Mapping the Fate of Religions in the Late Modern Era: A Theoretical Survey

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MAPPING THE FATE OF RELIGIONS IN THE LATE MODERN ERA:

A Theoretical Survey

Ahmad MuttaqinDepartment of Comparative Religion

Faculty of Ushuluddin, Religious Studies & Islamic Thought Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta

surel: [email protected]

AbstractThe monolithic approach of modernism that tends to generalize the ‘fate’ of religion based on secularism thesis is misleading, because secularization itself is indeed a multidimensional concept. This paper describes the ‘fate’ of religion in the late modern era from four perspectives: secularization, fundamentalism, religious changes, and Rational Choice Theory (RCT), focusing on their backgrounds, argument, and problems. Having discussed the four perspectives, the paper discuses the roots of controversy among the four and then looks for the possibility to negotiate among them. Finally, using Greeley’s profile of religions in Europe (2002), the paper proposes a thesis of religious vitality based on the relationship between cultural supports and religious vitality in the late modern era.

[Pendekatan monolitik terhadap modernisme cenderung menegasikan bahkan menghilangkan agama. Asumsi seperti ini kerap kali keliru, karena setidaknya sekularisasi itu sendiri merupakan konsep yang multidimensional. Artikel ini menjelaskan ‘nasib agama’ pada era modern melalui empat perspektif: sekularisasi, fundamentalisme, perubahan agama, dan Rational Choice Theory (RCT) melalui analisa latar belakang, argumen, dan persoalan-persoalan yang melingkupi. Setelah dianalisis melalui empat

178 ж Mukaddimah, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2012

Ahmad Muttaqin: Mapping the Fate of Religion

perspektif tersebut, artikel ini melanjutkan pada pembahasan akar yang melatarbelakangi kontroversi empat pendekatan tersebut sembari mencoba mendialogkannya. Dengan mengadopsi pendekatan Greeley (2002), penulis berargumen bahwa signifikansi agama terletak pada relasi budaya dan peran penting agama dalam abad modern.]

Keywords: Modernity, Secularism, Fundamentalism, Religious Changes, Rational Choices Theory (RCT).

A. IntroductionThe trends are quite clear: in most parts of the West, Christian belief and practice has declined significantly… The variations are also quite clear: in a few countries, such as Ireland and Poland, levels of belief and practice are still very high; in others, however, such as Sweden and Denmark, they are quite low. …[W]hat do these trends and variations mean? How might we explain them?1

Sociologists have discussed the relationship between religion and secularism for a long time. Such a discussion mainly focuses on the availability or vitality of religion in a secular era. Whether secularization will drive away religion from society or, otherwise, it will “manifest” in a new form is part of the intriguing topic. Generally, two approaches were used to explain these phenomena. The first is secularization thesis that assumes secularization and modernization would diminish social power of religion that subsequently leads to the extinction of religion. Such an approach is, in Gorski’s terms, the ‘classical secularization theory’,2 or ‘the Old Paradigm’3 or ‘Hard Secularization’.4 The second is “rational choice theory” (RCT) that developed on the ground of rational consideration of human preference, economical law as well as supply and demand, noting that religion will survive in secular arena due to the spreading of

1 Philip S. Gorski, “Historicizing the Secularization Debates”, in Michele Dillon, Handbook of The Sociology of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 110.

2 Ibid.3 Pal Repstad, (ed.) Religion and Modernity: Modes of Coexistence (Oslo: Scandinavian

University Press, 1996), pp. 1-2.4 Robert W. Hefner, “Secularization and Citizenship in Indonesia,” in Paul

Helas, Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity (Malden: Blackwell Publisher, 1998), p. 156.

Mukaddimah, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2012 ж 179


spiritual/religious market. Rooted on economical narrative, other scholars name RCT as

Religious Economical Model (REM). Both of the two basically assume secularization will not automatically lead religion to disappear in society. Rather, they regard that the pluralist structure of a “religious market” is able to vitalize religion. “[T]he freer religious markets are, the more vital religion will be”, Gorski stated.5 This exactly fits to the notion that ‘religious pluralism means religious revival’ not ‘religious decline’. The supporters of REM and RCT even sometimes appeal and strongly state that the secularization hypothesis is misleading and over simplified when analysing religious phenomena in the secular arena.

Many scholars note that secularization thesis was developed based on historical evidences in Europe, whereas RCT bases its theory on the United States’ experience. However differences between the two perspectives on the issue of availability and vitality of religion in society, one would agree that the controversies and even bitter opposition between them only suggest religion is one of the important issues to be discussed in the late modernity as well as global era.

Although most publications in sociology of religion dominate the discussion of religion and modernity in two perspectives, the secularization thesis and the rational choice theory, one should consider that the two perspectives are not the only ‘theories’ to discern the position of religion in modern era. In addition to the binary opposition of the two, Spickard (2006) notes five narratives on religion’s place in the modern world. The five are: (1) secularization that describes religious decline; (2) the ‘Good Old Way’ or fundamentalism noting religious rise to compete against modernity; (3) religious reorganisation that denotes to the changing of religious shape; (4) religious individualism stressing on the shift of religious locus ‘from organisations to individuals’; and (5) Rational-Choices ‘Theory’ of religious markets, challenging secularization thesis and regards that religions do not establish in social isolation, rather they struggle for ‘customer’ in ‘religious market’.6

5 Gorski, “Historicizing the Secularization Debates”, p. 110.6 James V. Spickard, “Narrative Versus Theory in the Sociology of Religion:

Five Stories of Religion’s Place in the Late Modern World”, in James A Beckford & John Wallis, Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), pp. 173-9.



The third and fourth narratives can actually be included in part of either secularization or RCT. They can also, however, stand on an independence perspective, posting modernity means religious changes both in institutional and individual level. This paper will describe the ‘fate’ of religion in the late modernity from four perspectives: secularization, fundamentalism, religious changes, and RCT. The discussion will focus on the backgrounds, the argument and the problem around them. Having discussed four perspectives, I will discus the root of controversy among the four and possibility to negotiate them. Finally, using Greeley’s profile of religions in Europe, I am trying to propose the relationship between cultural supports and religious vitality in the late modernity.

B. Secularization Thesis, “The Old Paradigm”, and “Hard Secularization”

According to the secularization thesis on religion or “secularization theory”, as a result of modernization, the social power of religion will diminish. Basically this theory is developed based on the assumption that religion and modernity are not able to coexist. The former, it is understood, will gradually disappear as the later becomes present.7 Theoretically, three process of secularization --the increase of social differentiation, societalization, and rationalization-- causes the absence of social significance of religion.8 The effect of the secularization thesis theory is so pervasive that according to Anthony Gill, it has been a dominant approach in the study of religion of the 20th century.9

According to Swatos and Christiano (1999), among principle proponents of secularization thesis were Europans such as Bryan Wilson, Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, and Karel Dobbelaere. Although Berger then emigrated to the United States, but he along with other three

7 Gorski, “Historicizing the Secularization Debates”, p. 111.8 Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, “Secularization: The Orthodox Model”, in Steve

Bruce, Religion and Modernization: Sociologist and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 8-9.

9 Antony Gill, (2003, Sep), “Lost in the Supermarket: Comments on Beaman, Religious Pluralism, and What it Means to be Free”, in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42, 3. Retrieved March 24, 2004 from EBSCOHost database (Academic Search Premier, AN: 10465694) on Word Wide Web: http://www.epnet.com/ehost/indiana/edu.html.



figures “were product of European Christian intellectual heritage and educational system that, we might now say, romanticized the religious past of their nations.”10

Secularization, as stated by Pratt, basically contains two processes, social and intellectual.11 Using these categories, the classification of both social differentiation and societalization as stated above are social processes that work in the structure of society whereas rationalization is an intellectual process that plays in the way people think.12

Religion that is discussed in the secularization thesis is in the sense of religious belief, action, and institution. Therefore, although in the beginning the secularization thesis assumes the decline of religion in its social power, subsequently, the loss of this important power will lead to diminishing of other aspects especially in the number of the practitioners and the ‘quality’ of religious people.13 Eventually, as secularization shifts community to society and individuation continues to progress, religious gatherings will diminish and then religion becomes just a matter of individual, no longer communal.

Proponents of secularization thesis use three indicators to prove that religion will disappear. First, as a result of rationalization, religion will be no longer the main motivation of human conduct as well as the source of morals/ethics. Although people may still have religious views, such views will not be bases for judgment anymore.14 Second, religious institutions will lose their membership and then other mundane-rational institutions will supersede their functions.15 And third, individualization would change community based to society-based relationship and it eventually would lead to the inevitable decline of religious communities.

Other scholars used various term to note secularization thesis. 10 William H. Swatos, Jr., and Kevin J. Christiano, “Secularization Theory: The

Course of a Concept, Sociology of Religion, vol. 6 – Number 3, Fall 1999, p. 210.11 Pratt Vernon, Religion and Secularization (London: Macmillan St Martin’s Press,

1970), pp. 5-6.12 \Willis and Bruce, “Secularization: The Orthodox Model”, p. 14.13 Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West (Malden, Massachusetts:

Blackwell, 2002), p. 3. 14 Anthony Russell, “The Rise of Secularization and The Persistence of

Religion”, in Sydney Brichto (ed.), Two Cheers for Secularism (Northamptonsphere: Pilkington Press, 1998), p. 15.

15 Ibid.



Warner (1993) calls it “the old paradigm” and Hefner (1998) mentions “hard secularization”. The old paradigm has been manifested in Berger’s works, The Sacred Canopy (1967, 1969). In Berger words: “in the pluralist situation … the authority of all religious tradition tends to be undermined” (1979). Furthermore, organized religion will weaken, and withdraw from the public scene to the private sphere, with few or no consequence for the main institutions forming society –technological structure, the economy, and the polity.16

The old paradigm emphasize that pluralism as a result of modernity is a key point to lead the decrease of religion. Repstad note that the relations between modernity, pluralism, and secularization in one hand and religious decries in another is part of structuralist tradition in sociology, at least in its more deterministic version.17

Secularization thesis developed amid the emergence of social science in the era of “nineteen-century evolutionism”. For many years, the thesis almost “dominated the social scientific study of religious change.” But the persistent of religions as well as their new kind of religious manifestation imply that the thesis face serious challenge.18

Some scholars like Hadden (1987) and Greeley (2003) strongly criticize to the secularization theory. Hadden, as cited by Swatos and Christino notes that “…in and form its genesis secularization constituted a ‘doctrine more than a theory’ based on ‘presupposition that...represent a taken-for-granted ideology of social scientific circles,” holding on “the myth of the age of faith.” The theory at least contains four weakness: (1) It is “internally weak in its logical structure”; (2) it “exist in unsupported by data after more than twenty years of research”; (3) “New Religious Movements have appeared and persisted in the most supposedly secularized societies,” (4) In modern as well as late modern time, “religion has emerged as a vital force in the world political order.”19

Greeley further resists the secularization thesis for it is constructed based on linearism, progressivism, and universalism point of view. Greeley

16 Pal Repstad (ed.), Religion and Modernity: Modes of Coexistence (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), pp. 1-2.

17 Repstad, Religion and Modernity, p. 4.18 Phillip E. Hammond (ed.), The Sacred in a Secular Age (1985), p. 1.19 William H. Swatos, Jr., and Kevin J. Christiano, “Secularization Theory,” pp.

210-1.



always regrets when the media always states that religion is in decline in Europe just based on the church attendance figure indicator. For Greeley, a statement that religion has declined in Europe is over simplified. In fact, “religion in Europe, like most other human phenomena, is gray.” In some countries religion has decreased but in other countries religion tends to increase or remain stagnant.20 The development of “religion in a given country is affected by history, social structure, and culture; and it affects them. The result, however, is very different religious conditions and not a single, one-dimensional trend”.21

C. Fundamentalism and “the Good Old” Religions This chapter describes what, why and how is religious

fundamentalism. Why religious fundamentalism emerges? What are its goals and targets? How does its deal with modernity? Hunter (1993)22 and Armstrong (2003-2004)23 characterize religious fundamentalism as follow.

In Hunter’s words, “Fundamentalism is orthodoxy in confrontation with modernity”. It is a “rebellion against the hegemony of secularist modernity”. Fundamentalism is basically a modern movement in the opposite direction of modern progressivism. It starts from religious groups or individuals who not only withdraw but also resist to modernity.

Regarding world history, fundamentalism sees history has gone wrong and has been biased by modernity, so fundamentalists try to make it right again. In so doing, they tend to use “anger” language and very often incorporate the violence of military or paramilitary. This is because of the special place given to the concept and reality of “holy war” in the fundamentalist cosmology.

On reacting to modernity, fundamentalism is not just a theological movement. It is an implementation of theological and ideological concept opposing modernity. It is an “orthopraxy of orthodoxy.” Fundamentalism is different from radicalism, militancy, and dogmatism, although for some

20 Greeley, “Religious Decline in Europe?” 21 Ibid. 22 James Davison Hunter, “Fundamentalism: An Introduction to a General

Theory,” in Lawrence J. Silberstein (ed.), Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective (New York: NYU press, 1993).

23 Karen Amstrong, “Resisting Modernity: The Backlash Against Secularism”, Harvard International Review, Boston: 2003-2004.



extend they could be incorporated in one “body.” Fundamentalism has close relationship with religious ideology and

national identity. Within the nations states that categorized as secular state, fundamentalist tend to separate from the mainstream of religio-political though where they grow and create a domain of their own. Because of their truth claim on their understanding, they even take an issue with their religious counterparts, confront to them and regard them as a non-perfect religious group.

Fundamentalism emerged based on their scriptural/literal understanding of sacred texts. They regard sacred text as word of God, inerrant, and absolutely true. Therefore, they strongly avoid metaphorical interpretation of the text. To this conviction, American Fundamentalism, for example, strongly oppose to the Darwinian evolutionism theory in favour to the creationism one. They actively do research and publish scientific base publications to campaign the truth of biological creationism theory. The groups also demand that American public schools should also provide creationism theory in addition to the evolutionism.

Fundamentalism typically emerges among those faiths with a deep prophetic tradition. They maintain “apocalyptic vision, which see the world as so wicked and perverted that God has to smash it in a final, fearful cataclysm.” In accordance to this vision, they also “develop a strongly messianic ideology, which looked forward to an imminent messianic redemption.”

Most fundamentalists are born from the lower middle class society. Most of them even are derivate from whom had not have rooted religious tradition, whose academic background was mostly natural science and engineering. They are converts to new religious understanding that previously dominated by “secular” tradition.

Fundamentalism is a resistant movement. It becomes “more extreme when attacked.” The more fundamentalist groups being attacked, the more they will grow and spread.

Since fundamentalists regard the “old way” as the best and the truest, they always criticizes all modern aspect such as its cultural, political, economical, and moral system. Furthermore, fundamentalists condemn modernity as a source of human decadence. As stated by Armstrong, “fundamentalism tends to overemphasize women’s traditional, secondary



role, [while in the same time]…they reveal the darkness sides of modernity.”24

Although strongly criticizing, even opposing and attacking to the modernism, fundamentalism is actually a fear and anxiety religious group who do not have “a great confidence and bravado” to challenge development. They tend to develop a group or community in a relatively remote from the centre of secular arena. But, interestingly enough, fundamentalist are frequently use modern-secular product such as technologies to spread their view.

It is clear that fundamentalism places religion as a foe of modernity. In so doing, fundamentalists frequently drive religion to away from modern culture and attract religious people to keep distance from it. Having blamed modernity as a fallacy, fundamentalists also provide their own interpretation of society, science, and culture that they said as under God guidance as an opposition to the modern.

Why such ‘the good old’ religious groups appears in modern time? According to Giddens, the groups appear due to the ‘nature’ of religion that “in some part generates the conviction which adherence to the tenets of modernity must necessarily suspend.” In addition, the group usually also “directly address issues of the moral meaning of existence which modern institution so thoroughly tend to dissolve.”25

D. Religious ChangeAlthough Marx, Durkheim and Weber has predicted religions

would progressively disappear from society for the expansion of modern institutions, we watch not only religions that reject to away from society but also see the emergence of novel sensibility of religions and spirituality in the late modernity. ‘Why should this be?’ ask Giddens. Giddens then finds Durkheim’s affirmation that religion has ‘some thing eternal’ namely ‘symbol of collective unity.’26

Will religion truly disappear due to massive spread of modernity? If the question were directed to Hefner, he would answer that the absent

24 Amstrong, “Resisting Modernity.”25 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern

Age (Oxford: Polity Press & Blackwell Publisher, 1992), p. 207.26 Ibid.



of religion at the secular and modern time is just temporary because every society needs ‘collective moral consciousness’. Durkheim, as noted by Hefner, also “believed that this lost of religion was but a temporary dysfunction of early modernization. No society can survive without a collective moral consciousness. The lost of social power of certain religions will be followed by the emergence of a new ‘civil religion’ replacing social role of the earliest. Such a civil religion is able to “provide coherence and stability even in the absence of a theistic canopy.”27 Berger (1992) and Cox (1990), as noted by Beckford and Walli, also predicted that the availability of spirituality in modern and even post-modern time is clearly potential.28 This because, as Mellor says, “societies have a sui generis reality that is collectively represented in religion.” Furthermore, “Religion is more than the mere cement of social solidarity”, it “continues act as an emergent, dynamic and creative force in societies.”29

According to Simmel, “changes in religious forms are part and parcel of the shifts taking place in modern societies as life becomes increasingly segmentalized. Specifically religious concerns are differentiated from other aspects of life and will be more individualized;” no longer does kinship or neighbourhood determine religious preference and affiliation.30 Helas (2005) explains such a situation as ‘subjectivization thesis’; a theory notes “the decline of some forms of the sacred and the rise of the others.” Helas used the theory to “make sense of both decline and growth by relating them to a single process” namely, as Charles Tylor (1991) calls, ‘the massive subjective turn of modern culture.’ In such a case, people move from life-as religion to subjective-life spirituality, where institutional and formal religions no longer the reference of human religiosity, replaced by inner subjective spirituality (“life lived in deep connection with the unique experiences of my self-in-religion”). Spiritual

27 Robert W. Hefner, “Secularization and Citizenship in Indonesia”, in Paul Helas, Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity (Malden: Blackwell Publisher, 1998), p. 150.

28 Ibid., p. 151.29 James A Beckford & John Wallis, Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary

Debates (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), p. xv.30 Grace Dave, The Sociology of Religion (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2007),

p. 31.



activity then will replace associational religion.31 This is what Spickard (2006) categorized as “religious individualism”.32

The perspective of religious changes in modern time emerges as a result of ‘negotiation’ process between ‘hard secularism’ and ‘soft secularism’, between ‘the old paradigm’ and the new one. It appears to be the middle way for positioning religion in secular arenas,33 as Repstad also said:

“[T]hat the two paradigms are suited to different dimensions of religions. The old paradigm may best suited to describe the intellectual, dogmatic dimensions of religion, and its validity may be highest when describing people for whom this dimension is central… The emotional and social aspects of religion, the aspect having more to do with belonging than with meaning may not be seriously threatened by a pluralist society. And may be there is a general tendency in modern society towards more emotive religion and less dogmatic religion both within and outside organized religion… [M]odernization certainly means religious change.”34

If this the case, then, claiming secularization has driven religion away from society or ‘disenchanted the world’ even in Europe, is as simplistic as promoting secularization has lead to religious competition and then religious revival or ‘(re-) enchanted the world’. The true is, according to this supporters, secularization has stimulated religious changes both in structure and content, ranging from religious organization to interpretation of religious tenets. In so doing, religion are forced to accept, adapt, or even opposed to modern system. The things to be noted here is that religious change could take in either positive or negative direction.

Following three types of secularization by Dobbelaere (2002) religious changes take place at least in three areas: society, individual, and

31 Paul Heelas & Linda Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality (Malden, Oxford & Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 2-4.

32 James V. Spickard, “Narrative Versus Theory in the Sociology of Religion: Five Stories of Religion’s Place in the Late Modern World” in James A Beckford & John Wallis, Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), pp. 176-7.

33 As reflected in the subjectivization thesis that Heelas and Woodheade clearly state it as a medium to solve the gap between secularization versus sacralization theories. See Heelas and Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution, p. 10.

34 Pal Repstad, (ed.) Religion and Modernity: Modes of Coexistence (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), p. 6.



organization. Societal change occurs when religions turn to be a sub-system of other secular system and los their social capacity to control society.35

Modernity as well as globalization basically provides a number of trajectories for social institutions, including religion (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Levit, 2004).36 The ability of institutions to grasp the spirit of modernity and engage in it would determine their survival. Religions that embrace modern culture tend to be more vital than those that reluctant or oppose it. In developing countries, the issue of religion and developmentalism, mainly the notion that religions do not contradict to modern culture, was one of discourses stipulated by the government.

In Indonesia, for example, discourse on ‘agama dan pembangunan’ (religion and development) and ‘ulama dan pembangunan’ (religious scholars and development) was so overwhelming in the 1970s and 1980s, noting that there is no contradiction between religion and modernity, or even ulama (religious scholars) can be the agent of development, following Weber’s thesis of Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. The discourses were supported by Mukti Ali, a Master holder in Religious Studies

35 Quoting a number of schoolars, such as Shinner, Parson, Bellah, and Durkeim, Dobbelaere further explains that religious change due to the (1) “rationalization of the institutional sphere”, (2) the ‘disengagement of society from religion’ (from Shiner, 1967: 212-3), (3) ‘the process of differentiation’ (from Parson & Bellah), and (4) ‘desacralization of the world’ (from Shiner 1967: 214-5), or Entzauberung (disenchantment). On Durkheim perspective, as explained by Dobbelaere, it is a situation “when society gradually takes over all the secular function that previously performed by religion”. Individual change refers to individual behaviour and measures the degree of normative integration in religious bodies. It is an index of the accord between the norms of religious groups – in domains of belief, rituals, moral etc. -- and the attitudes and conduct of their members. Shiners (1967: 209-10) as quoted by Dobbelaere, calls it “the decline of religion or dechristianization.” Wherase Organizational changes expresses changes occurring in the posture of religious organizations –churches, denomination, sects, and New Religious Movement – in matters of belief, morals, and rituals, and implies also a study of the decline and emergence of religious groups. Again, Shiner, as referred by Dobbelaire, names such secularization as “conformity with ‘this world’. See Karel Dobbelaere, Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels (Brussel: P.I.E. – Peter Lang, 2002), pp. 24-5.

36 Frank J. Lechner, “Trajectories of Faith in the Global Age: Classical Theory and Contemporary Evidence”, in James A Beckford & John Wallis, Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 55.



from Mc Gill University Canada and PhD from Pakistan, the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The goals are clear, to support modernity and developmental programs run by government. Some pesantren even added word ‘modern’ in their name, such as Pondok Modern Gontor Ponogorogo,37 Pondok Pesantern Moder Islam Assalaam Surakarta, and many others. This reflects that the word ‘modern’ can be used as a symbol of achievement and progress, better religious institution than that of the traditional one. In addition, adding the word ‘modern’ also imply that modernity has stipulated religious changes in the level of institution.

In sum, religious change perspective places religion just like other institutions of politic, economic, and social. All these institutions face problems due to the massive change of society in the late modernity. And, religion is not the only institution to have problem and to change due to the secularization. Even, as Swatos and Chritiano note “…secularization is a healthy part of cycle of religious growth and development.”38

E. RCT, REM, the New Paradigm, Soft Secularization, and Sacralization Thesis

Rational-Choices Theory (RCT) of religious markets explicitly challenges secularization thesis and regards religion does not establish in a social isolation. Religion always competes for ‘customer’ in a ‘religious market’. The basic assumption of RCT is that “individuals are naturally religious and will activate their religious choices, just like any other choices, in order to maximize gain and to minimize loss.”39

RCT emerged from American religious context were state-church, or the monopoly of religious groups (denominations) was absent. Unlike secularization thesis that regards pluralism as an initiation of religious decline, RCT recognizes positive connection between pluralism and religious activity. For Dave, “RCT is to America what secularization

37 Pesantren Darussalam Gontor Ponorogo has used Modern term as part of its name far before 1970. The term “Modern” has been a symbol that the pesantren was managed in a more rational structure, discipline and organization than that of the “traditional”. The implementation of “modern” management in Gontor stirs up some pesantrens to follow Gontor Models.

38 Swatos, Jr., and Christiano, “Secularization Theory”, p. 217.39 Dave, The Sociology of Religion, p. 69.



theory is to Europe.”40 Among strongest advocates of RCT are Rodney Stark, Bainbridge, Roger Finke, and Laurence Ianaccone.41

Initially, RCT was ‘introduced’ by R. Stephen Warner in the early 1990 in his article ‘Work in progress towards a new paradigm for the sociological study of religion in the United States’, American Journal of Sociology, 1993. Although the new paradigm that Warner worked was not clearly to RCT but it close to it. According to Warmer, secularization thesis was rooted in mediaeval Europe, about 1200s, when monopoly/authority of church was strong in control whole society.42

As noted by Dave, RCT bases it explanation on two forms of social-scientific explanation. First, on economic ways of thinking epitomized by Gary Becker in The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (1976), which is a “derivation” of Adam Smith’s utilitarian individualism. Secondly, on element of exchange theory taken from psychology initiated by George Homans and Peter Blau (1960s).43

Socially, Sherkat (2006) identifies three psychosocial aspects that influence religious choices: sympathy or antipathy, the purpose of example setting, and rewards or punishment.44 Sherkat further develops hypothesis of social influence on religious choices: 1) People with affective ties to others will be more careful in their religious choices; 2) Example-setting motivations for choices will be more prevalent among those in position of power, 3) Sanctions will be more influential on choices where social ties are consolidated, 4) The stronger the first order preference for religious goods, the greater the character-planning sanction of shame and guilt directed against non-participation in religious groups and ritual; 5) Sanction meted out by groups and individuals to whom one has affective attachments will be more influential on religious choices.45

Borrowing economic ways of thinking some scholars also name

40 Ibid., p. 67.41 Ibid., p. 70.42 Ibid., pp. 67-8.43 Ibid., p. 70.44 Darren E. Sherkat, “Preference Structures and Normative Constrains in

Movements Outside, Between, and Within Religious Organisation”, in James A Beckford & John Wallis, Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), p. 157.

45 Ibid., p. 161.



RCT as “Religious Economies Model” (REM) theory looking at religion as a “firm” selling its product to religious consumer. In this light, religious services are the “product” and all people in certain territories are the “market” which will be potential “consumers”. Concerning the persistence of religion in the secular or modern era, REM asserts that “the religious vitality” positively correlates to “religious competition” and negatively correlates to “religious regulation”. It means where “religious market” are dominated by small number of large “firms” (i.e. Churches) or heavily regulated by the state, the result will be lethargic religious “firms“, shoddy religious “products,” stagnation, and low levels of religious “consumption”, or religious stagnation. According to the REM, religious vitality is due not to the secularization but to the dynamics of religious economy.46

In addition, as RTC does, REM also assumes that between religious vitality and religious pluralism has a positive relationship.47 Plurality and competition among religions in a society and the absence of both religious domination and state regulation on religions is the basic ingredient of religious vitality. Having based on this argument, the supporter of REM, such as Stark and Ianaccone, frequently state that the secularization thesis is not true. They even appeal to drop the term “secularization” from all theoretical discourse48 because, as Russell has stated, the secularization thesis is over simplified. The thesis that modern person will be free from religion is difficult to be proved. What we see in the secular era is “a tendency to refer to modern society as being not secularized but religiously pluralistic”.49

Other scholars suggest that instead of secularization, modernity even lead to “sacralization” in which the sacred reemerge as social and cultural capitals. In such a case, Hammond notes, “New Religious Movement is an example of the revival of the sacred in a secular age, both in political and economical domain.”50

RCT and REM perspective are in same direction with the “new paradigm” of secularization in which it regards that not only is it

46 Gorski, “Historicizing the Secularization Debates,” p. 113.47 Ibid., p. 161.48 Ibid., p. 14.49 Russell, “The Rise of Secularization and The Persistence of Religion,” p. 21.50 Phillip E. Hammond (ed.), The Sacred in a Secular Age (1985), p. 2.



possible for religious movement to find more or less defensive modes of coexistence with modernity, religion may also thrive and expand in a modern, pluralist setting.51

Operationally, the new paradigm links pluralism and religious growth in two ways: (1). The liberal economic aspects “that competition creates vitality, innovation, and quality of performance, and that monopoly result in opposite” are basically also applicable in religious sphere. (2) “When demand is varied, a broad spectrum of product will lead to a higher total level of consumption”, as that common in economic.52 In his book, Greeley names the theory described above as a “supply-side theory”53 whereas other scholars mention it as “market theory“.54

Although the argument of RCT and its variants looks like so convincing, many critics appear to challenge. Dave (2007) identifies problems and critics to RCT as follow: first, RCT contains simplistic assumptions in which religious actors are assumed to act ‘rationally’ in choosing the form of religion that maximize their benefit and minimize their cost. This also assumes that every choice was made on rational consideration bases. The fact is that there is no rational standard. One’s rationality, of course, differs from that of another.55 In addition, religion is a matter of human’s heart, consciousness and affective domain rather than merely human’s cognitive/ratio.

Second, considering the relationship between religious pluralism and religious vitality, Voas et al (2002) regard that “pluralism as such is not the key variable; it is replaced by size distribution.’ In Voas’ word: ‘The general principle is that when the larger denominations have the greatest size variation, correlation tends to be negative, but when the smaller denominations are more variable, correlations tend to be positive’ (2002: 212).56

Third, the notion that increases in religious pluralism will stimulate the religious market and vice versa, is indeed determined by many

51 Repstad, (ed.) Religion and Modernity, p. 2.52 Ibid., p. 3.53 Greeley, Religion in Europe, p. 189. 54 Gill, “Lost in the Supermarket”.55 Dave, Sociology of Religion, p. 81.56 Ibid., p. 83.



conditions. So, taken for granted to the formula is misleading.57 Finally, according to Bruce in Choice and Religion (1999), implementing RCT as such to all religious fields simply doesn’t work because human histories and identities could affect religious choices as different context and religious organization does. The fact is “neither demand nor supply follows the rule of the market; both are skewed by all sorts of influences. Most social environments are not yet conductive to choosing a religion, which in most remains too important to be simply a matter of preference (Bruce, 1999: 129).” Bruce further sates that “the secularization process is part and parcel of modern liberal democracy, unless there are structural reasons (such as cultural defence) to oppose or retard the dominant trend. A society in which religious choices is possible will, necessarily, be secular.”58

F. Bridging the GapThe differences points of view on the vitality of religion among

the secularization hypothesis, fundamentalism, religious changes, and the rational choices theory can be traced from their differences in the definition of religion as well as spirituality. Some scholars refer to functional definition of religions, while others to substantive. In addition, there is no agreement on the definition that is accepted by all scholars. Some of them even differentiate between religions and spirituality (Heelas and Woodhead, 2005) and some of them bluer them in a single meaning. Knoblauch (2008), for example, states “Spirituality differs from religion by the stress laid on subjective experience of great transcendence by “ordinary” people…“Spirituality extends far beyond that market area that is culturally identifiable as religious and non-religious.”59 Quoting from Truetls, Knoblauch further state Spirituality, as Mysticism, is an autonomous social form of religion. It is not subordinate form of to religion.60

Hellas and Woodhead (2005) even strictly distinct between spirituality and religion. Religion, according to them, drives to neglect one’s inner subjective “will” to obey and to live-as what religions teach,

57 Ibid., p. 84.58 Ibid., pp. 85-6.59 Hubert Knoblauch, “Spirituality and Popular Religion in Europe”, Social

Compass, 55(2), 2008, pp. 145-6.60 Ibid.



whereas spirituality provides people to cultivate their inner desire to be subjective-life spirituality. Religion is an ‘external authority’ whereas spirituality is an “authentic connection with the inner depth of one’s unique life-in-relation.”61

Considering the difficulty to find comprehensive definition, religious studies scholars prefer to propose characteristics of religion. Ninian Smart, for example, asserts that every religion basically has 7 dimensions, there are: (1) practical and ritual; (2) experiential and emotional; (3) narrative or mythic; (4) doctrinal and philosophical; (5) ethical and legal; (6) social and institutional; and (7) material and cultural.62

From the beginning, the secularization hypothesis assumes religion that will be diminished by secularization and modernization is its social power to influence society. Furthermore, one should consider that supporter of secularization thesis and modernization use term religious ‘diminish’ instead of religious ‘extinction’.

Secularization thesis, as seen from Wilson’s opinion, actually carefully distinguishes between the decline of the social significance of religion and the decline of religion itself.63 The basic proposition of the effect of secularization on religion is “that modernization creates problem for religion.”64 In other word, the decrease of social power of religion does not automatically mean the absence of religion in a society because as Toynbee states, “every human being has religion: in fact, that one cannot be human without it in some form”.65 Toynbee further argues that what is lost from religion in the secular era is its old fashion properties which no longer fit to the secular/modern community.66 Because of its natural vitality, religion will always be present everywhere and at all times although in different forms. In this light, Greeley’s profile of religion in Europe at the end of second millennium correctly states

61 Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality (Malden, Oxford & Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 2-4.

62 Ninian Smart, The World Religions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989).

63 Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West, p. 3.64 Ibid.65 Arnold Toynbee, “Preface” in John Cogley, Religion in a Secular Age, The Search

for Final Meaning (New York - Washington - London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. vi.66 Ibid., p. xviii.



that secularization, even communism, could not drive away religion from human beings.

Considering to above explanation, it worth to note here that: first, on the relation between religion and human history, religion will always be present as long as human beings exist. Religion, in whatever forms and shapes, will newer absent from human history. Secondly, on the “criteria” of religious appearance in the secular/modern era, it is possible ‘being religious without having religion’. If the secularization thesis assumes that the social power of religion would decrease as a result of secularization, and the absence of this important power would subsequently diminish religious practice and religious belief, the question is, should being religious requires an affiliation to certain organizations of religion? It might be true that in the secular and global era, organized religions would lose their “supremacy” but it does not mean the disappearance of religion in all aspects, however. The “ambivalent” phenomena of the atheist and agnostic groups in Europe that believe in miracles, mysticism, and magic, as explained Greeley (2003) are the indication that religion will still survive although in the difference “shape”. In this light, certain scholars such as Karen Amstrong, predict that religion in the shape of mystical experience might be well in demand.67 This is why religion in individual-spiritual form as seen in Greeley’s profile tends to appear in Europe at whatever society has changed.

To see the absence and the presence of religion in this changing era one must consider how he or she defines religion. In what sense is religion absent and in what meaning is religion present? To answer this question, it is worth to refer Cannon’s religious dimensions in which in the late modernity religions seem still have vitality in doctrinal, experiential, emotional, and material cultural. But, the other dimensions such as ritual, social, ethical, and narrative tend to be reduced.

Trying to negotiate the two perspectives, Repstad said: “that the two paradigm are suited to different dimensions of religions. The old paradigm may best suited to describe the intellectual, dogmatic dimensions of religion, and its validity may be highest when describing people for whom this dimension is central… The emotional and social aspects of religion, the aspect having more to do with belonging than with

67 Karen Amstrong, A History of God, The 4,000 Years of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (New York: Ballatine Books, 1993), p. 396.



meaning may not be seriously threatened by a pluralist society. And may be there is a general tendency in modern society towards more emotive religion and less dogmatic religion both within and outside organized religion.”

If this the case, then, modernization does not always mean secularization, “but modernization certainly means religious change.”

In sum, saying secularization has cased religion disappeared in modern-secular society is reckless and therefore does not fit to the fact. However, stating that secularization does not have a significant impact on religion is over confident. In addition, the four places for religions as well as spiritualities are available in the late modern time. The track of secularization, fundamentalism, religious changes, and rational choices are available in society. This reflects the modernity as well as the late modernity not only leads religion to a single direction. Modernity as well as secularization means religious diversities in their faces and shapes.

G. Cultural Support and the Vitality of ReligionIn his book Religion in Europe at the End of Second Millennium, Greeley

(2003) profiled the decline of religion in Britain, the Netherlands, and France that fit to secularization thesis theory, especially in chapter 11. Greeley firstly describe that religion has declined so sharply in British, the Netherlands, and France. His explanation, nevertheless, does not directly operate the thesis of secularization in the countries. Rather, he looks for other reasons to answer the question of why religion has declined so sharply in these three countries and not in the others.68

In the case of Netherlands, Greeley argues, the collapse of religion may have been caused by the failure of the three pillars of society (Catholic, Protestant, and socialist) to work well. The Catholics, which are considered as the source of cultural support to sustain religious belief and resist “secularization” do not have significant power anymore. In addition, the Second Vatican Council and Ecumenism those are more tolerant than previous councils had led Catholic people to have less vigorous ties with their congregation than ever before. Furthermore, the Catholicism in the Netherlands, mainly before 1960, was supported

68 Andrew M. Greeley, Religion in Europe in the End of the Second Millennium (New Brunswick & London, Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 197-8.



by a political structure, not by a deeply religious culture such as existed in other countries. Hence, when the political supporters of this pillar collapsed, the power of Catholic in Dutch society also diminished.69 So, basically, religion in the Netherlands was upheld by a pseudo power.

Compared to Switzerland, whose situation is in the some ways similar to Dutch especially on the religious pillars (Catholic and Protestant), the collapse of religion in the Netherlands is more dramatic than in Switzerland. The difference is caused by the fact that religion in Switzerland is supported by a strong religious culture whereas in the Netherlands religion is supported by the “very fragile social structure culture” (politic).

Although Greeley concludes that three countries --Britain, the Netherlands, and France-- clearly fit the secularization model, his explanation in chapter 11 actually tends to refute the work of the secularization thesis and states that the problems were more complex. The decline of religion in those countries was not only because of the success of secularization but it also had to do with a relationship to the cultural support they had. The inclination of Catholic countries having more cultural support to resist secularization even brings Greeley into doubt about whether secularization will inevitably persist in most Catholic countries. It means that the countries where Catholic culture, not Catholic political power, is high, the secularization thesis tends to be far from reality.70

Besides the data described above, if I am correctly understood, there are still other data that can be regarded as contributing to the secularization thesis in Greeley‘s profile. Such data are especially related to the loss of social power of religion in society. Let us see some examples of them.

The first are data about religion as an individual matter and its relation to the increase of non-religiously affiliated people, the decline of church attendance, and the increase of people never attending in most Europe countries. As can be seen from Table 1.1, most Europeans actually still believe in God and life after death. Although Greeley uses the persistence and the increasing rate of belief in life after death as a sign

69 Ibid., p. 198.70 Ibid., p. 212.



that Christian faith increased in Europe,71 it seems to me that religion in Europe tends to appear only in the individual level. Therefore, the high rate of belief in God and life after death could be interpreted to mean that religion has been reduced just in the doctrinal dimension. The other dimensions, such as social-institutional and ritual, tend to diminish. These data also fit to the fact that the number of non-religious affiliations is increasing in most European countries, except Russia. Moreover, in some countries like Northern Ireland, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland the number of church attendance is also reduced. In Britain, Northern Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland, the decrease of the number of church attendance is even followed by the increase in number of people who never attend.

From the secularization thesis point of view, the data stated above clearly demonstrates the decline of the social power of religion. The church as a religious institution is no longer the main determining affiliation of religious people. This phenomenon also indicates that individuation, one of the pillars of secularization, has led people to choose to be “privately pious” rather than “publicly pious”.

Second is the data about the loss of the social power of religion, mainly through the decrease of religious teachings. This statement can be proved from the data showing the increase of “sympathy” for premarital sex and same-sex-relations in the time most religious teachings still regarded such relationships as a sinful. Greeley even asserts that in most Catholic countries around the word, there is a trend to leave “Catholicism’s sexual teaching“.72 The point of this description is that implementing certain religious teachings indicates that the religion is still practiced by its believers. Conducting such a teaching, therefore, can be the “symbol” that certain religions still exists. When religious teachings are already thrown away from the community as mostly happens in European countries, how can we see that the religion still exists? The data described above clearly indicate that the secularization process to some extent has declined religion.

71 According to Greeley, “belief in life after death is one of the core components of Christian faith (and utterly abhorrent to the patrons of modernity),” therefore he “asserts that Christian faith has increased in Europe as a whole“. See Greeley, “Religious Decline in Europe?”

72 Greeley, Religion in Europe, p. 126.



One of Greeley’s conclusions in the last chapter of his book is “the survival of Orthodoxy and Catholicism in part be due to the rich cultural heritages which have supported belief in those traditions.”73 This conclusion is derived from the fact he found in the majority of Catholic countries (except France) that religion tends to be more vital than in Protestant countries. According to Greeley, religious culture that is saved by the Catholic and the Orthodox tradition could be an effective power to oppose secularization.74

To prove his thesis, Greeley analyses and compares the vitality of religion between Catholic countries such as Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, on the one hand, and Protestant countries such as British and the Netherlands in the other. Greeley found that although most Catholic countries undergo modernization, religions still survive. The availability of religion in Catholic countries, Greeley asserts, might be supported by the religious culture they have. Compared Protestantism, Catholicism is more ‘cooperative’ for certain cultures that are judged by Protestants as heretical. The inclination of Catholic countries having more cultural support to resist secularization brings Greeley to doubt the prediction that secularization will inevitably pursue in most Catholic cultures. It means that the countries where Catholic culture, not Catholic political strength, is high, secularization thesis tends to be far from reality. This reality brings Greeley to his main point of his thesis on the relationship between cultural support and religious beliefs. In his view, religious culture (and sub culture) can be the potential power to protect society from secularization. In Greeley’s words: “…. religious culture (and subculture) [in Catholic countries] might be a firewall which resists “secularization” which does not exist in Protestant countries”.75

In addition, Greeley follows what Roberto Capriani has described about the massive spread of Catholicism in Italy through Italian culture. In the view of Greeley, the same model is also present in Spain and Portugal.76

Besides comparing Catholic and Protestant countries, Greeley also found the data that state Catholic groups in certain countries are more vital than Protestant groups. For example, when explaining religion in

73 Ibid., p. 215. 74 Ibid., p. 212.75 Ibid.76 Ibid., p. 210.



Britain based on table 11.7 he concludes that the Catholic group has a higher degree of religiously active both in religious belief and religious practice than the Protestants. The result is that the number of the Catholics never attending the church is also less than the Protestants.77

Moreover, Greeley also explains why Catholics in Netherlands and Britain seem to have no power to resist secularization. In this case, he argues that the absent of cultural support in the Netherlands because before 1960 the Catholics in the country were upheld by ‘pseudo power‘, namely a political structure, not by a rooted religious culture like existed in other countries. Hence, when political support weakens, the power of Catholicism in Dutch society also diminishes.78 The result was secularization growing without a counterpart. That is the reason, compared to the Swiss; the Dutch have less confidence to the church. On the view of Greeley, “Swiss religion is supported by a strong religious culture” whereas “Dutch religion was supported by what turned out to be very fragile social structure.”79

Still using the thesis of the relationship between cultural support and religion, Greeley would argue that the decline of religion in Britain is not merely caused by “secularization”. Rather, the decline is the “final effect of the reformation“. The reformation in Britain has driven away the cultural unit of religion that was previously preserved by the Catholics. As the Protestants become stronger, the Catholics become weaker. Therefore, Catholicism in Britain is not strong enough to oppose “secularization”. Compared to Protestant groups, however, Catholics are more religiously active.80

Greeley’s thesis on the relationship between the vitality of religion and the cultural support indicates that as long as religions preserve the cultural unit around them they would still have enough power to exist. It is cultural unit that maintains inner human consciousness of religion through the many symbols in it. In global arenas, such a thesis also fit to the success spread of Pentecostalism as stated by Lechner, “…the secret to Pentecostals success… lies precisely in their flexible indigenising practice

77 Ibid., p. 207.78 Ibid., p. 198.79 Ibid., p. 202.80 Ibid., pp. 204-7.



that intertwines global tradition and local culture…”81

In developing countries like Indonesia, as long as I concerned, cultural support also contributes to maintain sustainability of religion. It was not political Islam that drives Indonesia more publicly Islamic but those Islamic organizations that maintain cultural path. Amid the blame of being inappropriate and not truly Islamic by puritans groups, the sustainability of Islamic Sufism in the late modern Indonesia, as stated by Howell (2005), was due to their ability to maintain cultural supports around them, such as local tradition, local figure, local custom, and the culture of being inclusive. The case is then; instead of staying in a ‘ghetto,’ Indonesian Sufisms even transform themselves to be more popular, attracting urban people to involve in. It was also the culture of pluralism, where there were no single monopolies of religious authority that lead Indonesian Islam so dynamic.82

Based on the description above, it is clear that there is no single approach can explain the dynamic of religion in the modern as well as late modern era. The secularization thesis, fundamentalism, religious changes, or the rational choices could not lead to an absolute conclusion because there are many factors affecting the ‘fate‘ of religions, such as history, social structure, and culture.83

The assertion that there is no single theory as a grand narration to describe religion in the world is absolutely understandable. The problem of religion is so complex that there is no single approach or theory could describe the profile of religions absolutely right. Accordingly, assuming that secularization will inevitably diminish religion or assuming that modernization would only lead to the religious revival is a brittle hypothesis and must be reckoned to the empirical data.

The complexity of religious problems in the secular era is actually parallel to the plurality of the ways being religious. As stated by Dale Canon, there are six ways in which people could be religious: sacrifice,

81 Frank J. Lechner, “Trajectories of Faith in the Global Age: Classical Theory and Contemporary Evidence”, in James A Beckford and John Wallis, Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), p. 56.

82 See Julia D. Howell, “Muslims, the New Age, and Marginal Religions in Indonesia: Changing Meaning of Religious Pluralism” in Social Compas, 52(4), 2005, pp. 473-93.

83 Greeley, “Religious Decline in Europe?”



right action, devotion, shamanic mediation, mystical quest, and reasoned inquiry.84 Based on these typologies, claiming that religion has declined because of secularization may be true in certain way but not in the other. The decline of religion in certain way, let say devotion and shamanic mediation, usually will be substituted by the other ways, mystical quest and reasoned inquire, for example. This is the explanation of the decrease of church attendance in many Europe countries, but their decreases are replaced by ‘spiritual revolution’ ranging from mysticism, astrology, holism, mind-body-and soul, yoga, meditation, and many other spiritual paths. All of these indicate the decline in church affiliation but the increase of individual-spiritual manner.

Which ways of being religiosity would still sustain in the modern or even post-modern time? There is no exact answer. Certainly, religiosity that based on cultural elements surrounding them would have more vitality to survive than those neglecting to the cultural heritages.

H. ConclusionThe monolithic approach of modernism that tends to generalize

the ‘fate’ of religion in the late modernity based on secularism thesis is misleading. The fact is that, as Dobbelaere (2002) notes, secularization is indeed a multidimensional concept. There is no single theory can explain appropriately the profile and the ‘fate’ of religion. Every country has a specific history, social structure, political situation, and cultural elements in term of religion. To understand accurately the trajectories of religions in each country, a comprehensive analyses based on various elements around them are needed. The fact is religion in the late modern time faces complex and multilayered problems as other institutions have.

Institutionally, there is a connection between religious vitality and cultural supports. Religion that preserves cultural elements in a society tends to be powerful and is able to survive. The cultural element is the ‘soft gun’ of religion in resisting the challenge of modernity. The more “cultural support” a religion has, the more vital it will be. It means, no mater a society changes, as long as religion still maintains cultural units around them, it will still exist.

84 Dale Canon, Six Ways of Being Religious, A Framework for Comparative Studies of Religion (USA: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1996), pp. 69-70.



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Artikel yang dikirim harus memenuhi kriteria berikut:* Artikel ditulis dalam bahasa Indonesia atau Inggris.* Isi artikel terdiri dari 6.000-10.000 kata.* Artikel harus mencantumkan abstrak yang terdiri dari 200-300 kata

dan 3-5 kata kunci artikel.* Nama lengkap penulis disebutkan pada halaman awal artikel dan

disertai identitas institusi penulis* Kutipan ditulis dalam bentuk foonote dan daftar pustaka harus

mengikuti model penulisan yang digunakan Mukaddimah: Jurnal Studi Islam. Ketika satu sumber pertama kali dikutip, maka informasi lengkap tentang kutipan harus disebutkan: nama penulis, judul, tempat terbit, penerbit, tahun terbit dan nomor halaman yang dikutip. Sumber yang mengulang data yang pernah disebutkan pada kutipan sebelumnya ditulis dengan menyebutkan nama penulis, tiga atau 4 kata judul awal sumber, dan nomor halaman yang dikutip. Ibid. digunakan jika kutipan disebutkan secara berurutan, sementara op.cit., dan loc.cit. tidak digunakan.

Contoh: Footnote: 1 Mircea Eliade (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 8

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), hlm. 18. 2 Norman Daniel, Islam and the West (Oxford: One World Publications, l99l), hlm. 190. 3 Mircea Eliade (ed.), The Encyclopedia, hlm. 119-30. Daftar Pustaka:

Eliade, Mircea (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. 8, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.

Daniel, Norman, Islam and the West, Oxford: One World Publications, l99l.

* Istilah bahasa Arab yang belum menjadi kata serapan dalam bahasa Indonesia harus ditransliterasi dengan mengikuti pedoman transliterasi yang digunakan Mukaddimah: Jurnal Studi Islam.

* File artikel dikirim ke [email protected] dalam format .doc, .docx atau .rtf.

PETUNJUK UNTUK PENULIS

PEDOMAN TRANSLITERASI

A. Transliterasi Huruf

b = ب dh = ذ t\ = ط l = لt = ت r = ر z} = ظ m = مth = ث z = ع = ‘ ز n = نj = ج s = س gh = غ w = وh} = ح sh = ش f هـ = h ف = kh = خ s ئـ = ’ ق = q ص = \d = د d} = ض k = ك y = ي

Vokal dan diftongnon-mad (panjang) : a = َـ ـِ = i ـ ـُ = u ـ ـdengan mad : a> = ـَا i> = ـِى u> = ـُوdobel vokal : ay = ـَى aw = ـَو

B. Note1) Kata yang diakhir dengan ta>’ marbu>t\ah ( ــة ) boleh ditulis

dengan/atau tanpa “h”; namun jika kata tersebut merupakan bagian dari sebuah istilah khusus maka, ta>’ marbu>t\ah ditulis dengan “t”.

2) ali>f-la>m ( ال ) ditulis al- ; jika menjadi bagian preposisi, maka ali>f-la>m ditulis ’l- .

3) Ayat dalam Al-Qur’an ditulis berdasarkan suara bacaan. Misalnya: Kata dalam bahasa Arab secara umum:ahliyyah atau ahliyya = أهلية su>rat al-Baqarah, bukan su>rah al-Baqarah = سورة البقرة ahl al-sunnah wa’l-jama>‘ah = اهل السنة واجلماعة Ayat Al-Qur’an:ya> ayyuha’n-na>s, bukan ya> ayyuha> al-na>s = يأيها الناس dha>lika’l-kita>bu la> rayba fi>h, bukan = ذالك الكتاب ال ريب فيه

dha>lik al-kita>b la> rayb fi>h.

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