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Literature Review

Introduction:

My thesis will focus on the role of the Venetians in the crusading efforts of the

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. A topic that has received only piecemeal study. Current

scholarship on this topic sees sporadic interest from historians who focus around big events

or topics in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; however there currently exists no unifying

work that brings these ideas together. The purpose of this paper is to bring together the

writings and study that historians have done on the Venetian involvement in the crusades and

crusade politics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; in doing this it will highlight the

need for a unifying composition and that further study still remains to be done. It is this gap

in the subject material that my overall thesis will try to help fill. This paper will break the

previous study down into a number of topics that will likely be covered in the overall project.

The subjects discussed here are: policy, diplomacy with Muslim powers: Ottoman Turks,

Mamluks, and the Mongols, diplomacy with eastern Christian powers: Byzantium, Cyprus,

and Rhodes, diplomacy with western Christian powers: France, the Papacy, and other Italian

states, perceptions of the infidel, property, defence of the empire, ship management, and

trade. The Venetian shifts and approaches to policy will likely be the main theme of the

whole thesis with each of these other categories feeding into it. This paper will present the

current published research on each subject with some commentary by this author on its

usefulness and its limitations for the study to come. This remains one of the biggest aspects

of why further study on the Venetians in the Crusades is necessary. Very little work has been

done that connects the various aspects of the struggles of the Venetians against the expansion

of the Turks and the other crusading efforts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

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Policy:

The policy that the Venetian Senate employed and developed over the centuries

following the capture of Acre by the Mamluk Sultan in 1291, will be the main focus of the

overall thesis. The loss of Acre signalled the end of the Crusader States on the mainland and

would lead to a dynamic shift in the scope, range, and target of future crusading. The policies

that Venice would develop and implement in the years after 1291 would have effected every

aspect of Venetian life from its trade treaties and mandates, the building of the republic’s

ships and the continued maintenance of their fleets, to the declaration of war and peace with

both fellow Christians and with the various Muslim powers in the eastern Mediterranean.

This paper will introduce this topic first to get a clearer view of the context in which the

research of other topics fits. Peter Holt discusses the role that the maritime republics played

in the pre-1291 Crusader States. Pisa, Genoa, and Venice provided much needed naval

military support and supply for the eastern Latin states; without their support many of the

coastal fortresses, that would later become some of the strongest locations in the East and the

last cities to fall to the Mamluks in the thirteenth century, would never have been captured

with the Egyptian fleet able to provide naval reinforcement. According to Holt naval support

from these cities began in earnest after 1100 and only grew from there as the republics gained

special trade permissions and other rewards for their service such as territory or the use of

sections of these cities to use as colonies.1 This effort continued into the fourteenth century as

Holt comments that during the ‘Last Egyptian Crusade’ in 1365 Venice and Genoa both

participated. Muslim chronicler al-Magrizi recalls that 24 Venetian galleys were present

when the crusade reached Alexandria.2 This crusade followed a new goal it was meant less to

capture land, although Alexandria was the target, but more aimed to disrupt the Mamluk

1 Holt, P. M. The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517. London: Longman, 1986. P. 252 Ibid, p. 125

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economy and production by raiding their trade routes and blockading one of their most

important ports. Unfortunately, Holts work does not include footnotes and instead relies on a

biographical survey that makes it difficult to know exactly where the information he uses is

coming from unless explicitly stated within his text. In his work James M. Powell argues that

it was financial and trade gains that most motivated the maritime republics to participate in

any crusading effort.3 This is supported by Kate Fleet, who initiates her article by explaining

that the eastern Mediterranean was surrounded by Turks in the north, Mamluks in the south, a

failing Byzantine emperor in the West, and the trade republics of Genoa and Venice dividing

up the commercial zones between these powers.4 Zones that had to be defended and

strengthened for the survival of these republics. Monetary and trade gains were a major

concern in policy making in the republics as their wealth determined their survival. These

states were limited in their production and agricultural power and as such needed to import

much of their necessities from outside sources or from their colonies and overseas territories.

Trade concerns influenced the Venetian pledge to help retake Constantinople after its loss to

the Greeks in the 1260s as they had enjoyed trade superiority in that most important city.

Their superiority was lost to the Genoese who made an alliance with the Byzantine Empire to

help the Greeks retake their capital.5 Crusading efforts, although largely controlled and

launched by the major powers of the West such as Burgundy and France, could provide the

defensive action necessary for the republics to protect their assets. The fourteenth century

saw the development of a new form of crusading, the Holy Leagues, which Venice itself

helped to create. These Holy Leagues supported the shift away from long range grand

campaigns towards crusading campaigns supporting and supported by localized threatened

3 Powell, James M. Anatomy of a Crusade: 1213-1221. Philadelphia: Pa., 1986. P. 904 Fleet, Kate ‘Turks, Mamluks, and Latin Merchants: Commerce, Conflict, and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean’ in Harris, Jonathan, Catherine Holmes, and Eugenia Russell, Byzantines, Latins, and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean World after 1150, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. P. 3285 Housley, Norman, The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. P. 50

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powers.6 Tyerman uses the creation of the Holy Leagues to support his argument that popular

support for grand crusading campaigns had largely died down in the West by the mid-1300s

and that instead smaller scale locally organised crusades were the new norm for crusading

practice. Though he does continue to state that this is in contrast to the contemporary

crusading rhetoric. Norman Housley discusses the attempts of Venice to form the first of

these defensive league in 1325. The Senate sent word to many of its colonies as well as other

major Christian political powers in the east such as the Greeks and Genoese in

Constantinople, the Cypriot kings on their island of Cyprus, as well as the remaining order of

the Knights Hospitaller who had gained the island of Rhodes as a base of operations.

However, Housley also mentions the failure of Venice and others to capitalize on the

fracturing of the Turkish states in the early part of the fifteenth century and the lack of

enthusiasm that Venice displayed for the Crusade of 1443. This was a highly targeted and

small scale crusade and Venice worried about losing the peace and trade agreements they had

received from the Turks prior to the launch of the Crusade. Housley further argues that the

Venetians believed that only a massive large scale crusade could hamper the Turks enough

for them to risk the peace and trade they enjoyed.7 One interesting work by Stephan

Stantchev focuses on the development of embargo as a military tactic, weapon, and political

policy and tool.8 This is particularly of interest for this topic as effective embargo relies on

naval and land superiority working in unison and how a state can enforce policy through its

implementation both on its own people by developing new naval tactical theory and its

enemies by applying pressure on economies and morale. Naval power provided by the

Venetians likely was employed to embargo its enemies during periods of war in the

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; however Stantchev’s work focuses solely on early

6 Tyerman, ‘New Wine in Old Skins’? Crusade Literature and Crusading in the Easter Mediterranean in the Later Middle Ages’ in Harris, Holmes, and Russell, eds. Byzantines, Latins, and Turks. P. 2697 Housley, Later Crusades. P. 868 Stantchev, Stephen, ‘The Medieval Origins of Embargo as a Policy Tool’, in History of Political Thought, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2012, pp. 373-399

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medieval history from the 900s until the 1100s with no information about the later use of

embargo. More investigation into how embargo was expanded and used in the later centuries

of the medieval period could prove useful and helpful for the further study of how Venice and

other strong naval powers used their naval superiority during times of war. Stantchev himself

acknowledges this fact when discussing some of his sources such as Ellings’ Embargoes and

World Power, which he states relies heavily on the Frederick Lane’s Venice, which itself does

not easily lend itself to the study of how Venice used embargo or other such tactics.

Whatever Venice’s tactics, Christopher Tyerman argues in his article that crusade purpose

and ideology in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were often removed from the actions

and policies of those involved.9 Serban Marin supports this as he argues about the role Venice

played in the crusades both as supporters and as obstacles in two of his articles. In one article

Marin briefly discusses how Venetian chronicles view their city’s involvement in the

crusades and then discusses numerous instances in which they proved to be a hindrance or

obstruction to crusading movements.10 These range from simply being a thorn in the side of

crusaders like their ‘extortion’ of the rights to Dalmatia from Andrew of Hungary in return

for their help in the Fifth Crusade to Venice’s downright refusal to participate in the crusade

of the Angevin king of Naples, despite papal intervention. Unfortunately it is unclear which

crusade he is discussing here as he does not specify. The focus of his article is to look at the

instances in which various crusading campaigns are mentioned within 76 different Venetian

chronicles and writings including those of Sanudo, Barbaro, and de Canal. This article

provides a good catalogue of the available primary material for the fourteenth to sixteenth

centuries from the Venetian viewpoint. His article is full of categorical information and relies

solely on the primary literature, but fails to provide specific details in several instances.

Marin also recounts the necessity of the papacy to enforce a peace between Genoa and

9 Tyerman, ‘New Wine in Old Skins’?’ in Harris, Holmes, and Russell, eds. Byzantines, Latins, and Turks. p. 265 10 Marin, Serban, ‘Venice- obstacle for the Crusades? The Venetian Chronicles Viewpoint’, in Revista Istorica, Vol. 23, No. 3-4, 2012. P. 1

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Venice so that they could support Louis IX and Charles of Anjou’s crusade. In another article

Marin discusses how Venice’s involvement in the crusades can be seen in two forms:

abeyance and involvement.11 This article follows much the same pattern as the other but

divides Venice’s involvement by recounting events rather than just categorizing the mentions

of the crusades in various Venetian written works. These articles are interesting in their study

of how Venice records and reports on its own involvement in the crusades. They also show

that the Venetian Senate’s policies directly called for the support or oppose crusading actions.

Unfortunately, as with much of the works provided here the timelines of these articles are too

narrow or too early. Most of the examples within Marin’s work which lays out how Venice

helped or hindered the crusades are limited to thirteenth century.

Diplomacy with Muslim Powers:

The Venetians were not known for their military strength on land, their forte was

mostly based around naval superiority. Venice won, lost, and altogether avoided wars by

deftly using its ambassadors and diplomats. Venice often sent merchants and diplomats

eastward to make contact with Muslim powers that could prove to be powerful enemies or

bountiful trade partners. Peter Holt discusses how Venice attempted to maintain good trade

relations with Muslim rulers. Even after the success of the First Crusade Venetian merchants

kept trading with Ayyubid rulers of Egypt, despite the enmity between the Christians and

Muslims.12 Throughout the thirteenth century Venetians continued to trade, sometimes

against the wishes and orders of the Papacy, with Saladin and his descendants. Moving into

the fourteenth century, Venetian records first begin to recognise the threat of the naval power

Ottoman Turks in 1318, the same year of the first attack on Venetian territory.13 However the

11 Marin, Serban, ‘Crusades seen through Venetian Eyes- between Being in Abeyance and Involvement. The Case of the Chronicle Ascribed to Marcantonio Erizzo’ in Cristea, Ovidiu, Petronel Zahariuc, and Gheorghe Lazar, eds. Viam Inveniam aut Faciam in Honorem Stefan Adreescu. Iasi, 2012. pp. 121-124 12 Holt, Age of Crusades. p. 6213 Mike Carr, ‘Motivations and Response to Crusades in the Aegean: c.1300-1350’, Royal Holloway, University of London, PhD Thesis, 2011. p. 106

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Venetians and other western powers failed to capitalize on the early weakness of the Turkish

expansion and instead moved to make peace treaties and trade agreements with them.14 As

Tyerman states there was an ‘inescapable partnership of commerce and diplomacy that

overshadowed all’.15 An interesting aspect that Kate Fleet covers in her article is that while

the Venetians and others were more hostile towards the Turkish emirates of Asia Minor in

this period, it was fact these same groups were more conciliatory toward merchants and the

republics. Meanwhile Mamluk Egypt remained very harsh on western merchants invoking

severe penalties and punishments against them despite the lack of hostility between the

Mamluks and the Western powers. This is a strange quirk of cultural memory and its effect

on diplomacy and attitudes that persisted throughout the period. David Jacoby discusses the

treaties that Venice made with the Turkish powers of Aydin and Menteshe in the fourteenth

century which often included shipments of Cretan cheese.16 This rather singular article helps

to highlight the issue with the study done on this period and the Venetians in general.

Jacoby’s article is very interesting and sheds light on how commodities are used by various

states and the role control over commodities can play in diplomacy; however, it provides very

little to help connect all the disparate studies and articles like this one too each other. There is

also very little on Venetian attempts to make treaties and garner support from other Muslim

powers such as the Mongols and the Persians to the north and far east against the Turkish

emirates. Tyerman does make claims that after 1336 the last hope of a Mongol alliance was

lost, a hope that held out in the west from at least 1300.17 He does little to elaborate on this

subject however. Ayden and Menteshe form the basis of Elizabeth Zachariadou’s work on the

Venetian trade and treaty with these Muslim states.18 Unfortunately, copies of her work are 14 Housley, Later Crusades, p, 8215 Tyerman, ‘New Wine in Old Skins’? in Byzantines, Latins, and Turks p. 26616 Jacoby, David, ‘Cretan Cheese: A Neglected Aspect of Venetian Medieval Trade’ in Queller, Donald E., Ellen E. Kittell, and Thomas F. Madden, eds. Medieval and Renaissance Venice. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1999. P. 57 17 Tyerman, ‘New Wine in Old Skins’?’ in Byzantines, Latins, and Turks p. 268 18 Zachariadou, Elizabeth, Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415), Venice: Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, 1983.

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difficult to get a hold of and this author was unable to access it presently. In similar form to

Zachariadou, Mike Carr’s work focuses largely on trade and diplomacy within the period of

this study. Their studies are very useful for understanding the political situations of these

centuries; however their focus on diplomacy and trade often overshadows all other aspects

and they provide limited use for other aspects of study of the maritime republics.

Diplomacy with Eastern Christians:

Much of the study of the diplomacy between Venice and the Eastern powers is

dominated by the Venetian-Byzantine relations and diplomacy. Furthermore this study on this

subject is limited to the early middle ages up to the Fourth Crusade and into the thirteenth

century. However as the Byzantine Empire begins to fall to the Turks in the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries, little study follows how relations changed between the two powers.

Donald Nicol states that the Venetians were long-time allies of Byzantium and were more

concerned about events in the Adriatic during the First Crusade and as such did not help the

crusaders thwart the interests of the Empire.19 Susan Rose barely discusses the relations

between the Venetians and the Greeks aside from the mention of their early alliance before

the First Crusade that saw Venice as the main provider of Greek naval military strength.20

When the Empire, with the help of the Genoese, regained Constantinople in the early 1260s

Venice lost its prime trade position in Constantinople and was briefly banned from trade

within the Greek lands. However, after the exposure of Genoa’s lack of commitment to the

Empire a treaty was brokered in 1268 between Venice and the Byzantines that allowed

Venice to trade with them once more.21 In 1310 after King Charles failed to fulfil his promise

to Venice to help retake Constantinople for the Latin Empire, the Venetians made a 12 year

treaty with the Greeks. By 1320 relations between the two states were reasonably cooperative

19 Nicol, Donald MacGillivray. Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.20 Rose, Susan Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500, London: Routledge, 2002. p. 721 Lock, Peter. The Franks in the Aegean 1204-1500. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014. P. 157

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which can be seen in Marino Sanudo Torsello includes them in his proposed crusade plan to

take Egypt.22 While the relations with the Byzantines for the most part improves, Tyerman

points out the fact that non-Greek, Orthodox Christians did not have many issues with the

Turks and even fought on the Turkish side at the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396 and during the

Siege of Constantinople in 1453.23

Diplomacy with Western Powers:

Perhaps more important than their foreign Christian allies and rivals are the

contacts Venice had in the West. Venice has a long and storied history with its Italian

neighbours including Pisa, Genoa, and the Papacy; however it also played a large role in the

crusading efforts of all the great kingdoms of the West. Diplomacy with these great nations

was paramount to the growth and protection of Venice and its colonies. As stated above,

Rose believes that Venice saw the need of great crusades to truly influence the expansion of

the Muslim states. It is difficult to know this for certain but their attempts to unite the

threatened Christian powers in the east and to receive support from the west seem to support

her idea. Venice alone did not have the resources to ever mount a crusade on its own without

the support of Christian allies. The Venetians maintained diplomatic contact with the

Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Kingdom of Cyprus from the beginning of their involvement

in the crusading movements of the twelfth century until the loss of Acre in 1291 to ensure the

survival of their quarters and the maintenance of their privileges. In the thirteenth century it

seems to be assumed that Venice lost the trust and support of many western kingdoms and the

Kingdom of Jerusalem due to their involvement in the outcome of the Fourth Crusade.

During the Fifth Crusade dependence on the Venetians was avoided and Genoa was

approached to help provide transportation. However, James M. Powell helps argue against

this idea when discussing the preparations for the Fifth Crusade that while Roberto Cessi 22 Housley, Later Crusades, p. 5523 Tyerman, ‘New Wine in Old Skins’?’ in Byzantines, Latins, and Turks p. 269

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claims that Venice played no role in the crusade, Hugolino, the papal legate, enforced a peace

between Venice and Padua during this time and ordered Venice to prepare ships for the

crusade’s use.24 However, during the fifteenth century Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy,

was counselled to go to the Venetians to acquire the ships he needed for his crusade because

if he approached the Genoese it was more likely that a Turkish spy would overhear or learn

of his plans.25 This is interesting because it shows that Venice was considered first among the

possible providers of transportation that the duke required. Venice’s presence in the eastern

Mediterranean and their power continuously made them an attractive ally for crusading

efforts, despite any feelings of distrust. During Andrew of Hungary’s crusade the Venetians

provided 10 ships for 550 marks each as well as the rights to Dalmatia as mentioned before.26

This seeming extortion by the Venetians is a common theme in their diplomacy with western

crusaders. In the early fourteenth century there were disputes between the Doge of Venice

and Charles of Valois over the cost of transportation that the Venetians were demanding.

Their reasoning for this pricing included the possible losses they would assume should the

crusade fail or fail to materialize, which it later did.27 Carr is highlighting here the Venetians’

focus on their own survival and interests over those of the crusade, but it also highlights a

possible trend in Venetian policy that evolved from the events of 1204. By covering their

bases from the start Venice is here attempting to prevent a similar situation as before. In the

1270s Venice made an alliance with the Angevins but their failure to launch their proposed

crusade on the Byzantine Empire forced Venice to make its treaty with the Greeks in the

1310. During this time there were numerous attempts at diplomacy in the west to unite into a

strong crusading presence. Pope Clement wrote to the Genoese and Venetians in attempts to

forge a peace between them and obtain support from both republics for the coming crusade.28

24 Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p. 6725 Pippidi, Andrei. Visions of the Ottoman World in Renaissance Europe. New York: Columbia UP, 2013. p. 1626 Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p. 12727 Carr, ‘Motivations and Response to Crusades’ p. 11528 Carr, ‘Motivations and Response to Crusades’ p. 38

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In 1320 Philip II, the titular Latin Emperor of Constantinople approached the Venetians to

offer alliance against the Greeks, but instead focused on securing his lands in Achaea

instead.29 Much like Carr is above, Housley here seems to be discussing the issues that

Venice faced with western nobles failing to fulfil their commitments. Some of these were due

to wars elsewhere in the west causing distraction or a shift in priority of the nobles launching

the crusade such as Philip II’s desire to secure his own lands before launching a crusade later.

Though while there were many campaigns that failed to materialize there were still several

through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that did proceed. In the 1440s ships were

provided to Burgundian crusaders for their expedition. However, Venice’s power and

political intrigues left the state increasingly isolated against the eastern threat of the Turks. In

the 1490s Venice was forced into wars against the Turks and suffered major losses. Their

western rivals were openly jubilant at their misfortunes. Despite their increasing isolation

Norman Housley believes that Venice was the only state who could have stood against the

Turkish expansion westward if they could have united the west diplomatically in a firm

alliance.30 A sentiment that seems likely based on their efforts to resist the Ottoman Turks.

Perceptions of the Infidel:

Perceptions of the infidel by the Venetians is not often discussed in the majority of

historiography that has been collected here. However, the topic has received extensive

treatment on its own from historians such as Kate Fleet, Lester J. Libby, Andrei Pippidi, and

others. Understanding how Venice viewed its enemies is very important in the discussion of

policy. How one state or people view their enemies and friends greatly influences how they

treat them in war and diplomacy which are guided by the policies that have been set. Andrei

Pippidi focuses less on how Venice viewed the Ottoman Turks and more on general opinions

and reactions, particularly after the Battle of Nicopolis and the defeat of the joint crusade 29 Norman Housley, Later Crusades, p. 54 30 Ibid, p. 117

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forces in 1396.31 Many of the reactions appear typical to previous treatment of Muslim

enemies calling them barbarians and infidels while others view them as the righteous

vengeance of god and a holy punishment against sinful Christians. Pippidi continues to

describe reactions of various figures within Europe but only briefly touches on what the

Venetians may have thought about the Ottomans. According to his work the Venetians

viewed the Ottoman Empire as the antithesis of their society; calling the sultan a tyrant and

despot.32 Pippidi argues that this is an odd phrasing as a tyrant, according to Pippidi, is a

usurper of power; however, as Venice never recognized the Byzantine Emperor after 1204

then the Turks did not usurp anyone. Pippidi’s narrow definition of tyrant here to fit his own

arguments is suspect. There is also doubt that Venice did not recognize the Byzantine

Emperor after 1204 as they repeatedly made contact with the Emperor to seek and gain his

assistance in the various Holy Leagues, in which he supplied galleys. However, the Ottomans

were a new threat to the Venetian empire and needed to be defined and confronted. Despite

this labelling, Venice was careful not to provoke Ottoman disfavour and it is not until after

the attacks on Lepanto that they title of tyrant is used. The rest of Pippidi’s work focuses on

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The jointly written work by John Tolan, Gilles

Veinstein, and Henry Laurens deals almost exclusively with these two centuries when

discussing Venice and the Ottomans. Furthermore their work focuses on the events, typically

war and diplomacy, between Venice and the Turks and less on the Venetian perceptions and

views of their enemy. Lester Libby’s article also focuses solely on the centuries after the

scope of this thesis. Libby does discuss how the Venetian view of the Ottoman’s changed as

time went on. Many of the opinions presented come from diplomats and merchants who

visited Ottoman lands during this period. However, Libby only presents the later sixteenth

century view that the Venetians held of the Ottomans, mainly that the Ottoman power was

31 Pippidi, Visions of the Ottoman World, p. 1232 Ibid, p. 61

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weakening and that the sultans were falling into despotic apathy, that most of the countries

fighting strength came from mercenaries who are considered to be unreliable, and that while

they Ottomans possessed excellent material for ship building they lacked the shipwrights and

experienced sailors.33 The most useful source of information would be Kate Fleet’s article in

the Journal of Mediterranean Studies titled ‘Italian perceptions of the Turks in the fourteenth

and fifteenth centuries’. Unfortunately, this source was not available in time for this author to

access it and will be researched later. In the doctorate thesis written by Mike Carr, he

provides helpful information into discerning how Venice and Europe viewed the Ottomans in

the first half of the fourteenth century. Pope Benedict XI is acknowledged to be the first pope

to use the threat of the Turkish expansion as a cause for crusade, although his plan was aimed

at taking Greek lands for the defence of all Christendom.34 Pippidi supports this with his

claim that the West cared less about the survival of the Byzantines than it did about the

expansion of the Turks.35 Later Carr identifies that is was at times difficult for Venice to

gauge their enemy. Particularly as the various ‘tribes’ of Turks often faced infighting that

would regularly replace leaders who would treaty differently than their predecessor. This

made it difficult to judge or rely on the Turks to follow the terms of a treaty. Carr gives the

example of the peace between the Duke of Crete and the Turkish Emir of Aydin Hizir in

1337. However by 1340 Umur, Hizir’s successor and co-signer of the 1337 treaty, was

attacking Venetian fleets in direct violation of the terms of their treaty.36

Property:

The next four topics to discuss are all interrelated much like the previous sections

these include Property, Defence of the Empire, Ship Management, and Trade. While the

33 Libby, Lester J, ‘Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire from the Peace of 1503 to the War of Cyprus’ in Sixteen Century Journal, 9 (1978), p. 108 34 Carr, ‘Motivations and Response to Crusades’, p. 3635 Pippidi, Visions of the Ottoman World, p. 1136 Carr, ‘Motivations and Response to Crusades’, p. 180

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previous sections all dealt with topics that were in some ways influenced by the policy set

they also helped develop and set policy for the Venetian Senate. These next topics were most

often the reason policies were put in place. Defence of the Venetian colonial empire and trade

were of the upmost importance to the Senate; however a discussion on the property owned by

Venice is an important boundary to set down to understand where the Senate’s focus was set

and each locations’ role in the empire, its crusading efforts, and the defence of the Venetian

Empire’s interests. Much of the article by Merav Mack is based around the survey put

together by the Venetian bailio of Jerusalem Marsilio Zorzi in the 1240s. It records the

property and the privileges provided by the Kingdom of Jerusalem to Venice within Tyre

itself. The document was most likely written to provide proof of ownership in case of dispute;

however Merav Mack uses it in attempts to map out the medieval city of Tyre, or at least

those parts owned by the republic.37 Peter Holt claims that by the 1250s the leadership of the

Frankish States in Outremer had all but failed and it was the republics of Pisa, Genoa, and

Venice that really held and ruled the coastal cities that remained. Ruthy Gertwagen, who has

extensively studied the use and role of ports in maritime trade and travel during the medieval

period and in particular those belonging to Venice, has compiled the most important

possessions of the Venetian empire in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. From 1204-

1500, Gertwagen writes, that the most important ports for the Venetians were at Corfu,

Modon, Coron, Crete, and Negroponte. These are their major gains after the capture of

Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade and form the basis of their colonizing empire. However

two of these, Crete and Coron, which would later become jewels of their overseas territories

were rather unimportant both as trade posts in general and in the eyes of the Venetians. These

two islands were not originally part of the treaty and were gained through treaties or by force

37 Mack, Merav ‘Italian Quarters in Frankish Tyre: Mapping of a Medieval City’, in Journal of Medieval History, Vol. 33, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 147-165

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at a later date.38 Meanwhile, Negroponte was not completely under Venetian control until

almost the fifteenth century. Despite their less than prized status in the thirteenth century,

these locations would later become of the utmost importance to the Venetian Senate and their

continued control on trade in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas. Despite the title of

the work however, Gertwagen’s work does provide only limited reference to military activity,

instead focusing, as many historians do, on the trade aspects of the republic and these ports.

Peter Lock discusses in brief the lands that Venice was granted in the struggle against the

Ottomans. Most of these locations, according to Susan Rose, were accepted by Venice more

in order to prevent Genoese involvement than for their protection against the Turks.39

However, during the struggle against the Turks as many of the other eastern powers failed to

provide protection some 26 coastal and island fortresses and cities including: Athens, Argos,

Nauplia, Navarino, Monemvasia, Naupaktos, and Patras, were taken under Venetian

protection and control.40 Most of these locations would eventually fall to the Turks despite the

efforts of the Venetians. Susan Rose comments that it should not be assumed that while

Venice took on many of these locations and participated in the various crusading and holy

league actions that they were doing it for the sole purpose of acting as a defender of

Christianity. Instead she claims that they would rather have made peace with the Ottoman

Turks and secure favourable positions with them than to continue to fight against them.41 Her

argument here seems to be based on the arguments of Lane in Venice: A Maritime Republic,

which discuss the extent of which Venice would go to secure its own safety above all else.

Defence of the Empire:

38 Gertwagen, Ruthy, ‘Does Naval Activity- Military and Commercial- Need Artificial Ports? The Case of Venetian Harbours and Ports in the Ionian and Aegean Seas till 1500’ in Lavadas, George ed. Graeco-Arabica Festschrift in Honour of V. Christides. Vol. 9-10, Athens, 2004. P. 16439 Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare, p.109 40 Lock, Franks in the Aegean, p. 16041 Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare. P. 115

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The areas discussed above were important for the continued financial and political

growth of Venice and her empire and were the main focus of defensive action by the

Venetian Senate. For this purpose the development of a new form of crusade was created,

according to Norman Housley, by the Venetians, called the Holy League.42 These leagues of

threatened Christian powers would provide ships for a defensive fleet that would serve,

typically under a Venetian admiral, for the defence of Christian lands in the east. The

Venetians considered the idea first in 1325 with letters sent out to their territories and to

Constantinople to the emperor in 1327 discussing the idea. The first actual league appears

nearly a decade later in 1332 in September and is meant to serve for as a defensive fleet for

five year period.43 Although the majority of his article is far outside the scope of this project

Domagoj Madunic’s article discusses the first fleet developed by the Venetian Senate strictly

for the defence of their home waters in 1301. Mandunic writes that the fleet is ‘best described

as an independent, semi-permanent fleet of state-owned, state-administered warships serving

in the Adriatic under the command of the Governor General of Dalmatia and Albania in

Zadar’.44 This fleet is the first recorded and was necessary for the defence of the home waters

of Venice. It consisted largely of galleys and was supported by the arsenals at Zadar and

Lessina. If control over the Adriatic was lost the rest of the expanding overseas empire would

likely flounder or break free and likely form independent states of their own. Gertwagen puts

forward that Modon and its port were a key defensive location for the Venetians as it

controlled the trade routes into and out of the Ionian Sea. Her main focus is looking as the

uses of the port, but this locations strategic importance is undeniable. It is interesting that

despite its importance, it is over 150 years after first taking control of Modon before the

Venetians build an artificial port at the location. According to Gertwagen the port served as a

42 Housley, Later Crusades, p. 5743 Ibid, p. 5844 Manduic, Domagoj ‘The Adriatic Naval Squadron (1645-1669): Defence of the Adriatic during the War for Crete’, in Historical Contributions, Vol. 45, No. 45, 2013. P. 201

17

port of call for Venetian merchant marines, a loading station for certain commodities, a

pilotage point, and a mandatory stopping point for all Venetian military ships, as well as a

defensive location for the trade and fleets of the republic.45 Susan Rose discusses the growth

of the Great Arsenal in Venice and attributes it largely to the wars fought between the

Venetians and the Genoese during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.46 With the

increase of naval battles between these two republics the Great Arsenal grew to match the

increased demand for war vessels and was even granted a monopoly on the constructions of

galleys, the main ship used for warfare in the medieval period. With four major wars between

Venice and Genoa between 1253 and 1381, demand for ship construction became an

important feature of defending the island republic. Much of her information seems to come

from the work of Robert Davis who writes extensively on the role and development of the

Venetian Great Arsenal.47 Fleets remained the major defensive force of the Venetians against

the Ottomans throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In 1470 during the siege of

Negroponte, the Senate furiously attempted to gather a relief fleet to send. Many of these

ships were likely to have been built in now greatly expanded Great Arsenal. After the loss of

Negroponte, the Venetians gained an ally in Cardinal Bessarion, who advocated on behalf of

Venice in attempts to form alliances between Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and Venice in order

to prevent further defeat.48 Defence of a naval empire such as the one the Venetians had

created relied on its fleets and the fortification of strategic locations. To this end Venice built

impressive and expensive state-of-the-art defences against the Turks in many of its fortresses.

However, not all of these defensive improvements proved successful. The technologically

superior fortress at Nicosia in Cyprus fell to the Turks within two months, while Famagusta,

45 Gertwagen, Ruthy, ‘Venetian Modon and its Port 1358-1500’, in Cowan, Alexander, ed. The Mediterranean Urban Culture, University of Exeter, 2000 p. 123 46 Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare. P. 7-9 47 Davis, Robert, Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal: Workers and Workplace in the Preindustrial City, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.  48 Pippidi, Visions of the Ottoman World, p. 30

18

which had not received the same defensive upgrading, held out for eleven months of siege.49

Unfortunately, Tolan provides no evidence or even a footnote here. Without further

investigation into how Venice improved and maintained these fortresses their ‘superiority’

and effectiveness is based solely on the statements here of Tolan et al. Elsewhere the

Venetians spent two thousand hyperpyra on fortifying Modon-Coron and Negroponte in the

early fourteenth century.50 Unlike Tolan’s work, Carr provides us with source, mainly the

Deliberations des assemlees Venitiennes concernant la Romanie edited by Thiriet. Carr also

ties this expenditure to the reason why Venice demanded a much higher price to transport

Charles de Valois on his campaign. Despite their best efforts and many campaigns and wars

against the Turks, the last of the Venetian territories in the Morea were lost in 1502 leaving

mostly island territories for Venice to protect and maintain.51 Simon Pepper adds to the

discussion about Venice and its fortification works by discussing the works done at their most

important sites, such as the defensive walls at Negroponte, built after the fall of

Constantinople.52 Pepper’s article unlike that of Tolan provides specific details and sources

for his work. Pepper further connects the defensive scheme of the Venetians by explaining

the role that the fleet had working in conjunction with its important fortified locations.

Fleet Maintenance:

The defence of the republic’s lands and privileges relied heavily on its ability to

maintain a working war fleet. Ships were a necessity but wooden ships were notoriously hard

to maintain. Maintenance of wooden ships was a constant and costly problem as many ships

would need repair and refitting between sailing seasons. Supplies were necessary to keep

49 Tolan, John, Henry Laurens, and Gilles Veinstein. Europe and the Islamic World: A History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. p. 19150 Carr, ‘Motivations and Response to Crusades’ p. 11551 Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500, p. 11552 Pepper, Simon, ‘Fortress and Fleet: The Defence of Venice’s Mainland Greek Colonies in the Late Fifteenth Century’ in Hale, J. R., David Chambers, Cecil Clough, and Michael Edward Mallet, eds. War, Culture, and Society in Renaissance Venice: Essays in Honour of John Hale. London: Hambledon Press, 1993.

19

crews well fed and prepared should they be needed in battle. In terms of men, the average

galley could carry over a hundred men. Several historians, such as David Jacoby, have

written on the necessary food stuffs that needed to be provided for sailors. Much of this relied

on biscotti or hard bread, salt fish, and cheese. According to Jacoby the typical sailor would

get 40 grams of cheese per day as part of his rations and in 1402 Marco Falier, the Duke of

Crete, requested the provision of 2,562 kilos of cheese, enough to feed a crew of 180 for

about two months.53 The supply of these victuals was a constant worry as fleets could not

‘live off the land’ as armies on the march could attempt to do.54 Fish could be caught at times

for the provision of food, but not often in the quantities required to feed a fully manned galley

and the provision of fresh water was a constant concern. To provide for the repair and

resupply of ships arsenals were constructed at many ports throughout Venetian territory.

Although many of these were not the size of the Great Arsenal in Venice itself, they were

able to provide repair services, supply depots, and even at a few full construction yards.

Susan Rose states that the most important of these ports were located at: Candia, Corfu

Retimo, Zara, and Zante.55

Trade:

When discussing the Venetians no topic is broader or more studied than trade. Of all

aspects of Venice’s long and storied history trade is always at the centre of every action and

decision for the republic. This project will discuss trade in detail because of its importance to

the city and the republic’s survival; however, it will only form part of the story and not

dominate the narrative like it has for so many historians before. Of course the topic cannot be

wholly ignored, nor can all that has been written be portrayed here but we can attempt to see

how trade played a role in the policy of the Venetian Senate when it comes to their

53 Jacoby, ‘Cretan Cheese: a Neglected Aspect of Medieval Venetian Trade’ in Queller, Donald, Ellen Kittell, and Thomas Madden, eds. Medieval and Renaissance Venice, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1999. p. 5554 Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500, p. 2055 Rose, Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500, p. 9

20

involvement in the crusading efforts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Denys Hay

comments on trade and the relationships between Venice, Genoa, and Byzantium in the

thirteenth century but then states that by the fourteenth century trade had become small scale

and less important.56 This is observation is made with no supporting information or

clarification and is not supported by the studies of many historians such as Carr, Zachariadou,

or Ashtor, who’s work forms a lengthy discussion on trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries and does not support any theories that trade lessened during this period.57 Trade was

so important to the Venetians that in the early period of the crusades they would often ignore

bans on trade, often issued by the papacy, to Muslim states, particularly of ‘war materials’

such as iron and wood. This is often considered a highly profitable market. The trade

agreements with these states, often Egypt, were maintained despite any bans. In the

fourteenth and fifteenth century this practice is likely to have continued though little of it is

discussed. It was common to find Venetian merchants in Syria and even parts of Egypt

throughout these centuries.58 To protect their trade Venice began using a yearly convoy

system that would do circuits of its main trade areas. These convoys would provide

protection for all ships involved and helped ensure trade agreements were better fulfilled and

carried out with less loss of merchandise.59 Furthermore, trade concerns often caused

Venetians to refrain from full commitment to a cause in attempts to maintain these trade

agreements. When looking at Venice’s expansion of infrastructure to support trade Ruthy

Gertwagen’s work again provides and interesting conundrum. Historians in the 1970s and

1980s such as Mollet, Gilissene, and Verlinden argue that artificial ports were necessary for

trade their work fails to separate where artificial ports were constructed at major Venetian

56 Hay, Denys, Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966. P. 17457 Ashtor, Eliyahu, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 198358 Tyerman, ‘New Wine in Old Skins’?’ in Byzantines, Latins, and Turks. P. 28359 Tolan, Veinstein, Laurens, Europe and the Islamic World, p. 79

21

ports.60 Many of which Gertwagen goes on to prove survived and grew as important trade

centres without the inclusion of an artificial port. It is not until later that artificial ports are

constructed at some of the more important Venetian colonies. Unfortunately this author was

not able to access the works of these individuals at this time and must rely on the reports of

Gertwagen’s work and assume that they support her claims.

Conclusion:

This paper was designed to lay out the collected works concerning Venice during the

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There are numerous works that were omitted here for

reasons of space, the repetition of ideas, lack of credibility, or concerns of a tenuous

connection to the subject material. The major concern is that there is no single,

comprehensive study about the Venetians in this period or their role in the crusading efforts.

One has to wonder at the reason for this dearth of information. There is enough evidence and

literary record for historians to write about this period. Most of the works above rely heavily

on the archival materials of Venice itself with footnotes linking to those archives. Many of

them also consult the works of Thiriet, who translated much of the deliberations of the

Venetian Senates into French. Thiriet and Frederick Lane appear in almost every

bibliography and fill many of the footnotes and endnotes sections for these works. However,

Thiriet is not used as a study of the Venetians themselves and Lane’s work is slowly

becoming dated and used more and more frequently to provide historical background and not

as a useful study. The archival material of Venice is the key source of information and the

authors that use the documents found there often have the most extensive and traceable proof

to support their claims. One has to wonder why the writing has remained so limited, but this

author will attempt to remedy this with his main thesis. As it stands most of the articles and

monographs discussed above focus on small events or topics and only tangentially tie them to 60 Gertwagen, ‘Does Naval Activity- Military and Commercial- Need Artificial Ports?’ in in Lavadas, ed. Graeco-Arabica Festschrift. p. 161

22

crusading effort. David Jacoby’s article on the trade of Cretan cheese discussed above, is an

interesting and well designed and researched study; however, it does not expand much of the

knowledge of Venice’s role outside a niche trade market and the effect of this market on the

diplomacy with specific powers. Many of the other sources, despite some of their titles, also

focus as early as possible on the timeline and only barely discuss the later periods. Peter Lock

has an entire chapter devoted to the actions of Venice and Genoa from before 1204 up to

1500 according to his title. Unfortunately, not only does the chapter devote itself mostly to

the actions of Venice, only mentioning Genoa when they are at odds with the Venetians, he

devotes a mere 5 pages of a 30 page chapter to the period of 1261-1718. Mostly focusing on

the events and the territories that Venice gained around the Fourth Crusade instead. Lock is

far from the only historian who makes this error in the treatment of the Venetians. It is for

these reasons that a comprehensive study like the one proposed here that will help fill the

gaps in our knowledge and tie together these disparate ideas and studies on trade, politics,

defence, and crusading. As several of the historians above have stated, Venice was one of the

strongest most influential powers in the eastern Mediterranean at this time, it is hard to

believe they would not factor into every military and political action in some shape or form

throughout these two centuries.

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