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Metaphor and ethnic terrorism (English version of Bustos (2012)

Eduardo de Bustos

Dept. of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science

UNED

ebustos@fsof.uned.es

http://www.uned.es/dpto_log/ebustos/index.html

Abstract

The terrorist discourse has been critically analyzed with traditional tools provided by discourse

analysis, theory of argumentation and rhetoric in general. This paper proposes instead a critical

analysis of ethnic terrorist or nationalist discourse that makes use of the contemporary theory

of metaphor to reveal the cognitive frames that give meaning to both the language of terrorist

organization ETA and the Basque nationalist and separatist discourse in general. This approach

allows overcoming the limitations of the classical rhetorical instruments, focused on the lexicon

or argumentative analysis to provide an explanation of the mental configurations that

characterizes this kind of terrorist discourse.

Keywords: terrorism, terrorist speech, cognitive frames, cognitive theory of metaphor

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0. Introduction

The common thread of this paper is the problem of understanding and explaining the cognitive

and inferential processes leading to a terrorist ethnic-nationalist to commit a terrorist act, and

think that such action is justified from a rational point of view.

The perspective adopted is avowed individualist. That is, it is not particularly strong on terrorism

as a 'political' response adopted and used by a social group for political purposes. As option or

'political' response, terrorism has been analyzed as a strategic action for collective or social

nature. As such, it has been highlighted its potential rationality, at least in relation to its

formulation in formal theories such as game theory and decision theory (T. Sandler and Arce,

DG 2003; T. Sandler and Siqueira, K., 2009). Certainly, terrorism, so considered, has its 'logic',

i.e. what is judged broadly as a relation of congruence (to say the least) between means and

ends. Nevertheless, there is a less explored dimension, more relevant for understanding the

phenomenon, the existence of inferential processes of justification of terrorism that are signed

not only socially, but also and especially for those who commit terrorist acts. In other words,

critical analysis of the argument when that argument concludes with the need for action cannot

ignore the fact that an individual will perform such action. It is possible, and often happens, that

argumentation, as a textual product, would be not an individual elaboration, but a social or

cultural one. It is possible that the base argument is supported by many individuals, for example,

by all who lend their social support to terrorism. But the truth is that, as part of the explanation

for a terrorist action, argumentation has to include the individual, psychological components

that make dramatically unique the terrorist, since she is ultimately the agent of the terrorist act.

In this individual level, you should pay attention however to the permanently present

relationship of personal and social factors. In particular, they are ideological and psychological

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factors. What is interesting is the way they constitute what can broadly be called conceptions

(concepts, categories, beliefs, scripts, stories, in short, the whole range of instruments at our

disposal to assimilate the world, to make sense of it) and how these concepts relate to our

thoughts, our language and the things we or others do.

It is a psychological analysis that has been less applied to the analysis of terrorism. In

comparison, the psychopathological approaches have been more explored, trying to specify

what the permanent features of the terrorist mind, either in the form of temperaments,

personalities, in more or less pathological versions, either along what is called the clinical axis

(schizophrenia, depression, etc.) or the personality disorders (social disturbances as sociopathy

or psychopathy). In J. Victoroff and A. Kruglanski, Eds. (2009) it can be found a good summary of

the psychological analysis of terrorism that have generally tried to equate it to some form of

disorder, illness or psychological syndrome. Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending how you

look), the conclusion or the currently majority consensus is that in the mind of the terrorist -

assuming you can talk to that level of generality - there is nothing abnormal or pathological.

What is disturbing is not the only issue that terrorists are normal people, psychiatrically

speaking, but also that normal people can be terrorists (Sanmartin, 2005).

1. Terrorist argumentation and practical reasoning

From the point of view of argumentative analysis, the interesting aspect of terrorism is

that the willingness to carry out terrorist acts seems to be the conclusion of a practical reasoning.

However, we must carefully distinguish between that provision and the justification of a terrorist

act. Certainly, justification does not necessarily share the willingness to act of terror. So to speak,

their reasoning is different, partly because her conclusion is different. The conclusion of the

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terrorist is practical, while that of the justifier is theoretical. In the first case, it has more or less

the form "I do X", where X is the terrorist act, while the 'theoretic' of terrorism is simply "X is

justified." The terrorist argument leads to action; the theoretic to the justification of the action.

Another important aspect is the monologic or dialogic nature of the practical reasoning of the

terrorist, that is, if it is effectively produced before a part to which reasons are to be given, or is

the product of a mere deliberation. In other words, if this is the reasoning of the terrorist for

herself and that leads to her action, or if it is the argument that justifies the terrorist

determination before an interlocutor, understanding that such justification is not a theoretical

justification but an explanation of their readiness for action. In any case, the objective is to

accumulate reasons (to herself or to potential partners) for action. We must therefore exclude

cases where the subject itself, the terrorist, believes that her action is in no need of reason,

justification or explanation. This does not mean that the terrorist action lacks causes, even for

the terrorist himself. At the end of the day, the terrorist action can be assimilated to an

automatic and unintentional answer in extreme situations of aggression and violence (real or

perceived). Or it can also be explained by a blind obedience to a superior or a leader in a strongly

hierarchical structure. This happens when the ideological and argumentative complex of a

terrorist organization is assumed or is internalized. Of course, do not expect the individual

terrorist particular critical awareness regarding the 'reasons' for decisions within the

organization. In part because that critical consciousness is punishable by the organization itself

(there are the cases of Pertur and Yoyes in the ETA terrorism to illustrate it), but also because

the preservation mechanisms of this frame (Lakoff, 2008) are a fundamental part of the fabric

of the organization. The existence of mechanisms for recruitment, training and assignment of

prestige, as analyzed by J. Casquete (2007, 2009a and b) for Basque terrorism and by many other

authors for religious terrorism, aims to make it almost impossible any critical reflection of the

individual entering the terrorist organization.

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If an individual enters a terrorist organization it is because it has previously accepted, at

least in part, the cognitive framework that gives meaning to the practical argument justifying

terrorist action. The phenomenon of the self-recruiting or volunteering, present both in the

nationalist terrorism of ETA and the Islamist one, it is intelligible under that assumption: the

willingness of the individual to accept a particular approach to a social and political situation, let

alone the assumption of certain values that distinguish the group as such.

But the case that is relevant is that of justification by reason, either to yourself or to a

partner. Only when that attempt to self-justification or legitimation by reasons happens, you

can analyze critically or call into question the reasoning of the terrorist and who justifies it.

For that reason, the case where the self-justification occurs requires less attention, i.e.,

the case in which terrorist considers that there are reasons that justified the action not only

from a theoretical point of view, but they make it mandatory (required) from a practical point

of view, i.e., pushing him inevitably to the terrorist action. For the terrorist, his action is, from

the argumentative point of view, coherent. In fact, the ideological coherence, which traditionally

has been conceived as a relation of congruence between theoretical thinking and action, is the

preferred instance of justification of the terrorist. The terrorist commits their actions because,

if that coherence is to be respected, she is obliged to undertake it. The terrorist action is

conceived as a necessary means to achieve their goals then, if you want to the objectives at all

costs, and the terrorist action is judged as the means necessary for the attainment of those

goals, then the terrorist action becomes inevitable, inescapable, for the terrorist own mind.

3. Beyond the persuasive naming and definition

Understanding the mental mechanism that leads the terrorist to justify their action,

considering unavoidable, must begin from the analysis of their starting point, i.e. the

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conceptions that constitute the cognitive frame of that mechanism. It is necessary to analyze

the assumptions, generally unquestioned by the terrorist, tht give their sense to their reasoning

and actions and, therefore, to scrutinize their statements when they aim at self-justification. The

classical rhetorical approach has focused on the denomination and its contribution to the

establishment of a starting point in the argument. And emphasized the non-neutral, 'loaded'

lexical choice: the concepts were introduced not as mere essential definitions, but incorporating

ideological and emotional components (Macagno and Walton, 2010). The choice of expressions

prefigured what would be the argument and its conclusion. In other words, the choice of

expressions introduced a bias in the argument. The best known manual of argumentation theory

(Walton, 2006) reflect this classic design, particularly in chapters devoted to detecting fallacies

and more or less incorrect arguments. For example, D. Walton (2006, 218) discusses the role of

biased language as a determinant in establishing a point of view, the point of view of those who

enter a given term in a discussion. According to him, the view or the starting point consists of a

proposition and an attitude about that proposition. The choice of certain terms establish what

the point of view of the speaker is: expresses his attitude rather than simply state it.

However, it must be said that both the classical and the most modern rhetorical

treatments of D. Walton, are unsatisfactory. Moreover, they are too limited to lexical choice,

and being burdened with a traditional conception of what the lexical meaning is and how it

relates to the whole of our beliefs. Cognitive semantics (Evans and Green, 2006), the discipline

that relates the notion of meaning with mental facts, provide a much more complex and detailed

picture about how lexical choice and the consequences it has. The choice of different terms is

no longer a mere stylistic or argumentative question. It takes place against a background of

beliefs that cannot be reduced, as claimed by the classical textbooks, to the notion of viewpoint.

In modern cognitive semantics, linked to neurobiology (Evans, V. and M. Green, 2006),

the meaning of a term is not identified with a list of notes or properties that constitute the

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definition of that term. That is, to consider how a term communication functions is not enough

considering the essential properties that define what are referred to by the term. In fact, many

times a term user does not know their essential properties. The meaning of a term in cognitive

semantics, is identified with a set of knowledge - among which is that of the correct application

of the term – that has more to do with the encyclopedic knowledge than properly linguistic

knowledge.

The knowledge required for a proper use - and understanding - of a set of expressions is

not an unstructured knowledge. It is organized and grouped by conceptual or experiential fields

or areas. In addition, that organization is not unique or exclusive: the same field or domain may

be structured differently. The relevant notion in this level is the frame, the type of cognitive

structures that shape the way we see the world. The frames also determine what types of

arguments are valid in a given situation, what conclusions are admissible and its persuasive

force.

The use of language is directly related to the notion of frame. "We know the language

through frames. When a word is heard, is active in the brain the frame (or collection of frames)

[....] Because language activates frames, new frames require a new language, Thinking

differently requires speaking differently "(Lakoff, 2004 [2007, 17]). Of course, one can

characterize the notion of frame in a more technical and precise way, but a simple example will

be enough. And that example has two remarkable features: 1) shows how the same frame can

be used by opposing Ideologies, progressive and conservative in this case, and 2) how frames

relate to the use of metaphors for the construction of new concepts and arguments.

The example refers to the situation created after the 11-S. Of course the terrorism

existed before that date, and has existed since then, as we know, among others, the Spaniards.

However, few events in history have led to a conceptual rethinking so dramatically, especially in

the US and, through it, in all Western societies. Not only because it was a set of events that

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happened in the US territory (at home), causing more victims than the attack on Pearl Harbor,

but because, unlike the latter event, it was not clear where it came from, what forces had the

aggression carried out or, in short, who the enemy was. Terrorism of 11-S required a conceptual

effort, a work of assimilation of a new experience, with features that were unprecedented in

history. However, the official reaction was, from the conceptual point of view, very poor, very

basic, though, could you say, very effective. Because the Bush administration chose the frame

of war, military confrontation, to understand the new situation the US and the West in general

were facing. According to the ideologues who advised Bush, the war metaphor was the most

appropriate to deal with this situation: it was a new war, as the US throughout had battled the

twentieth century and, like all wars of that century, the US had to win. The US was at war. The

metaphor of war was particularly appropriate because "reduced apparent immense, abstract

and complex problem to a well-defined, simplified entity and, ultimately, a manageable one"

(Steuter and Wills, 2008, 8). Using this metaphor, an abstract concept is personified, like terror,

in a certain type of enemy. As such abstract concept, terror could be presented in different ways,

even in unexpected ways, so that it should be a permanent state of alert. Any dissent and critical

analysis of the application of military framework was considered an act of treason: several

intellectuals, among which are the best known G. Lakoff, S. Sontag, N. Chomsky or G. Vidal, were

stigmatized by objecting the use of this frame and the related vocabulary. That was one of the

advantages of the frame in question: in a war, in an open war situation, there is no place for

criticism or dissent: the thought goes from being a reflective thinking to a reflex thought (Lakoff,

2011, 43).

The story of how it has evolved the application of a military framework for the fight

against terrorism is extremely interesting. Nevertheless, what matters is to highlight the

relationship of the frame with the use of language, more particularly, to the use of metaphors

to assimilate, integrate, and categorize a new experience, and to enable the individual to reason

and argue about it.

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4. Metaphor and terrorism

One shortcoming of war frame for thinking about the phenomenon of terrorism is that

it is symmetrical. Many analysts have pointed out that feature (Lakoff, 2011): the war frame is

the same used by terrorist organizations to describe their actions against Western societies. In

the same way that Islamist terrorists talk of a holy war (Yihab) against the West (war, according

to them, is a war of liberation), also in the West we speak too often of a new Crusade, Crusade

in defense of the Westerners values. The key, explicitly religious or not, is not the same, but the

frame structure and, of course, the expressions used are: war, enemy, infidel, Satan, the battle

against evil, axis of evil, etc. Obviously, none of the alleged sides accepts the characterization

that the other makes of his nature, but there is a deep, structural identity, in the ways of talking

about each other. That identity is evident in the use of similar metaphors.

José María Calleja (2006) referred to this vocabulary and metaphor contagion in the case

of ETA terrorism (or eta, as he prefers to write). Adopting a classic rhetorical approach, i.e.

lexical, he put some examples of how the terrorist vocabulary had been adopted by the media

in general (not only related to terrorism). They may seem anecdotal, but take on a different

meaning when considered in the context of the cognitive frame that arise. So, JM Calleja (2006,

192) mentioned the term 'legal', used by terrorists to refer to the status of a terrorist or a

'command' (another term worth analyzing) which was not signed by the police. Not only is 'legal'

a positive connotation, but invites a reversal of perspective from which the terrorist action is

considered. The legality in the terrorist sense becomes the counterpart of democratic legality.

Paradoxically, the 'legal' terrorist is the one that can make easier 'illegal' acts. Accepting to call

'legal' a terrorist, although one could be aware of the meaning in their jargon, it is a concession

that it is dangerous to do.

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All this is very true, but what is noteworthy is that the problem goes beyond the choice

of vocabulary: the problem is that, inadvertently or unconsciously, the cognitive frames of the

opponent are adopted. Consequently, not only their reasons are understood, but they are

accepted as a legitimate basis for an argument. Accepting the cognitive frame means accepting

that such reasons have a certain weight and therefore justify in some extent their reasoning and

argumentation.

The cognitive frame of eta, and other ethnic terrorist movements, is nationalism - the

qualification of 'independentist' is superfluous, since all nationalism explicitly or implicitly

aspires to independence. At first, it might seem that there was something like a leftist

nationalism as an ideological base, but the process of un-ideologization of ETA terrorism has

reduced it to some ends that are indistinguishable from any other nationalist movement. The

distinctive elements of the terrorist independentism are of course promoting hate and the

exercise of violence.

The statements of a member of eta, transcribed by F. Reinares (2001, 154), are revealing

in this regard: "The goal was simply independence. To me I would have liked improved

conditions for ... everyone ... For workers and such, right. However, we already looked like a

thing that people had to decide when we should be independent. If Euskadi decides to be social-

democratic, well. Or wanted to be fascist, well, fascist. But hey, we would be independent, right?

The first thing was independence [...] Socialism?. If people wanted, fine. And if not, too. But...

since we were a people already. "(Interview 39).

Elsewhere (Bustos, 2000, Ch. 9) I have analyzed the cognitive structure of nationalism,

noting that an essential element of any nationalist ideology is that of identity. For the nationalist,

the nation is providing an identity to individuals; individuals belong to that identity. And

belonging to a particular nation not only identifies but also, and for that matter, distinguishes;

it allows conceptualizing others as the others, which not only are not identical to you, but also

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constitute a potential threat to one's identity . In the analysis of the processes of identity

construction have intervened both sociologists and anthropologists, and cognitive psychologists

as well. Those analyzers have been aimed at elucidating the processes by which the individual

acquires an identity, which is always built, but in general the individual judge it as a natural one.

However, it is not easy to maintain, from the scientific point of view, that the identity constitutes

a psychological state, distinguishable from other psychological states. Rather, it is the result of

how the individual sees their lifestyles and gives them meaning. So Billig (Billig, 1995, 60 passim)

maintained that "An identity is not a thing; it is an abbreviated description of ways to talk about

self and community. The ways of talking, or ideological discourses, do not develop in social

vacuums, but are related to lifestyles. In this regard, the identity ', if there be understood as a

way of speaking, we must also understand it as a way of life." This assertion can be turned upside

down; lifestyles, and their ways of talking, do not develop in a psychological vacuum. Require

the construction of concepts, or more complex cognitive configurations, such as cognitive

frames that do not emerge from a vacuum, but in the ways in which individuals experience a

reality, categorize and, never more appropriately said, incorporated in their beliefs, even in the

form of a theory.

What is psychological in nature is the cognitive basis or the substrate (background), on

which the individual constructs that identity. A psychological background that requires the

construction of conceptions, ranging from concepts to more complex cognitive elaborations,

such as stories, or other symbols, static or dynamic structures. In the process of assuming an

identity exists a will of incorporation, not only in the sense of assuming theories or narrations -

believing they are true and describe the natural way - but also in the more modern sense of

assimilation into the body, so as to build a 'natural' extension of it.

The Integration of a theory, in this case nationalism, in the common sense is indicated

by its embodiment. Nationalism is no longer judged as an abstract theory (abstract in

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competition with other theories) to be considered the natural way in which the individual relates

to society, history and culture. Although this transformation is by no means universal, much less

ahistorical – as Juaristi J. (1989, 1997) and J. Aranzadi (1994) have proven for the case of Basque

nationalism - provides a glimpse of explanation that transcends the sociological and

anthropological level, an explanation that accounts for the pregnancy of nationalist ideology.

The spread of nationalism as a popular political ideology or religion (Casquete, 2009) requires

an explanation beyond, or deeper than the historical-political dimension. An explanation of why

such a conception -and forms of speech or the language games involved - so easily have

permeated the media, to the extent to assimilate it to common sense. But for such explanation

have a certain content, you must detail the cognitive mechanisms by which takes place this

incorporation into common sense; in particular, it is necessary to identify the source of the

cognitive elaboration of the national identity.

An obvious candidate, from the cognitive perspective, is the bodily individual identity,

which is commonly referred to as the self. Not a metaphysical or transcendental self, but a

concrete, corporeal, subject to what has been called 'original experience' (M. Johnson (2007); R.

Gibbs (2006)). Which is conceived as the residence of the individual's identity, a self defining it

as a subject. In the analysis of contemporary theory of metaphor, the notion of subject and I are

related by a metaphorical projection according to a general scheme (Bustos, 2000, 243):

General Proyection

the subject has a self (one or more)

a person> the subject

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a person or thing> a self

a relationship (of belonging or inclusion) > the self relationship

As usual, under the principle of multiple metaphorization (Lakoff and Johnson, 1984),

there are secondary metaphorical projections that enrich the conceptual structure. Among

them, it is important the metaphor that establishes the domain of identity, that is, the subject's

ability to control her own self. This is particularly important in structuring the mental life: the

loss of control of the subject on the self is experienced as a pathology, or at least as a personality

disorder, as an altered state of 'natural' things.

The metaphor of self-control (Bustos, 2000)

The self-control is control of an object

a person> the subject

a physical object> the self

Relationship of control> control of the self by subject

lack of control> psychological decontrol

is important because it highlights how the bodily physical experiences are linked with concepts

that make sense to mental life. Controlling one's identity is conceived as a physical control that,

in the one hand, involves consciousness (or self-awareness) and, on the other, provides a

conception of mental life who is not the one of the strangers. Just as, as subjects, we identify

with our self, we attribute personality and identity to others: they are others because they are

other selves, with its limits.

There are other metaphors that also have an experiential component, which reinforces

their embodied character. They are metaphors that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have called

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orientational, and have to do with the location of the subject and the experience of the life

course of her self. In the first of these metaphors, the self-control is linked to the spatial location

as the (in) stability of this location (Bustos, 2000, 244)

I. self-control as a location in one place

a person> a subject

a normal place> the I

to be in a normal place> to be under control

not to be in a normal place> to have no control

In this metaphor there is an implicit theory of "naturalness" of the locations of the self.

The subject is a kind of natural locations, primarily those in which experience 'wellness', i.e. not

only a pleasant body awareness, but also an experience of 'fit' between the body and the

external environment. Loss of control is experienced as being the absence of the wellness and

the lack of adjustment to the environment. This, to the extent that it is alien to the individual, is

considered as a potential or actual threat to the welfare of the subject. The unknown

environment is, by definition, a potentially hostile environment, a source of pain or suffering for

the subject.

On the other hand, the metaphor that internalizes the life course of the self, to the extent

that it is subject to eventual variations and social changes, is the metaphor of multiple self which,

according to Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 270), involves an internalization of the social and

historical life.

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II. the multiple self

a person> a subject

others> other subjects

the social roles> the values assigned to roles

to be in the same place> to have the same values

to be in a different place> to have different values

Throughout its social and historical life, the subject experiences modifications or

alterations to her self. In the case of vital span, changes in the structure and capabilities of the

body can be treated as disturbances of self. The I cannot be recognized in these changes because

it has developed a theory in which the permanence and stability is essential, in which the

evolution or change is not accepted ('I am no longer that I was', etc.). The same is true for the

relations of the subject with their social environment that often is forced to play different social

roles. Those are linked mainly with values of belonging or authenticity, roles in which the subject

may feel more or less identified. When the subject is forced to embody different roles, the I

may or may not feel recognized in those papers associated to values. Therefore, in this

dimension of individual experience, the self and the subject entertain 'social' relations of affinity

or strangeness. Affinity, when the self feels recognized in the social role that takes the subject;

and alienation when the social role adopted distorts the nature of the self.

The notion of I, in turn, is structured according to a metaphor that links its external and internal

dimensions, and a notion of 'authentic', 'essential' self (Bustos, 2000, 245):

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S (e)xternal

S (I)nternal

S (A)uthentic

S(I): the inner self is within the outer or apparent self

S(e): the actual outer self, the apparent self, as opposed to the occult, who is in and who

sometimes struggle to get out

S(a): the authentic, the imagined, or normative image of self, the self that we would want to be

The external and internal dimensions are linked metaphorically according to the

dualistic theory of common sense, which posits a hierarchy or inclusion in the outer and the

S (E)

S (I)

S (A)

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inner self. This hierarchy corresponds to an image-schema current (first identified by M. Reddy

(1979), as the metaphor of the container) whereby, within each outer or apparent self, there is

an internal self, which is what determines behavioral, external manifestations of the subject.

However, this internal I can be consistent or not with an essential self, which is primarily a

cognitive construction of the subject, which generally has a narrative structure. The subject sees

that essential I as the authentic self, one for which, in his imagination, should aim their inner

selves and, through it, external, behavioral manifestations. From a cognitive point of view, the

essential property in all this game of I´s is coherence (Thagard, 2000). The perceptions of

consistency or inconsistency are that drive the dynamics of relationships between selves, and

the origin of conflict and psychological solutions.

The psychological life is structured by these and other metaphors. If these are mentioned is

because they are relevant to an understanding of the structure of the concept of collective

identity, especially in its nationalist dimension. In the constitution of the concept of national

collective identity, a metaphorical projection of the structure of individual psychological life

operates. Basically, the process consists, as stated by the cognitive theory of metaphor (Lakoff,

2008; Gibbs, 2006; Johnson, 2007), in a use of basic, concrete experiences related to body

awareness, for its application to the constitution of abstract concepts such as collective identity.

This is part of the explanation why nationalist ideology is incorporated as quickly and

easily to common knowledge: its anchor from the abstract to the concrete, and its roots in the

body, immediate and universal experience. Moreover, it must also be part of the assignment of

emotional integration values in a collective identity as an extension of the body's own felt

identity.

Not difficult to describe (Bustos, 2000, 247) is the metaphorical projection essential that

forms the core of the structure of the concept of national identity:

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Subject > people or ethnic group

I > Nation

Relationship subject – I > relationship people - Nation

In this metaphor, relations pertaining to the subject and I in the historical, social and cultural

dimensions are played. As the subject has a self, which defines its identity, the people or ethnic

group must have a nation. The nation is the subject experiencing alterations or modifications

according to time (history) or the relationship with the environment (policies). These changes

are also experienced and categorized in terms of fit or compatibility. The extreme case is obvious

when what is metaphorically equivalent to the self 'lack' of a subject, when the nation has not

reached its existence (as happened to the state of Israel) or when its existence has been denied

or impaired in some sense (Basque Country, Northern Ireland, Scotland...).

Similarly, the membership scheme is reproduced. The nation is under the possession or

control of a people or ethnic group, is the way that identity manifests and concrete itself. Each

people, as a different subject, not only has a nation, but also has the right to have it, since to

deny it is to deny the very identity of the subject.

Therefore, it is important the metaphorical projection of the control relationship (Bustos, 2000,

248):

The relationship of control

Subject > people or ethnic group

I > Nation

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relationship of control > the people or ethnic group has a nation or domain

uncontrol > people do not have a nation

because it expresses how people relate to their nation. Control is paradigmatically expressed

through the notion of sovereignty: a people misses its collective identity if it is not manifested

through the possession of a sovereign nation. Do not reach or loss of sovereignty feels like a loss

of control of self, of identity (Bustos, 2000, 248).

The control as possession of an object

Subject > people or ethnic group

I > Nation

I control > sovereignty

loss of control > lack of sovereignty

And this does not develop as a pure play of abstract concepts: the relationship of control is

specified in the spatial dimension. Owning a nation is owning a territory, a space in which the

self, the nation, have their natural location (Bustos, 2000, 249)

The control as location in a place

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subject> people

I> Nation

being in a normal place> being (having) a sovereign territory

The game of the different selves, external, internal and authentic or essential helps to

understand other dimensions of the concept of national collective identity (Bustos, 2000, 250):

The multiple self

Subject > people

other subjects > other peoples

values of roles or social stereotypes > values or ethnic characteristics

having the same values > belonging to the same people

The metaphor projects the world of relationships of different selves in the world of

relations between peoples. To the extent that others are different individuals from me, so it is

with the people. Everyone has their identity: a people differs precisely by the alleged fact that

has a personality, some features that others do not. And those traits are values that project from

the social sphere to the ethnic one. What is the outcome is no longer the different social roles

that the subject experiences in their social life, but the different national or ethnic traits that

characterize the people. One is obviously the language, which is a fairly objective factor, but

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other features clearly belong to stereotyped images through which they are perceived and

conceptualized those belonging to that people, that is, the symbolic and narrative construction

of what is its own distinctive ethnicity. Of course, this projection of social relations on ethnic

relations is not characteristic of all nationalisms, but it is clear in ethnic nationalism and

occasionally in the right-wing movements of xenophobic or racist character.

In ethnic nationalism (as Basque nationalism in both its moderate version of PNV and

radical of HB or Amaiur) a cognitive dominance of that ethnic dimension over the social occurs,

to the extent that social relations themselves are thought through that prism. Moreover, such

inversion is clearly perceptible in the ideologies of the terrorists themselves. In his remarks,

there are numerous statements that suggest that the nation (or nationality) today is but an

external self that, in the best case, only partially coincide with the nature of the Basque nation

and, indeed, has relationships of patent inconsistency with the essential nation, the Basque

Nation imagined by the nationalist mythology.

The ideological thrust of the ETA terrorist has been to make the reality of an essentially

Basque nation possible, but this essential notion certainly does not correspond to the external

(current Basque Nation) with the historic nation or the nation that, over the years, has been

modified or distorted his true nature, his inner self. And this guidance is primarily aimed at the

destruction by the violence of the current outer self and the possible obstacles that have

impeded the full identification between the inner nation and the essential nation.

5. Conclusion

This is the background against which we must place the ethnic language of terror, which

differs little from the nationalist one. As noted on many occasions, the essential maneuver of

nationalistic speech is a kind of synecdoche (a part for the whole): just as there is only one true

22

nation, that we must not identify with the historical nation, only there is a genuine class of

citizens, nationalists ones. The others are, at best, individuals who have not attained sufficient

awareness to elevate them to the status of patriots. The community as a whole can only be

characterized and represented by the nationalist citizen. And just as he belongs to the nation,

and it identifies her, the nation belongs to her, since it is she who determines its true nature. His

whole speech is thus aimed at seizing the voice of the community as a whole. The language of

terrorism only exacerbates that feature; because the terrorist sees himself as an elite within the

independence movement, as a member of a minority that has understood something that

others, the mere nationalists, fail to understand (or feel), that the exercise of violence is

necessary to achieve the political objectives. In turn, as noted on many occasions (Calleja, 2006,

Ch. 9), nationalism tends to consider that terrorists are misguided patriots who have been driven

by hatred of a childish form, which have not analyzed the political situation in a mature and

responsible manner, etc. That contention results in the use of an apparently neutral (or

technical) language in which terrorist acts are described as a road or a wrong way to achieve

political objectives. Another outcome is the adoption of terms as ‘armed struggle’ to refer to the

terrorist attacks, expressions that only make sense from the perspective of the terrorist.

In general, as conclusions of theoretical nature, the following two can be stated:

a) The terrorist language requires a critical consideration, based on cognitive science. This

means not only critical with the choice of a specific vocabulary or a particular slang for

terrorist acts. It also involves revealing the cognitive background that gives meaning to

the ways of speaking of the terrorist and his supporters. Some of this criticism can

extend to the language of nationalism, to the extent it incurred or it is based on linguistic

abuse.

b) A key dimension of critical consideration of terrorist language is the effort not to adopt

the cognitive frames where the terrorist language arises. Too often, perhaps

23

unconsciously, these frames, or part of them, are accepted, making an implicit support

of reasons and arguments to the terrorist.

As Zulaika indicated (2009, 2), the terrorist discourse creates a reality, their own reality, but

it does not by an alleged magical power of words, but through the embodied world to which the

speech refers. Ethnic terrorist discourse is based on the metaphorical construction of a concept

of nation and the re-narration of his history (usually in terms of oppression and suffering).

Criticism of that speech, criticism of terrorism, cannot be limited to signal their rhetorical

dimension, but must go beyond, to the critical analysis of cognitive structures that feed it.

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