. _ - _ . . . _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . ...

.

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UNITf.D STATES

NUC12AR REGUIATVRY COMMISSION

VASHT)4710N, D.C. 20555

Solicitation No. RS-NRR-89-026

Nuclear Power Reactor DesignInspection Services

PAkT 111: Technical and Manaperant Proposal.

|nisr3'.isn in lhit !000!d WJS dOIt!'dir, me:J:ste cab he it:edom et Information

AECL Ref. 89-025 ;'01, M W.;'!iOD$ - - - - - - -4 1989 June[0;A. 8 A_./ fd._ ---.

s

*T2' 9101220505 900920ume PDR FOIA

LOFY90-196 PDR

k|. . - . . . . . _

- - - - _ _____ ____ _

-

p ergc ? 4515 %rE::: TECHNOLOGIES o,w dict g.

.I EGs W>o xv UG. iUm om;oOcis~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~T txoca an or. svee wr

,

Axhu Ac ats3

rol (301) ?.s9 |tXt$Te es Lugfu <x u ?tweIM$a AECL

Ref: 89-025I=

1989 June 15Ms. Teresa McLearenUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRoom 10117920 Norfolk AvenueBethesda, MD 20814

i U.S.A.

Dear Ms. McLearen:

Re: Solicitation No. RS-NRR-89-026Nuclear Power Reactor Design Inspection Services (

AECL Technologies is pleased to submit this proposal to provide nud tr powerreactor design inspection services.

I As requested in the RFP, we are submitting the following in three separateand distinct parts:

g 1) two (2) original signed copies of the Solt-1.tation package;3 2) one (1) original and five copies of the C ' proposal; and

3) one (1) original and five copies of the Technical and ManagementProposal.

.I We believe that our proposal is fully responsive to the intent of therequest for proposal (kFP). The management and experience embodied in theproposed project team provide:

A team well qualified to handle the tasks set out in the RFP..

The ability to mobilize resources rapidly to complete the tasks toI required schedule and budget..

Flexibility to address new tasks as NRC's priorities may change in.

the future.

I Furthermore, ve are able to of fer these extensive skills and capabilitiesclear of any conflict of interest.

Should you have any questions, or wish to have any supplementary data tof acilitate evaluation, please do not hesitate to contact this of fice or ourMr. R.D. Gadsby, Deputy Director at 1-800-USA-AECL.

Yours truly,

' h.b h|$fD.R. Shif ettVice-President & Ganeral Manager

I. DRS/tm AECL-Technologies

wawatm o c

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|

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- . . _ , _ . . . _. . _ .

.. .

fREF: RS-NRR-89-026

TABLE OF C0h"IIh7S

PAGE

1. IbTRODUCTION

I 2. STATEMEh7 Of VORK

|

3. VHY AECL IS QUALITIED

_a 4. PROPOSED hETHOD OF APPROACH

g5. SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE

6. KEY PERSONNEL

.

7. RESUMES OF KEY PERSONNEL-

8. r>9UPCE OF PERSONNEL

9. MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUC'R,7E

10 ,- MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SUPPORT

11. OTHER VORK COMMI1MENTS

- APPE! ICES

APPENDIX A RESUMES OF PROPOSED STAFF

APPENDIX B AECL'S EXAMPLES Of ADDRESSING SIMILAR TASKS

I:I

IAn

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.,

1-.

PART III

i

*

1. IhTRODUCTIO!!

!

Ja accordance with ins *. ructions given in section L of the NRC

Request for Proposal (RTP) No. RS-NRR-89-026 entitled Nuclear %. ' y .fPowcr Reactor Design Inupection Services dated 1989 May 22, t N*,

,

proposal f rce AECL Technologies, a Division of AECLThd knovn-henceforth as AECL), is being submitted in three (3) distinct 2dseparate parts. Re part herein is Part til - Technical andManagement proposal.

AECL Technologies operates as a corporation under the laws of the

State of Delaware. It can draw on i.he staf f resources of over4,500 ki thly trained people.

2. STATEMENT OF WORK

The objective of this proposal is to provide expert technicalassistance in the fields of electrical power systems, instrumenta-tion and controls, mechanical systems, mechanical components,

civil and structuring engineering to the NRC inspection teams in

the-performance of design inspections. The design inspections,vill be carried out to assume that the design procedures used inconstructing or modifying the operational nuclear plants havefully ceeplied with the NRC regulatory requirements and licensee ,

commi tme nt s ,

ne de=ign inspections vill provide a close eumination of thedesiga process and implementation for a selected, limited sampleof the structures, systems and components. 'Ite selection of thesamples vill be arrived at in consultation with the NRC team. For

the plants under construction the review vill normally include the|

III'Is u n ie.

UT.%._

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.J ''-

Ic cepl e t e de s i gn pr c< e s s , i . e . free the formulation of principalarchitectural and engineering design criteria, through thedevelopment and translation of the criteria into the revisions andverifications of the design.

For operating plants, the design inspection vill address thedesign aspe:ts of the plant saf ety system functionality, including

a$ the review of the af'ects of the incorporated or proposed

modifications.

IAs part of these inspections the lessons learnt will be docum ntedin the final inspection reports.

It is noted that the e f f orts required in each of the disciplinesfor the annual design inspection or the overview of applicantc

design assurance is very similar to the ef forts carried out byAECL f or their CANDV Reactors that are either presently operating

or are in the construction phases, Similar jobs / tasks have been

carried for a number of our utilities. It is noted that our power

plants are designed to meet the ASKE, Canadian StandardsAssociation (CSA), Ministry of Consumer t.nd Consumer Relations

(MCCR) and the Atocic Energy Control Board (AECB) requirements,itence, our staf f are fully familiar with the requirements forDesign Inspections and/or reviews for the systems, structure andcomponents for the operating and under construction,

It is also noted that our reviews and inspections in examining a

system, structure, cceponent or operational program at operatingplants for our custcoers have also included, but not limited tothe following topics:

Validity of design inputs and assumptions-

- Validity of design specif! ationsValidity of analyses-

Identification of system interf aces requirements-

III.2

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-,

Potential synergistic effects or changes-

Proper component classification-

Revision control-

Documentation control-

Verification of as-built condition-

Testing and functionality of design product-

Past audit findings-

Knovn and suspected deficiencies and their solutions.-

As mentioned earlier, these types of tasks have been carried out

by our staf f on a regular routine basis for a number of theutilities and other customers. It is noted that the standards andjurisdictional codes used are the same as those for the USReactor. Appendix B includes a list of the typical tasks for twoseparate jobs. Also, included in this Appendix is a sample

report.

The purpose o. ,tachment is to give a sample of the kind of'-

work undertaken by some of out staff offered in this proposal.

Typically, when the task order statement has been issued by NRC,the review / inspection specialists will perform the followingactivities:

'

(a) Reviewing background information.

(b) Selecting the plant aspects to be reviewed during theinspection.4

'

1

(c) Reviewing implementation ef fectiveness of design qualityassurance and quality control programs.

(d) Performing and documenting design inspection. l

i

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IIII.3 j

49/94/19

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_---- -

1

.

, . . . .. ..

_ _ _ _ _ .

.

. .

(e) Reviewing the final report of applicant / licensee self-initiated _ design verification programs for accuracy,completeness, and acceptability.

(f) Reviewing applicant / licensee responses to the designinspections and review findings and concerns, and providingwritten evaluations of the responses.

(g) Reviewing any additional information (not covered above), toevaluate the design / design process of the subject facilityand/or to close out design inspection and review findings and

concerns.

(h) Providing expert testimony on problems, issues, andallegations at public hearings vi Hh result from design.inspections and reviews, as necessary.

(i) Documenting the results of design inspections and reviews andother assignments f rom the Project Officer, in reports to theh7C which are on sof tware compatible with the IBM PC.

(j) Providing an internal quality assurance program tv ensure

contractor tasks are cionducted in an efficient andsatisfactory manner.

III.4

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|

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-_- - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .

- - - -- - --_-- __ ______________

{.t

.

/3. Wf AECL IS QUALIFIED

)

1. The effort required in each of the disciplines for the annual ;,

design inspections of the overview of applicant design assurance'

is very similar to the efforts carried out by AECL for their CANDUReactors that are eithe. presently operating or are in theconstruction phases. Our power plants are designed to meet theASKE, Canadian Standards Association (CSA), Mi.nistry of Consumerand Commercial Relations (MCCR) and the Atoc'.c Energy Control

Board ( AECB) requirements. Hence, our staff are fully familiar-

with the requirements for Design Inspections and/or reviews forthe systems, structure and components for the operating and under-

construction plants. These reviews typically focus on the,

following aspects at various stages of the reviews:

Validity of design inputs and assumptions ,-

fValidity of design specifications-

Validity of analyses-

Identification of system interfaces requirements-

Fotential synergistic effects of changes -

-

Proper cocponent classification-

Revision control-

Documentation control-

Verification of as-built condition-

Testing and functionality of design product-

Past audit findings-

Known and suspected deficiencies and their solutions.-

1

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5. SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE

,

AF,CL has excellent human and technical resources at its disposal..

- - - - - - . - - - - .

_'~ ___

_ft erploys app.rox. imately,5.u 00 staf f..in two main operating0,.. -- - - . - -- . _,

divisions - CANDU Operations, (AECL-CO) and Research Company. As

a result it can draw on these resources as and when required.

Members of our staf f are very active in various nuclear andquality assurance standards activities at national andinternational levels.

AECL-C0 maintains membership and participates actively in a largenumber of technical, professional and nuclear industryorganizations. Some of these are:

American Nuclear Society-

Atomic Industrial Forum-

Institute for Nuclear Power Operation-

International Atomic Energy Agency-

American Society of Mechanical Engineers.-

AECL-C0 maintains well staf fed and equipped engineering

laboratories. These f acilities cover testing and development

services, specialized tooling engineering, instrumentationservices.

AECL can offer these extensive skills and capabilities clear of

any conflict of interest.

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_EY PERS0hNEL,-

K' 6.

The following specialists have been identified as the key_

personnel:

11. - Mechanical Systes

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I2. Mechanical Components

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7. FESUMi.S OT KEY PERSONhTL

The resue6s of the key personnel identified in section 6 of thisdocucent are in the attached Appendix A.

1

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LIST OF TASKS: JOB 2

The overall objective of the evaluation are to: - -

Confirm the appropriateness and completeness of the design-

criteria established for the nucle:r island design.

Confirm that the design of the nuclear island compiles with the-

design criteria established.

Confirm that the safety analysis is both adequate and complete.-

'

Confirm that the reactor is stable and will operate as designed,-

Identify what additional engineering analysis and/or design 1-

modifications are essential to meet the above objectives takingdue account of the construction status of the actual plant.

To accomplish the above objectives, the contract was divided intothree phases, namely:

i

Phase 1: Review of Reference Codes, . Regulations and DesignCriteria

Phase 2: System and event Functional Analyses.

-Phase.3: Additional Special Topics.

A stuumary of the recc<.nendations and conclusions from all of the

Products is included as Product 09040 (Recocunendations Summary).

,' 'This Product Report is one of a series of reports prepared on the,

), topics as-Indicated below in Phases 1, 2 and 3. Products marked with anONU

-OB-3

,8.:u=n, -muummas~ - _ _- - - - -

---- - ~

- -- - -.

.

'

.

asterisk (*) have microfiche copies of relevant computer data packagesseparately.

I PRODUCT TITLE

Phase'l: 09011 Review of Principles, Criteria and SafetyMethodology.

I 09012 Review of Nuclear Codes and Standards.

IPhase 2: 09021 Design Basis Event Review.

09022 Event Sequence Review.;

09023 Preliminary Transient / Accident Analysis Validation.

09024* Tr ansient/ Accident Independent Analysis.

09025 Process Systems Review.

09026 16C Systems Review. +

! 11| 0902, Review of Reactor Core Systems and Fuel.|

| Phase 3:- 09031* Single Channel Event Analysis.

I'

09032 Extension to 09022 Event Sequence Review - Phase 3.

09033* Shutdown System Trip Coverage Assessment.

g 0,03s. S t.m., S1.1 at ions .

0903,. Dr,oe e m ahi m , Assessme e .ye903,. Ream ivit, 1nsem ions ane ,o.er E _ sions.,

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fSome tasks and the topics addressed in this report are as

follows: I

*t

TASK d IN THE GENERAL TASK

A1TACHMENT

331001 Validity of design inputs and assumptions

331025 Validity of design specifications

331009 Validity of analyses ,

331006 Proper cceponent classification

331067 Revision control

331075 Documentation control

331067 Verification of as-built condition331068 Testing and functionality of design product

331058 past audit findings

331037 Known and suspected deficiencies

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8, SOURCE OF PERS0hWEL

It is envisaged that all staf f would be sourced from AECL and its'

various divisions. The key personnel have been identified insection 6.

,

AECL may substitute a person with equally appropriatequalification should a candidate become unavailable due tosickness, job termination, work load, etc.'

.,

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9. MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUC%E

The project team will be assisted in the rinagement function byvarious support groups, including planning and scheduling, projectcost control, administrative services. Figure 9-1 shows the

overall organization at AECL CANDU Operations.

I The work will be executed through our Engineering Services Branch.J.S. panesar will act as the NRC job Co-ordinator. lie will reviewthe tasks and select the appropriate persortnel for the specified

resource pool as shown in Figure 9-2.

III3

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_

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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.

CANDU -- AECL

OPERATIONS TICHHQIiGIES

QUALITYBUSINESS PLANNDG ASSURA}KJE

PROJECT CONTROL

MARKETING

DEVELOPMERrPROJELTS

'BUSINESS F1JNCTIONAL

UNITS UNITS

PROJECTS TECHNICAL - SUPPLY

.

ENGINEERING FDLGCE

SERVICES

,

SERVICES

FIGURE 9-1

AECL - CANDU OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION

III.13

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_ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - - _ - - - _ _ _ - _

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__

INRC JOB

CO-ORDIsATOR

:I-

IMECRANICAL ECItANICAL CIVIL STRUCWRAL ELECTRICAL ILC

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I:

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'

. . _ _ . . . _ . . . . .

. . . _

10. MANAGEMDir, SYSHM SUPPORT

10.1 General: _ Project Cos_t Control and Monitoring System

The following systems exist for cost control, depending on thesize of the tasks:

The cornerstone of Project Cost Control is the Vork BreakdownStructure (VBS) which defines a contractual package of work intoPRODUCTS (i.e. separate Client task orders) and TASKS.

Each product has:

~ a numerical identifier based on the Subject Index (SI)~

a title, generally similar to the SI title-

a' scope of work-

a list of deliverables-

a schedule-

a budget (related to the schedule and to the deliverables)-

a record of accumulated expenditures.-

Vhereas the " PRODUCT" is a package of vork, a M is a finiteactivity or chain of activities leading up to the production of a

DELIVERABLE. For each one of the technical evaluations to be

performed the Product will be broken devn into a number of

TASKS / DELIVERABLES.

10.2 Project Management and Implementation Plan

10.2.1 Management Controls

In a continuing effort to ensure that all major and minor projectsundertaken by AECL are executed with the appropriate resources, onschedule and within budget, senior management conducts Operation |

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Review Meetings regularly. Through this information/feedback / control . mechanism, the Project Team vill have access to

top management participation in the project, In emergency

situations, hovever,- the Project Manager is at liberty to consultvith individual senior executives on specific issues and obtaini guidance and/or resolution of conflicts that could arise in the

course of project execution.

10.2.2 AECL Plan

:

(a) The overriding objective of the Project Implementation-Planis to ensure that Task Orders are executed and performed tohigh standards, within predetermined time frames, and within

= budget.

The Project Management and' Implementation Plan describes the

structure and functions of the Project Team and the methods,

systems and controls that will be used to successtully manage-and execute the Task Orders.

The concepts presented are proven and developed, They have

been used successfully on numerous previous AECL C0

- projects.

(b) On Notice of Award (NOA)

On receiving the NOA, the AECL-C0 Project Manager will

prepare a Project Plan which will define how the project isto be managed, controlled and administered.' The Project Planvill include: scope; schedule; budgets; deliverables;project objee.tives'and goals; project organization structure

.

and resource plan; project policies and procedures;I- contractual terms and conditions; financial plan; QA plan;

engineering plan and client interface requirements.

111.16 .

n 9e.

06/49

- . - - - - .- -. . - - . . . .- -- - -.

',

The Project-Team members vill be assembled and the basic=

. _ project administration systems established..

(c) On Receipt of a Task Order RTP (TOR) I

On receipt of a Task Order Request for Proposal (TOR) from j

the Client Contracting Officer, AECL will respond.,

-(d) On Receipt of Task Order Award (TOA),

Actual initiation of project activities vill be triggered bythe receipt of a Task Order award from the ContractingOfficer. The major engineering implementation steps are as-follows:

'-

(i)- The Project Manager vill reviev the scope-and intent ofthe Task Order, and draw the appropriate manpower

-

'-

resources from the functional disciplines,o

(-11) The Task-Orders vill be; subdivided into products. Each '!

product vill cover- a typical area as described in thea

RTP e.g. planning and scheduling, Quality Assurance',|- g etc. :It 'is expected that each product vill necessitate ;

[ . a multi-disciplinary partic.ipation-. . -

3:

(iii) Each product vill be assigned a-leader to be attached to 4

-the Project Manager's team. The leadership of the|-

product vill- be assigned to an individual whose

discipline is:a large contributorLto the-product. The.

Product Leader vill' provide technical riendership.-- as- well;.

as' budget control and. schedule monitoring to ensure"the-a. quality and timely completion of the Task Order-

p deliverables. The Product 14ader vill seek and-receive,-

. t

III.17||TO

49/96/19

'hg[ 7 k NtE M EEAN NM

.-- .-, , , - ___ __ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ , . .. _ . . . . _ _ ~ . .

- - - . . = - - - - - -

A

as necessary, technical assistance f rom the appropriate i.

Tunctional Engineering Managers in order to assure a

quality execution of the work.

(iv) Each product vill consist of one or several tasks.

addressing the specific topics representing specificissues, e.g. Performance objective, development of

I generic cost factors, replacement power cost analysis,etc. If the product has one task, the Product Leadermay assume the task leadership as well. For a multi-task product, separate task leaders shall be chosen.Project engineers, nuclear physicists, etc. with theappropriate skills vill be part of each task reportingto the Task Leader.

I--(v) Depending on the nature of the Task Order, i.e. its

_g'

5 scope, budget allocation, schedule requirement, the TaskLeader and the Task team member vill be either attached

- to the Project Manager's team or cperating f rom theirhome base in the varicus functional areas. In eithercase the Task team will still operate in a matrix

~ organization.

I! (vi) The Task Leader will receive technical and projectd''''''""*'h'"'""'''*''''' *"'"'' 'h'' 'h*

5-5 work proceeds on a course satisf actory to the

requirement of Client and its' Project Officer.

-(vii) The final report vill receive approval from both theappropriate Functional Manager and the Product Leaderafter review by the Task Leader.

il, .

III.18unsa ,/06/49

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. . . _ . , -

(e) .Vork Package System

The concept of the AECL Vork Package System is to break the

work dovn into a number of definable and manageablepackages.

For this project, a Task Order will be called a Product and

each Product may be assigned to a Vork Package comprising a

number of Products depending on the size, complexity,duration, etc.

The scope of each Product (Task Order) will be specified tothe respective- Product Leader by the Engineering Manager.The specification will include the following:

(i) The . intent of the Task Order,(ii) Defined Scope of Vork,

(iii) Agreed budget and charge numbers,

(iv) Input documentation and output deliverables,(v) Responsibilities between groups or individuals.

,

Following receipt.of the initial Product, the Product Leader' - will , . at a point in tioe consistent with the work schedule

. elaborate the scope of the product, subdivide the workI content of his Product into Tasks with an estimate (per task)-'

of the r.anpower and other costs required to carry out thework indicated,+

f

.

In setting tp these Tasks, the Product Leader vill observe*

'the following guideltnes:

4

i. (1) Tasks should generally be associated with a deliverable! (usually a report of its equivalent) having a clearlyi

defined end date..,-l

a

III.19

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N db E N N d N [ [ N N E E N$b s 3 !d b b b ! b Lh I

. ... _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~ ,

i

(ii) A separate budget and tire schedule defined by theProduct Leader should be allocated with each Task.

I (iii) To f acilitate monitoring, each Task should have only onedeliverable.I

(iv) To f acilitate monitoring, only one group should be

I involved in any one task if practic.able.

(v) The task definition should include a description of

interfaces vitu other Products, type of interf ace,

information expected or to be transferred, etc.

(vi) The task breakdown vill facilitate the use of resourceskills available and selected to participate in the work

of the Product.

The Product Leader vill be responsible to the Project Managerfor the successful completion of the Product (Task Order)within the agreec oudget and schedule.

~

I t

(f) Project Progress Reporting

A monthly progress report vill be prepared and issued to theClient, in accordance with the Client requirements. The reportI vill include: schedule status, financial status, accomplishments,results, problem areas and planned corrective action. The reportvill be issued by the Project Manager.

10.3 Elements of the Accounting System_

Elements of the accounting system used for Project Cost Controli used within AECL are as follovs:

R

111.20g ,,,R O ?. ,

- - - . . .- _ - . - - - . - _ . ... 1

- - - _ _ _ _ ___ - -__ - __ - - -____ - - - - - _ _ _ _ - - - _ -

, -- - - - _ _ - . - _ __ _

r

.

.'

'' .

(a) Master Code File (MCF)

i nis system contains the Company's accounting structure and" dictionary" files. The other systems drav data from HCF asand when required.

(b) Time Capture System (TICS)

>

All time sheet data is entered into TICS for editing,

correction and distribution. It feeds data, as required, toE

VPRS and PLRS._

(c) Vork Package Reporting System (VPRS)

L

his system carries all project :canhour budgets and,

- expenditures to date (by Professional, Technical, Draf ting,

_

Administration), and generates costed manhours for billing

purposes. Manhours are recorded at the V/P, Product (Job),

and Task 1cvel.

(d) Project Ledger System (PLRS)r-t

This system contains all fiscal $ budget and expenditure- data. Manbcurs are also included at a summary level for '

inforzation purposes.

(e) General Ledger System (GL)__

This system contains all AECL financial transactions in_

support of the company's incomo statements and balat.ce

sheet..

K

Further information is provided in the following sections.

__

III.21

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. - - - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

. . ..- -- . ,

- |- , ,

f__ 10.4 Master Code File System (MCPS)

HCFS maintains AECL-CO's cccoonly used data lists and " dictionary"

files. We system separates the file maintenance function from

-

the processing and reporting f unctions performed by other systems.

5: Typical files are as follovs:

(a) Organization Analysis Table, f r . luding etaployee numbers ,Branch Account numbers, project T sers, W/P numbers, SCA

numbers etc. , and their associated names or titles. Also

included are the necessary roll-up tables.

(b) V/P "Validest" file containing all V/P, Job. Task data.

- (c) GL/PL validation file'cor.taining the account structures.

'

(d) TICS parameter file containing veek ending dates, statutory___

holidays, etc.

I(e) Other miscellaneous security files and table f.iles.

:

10.5 -Time Capture System (TICS).

I TICS handles the input, edit, and correction of manhour data, and

7 ,the feed of. this data to other systems. Specific-functions are as

_

' follows:1

Receive time sheet input data-.

Geoerate time sheet data for those on "autmatic" time-

a

sheets

Generate missing time sheet "eports''

-

Edit time sheet input date.-

Generate time sheet error reports receive and edit tiec sheet-

Correction data

111.22

' B/94/49-L'T*' ,

.I

-- - _ - - _ _ _ _ - . - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

8

4'

Provide corrected manhour transactions to hTRS and any other-

setem which requires transaction dataPrcduct audit trail reports-

In future, generate "tutn-around" tis heets-

Some nf those functions, such as error corr . Oton, can also bedone co-line. In addition on-line enquiry 4. provided to that

good time sheet file-

error file-

validest file-

adjustment file-

10.6 Wrk Packageleporting Sysym (kTkS)h

WRS stores and reports on actual manhour expenditures vs budgets,i :.t the VP level and at various roll-up 1cvels.- Specific functions, aretj

receive actual weekly manhour data from T!CS-

. receive manhour budgets from MCFS-

generate weekly reports of actual exp nditures-

generate monthly V/P reperts of current month actuals,-

cus-to-date actuals, budgets, and % spent (data sorted by|

Job / Task)

generate rimilar reports succed up to the Branch, Dept.,-

Division, and Company level, with each level containingsuenary data from the next lover level report.apply labour rates against manhour expenditures to produce-

mont.bly cost to labour data for PL & GL) generate Statement billing reports-

generate SCA reports for manhour and billing purposes-

produce leave and overtime reports-

,

111.23U!.'O,q suw

"K { R E H61?d S E E 2 n lifEd @ 2 N Ml M E R E N A M IIN E i33,

__ -

.

IProject Led er Systemp12SJ10.7 t

- This system collects all expenditure data, by bud,et category andt

reports against budgets on a fiscal year basis. It perforns the

following iunctions:

and costed eenhours free VPRSreceives total 0 '

I-

receives expense tion data from the expense edit- .

subroutine connected to the General Ledget System

generates monthly transaction reports-

generates monthly V/P reports, sorted by budget category-

generates monthly /tranch reports, scrted by project, by-

budget category

generates monthly SCA reports-

The project ledger system contains the f ollowing da*.a fields:

Project-

I Vork Package-

Seope Change Application (SCA)-

Budget Category-

Branch # (Budget .Let d)-

Current tionth and year to-date data for total hours,-

er.penditures, control budget, authorired budgetFiscal year data for control budgets and authorized budgets-

II

I,

I,

-

i g g $ 8g~

, , = ,

i

i

\ :

.

10.8 Prpgress F<por t Tor tra t!

< Tinancist and technical assessment progress for each project taskwill be rcported to the Client each nonth by neans of three

'

standard reporting f orzat s :4

(1. Financial Sures ty

2. Month'.y Progress Report,

[i 3. Technical Assessment

ns

f 10.8.1 Financisi Su.m ary

u

The Financirl Sumary presents the totsi spends by labourcategory, billing rate, expnses, f ee and tot als f or individual'

project tasks. The contract / budget dollar amount of the task is'

{ also displayed on this report.

10.8.2 Mont_hly P r ojr e s s Re pp_r t;

,

a8

The Monthly Progress Feport disp'ays the sumeary listing of totalspends for labour, rates, extenses, fee and totals for all

jproducts (project tasks) vorked on for the overall contract (s)awarded by the Client.

I

10.8.3 Technical Assessment

baf; The Technical Assessment provides the summary provides the current

(i month spends of labour, expenses and fee for individual prcducts.p[

Also provided on this form is the narrative of technical progress- and forecast of work plant.ed f or the succeeding ncnth,

fu5

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.

II. OTHER _y0FK CONMITMENTS AND LXTERIENCE

11.1 Other Vork Cc.enitments

AECL has the resources and the flexibility to hacdle apigreents1 as de fined in this RFP. As :4ntioned earlier, AECL can drav su a staff of

almost 5,000 through its various divisions. Therefore, NRC requirezints canbe eet without adversely af fecting other ccernitments.

11.2 ,E xpe r i e nc e

Please find attached in Ap;>endix B a summary of AECL verkexperience in addressing similar tasks,

I

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l.157 0F TASKS: JN! 2

The overall objective of the evaluation are to:

Confirm the appropriateness and completeness of the design-

criteria established for the nuclear island design.

Confirm that the design of the nuclear island complies with thr,-

design criteria established.>

Y

Confirm that the safety analysis is both adequate and ccmp!ste.-

Confirm that the reactor is stable and vill operate as designed.-

.

Identify what additional engineering analysis and/or design-

snodifications are essential to meet the above objectives tak;ngdue account of the construction status of the actual plant.

- To accomplish the above objectives , the contra.:' was divided intothree phases, namely:

!

Phase 1: Review of Reference Codes, Regulations and Design7

Criteria

Phase 2: System and event Punctional Analyses.

Phase 3: Additiotal.Special Topics.

A summary of the recoccendations and conclusions frce all of the

Products is included as Product 09040 (Recceendations Sunnary).

' ,

This Product Report is one of a series of reports prepared on the,

h.# topics as indicated belov in Phases 1, 2 and 3. Products marked with an

Nhk j

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l, . - - - .. , - --- - - - - - -

- - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..__

.

|I .

I

asterisk (*) have microfiche copies of relevant computer data packagesseparately.

PRODUCT TITLE

Phase 1: 09011 Review of Principles, Criteria and SafetyMethodology.

1 1 09012 Review of Nuclear Codes and Standards.

IPhase 2: 09021 Design Basis Event Review.

09022 Tvent Sequence Reviav.

09023 Preliminary Transient / Accident Analysis Validation.

09024* Transient / Accident Independent Analysis.

09025 Process Systems Review.

09026 16C Systees Review.

I 09027 Review of Reactor Core Systetts and Tual.

IPhasej: 09031* Single Channel Event Analysis.

09032 Extension to 09022 Event Sequence Review - Phase 3.

I 09033* Shutdown System Trip Coverage Assessment.t

09035* Startup Simulations.

0,032 o r ,o. , ,r os ah i m , Asse ss me nt.g

e,es,. xeamivit,1nsertions ane r er t_sions.

B-4

1. . n".

- -- - _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ____________._____ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

m

,

.'

'.'

Sor:;e tasks 6nd the topics addressed in this report are as

follows:

GE.ERAL TASKVTASK d IN THE

ATTACHME.W,

|

331001 Validity of design inputs and assumptions

331025 Validity of design specificaticcs331009 Validity of aralyses

331006 Proper cceponent classification (

331067 Fevision control331075 Documentation control

331067 Verification of as-built ecndition!

331068 Testing and functionality of design product

331058 Past aadit findings ;

331037 Kncvn and suspected deficiencies

i

4

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An d 4.J : ''. L'i'.4Y.

7AE!I CF C0!G ENTS ,

TASK 22 2.1 D;0 FIED t.,YSirA

1. Introduction2. Fr f e r t hc e De s l yn p. pun g.c gyc~ *i;t;

tj', , fcM,4 '/TD 0 rood systm Design fot3. L MG, ' E.hinh.2' 4. Systm tvaluation

I 5. Conclusions4 6. Fecenmandations

7. Feferences

APFUNDICES

TASK 22 2 2 EMIXENCY CCFI CCCLING SYSil?,

'

1.0 Introduction2.0 Toview of Systm tesign and Ccerenent tarameters

i Syst u C eration30 i4.0 ECC Water Tem;erature5.0 Hydraulic Data

16.0 Systet Evaluation

7.0 Conclusions and Feccasendations8.0 F#ferences

Ar t ENDIC ES

TASK 22.2 3 SHV ZVN CCULING SYSTE.M

i 1. Introducsion J2. Eeview cf Syst em Cett;ce ttion and Cec;cnent f a r ac e t e r s

,

3 14ng ter3. Core Cooling Capability at Ac c i d e n t Cc nd i t i o n s4. Coolicvn 'Pransient Analysis

5. Srco y of L'p-to-ta te Changes in Fe f er ence De sign' 6. Systna Evaluation

7. Conclusions8. Faferences

AFTENDICES

( TASK 22 2.4 AUXILI ARY FEILMATER SYSTEM.

10 Int r eA uc t ion2.0 Sys t ten t.e s ign Te qui r em e nt s3.0 Tovinv of Systm re sign and Ccerer,ent Pa ramet e r s |<

4.0 System Cperation |'s . 0 Systscs Evaluation |

.6.0 Ccaciusions and Tacccmendationc

, 1 7.0 Feferences'

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TA.81.E CC CONTENTS-

}Pact

l

1.0 2h*r 7toDUCTIONg

2.0 REVI t'd CP SYSTfM CESIGN AND CCHNHINT FAFJME70R$ 2

2,1 System Description 2

2.1.1 High Pressure ICC Injection T1ovpath 2

e 2.1.2 Iov Pressure ECC Injection and Recovery riewyath 2 ]

I 213 cceaon Hign/Lov Pressure Insection Tiovnath 3

22 System Design Changes Frc<a Phase III Study 4 |

Waber of 0 0 Check Valves 4'

2 2.1 2

2 2.2 Containment Penetrations and Injection Valve 5 l

I )I Arrangement

223 ECC Injection Line Orificing 5 i' '

224 }HT Set Pressure For ECC Initiat' .n 6'

2 2.$ Crash Cooldovn Time Delay 6

I 2 2.6 Sequencing of class 11 P: vere' .1ves 67

227 Cpening Sigrral For lov Pressare Injec tion Valve228 Cperation of the ECC/PHT ! solation valves Connected to 8

the Unfailed IcopI 2.2 9 Accumulator Gas Tank Cperating Pressure 8 |

2 2.10 Accwtulator Water Tenk and bergency Cooling Water 8

Storage Tank Cperating Temperature2 2 11 Changes in Equi;ttent Sy4cifications 9I 923 Con;cnent Parameters

9231 Acc e ulator Gas Tank2.3.2 Accumulator Water Tanks 9

10I 2.33 Emergency Cooling Water Storage Tank11

234 LCC Pumps122.3 5 Heat Exchangers13236 Valves

1430 SYSTEM CPEFATICH

143.1 Reactor TripI 143.2 Plevdown 1533 Emergency Core Cooling

15.3.3.1 Short Term CTeration 16|- 3 3.2 tong Term Operationd

165 33.3 Cooling of the Unf ailed loop

174.0 ICC WATER T!24PERATURE

2050 EYOFAULIC CATA

I 216.0 =SYST1N EVALUATION

4

227.O CCHCLOS7CNS AND RECCMXENCATICH$

00 REF ERKHCES -- 23

APPENDICES: A-2 Recovery Sump Temperature Transic tsB-2 FCC Systern Hydrantic DataC-2 Mem randa'

p-2 Memoranda*',

/ E-2 n es of Meeting -

I,

I_ _ . - _ _ _

- . _ _ .. _ . _ ., _ __ ,_w

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kI

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W 2.0 FJNIE*d Cr SYSTIM DESIGH AND CoKPoNENT PARAK1.TERS j'.

)~t

~ 21 Cystets Descriptionll

A schnatic diagram of the ECC systern is shown in figure 1.!

i211 Qh_Pr e s sur e ECC Inlegn Flovra th

The high pressure injection portion of the ECC systos consists ofone accumulator gas tank, two accumulator water tanks and associated valves

r Auxiliary Nilding.and piping. These three tanks are located in ,

is isolated frca theThe gas tank which is normally pressurized tewater tanks by two pneumatic normally closed,j

r11 o valves in parallet,

which are ref erred to as the CAS TANK ISQL.ATICH VALVES. e water tanks anda

the piping downstream are normally pressurized to'

The sixteen inch discharge line frca the two water tanks splits into9 two twelve inch branches. This is the se;4 ration reint for the two ECC sub-

systems, ref erred to as train A and Train B. The two trains are conceptually'

identical. There are some minor dif f eren:n in the pipe layout caused byrelative locations of the ECC accumulator tanks and the recovery sump.

Downstream of the separation ;oin, each branch contains two nor-4

Inally open, electrically operated valves and a check valve, all in series.These thr ee valves, which are ref er red to as the ACCT,NUIA70R DISCMARGE VA1.VESand the ACCUMUI.ATCR DISCMARGE CHECK YALVE, isolate the accumulator tanks atthe conclusion of high pressure injection.

Imediately devnstream of the three valves, each high pressureinjection flowpath merges with the sixteen inch icw pressure injectionflovpath associated with the same train (ie. the train A high pressureficvrath joins with the train A 1cw pressure flewpath and similarly for the 8trains).

2 1.2 law Pressure ECC _ Injection and Recovery Flevpath

The low pressure injection portion of the ICC system consists of theEmergency Cooling Water Storage (EC"dS) tank, ECC pumps, heat exchangers andassociated valves and piping. .The ECWS tank is located outside the FeactorAuxiliary Nilding at grade elevation. The tank is comeon to loth ECC sub-systems and to toth . Reactor Containment Spray (RCS) subsystems,

f our sub s y s t ern s sh a r e a eenmen di s ch a r e no r ti e f r een the tcVsm. -

;

1

1

al

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. _ _

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'

fovnstream of the separation goint there a wancemair el s,J'* n' "Jeese y,s

trically crerated valve in series with a check va!..res- "#8g cali,

the ECVS TANX ISO!ATION VALVE and the IrWS TANX CuiC::::* 'EC.VC.A8014 tionvalves prevent air entraircent into the ECC pump soe-::::.m: een the Vater in gECVS tank is depleted.

The low pressure D;C injection line thes -iw a<lth the 113# freanUp s t r e am o f th i s con n e c t i on , h r.w-==* vary gunp

* isthe recovery rump.isolated by a normally closed, electrically operamM. mC=e'e in eerg h8

These valves are known as the PICCVE:M N 2So!ATION gcheck valve. andthe PICCVIRY SUKP CHECX VALVE.

The recovery sump la=W erann valve 1,ed~~wM in the Ifor contaiteent isolation since the recovery sump r.ms .

s

Du11 ding (FCB) and i s er, ::::'. -== 'th* Con t a i te e n tof the Reactor Containmentatmosphere. The recovery surp cheek valve prevents .asts.*::' f" w" flowinfetii *recovery sump during the transition from low pressux:e son:r-: tera injthe recovery mode.

~~

Ss eConected to hoth:==The ccanon low pressure injection /recove:ythe ECC pump suction and the PcS pump suction. rcwwsruc of the tcc U"P'the ECC sys t em is cotapl e t ely se pa r a t e f r om the ;c;5 sy/.ra.

{ exchanger to the junction of the high and low pressurse ::rMtion pgpgflevViaahea+}The sixteen inch Ecc pump discharge line cite ac:Js

. check valve and a normally closed, electrically cSened wa2ve on g3, 3,yPRESSURE DLT.cC"C"Os TA2,yE and W pggg,i

pressure injection line termed the LOWthe up s t r e am pips.5r5 and ergu g f8'n t f r eeSUFI INJECT!CH CHECX VALVI preventbeing overpressurized during high pressure ECC oper.acSa4 testin9 of the a*;

'

mulator water tanke or f ailure of either gas tarsk 1x*se;icJa valve.__

There is a recirculation line f rom the l'C'::* 725:P **ischar ge to mThe maximum fiev through this line is b 78 as3/s. n,

pump - suc tion.irecirculation line termits testing of the ECO pu:sps durin tormal reactor

also provides the r.inimum pump flew awing high pressure trC1 operation. ItThe recirculation line contains a nor sally crem, fat' epen pn g,.

injection.snatic valve kncwn as the PUMP FIC2 RCI.'LATICN VA1VT.

I common High/Lov Pressure Io_iectio g h t22 1.3

Covnstream of the point where the high and los pressure lines join'. the sixteen inch cce. mon injection line contains a normally closed, elee.trica.11y cperated valve ref erred to as the Ecc INJECTICW VALVI. n g , yg

located just outside the FCB vall and serveJ as containment isolation.

After penetrating containment, the ECC injection line ,pigg, gnto'

one branch provides 2CC flow to the headers at the north wtwo branches,the reactor and the other branch provides ECC flow to the headers at the so

A rupture disc is installed in each branch line to main{fg. tain separation between the light vater used for ECC injection and the o o

end of the reactor.,q,f } used in the Primary float transport (PHT) system. The rupture discs are99

,

designed to horst open when the upstream pressure excedds the downstream.

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townstream of the separation joint there is a normally open, ,1,g,. . .f-

t rically cperated valve in series with a check valve. These valves are calleg ht he EC"d S TAN K ISCLATICN VALVI and the EC'dS TANK chrCK VALVE. These isolation *

valves prevent Air entraircent into the LCC pur p suc t i o n wh e n the wa t e r in thei

ECWS tank is depleted. ;!

The low pressuro ECC injection line tien merges with the line frathe recovery su:np. Upstream of this connection, tic recovery sump line te

i isolated by a norrally closed, electrically operated valve in series vith acheck valve. These valves are known as the PICOVERY StHP ISciATICN VRVE andthe MCCVERY StHP CHECK VALVE. The recovery surp ;selation valve J s requiredfor contaiteent isolation since the recovery sump is located in the basemento f the Pr a c tor Cont aira e n t Building (PCB) a.nd is open to the contaimentatacsphere. ne recovery sump check valve prevents water frcm flowing into therecovery sump during the transition f rom Icv pressure short term in;ection tothe reccvery unde.

I The ccc. mon Icv pressure injection /reccvery line is ccnnected to tctt:

the ECC puep suction and the RCS purp suction. tc .'n s t r e a m c f th e EC C pump ,

the ECC system is coerletely separate free th e PC S s y s t e * .9

The sixteen inch ECC pump discharge line directs flow via a heath exchanger to the junction of the high and low pressure injection piping. A

) check valve and a normally closed, electrically operated velve on the low} pressure injection line termed the LCW PFI S S URE INJECTICH VMVE and LOW PFIs.

SURE IM1CTICN CHECK VALVE pr event th e upstream piping and equi; cent from{q teing everpressurized during high pressure ECC operation, testing of the accu-

rnulator water tanks or f ailure of either gas tank isolation valve.

There is a recirculation line frce the ECC pump dischar ge to the(j 3j pu::p suc tion. The maximum flow threugh this line is 0.16 m /s. ~~h e

r ec i r cu l a t i on line permits testing of 'he E00 peps during nornal reactorlt e pe r a u e n . It al s o pr c v i d e s th e cu n i: sue pump fl ev dur ing hi gh pr essur e ECC

[ injection. The reciremiation line contains a normally cren, f ail open pneu-' ratie valve Mu .m as the PtHP RECIPCULAT:CN VE VE.

,

2.1.3 Ccy on H i gh /14v P r e s ai u r e I n f e c t i o n F 1_cy ag

a tevns tr e am of the po in t whe r e the high and lev pressure lines join,

]J the sixteen inch cccmon injection line contains a nor ally closed, elec-

p trically operated valve referred to as the ECC D4JECTICN VALVE. nis valve is

located just outside the RCD vall and serves as containment isolation.y%g Af ter genetrating containmenc, the ECC injection line splits intoN tw branc'.es . One branch provides ICC flow to the headers at the north end cf

y the reactor and the other branch provides ECC flow to the headers at the soutA,

; end of the reactor. A rupture disc is installed in each branch Line to rain--

G tain t.eparation between the light vater used for ECC injection and the D C2p' _' used in the Primary Beat 7ransport (PUT) system. The ruptura dices are

designed to htrat cpen when tJ upstreas pressure exceeds the dovnstream.

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I pressure by h g ne di f f e r ential pr e r,sur e required to tur st the disc s;[|;

;- in the reverse direct on is slightly greater. The dis cs ar e scor ed ao that . * jthey vill not frag:ent, but getals vill fold back with flow creating an .,n

'!

opning with a cross-sectional area slightly smaller than the plM. Tests '; I4

were perforised on the twture discs used in other CANDO 600 !cc systens. '

These tests have shown that the additional resistance adac4 to the DOC systess b; '

by the rupture disc is the sa=e order of tr.agnitude as a fully cien globe h|I v alv e . $

tovnstream of the rapture disc, each branch line is further sub-

I divided into four ten inch in2ection lines each eventually cortriecting to a

different reactor header. Esch injection 9th contains a check valve and anormally closed, electrically operated valve in series. W.ese valves are

I called the D 0 CHECK VALVE and the ECC/PHT ISOLATION VALVE. Opstream of2the D 0 check valve the pressure in the ECC lines is kept close to aunes-

2I pheric. Oovnstream of the DOC /PHT isolation valve the pressure in the ICC

- lines is the same as in the reactor headers. We pressure in the interspacebetween the D 0 check valve and the ECC/PHT isolation valve vill 14 at2scoe intermediate value which depends on t.he relative leakage rates of the

D 0 check valve and the ECC/FHT isolation valve.2i

The D 0 check valves prevent toth core and toiler hypssing when2;

the ECC/FHT isolation valves are opened following a LCcA. n.ey also te rmit the

I ECC/PHT isolation valves to be tested during nornal reactor cieration withoutreverse rupture of the rupture discs.

A restriction orifice is provided in series with and upstream ofeach D;C/PHT isolation valve to limit the flow through this pth in the eventof an ECO line break devnstream of the F^C/PHT isolation valve.'

'

The train A and train B injection lines for a gives reactor headerW ccebine devastream of the ICC/PHT isolation valves and the restriction ori-

fices. These ccabined injection lines do not connect directly to the reactor,

headers but rather to the shutdcwn ecoling system piping which in turn is cen-nected to the reactor headers.

22 System Design changes Free Phase III Study

2.2 1 Nt Aber of D30 Check Valves

I In the Phase III study one D 0 check valve was providad upstreamt2

of a pir of ECC/PHT isolation valves. In the present design one D 02

I check valve is provided upstream of each ECC/PHT isolatlon valve (Ref.1).This prevents toiler bypssing following a real or spurious 14CA signal. This

! change results in a total of eight valves being added to the ICC systea.

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In the lhase III s tudy, the high prest.ur e injecticn flewpath and theics prestore irQ ec tion f1;vpa th penetrate contair.nent sepsrately and then d

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'i G asM, .N. S. .% w. AnW.G d MOMM * A1 6h & 14rt ofdschange, the accumulator discharge valves and the Icv pressde injectionche:k velves vere relocated c.at side cont, air. ment which f acilitates valv$

tr a i r.t e n a n c e ,

i.nve arrangutent at tie ccntair. ment penetration was edified

slightly in ty.e pretent design (Fef. 2). In the Phase III study, theaccu:rulator dis;harge valves se rve as contain' tent isolation for the high

pretsare injection flevpath. Also in the Thase III study t.here vas a secondvalve in series with the Icv pr essure in;ection valve for contaitsent

isoletion.

desi n a r.ev valve (the 000 injection valve) locatedIn tie ;-r e t ent i

in the ecc. son LCI injectich li*e, just outside tl'e contaircent boundary,

s erves as containment 18 elation. As a result, tie va l v e in se r i e s wi th th e

low pressare in;ection valve va s no longer required and was eliminated.Since the LCC inj ection valve is loc ated dean st re aft cf the accumulator dis-

charge valves And is nor: rally c1csed, bcth accumulator discharge valves ineach sd a ys t ue can be normally cien. This reduces the operational require-m e r,t s on the a c es:.fr ul a t o r i s ol a t i on v a l v e s - the y a r e s till r equi r ed to be fasteiering valves, but t.h e ope ning t ia e is no lenger 121ertant. The E00 injec-

tion valves are required to 14 fast epening valve s .

The accu:tulator discharge check valves were added in the presentstady (Fef. 2) to prevent vn '. e r f r :n bei n g pumpe d into the accumulator tanks

if tie icw pressure in;ectier. valves were accidentally opened during ECC pwrptesting.4

i

2.2.3 f.CC Ind ection Line Ori fleir3

i In the ref e rence des ign, t.he ECC inj ection lines to the reactor out-

let headers each contain a rest.riction orifice having a k-value of 20. Thepur;wse of these orifices was to int rove the LCC flow distribution between their let and outlet headers folleving a t eactor outle' header break vith the PHT

purrps running. Increasing the r e s i s t a nc e in the Irc 11.ne s to t.he out l e theaders (Poll) increases the relative ECC fiev to the reactor inlet headers(RI}i) which are at a higher pressure because of the Zunp head and the breaki

icention.

It was assumed in the Phase III og that similar orificing wauld

be pr ov $g.g n t.h e ICC sy n t esj study assume a Ices of clas[s iV power when the reactor isdesign fot gcgv Ibvever, the pf aty analysesf or the

tripped. TN :refore the PWf pumps vould not be running during ECC injectionand it le likely rot necessary to have a higher resistance in t.he ICC line tothe Roll that in the line to the Mit.

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g In the present study orifices are provided in the ECC lines to the#

3 ROU and the lines to the RIH. These orifices are intended to limit ICC vater '

vastage (Ect vateer flowing directly out the break without passing through thereactor.pyLin the event of an ECC line break. We ErrE phase analysis lased

g the ECC va te r va s tag eon the]ing a non]-orificed (RIH)QQ. r e f e r ence de sign h.a s shown thatg

M P:qtW M M TKym*?p;n7n~vhm.p:TQ W; V;%line break is significant, but acceptable.fo 1ow

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M3 Hr.ever ECC injection line orificing villof vastage and * Increase the cargin for high pressure ICCY$heethe a2 cun t

injection.

In this present design stage it is proposed that the restrictionorifices provided in the lines to the inlet headers and in the lines to theoutlet headers, have the same resistance value, i e . , k equ a l to 2 0.

2.2.4 PHT Set Pressure For ECC Initiation

gp$q In the Phase III study the PHT set pressure for NC initiation wasstudy this set pressure has been increased teh]M J S ]] ]In the presentyyid$3 This change is ecst beneficiel for the small LCCA scenarTosbecause the ECC initiation signal is generated earlict. Bis results in an

earlier crash c:cidown signal to the steam gene r a tor s, f a ster depres surizationo f the PKT h e a d e r s and hence earlier ECC injection into the reactor cere.

M 2.2.5 Crash Cooldo.m Time Delav'4 g

In the Phase III study the time interval between the ECC initiatingsignal and the signal to open the steam relief valves on the steam generators

I is 30 seconds. This delay was to allow the stop valves to the turbine tof ully close be fore the MSSVs are cf2ne*d. It has since been determined that

Berefore,fI only 10 seconds need to be allowed for elesing of the stop valves.

| |in the pre sent design the time delay between the ECC initi4 ting signal and thecrash cecidevn signal has been reduced to 10 seconds (Ref. 3). B is change

|p

results in earlier ECC injection into the reactor core.

*

42.2.6 Sjequencing of the Class II Powered Valvesi.

I All electrical valves required to operate to allow high pressureinjection frce the accumulator vater tanks are supplied by Class II power.;

,

These valves include the ECC injer tion valves and the ECC/PRT isolation _,

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_ e,ggered at en interval of E' '

,,, m{,Ope r a t i o n o f tio abc y o v a l v e;s j aCl a s s I I i nv e r t e r s w r e s i z e d t o p rm i t Um}u t a n eou s ope n i ng of al l the ygeVn in Aichhijf Wis is a changs from thehg reference desiI *

ty

f Class 11 powred valves. St agge r ed opening of the ECC valv e s of f er s a cone t, _k.

derable econcale advantage (Fef. 4).p|

Two indepenf.ent inver ter s ar e provid ed, one is used for the Train g/ ECC valves and the other for the Train B ECC valves. Were are a total of

vgqqQ W e r e f o r e the final ECC. nine Class II pcvered ECC va(gjyg} ICC train./

valve w uld start to ope r a t e after the first valve had started toqo; crate. aJLhhdV-

J There is also a delay in operating each valve dee to the control And

is a delay {{[[y is3MN$h,ffry{hd[itt'I]ng first flovestimated t hfU { In addition,instrumentation. This delaj

! therethrough the valve be to ineffective stem t2avel. These delays are consecu-t

i . tive. Therefore, wi th segaencing, the final ECC valve reguir d for high( r e f e r r ed to a s th e LCC A s i g n a l {wa s ge n e r a t e d .d[h a f ter the ECC

to pe rri t flo.pressure $CC in;ection would startt

giinitiation signal

Cd Eecause the ECC inj ection valve is in series with the eight ICC/FHTh isolation valves in each train, it should be opened first. We order in Aich

C the ECC/PHT isolation valves are ciened is not in} o r t a n t . The anal sis vill

assume that the ECC injection valves start to permit flow h [ h [ ] afterh0 the IxcA signal and tlat all eight ICC/PHT isolation valves start to ;crmit*

[ flew s im ul t s n eou s l y a t 7%f(L$ i f t e r th e IAC A .AnhC.a

u f ety analys is for the hb'3 re f e r ence design, a::ep-0 In the

table results wre obtained assuming that hU elapsed between the licAh signal and the first D'c inj ection flev i 5N fe7 N system. 14e c ra s e the F HT

set pressure for ECC initiation has been ingq ed tch' MT$$ the bccA signalvill be gener ated slightly earlier for the g lesign. w uld te! 4 the

| effect of the delay in opening the class I povered ECC valves on t? fsafety analysis.

s

The tic A signal is also used to close the valves in all the inter-, connection lines joining the heat tr a n s;o r t icops. Wese include the pr es-, the 0 0 f eed valves 3331-Mv13surizer isolating valves 33 32-MV1 and MV2,i 2

and MV22 and purification system valves 3335-MV1 to MV4. The pressurizer1

isolation valves vill also be sequenced at 0.2 s econd interv als af te r the ECCvalves. The analysis vill also assume a 0.5 second delay in the c;eration ofthe valves due to instrumentation and control. The recaining valves vill be<j

1 pcvered by Class III pover and therefore are not segaenced.hta

j 2 2.7 Crening Sipal For 14v Pressure Injection Valvet

,

In the Phase III study, the opening of the low pressure injection<

;. valve was controlled by the water level in the accumulator tanks. During high

pressure injection, when the level in the tanks reached a low level set;cint,'j'

the low pressure injection valves vould start to open. This was intended toi

u prevent flow into the lov pressure injection piping during high pr essureinjection.

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W-r ,t. --. s e n . . M y D;s yX

-

-' , . '

I. r .,:w

I.a s' , , ., ,. y y . ' ! ' + 7 .. +3 ... 5 d g ,7 .,*

i-

P93 7 4 n --i . "s w . h i. e v-

L ; - N.,.g.

Wn $; :;Q. .s' f , ,;.. .

.

.} m %+7.

s , ~ -} , f , %QR,Q y ' }vi , ;e8 *

4m .

,,

.'et,\ : .. ,e

-T. ., ; n, : w . ,a,3'<-~ ~ o wm? y,tw,

g ',.4 a.hS,v :,:

. f.

. , eL .u'-(

.e o . . ' , -'*4' ** $ .,%=,,,

:. . . g '. ,50' .$ (

7i _ ', 4, * ;wsaV ,'t.( L A i. e

- ' 3 *

gJ= i .'*

5 4- V, e, #

-

'

t#

| : qi - !!e a t i n g,

A , ' w -*-4 a. ,Py, +;wW.-

A M~ ' -~ -w*

1

4 c' 0. . .u m

,.

- o t m' w ~d the 10 3 t ux -ti bee. a ,,3 .w:G ~ *

~ ~--

te;ul;t e nts fer tre e M atar u er s an

,

revie e-1 in the d e t a i l e d b o t g n s '. 3 ; e .

,

,'

% %

-e -, ,, -. w, . . . , . - - - , w , . . . - . . - - - - - . , -- _ _ . - _ - _ _ w-- -

-- .

. _ - __ ___ - _ ___ _ - _

____ _ _.yg,.. _

2.2 11 ,Qangee in Eguipent Stocifications_

:, y.

'

cruring the present design phase, the specifications for the Mjorprc. cess ecceponents were studied in core detail than in the ge111 stud and

h '?!k M "'k 3 i 4R ['*

i

Qh ( h hjh(h . I The IEC jump head was l ' -

b the Phase III study to prova e a smccther transition frc> 1 ressM [ ( h Md 7.3ECC in ection to lovgressure ECC ing$;;g ' calculations have shown that the2 3 d IM d l5$51[d E 3 '; gi

ee

%'[Ofrecovery suap a.nd ECC injection te.mperat. e could still be kept within designI

11.rdts using the w. aller heat exchanger.

'2.3 Corqcnent Paraneters,

i

231 Accumulator Cas Tank

The accu:nulator gas tank provides the pressure for high prensure ICCinjection. The design specifications are listed belows

" Mm E PA

Equipment No.,

( TiF e y )

MATERIAL: { ..

fiC AP AC ITY : ,.

,f h"p' iT W.TERATVRE:Cy4 rating -' I

De si gn h' % N.i

P RE S S W.E j'

'

Operating "'

Oesigni

APPt1CAPLE CODE: :SEISMIC C: ASSITICATION .

,.__

'2 3.2 Accumulator Water Tanks

_

During initial ECC injection, water store 3 in the accumulator vetortanks is 1njected under pressure to the reactor 'nanders. The design specifi-cations Are listed below:

GENERAL:~

Equirenent No.p

t/Pe ',

,,

n'. . ;'

i .

I4

2-9. .

M $$

- _

g v , _ . _ .

..o, a

* ij$, N, ,, ,

q.

) &- - va a u m eu m m e.w m us m mmam -

KATERI ALI 9 - a

| g r-

7Ef f ective Volume for Injection M p[ -

CAPACITY:

|;, ~ ~ -

| I-y

'

TINPERATURB sOperating ,

^

Design

fPRESSURE: '

Operating I'Design , ,

' )APPLICABLE COCE:SEISMIC CLASS 1FICATICH g

d [gj_rjene,y_C e ling ' dater Storage _7a_nk233 e

During the low pressure stage of short tere ECC operation, wate-

I stored in the ECdS tank is injected to the reactor headers using the ITBecause the opere: ion of the NS syste:n has teen changed such t'at thepumps.

RCS recirculation mode vill legin on the same lov lev 1 sigta1 usta to iniathe ECC r -very m:Je (Ref. 6', the capetty of the DNS tank has been ')gate

{f r:e the Phase 111 study.'

The EC"ds tar.k is insulated to reduce heat icsses. Nrin the coldI anonths the operating te.,;erature of t.he tank is 2.aintainedh{ g$ sing anexternal heater in series nth a recirculation pump. The pr inetp.e pur;csa of

|: the recirculation pump is to assist in the chemical corrosion control of the! EcdS tank.

The design specifications for the EC'dS tank are listed below:

GENERAL: - Y J i; G' R, d*F.i fM Difb %1 .T'Quantity ..

'M fAEquipeent No.

MATE RI AL: ;,

18 ,y,,i s

'. , ! -, ,

4 fI f 'Y ,CAPACITY

3s - (f*p. |f ,I |3' ky e.

Ef fective Volume for ECC Injection ? '. . ] ;.f ; 1?

Ef f ective Volume for FCS Injection . -f ,, ,,< y; . 0,. R, Qy-) .+;p ,,gu~ -

.

I .e 1

m g'% % 4 b.,,TIMIEbdTUNEl-

-,. yoperatin,

iMi Edj%., wgt . M. 4 w@.I Dee1,n .<,

ph '( tPRESSUxElI yy ' n%p;.i.'.operaein9 (

4)4;j; q.gDesign s

.]q Pg7 .n..

2-10

. -- . - . _ . - . . .- - . - - -_.

- . ( 1-- - - - -

. j% # i' ;ed .-!- s, - ~ ~~, m n-m-a.m.mw.ya.p. M %,

I. . ,a s

I N.Addh, gA}PL1 CABLE C0tti M T8 Class 3\

g SEISMIC CIAS$1rIC ATICH A.

3-

ii

1 l( it 234 icC hmy J

} 4

'

)The EcC pumps are required to cperate during the Icv pressure stage

of short ECC operation and during long tern ECC o;eration. Thus c.no ogt e rm

the two ECC pumps must be c;4 rational for at lease 0 zonths.

4 In the reference desigm, the low pressure stage of short tera ECCore r a t ion i s r e f e r r ed to a s ' m ed i u n pr e s s e inj ection' . g.y s bec aus e the

,

seurce of water for injection is the dowing tank iccated lam above then

i recovery sump. Thus the inyection pressure during mediu:n pressure injectionis significantly higher than daing the recovery nMe.

This is ot the case in the ECC design for EPDC. The ECWS tank is/ located at near grade level is is the recovery swep.'

rg!7Y:'*VT:( The ECC pap he ad f o r E F;C wa s ggfdgWWT'; f rom the referencei design to ct2rensate for the use of the rade level EWS tank instead of the

higher 1cvel dousing tank. In determining the final p=p specifications, itwas nece isary to achieve adequate injection flows with a minimal pressurereduction at the end of high pres sure inyection. At th e sue time, pump run-out had to to prevented and the Etc pump p:ver requirements minimited.

<

The pump head vs flew curve assumed in the saf ety analysis is shownin figure 2. The actual pap curve vill not be available until the pap canu-f acturer is selected, however there should be very little dif ference frc<n thea s s um e d fl o v 'curv e . The EP:C p=p design vill te essentially the same as ther e f e r e nc e panp de s i gn ex c ept a d2fferent impeller vill to used and the p.mp

'internals r.ay be slightly m:dified.

4

The de s i g n sp e c i f u a t io *. s lo r th e ECC pump s ar e li s t e d tel ev.(

.-

g g . q)$qpg y;g MGENEPALt ! h [ryu1 rent so. p:r<

%p p %@M.jun

#s Qh HWM&:MQType .

i, @h @m@pw. p: M %:W$. F.4 &@?%# =riuid p2 ped $ h wt. ypRated Flow

%OR "q-@"f[JW N;o

/ h[ h (C% M i [ ? M [i dN!Q. k h[Read at rated Flev

w w m% h; hShutoff Head p n' doperas e r1ov r.nge re 1 red

- 9m m pes~ ,f. h;ik " h $ s p;. q>n- M. ej e.pMN,;*w%;p g uvjg-

9 6 c p:ye,x.M--

vm m m.; p~wfN PSH To qui r ed at Ta t e.d Fl ow v1y;; g

. ,C ' ,b Mfg ",yu S Q4 Qbqu,M, .Q M~JM

,

,

.

g i. K.cmew ry y s wMATERI AL:

ggg%, $g}ig&ggy]6hggpy]w|g,gggImpeller, case, shatt

%gg%-

q q

N@$&&%!M% N//.2 qMM pWd

@%?$5:#W #gG hiuQ$rREssunei

nonna t M&WMIfMh$ MOM M hNNDesign

,$w:y$dk&d b h22i L & &,n_$ $ M W$p g.m,cc $g M? iM94g mmh

5i2-11 -

i ;,'t - * N

,

V'

\."/ ;

,

1./

**.e p p .!

m .,._ % w __~ . . .._ ... ,_. y ; .g, g.

'

. 7 ... .h)E 4 ' ' Nb.d '1*

'TLN E %TUREI .

}k ,' W); k ,J ,*| Q{Hortal &L .

O '.9.rep rating i6.( j M,b,i i '' ~ .. t j1d*

%. .Design . g .,gc,

l DRIVE W/NRt . [ - --

''

.

.

}: '| ", f . .. < R' p*.< , _ ..Type (.

9 ." 3.pC ";'._

1,.'

n, ,' .,

Sixe ;u..-,. s ..., 9 1

S mg e. . . /.:-

m., g |TQ. ,_'.4,g ' 4 y ,Q,s .'Et:APPLICASLE CCDEl .

. . O . , . ..,

. Wi ,' 4'. h.7,YW 9/~f h l ' 7

*$Y M

I' 1 SEISMIC CIASSITICATION - r.

, h. ,.

- >

|.

h y ..% ,. ' r..'f;

|

2.3 5 Heat Exchangers

The ECC heat exchangers are required to remove the reactor decayfrcen t.he failed PHT loop followi a LCCA. In the resent study the duty

I heat Calculationsof each LCC heat exchanger wasshow that with one NS system at e.xchanger c;erating, the smaller LCC heatexchanger wuld still eaintain the recovery sump te ;erature and the ECCinjection temperature within design limits. These calculations are further j

described in Section 4.0 and are conservative.;

The design of the heat exchanger was specified iri detail using a )

simple cceputer prograeae. The primary and secondary side pressure drops '

acres the heat exchanger wre ket' to these 1n the Phase III study.E NE

fhtails). .

- to t.he mixing ef f ect of t.he pump rec treu' ation line. This changein t)'e primary inlet temrerature reduces the ef ficiency of the heat e.xchangertherefore it was decided not to reduce the secondary side flev.

,

1-shell pass, 2-tube pass type heat e.xchanger is considered theA

optimum and recccmended for the present design. The required heat transferThe design specifications for the heat

_I .area is approximately 1100 m2exchangers are sur.marized N1owt-

j

[ . .~ M ' Q,. .'[ ho

GENE RAL:'

~

} jQ ' f 3.

i ,.

Equircent No. y .c .

f , '. i, , J. fgTyped Service ;%: "-f;_ pts . , Qic _: :, f,

' 7[; O :,4 g g;M_,

g,,. { 2 ,A '.',capacityt/4nHeat Transferred e-

,, : . y- p g.- q,

^g'4.B+p.( - {7 ',. 3. p,/ay. 4 . u ,-, . . .

. 1,

[[f@ *; ;$, ..I.h,hi .. .-

,

,

,

2-12,

_

- . - +,---m- -, , , , ---m sy., ,- ._,m-5nr +w-+m an iw+ - = . - -me w-- *-a- -*' e' wv--- -' r *S-.

- _________-______ ________

L : . _ _ _ g. - - - - - - . _

SHE!.1, S!DE CATA 8 rac, Th/,

'

1' 9tFluid '

| .i['

riow rate 6Inle t Teto;+ r a tur eCNtl e t Te mpe r a t ur eDe sign Temper atur e

<-

jDesign PressureDesign Pressure DropApplicable Codeseismic Class

TUBf; SIDE DATA:

FluAdriow FateInlet TemperatureOutlet TemperatureCe sign Tempe ratur eDesign Pressure Drop

i - ,

*

236 valves

It is reccc2 ended that the large valves in the low pressure p>rtionof the 14C system which contains light water be specified as butterfly valves ,

{ with a ring type seal. These valves should also be flanged for ease of min-tenance.

The large valves in the high pressure partion of the Ltc systemscentaining either light wa t e r or he a vy wa t e r a r e r equi r e d to te ga t e va l v e s .

i[h.]Qff @$$"@"MEiTL7d3S[dDh/dTIF%TLYM33%Td5M'

eAll high pa essure valves and all heavy water valves are.gjga p) s.( "fi%gp

to 14 welded in order to mini. mire leakage.

#

%e

4

2.13 ,

b b$$' b~ hhh hhfkhhk hh&hb 0 *

_ _ - _ -- _-

W QJ ,

d'

b.e.a,

cI.

!!>

,. AECL Proptlotary,

4 ,_ . , _ . . - c - .2% = . . _ . - - -

30 SYSTEM OPERAT10H

The ECC system is on standly durir49 norsal reactor operation. It

operates only in the event of a 14CA. .-

I,

3.1 F4 actor Trip

in the ev e n t o f a 1,CC A , th e p r e s s u.r e i n s i d e th e NC B r i s e s an d t.h e

pressure in the PHT system drops. Before ECC system operation is initiatedthe reactor is t. ripped. The trip parameters are high neutron towur and/or PETI low flow and/or high PCB pressure.

32 Blowdcen

The t im e a f t e r the LCC A, un t i l the FHT p r e s sur e r e a c he s the LCC

I injection pressure,- is known as the bicwdnen feriod. The lenyth of ttze forthe b1cwac'm geriod is dependent on the break sise.

During t.he blowdevn eriod F n,a 1 te . rat d. ?

$$Ni k| 9 ,=

bl _ _ _ LTThe LCCA signal initiates the folleving tr.sjer actions

Cyen t.he gas tank isolation valves .-

Cpen the ECC injection valves * *I Cyen all sixtt n ECC/PRT isolation valves''-

-

Start the ECC pumps-

Start cooling water flow to the 000 heat exchangers

I Cpen t.he low pressure injection valves-

-

Cpen the SG safety relief valves after a 10 second delay-

Close the PHT loop isolation valves: pressurizer isolation valves,''-

I D 0 f eed valves and the purification system valves (Thir isolates the2f ailed loop from the unf ailed loop and isolates leth PHT iceps from the

pressurizer, feed system and parification system.)

I* The reference CANDU 600 design has been changed such that it ncv uses a high

moderator level signal as conditioning for in-core breaks. Thus retentionof the high roderator cover gas pressure sigr.a1 for EPDC constitutes adesign dif f erence f rc<n the re f erence de sign.

'

* *The operation of t.hese valves is sepenced at 0 2 second intervals to limit ,

the site of the class II power inverters, see also section 2.2 6.

|- 2-14

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - s

- - - - - - - . . . - - - . - .

') {- ('

use -voumwa summar ec; = == -m weem,a

33 raergency Core Cooling j }~.

During the full sequence of mergency core cooling operation, decayheat removal ic by transfer of heat to the steam generatnrs or by .11scharge offluid through the treak. The latter rode predominates for the Isrge break.

The fortner code predcainaces for reall breaks.

s_hoge rm Cre ra tion3 3.1 h

. Within a few seconds af ter the as tank isolation valves first startto open,. gg |.

QfMje 5"

because the piping totveen the accumulator vater tanks and the gas tanisolation valves is gas filled and initially at low pressure. *

ECC i etion cw frcm the accumulator tanks into the PHT systemaf ter the LOCA sL nal (due to ECC valve openingwill start at .

system pressure drops t(.3[g5$1f this occu.rs af ter9

eip or een .e J

] Q%There is suf ficient ecolant availaTiIe in Ee accumulator wateror a minimu:n of %fbr e aks the tim e i s ex t e n det[iJ'' -

.

for a 100% headei- bre;ak size. For smallerads.

.

As coolant is discharged free the water tanks the ecolant level in'

!"/the tanks and the injection pressere f all.3 Y(;P .l 85%9EWiRM.

(g{f"TSg7g "f@iFor e4 g 3 rgak sizes the . ressure and e

1

h, ax.

Q E555,

k[Y@,,tSe wrature ar daner

on low coolant level in the accunulator vater tanks, the accumulator

discharge valves are closed to prevent gas frote being injected into the PHTsystem.

While high pressure injection is occurring, the ECC pumps havestarted a.nd are recirculating vater via the pump recirculating lines. The lowpretsure injection valve opens on the bCCA signal but t.he icv pressure pipingIwains isolated by the check valv4. in che low pressure injection line. Whenthe press tre devnstream of the check valve falls belew the pressure generatedby the pu:.p:, injection from the ECWS tank begins.

Frca this time, until- the accumulator discharge valves are fully

closed, DOC ' injection water is being supplied frca icth the accu:nulator watertanks and the ECWS tank. This helps racoth the transition from high pressure

to low pressure injection.~

There is suf ficient vater in the ECVS tank for 15 minutes injection

for a irrge toCA vith toth LCC trains operating. Short ter: ECC injection.

I ~ vill therefore last a minimu:n of 17.5 minutes.~

2-15

NNENIhENEEDEMMEEYihMERG|MMTSTELSMS747dEglic"3"0F.

. . . . - - . - _ - - - - - . - - - -.- - - - _ _ .. .. .-

-

g-

- -- - g -9- - - _ _ _ _

,. : ; fAy.:

g,1 ' j h y's

C jf ''.

y "

}[ m - = = - --a,,..n.,,m,me.u..,muw,w, 9

. .I3 3.2 ton 3_ Tera operation .

1>&

During short term operation the injection flev esca;<s free the k*

break and collects in the FCB basement. When ,tgh,e EW S ta nk r e a che s a pr e- f . "',.

determined icw level set;oint, the recovery line isolation valves frce the yes Y;Qbaccuent are auternatically cpened. Shortly af ter, when the ECVS tank reaches ?the very lov level settcint, the Ecvs tank isolation valves are closed and thelong term recovery mode of EC operation begins. nis code of operation ,4

,

I referred to as the recovery rode, continues until the decay ;cver is very lov.For des 1 a pur;cses, this period is assumed to be three conths.9

The recovery, code is essentially steady state recirculation of waterdischarged frta the break t.ack to the f ailed FHT Icop. S e water is heated inthe core by decay rever and is cooled by heat transfer to the reactor cc<nyo-nont cooling vater systen via the NC heat exchangers and also by heat trans-f or to the steam generator secondary side.

Steam generated in the steam generator is rejected via the main1 These have been opened af ter a LCCA for Steu generatorsteam safety valves.

cooldovn . The auxiliary feedwater systcc provides flow to the aten generatorsecondary side.

For a sinall break the ECC pump flew is small and heat transfer tothe steam ger.erators will to a significant fraction of the total decay heat

I removal, particularly sten the water in the PHT system is hot. Tne TC heatexchangers still remove heat f rce the recovered water. Af ter approximatelyfour hours, t'he core vill be cooled to a icv enough temperature that the ECOheat exchangers alone are adequate for cooling the fuel and feedvater flow tothe steam generatora in the failed loop is not required.

333 ceclir.1 of the Unfalled i n

The unf alled icop is cooled by thernosyphoning with heat removal bygg the steam generators, ne natural circulation flow is sufficient ti provide,

o e cooling of the fuel. When the PHT coolant temperature drop 1 tothe shutdown eccling system can be connected to the unf ailed loop.

I Makeup to the unf ailed iccp is provided whenever the icop pressurefalls below that of the energency core cooling in$ection pressure.-

II-

II

.

2-16

- .

. _ _ - - - _ - - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _

~ ] '-_ ____ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ m

,\g ipta + y - - - - . - - _ _ - - a m y-,.- 4.0 ICC WATER TEMPERATURE ,

' a

In order to size the ECC heat exchangers, it was necessary tc calcu-late the temperature of the water in +he recovery sump at the start of the gen

-

r ecovery ac4e. Two cases were considered a 100% ROH break and a feeder sig,.

break. ,

We data for i nese calculations vas derived frco AI-1088: " Station[ Data and Modelling Information for the 600 MW Containment Analysis" (Ref. 7),,

] The rethod of calculation and the key assumptions used r e described below:

We average ICC flow for each break size was octermined frce the AI-10eg- 1. These flows were adjusted to account for the higher pump head a.nd.

data.} different resistances in the EPDC design. For the feeder site break the

v is 4) and for the 100% ROH break the ECC flow isj

The time at sich the recovery mode legini vis calculated by dividing the2.total in$ectable mass from the accumulator cater tanks and the ECWS tank

-

!

t from on) 6 kg) by the combined RCS and ECC flow.

(?.022 x 10 and[ For the feeder size break the recovery mode be ins atL f or the 100% ROH break recovery begins at

It was assumed that all the energy discharged f rco the break vas present3in the recovery sump liquid. Thus the total enthalpy of the sump water

( was calculated by suming the initial enthalpy of the RCG wter and the- 4

The break dischargeenthalpy of the fluid discharged frce the break.p

ii enthalpy frca A' , A ys q rreggej or the higher initial temperature of<

f and thejifdh n the reference design)the ECC wter $g dN,$m size break the total enthalpy of thehigher ECC ficss. th ? eue

sump w t e r y,' and fu che 100% RCH b reak the total'

The total enthalpy is higher for the'

energy is *feeder nae nreaA% ecause of the longer time before the recovery mode

'

i

(>

begins.1

( The temperature of the recovery sump water was calculated by dividing the<

4. sump wa t e r by the ma s s of the sump wa t e r ( 2 . 02 2 x: stal energ of the For thekg - no hold-up of the discharged water was assmed) ..06f eeder size break the average entr al of the sump water is([g[[p(- ,

"

-

corresynding to a temperature of E For the 100% RCH brea ,

'

corresponding to aaverage enthalpy of the cump wate||*

temperature of,

1 It should be noted that the asseption that all the energy dis-charged frca the break is present in the sump liquid is very conservativeSoce of ther.ince flashing of the fluid discharged frca the break will occur.

-

Wej vapour vill condense on the FCB valls, internal structures ar.d equipent.-j ' atent heat of condensation vill be transf erred to these surf aces and not to( Some of the vapour vill not condense. This also reduces the(

the cump water.k j'

total ener7y present in the sump vater and hence the sump vater temperature.E (..

t

,

Cg ( 2-17

i 5

- t.

- 4 <

it

,

Ef - p- ----- .e, , y m ,,,|

- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

!,.! . 4 6.,o ~q

.# %4h emwrmenwamruwen:wrw%rmaceaupwenneurnunwemmasmecamua f"

I, -

- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 9

f f,

S)< ELL SIDE (ATA : '*

Fluid

h(/{- d{Tlev rateI nlet Tetepe r a t ur e

*~

N t l. e t Terape r a tur e''

C+ s i g n Te =pe r a t ur e 3 '

0+ s i gn Pr e s s ur e |!

tecsign Pressur> Stop f|

''

Applicable Ce** g

Seismic Class p .{t .

TUBE SIDE CATA : f MFluid i // if >

f j #'riov Fate.Inlet Tem;e r a t ur e g-. f.

Cut l e t hm pe r a t ur e p~

0.e s ig n Ten;.* r atur e ; ,

i,Design Pressare Drop h-

ip~. ,J t

~ ~ ~ ~ -~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ~

2.3 6 valven

It is r e c cc.me nd ed tha t the large valves in the low pressure portionof the ECC system which containn light vater be specified as butterfly valves

( with a ring typ.e seal. These valves should also be flanged for ease of main-tenance.

The large valves in the high pressure p:rtion of the trC systemscontaining either light wa t e r or he a vy wa t e r a r e r eq .li r e d t o te ga t e va l v e s .

h fhs ft 2- '

hyfSRd.L5b(dbdMdMDydy All :tigh pr e s sure valves An 1 all heavy water ' valves areto b4 welded 1.*. o r d e r t o rein im i z e l e a k e g e .

t

1

s.

:|

||

2-13 e

h, ) hfffg fhkh k$f 1'

i'

,

1

.

U V _a

\u 3..?q

- V unamwewrwowwmemannmam ranamar. uu=--= AECL Prc. N y.

3.0 SYSTEM OPEPATION

.The ECC system is on standby during normal reactor operation. It

operates only in the event of a ICCA. . . . -

-

31 Reactor Trip

In the event of a LCCA, the pressure inside the TCB rises and thepressure in the PHT system drops. Before ECC system operation is initiatedthe reactor is tripped. The trip prameters are high neutron power and/or PHT

I. low flew and/or high PCB pressure.:

32 Blowdown

The time af ter the 14cA, until the PHT pressure reaches the ECC

1-injection pressure, is known as the blowdewn yeriod. The lenph of time for

the b*.cwdevn priod is dependent on the break size.

F j{ $[ yV5 7' (

| :

The LOCA signal initiates the following e.sjor actions:

Cren the gas tank isolation v-1ves-

Cpen the_ECC injection valves **g -

Cpen all sixteen ECC/PHT isolation valves * *l' E- -

l Start- the ECC pu:nps-

Start cooling water flow to the ECC heat exchansers_g -

E- crea the low Pr***ur' in$ action valve = --

' Cpen the SG safety relief va)"es af ter a 10 second delay-

close the Py" loop isolation valves pressuri:er isolation valves,* *-

|aD;O f eed val /es and the purification system valves (This itolates thef ailed loop from the unf ailed loop and isol tes both PHT 1 cops from the

<

pressurizer, feed system and purification system.)

I* The reference CANDtf 600 design has been changed such that it now uses a high~

moderator- level signal as conditioning for in-core breaks. Thus retentionof the _ high roderator cover gas pressure signal for EPDC constitutes a

' design difference from the reference design.

* *The operation of these valves is sequenced at 0.2 second interials to limit ,

the -size ef the Class II power inverters, see also section 2.2 6.

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33 Emergency Core Cooling ;-

.

During the full cequence of mergency core cooling operation, decay.

heat removal is by transfer of heat to the steam generators or by discharge offluid through the break. The latter enode predominates for the large break.The former mode predcoinates for small breaks. .

3 3.1 ,Short Term Operation

Within a few seconde af ter the as tank isolation valves first start

$[ 3 kbecause the piping between the accumulator water tanks and the gas tanisolation valves is gas filled and initially at low pressure.

,

ECC in ection f ov f rco the accumulator tanks into the PliT system

[[fI)h af ter the I,0CA signal (due to ECC valve openingvill start at?$ystem pressure drops tc%MQtf this occurs af ter -or when e

d e l a y,if ( There is sufficient ecciant avail 4$Te in Die accumulator vaterT aras or a aunimum of { [gbreaks the time is extenued. g'

for a 100% header break site. For tmaller

*

t'

As .lant is discharged frce the water tanksj the ecolant level 1.e

1,t .! G ! bT [y"

,h For y J kra sizes the ressure ud espa a lj *

$ $ b5N$I$ 5 bNi bl0 5 b hh {akon lov coolant level in the accumulator water tanks, the accumulat:r

dis:harge valves are closed to prevent gas from being injected Lnto the PH;system.

While high~ pressure injection is occurring, the ECC pumps havestarted and are recirculating water via the pump recirculating lines. The !cvpressure injection valve opens on the LCCA signal but the icw preswre pipingremains isolated by the check valve in the low pressure injection line. Whenthe pressure downstream of the check valve falls below the pressure generatedby the pumps, injection f rom t.he ECWS tank begins.

From this time, until the accumulator discharge valves axe fullycleaed, E:C injection water is being supplied free both the accumulator vatertanks and the ECWS tank. This helps smooth' the transition fxce high pressureto low pressure inj ec tion . -

There. is suf ficient water in the ECVS tank for 1$ minutes injection- f or a large LOCA vith- toth D:C trains operating. frhort terra ECC injection

I ~ vill -therefore last a mtnit a of 17.5 minutes.%.

2-15,

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During short term operation the injection flow escapes frca the | jgbreak and collects in the kCB basernent. When the ECWS tank reaches a pre- 4' bgf

-

determined low level setpoint, the recovery 11nT isolation valves frca the tc3 'Mfy~

O.

basement are autenatically opened. Shortly af ter, when the ECVS tank reachee ithe very lov level setroint, the ECVS tank ieolation valves are closed and she,

long tona recovery mode of frc operation begins. This rode of operation .

referred to as the recovery mode, continues until the decay power is very lov. j:Tor design purgses, th i s pe r iod i s a s s um ed to be thr e e en ths .

.

The recovery, mode is essentially steady state tecirculation of waterdischarged frca the break back to the f a il ed PHT I c.op. We water is heated inthe core by decay power and is cooled by heat tr a n s f e r to the r e a c to r ccep-

_- nent cooling vater system via the Irc hea*. exchangers and also by heat trans-

f er to the steam generator secondary side.

-Steam generated in the steam generator is rejected via the main

- steam safety valves. These have been opened af ter a !ccA for steam generatorc ooldown . The auxiliary feedwater system providea flew to the steam generatorsecondary side.

For a small break the ECC pump flow is small and heat transfer tothe steam generators will be a significant f raction of the total de-ay heat

I removal, particularly when the water in the PHT system is hot. We LCC heatexchangers still remove heat f r ce the recovered wa ter. A s -i approx fna telyfour hours, the core vill be cooled to a icw enough te ;erature that the ECCheat exchangers alone are adequate for cooling the fuel and feedvatar flow to

I- the steam generators in the failed iccp is not required.

3.3.3 Cooling of the Unfailed Loop

'g The unf ailed loop is cooled by thermosyphoning with heat removal by

J the steam generators. The natural circulation flow is suf ficient to provide,

o a t e cooling of th e f u e l . When the PHT coolant temperature drops tothe shutdown cooling system can be connected to the unf ailed loop.

I Makeup to the unf ailed loop is provided whenever the 1 cop pressurefalls below that of the emergency core cooling injection pressure.-

I3..

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ECC WATER TEXPERATURE {,40 '

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In order to size the ECC heat exchanger s, it was necessary to calcu. *'2late - the teaNrature of the water in the recovery sump at the start of the ten

- r ec ov e ry inod e . Two ca se s ver e consid er eda 100% ROH break and a f1eder sige i

1

break.,

We data for these calculations was derived trun AI-1008: " St ation

Data and Mdelling Information for the 600 MW Contairement Analysis"(Ref. 7),

The method of calculation and the key assumptions used are described belovi'

We average ECC flov for each break site was determined froan the AI-1088for the higher pump head and1.These flows were adjusted to accountFor the feeder size break the,

data. EPDC design.dif ferent resistances in the and for the 100% B0H break the ECC flow ist

fr{ fiev isa

The time at which the recovery mode begins was calculated by dividing thetotal injectable mass from the accuaulator water tanks and the ECWS tar,k

2.f rom on6 kg) by the con.bined RCS 'and ECC flow

.

(2 022 x 10 indfor the feeder size break the recovery mode be ins atfor,the 100t RCH break recovery begins at

It was assumed that all the energy discharged f rco the break vas present3.in the recovery , sump 11gu.id. Thus the total' enthalpy of the sump vater

.

'

was calculated by summing the initial enthalpy of the RCS vater and theD- ithe break. The break discharge

enthalpy of the fluid dieci.arged f rcaor the higher initial temperature ofenthalpy frca A'-t 4 v s $ 4reeted

1 J k m[ n the ref erenca design) and thethe ECC vater f eoder size- break the total enthalpy of thehigher-ECC (1:<s. r tn

a'nd for the '100% RCH break the totalsump va t e * The total,enthalpy is higher for thei

+ e r.e rgy 1s of the longer time before the recovery modef eeder sife breu becausebegins.

The teaperature of- the recovery sump water was calculated by dividing the,

total energy of the sump vater by the mass of the sump water (2 022 x _4.For the

k9 . -no hold-up of the discharged water was. assumed) .the sump water ishhJ

106_

enf eeder size break the average. the 1004 RCH brcar, ta ."

correspanding to a temperature of corresponding to a. average enthalp of the sump vate

tenperature of-

it ~

the assumption.that all the anergy dis-ti It should be noted that |. cha:ge fren- the break is present in the sump liquid is very conservative

1

.Some of the jsince flashing of the finid discharged frca the break vill occur. Weinternal structures and equip < tent.i vapou will condense on the FCB valls, |latent heat of. condensation -vill be transf erred to these surf aces and not to'' :$ This also reduces the ' !5cce of the vapour vill not condense.the- surap water.

-

total energy present in the sump water and hence the s ap water temperature. q' =c,4

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Tvo criteria were used in designing the ECC heat exchanger -f|- Q

- the ECC injection tenperature (ie. the heat exchanger cuti t te c r a t ur e) himust always be less than or equal to the design value of1I in conjunction with the NS heat exchanger the recovery sump veter'

-

temperature must be reduced to and f all below design value of 65.5'C.' It ws determined that maintaining the EC 1.njection ten;erature '

lew thanELWror th too' ao" dre^x ca a vaa the itaities f actor ta thedesign. Consequently trC heat exchanger vas sized for the conditions corres-

I- ponding to the 100t RCH break.

once the recovery mode starts the ECC injection ficv vould drop

_ I slightly since the recovery sump is at a lever elevation than the Et'ds tank.For the 100t RCH break size the ECC inj ection flow va s est_! mated at

, j%3E The primary side flow through the heat exchanger is er.pa

I {to t ,e iriection flow plus the corresponding ECC recirculation flow ofThe primary inlet t empe r a tur e is therefore

equa tot

'.

This data was red into a simple heat exchanger design progt ace g

.

together with tube -length and shell diameter restrictior.s taken frca the Phase ,

III study.- The resultant heat exch.iger is described in rection 2.3 5

-| The tenperature of the vater in the recovery sump as a function oftime was then calculated ,for the 100t RCH break and the feeder size break,' Wusing the folleving assumptions:

tu - t i al sump wa t e r t empe r a tur e i s for the 100% RCH break and-

for the feeder size break. =

the heat input to the sump is equal to the decay heat of one reactor-

loop.

there is- one ECC and cne RCS heat -eachanger operat.ional.-

the size and duty of the RCS heat exchanger is as described in the Phase-

III re;crt.

the Xays-London e.ethod. ( se e Appendix A s Re f . 8 ) wa s caed to determine the-

heat exchanger ef ficiency when oFarating at other design flevs and inlet< g

5 ' oar *r^tura$-all the water frca the break is present at the recovery sump and there _ is-

uniform m.txing.

.

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- - - - - - -

The recovery surnp tayerature transients sich result' are Pfesent'

i n Appe nd i x A.Prom the sta r t of the re cove ry erod e , the decay heat of on. */;Nh(Elf

reactor loop is less than the heat removal capability of the ECC heat -

0*.

exchanger. Therefore the PCS heat removal capability does not af fect the ) (jsizing of the Ecc heat exchariger. For the 100% ROH break the ECC injection

14'

temperature decreases quickly demonst-rating that very soon (ie, within a fewminut e s ) af ter the recovery >>Se begins there is excess heat renoval }4;+

c a pabilit y in t.he sys t eta . U t.he criteria for sizing the heat exchanger canbe relaxed ,to ermit the D'c on temperature to re. main above the design

d value of provided that the beat removed by theECC heat exc anger is at least equa to the decay heat of one reactor loop'

then the area of the ECC heat exchanger can be significantly reduced andI consideration could be given to also reducing the cooling wter flow through

the I:CC . heat exchanger.s

|

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5.O HYDP,AULIC DATA

3 1

I _ j 'lte layout of the systers is wt

ccapletely finalized. However, in AECL 's ud gen e n t , the hydraulic data usedin the; aulysis is a reasonable representation of the overall ECC systen flowresistance and of the relative distribution of the resista.nce between the

-I various partions of the ECC system. It should be adequate for the present*1survey analysis. When the ECC system layout is cenpletely finalized the

hydraulic data vill be updated for the future sa f ety analyses. It is expected

I that any changes vill be minor and vill not affect the overall results of thepre sent survey analyse s. -

In order to limit the number of ecses to be studied in the presentI pha s e of the sa f e ty a n a ly s i s i t wa r nec e s s a ry to s ymin e t r i z e the ECC s ys t ernhydraulic data. This treatment of the data was justified by the met recentproposals for the ECC syste:n layout pre;cred by EPDC which are almost c:n-I pletel.y sy: metric.

Consequently the safety analysis assu:.es that the resistance asso-clated with the Train B flowpath to the ECC/PHT isolation valve station on theop;osite side of the PCB f rc<n the Train B G'C injection containment pe r.e tr a-tion, applies to ea^ of the flow re t ha from de accumulator tanks to the fourECC/PHT isolation tv - stations. '. reais w.ce was selected because it was

IL the largest res'sta..a . To achilve sy=etry in tne actual ECC systen layouteach flevpaso would } ;v. to have a similar resistance to the one selected.for the piping between the ECC/PHT isolation valve station and the reactor

I. outlet headers,. the average resist $nce of the fou.r flonaths was used. Forthe' piping between the ECC/PHT isolation valves and the reactor inlet headersthe same approach wa s ased. - An average value was used because the resistance

. of the piping yas small relative to the restriction orifice in these lines.Thus the size of the ortf tce could be adjusted, if necessary, to make the

,

resistance ir. each ficw path the same.

, Thi-hydraulic data used as a ksis for the safety analysis is. included as . Appendix !B'.

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6.O SYSTr.M EVALUATICN d |{

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This ~ection wi'l be issued once the safety analyses involving thi *iihi, /' .1,

' bECC sy s t em ar e cenpl e t e .'l

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->7.0 CCtK'LUSIONS AND FICOKMECATIONS*; 1

:

W The 1:CC avo t e:n vill act f olleving a IIC A to remove residual and 3

d ec a y he a t f r cas th e r e a c t o r co r e a rd to l i m i t f uel dunge . Th e sy s ten is s ."

] designed to tolerate any single active cw;onent failure during short term Y'

H operation or either an active or a pesive cco;onent f ailure during long t naopration. ne DX s ys t etu is aut cu t i c a l ly in i t i a t ed and 6x a no t r equi r e

f)g oprator action in the long terra.$]| It i s r ec cen e nd ed th a t t '. e ma t e r i a l u s e d fo r th e DNS tank be I

changed frota carbon steel to stainless steel to simplify Grrosion protection. '

At present, it is planned to use chettical control to prevent corrosion hc*cVerthis requires gcod circulation in the tank esacially since the tank is ventedto atmosphere. If a stainless steel tank were used the size of the p'ap used

j to recirculate the water can be red aced since the pu:rp wuld cnly be required1J to tra i n t a i n the t empe ra t ur e in th e ICAS tank.

s It is r eccc. mend ed tha t the design require. rents for th e ECC he a tt.' e F.CC inj ec tion t ett;erature to e.xceed

['g xcha n p r be r ev i e we d to p r n i t[ hh provided that the heat e.x: hanger is always able to remove the decayheat of one reactor icop af t er the start of the reccvery mode. Thisreccetzendation is reannable given the conservatism of the assumptions used tocalculate the recovery sump water temperature at the beginning of the recoverymcd e .

It is essential that th e F;CC hydraulic data be revised once thefinal ECC layout in th e Fr ac to r Ce n ta i nm e n t Building and in the Eractor Auxi-liary Dutiding has been finalized. These data should be com; t red qualita-tively to the hydraulic data used f or the survey analyses .

Since the t emp r a t ar e c f the ac cumul a to r wa t e r t ank s and the EC'dStank is signif t:antly increased al:ve the ref erence design and Phase IIIstudy, the a:cumulator tanks wil' 5. ave to be insulated and/or a heater.

provided in series with the loca'. recirculation pump. Fo r th e Erd s t ank , a

larger heater cuid be requir ed. B e heating requirement should be rev;evedin the detailed design stage.

H

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Q{["AsdefinedintheContracttheassessrantisdividedintothree@ @@$$53E[$iNikh M!I

-|_distinct phases, each with separate delinection of work and objectives:

Phase 1: Review of Reference Codes, Regulations and Designcriteria

Phase 2: System and Event Functional Analysis

Phase 3: Additional Special Topics

In Phase 1, the appropriateness and completeness of the safetyare revieved.

I' design criteria established for the nuclear isi .d desigt.ne Phase i sumary report was issued in Augu.st M '.he reportpresents a goneral shnrtary of the reviev of the criter'n completed ine

Phase 1:vith a brief outline of the rest important conclusions andI r ecomendations.

This report sumarizes the verk den Phases 2 and 3.- The

I- overall objectives of Phase 2 vork for the echnical evaluation

are to:

(a) Confirm that the design of the nuclear isla*.6 cceplies with theI.- design criteria established in Phase 1.

Confirm that the safety analysis is both adequate and-(b)Ej complete.-

.

and (c) Confirm that the reactor is stable and vill operate as-e 4''58^'d-5

One objective of this Sumary Report i,s to otmar!ze hov vellnuclear power plant. has met these three ove: all objectives.''

-$ theInformation to support these su~.rnary statements is drevn from all themPhase 2 task reports for each.of the products.

Phase 2 of the technical assesament corcains the follovingproducts:

09021: Design Basis Events Reviev09022: Event Sequence Reviev09023: Preliminary Tra.nsient/ Accident Analysis Validation

.

09024: Independent Transient / Accident Analysis09025: Process Systems Review

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I 09026: Instrumentation and Control Systems Review i09027: Peview of Reactor Core Systems and Puelu

It should be noted here that in Product 09024 independent ianalysis of plant transients and accidents is done to supplement the 3

.

e

Product 09023 review of the available safety arsalysis. 24cause this'

reviewed analysis was preliminary i.n riature, it was considered preferable4

(

to perform suf ficient independent analysis in Product 09024 rather thanvait for the fiaal analyses to become available for review,

t

The objectives of Phase 3 vork are to address special topics4

i

arising from the activities of Phases 1 and 2 or identified by EhTI.,Phase 3 contains the folloving products.

09031t Single Channel Event Analysis09032: Extension to Product 09022 Event Sequence Reviev

]c 09033: Shutdovn System Trip Ccverage Assesseent09035: Startup Simulations09037: Dryout Probability Assessnent

i 09039: Reactivity insertions and Pover Excursions09040: Reconnendations Sumary

i 09041: Shutdovn Systems Reliability Assessnent.i

In this report, the results of the various reviews and analyses,

Fare discussed in the framework of certain "s;>ecial topics". These are

,

CIRD'E plant issues that extend across the boundaries of the specificproduct verk areas. This approach provides convenient access to theinformation and aids comprehension.

'ihe presentation of infort:.ation under these special topics isintended to rank in order of ir:portance any of the conclusions andnot

recornendations made in the product reports, The choice of the special<

topics is also not claimed to be exhaustive but it does provide coveragei of the e.,:re major issues identified.

Plant Stability and Control<

The reviev of plant stability and control concluded that the,

reactivity control devices provided meet the intent of the relevantgeneral design criteria. However, analysis of pcvar canoeuvres and otherplant transiert

in Product 09024 ahoved tfat the ceutron pcver is not,vell contre 11ed under these cond k; @IQf51ns

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translents vere run for too short a period of tiroe, .:.d the perturbationsused may be too srall to excite any inherent nor.~1inearities. Analysis i idone by AECL indicated a potential steata dnen level instability. Theanalysis also sho ?d that the recirculation flov is unstable vhan a ?recirculation flev control valve tira zonatant near the realistic value i

ft is used, further analysis should L. done to confirm that adepate *

[$ margins to instability exist,

g An assessrant of the reactivity control devices reliabilityg conc 2uded that no unsafe loss of reactivity control is predicted at

credible frequencies. -

Core Heat Receval During Normal Operation

In norul operation, fuel cooling is provided by the priraryg coolant system and associated equipcont and heat sinks. The review of5 the systec5 contributins to the function of heat removal fro: the cor*

during no .a1 reactor c;eration indicate that the function vill generallyh h hhbph$y"ek|jj,AhM9Mf4dM7f ShM@dh%kMMulGRdhbalhe&M&MNgfMd@d"hh 'ddd,pf

Core Heat Removal During Accidents

h h8

np4wap-^p-'e-" epa-a8 nmaaQ A number of fuel cooling concerns have been raised in the event5 sequence assessments done by AECL. The critical event sequences

i ger,erally involve less of heat sink in the c:edium to long term and can be.

divided into three general categories:

1. Event seqance limited by operator unreliability.

| 2. Event sequence limited by equiprant unreliability.

3. Event sequence reqv, iring analysis support to justify thestability of the event sequence end conditions or ass.ss theconsequ ence s.

.

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t for sequ$nces initiatW by loss of feedvator, the min ,'

contribution to the loss of feedvater is the tripping of the norullyoperating feedvater or condensate extraction pumps. This high frequencyg

J is judged to place unacceptable demanda on the operator. For sequences! limited by the oper ator, it is roccer:> ended that a reviev of the Alani/j sequences be undertaken to determine if an increased reliance on tima17operator action is justified. Appropriate training and procedures abouldI also be considered. Total loss of Class 3 and 2 electrical pover

supplies is credible, based on an assumed unreliability of 8 x 10*8 for,

the standby diesel generator set. Class 2 syste:n reliability,

I improvenents by design changes and/or teore frequent testing areq recor:reended.

A review of the prell.?n4ry safety analysis revealed a number,

of deficiencies in the ther::chydraulic analyses codes which could affecte

fuel cooling results, nerefore, independent AECL analysis vas done toclarify the conc 3rns. The analysis results shov that the fuel andchannel related safety targets are satisfied in all cases but one. Inthe stagnation feeder break, the pressure tube is predicted to strain and

n contact the calandria tube in violation of a safety target,f Recomendations to alleviate this problem include re.vaving certain

j] conservatism from the analysis, or accepting contact and analyzing its-

consequences.

l'

Analysis of small break vithout high pressure ukeup shovs the twhen the energency condenser depressurization is initiated, natural

[ circulation f ails and a prolonged fuel heatup occurs. lthough thefuel-related parameters are acceptable, it is recome 2ed that a generalreviov of events which could lead to this type o! behaviour should be,

conducted.,

* The analyses also indicate that the e:>ergency injection systemf is ef f ective in cooling Qvn the fuel . Tvo specific situations are

identified which are not addressed in the analysis: effectiveness ofrecovery injection to cool the af fected channel for the header break vitha feeder check valve stuck open, and the ef f ectiveness of injection for ai feeder break,

Core Heat Re:cval During Shutdovn

The systems required for core heat reenval under shutdownconditions include the uin circulation system, the min steam andfeedvater system, the coorgency condenser systein, the residual heatremoval systm and the min ccqenent cooling systm. A number ofrecomandations are ude to inprove the function of these systems undershutdovn conditions.

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Initisting Events -

.

ne. postulated initiating evente considered in the V -.

design documntation have been compared against a list postu a e '

- g[: ' initiating events e iled usin Canadi g g s,og . f, | .

, -

Isiing'

hNota e aoonYthe freque s rs

I malfunctions o control computere, spurious opening of the emergency pcondenser condensate line valves,-and inadvertent opening of the lines to Lthe residual heat removal- system.

A neber of inf requent events that are not addressed in the;

3ocuantation are loss of service stems, moderator system failures- an end shield failures. Based on experience some of these system

f ailures can result in severe chal ngea to the integrity of the primary -;circuit boundary and the attuctural integrity of the reactor assembly.

Single Channel Events

The comparison of limiting initiating events in . J W and-g! AECL lists it , ified eight events not considered in-the L analyses.-

13 Three of thess are single channel events .vhich are the s ect of AECLanalyses.- ne' assessment of ssure tube rupture shoved that

m

Assuming the pressure t e rupture occurs,- the consequences areacceptable,

The flov blockage analysis shewed that the most likely blockagevould not be sufficient to cause fuel sheath dryout in the affectedchant.e1. - To furtter strengthen the plants' capability to deal vith flowe

th_ - blockage, 'it is recorrended that local measureunts for all channel flevsbe made available to the cperater in the main control room.-

I - geometries af ter the fuel bundles ~ ara ejected-into contairunent.- In the_- ;

End fitting' f ailure analysis was done assu:ning a' range of fuel 4

case .of the most likely_ geocietry af ter the end- fitting f ailure (scattered '

3J = elenents) .- the oxi6stion release is calculated to-be about one third of-,

the total channel inventory. It .is recoceended that: releases -fromg i rm, _' contairnent -ae.d public doses be calculated, takingiinto account the

~

|

'

- contaireent response to the event.

". ~ - Event sequence : analysis for the single channel events reveale<! .that the' loss of class'3. and 2 pover following a pressure tube rupture is

.

credible.- ,

f|!

E w,, -v-,

-. . . _ _ _ . _ _ _. . . .

, w m .,e n , m m m n. w a.v m .a m u w w m a m abmic twy, a cm,j

'W i".

. ,' .Y n

. Mitigating Systems bI| y;

Systtas required to stabilize the plant follovin8 't initiati d) events are called n.itigating systems, noir unrollability dictates the i

course of the event sequences and the event se,y%Q{%potntMh@WWEguenceend :

1(.The f; f||lphi g ],{j?M y g pTiS g[ Hfrequeneies, IQ qp

P"G$%@!$I T- TM MA MPs. j1

i 2N eu k s Df in particular, a?& gdgdjl.MdijMdM

"T@WlIIgp~AM assess:ent of the shutdovn systeis reliability was done inf,

ed

Product 09041, and confirmed the unavailabilities calculated by '"a1svas noted huever that tha cocraon cause f ailure rates (which ve[r"Fg Ige oadopted for the AECL analysis) vere :nsuf ficiently justified,

A variety of analyses have been per formed by AECL vhich supporgthe ability of each shutdevn system acting alone to terminate design,

tasis power transients. Large dovntotor and header breaks have beenanalyzed in Product 0902 A assuming only the wderator dump system isavailable. The margins to fuel breakup and prompt criticality aresubstantial, The func tional reviev of the shutdovn systems identified,

j several issues which need to be resolved. In particular, the measurementof neutron flux by the in-core and out-of-core power range detectors doesnot adequately take into account the offects of underator level changes.

The reviev of the preliminary safety analysis revealed severaldeficiencies in ter.s of completeness. One of these is a lack ofanalysis ever a range of initial povers and event severities, Therefore,HCL perfor:tod a trip coverage assessment

MNhdyas descrQed behv. [N$ chm"RQEMEMEh's53.I.N2U0Eb 'MEhave been identified f or further consideration include a@sull bretk vith

i bui

Class 3 pever available and a LOCA vith a recirmalation ;cy dischargecheck valve stuck o;en.

Dryout Analysis

T' ZQ [M lk dia 'k chMpf Amng e cencerns raised" vere [the" lac channel analV8is, and)ConCornJof a hot about the

h d'ddnMind dMindjW{&&k?h55ESESESE5S55555The AECL analysis sheved that the criterion is.

4

exceeded for slov loss of flow control and slov less of pover controlpesign solutions involving changes in lov flev and everpovercasos,

setpoints, and in the nom! %1 full pover recirculation flev have tensuggested.,

.

.

C M 4 &Cl?s

. - v2 -.s

,

k

b $ * h $ d b ND'M 8"NM*W.w > - *.;

|

g'' '

V y .;wg- __ t . ,, _ _ _ _

~ -k h-

.

point Kinetics

An important issue is the use of point kinetics by@ to y

analyze transients and accidents. To evaluate the adequacy o t point

I kinetics approach, a postulated LOCA vas analyzed by AECL using both a 3DAynamic code and point kinetics. Geed agreement was obtained as long asthe trip time determined with spatial kinetics was used in the pointkinetics simulation. It was concluded that point kinetics is adequate to $

- analyze acf.ident scenarios provided that the delay tim of the accidentscenario of interest is known a priori.

In the overall technical assessment, the positive voidreactivity coefficient was not considered a detrimental feature. Ow,*

(g the p1snt control problems outlined above are resolved, and, ing- particular, the therm 1 calibration problem, it is expected that the

control of pover and other key parameters can be shovn to be adequate.

Trip Coverage

'Ite shutdown syst ip coverage assesscent done in Product

g 09033 made use'of AECL and analysis results to construct tripi

3 coverage maps for the various iting event:. The majority of the'

significant findings relate to vednesses in trip coverage belovGenerally, analyses or further revievs have been recocr ended to resoi a

j these issues. To inprove primary trip coverage for_ loss of regulatione"ents resulting in slovly increasing power when y p steam is used,an overpower trip with trip setpoint just above Le- on the coderatordump system is suggested. To provide backup coverage. for slov less ofI. flev' events and slev loss of power control with a cross link f ailure ofthe recirculation flev control, addition of a lov flov trip on the liquid

g rods system is suggested. In addition, eliminating the sharipg of flux4

5 detectors between primary and backup trips, and between shutdovn systemsis recoc tended. It was also recomended that a trip coverage assessoent

<

of loss of moderator and end shield cooling events be made in conjunction

f vith analyses recomended in Product 09022.

Severe Reactivity Insertion Analysis.,

_

,

Because of the Chernobyl accident, assessment of severe> reactivity insertion events has become desirable.- An AICL analysis ofreactivity insertions beyond the design basis was perforr.ed under Product

I' 09039. As part of- the study, it vas established that during a pover:4

. excursion, the only mechAnis:n for fuel and channel f ailure vould be fuelbreakup due to average -fuel enthalpy in excess of 300 cal /g. The main-I

finding of the analysis is that either shutdovn system would effectively.

terminate a-guillotine break of tvo headers, or a simultaneous guillotine"

failure of more than four steam mains. Since these events are much nare- ' severe than any of the design basis accidents thare are no

recomendations or actions required..

'

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. 7(- Reecceendations Succ.ary I;

All of the Technical Assessment conclusions and recemondatio *'

a re au c.arized syste cby-system in Product 09040. Actions are suggests 4,

1

to aid the implementation or dispositioning of the racccrandat' ions, A (y cover sheet is provided with each system package listing any [q recorr:endations which are judged to have a high probability of a major *

effect on the plant cost or schedule. ki

Yj It is concluded that, implerAntation of the changes recomended| in this report vould strengthen a design which is already basically

q sound.

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<RECOMENDATICNS SUKKARY - PRODUCT 09040 ji/o:Wa

n.,e f,

.

e+MI RECOMMENDATION f : 331001 ap;, ;

s. m.NNSYSTEM (S): 331/332 c. a

REFERENCE: Product 09025 Task 81.1/5.1, Section P.2 3,,

DESCRIPTION OF Saf ety Class Criterion Based on High Pressure Makeup .

BECOKMENDATION Sy 2 L em

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DISPOSITION

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~Qtic.. !y e j'

RECOMMENDATION is 331006 Q -( ( [3]' ;, ,j *.

SYSTEM (S): 331y,

*

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REFERENCE: Product 09025. Task 4.1/S. I. Secti on C ,2. 2.1, /,

\DESCRIPTION OF Safety Class U; grading - Teeder Ficv Heasurecent ~

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RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY - PRODUCT 09040-

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RECOMMENDATION f 331009 I

g|SYSTEM (S)1 331 ,|

i!I Product 09025. Task 11.2/5 2, section P.2.5.4,|,)REFERENCE: Ta.sk it.1/5.1, Secti on P. 2.5.

-DESCRIPTION OF Plant Process Condition Transients l

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,

4 ()< RECCHMENDATION f: 331025 1,

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[. SYSTEH(S): 331'

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}ti REFERENCE: Product 09025. Task 4. 2/5. 2, Secti on C.2 3.1c/d. 1.<

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S IMPLEMENTATICNREQUIRED PRIORd; TO PLANT STAGE NO:44

e

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N,Ji1 1 rp

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..

RECOMMENDATION i: 331037

SYSTEM (S): 331/I ?

RETERENCE: Product 0902a, Tuk 1.0, Section * 0

DESCRIPTION Of Flow Stability in Primary SysteeRECOMMIND A TION,

OR CONCLUSICN The recircul ation f1 v iJ unstable if a recirculationg fi cv co nt r ol val ve t i:e co ns t an t cl os e t o t he,

0 r eal i s ti c val ue i s us ed. It is rexceended that4

f urther studies of the ficv stability be made toe r.s ur e t ha t suf ficient marg!n to the instabilityI e xi s t s .

CATECORIZATICN: B

{ REQUI AED ACTICN This is a Mter.t! ally serious problem which needs toAND/OR CCMMENTS be investigate: i n more detail . Much can be learned

- f rce cct:i sslora ng tes ts , parti cularly hotcoemi ssi oni ng t es t s wi t h s t art up s t eac i tQ ect e d i nt othe core. HWever, it is not clear that this vill

B_ yevi de eneup ee nfidence aNut opration at power,'t i *

,

hivf$$d.ae2Tddh , Code predietiens played avery 1:;cet ant rol e 1:1 e discovery of, ano the,

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IMP LEMENT AT 20N' REQV18ED PRIOR 11

TO PLANT STAGE NO:

DISPOSIT ION :'

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DESCRIPTICH OF 0xygen _ Suppression in Steam

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-

'a@@'

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],|RECOMMENDATION h 331067 t

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REFERENCE: Product 09025, Task 11.5, Section 4.6. j

I DESCRIPTION OF Editorial Changes to NIRA Document S-33100-PP-100-001RECOMMENDATION q09 CONCLUSICH p

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REFERENCE: Product 09MS. ' 7ask 11 3. Section 4. 3.

DESCRIPTION OF Editorial Coe=erity tg 'jIRA Document S-33100-V A-910-oolRECCMMENDATION And S-33100-YS-o09-0U2

__

OR CONCLUSION .;

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CATEGORIZATION: D~

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TABLE OF CONTENTS }}''

g

-

1.0 SUWARY 3,4 ),

f'

'

2.0 INTRODUCTION ;

30 METHODOLOOY

31 Ceneral32 Process Systees 4

33 Pressure Vessels and Heat Exchangers ,

'1i 34 Selection, Welding and Inspection of Materials, and jInservice Inspection ,

,

- 4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS,

#4.1 Process Syste':s

. s'' '

4.1.2 odes and Standards of 1983 Edition EmployedInternationally

4.2 Pressure Vessels / Heat Exchangers

"''#@$$$$IEEEE3EIiffffhodes and Standards of 1963 Edition Employe4.2.2Internationally

' 43 Selection, Welding and Inspection of Materials, andInservice Ins;ection

i

5.0 CCNC'.USIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

5.1.1 for Process Systems

|5.1.2 Pressure Vessels and Heat Exchangers5.1 3 Selection, Welding and Inspe0 lon of Materials.,

and Inservice Inspection,

I i

5.2 Reco cendations| |

6.0 RE FE RENC ES

7.0 APPENDICES

Appendix A: Review of Codes and Standards for Process Systems

. Design

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TABLE OF CONTERTS,

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(continued) -

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NiAppendix Bt . Review of Codes and' Standards for. Pressure Yessels/ i

~ 'y,Y..,. Heat Exchangers Design .

;

; fi:3Appendix C Review of Haterials Standardsk.

Appendix Di Review of,

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,'1.0 SUMMRY t. |

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This report presents a sursary of the review conducted on t.be * |

Codes and Standards employed for the de of process systems, pressureNuclear Power Plant. -vessels and heat exchangers in the >

The review determined the adequac an pleteness of the^

? WvCodes / Standards (1975 edition') used in the plant desi

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I y,

..

Q Qg They are completeI and generally adequate for use n ..e 33 Systems, pressure

vessels / heat exchangers, for the selection and use of materials, and for-the inservice inspection of components. But some significant differences

I and chan es exist between the two editions of the Codes / Standards which*< Q :f,o j .;f, ;.jg :L :: Q'

}.

'b i .M .iAf/<

) , !"These differences / changes are identified to be in the areas'

oft ,

design for system overpressure protections-

review and certification requirements of design reports for-

pressure vessels and heat exchangersi;

rules for design and analyses of critical cceponents of-

pressure vessels and heat exchangers.

Inservice inspection of metal containment components-

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2.0 INTRODUCTIONe

h This report deals with the review of Co e. and Standardsa conducted as Task 05 work in Product 09012 of the 'J1 echnical

Assessment. Basically, the scope and the objectives of this review are*

i as follows: Tri .,

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of this report. Discussions of saltent poin:4 of review resu1*.s are'

presented in Section 4 The conclusions rea:ned from the review and the'

recom:endations are sue.tari:ed in Section 5.

$ jocui:ents referred inIn Section 6, the'

the review are listed. In dection 7, tre co20rehensive reports fecm thei

three review parta are appended.

. .

'hecughout this report, wherever reference is made t:'

4h 9t,ih the code ispi!ed [3Ax|Ytion up'to and including wint 1ddenda for the@ |Edappl! cation of the 9 edition, wi:n no addanca, cureei y .a use )

,internationally. -

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30 METHOD 01,0GY

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current version of the standard to review these topics, the

i 95555E552W| erms applicable, suitable, adequate, ~ appropriate are! considered to have the same meaning.)

!'

' In carrying out the review of adequacy and completer.ess thefollowing steps were followed:

1. The design requiretents which should typically be addressed foreach type of pressure retaining cottponent were identified.

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[{$f[c$vIraeoft desikn require $eNts w%

assesse .

| BRIP"*llfor8hedest'rno.The standards currently used internationa'

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3,2 Process Syste:S i yi'g ; . .?3 A " process system" means a system associated 'vith the operation ''

of a nuclear power plant, and ecnsists of an assembly of items including .

supports connected to perform one or more designated functions with thet,oundaries extending either to a component that provides isolation 'fromthe adjacent system or to a discharge or vent port.

In the design phase, classification of process syste:S intosafety classes provides criteria for the process system design from the

{{ pressure t>oundary integrity viewpoint, and, the basis for the design and@ construction requirements to assure the desired system / component

integrity and reliability.

p,

their acceptability to the process system design.' Finally a comparison is made of the Task 03 and Task 041,ists| (Ref.1 and 2) of the Codes and Standards to highlight the dif ferences

and omissions of significance to the system design free the safety' viewpoint and to outline the significance of the differences between the

1975 and 1983 editions of the Codes and Standards to the process systemd e s i gn .

l .A comprehensive re;crt of the review is attached as Ap;endix A

to tnis report.

' 3,3 Pressure Vessels and Heat Exchangersi

In current design ;ractice, the basic design require:ents for atypica; pressure vessel, as an exa:nple, a tube-in-shell heat exchanger,cover the follcwing areas:

,

1) Calculat!cns for i e pressure vessel sizing, including thevessel wall thickness, and for its external supports,

11) Analysis of crit 1031 joints in the vessel assecbly,

111) Selection of materials for the vessel;

iv) Calculations and analysis for dasigning the internals of thevessel.

TheCodesandStandardsusedinh for the design ofpressure vessel (Ref.1) are evaluated for "their acceptability to the

} basic requirements defined above.

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The final step is to identify the Codes and Standards (Ref. 2) . k

e ioyed international 1 in the current pressure vessel design practices, f PhIg~ IM h''Yg

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h des / Standards are complete for the pressure vessel , (;the-

(des gn

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there are dif f erences/ omissions between tne .

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editions of the Codes / Standards and the sig cance o eseidifferences that could affect the pressure vessel design in

terms of current design practices.I

A comprehensive report of the review as above is a;; ended asAppendix B Table 5 of this report.

34 Selection, Welding and Inspection of Materials, and Ir. serviceInspection

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*ih.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS .

1[.9 I -

4.1 Process Systems y.f['

^

The salient results of the review performed per Section 3.2 areI listed below. Discussions, as appropriate, follow each set of results. 1

For additional details, references are made to the ccaprehensive report i

Appendix A, appended in Section 7.I i

4.1.1 Codes and Standards of Edition esployed ir

Codes and'St'

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.

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Standards of the Hydraulic Institute f-

l'Power Test Code PTC-32.1, Nuclear Steam Supply System-

I5 N-193, Overpressure Protection of Low Presswe Systems-

connected to the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.

| B R'6ther Codes andEKEEEEEER-

randards listed in the Task 03 list asg e:nployed for the casign of g ' lant are not applicable to nuclear

,

Exanples of these Codes / Standards areftWA?fM,nt desig%These are generally' applicable - to equippe n and| | process systems.

gbcaterials.| i

i Standards (Ref. 1, 2). Some of these Codes and Standards are reviewed 7nI Appendices B and C of this task report, and in Task 06 free the equipment

design viewpoint. The Italian Codes and Standards are not reviewed in| i

this part of Task 05.,

[

The QQ[if'#-]@cde Class is applied to the processsystem in its cesign on t. e basis of the Saf ety class of the system. The~

,

I' safety classification is based on the safety function the systes isrequired to perform. There are four safety classes for the systems,

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nacely SC-1,SC-2, SC-3 and Conventional. .

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The design of a nuclear system and its components to thei i

y;Irequirements of the ASME Code Section III assures. an acceptable de !_ o f '.etructural- and pressure boundar ' integrity. The approach taken= in ~'

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NE '!

. |'

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, A similar approach prevails !nternationally, but the method in whic t these code requirements are'

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cceplied with varles. |

From the above, it is concluded that the Codes / Standards,

employed in y k are acceptable.

h l.2 Codes and Standards of 1983 Edition Employed Internationally.

>'j (See Section 4.2 of- A endix A).

For the are used.Mc we ver ,,

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refore, it is concluded that the codes andff3W! That is, the are

si to the fode,standards employed inj or process systems design a e cceplete in

1 terms of the Codes anc tandards employed internationa .y

A ccmparison of th fitMOof the Codes and~

Standards with those used-in Tdent1 ries a significant dif f erencebetween the two editions of e s/ Standards that may !apact on the

overpressure protection deg 'n er he systems. This diff acence arisesfrom the revisions to thefdtR S4 : odes curing the period 1975 to 1983due to changes in design pntlosophy. towards tetter. design / protect!)n fori

Safety Systems and Components. Details of tais difference are describedin Section 4.4 of Appendix A. 3riafly, tnis difference relates to:

acceptability of certain types only of overpressure ;rctection-

devices, e.g relief valves are more acceptable than rapturei

discs,

requirements for overpressure protection reports;-

requirements for connections between the protective device anda

,the adjoining system component;

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' requirements on relief capacities of t :9 protective device.-

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The salient results of the review performed per Section 3,3'ap, ghffoutilned below with the discussions, as necessary, following each set of SiMf{results. Appendix B in Section 71s referred to for details as " -Q|

.

qappropriate.

I|4.2.1 Codes and Standards of Edition Employed in

Codes and Standards, of effective year employed 'in theant for the design of pressure vessel /h exchangers are

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Standards' . . -

tandards (1968 edition)' -

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; * The standards are used widely in the U.S. A. and Canada.

$. The Standar re extensively used in the U.S. A. and Canada in the

|J dest n of conventional, non-nuclear pressure vessels. The $ $ odes and

Standards are used extensively for nuclear press e vessels in the'

rent international design practices. Therefore.,. .

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It also specirles the design stress limitsn ._ on the basis of design category, safety classification and " essential"*jh| status of the pressure retaining ccoponents (see Section 3.2.4 of

Appendix B). The adequacy of the Codes and Standards listed above arei s.pN $; determined based on the criteria and classifications described in the

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}j ", HIRA document.

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Verification of the Codes and Standards employed inh fagainst the basto design requirements for pressure vessels / hew

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exchangers shows that

basic calculations for vessel sizing, vall thickness and its-

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the pressure test require. tents are covered by .' .@ v*hiTM ~kJ- 6 "

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(Ref. 3) and arej be conservative with respect to the[g.

verified t. equirements from the pressure boundary integrityfdF4M5 -

Viewpoint. The design stress limits for cernponents in designcategory I are the same as those specified for t.evel A s ry +e

~ *

|pg}$($gg i _conditions

the requirements for the design'or the vessel internals and for-

protection against flew induced vibrations are not specif fed.

from the above It is shown that, for the project s;ecificdesign categorization and safety classifications of the pressure ,

; vessels / heat exchangers, the codes and standards ecployed are generally| adequate, except that the requirements for vessel Internals design, aad

protection against flow induce: vibrations are not s;ecified. It is a

noted that these two requirements are not covered by '.he Codes andStandards but are based on the wide usage in cerent design practices.

i

4.2.2 C0 des and Standards of 1983 Edition Emp10yed International;/

The codes and standards employed internationally in cerentdesign practices for the design of pressure vessels and heat exchangersi

i are listed in Section 3.3 of Appendix B. Briefly, in addition to th:se

used in the' jesign (Section 4.2.1 above), the folicwir.g are used:'l

The'~ tre basically the same as the @ . odes

and, hence, th ir reqiirements' art met throu.h the ode.

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These changes / differences are detailed in the Tables 5 to 7, of |

I Section 4.2.3, Appendix B. These changes /dif ferences are grouped into:

A change which may result in a significantSigrtificant:increase in the structural integrity or the reliability of the

-

I e retaining boundary to an extent that the existingdesign may be inade uate in raintain!n its safet

unct 1 on . -

PEE :.

Not .Significant: ,-

That is, the existingj _

design le adequate to maintain e . saf ety function withoutincorporating the change.

Briefly, some of the significant changes that adversely affect<

I jthe existing design are

the cwner's (third party) review and jurisdictional authority's!| -

rts for each code ecertification of the Des! ,R .Ecc fonent and supports . N_ . - .

,

, -.

the rules governing the assumptions for and analysis of-

stresses in the critical parts of the pressure vessel(Subsection NS-3200);i .

I' the detailed analysis in local stress regions, for example, in.

the vicinity of openings (Subsection NS-3300);'<

the restrictive rules governing the ' dimensions ~ of the openings-

relatt ve to the vessel; similar rules for the spacing.of.theopenings, and for the vessel thickness and reinforcements based

'!

[ gon the allovable stresses (Subsections NB-3200 and NC-3200)

, .5

'

Another significant change, not listed in the Table 5 to s,

I related to the candatory recuirements for -impact testing of'

g7 QMM_ The impact testing is subject tot

|' several exem

ns based on s ze, wall thickness, and type of materials' design, cctn,Mnents ir. Class 2 and 3 systems are reviewed(

used. Inspecified,'where appropriate, based on similarI

ard it, sacconsiderat!.ons and on t saf ety f unctions. A review of this as et;

should be cone for the design, using.the rules of the

I ccde to 1-dentif y the c Aponents inYo1Ved. The reVieV should

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examine the material proporties and physical dimensions' to confira thatthe pressure boundary ts adequately r611able. Where impact testing is-judged necessary and was not performed, the effects of a potentialf ailure should be evaulated.

Significant chafges arlslng from a comparlson of the'Sth (1968)and 6th editions of the 1 Standards relate tot

the limits on size, maximu.1 operating and design pressures-i

the limits on unsupported tube length.-

4,3 Selection, Welding and Inspection of Materials and InserviceInspection

i

The important results of. the review per Section 3 4 are.discussed below. Appendices C and 0 in Section 7 of this report are tobe referred to for details.

itionused_inthe[h[h[gThe Codes and Standards of

design for the % $ M Q ,

ares

.

The flest three standards are used widel in the U.S.A. andCanada, and hence are also acceptacle for ~use-in@ 'he My ,Standards, whlen.are also used extensively in the . . and Canada, are.

sultacle for use in the design of conventional, non-nuclear litycc mponent s . The changes / differences between the edi tionsof the Codes and Standards involve:

A review of these changes /differen 3. Indicate that they do not

have an adverse effect on the ex in selection and use ofmaterials which are based on the ditt of Codes and Standards.

The exceptions to the Coder. and Standards cited by(Ref. 4) for the selection and substitution of materials, an econditions /critecta under which the Individual exceptions may be utt11:edare acceptable because, in general, stallar practlee of qualiftedsubstitution of materials prevatis in Canada. However, in Canadianpractlee, the justification fer substitution of materials 15 only interms of technics 1 aupertorlty and is not based on econoalc or supplyreasons.

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different levels of visual inspection-

eddy current examination of steam Eenerator tubes-

qualification cf inspection personnel-

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alternatives in inspection c}cles:-

re:-str procedu*es for --

| changes to exemption o components from inspection:< -

I requirements for more inspection of residual heat removal and-

'emergency core c001158 syste:si

Ii new requirements f or visual _ inspection of metal containment i-

components and the acceptance standards for inspection:i

reduced test frequency for Inservice testing of pum,s-

te perature criteria for system pressure tests:-

A review of-these di enges/ changes between the_ __ __

- de, and of the requiremen s ofStandards for plants And s that the= following aspects have an-

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5.0 CONCl,USIONS AND REC 0KMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

The following conclusions are reached from the review.

5 1.1 Process Systems

The Codes and Standards listed below of

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The following Codes and Standards, of Ny.. d'ition, used in themy@/a Q^ des i.gn of the ;~,14hh

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My$e$Gffpy g$ge$'W$ N S Mh4,A@ lim,hThh;h[$ N N @A@y, y,h?I?M.t.aM; pdm < qm ,AMNs

MMd cr% ypwymMM- bfh

M,9 ?|M$)y.MQ@|Q;;QRy$.ipqp@:;qG@dffy)x;&jM MgNfNede$$rw$$qn&gNWh@ai MMMf ddp sWN,

?hWh:k%y g %c h&:yy%,hd !4 fQyM

h@hM;Q@QQg@p; @%5 fNfd!@i ugh $ N M M %g @Q Q @ @,% @% y%;$6yWs P M @

' Q

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hhbbb bb b Ib b''

|r? view and certification require:ents Of iesign reports; see-

note below)

rules for stress ana'js!s of critical Occponents:1 - .

1

rales governing the ci:,ensions of the openin6s relative to the-

vessel,

requirecents for 1:;act testing of Class 2 at>d 3 Caponents,-

<

On the review and certification requirecents of design reports,it is to be noted that these requirements .iere added to ensure that, byreview, the design was done pr:;erly, and by certification, the

} m$ $r m$ s $ h h 5 8 R.O M S M E D % w w [k NfyWAqq!'Rpmqr "TGF[w$[thMNhh5Mh>p is olaced on the destpers.AW?'5Wi9M """hIhkhaccountability /responsiblitt for the dest

9%% %KTW?! WfGW|MNNMb3AfMhNENh I kbkdkh

ihbbh &&ww|f&ab%g&w&apggww w a h & $MN lh MMjNYh@

as M@ 2 x ens % Kf2*'T'WlTT QTM MWi &g g @&g g@$[$$f.Q MggQ[lIt is concluded that the above

IN W ych Y N&Gl RKRW7tdhnMMysigg- 16 -

:50097/C051

M/EMMME2MND,EEIEWMNDEMGI21H3MMEMUJMEEj7[(ME

_

. - - - - . - - - _ _ _.

_ __ _____ __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ ___

.

,e-...aem nm mmmame.asemanenemmmew Atmik iww of cauda tkntted-.

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513 Selection. Welding and Inspection of Haterials, and Inservice.jI Inspec tion ___p

f/'f ..h 3j b. h ff( /~' ' ;

.Nhff[| h- '{ff

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For plants, the 4 ! a

|$$$3M W MGWC3 is followed.s similar to that inAlthou h the objective in the t

the U : ode, there are major' erences ; ween the two with regard tothe c.spection details and requirements.

5.2 Recom .enda t ions

g Based on the above conclusions, the fol10ving reccer.endations'

i

3 are made:'

1 lFor Process A,s, tees .

. , g,i

''

'

. j '- --

~

For Pressure Vessels and Heat Exchangers a

1. Guidelines for the design of heat exchanger tubes against flovinduced vibrations should be provided.

d 2. Guidelines for the design of -internals in the pressurevessel / heat exchanger should be established.

3. Design reports for all code class cceponents and supportsshould be submitted for.a third party review and certification'

by the jurisdictional authority.

-"~ '

sos 7,co5,

. - - - - - . . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ . , . _- . . - - .

- . . _ , , .

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li . ReYiew of the component design details should be made to assesswhether any design modifications are necessary in order tosatisfy the changes to the Codes / Standards in' P.he area of 1ccalstress regions, allowable stresses, stress type classification,stress concentration f actors and the location of nozzles in thevessels.

I For Inservice Inspection

E MBEEEEEE"

2. Whether additional inspections are required or not should bedetermined for components of the residual heat removal systeesand the emergency core cooling syste:s.

The irspection program based on Y%perhor]meTwfth a totalQ 7 $ h should be3

reviewed to ensure that it can b%radiation exposure which would not require an unnecessarilylarge number of inspection personnel. If not, measures tolimit the extent of inspection should be considered to minimizeradiation exposure of inspection personnel.

For Materials

1. The Class 2 and Class[[h(nents which would require impactecc %

ensure that the pres ~2re toundary o[r ;he c:cpenent isId [d [ snould be reviewed totesti.a.g according to

adequat ely reliable, or that potential f ailure would not resultin unacceptable saf ety cor. sequences.

- 18 -C50097/C051

||

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7.0 APPENDICES 2, ;'

.

1- |

|Appendix As Review of Codes and Standards for %f rocessSystoss Design - #*

I

Appendix 8: Review of Codes and Standards for Pressure'Yessels/ Heat Exchangers Design

Appendix C: Review of Materials Standardsi . __

Appandix Di Review of 5 i . ,

5 .

*,

4

4

1

.'

.

.

- 20 -' ^'

:50097/C051 'N

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UNITED STATES, ''

!,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASillNGTON, D.C. 20555

Solicitation No. RS-NRR-,39426

Nuc! car Power Reactor Designinspection Services

Addendum:

PART III: Technical and Management Proposal

1

.

4

AECL Ref. 89-025 Rev. I. s recorj y,;s ce't'fd 1989 October 20inth.i 10I ' d.c.

in acc r 1 c c3 .,,':t'U fle:I n of !'Jerra3', ion/A t, ei ." ;; 0,1s __ 3 . _ _ _ ,__t ,

IOY' - b?--|$k -.. . . ..,,'

,

un,a

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l

TABLrt OF CONTENTS'

, ,

PAGESECTION.

:'

1.0 INTR OD U Crl ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 - 1. .

' |,, = ' i,,

.

'. 2.0 mIMS REQUIRING FURTliR DISCUSSlON BY AECL , . . . . . . . . 111 - 5.

|'

' APPENDIX 1: K E Y P ER S O NN EL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 13

APPENDIX 11: PRIOR WORK FOR US NUCLEAR UTILITIES . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . III-l 5

APPENDIX III: ADDITIONAL RESUMES

'""w III-l

.-. . _

_. . _ .

.. .. .. .. . . . . . .. . . .

,_,

sifg 5 s omer act n

_,___~a ha_TECHN O L O G IE Ss

fsm __ . _ . . _ _- - _ . _ . . . _

N|~_ _ _.

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34 r, cts *revo ose s pa s see wox's %h48dOAWJIV (30t)iM KUTeo XJ4Qfas (xO /M .YJ(14XUSA AECL

1989 October 20File Ref. 89-025-1

Ms. Teresa Mel2arenUnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Room 10117920 Norfolk AvenueBethesda, htD 20814

U.S.A.

Deat Ms. McLearen:

Solleitation No. RS-NRR 39-026Subject:Nuclear F9wer Reactor Design Inspection Services

"Best & Final Olier" Addenduin Document

AECL Technologies is pleased to submit this "Best and Final Offer" for the above solicitation.In accordance with instnactions provided at a meeting between representatives of the USNRC andAECL Technologies on 1989 October 16 AECL Technologies is submitting as a supplement to theoriginal proposal, three additional documents consining of:

Solicitation Proposal - Addendum No. I Best and Fina10fferPan 1:

Cost Proposal- Addendum No.1 Best and Fina10fferPan 11:Technical and Management Proposal - Addendum No. I Best and Final 0:Ter

Pan 111:

These three Addendum pans are to be read in conjunction with our previous submission dated 1959June 15.

As my staff must have mentioned during theiidiscussions with you on 19890ctober 16[ide the besthat I anach

great imponance to the success of this job anTour organization shall endeavour to pnnresources to support your work.

I would also like to reiterate that we can offer these cuensive skills and capabilities, clear of anyconniet of interest.

Should you have any questions or wish to base any supr'ementary data, please do not hesitate to'

contact this office.

We thank you for this opponunity to be of service.

Sincerely,'

||.k.%||$9f.

D.R. ShineitVice-President & General ManagerAECL Technologies

cc: Ralph Brittelli Jr. - Atlanta.

_.~..__._._._..._m._.__ . . _ . _ _ . _ , , _ , _ , _ _ . _ ., _, , ,

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PART1]h TECliNICAL AND h1ANAGEhlENT PROPOSAL

|. ,

1.0 : JNTRODUCTION,

-

,t ' .

In accordance with instnactions provided at a meeting between represe'ntatives

of the USNRC and AECL Technologies on 1989 0:tober 16 AECL - !'

I Technologies is submitting as a supplement to the original proposal, three ,'

additional documents consisting of:

I Pan 1: Solicitation Proposal - Addendum No, I Best and Final Offer

Pan II: Cost Proposal- Addendem No. I Best and Final Offer

Pan Ill: Technical hbnegement Proposal- Addendum No.1 Best and Final ;

| Offer,

ne pan contained herein is Pan 111: Technical and hianagement Proposal, j,

.t .. -

AECL Technologie's is a division of AECL Inc. with offices in Rcdville, ;'

512 y'and and Atlanta, GA, AECL Technologies unlities the resources of

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). AECL Technologies operates -

under the laws of the State of Delaware,-'.

The cganization chan showing the relationship of AECL Technologies to the !

j, total corporation is included oserleaf. q

AECL is one of the largest and most diserse engineering, research and-

deselopment companies in Can'ada. AECL is a gonrnment<wned (Crown)-

,j. corpontion established fonnally in 1952.

.

AECL corporate of0ce is located in Ottawa,'Ontazio. Dayao <!ay activities'

- are carried'out throujh two operating companies:

AEClk(grations,'i

AECL Researth Company.

I

e ppg )perations is located in hiississauga,(near Toronto) Ontario. It hash[k: sign, test, and commissioning focus for reactor design

ij.ti

a

Open: ions is a profit-making entity based on projects and services.*|,s'\

.

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The Research Company, a major research and development organization is

located at two main sites: the Chalk Rher Nuclear Laboratories located ati Chalk Rher, Ontario and Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment at

Pinawa, Manitoba.

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j STATES 1 I ___2___) ___J___) ,

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HECL TECNNOLOGIES .

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NSSSNE ENGINEERING SERVICES ' ,

BUSINESS UNITs. ,

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anning POWER PLANT ADVANCED SYSTEMSMarketing ENGINEERING LAB.i and Sales SERVICES APPUCATIONS

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- - - - - - _ - _ . _ - _ , - . - - - - - - - - - . - . , - - . - - -

,_ _ _ _ . . . - . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ . . _

'* , , ,

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i . .

2.0 ITEMS REQUIRING FURTilER DISCUSSION!lY AECL4

RS-NRR-89026

NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR DESIGN INSPECTION SERYlCES

AECL should discuss whether the personnel proppsed for the subjkta.

contract are familiar with,,IEEE and ANSI standards | ;

Thepcts onnelproposedfor the s ubject contrac t ortfamiliar with iEEE ond ANSIa.

standarth ;

t ' .k ,h,hf,)ple, the nu:| ear reactor design of theFor ewr i

hh is based on ineering the requittments of the [,

Design hianuals and Design Regtdrernens dotwnents a hich in nun reference the

pertinent |EEE and IES standards.

Another e.tample of AECL familiarity with the standards is the

$)h$'Standads

b

Thc 1,esign aho requires the use of thi ANSI standardsfor the destyn

c'f|. ||f Another ezynpleis the use of WSistandardsf:'

; anich are c.ttcnsisely used in oto designs.

The personnel on the proposed subject contract hme an meroge of

'k

; A ECL understands thatplants of n1rious vintages willbe reviewed andinspected'

by the design irapection team. This meatu that AECL will be revicsing plants _

A E$g ipplicable LEE E and ANSI stantL2rds ate different than todays standards,ahos*

is particularly competent in handling this problemfor NRC*

.

| '*" ?M Ill-5l i

'

_ . , _ _ _ ., _ _ ._. _ _ _ _ . _ . ._ _ . . _ _ _ - . . _ - _ _

' ' .,

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l,

AECL has t<en designing nuclear poser plantsfor over 30 years. As a result,

ow; p sonnel har e been associated and wotled with these cret changin; A.NSIandIEEE stan& mis for the less esperiencedengineering stagmembers. AECL

maintains statc<f-thcot Irformation center which enables the quick and

ejylcient retricvalof applicable standards. This itfortnation systern enables our

highly e.tperienced engineering staff to keep abreast of changes in applicable

standards.

AECL does notfeel tha, she changes it. IEEE and ANSI standardiner the years

is a problem. We Ibn e e.tperience eriginccring staff and irformanon systems to

deal with this issue.

b. AECL should discuss the as alf ability of all personnelidentified in Section

6 of the proposal. AECL should clarify the percentage of time the personnel

uould te committed to other projxts and the percentage of time commitled

to Ibe subjnt contimet.

b. All the namts idennfled in the proposal shall be available to work on the NRC

task ordcrs The plan is to tue the staffidennfiedin the proposalas the resowcc

poolficm u here the staf would be dras n Should unusual circwesunces arise,AECL can also draw on its corporate-side labor pool of oser UDO highly

trained employees.

ScUed on a lead time of hs o or three H e els. all thepeople nDminated are e.tpected*

to be aralfable to work on NRC task orders. The anached sheet Appendit )

jrovides the percentage of time available to be corrvnitted to the NRC task orders'

-

.

To reirforce our resources capability, se have includedh $>

>rosided in our e lier proposal of 1989 lune JS.f( . ,

r We would file to indicate that among i e5 a i

tenwammmmamm

$gdk|}}%,dyIdf@McTd1@$y4?* 5 "4 dg

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We do not anticipale any secwity or drug relatedproblenu based on ourprevious

association uith nuclear utilities or other security conscious organi?ations.

Ill-6"fM[

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AECL should provide details of its understanding of the U.S. regulatoryc.

process or eshibit,some famillarity with Regulatory Guides, Hulklins and'

Generic Letters.' The offetor needs to addrtss its undmtanding of U.S.

Codes and Standards (e.g ASME and IEEE Standard 4 in Section 4 of the

proposal

AECL is familiar with the NRC regulatory process. This if prin arily based onc.an in depth internal AECL project study which assessed the US NRC regulatory

|process requirements in order toprepare a Preliminary Standard Safe ' Analysis i

'

[Report tPSSAR)for the Nuclear Steam Supply System INSSS) ofi.

under the NRC liceMing requirements. The Ley technicalissues (differences! I

sete addressed in this study.- One section of that report described the " formal

licensing process" of NRC.

I11is to be noted that there are a number of similarities between the Regulatory ,

i

Processes in Canada and the U.SA For example, both processes invohe steps

leading to:

a site approval-1

a construction permit-

an ,perating licence-i

The scope of the technical review and inspection is similarfor the two .rystems..

; Tall.s are presenty being held with NRC regarding licensing e olant to

NRC requirements. This has also provided AECI. an opportunity oflearning

inore about the NRC regulatory process.

AECL isfamiliar with the Regulatory Guides and Bulletins. Some of these (e g.

Regulatory Guide 1.29 Seismic Design Classification) has been used routinelyI <

in some of our desigrts. For some areas, we have ow own Design Guides,

hauerer a nuunber of the Design Guides make reference to the NRC'

RegufatoryGuides Most the e arefamiliar with and have tard the NRC

Regulatory Guides in thel lesign..

The AECL technicallibrary maintains current versions of US NRC Regulatory.

Guides and Bulletins.,

>

** M lila.

;-

i

vv- Tw 'w o - w w -+c vte, -, v r y-- y.,,----y-wwwg =w-m g es, m-m ew - ~w.,r-wem,-=,y,-c,- .,w,+ , r=.-,,,-,ew---,v$,w,,,,,-me-e.e-en,-,,~.ve.-,,--o-e- . e+ -r- rw Ee-mwwmm

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The profwedpersonnel have fald an e.tItmive norting knon fedge of thMShf E

"" 'Yb'I' " "' ' "I ''

are essenna0y designea to the UblE codes There are someh&:' ' '

V rpecific,

design aspecu which are not covered try tid > AShiEKode and desigt.ed to the

Canadiats(CSA) standards:~

jr

Another e.twnple ourfamiliarity with the USpiping sy stem anal > sis (including

hfi }Ii dNi b, &h?hIbS;&$$

selsmic)is Iha:f !h f$!hJB Theiruvtlwwjwfud

(>35dNI'

to be professional a nd they made a significant contribution to the project.

d. AECL needs to further discuss its understanding of how the project

organliational structure Interacts with the NRC learn leader to effwth ely

compkte a design inspection. This is discussed on page 11115 of the

proposal, and in Sktion L.16 of the RFP.

d. Upon Ihr e,vard of a task order, AECL will assign a staff mernbe? to the no?l.

This representatne sill meet with the USNRC team leader to dis::as scope of

work. ob|cctires ad schedide The timing of the initiating meeting nill be

governed by the wpnq of the sori as dgMned by the team lexter.

AECL has identined Jarnail S. Par.esar as the oseroll project ir : apt. bit..'

Panesar will assist the NRC tecknicalleader with the identyGcation .:dse|ection

of an appropriatepersonfrom AECL's rescwce list.

In accordance with the team leader directions. AECL shallperforir. the required'

scope and report results to the urdity, ccntractor andor USNRC in accordance

with the mandate provided at the initialinterricw,

,

follow up impections shall be performed as and a hen rcpired a?J d;tected by

the USNRC tearn leader.

The AECL representative shall be responsib!c to and report to the USNRC team

leader,,

'''.?{! nla

l

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'sc. AECL did not address Sedion L.16.E of the RFP regarding corporate

confilet of Interest. This information must t>e provided for complete

evaluation of the proposal and should includt b kh'iM7[(dj['%!

[dyk fk - _7 AECL should alsoQ]Q[if its licensing application for review of the advanced reactor design

'

discuss

presents a confilet,

e. The idennpcation of prior, current and planned svik for nuclear utilities are

attachedin AppenditII. !

A1:CL Technologic { i *">

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The AE L Techvis i< t

Q&fhf AECL rnay proride other

ser> ices consistent with a large design orpni:ation but these are not the

subject of afociesed marLeting plan - AECL has strong quahpcations

** in these areas but these marlets are generally sellserviced alrea$v.

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Asidefrom the ..3 reactor is twgely sitnitar to

Pressurized Water Reactors - many of the sysicm3 we identicalin:

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\In Ihe area of deconvnissioning, A ECL has already decorrvnissice,td ts o

inafor power reactors atu; is JIat finishing decommissioning, a third'

protonpr reactor.11ased on this operience, A ECL has developed afull

range of decominissioning scivices

[>

:

j

We do not ser any cotylict ofinterest situation betaccn our licensing

applicationfor review of the adranced reactor design and this design

rcvicw job. We ate sure thar NRC would have athers revicw Ihat

application., -

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g. AECL notes in Swtion 2.1) of the pruposal noted that travel, per diem and

accommodations will be in accordance with company standard polley and

procedura. The estimated travel costs must use U.S. Federal-TravelRegulation per diem rates for travel destinations and allowable-Gos ernment car rental rates. AECL should re-estimate its costs based on

these guidelines,

g. A ECL willinvoice US NRCfor reimbursement of trm el costs in accordance with

the rates and limits prescribed by the U.S. Federal Travel Regulations.

The re-estimate ofcostsfor the Best andFinaloffer is being prepared using these!regulations.

h. ConGrm your understanding that the contract will be on a task order basis !and only work that is spal0cally authorlied by task order can be charged. !Also, connrm you r understanding that only those Individuals named in 3 ou r

proposal in response to a task _ order request are authorized after NRC i

approval, to perform work. Thus, when people are not engaged in specine-

work authorized by a task order, their time cannot be charged,

h, We o$rm ole understanding that the contract will be on a task order basis.

We also cu$rm tha: only those indivMuals namedin the task order proposal will

be al| owed to charge to the NRCJob.,

l. Conurm your understanding that the total estimated cost for each task

order will be negotiated. Also, confirm )our understanding that the fee for

each task order will be negotiated. Il0 WEVER, the fee will not exceed the

fee ceiling w hlch will be established la the contract.

I. AECL understands and ogrees that the total estimated cost andfeefor each task

order assigned to AECL will be negotiated.

AECL also cofrms our understanding that the swn of allfees for services

performed will tu exceed thefee ceiling to be established in this contract.

J. Be prepared to nt-gotiate a ceiling fee for task _ orders issued under this

contract (see Sections B.2.c and L.16.j).

'10 -11

**M.

_ -

. . _ . . . . . . . . . - - . . - . _ . --. _ .. . - - - . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ - - .- --. _ _ _

|

|1

.

'

J. AECL is prepared to negotiate a ceiling fee for unk orders issued under this

contraCl,

k. In your Best and Final, please utend the time for acceptance of your

proposal through December 31,1989.

k. The Best and Final offer prepared to be submitted shall be validfor acceptance

by US NRC through 31 December 1959.

|

|

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* T,.'

111-12

.- .,- . . . -. , . , - -, .,

_. _ .__ _ _ __ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

APPENDIX I: KEY PEllSONNEL'

1.0 ManagnLCostdin;ttot G Of Time ForhRC lyo.cL

,5PhJ.S. Panesat

'#2.0 Mechanical _S.ulem

1

3.0 MnhanicaLColimonent

E.S. Panesar8B!!

d 4.0 ciril,

[dl@d'

<

*'h01 fil-13;'

_ _ _ , ._. . , _ _ . .

[v -- _

'

5.0 SitutturaLEnginnring*'

50

;o . n.

33

.S. Panesar

6.0 Eintri| 25

25

25

50:(0

~

7.0 iLC

ERI !!

,

seI