero during tripping of remaining breaker within 150ms of occurrence of fault. It may be the signal problem in DR, it needs to be looked into?

16. Reason of tripping of 400kV Anpara-Mau line immediately during fault (Protection over reach)?

17. All three phase of 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 tripped within 100ms of fault occurrence and ckt-2 tripped in 500ms from 400kV Mau (UP) station. Z-1 and Z-2 setting at Mau end of 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 & 2 to be checked? Three phase tripping from Mau end within 100ms of fault occurrence also to be checked?

18. Exact time of tripping of 400kV Azamgarh-Mau circuit needs to be confirmed. If it is tripped within 350ms than CB digital status reporting time in SCADA SoE needs to be checked and corrected.

19. UPPTCL may kindly look into the tripping of 400kV Anpara-Mau line from Anpara end on Z-2 protection before tripping of 400kV Mau-Balia ckt-2.

Observed, frequent bus fault occurred in Northern region during planned outage of transmission line. This issue needs to be looked into.

G. Suggestive measures:

1. For 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4, line isolator interlock was bypassed by the operator for opening of line side isolator. This operational issue needs to be addressed and procedural changes required to doubly insured the breaker, isolator and earth switch operation.(General Recommendation)

2. Periodicity of checking of trip coil circuits of the breaker to be increased.(General Recommendation)

3. Adherence to the testing procedure to be improved for new installation or replacement of the old system. (General Recommendation)

4. Operating codes for opening of transmission lines, ICT, Reactor (Line and Bus) needs to be updated with input of CB position status, current and voltage reading in all three phase, earth switch status, interlock status,reason of bypass the interlocks etc. POWERGRID may kindly prepare the operating code for opening of transmission line, ICT, Reactor and important elements of substation. (Action: POWERGRID; Time Frame: 7days)

5. Operational Practices and periodicity of healthiness checking for Protection system needs to be improved.(General Recommendation)

6. One of the 400kV bus bar protection for 400kV Balia (PG) was out of service due to fiber cut and one was not in servicedue to suspected firmware problem. Alarm visibility to the site operators may be improved and prioritized according to the criticality.(Action: POWERGRID; Time Frame: 15days)

7. Neutral shifting & multiple earthing of CVT may be checked for 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 & 2 and 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2 for transient over voltage.(Action: POWERGRID; Time Frame: 7days)

8. At 765/400kV Balia (PG), Protection co-ordination of 765/400kV 1500MVA ICTs with 765kV transmission lines needs to be looked into.(Action: POWERGRID; Time Frame: 7days)

9. Transient earth fault protection setting and its directionality needs to be corrected for 765kV Balia-Gaya ckt. (Action: POWERGRID; Time Frame: 7days)

10. Nomenclature of 400kV Balia-Patna ckts needs to be corrected as it was mentioned as Balia-Barhckts. (Action: POWERGRID; Time Frame: 3days)

11. UPPTCL may kindly check the Z-1 setting and three phase tripping in Z-1 for 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1. (Action: UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

12. UPPTCL may kindly check and correct the protection co-ordination forZ-2 setting of 400kV Anpara-Mau and Azamgarh-Mau ckt with Mau-Balia ckt-1 & 2. Also shared the correction details for proper protection co-ordination. (Action: UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

13. Digital data time synchronization of 400kV Azamgarh (end)-Mau ckt needs to be checked for delayed reporting in UPPTCL SCADA SoE. (Action: UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

14. Availability of digital data of Balia, Mau end needs to be ensured. (Action: POWERGRID, UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

15. Detailed report of the event in the approved format is to be provided. (Action: POWERGRID, UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

H. Pending Information:

1. POWERGRID may kindly submit the Detailed Report and lesson learnt report from the incident.POWERGRID may kindly also submit the remedial measures already taken and to be taken along with time frame.

2. UPPTCL may kindly submit the Detailed Report and remedial measures report for the incident.

3. DR/EL details of the following line tripping needs to be shared by POWERGRID: a. 765/400kV 1500MVA ICTs at Balia (PG) b. 765kV Balia-Varanasi ckt (Varanasi end DR) c. 765kV Balia-Gaya ckt (Gaya end DR) d. 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-1,2,3 & 4 (Patna end) e. 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 &2 (Biharshariff end) f. 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4 (Main-II protection DR) g. 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-1 (Main-II DR)

4. HVDC Balia-BhiwadiSPS, automatic load shedding details from Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Delhi is still awaited. (Load shedding in Load Group-A, B, C & D)

5. Generation backing down details for HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi SPS operation from Rihand, Singrauli and Kahelgaon is still pending.

I. Actions taken at Control room: Instructions wereissued to SLDCs and generators to strictly follow their schedules.Chargingcodes were issued for immediate revival of the tripped elements.

J. Violation of Protection Standard:

1. Delayed clearance of fault and non compliance of CEA Grid Standard 3.1.e and CEA Transmission Planning Criteria

2. CEA Transmission Planning Criteria 3. CEA Technical standards for construction of electric plants and electric lines –Clause

43(4) (c). 4. CEA Technical Standard for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines: 43.4.A. 5. CEA (Technical standards for connectivity to the Grid) Regulation, 2007: Schedule Part 1.

(6.1, 6.2, 6.3) 6. Indian Electricity Grid Code 5.2(r), 5.9.6.c (VI). 7. CEA Grid Standard 15.3. 8. Bus Bar Protection at 400kV Balia (PG) was not in service without intimation to NRLDC. It

was decided in 13th protection sub-committee meeting’ held on 28th January 2011, whenever any protection system such as Bus Bar protection, LBB protection, Auto reclose etc. at generating station or grid substation is required to be taken out of service for any maintenance work, an operational code shall be taken from SLDC/NRLDC.

Annexure-1 Graphical plots:

Fig. PMU plot of voltage at Agra& Kanpur at 08:41hrs

Fig. PMU plot of voltage of Balia at 08:41hrs

Fig. PMU plot of current of Balia at 08:41hrs

Fig. PMU plot of Frequency and df/dt

Annexure-2

Fig. SCADA data plot of Line Flows from Balia

Fig:SCADA data plot of HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi Power flow and HVDC Balia Voltage

Fig:SCADA data plot of 765kV Power flow at BaliaStation

Fig:SCADA data plot of 400kV Power flow atMauStation

SCADA SoE:

Time (in hrs) Station Voltage (in kV) Element Device Status Remarks

08:41:51,406 SOHAWAL 400kV 8T2BA1 CB Open Main & Tie CB of Sohawal-Balia ckt-1 08:41:51,411 SOHAWAL 400kV 7BALIA1 CB Open

08:41:51,429 SOHAWAL 400kV FSC1 CB Open Main & Tie CB of

Sohawal-Balia ckt-2 08:41:51,476 SOHAWAL 400kV 10BALIA2 CB Open 08:41:51,476 SOHAWAL 400kV 11T1BA2 CB Open

08:41:51,497 ANPAR_UP 400kV F_17(MAU-1) CB Open Anpara-Mau ckt

tripped from Anpara end

08:41:52,276 LUCKNOW765 400kV G_1(BALIA-1 BUS-1) CB Open Main & Tie CB of

765kV Lucknow-Baliackt tripped

from Lucknow end 08:41:52,509 LUCKNOW765 400kV G_2(BALIA TIE) CB Open

08:42:18,393 AZAM1_UP 400kV 9MAU CB Open Azamgarh-Mau line tripped from

Azamgarh end 08:42:28,503 AZAM1_UP 400kV 10MAU CB Open

Annexure-3

System Protection Scheme (SPS) for HVDC Balia-BhiwadiBipole

Case Contingency Action

Case-1

Tripping of pole resulting in power order reduction by more than 500 MW and upto 750 MW. (Measured at Bhiwadi)

Shed Loads in Groups C & D (of Fig 1 Load Details).

Case-2

Tripping of pole resulting in power order reduction by more than 750 MW and up to 1500 MW. (Measured at Bhiwadi)

Action-1:- Shed Loads in Groups A, B, C& D as Described (of Fig 1 Load Details). Action-2:- Automatically back down generation by 250 MW at Singrauli-Rihand complex in Northern region and by 250 MW in the Eastern region at Kahalgaon in the shortest possible time

Case-3

Tripping of poles resulting in power order reduction above 1500 MW and up to 2000 MW.(Measured at Bhiwadi)

Action-1:- Shed loads in Groups A, B, C, D, E & F (of Fig 1 Load Details). Action-2:- Automatically back down generation by 750 MW at Singrauli-Rihand complex in northern region and by 750 MW in the eastern region at Kahalgaon/ Barh/ Farakka in the shortest possible time.

Case-4

Tripping of poles resulting in power order reduction above 2000 MW. (Measured at Bhiwadi)

Action 1:- Shed loads in Groups A, B, C, D, E, F &G(of Fig 1 Load Details). Action 2:- Automatically back down generation by 750 MW at Singrauli-Rihand complex innorthern region and by 750 MW in theeastern region at Kahalgaon/ Barh/Farakka in the shortest possible time.

Remark:

1. The envisaged automatic backing down of generation in the Singrauli-Rihand

complex for Case-2 is yet to be implemented.

2. Load Shedding shall be achieved within 500ms, including all signalpropagation/

breaker opening time delay

Load Group details:

Delhi UP Rajasthan Haryana Punjab

Sl. No. G

roup

Load PlannedLoad(MW)

Load

PlannedLoad(MW)

Load

PlannedLoad(MW)

Load

PlannedLoad(MW)

Load

PlannedLoad(MW)

GroupTotal

1

Gro

up-A

Mandaula(PG)-220kV

Mandaula-NarelaD/C

150

Feedersfrom220/132kVMuradnagarolds/s

100

220/132kVBagru-

132kVGSSBagru

25

220/66kVMalerkotla-

66kVMalerkotlackt-

66kVNaudhranick

35

310

2

Gro

up-B

Mandaula(PG)-

220kVMandaula-Gopalpur

200

220/132kVRatangarh

-132kVGSSMomasar

26

Panipat(BBMB)-

1x100MVA,220/33kVICTatPanipat

50

276

3

Gro

up-C

Feedersfrom220/132kVModipuramsubstation

100

220/132kVKota-

132kVBaroli;220/132kVBhilwara-

132kVGSSHamirgarh

60

Samaypur(BBMB)-

220kVSamaypur-PalwalD/C

50

220/66kVGobindgarh-1

-66kVChourwalackt -66kVTalwarackt-

71

281

4

Gro

up-D

220/132kVAlwar-132kVGSSBansoor,132kVGSSRatangarh

59

Samaypur(BBMB)-220kVSamaypur-BadshahpurD/C

90

220/66kVLaltokalan -66kVGillRoadckt-1 -66kVGillRoadckt-2

-66kVFerozpurRoadckt

90

239

5

Gro

up-E

220kVMainpuri

-2x132/33kV,40MVAT/F(20MW

-60MW)

50

220/132kVAlwar-132kVGSSMalakheda;220/132kVBhilwara-132kVGSSGangapur,132kVGSSDanta,132kV

GSS Devgarhand132kVGSSKareda;220/132kVMerta-132kVGSSKuchera

100

132kVPTPS- 132kVPTPS-Chanduali

132kVPTPS-Munak

50

220kVJamsher -

66kVNakodarRoad-1

-66kVNakodarRo

ad-2

100

300

6

Gro

up-F

220kVNara-132/33kV,40MVAT/Fand132/33kV,63MVAT/F(32MW-52MW)

50

220/132kVAlwar-

132kVGSSAlwar(localload);220/132kVMert

a-132kVGSSLamba,132

kVGSSGolan

100

132kVNarwana 132kVNarwana-Garhi

132kVNarwana-Tohana 132kVNarwana-Uklana

132kVNarwana-Dhamtansahib132/33

kVT/F20MVA 132/11kVT/F8MVA

75

220kVMohali -

66kVMohalickt1&2

-66kVMohalickt

3&4

100

325

7

Gro

up-G

400/220kVRatangarh

-220kVGSSSujangarh,and220/132kVRatanga

rh-132kVGSSSardarsahar

100

132kVDadri 132kVDadri-

Dadricity132kVDadri-Matenhail

132kVDadri-Kalanaur 132kVDadri-

Bahu132/33kVT/F20/25MVA

132/33kVT/F16/20MVA

75

220kVAblowal -66kVRakhra-1 -66kVRakhra-2 -66kVRakhra-3 -66kVRakhra-4

100

275

TOTAL 350 300 470 390 496 2006

DR of 400kV M-1 Balia (end)-Patna ckt-4 (08:29hrs)

Blue-phase of 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-4 manually opened from Patna end due to planned shut down. DT received at Balia end. However Blue-phase main CB breaker of Balia end stucked

NITIN

Typewritten Text

ANNEXURE-4

NITIN

Typewritten Text


Blue-phase breaker was already stucked. Fault occurred in B-phase. Fault persisted for around 1400ms. Same was also captured in PMU data. Nomenclature Balia-Barh ckt-2 to be corrected

Fault current: 32.5kA


400kV Balia-Patna ckt-1 tripped in reverse zone after 500ms. It seems remote end also tripped in Z-2 as no voltage in DR after 500ms


400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2 tripped on TOV stage-2 protection. Why Y-phase open signal was coming in DR. Tie CB Y-phase open signal also not captured in DR.


Tie CB of Y-phase open signal received at 08:42:22.817hrs. Y-phase CB was already opened as voltage and current became zero at the time of tripping of line.


Main-2 picked up reverse zone, Why TOV stage-2 was not picked up by Main-II protection of 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-2 (Main-II relay voltage was ~1.1pu)


Main-2 picked up reverse zone, Reason of tripping not captured in DR, Why Main-I protection was not triggered. It seems 400kV Balia-Patna ckt-3 tripped from Patna end in Z-2 in 350ms. Why 1 pole open signal for L3 received in DR

DR of 400kV Balia (end)-Biharshariff ckt-1

400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 tripped from Biharshariff end in Z-2 after ~500ms. Balia end tripped on Transient over voltage stage-2

DR of 400kV Balia (end)-Biharshariff ckt-2

400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-2 tripped from Biharshariff end in Z-2 after ~500ms. Balia end tripped on Transient over voltage stage-2

DR of 400kV M-2 Balia (end)-Mau ckt-1

Blue-phase of 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 tripped from Balia end within 100ms of fault occurrence. It seems line tripped from Mau end within 100ms.


Blue-phase of 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 tripped from Balia end within 100ms of fault occurrence. It seems line tripped from Mau end within 100ms. All three phase opened from Mau end


It seems line tripped from Mau end within 500ms. Balia end relay picked up TOV stage-1 but no tripping

DR of 400kV M-1 Balia (end)-Sohawal ckt-1

400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-1 tripped from Sohawal end in 300ms. Line was not tripped from Balia end.


400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-1 tripped from Sohawal end in 300ms. Line was not tripped from Balia end. 1 Pole open signal received at Balia end.

DR of 400kV M-1 Sohawal (end)-Balia ckt-1

400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-1 tripped from Sohawal end on Z-2 distance protection. Line was not tripped from Balia end. As current was leading voltage by 90degree


400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-2 tripped from Sohawal end in 350ms. Line was not tripped from Balia end. As current was leading voltage by 90degree


400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-2 tripped from Sohawal end in 350ms. Line was not tripped from Balia end. Balia end forward zone sensed. Reason may be looked into. 1 Pole open signal received at Balia end.

DR of 400kV M-1 Sohawal (end)-Balia ckt-2

400kV Balia-Sohawal ckt-2 tripped from Sohawal end on Z-2 distance protection. Line was not tripped from Balia end. As current was leading voltage by 90degree

DR of 765kV M-1 Balia (end)-Gaya ckt

765kV Balia-Gaya ckt tripped from Balia end in 500ms on TEF protection by Main-II protection relay.

DR of 765kV M-2 Balia (end)-Gaya ckt

765kV Balia-Gaya ckt tripped from Balia end in 500ms on TEF protection by Main-II protection relay.

DR of 765kV M-1 Balia (end)-Lucknow ckt

765kV Balia-Lucknow circuit continuously feeding the fault. This line was tripped from Lucknow end after 1500ms

DR of 765kV M-2 Balia (end)-Lucknow ckt

765kV Balia-Lucknow circuit continuously feeding the fault. This line was tripped from Lucknow end after 1500ms

DR of 765kV M-1 Lucknow (end)-Balia ckt

765kV Balia-Lucknow circuit continuously feeding the fault. This line was tripped from Lucknow end after 1500ms on IN>1, transient earth fault protection operated in 1500ms

DR of 765kV M-2 Lucknow (end)-Balia ckt

765kV Balia-Lucknow circuit continuously feeding the fault. This line was tripped from Lucknow end after 1500ms. Z-3 start and again dropped in 480ms

BCU Event Log for 701 at Lucknow end:• * 09/07/17 08:41:52.249 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Trip PhY OPERATED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.249 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION DT SEND CH-1 OPERATED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.249 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION DT SEND CH-2 OPERATED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.250 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Trip PhR OPERATED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.250 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Trip PhB OPERATED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.252 E701 BALIA-1 /AR SIGNALS LOCKOUT_FBD_OUT OPEARTED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.257 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION 86B RELAY OPERATED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.267 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION A/R L/O OPERATED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.269 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 ILOCKPERMISSIVE NOT SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.269 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Close intlk SPS NOT SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.274 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 blocking OPEARTED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.276 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 R PH POSITION OPEN • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.276 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Y PH POSITION OPEN • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.276 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 B PH POSITION OPEN • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.276 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 CB POSITION OPEN • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.284 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89A Close intlk SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.284 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89A Open intlk SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.284 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89A ILOCKPERMISSIVE SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.284 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89B Close intlk SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.284 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89B Open intlk SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.284 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89B ILOCKPERMISSIVE SATISFIED • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.286 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Autorecloser st RECLAIM ML TIMER• * 09/07/17 08:41:52.286 E701 BALIA-1 /AR SIGNALS AR LOCKING RESET • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.286 E701 BALIA-1 /AR SIGNALS LOCKOUT_FBD_OUT RESET • * 09/07/17 08:41:52.288 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89L Close intlk SELF CHECK FAULT

BCU Event Log for 701 at Lucknow end:* 09/07/17 08:41:52.288 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89L Open intlk SELF CHECK FAULT* 09/07/17 08:41:52.288 E701 BALIA-1 /ISO 701-89L ILOCKPERMISSIVE SELF CHECK FAULT* 09/07/17 08:41:52.290 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION CB CLOSING RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.295 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION DT SEND CH-1 RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.296 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION DT SEND CH-2 RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.328 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Trip PhR RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.328 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Trip PhY RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.328 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Trip PhB RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.394 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION CB CLOSING SET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.394 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION LIVE_RUN_LIVE_IN RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.394 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION DEAD_RUN_LIVE_IN SET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.438 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION CB CLOSING RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.438 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION LIVE_RUN_LIVE_IN SET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.438 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION DEAD_RUN_LIVE_IN RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.482 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION CB CLOSING SET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.482 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION LIVE_RUN_LIVE_IN RESET * 09/07/17 08:41:52.482 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION DEAD_RUN_LIVE_IN SET * 09/07/17 08:41:57.282 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Autorecloser st LOCKING * 09/07/17 08:41:57.282 E701 BALIA-1 /AR SIGNALS AR LOCKING OPEARTED * 09/07/17 08:44:43.179 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION A/R L/O RESET * 09/07/17 08:44:43.181 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 ILOCKPERMISSIVE SATISFIED * 09/07/17 08:44:43.181 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 Close intlk SPS SATISFIED * 09/07/17 08:44:43.615 E701 BALIA-1 /PROTECTION 86B RELAY NORMAL * 09/07/17 08:44:44.552 E701 BALIA-1 /CB 701-52 blocking RESET

DR of 765kV M-1 Balia (end)-Varanasi ckt

765kV Balia-Varanasi circuit continuously feeding the fault. It seems this line was tripped from Varanasi end after 1500ms. Varanasi end DR was not available

Annexure-5

Report of Multiple –Element Tripping at Ballia Substation on 09.07.17: Sequence of Events :

1. 400KV Ballia-Patna-4 line was opened at 08:29 hrs. from Patna end for replacement of Line Insulator by ER-I T/L group.

2. DT received at Ballia from Patna end. Subsequently, both main and tie Circuit Breaker were opened except B-Phase main CB which was stuck up and voltage of 236KV B-Phase-Earth and current 165 Amp was feeding to line and Line Reactor.

3. At 08:33 Hrs. code was given from Patna end for Line Isolator opening at Ballia end. At 08:41 Hrs. Line Isolator was opened at site by Ballia group. Upon the event of opening of Isolator, a fault current of 33KA was observed. Subsequently all 400KV & 765KV lines tripped leading to Power source zero of HVDC lines also.

Line Tripped from Ballia- 1. 400KV Ballia-Patna# 1, 2 & 3 2. 400KV Ballia-Biharsharif # 1& 2 3. 765KV Ballia-Gaya.

Lines tripped from remote end. 1. 400KV Ballia-Mau#1&2 2. 400KV Ballia-Sohawal#1&2 3. 765KV Ballia-Varanai 4. 765KV Ballia-Lucknow.

765/400KV ICT#1&2 not tripped. OBSERVATION: 1) Operator could not identify the Main Circuit Breaker B-pole stuck problem and opened the line isolator, causing fault due to creation of heavy Arc. 2) 400KV Bus Bar#2 ABB (REB 500) was having suspected firmware problem for which PO has been placed to M/S ABB for rectification and Engineer is expected at site in next week. 3) After occurrence Bus Bar#1 has been checked and fibre found cut. In view of above Bus Bar protection did not operate from LBB operation. Jointing of the fibre is in progress. Sequence of normalization: All the CBs of 400KV & 765KV which remained connected after tripping were first opened at Ballia end and the equipment and lines of Ballia end were charged as per following details.

1. 400KV Ballia-Sohawal-1 line charged at 09:49 Hrs. 2. 400KV Ballia-Sohawal-2 line charged at 09:52 Hrs. 3. 400KV Ballia-Patna-1 line charged at 10:03 Hrs. 4. 400KV Ballia-Patna-2 line charged at 10:07 Hrs.

5. 765KV Ballia-Gaya line charged at 10:36 Hrs. 6. 765KV ICT-2 charged at 10:40 Hrs. 7. 400KV Ballia-Mau-1 line charged at 10:43 Hrs. 8. 765KV Ballia-Varanasi line charged at 10:48 Hrs. 9. 400KV Ballia-Mau-2 line charged at 10:51 Hrs. 10. 765KV Ballia-Lucknow line charged at 11:38 Hrs. 11. 400KV Ballia-Biharsariff-1 line charged at 11:27 Hrs. 12. 400KV Ballia-Biharsariff-2 line charged at 11:28 Hrs. 13. 400KV Ballia-Patna-3 line charged at 11:53 Hrs. 14. 500KV HVDC Pole-I charged at 11:59 Hrs. 15. 500KV HVDC Pole-II charged at 12:11 Hrs.

Detail tripping Report: DR and EL of Both the ends are enclosed.

DSAgile Events

From 09/07/2017 07:0:00

To 09/07/2017 13:25:59

Date ORIGIN Object Name Event Message ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 7/9/2017 9:39:15 AM.014 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 9:39:09 AM.066 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1B-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:09 AM.000 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.965 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.965 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.961 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.960 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.936 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.936 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.936 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.936 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1B-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.930 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.925 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.925 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 9:39:08 AM.925 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1B-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 9:38:39 AM.133 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 9:38:39 AM.018 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 B-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 9:38:39 AM.012 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:38:38 AM.948 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 9:38:23 AM.292 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 9:38:13 AM.949 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 9:38:13 AM.900 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 9:38:13 AM.894 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 9:38:13 AM.889 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 9:36:42 AM.728 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / 89A-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:36:42 AM.728 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / 89A-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:36:42 AM.728 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / 89A-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:36:33 AM.413 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / 89B-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:36:33 AM.413 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / 89B-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:36:33 AM.413 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / 89B-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:10:27 AM.211 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:27 AM.211 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:27 AM.211 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:22 AM.299 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:22 AM.299 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:15 AM.893 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:15 AM.893 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:15 AM.893 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:15 AM.890 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:15 AM.890 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:10:15 AM.890 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:32 AM.524 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:32 AM.524 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:32 AM.524 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:32 AM.521 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:32 AM.521 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:32 AM.521 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:24 AM.892 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:18 AM.594 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:12 AM.772 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:07:06 AM.469 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 9:02:59 AM.941 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / 89A-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:02:59 AM.941 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / 89A-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 9:02:59 AM.941 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / 89A-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:59:06 AM.075 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / 89B-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:59:06 AM.075 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / 89B-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:59:06 AM.075 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / 89B-ISO POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:42:58 AM.455 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / CT SELECTION AT2 DESELECT THROUGH GOOSE SELECT 7/9/2017 8:42:46 AM.020 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / OPTOS CARRIER CH-2 HEALTHY Set 7/9/2017 8:42:45 AM.783 BALIA / 765 kV / VARANASI MAIN-1 / SYSTEM CARRIER HEALTHY CH-1 NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:42 AM.702 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TRANSFORMER COMM TAP CHANGER PHASE DESCREPANCY SET 7/9/2017 8:42:42 AM.702 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TRANSFORMER COMM TAP CHANGER PHASE DESCREPANCY SET 7/9/2017 8:42:42 AM.702 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TRANSFORMER COMM TAP CHANGER PHASE DESCREPANCY SET 7/9/2017 8:42:42 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TRANSFORMER COMM TAP CHANGER PHASE DESCREPANCY SET 7/9/2017 8:42:42 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TRANSFORMER COMM TAP CHANGER PHASE DESCREPANCY SET 7/9/2017 8:42:42 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TRANSFORMER COMM TAP CHANGER PHASE DESCREPANCY SET 7/9/2017 8:42:33 AM.090 BALIA / 765 kV / VARANASI MAIN-1 / SYSTEM CARRIER HEALTHY CH-2 ALARM 7/9/2017 8:42:32 AM.295 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / CB 712-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:32 AM.290 BALIA / 765 kV / 711_FUTURE2-TIE / CB 711-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:32 AM.071 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / CB 709-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:32 AM.070 BALIA / 765 kV / 708_GAYA1-TIE / CB 708-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:32 AM.048 BALIA / 400 kV / 425-ICT 2 / CB 425-52 AC SUPPLY2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:31 AM.838 BALIA / 765 kV / 706_BUS REACT-2 / CB 706-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:31 AM.837 BALIA / 765 kV / 705_LUCKNOW1-TIE / CB 705-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:31 AM.762 BALIA / 765 kV / 704_LUCKNOW-1 / CB 704-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:30 AM.702 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / CB 710-52 AC SUPPLY HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:29 AM.990 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / AMF PANEL DG MAINS-2 LT SUPPLY CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:42:28 AM.214 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / 220V 220V DC-1 EARTH FAULT TRIP OPERATED 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.343 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / 220V BATTERY CHARGER-2 RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.299 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / 220V BATTERY CHARGER-1 RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.265 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / MAIN SWITCHBOARD 415V BUS-2 UNDERVOLTAGE RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.209 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / 48V BATTERY CHARGER-2 RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.207 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TR_709_RPH CONTROL SUPPLY R-PHASE NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.198 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / 48V BATTERY CHARGER-1 RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.190 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TR_709_YPH CONTROL SUPPLY Y-PHASE NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.188 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TR_709_BPH CONTROL SUPPLY B-PHASE NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.182 BALIA / 765 kV / 708_GAYA1-TIE / SPAR_TRF_TROUBLE CONTROL SUPPLY NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.182 BALIA / 765 kV / 711_FUTURE2-TIE / SPAR_TRF_TROUBLE CONTROL SUPPLY SPARE-PHASE ICT NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.179 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TR_712_RPH CONTROL SUPPLY R-PHASE NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.175 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TR_712_YPH CONTROL SUPPLY Y-PHASE NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.172 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TR_712_BPH CONTROL SUPPLY B-PHASE NORMAL 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.169 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.168 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.154 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TRANSFORMER COMM AVR OPERATION FAIL SET

Page 17 / 23

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-5

DSAgile Events

From 09/07/2017 07:0:00

To 09/07/2017 13:25:59

Date ORIGIN Object Name Event Message ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.151 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TRANSFORMER COMM DC UNDER VOLTAGE DETECTED RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.150 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TRANSFORMER COMM DC UNDER VOLTAGE DETECTED RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.093 BALIA / 765 kV / 707R_GAYA1 REACT / CB 707-52R AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.086 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / CB 707-52 AC SUPPLY-1/2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.073 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / AMF PANEL DG DG CHARGER-2 ON 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.072 BALIA / AUXILLIARY / 765 AUXILLIARY / AMF PANEL DG DG CHARGER-1 ON 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.070 BALIA / 400 kV / 406-BR 2 / CB 406-52 AC SUPPLY1 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.069 BALIA / 400 kV / 405-TIE / CB 405-52 AC SUPPLY1 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.065 BALIA / 400 kV / 404-BR 3 / CB 404-52 AC SUPPLY-1 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.060 BALIA / 400 kV / 406-BR 2 / CB 406-52 AC SUPPLY2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.059 BALIA / 400 kV / 405-TIE / CB 405-52 AC SUPPLY2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:27 AM.055 BALIA / 400 kV / 404-BR 3 / CB 404-52 AC SUPPLY2 HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.874 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Pole discrepancy trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.874 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Pole discrepancy trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.874 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Pole discrepancy trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.846 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.846 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.846 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.815 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-2 Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.815 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-2 Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.813 BALIA / 400 kV / 407_87T / SYSTEM TIE CB OPERATED 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.813 BALIA / 400 kV / 407_87T / SYSTEM TIE CB OPERATED 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.809 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.809 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.809 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:42:22 AM.809 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:42:13 AM.041 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / CT SELECTION AT1 SELECT DISCREPANCY ALARM RESET 7/9/2017 8:42:13 AM.041 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / CT SELECTION AT1 SELECT THROUGH GOOSE DESELECT 7/9/2017 8:42:12 AM.823 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / BUS SELECTION BUS-1 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:42:12 AM.795 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / PROTECTION DIRECT TRIP SEND CHANNEL-1/2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:12 AM.795 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / BUS SELECTION 400KV SELECT Set 7/9/2017 8:42:12 AM.795 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / PROTECTION DIRECT TRIP SEND CHANNEL-1/2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:12 AM.795 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / PROTECTION DIRECT TRIP SEND CHANNEL-1/2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:12 AM.249 BALIA / 765 kV / 704_LUCKNOW-1 / PROTECTION BUSBAR PROTECTION OPERATED PU4A Reset 7/9/2017 8:42:01 AM.126 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.718 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TRANSFORMER COMM RPH- REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE SET 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.685 BALIA / 765 kV / 709_ICT-2 / TRANSFORMER COMM RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY SET 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.204 BALIA / 765 kV / 707R_GAYA1 REACT / PROTECTION RPH-2 REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.204 BALIA / 765 kV / 707R_GAYA1 REACT / PROTECTION RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY Set 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.178 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TRANSFORMER COMM RPH-2 REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE SET 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.131 BALIA / 765 kV / 712_ICT-1 / TRANSFORMER COMM RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY SET 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.085 BALIA / 765 kV / 705_LUCKNOW1-TIE / PROTECTION RPH-2 REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.057 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / PROTECTION RPH-2 REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.057 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / PROTECTION RPH-2 REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.047 BALIA / 765 kV / 705_LUCKNOW1-TIE / PROTECTION RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY Set 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.016 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / PROTECTION RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY Set 7/9/2017 8:41:59 AM.016 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / PROTECTION RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY Set 7/9/2017 8:41:58 AM.949 BALIA / 765 kV / 706_BUS REACT-2 / PROTECTION RPH-2 REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:56 AM.380 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION FLT DISTANCE Valid 0. KM 7/9/2017 8:41:56 AM.380 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION FLT DISTANCE Valid 0. KM 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.605 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / PROTECTION RPH- REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.605 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / PROTECTION RPH- REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.605 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / PROTECTION RPH- REFERENCE VOLTAGE FAILURE ALARM 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.551 BALIA / 765 kV / 706_BUS REACT-2 / PROTECTION RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY Set 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.551 BALIA / 765 kV / 706_BUS REACT-2 / PROTECTION RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY Set 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.551 BALIA / 765 kV / 706_BUS REACT-2 / PROTECTION RPH-2 RELAY NOT READY Set 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.101 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / INT-MANUAL-SYNC Absence of voltage Set 7/9/2017 8:41:54 AM.101 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / INT-MANUAL-SYNC Absence of reference voltage Set 7/9/2017 8:41:53 AM.092 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:53 AM.072 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.871 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA LR IMP / PROTECTION REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.871 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA LR IMP / PROTECTION REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.871 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA LR IMP / PROTECTION REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.848 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / INT-MANUAL-SYNC Presence of reference voltage Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.848 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / SYNC OUTPUT DEAD_RUN_LIVE_IN Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.848 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / SYNC OUTPUT DEAD_RUN_DEAD_IN Set 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.847 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / SYNC OUTPUT CLOSE PREMISSIVE Set 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.847 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / SYNC OUTPUT LIVE_RUN_LIVE_IN Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.847 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / INT-MANUAL-SYNC Presence of voltage Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.804 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.780 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / SYNC OUTPUT LIVE_RUN_DEAD_IN Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.780 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / SYNC OUTPUT LIVE_RUN_DEAD_IN Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.780 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / SYNC OUTPUT LIVE_RUN_DEAD_IN Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.759 BALIA / 765 kV / 710_VARANASI LIN / INT-MANUAL-SYNC Possible closing Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.683 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION OVER VOLTAGE STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.683 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION OVER VOLTAGE STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.683 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.683 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION OVER VOLTAGE STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.682 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.681 BALIA / 400 kV / MAU-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.680 BALIA / 400 kV / MAU-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.679 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT-1 REF / PROTECTION OVER FLUX HVSIDE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.679 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT-1 REF / PROTECTION OVER FLUX HVSIDE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.679 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT-1 REF / PROTECTION OVER FLUX HVSIDE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.666 BALIA / 400 kV / MAU-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION General start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.664 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT-2 REF / PROTECTION OVER FLUX HVSIDE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.664 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT-2 REF / PROTECTION OVER FLUX HVSIDE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.664 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT-2 REF / PROTECTION OVER FLUX HVSIDE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.651 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT1-67HV / PROTECTION OVER CURRENT PROTECTION STAGE-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.651 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT1-67HV / PROTECTION OVER CURRENT PROTECTION STAGE-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.651 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT1-67HV / PROTECTION OVER CURRENT PROTECTION STAGE-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.650 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.650 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.650 BALIA / 765 kV / LUCKNOW MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.644 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / BCU Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.644 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / BCU Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.644 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / BCU Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.623 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.560 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip receive channel-2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.511 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.507 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip send channel-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.507 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip send channel-2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.432 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.432 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.432 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip main bay Reset

Page 18 / 23

DSAgile Events

From 09/07/2017 07:0:00

To 09/07/2017 13:25:59

Date ORIGIN Object Name Event Message ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.432 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.432 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.432 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.429 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.428 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.428 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.428 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.428 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.428 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.428 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.387 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip send channel-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.387 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip send channel-2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.382 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSF-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION General trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.382 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSF-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.382 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSF-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.382 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSF-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.331 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.331 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.331 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.331 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.330 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-2 Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.330 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-2 Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.329 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.329 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.328 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.328 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.328 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-2MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.327 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.327 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.327 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.326 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.326 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.326 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.326 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.325 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.325 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / BCU Trip Coil-2 Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.325 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.325 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / BCU Trip Coil-2 Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.324 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.324 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.324 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.324 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.323 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.323 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.323 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.323 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.323 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.323 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.322 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.322 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.322 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.322 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.321 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.321 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.317 BALIA / 400 kV / BIHARSA-1MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.302 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.302 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.302 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.302 BALIA / 400 kV / 420-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.300 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / BCU BUSBAR M1 3ph trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.300 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / BCU BUSBAR M2 3ph trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.300 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / BCU BUSBAR M1 3ph trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.300 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / BCU BUSBAR M2 3ph trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.300 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / BCU BUSBAR M1 3ph trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.300 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / BCU BUSBAR M2 3ph trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.299 BALIA / 400 kV / 415-BSF 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.296 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.296 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.296 BALIA / 400 kV / 419-BSF 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.295 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.295 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.295 BALIA / 400 kV / 421-ICT 1 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.141 BALIA / 400 kV / MAU-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.140 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.121 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:52 AM.049 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Start autoreclosure Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.931 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION OVER VOLTAGE STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.931 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION OVER VOLTAGE STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.931 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION OVER VOLTAGE STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.866 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Prepare 3ph Trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.861 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Prepare 3ph trip main Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.796 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.790 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU General operation lockout Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.790 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU General operation lockout Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.785 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.785 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.785 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.784 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION CVT FUSE FAIL RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.784 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION CVT FUSE FAIL RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.784 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION CVT FUSE FAIL RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.783 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip send channel-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.783 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip send channel-2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.775 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.775 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.775 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip main bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.775 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.775 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.775 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip tie bay Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.725 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION General trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.725 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION R-Phase trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.725 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Y-Phase trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.725 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION B-Phase trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.724 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU SF6 gas Lockout Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.724 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU SF6 gas Lockout Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.724 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Zone-4 trip Reset

Page 19 / 23

DSAgile Events

From 09/07/2017 07:0:00

To 09/07/2017 13:25:59

Date ORIGIN Object Name Event Message ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.695 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Loss of SF6 gas Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.695 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Loss of SF6 gas Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.679 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.675 BALIA / 400 kV / 403_87T / SYSTEM MAIN CB OPERATED 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.674 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / BCU Trip Coil-2 Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP R-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP Y-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP B-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP R-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP Y-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP B-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP R-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP Y-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION TRIP B-PH RESET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.673 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / BCU Trip Coil-2 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.671 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.671 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.671 BALIA / 400 kV / 403_87T / SYSTEM TIE CB OPERATED 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.671 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.667 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Zone-5 start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.667 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Zone-5 trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.666 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Zone-4 start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.666 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.666 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Power swing start1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Power swing start10 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Power swing start2 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Power swing start3 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Power swing start4 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Power swing start5 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.665 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.664 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.664 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.664 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / BCU CB Pump over running Set 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.650 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.640 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.640 BALIA / 400 kV / 402-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.639 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.639 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.639 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.639 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.639 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.639 BALIA / 400 kV / 403-PATNA 1 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.597 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / PROTECTION DIRECT TRIP SEND CHANNEL-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.597 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / PROTECTION DIRECT TRIP SEND CHANNEL-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.597 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / PROTECTION DIRECT TRIP SEND CHANNEL-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.587 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 LR IMP / PROTECTION BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.587 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 LR IMP / PROTECTION BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.587 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 LR IMP / PROTECTION BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.586 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.586 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.586 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL EARTH FAULT START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.580 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT2-67HV / PROTECTION OVER CURRENT STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.580 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT2-67HV / PROTECTION OVER CURRENT STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.580 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT2-67HV / PROTECTION OVER CURRENT STAGE-1 START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.569 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage trip Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.566 BALIA / 765 kV / ICT-2 DIFF / SYSTEM 765KV TIE CB STATUS OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.564 BALIA / 765 kV / 708_GAYA1-TIE / CB 708-52 POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.564 BALIA / 765 kV / 708_GAYA1-TIE / CB 708-52 R PH POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.563 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / CB 707-52 POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.563 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / CB 707-52 B PH POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.563 BALIA / 765 kV / 708_GAYA1-TIE / CB 708-52 Y PH POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.563 BALIA / 765 kV / 708_GAYA1-TIE / CB 708-52 B PH POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.562 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / CB 707-52 Y PH POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.561 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / CB 707-52 R PH POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.555 BALIA / 765 kV / 707_GAYA-1 / Autorecloser AUTO RECLOSER BLOCK Set 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.555 BALIA / 765 kV / 708_GAYA1-TIE / Autorecloser AR BLOCKING SET 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.550 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-1 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Flt Distance Valid -4.5 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.535 BALIA / 765 kV / GAYA MAIN-2 / OPTOS MASTER TRIP RELAY 86B OPERATED OPERATED 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.530 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.530 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.527 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Trip Coil-2 B-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.527 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.527 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Trip Coil-2 B-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.527 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.525 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.525 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.525 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.525 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.525 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.525 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.524 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.524 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.514 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Module SPS Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.500 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.500 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.500 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.492 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-2 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Zone-5 start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.491 BALIA / 400 kV / 409-PATNA 3 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.476 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Zone-5 start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.466 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-3 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Zone-4 start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.425 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Zone-5 start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.402 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.356 BALIA / 400 kV / MAU-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Carrier channel-1 fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.293 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-2 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Zone-4 start Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.290 BALIA / 400 kV / 407_87T / SYSTEM MAIN CB OPERATED 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.284 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.284 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.272 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.272 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.271 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.271 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.267 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN

Page 20 / 23

DSAgile Events

From 09/07/2017 07:0:00

To 09/07/2017 13:25:59

Date ORIGIN Object Name Event Message ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.267 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.249 BALIA / 400 kV / 407-PATNA 2 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.246 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.246 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.242 BALIA / 400 kV / SOHAWAL-1 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Carrier received Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.237 BALIA / 400 kV / 408-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.225 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.130 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 IMP / PROTECTION REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.130 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 IMP / SYSTEM REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE TRIP START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.130 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 IMP / PROTECTION REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.130 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 IMP / SYSTEM REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE TRIP START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.130 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 IMP / PROTECTION REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE START Reset 7/9/2017 8:41:51 AM.130 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 IMP / SYSTEM REACTOR BACKUP IMPEDANCE TRIP START Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:20 AM.154 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:12 AM.878 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:12 AM.773 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:12 AM.590 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:12 AM.425 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:12 AM.419 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.695 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.671 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.640 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.607 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.583 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.551 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.520 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.496 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.463 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.439 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.407 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.383 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.352 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.319 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.295 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.263 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.232 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.208 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.184 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.151 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.119 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.088 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.064 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.031 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:08 AM.007 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.975 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.951 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.920 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.887 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.863 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.831 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.800 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.776 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.743 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.711 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.680 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.656 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.623 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.599 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.567 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.543 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.512 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.479 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.447 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.423 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.392 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.368 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.335 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.303 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.279 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.255 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.224 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.191 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.169 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1B-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.169 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1B-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.167 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.164 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1B-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.160 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1B-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.143 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.113 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 B-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.113 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 B-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.111 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.108 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 B-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.103 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 B-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.087 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.056 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.039 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.023 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.010 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:07 AM.001 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.999 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.991 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.991 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.965 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip receive channel-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.960 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.959 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.956 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.950 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.938 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.936 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.919 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.903 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.883 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.883 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.879 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.879 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Set

Page 21 / 23

DSAgile Events

From 09/07/2017 07:0:00

To 09/07/2017 13:25:59

Date ORIGIN Object Name Event Message ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.871 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.864 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.864 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.831 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.823 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.816 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.799 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.799 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.792 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.783 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Directional EF start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.783 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Overvoltage start Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.782 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.773 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.767 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.761 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Fuse fail Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.760 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-2 / PROTECTION Prepare 3ph Trip Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.755 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.755 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.755 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Prepare 3ph trip main Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.755 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.755 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.753 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.753 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.747 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.747 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.747 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.746 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.745 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.745 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.745 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.745 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.745 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.745 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.743 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.743 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. OPEN 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.742 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.741 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.734 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-1Y-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.732 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / BCU Trip Coil-1 R-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.718 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 R-phase faulty Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker R PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker B PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip receive channel-1 Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.714 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / circuit breaker Y PHASE- POSITION. CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.709 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.709 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.709 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-B trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.708 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / BCU Trip Coil-2 R-phase faulty Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.707 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip receive channel-1 Reset 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.706 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.706 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.706 BALIA / 400 kV / 413-PATNA 4 / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.706 BALIA / 400 kV / 414-TIE / TRSM 3ph Gr-A trip relay operated Set 7/9/2017 8:29:06 AM.692 BALIA / 400 kV / PATNA-4 MAIN-1 / PROTECTION Direct trip receive channel-1 Set 7/9/2017 8:16:25 AM.310 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL KO- synchrocheck 7/9/2017 8:16:25 AM.268 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 POSITION OPEN 7/9/2017 8:16:25 AM.217 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:16:22 AM.967 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:16:22 AM.935 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:14:32 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:14:32 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:14:32 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:14:32 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:14:32 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:14:32 AM.512 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:12:39 AM.685 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL KO- synchrocheck 7/9/2017 8:12:39 AM.592 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:12:35 AM.560 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:12:35 AM.529 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:12:16 AM.935 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL KO- synchrocheck 7/9/2017 8:12:16 AM.748 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:12:12 AM.748 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:12:12 AM.717 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:11:52 AM.935 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL KO- synchrocheck 7/9/2017 8:11:52 AM.826 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:11:50 AM.248 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:11:50 AM.201 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:10:08 AM.092 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL KO- synchrocheck 7/9/2017 8:10:08 AM.060 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:10:03 AM.873 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:10:03 AM.842 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:09:51 AM.013 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL KO- synchrocheck 7/9/2017 8:09:50 AM.982 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:09:48 AM.482 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:09:48 AM.451 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:09:35 AM.013 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL KO- synchrocheck 7/9/2017 8:09:34 AM.888 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:09:32 AM.951 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:09:32 AM.935 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / CB 702-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.863 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 A/R CB HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.863 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 A/R CB HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.863 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 A/R CB HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.863 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 A/R CB HEALTHY 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.849 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-2 CHARGED

Page 22 / 23

DSAgile Events

From 09/07/2017 07:0:00

To 09/07/2017 13:25:59

Date ORIGIN Object Name Event Message ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.849 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-2 CHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.849 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-2 CHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.849 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-2 CHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.842 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / RUN TIME SUPVN RUN TIME SUPVN RESET 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.842 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / RUN TIME SUPVN RUN TIME SUPVN RESET 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.842 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / RUN TIME SUPVN RUN TIME SUPVN RESET 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.842 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / RUN TIME SUPVN RUN TIME SUPVN RESET 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.839 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-1 CHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.839 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-1 CHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.839 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-1 CHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:46 AM.839 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-1 CHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:44 AM.138 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:08:44 AM.113 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:44 AM.113 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:44 AM.113 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:44 AM.113 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.153 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / RUN TIME SUPVN RUN TIME SUPVN ALARM 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.101 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-1 DISCHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.100 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.100 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 SPRING-2 DISCHARGED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.100 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 B PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.100 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 B PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.100 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 B PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.100 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 B PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.098 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.098 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.098 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.098 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.093 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 Y PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.093 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 Y PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.093 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 Y PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.093 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 Y PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 702_FUTURE1-TIE / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.089 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / BUS SELECTION BUS-2 SELECT 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.083 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 A/R CB FAULTY 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.082 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 DIFF / SYSTEM MAIN CB STATUS CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.082 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 DIFF / SYSTEM MAIN CB STATUS CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.082 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 DIFF / SYSTEM MAIN CB STATUS CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:08:43 AM.082 BALIA / 765 kV / BR-1 DIFF / SYSTEM MAIN CB STATUS CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:08:42 AM.935 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 CONTROL Exec CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:08:40 AM.529 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 CONTROL Success 7/9/2017 8:08:40 AM.467 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:08:36 AM.154 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 CONTROL KO- interlock 7/9/2017 8:08:36 AM.107 BALIA / 765 kV / 703_BUS REACT-1 / CB 703-52 CONTROL Select CLOSE 7/9/2017 8:03:33 AM.354 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 8:02:36 AM.364 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 7:42:25 AM.985 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 7:39:55 AM.270 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R R PH POSITION CLOSED 7/9/2017 7:39:55 AM.270 BALIA / 765 kV / 704R_LCKNW REACT / CB 704-52R POSITION CLOSED

Page 23 / 23

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-6

Executive Director, NR-3

POWERGRID

12, Maharana Pratap marg New,

Sikandar Bag Chauraha, Lucknow-226 001

Chief Engineer (Power System), 5th-floor

Uttar Pradesh Power transmission

Corporation Ltd., Shakti Bhawan, 14-Ashoi

Marg, Lucknow-226 001

1:711-4-7 al-z.act-f 3l114421" ct,i -a'1 12Tr •r) urn 1r(WCIE0

POWER SYSTEM OPERATION CORPORATION LIMITED (A wholly owned subsidiary company of POWERGRID)

NORTHERN REGIONAL LOAD DESPATCH CENTRE 18/A, Shaheed Jeet Singh Sansanwal Mary, Katwaria Sarai, New Delhi - 110 016

Tel: 2685 4015. 2685 3082. Tele Fax: 011- 2685 2747 e-mail: nrldcaysnl.com

CI N: U40105DL2009G01188682 e,g: 3 # J-TT 4 \ TS-11\ 317:07, 2016

bk_4: Detailed Report of Grid Event occurred at 400/220kV Balia(PG) Station

24th September 2016.

Trft-zr, Kindly refer to the tripping event at 400/220kV Balia(PG) station on 24th Sep 2016.

Preliminary report for the event was issued from NRLDC. The report for the event based on the

details received and data available at NRLDC viz. SCADA data, Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU)

data & DR details from Balia(PG) is attached herewith for your kind perusal and necessary action.

It is requested that the concerned may please be advised to undergo the in-depth micro

analysis of the tripping event and take remedial measures to avoid their recurrence.

Utilities may submit the detailed report along with remedial measures (already taken or be taken) to RLDC/RPC.

Thanking You

(Trtrd 14)-TTIFT)

3711-413

1. 4-te,•HA Trfq, icck a-fiti-zr 18v, -f-trq-T:\ 10-1 cl ceitzrr, r- 11()

2. 3fitwrtt, eplo vtar, - 110 016

3. 311:7 cru-n--Ar Titctrzi @TR ts[UT , X11X11ml, 9, 1,c311

vitzr-r, - 110 016

4. (GO&D), ttrq- itqF u 110 066

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-7

Analysis report of multiple element tripping at 400kV Balia(PG) station on 24th September 2016 at 11:25hrs

A. Event Summary:

On R-phase to earth fault, 400kV Balia-Mau line tripped in zone-1 with a fault clearing time of about 160ms. During this fault, over voltage stage 2 picked up in 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt 1 & 2 at Balia end and both the ckts tripped on O/V stage-2 protection operation. Event Category :GI-2 Load Loss :Nil Generation Loss :Nil Energy Unserved :Nil

B. Antecedent conditions (at 03:25hrs): Grid Frequency : 49.98Hz NR Demand Catered : 46042MW Net Inter Regional Export : 9356MW HVDC Rihand-Dadri Flow : 1150 MW HVDC Balia-Bhiwadi Flow: 250MW Vindhyachal BtB Flow : 250MW (West to North)

C. Connectivity Diagram:

NITIN

Typewritten Text

Annexure-7

D. Status of information receipt/available in this respect of this tripping: Information to be received from utility:

S.No. Particular Status (POWERGRID) Status (UPPTCL)

1 Preliminary Report Received after 24hrs Not Received 2 Detailed Report Not Received Not Received 3 Disturbance Record (DR) Received after 24hrs Not Received 4 Event Log (EL) Received after 24hrs Not Received 5 Relay Flag details Not Received Not Received 6 Sequence of Events (SoE) Not Received Not Received

Others:

S.No. Particular Remarks

1 SCADA SoE Balia, Mau and Biharshariff tripping not captured in NRLDC SCADA system.

2 SCADA analog data Lines tripped at 11:50:30hrs. Apart from above, Phasor Measurement Unit(PMU) data, DR details, SCADA data available at NRLDC also used in the analysis. (Attached as Annexure-1)

E. Restoration:

• Nf : is the number of failures to operate during power system faults (As per SoP(Standards of Performance of inter-State transmission Licensees)-Regulation 2012)

• Nu: is the number of unwanted operations (As per SoPR-2012) • Nc: is the number of correct operations (As per SoPR-2012)

F. Event Analysis:

Voltage dip of ~185kV at 11:50:25.480hrs is seen in PMU of Balia and fault clearance

time is 160ms. R-phase to earth fault occurred in 400kV Balia-Mau line at 11:50:25.513hrs. It is

supported by PMU data and DR received from Balia end. At 11:50:25.516hrs over voltage stage-2 picked up in 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt 1 & 2

and both the lines tripped at 11:50:25.617hrs within 100ms.

S.NO. Name of element Category Date & time of normalization

1. 400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 Nf (Three phase tripping on single phase to earth fault) 24.09.2016 13:19

2. 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 Nu 24.09.2016 12:47

3. 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-2 Nu 24.09.2016 12:29

Rise in the voltage observed in DR details of 400kV Balia-Bihashariif ckt-1 and 2 however in PMU details bus voltage increased upto 1.15pu.

400kV Balia-Mau line tripped in zone-1 at 11:50:25.617hrs. All three phase of main CB of 400kV Balia-Mau line (Balia end) tripped after 140ms of

occurrence of fault. R-phase tie CB also tripped and reclosed after 1000ms. Line current in all three phase of 400kV Balia-Mau line became zero hence all three

phase of the line tripped from 400kV Mau end. As tie CB of other than faulty phase at Balia end connected.

Such high voltage only in 400kV Balia-Biharshariff DC may be due to floating neutral/ neutral shifting or multiple earthing of CVT as all the other lines from Balia didn’t observe the problem of high voltage.

G. Issues& Suggestive measures:

Protection Setting & Others: 1. Delayed clearance of fault. (As per Grid Standard fault clearance time should be 100ms

for 400kV and above voltage level). 2. Reason of three phase tripping of main CB in case of Z-1 protection trip at 400kV Balia

end of 400kV Balia-Mau line. 3. Tripping of 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckts on O/V stage-2. 4. Neutral shifting & multiple earthing of CVT may be checked for 400kV Balia-Biharshariff

DC. 5. Over voltage protection setting for lines is attached as Annexure-1. The usual practice

followed for over-voltage setting at 400kV is 140/150% with 100msec delay. Voltage measurement should be phase to phase instead of phase to earth as per Ramakrishna committee recommendations. Extract of recommendations is also attached as Annex-1.

6. Reason of non-auto reclosing of 400kV Balia-Mau line from Mau end needs to be looked into.

7. In DR overvoltage picked up in B-phase whereas overvoltage observed in Y-phase from PMU. Check wiring of phases in DR.

8. Reason for non-availability of SCADA SoE data of Balia, Mau and Biharshariff stations. 9. Detailed report of the event is to be provided.

Suggestive Measures: 1. Three phase tripping of main CB in case of Z-1 protection trip at 400kV Balia end of

400kV Balia-Mau line to be checked and corrected. (Action: POWERGRID, UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

2. Neutral shifting and multiple earthing of CVT for 400kV Balia-Biharshariif DC to be checked and corrected. (Action: POWERGRID, UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

3. Voltage Measurement for over voltage protection setting should be phase to phase instead of phase to earth. (General Recommendation; Action: POWERGRID, UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

4. Non-auto reclosing of 400kV Balia-Mau line from Mau end needs to be checked and corrected. (Action: UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

5. Availability of digital data of Balia, Mau end needs to be ensured. (Action: POWERGRID, UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

6. Detailed report of the event is to be provided. (Action: POWERGRID, UPPTCL; Time Frame: 7days)

H. Violation of Regulations:

CEA Grid Standard 3.1.e CEA Transmission Planning Criteria CEA Technical standards for construction of electric plants and electric lines –Clause

43(4) (c). CEA Technical Standard for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines: 43.4.A. CEA (Technical standards for connectivity to the Grid) Regulation, 2007:

Schedule Part 1. (6.1, 6.2, 6.3) Indian Electricity Grid Code 5.2(r), 5.9.6.c (VI). CEA Grid Standard 15.3.

Annexure-1

Graphical plots:

Fig. PMU plot of voltage at Karcham

Fig. PMU plot of Frequency and df/dt

Annexure-1

Fig. SCADA data plot of tripped lines

SCADA SoE: Tripping not captured in NR SoE. Over-voltage setting:

The overvoltage setting of the lines as available at NRLDC is as below:

Circuit End-1 End-2 % Over voltage Time(sec) % Over voltage Time(sec)

400kV Balia-Mau ckt-1 150 0.1 150 0.1 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1 150 0.1 - - 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-2 150 0.1 - -

Annexure-1

Fig. DR of 400kV Balia-Mau line


Annexure-1


Fig. DR of 400kV Balia-Biharshariff ckt-1

Annexure-1



Annexure-1


Adani PL. (i) Sh. Nirmal Sharma, VP (O&M), Fax- 0141-2292065 OCC List of members

(ii) Sh. Sameer Ganju, Head-Northern Region, Fax No. 011-24115560 APCPL (i) AGM (O&M)-I, IGSTPP, Fax No. 01251-266326 (ii) AGM (EEMG), 01251-266326 BBMB (i) Director (PR) Fax- 0172-2652820 (ii) Power Controller, Fax- 0172-2653297. HVPNL Chief Engineer (Comm.); SE (SO & SLDC): 0181-2664440 Fax-0172-2560622 NHPC (i) Sh. Janardan Choudhary, E.D., Faridabad – Fax-0129-2272413 (ii) Sh.V.K.SINHA, Chief Engineer (O&M), Faridabad – Fax-0129-2272413 POWERGRID (i) Sh. Prabhakar singh, ED (NR-I), Fax No. 011-26853488 (ii) Sh. A.K. Arora, General Manager (O&M), NR-I, (iii) Sh. R.V.S Kushwaha, General Manager (O&M), Jammu; Fax- 0191-2471187 (iv) Sh.Rajeev Sudan Dy, General Manager (OS), Fax- 0191-2471187 RRVUNL Sh. P.S Arya, Chief Engineer (PPMC & IT), ) Fax- 0141-2740006 NTPC (i) Head of OS/ Head of RCC, Fax No. 0120-2410082 (ii) Sh. Praveen Chaturvedi, GM (OS), NRHQ Lucknow; Fax-0522-2305849. HPSEBL (i) Sh Suneel Grover, Chief Engineer (SO &P), Fax No. 0177-2653656 (ii) Sh. Deepak Uppal, SE (PR& ALDC): Fax-0177-2837143 (iii) Sh. Joginder Singh. Power Controller, Fax No. 0177-2837143. NRLDC General Manager - 26854861, 4051, 26569504 Fax- 26852747 NLDC General Manager, NLDC, Fax: 011-26853488/26601079 Lanco APTL Sh. Raj Kumar Roy, Director, Fax: 0124-2341627/4741024 SJVNL/NJHPS General Manager (C&SO), Fax- 0177-2673283 PTCUL/UPCL (i) Sh. Anupam Sharma, SE (SLDC), Fax- 0135-2451160, 0135-2763570 UPPTCL (i) Director (Op), Fax- 0522-2286476 (ii) Chief Engineer (SLDC), Fax- 0522-2287880, 2288736 HPLDS (i) Sh. N.P.sharma, SE, SLDC, Fax: 0177-2837649 (ii) Sh. Lokesh Thakur, Executive engineer, Fax: 0177-2837649 DTL General Manager (SLDC)/ General Manager (Protection) Fax-23236462, 23221069 THDCIL Sh. U.C Kannaujia, AGM (EMD), Tehri, Fax- 0135-2438682 PSTCL (i) Sh. S.S.Mal, Chief Engineer (SLDC) Fax – 0175-2365340 (ii) Dy.Chief Engineer (SLDC) Fax – 0175-2365340 CHANDIGARH Sh. M.P.Singh, SE (Elect. Op.Circle) – Fax-0172-2740505 IPGCL/PPCL (i) Sh. Y.P.Arora,GM (T), IPGCL, New Delhi, Fax- 23370884 (ii) Sh. R.K.Yadav, DGM (T), IPGCL, New Delhi, Fax- 23370884 BRPL Sh. Satinder Sondhi, VP & Head System Operations, Fax No. 011-39996549 Everest PPL Sh. Yogendra Kumar, Chief Operating Officer, Fax No. 011-45823862/ 43852507 RPSCL Sh. Niranjan Jena, Addl.VP/ Sh. Suvendu Dey, Asst. VP-O&M, Fax: 05842-300003 HPGCL Sh. S.K. Wadhwa SE/Technical(HQ), Fax: 0172-5022436

Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd. Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd.

HPPTCL Director (Planning & Contracts), Fax: 0177-2626284 J&K (PDD) Chief Engineer (Survey & Commercial) Fax-0191-2476213 J&K SPDCL GM, Fax: 0194-2500145 PSPCL Engineer-in- Chief (PPRR), Fax- 0175-2308698. RRVPNL Chief Engineer (LD); SE (SO&LD) – Fax- 0141-2740920 UPRVUNL DGM (TOM), 0522-2287861 UJVNL General Manager Engineering: 0135-2761485, fax- 0135-2761549 CEA Director, (GM-I), Fax- 26170385, 26108834 Chief Engineer, NPC NPCIL (i) Station Director, NAPS; Fax. 05734-222177.(ii) Sr. Manager (Transmission), NPCILFax.-

022-25563350 JPPVL Sh. Suresh Chandra, Director, Fax- 0120-4516201/4609464/4609496 Jhajjar PL Sh. Goutam Biswas, GM (Production), 01251-270155. Talwandi sabbo limited

Documents

Operation Coordination Sub-Committee (OCC) meeting of