Micro Sociology’s Presuppositions: Mead, Schutz, and Garfinkel*

Norbert Wiley, University of Illinois, Emeritus

Abstract. This paper concerns the presuppositions of micro theory -- (1) the nature of everyday life, and (2) the nature of a valid explanation in the micro sphere.

Mead accepted everyday life pretty much as it presents itself to us. But Schutz said that we suspend disbelief in everyday life, even though we could doubt parts or all of this ontological sphere. Schutz then set aside this doubt and proceeded pretty much as an ordinary sociologist

Garfinkel, following Schutz, also noted the questionability of everyday life, but being more stubborn he did not suspend this doubt. He thoroughly doubted everyday life, calling it a “fix.” He then showed how we often engage in dialogue, using ethnomethodogical practices, to find agreement on some ambiguous aspects of everyday life.

If everyday life is as doubtable as the social phenomenologists claim, a new Hobbesian issue should be faced -- though now it is not a war of all against all in the moral sphere but in the cognitive or meaningful sphere as well. Schutz and Garfinkel claim we make a social contract in the cognitive sphere (of everyday life) although Schutz works with this social contract and Garfinkel, calling it a fix, insistently rejects it.

The micro presuppositions then are whether we suspend disbelief in the natural attitude. And whether we have a social contract, in the cognitive as well as in the moral order. A valid explanation must take this contract into account.

Thanks are due to Michael D. Barber, Jeffery Alexander,

Robert Dunn and Jorn Bjerre.

1

It has long been recognized that macro sociology has

presuppositions, i.e. ideas or premises, on which the field is

based. These usually concern the definition of the subject

matter (the “social”) and the nature of a valid explanation in

this field. Jeffrey Alexander wrote at length about this issue,

applying it to Parsons and the classical macro theorists,

especially Marx, Weber and Durkheim (Alexander, 1982).

Although Alexander’s analysis received a lot of criticism, it was

a serious confrontation with a major issue.

There has been continual discussion of micro theory

including its premises, but this discussion has been more

complex and less organized than the macro discussion.

Perhaps the most controversial issue has been how Garfinkel

and ethnomethodology differ from symbolic interaction, a

comparison that is still unsettled. There is nothing in

microtheory with the clarity of Alexander’s sorting out of the

macro premises. Micro’s pre-suppositions seem to be more

deeply philosophical than those of macro. In particular, the

influence of Husserl’s phenomenology and that of his

successors has been somewhat mystifying. Husserl, in

modifying Descartes, used the idea of doubt in several novel

2

ways. Schutz and Garfinkel applied Husserl’s doubting

procedures to micro sociology in a manner that challenged the

standard ideas of validity.

These challenges gave a “murky” quality to micro sociology,

at least at the theoretical level. Doubt is the villain here, i.e.

doubt has been the source of confusion and uncertainty. A

major purpose of this essay will be to clear up this confusion

and define the competing micro sociologies in a clearer way

than has been hitherto achieved.

At present the issues of subject matter and explanatin are

both unclear in the micro premises, but that of the subject

matter seems especially cloudy. For one thing, although the

macro approaches center around the “social,” the micro

approaches tend to use the more general idea of “reality,” the

social being included in this reality. This abstractness is in the

spirit of Husserl, and it will be necessary to look at Husserl to

get our bearings. Husserl had followed Descartes in using the

method of absolute doubt, but he did Descartes one better by

also doubting the “cogito ergo sum.” The cogito had been

Descartes stopping point, because it was, or so he claimed, an

indubitable truth. Descartes built a system on the cogito. In

3

contrast Husserl doubted the “I” itself. As a result he had no “I

think” and therefore no “I am.” His stopping point was the

simple idea that “thought goes on,” the thinker or self having

been eliminated.

Husserl then spent his career attempting a close analysis of

thought, which was his reality. He called the contents of his

mind “presence,“ and in a specialized sense, “intentionality.”

He also continued to use Cartesian doubt in unprecedented

ways. The reason micro sociology has unclear premises, then,

seems to be largely because both Garfinkel and Schutz leaned

on Husserl, Husserl being extremely abstract and not

completely clear. (Footnote 1)

Both Schutz and Garfinkel took methodological ideas from

Husserl in selective ways. Their uses of phenomenology

differed from each other, and this is one reason the idea of the

micro premises is in such disarray. Schutz and Garfinkel also

differed from the now, somewhat standard George Herbert

Mead micro theory, but again in different ways.

4

When Schutz decided to create a phenomenological sociology

he realized he could not completely follow Husserl and doubt

everyday reality, especially not the social, or his sociology

would have no subject matter. So he altered Husserl’s method

by accepting the existence of the everyday world, including the

social. Schutz also, unlike Husserl, accepted the existence of

the self, again because his sociology needed this assumption.

When Schutz acknowledged the everyday world, he added a

phenomenological twist that Husserl had not thought of.

Schutz took the position that the acceptance of the everyday

world entailed a suspension, not of belief, but of disbelief. He

assumed, correctly I think, that every culture’s everyday world

contained some questionable beliefs and contradictions. In

addition cultures differ from and contradict each other.

People in these different cultures naturally accept their own

belief systems, since this is a normal and usually inevitable

feature of growing up as a human being. But it is also normal

to withhold or at least attenuate assent from some beliefs.

(Footnote #2) In other words people usually suspend disbelief

in (i.e. they believe in) their cultures. In Mead’s terms they

5

accept the generalized other, including its cognitive as well as

its normative features.

Schutz expressed this double suspension as follows.

Phenomenology has taught us the concept of

phenomenological epoche, the suspension of

our belief in the reality of the world as a

device to overcome the natural attitude

by radicalizing the Cartesian method of

philosophical doubt. The suggestion may

be ventured that man within the natural

attitude also uses a specific epoche, of

course quite another one than the phe-

nomenologist. He does not suspend be-

lief in the outer world and its objects, but

on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its

existence. What he puts in brackets is the

6

doubt that the world and its objects might

be otherwise than it appears to him. We

propose to call this epoche the epoche of

the natural attitude. (Schutz, 1973, p. 229).

Schutz then proceeded in a more or less normal way as a

sociologist. He had gone through some unusual

presuppositional thinking, and his premises differed from

those of standard sociology, including Mead’s symbolic

interaction. But these premises were buried in his logical train

of thought. He had no need to mention, repeatedly, that he was

accepting a specialized set of beliefs. He had invented (or

discovered) a distinct phenomenological loop -- the “belief,

disbelief, belief” triad. Then he built on these premises, but he

usually let them lie quietly in his meta-sociological

imagination.

Garfinkel was quite another story. He was rather transfixed

by Schutz’s thought process -- of suspension of disbelief in the

7

everyday world and then a suspension of this suspension

(which I referred to as a “double suspension”). Garfinkel made

this point, which he got from Schutz, as follows.

We may say of the person whose activities

are governed by the attitude of daily life that

he suspends any doubt that the world is

given in any other way than the manner in

which it appears. . . . The world within this

attitude shows in its organization the

feature of a set of possibilities that, as a

set are “closed,” settled, but settled by

what we might refer to as the “et cetera

assumption.” Garfinkel, 1952, pp. 45-46.

Once Schutz went through these presuppositional stages, he

placed them in the back of his mind. But Garfinkel kept them

front and center. He was entranced by the way people seem to

accept what he regarded as arbitrary beliefs in their everyday

8

world. At times he referred to it, as though it were some con

man’s scheme, as a “fix.” (1967, p. 35)

To make the comparison between Schutz and Garfinkel, it will

be helpful to list the stages in the phenomenological loop that

Schutz had produced.

Stage 1. The natural attitude of everyday life is presented to us

as we are socialized, as children, into our society. We accepted

this “world” as valid and true.

Stage 2. We experience the little discrepancies and

contradictions in this natural attitude, but initially we follow

others in papering over these weak spots. We accept them as

valid. Most people just stop at this stage.

Stage 3. Drawing on the doubting culture of Descartes and

Husserl, Schutz began realizing that the natural attitude

entailed a suspension of disbelief, somewhat like the one that

Samuel Taylor Coleridge had introduced into literary theory

9

(1983, pp. 6-7). People in minority groups are especially prone

to this realization.

Stage 4. One can doubt (or suspend belief in) this suspension

of disbelief in the natural attitude.

Stage 5. Upon doing this, one will experience the cognitive

dissonance of entertaining contradictory beliefs. This may be

emotionally uncomfortable, as Garfinkel was well aware.

Stage 6. One can then, as Schutz did and Garfinkel did not,

suppress this cognitive dissonance and return to the stability

of stage 1. This stance, however, will not be as gullible as it

would be for people who had initially stopped at stage one and

not gone through Schutz’s phenomenological loop. Simplicity

lies at both ends of sophistication, and the simplicity of the

Schutzian will be at a higher level than that of the ordinary

believer.

10

Stage 7. Or, if this form of sophistication does not appeal to

you, as it did not to Garfinkel, one can stay in the 6th stage, the

cognitive dissonance stage, and make a lot of comment about

this experience, as Garfinkel did. Garfinkel was saying, “look!

look ! The fix is in!” Or one could follow Schutz’s path, subdue

the cognitive dissonance, and engage in and accept pheno-

menological sociology in this manner.

In other words, Schutz stopped at stage 6 whereas Garfinkel

went on to stage 7. As a theoretical strategy Schutz accepted

the limitations of the natural attitude and took these as his

sociological material, as his definition of the subject matter. In

contrast Garfinkel, possibly because of his minority group

consciousness and his identification with blacks in the Jim

Crow South, went on to stage 7 and trumpeted, Cassandra-like,

the meaninglessness of the world. Garfinkel’s breaching

experiments, unveiled the anomie (Hilbert, 1992) of the

natural attitude.

11

I once had a lengthy interview with Garfinkel (3-31-80)

about his intellectual history and how he developed his ideas.

He seemed most gripped by his early years, before he studied

for a Ph.D., under Parsons, at Harvard. (Footnote 3) Two

events stood out for him. For one, while riding a bus in North

Carolina, he was present when an African-American women

demanded that she be allowed to sit in the front of the bus, in

the segregated white section. This had evidently been a

common experience for Southern bus drivers, and in

Garfinkel’s case the bus driver had to call the police to force the

women into the black seats. Evidently black riders would

sometimes claim that the egalitarian clause in the Declaration

of Independence, about God having made all human beings

equal, empowered them to sit where they wanted. From this

experience, it would seem, Garfinkel developed the idea of

cognitive perspective, that black bus riders, white bus drivers

and white police all had different beliefs about who should sit

where on these buses. They each handled the suspension of

disbelief in different ways, they differed in phenomenological

perspective. This stuck with Garfinkel.

12

Secondly, when Garfinkel did a year of graduate work in

sociology at North Carolina, in 1939-40 he discovered

Husserl’s phenomenology and interpreted the bus incident

(which the drivers routinely referred to as “color trouble”) in

the categories of social phenomenology. The woman bus rider

had been unwilling to suppress disagreement with this Jim

Crow practice. She would not suspend disbelief in the

normalcy of segregation, and therefore had no need to take the

next Schutzian step and suspend this suspension. She insisted

on her reality. Garfinkel identified with African Americans

because he, as a Jew, had also run into ethnic prejudice, and he

agreed with the views of the female bus rider. Schutz’s

Jewishness did not seem to affect his version of

phenomenology, but Garfinkel’s did. It should be remembered

that Schutz left Germany to get away from the Nazis, so he

already had had his confrontation with anti-semitism, though

not in the United States.

When Garfinkel spent his year at North Carolina he was quite

impressed by a philosophy professor, Louis Katsoff, who

introduced him to phenomenology and its relation to sociology

(Garfinkel, 2002, p. 83). In addition the sociology graduate

13

students at this university had a discussion club, referred to by

Garfinkel as a “cabal,” (p. 83), in which they talked about

applying phenomenology to sociology. After a stint in the army

in World War II, Garfinkel was accepted as a graduate student

in Harvard’s Dept of Social Relations. He often praised

Parsons’ sociology, but it should be obvious that Garfinkel’s

phenomenological views were in stark contradiction with the

ideas of Parsons.

In preparing his Ph.D. dissertation Garfinkel had been

developing and conducting “breaching” experiments. These

experiments, which had the flavor of Cartesian doubt,

contradicted the natural attitude. His students acted in ways

that collided with ordinary beliefs. Acting like a guest in one’s

own home, including requesting permission to use the

bathroom, was an example. Another was trying to bargain for

price in a swanky store that had a single-price policy.

Garfinkel’s dissent from ordinary practices was similar to the

way Saul Alinsky, the community organizer, invented clever

forms of political dissent, such as occupying all the toilets in an

airport as part of a labor dispute. Garfinkel and Alinsky were

both experts at disrupting the natural attitude.

14

When I asked Garfinkel how Parsons had acted toward his

unusual Ph.D. project he said, Parsons told him to just write it

as it came to him, as he thought it should be. There were no

directions or even advice. Parsons was obviously telling

Garfinkel that he would approve the dissertation despite its

being wildly opposed to Parsons own ideas. This is how

Garfinkel interpreted Parsons’ comments, and it gave him the

confidence to do the work. Parsons had given him a “blank

check.” When the time came, Garfinkel’s committee

unanimously approved this work, even though it

revolutionized sociology as it was practiced at Harvard.

Parsons could recognize genius. With a Ph.D. in hand, then,

Garfinkel was in a position to engage in a career on his own

terms.

Returning to the Schutz-Garfinkel comparison, the list of

stages helps show how they differ. They both accepted what I

called, for convenience, the phenomenological loop, where one

suspends the suspension of disbelief in the natural attitude.

Both recognized the weakness in the natural attitude and gave

their response to it. The difference was in the response.

Schutz decided to normalize the natural attitude, despite

15

having discovered all its discrepancies and questionability. He

acted as though the natural attitude was as it had been

presented to him in his youth. Garfinkel was more stubborn

about it. He became fixed at the seventh stage, where he kept

looking at and revealing the contradictions. Garfinkel

“disrobed” the natural attitude, and Schutz, the friendly banker,

kept it presentable.

Mead vs. Schutz and Garfinkel

Mead’s primary creativity was in explaining the origins of

the self and the nature of meaning (Wiley, 2016a; 2016b). He

also had a powerful explanation of interaction in the concept of

role-taking. He did not, however, draw on Husserl or any other

phenomenological ideas. Husserl had been influenced by

William James, just as Mead was so influenced, but this shared

third party did not create any important similarities between

Mead and Husserl. Husserl had gotten his phenomenological

start from Descartes, and Mead, along with Peirce, was in

distinct disagreement with Cartesian doubt. Mead accepted

the natural attitude pretty much as it was presented to him.

16

His major doubt concerned God and religion, not the nature of

the everyday world. Mead confronted and opposed the

religious idea of a soul with his ideas of the natural origins of

the self, both in ontogenesis (in the species) and phylogenesis

(in the infancy of the child).

In other words Mead had taken an earlier pathway into

social theory than Schutz and Garfinkel. Mead’s generation had

to confront Darwin’s theory of evolution and it’s impact on

religious beliefs. Schutz and Garfinkel, as Jews, had not only

avoided the traditional beliefs of Christianity. In addition they

were around after evolutionary theory had settled in and also

after the world-smashing social effects of World War I. They

faced a different and later presuppositional situation than

Mead.

Mead accepted the conventional meanings embedded in the

everyday world. He believed that humans create the meanings

of ordinary objects, and, although he looked closely at the

epistemological nature of meaning-making, he did not

systematically question the validity of ordinary meanings. In

17

contrast, Schutz and Garfinkel would question the whole skein

of ordinary meanings. Mead’s question concerned the

epistemological nature of these meanings, and how we, as

opposed to the other primates, can understand and

communicate with these meanings. Since Mead had already

given a believable explanation of epistemology, Schutz and

Garfinkel were able to skip this question. In contrast, Schutz

and Garfinkel believed that the everyday meaning system was

a fabrication, even though a highly convincing one for most

people.

Mead had looked at a different set of problems than those

of Schutz and Garfinkel. One could say that Mead’s ideas were

complementary with those of Schutz and Mead, but this would

be an over-simplification. For one thing Schutz and Garfinkel

contradicted each other in how they dealt with the alleged

invalidity of the natural attitude. Both see it as, in some ways,

invalid, but Schutz accepts this invalidity and works with it,

whereas Garfinkel was, so to speak, obsessed with this

invalidity. His mission was to analysis the (ethno)methods we

use to squeeze a questionable set of meanings into a form

which is intersubjectively valid (enough). For Garfinkel, we

18

take the fake meanings, the “fix,” and bend them into meanings

which are good enough to produce social order.

Another problem with the idea of complementarity is that ,

as pointed out earlier, Mead accepts the natural attitude (the

everyday world) as reasonably valid. Garfinkel and Schutz

regard it as invalid, although Schutz tried to work around this

invalidity and Garfinkel did not.

So calling the two approaches, symbolic interaction and

social phenomenology, complementary is at best a half-truth.

Still in the loose analytic world of micro theory, one could,

bowing to expedience, combine the two approaches and

merely switch theories as necessary from problem to problem.

This would be treating theoretical resources as a “tool kit,”

where you used the theory (Mead, Schutz or Garfinkel in this

case) that best fits your explanatory needs. One would then

be working with a “multi-paradigmatic” blend of micro theory.

The important thing would be to know the differences among

the paradigms and to avoid contradicting oneself as you moved

19

back and forth from one to the other. But this is merely a

practical adjustment, and the differences among the macro

approaches would remain.

This is like the difference between a shotgun and a rifle, the

multi-paradigmatic approach being the shotgun and the

single-paradigm approach being the rifle. A shotgun scatters

pellets in a wide range, making it difficult to miss with a close-

up shot but useless at a distance. In contrast a rifle is accurate

at a much longer and wider range, although there will also be

many misses. Each has strengths and weaknesses, although

science usually prefers a rifle (a more precise instrument) to a

shotgun.

The Nature of Micro Explanation

So far I have concentrated on the presupposition of defining

the subject matter, the social. As mentioned earlier, the

everyday world, including the social, has distinct definitions in

Mead, on the one hand, and Schutz and Garfinkel on the other.

There are also somewhat distinct definitions between Schutz

20

and Garfinkel. These differences can be handled, i.e. tip-toed

around, if the theorist is willing to think in multi-paradigmatic

terms. The nature of explanation though is still another issue.

I will treat this presupposition more briefly than I did the

subject matter issue, although it must be faced to complete my

theme.

The definition of the social, which has been my major topic

so far, has considerable influence over what is considered a

valid explanation. Meanings or definitions of the situation

have a lot of influence over behavior, as W.I. Thomas pointed

out, but presuppositions about the nature of the social world

influence meanings.

Mead, Schutz and Garfinkel had different definitions of

reality and the social, and these differences produced

differences in their explanatory processes. All three explain in

an interpretive manner, by way of meaning. But they have

different ideas of meaning and therefore of explanation.

Mead’s explanation centered on the significant symbol,

Schutz’s centered on (his version of) the ideal type and

21

Garfinkel’s centered on the use of interpersonal negotiations,

which he called ethnomethods

Behind these differences in meaning were the way the three

explained the orderliness of the natural attitude or everyday

life. People in society normally get along reasonably well,

although it is not obvious how this comes about. Hobbes had a

moral explanation of order. He reasoned that there was an

implicit “social contract,” in which people agreed to conform to

a “live and let live” morality. This implicit rule controlled

rights and duties and thereby allowed the avoidance of a life

that Hobbes said would otherwise be “solitary, poor, nasty,

brutish, and short..“ (1651, chapter 13).

But next to Hobbes’s war or all against all there is another

orderliness issue. This one has to do with cognitive, rather

than moral, agreement. Assuming that the natural attitude – of

what meaning to give to everyday life – may be largely a

fabrication and a cover up of a deeper level of disagreement

and anomie, the question is how we create a working

agreement on the cognitive aspect of the natural attitude. Is

22

there some kind of social contract here too? Schutz and

Garfinkel certainly thought so. But they disagreed with each

other, and with Mead, as to how this compromise comes about.

The Cognitive Social Contract

Mead did not have to confront this issue because he did not

agree with (or perhaps even know about) the suspension of

disbelief in the natural attitude. He accepted ordinary life on

its own, taken for granted terms, and attempted to explain it

with philosophical or universal ideas. His explanation of

meaning, the self and role taking was meant to explain these

processes in all societies at all times and within all cultures.

His theory of meaning was universal. Since he did not think

(or pay attention to the fact that) cultures were arbitrary and

based on a suspension of disbelief, he did not have to confront

these issues. He was not so much concerned with what we

believe, as how we are able to believe at all – what is, and how

did we get, the capacity to have ideas at all?

23

But as mentioned earlier, Schutz and Garfinkel came on the

scene at a later time and were influenced by a social

phenomenological view of everyday life. They could merely

assume Mead’s epistemology, if they wanted to, but on top of

this they saw the need to explain how, given Mead’s

explanation of cognitive origins (in the species and in infants)

people in a given society all believed, more or less, the same

things. Mead explained the cognitive powers but there was

still the question of the application or use of these powers.

There are three versions, then, of how to address what I am

calling the Hobbesian cognitive (not moral) war of all against

all. You can ignore it, as Mead did (and almost everyone else

does). You can knowingly compromise with it, as Schutz did.

Or you can endlessly struggle with it, as Garfinkel did. These

are the three ways of adapting to the explanatory

presuppositions of micro sociology.

Conclusion

24

I have now laid out the two major presuppositions of micro

sociology: (1) the definition of the subject matter (the social)

and (2) the appropriate explanatory model for one’s position

on the first presupposition. I applied these ideas to the three

major forms of micro sociology, those of Mead, Schutz and

Garfinkel. I did not discuss Goffman because his roots seem to

lie more in the social anthropology of Durkheim than in

sociology (Collins, 1985. p. 215). But I did push forward the

issue of sociology’s presuppositions. (Footnote 4)

Footnotes

1. Neither Descartes nor Husserl doubted doubt, however.

This would have produced a “paradox,” in the technical

logical sense. You would be saying you were both

doubting and not doubting, much as the Cretan in the

Cretan paradox asserted that he was both lying and not

lying.

2. In societies, such as the United States, that have minority

groups, the culture is largely determined by the majority

25

group. In these cases people in minority groups usually

withhold their agreement from the most offensive beliefs

of the majority, for example that African Americans and

women and gays are inferior beings. So a certain amount

of disbelief is normal in these societies. But still the usual

posture is to accept the main features of the culture, even

if they could be disbelieved.

3. I am now drawing on Ann Rawls’s excellent writings on

Garfinkel’s biography and ideas, for example, Rawls,

(2002, pp. 1-64).

4. I would add that Garfinkel’s personality style had a relation,

perhap an elective affinity, to the theoretical position he took.

He had a tendency to see threats as more serious then they

were. This was a minor trait, and it was, in itself, of little

importance. Everyone has psychological defenses, to use Anna

Freud’s term, (1966). We use these devices to organize our

emotions and carve out a workable path through life.

26

When I interviewed Garfinkel his main publication was still

the 1967 Studies in Ethnomethodology (Prentice-Hall), which

had eight chapters and 288 pages. Garfinkel would make

copies for his students and thereby save them a few dollars

each over the book price. He told me he was concerned that

his publisher might know about this copying and be hostile

toward him. He also said he wished the book could come out

in paperback, but, because of the copying, he was hesitant to

ask the publishers.

When I asked Prentice-Hall about the paperback they said

the book was already quite inexpensive in hardback, and that,

as a steady seller, it was making good money for the publisher.

So Garfinkel had it reversed. Rather than being hostile toward

him, Prentice-Hall was quite favorable. There are other

example’s of Garfinkel’s seeing danger where it did not exist,

but this one will do.

Normally a defense mechanism of this nature is

inconsequential and easily overlooked, but this one –- to get to

the point of this footnote -- seems to have joined up with

27

Garfinkel’s distrust of everyday life and (as he saw it) its

fabricated reality. When Garfinkel said “the fix is in’” he was

indicating a generally suspicious outlook, one that combined

his minor emotional foible with his much more important

theoretical outlook. This suspiciousness became a feature of

his identity, at least as some observers saw him.

When Norman Denzin and I talked Garfinkel into running for

the Presidency of the American Sociological Association in

1985 we had assumed that, given his creativity and originality,

he would easily win. We did not know that Kai Erikson, who

was extremely popular, would also be nominated. Evidently

there were unfair rumors about Garfinkel’s idiosyncracies, and

these cost him some of the vote. If Garfinkel had made it a

point of being as amicable as Schutz was, he would have

received far more public honors. But Garfinkel was Garfinkel. –

sometimes a bit difficult on the surface but extremely kind and

generous down deep.

Mead hystified himself and is idas

28

I me relaion is a case of this.

He talked about it so often in so many different ways it was

imosi le to caure weht he was saying

I accidentally found hat Peirce had an I-you r elaion. This

allowed me to compere Mead to him. This changed a caser

sudy into a (more disciplined) comparative relational study.

Now the I me has been tamed (andf is undersanfdable).

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