Zoë Reinstein

Colloquium: The Arab Spring

10/20/2013

Libya Paper

Since its founding, Libya has been rebuilt time after time, first by colonialists,

then coup leaders, and then revolutionaries. As a result, this one country has gone

through numerous governmental systems in a relatively short period of time, and has a

history marred by instability and regional factionalism. These historical breakdowns have

prevented Libyans from feeling truly and permanently unified as one nation. Each

government has experienced difficulties due to its mode of governance, special interests

and internal squabbles. Not surprisingly, each government has also been overthrown,

because they have tended to act in their own short-term interests, ignoring the most

pressing needs of the Libyan people. In reality, it is in their long-term interest to respond

to the peoples’ needs and to keep them content. The Libyan people have proven that they

are not averse to toppling their government if they deem it insufficient, and this has

proven to be not such a difficult task, as proven with expulsion of the colonialists, the

coup that ousted the monarchy, and revolution that replaced the Gadhafi regime.

The land that we have come to call Libya began as a Berber, primarily nomadic

civilization on the coast of the Mediterranean in Northern Africa, between Egypt and

Tunisia.1 For most of its history, Libya was an Ottoman province. However, the

Qaramanli dynasty ruled Tripoli from 1711-1836.

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During the initial phase of Ottoman rule, Libya was organized into three

regencies.2 These were Tripolitania in the Northwest, the Fezzan in the Southwest, and

Cyrenaica in the East. Due to its location on the north coast of Africa, Libya’s close

proximity to Europe allowed it to be a key exporter of African goods to Europe, and its

economy relied on the crossroads of caravan routes intersected in Libya. During the 18th

and early 19th centuries, the slave trade played a key role in Libya’s economy.

The Qaramanli dynasty is viewed as the golden age of Libya by many both in

Libya and abroad.3 Despite its involvement in piracy4 as the primary source in

government revenue, this period was one of the few periods of stability and unity in

Libya. A well-run patrimonial system of politics gave the Qaramanli legitimacy5 and they

therefore were able to rule for124 years. T

The Qaramanli fell due to foreign interference by the British and French, who

acted against the Qaramanli because they were concerned that piracy was too rapidly

spreading throughout the region as a legitimate way of funding government. However,

without the stability and unity provided by the strong, centralized government of the

Qaramanli era, tribalism and regional differences began to develop again, establishing a

trend of factionalism and disfunction that continues through the present.

When the Quaramanli dynasty came to an end, the Ottomans quickly

reestablished rule in 1836.The slave trade was abolished, but piracy continued to be

common.6 Driven underground, the perpetrators were not the government but individual

groups, who only practiced piracy on those of different faiths.7

During the remainder of the 19th century Italy “adopted a ‘gradualist policy of

slow economic penetration of Libya.”8 The goal of the Italians was to

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establish a settler colonial state or province which would serve as an outlet for population pressures and class contradictions within Italy and repatriate profits from such colonial economic undertaking to the Italian metropole. 9

The problem with this bread-basket concept is that only 1% of Libyan land is arable. ¾ of

this 1 % is only suitable for grazing, and most of the water that could be used for

irrigation is deep beneath the ground.10 This explains why, historically, Libya has relied

more on nomadic raising of animals than traditional, cultivation or grazing, agriculture.

Clearly the land could not sustain the heavy agriculture that Italy had in mind for it;

Libya was already facing problems of over-grazing and desertification at the time of the

Italian conquest.

The effects of Italian colonialism are still visible in Libyan society. Italy

developed the strategy of economic penetration, which was escalated in 1905 with the

establishment of branches of the Banco di Roma in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya’s two

largest cities.11 The Libyan people understood this as an act of attempted economic

domination, and refused to sell their land to Italians. This refusal was met by a formal

Italian military invasion, which began in 1911. Even the Italians were aware of the

problems with colonialism, as one military officer wrote: “Our conquest has indeed

injured traditional, time-honored interest that constitutes the fabric of all life for the

indigenous population.”12

The rise of colonialism ran parallel to the rise of the Sanusi order. Founded by

Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi in Egypt in 1798,13 the Sanusi order was a

missionary Islamic Sufi order that believed in economic self-support rather than

almsgiving.14 Their goal was to lift Islam out of its economic malaise and to halt the

European domination of the Muslim world. The Sanusi gained legitimacy by mediating

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tribal conflicts, and built Zawiyas15 at the interface of areas under individual tribal

control. The Sanusi were able to build mutually beneficial political and economic

relationships, and this allowed them to gain key economic control of the region and

obtain massive amounts of wealth. In time, they came to see themselves as the rightful

rulers of Libya.

The Italian conquest briefly paused when Italy became involved in WWI, but

continued more aggressively in 1918 with the end of the war. The rise of Fascist leaders

in Italy caused higher rates of brutality and repression in Libya.16 An Italian campaign in

1923 of bombings, poisoning of wells, and slaughtering of flocks completely destroyed

the domestic economy and enraged the Libyan people. These acts of aggression lead to a

resistance campaign lead by the legendary Omar Mukhtar, who was subsequently

captured and hung in 1931 by the colonialists.17

As Italians flocked to Libya, they confiscated Libyan land without compensation

and created entire Italian villages. The Libyans who remained in the countryside were

given the worst land, were not allowed to attend Italian schools, and were limited to

positions as cheap, manual labor. All of this led to a massive urban migration of rural

Libyans. Because of the inaccessibility to education, as of 1949 there were only 16

Libyan university graduates,18 which lead to huge problems in the post-colonial period, as

Libya lacked leaders sufficiently educated to rebuild and unify a fledgling nation.

In 1921 the Ottoman Empire formally granted Cyrenaica and Tripolitania

“independence” but under Italian rule. At this time, the new leader of the Sanusi order,

Idris al-Sanusi, was granted the title of Amir of Cyrenaica.19 He mended relationships

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with Britain and Egypt, which would prove to be key allies in Idris’s revolt against the

Italians.

The start of WWII marked a new era for Libyan resistance to colonialism. The

British chose Idris to facilitate the formation of a Sanusi force to sabotage the Italians in

Libya. A provisional Sanusi government was established, and was lead by Idris. In 1943

Italy finally gave up and left Libya, and the British moved into their place. The most

intense resistance took place in Cyrenaica, so at the end of the war there were not any

Italians left. However, some remained in Tripolitania.

At the end of the war, the British had to face the question of what to do with

Libya. They established a commission of investigators made up of the winners of WWII

to investigate the wishes of the people. However, it is questionable as to how genuinely

they wanted to hear the opinions of the people, because the leader of the anti-British party

was jailed during the investigation in order to “ensure free expression of opinion.”20 This

was the first time those in charge of Libya refused to actually hear the people’s wishes.

The commission concluded that Libya was not yet economically self-supporting, and

were therefore not ready for independence. So, they went to the newly founded United

Nations for assistance and it was decided that Libya would gain independence by 1952

after a transitional period with guidance from the West. A federal monarchy would be

formed and be lead by Idris.21 Libya was declared a sovereign state for the first time on

December 24th, 1951.

The new monarchy sought legitimization through Islam. King Idris quickly

abolished all political parties. The economy throughout the 1950s was weak and

depended on the renting out of military bases to the United States and Britain for

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revenues.22 The US and Britain also gave millions of dollars in aid to Libya for food and

development during this period. A lack of educated Libyans meant that most of the

workforce was comprised of foreign guest workers, who flocked to Libya for the many

jobs that the Libyans were not educated or trained well enough to do.23

Prior to the 1950s, it had been speculated that Libya might have large amounts of

oil, but none had been discovered. In foresight of the possibility of the discovery of oil,

the Libyan government created the Petroleum Law of 1955, which specified that Libyan

oil profits would be split 50/50 between the government and the oil companies.24 In 1959

Exxon discovered oil and more companies flocked to the country to try to get their share

of the profits. At the time, Libya was seen as a stable alternative to the other oil states.25

The 1960s were marked by frequent disagreements over the prices of oil, as the

Libyan government wanted a greater share. Libya was not strong in the negotiations and

was walked all over by the foreign companies. Asides from this inability to hardline in

the international community, Libya still experienced huge profits and was independent of

all foreign aid by 1964, joining OPEC as an independent nation in 1965.

Despite the massive oil wealth flowing into Libya, the daily life of the average

Libyan was unaffected. The Libyan people resented the oil industry and the Western

companies for of their reliance on foreigners for oil production. In contrast to the view of

the people, Idris remained friendly with Western allies, whom his government relied on

for revenue. The regime at this time began to be viewed as corrupt, because it accepted

bribes for oil contracts and spent most of this money on the importation of luxuries as

opposed to development, which would increase the standard of living for the people.

Years of poor agricultural output lead to a massive urban migration, which increased

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dissatisfaction with the regime. Tripoli doubled in size between 1954 and 1964,26 which

lead to high unemployment and a reliance on imports for agricultural products because

Libya could not produce these necessities by itself.

All of this unrest and instability lead to a successful and bloodless coup on

September 1st, 1969 that ousted King Idris’ regime while he was seeking medical care in

Saudi Arabia. The coup transformed how the US media represented the Idris regime. A

month before the coup, the New York Times marveled at the economic growth and

success of the regime in developing a modern Libya. They stated that “70 percent of

revenues go towards development,”27 that anti-Western sentiments are strictly a part of

the older generation and that the new generation is growing up Westernized and pro-

American. However, the article does acknowledge that Libyans do resent the continued

American use of the Wheelus air force base. The article expresses concerns about the US

interests reliably continuing in Libya much longer.

After the coup, the New York Times retracted its previous portrait of Idris as a

reformer and painted a much different picture. The day after the coup, an article describes

the Idris regime as conservative and repressive, noting “the arrest of 200 Libyans,

Syrians, and Palestinian Arabs for plotting against the government” in the unrest that

followed the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.28 The article also points to the underdevelopment

of the country, which the New York Times had previously hailed as successful. The

article finally points to the Monarchy’s failure to invest oil revenues in productive ways29

that would benefit the people, and points to this as a reason for the coup.

The September 1st coup was staged by a group of 14 military officers lead by

Colonel Moammar Gadhafi. The leaders of the coup were inspired by Arab nationalism,

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and relied on populist rhetoric to gain the support of the people. These military officers

were huge admirers of Egypt’s Gamal Nasser, and believed strongly in his ideas of Arab

unity and anti-imperialism. However, there were some key differences in Nasser’s

revolution in Egypt and these officers’ coup in Libya.

Nasser’s revolution was born in a comparatively poor country, but one which had an established middle class of some sophistication, and a tradition of institutions. Gadhafi’s revolutionary inheritance came in a country on the path to stupendous wealth through oil. This gave Gadhafi an additional international circle of influence.30

What is interesting about Gadhafi’s coup is that, although it was similar to Nasser’s coup

in Egypt in that it was lead by middle class, young, officers, the outcome was very

different due to the economic differences and its lack of sophisticated civic structures.31

When Nasser kicked out the British in 1952, basic civic structures and institutions were

already in place, while 17 years later the coup in Libya had no structures to take over

from the old government and gain the loyalty of. Similarly, the new government of Libya

was more quickly granted legitimacy from the outside world due to its oil wealth, while

Nasser had to work for this acceptance from the global community. For example, it only

took Iraq a could of hours to accept the new Libyan leadership.

The first action that the new leaders took was the implementation of the five

guiding principles of the new regime. These were the removal of foreign bases and

troops, neutrality, the policy of being friendly to friends and antagonizing enemies, the

principle of Arab unity through national unity, and the continued abolition of all political

parties.32 In time the leader of the coup was made public. This is where Colonel

Muammar Gadhafi steps into the picture.

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Another first move by the new regime was the preemptive defeat of any possible

opposition. Gadhafi eliminated all remnants of the old regime by putting the old

monarchical leadership on trial and Idris was subsequently sentenced to death. He was

never executed, because he never returned to Libya from his medical stay in Saudi

Arabia. However, despite not being executed, Idris and his regime were delegitimized by

this move, and it would not be able to become a threat to the new regime.

Like the Idris regime, the new leaders sought legitimacy through Islam, and

implemented Sharia law. Gadhafi’s reason for doing this was that many Libyans did not

relate to his ideas about Arab unity, but would relate to an Islamic government. The

creation of an Islamic state also allowed the regime to accuse any potential opposition of

heresy. Gadhafi addressed the power of the ulamas by eliminating their power in Libya,

claiming that they were unnecessary and that the people could communicate with God on

their own.33 Although this created the foundation of Islamic opposition later, for the time

being it erased the chances of any religiously organized opposition to the new regime. As

Gadhafi claimed, “We are socialists, but first and above all we are Muslims.”34

Gadhafi also implemented both cultural and popular revolutions. The popular

revolution called for the people to govern themselves. Peoples’ committees were created

all throughout the country that were meant to aid the people in governing themselves.

These committees also served as a way to weed out dissidents and monarchy loyalists,

and ended up removing 800-1,000 opponents of the regime from political power.35 The

cultural revolution was an extension of Gadhafi’s anti-western and anti-colonial policies.

This involved the “burning of books not expressing Arabism, Islam, socialism, and

process,” the closing of nightclubs, promotion of traditional Libyan dress, churches being

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turned into mosques, the establishment of revolutionary courts and judges not bound by

any penal code, a new calendar, and the expulsion of all the Italians remaining in Libya

after colonialism. 36

Gadhafi continued the politicization of Islam through his idea of a Third

Universal Theory that would stand as an alternative to Communism and Capitalism.

The third world lacks a theory to guide it so that it may not remain torn apart between the ideologies of the East and the West. For this reason we have come forward with the proposition that Islam is the right theory, that it can provide guidance to the world as a whole.37

Gadhafi believed that the problems facing the Middle East all stemmed from colonialism,

and believed that the needs of the region demanded a guiding principle specific to these

needs, hence the Third Universal Theory. Gadhafi was also against foreign political

structures such as Democracy because they worked too slowly for his revolutionary

process, and were Western theories that had been imported as a remnant of colonialism.

In the years after the coup, the economy remained inefficient with bloated sectors

that continued to plague the country, but also employed a majority of the population. The

state became the sole economic provider for the people, which it could afford to do

because of its immense oil wealth. However, the economy was not diverse at all, and was

not doing well outside the oil sector. Agriculture and manufacturing made up only 2.4%

of the GDP, and Libya remained reliant on imports. 38 The regime tried to alleviate these

problems with the implementation of business reform in 1978. The government took over

all private and commercial retail businesses. The regime openly viewed entrepreneurs as

“nothing but parasites,”39 which would cause problems for the economy later when the

regime attempted to liberalize its nationalist policies.

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In 1977 Gadhafi released The Green Book as the ideological primer for the

revolution. In this book he coined the term jamahiriyya, meaning:

A Political community marked by consultation, rather than repression. In it, ordinary citizens own the country’s resources, exercise authority, and directly manage the country’s administration and its bureaucracy through a system of popular congresses and committees.40

This furthered Gadhafi’s ideal of statelessness and a lack of hierarchy in Libyan society.

The name of the country was changed to The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab

Jamahiriyya. After this point, Gadhafi claimed to have no political power and stated that

all of the power was from the people.41

If Gadhafi was good at anything, it was hardballing on oil prices. In the early

years of his regime he demanded and succeeded in obtaining higher oil prices for Libya

and the other oil producing countries. To get the oil companies to agree with this, he

nationalized all of BP’s holdings and seized Exxon’s bank accounts in Libya until they

agreed to work on his terms. His ability to defeat the international oil companies gained

Gadhafi more legitimacy domestically and abroad, as the leader of Libya. Because of

Gadhafi, Libya gained control of 70% of its oil resources and the price of oil rose to

$3.32 per barrel in 1971, and again to $4.12 per barrel by 1974.42 This was important

because oil provided 99.99% of revenues for Libya43, so the government then had enough

revenues to continue to maintain the social contract that it had built with the people.

However, this was problematic because oil production only employed 1% of the

population, so although the government came to rely on it more and more, a large percent

of the population remained unemployed and unaffected by the country’s oil wealth.

Despite economic security and the social contract between the government and

the people,44 the regime still needed to use rampant repression tactics to maintain its

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power. An attempted coup by Gadhafi’s fellow officers, Bashir Hawadi and Umar al-

Muhayshi, caused Gadhafi to remove all personnel from the government that he

suspected of potential disloyalty. This period marked the beginning of corruption in the

regime as Gadhafi began to incorporate more and more members of his family and tribe

into the government because he trusted that they would not attempt another coup as their

success relied on him staying in power.

In 1975 there were the first large-scale arrests of students by the regime,45 and in

1980 the repression continued with the complete takeover of the press. A strong security

sector was built including the army, police, and intelligence agencies that had the

Right to propagate, guide, and control the revolution. Their final task was to defend the revolution at all costs, which included the power to pursue, hunt down, and physically liquidate enemies of the revolution abroad and at home.46

This policy called for interference abroad and would create problems for Libya

internationally as it attempted to liquidate “enemies of the revolution.”.

As the regime grew more mature, relations between Libya and the rest of the

world became more and more complicated and negative. Despite its efforts towards Arab

unity, the regime continually isolated itself from the rest of the region. A failed attempt to

unify Egypt and Libya strained relations between the two countries, which was only

made worse by Gadhafi accusing the Egyptian people of drunkenness.47 Involvement in a

war with Chad and an increase in strange behavior exhibited by Gadhafi also put a strain

on relations between Libya and the rest of the region. Gadhafi’s general strangeness made

other state leaders unwilling to work with him. An example of this is that whenever he

went abroad, he demanded on bringing Libyan camels with him and staying in a

bulletproof tent.

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The Gadhafi regime complicated relations with the West during this period as

well. Libya’s relationship with other countries was determined by their stance on the

Palestine issue. Early on, these beliefs contributed to Gadhafi’s intense hatred for the

West and the US in particular for its unwavering support for Israel. As Gadhafi so

eloquently put it, he wanted to remain a threat to Israel as a “big, hard, blow on [the

US’s] cold, insolent face.”48 The regime notoriously supported rebel causes around the

world, particularly in Palestine and Northern Ireland. The regime sent massive amounts

of aid and weaponry to radical Palestinian groups and the Irish Republican Army (IRA),

which further complicated relations with the West.

In 1978 the Carter administration began trade restrictions because it suspected

that Libya was involved in terrorist activities, and in 1979 Libya was put on America’s

list of states that harbor terrorists.49 Relations only got worse under the Ronald Regan

administration. In 1981, the Regan administration shot down Libyan planes over the Gulf

of Sirte in an attempt to provoke Gadhafi to the point of violence so that they could

retaliate and oust him. This was followed by several assassination attempts on the part of

the US as well.

This friction negatively affected the oil sector such that in 1981 foreign oil

companies began to leave and in 1982 crude oil was completely embargoed as the US

began unilateral sanctions. These sanctions were not successful in toppling Gadhafi

because of Eastern European reliance on Libyan oil, so the US countered with sanctions

on European companies that support Libya in 1995, and a full on boycott in 1996.

In 1986 the US realized their unilateral sanctions were not having as strong an

effect as they wanted, so Benghazi and Tripoli were bombed in a hope to further harm the

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regime. However, these attacks came with many civilian casualties.50 The Libyans

retaliated with the Lockerbie Pan Am bombing in 1988, which raised tensions once

again, and Libya was accused of supporting 30 international terrorist movements.51These

actions led the UN to approve sanctions and an air travel ban in 1992, which fueled anti-

Americanism in the region, as the sanctions severely damaged the economy. Due to the

air travel ban, besides inconveniencing and frustrating even the simplest everyday

activities of the Libyan people, the sick could not get to better hospitals in the region and

many died because of this.52

Due to the sanctions, the Libyan economy of the 1990s shrank. The regime closed

unprofitable state enterprises, severely reducing the number of state employees and

raising unemployment. Exports dropped significantly and the Libyan dinar devalued

drastically.53 The government attempted to ease the stress by way of slight liberalization

of the economy, but few were motivated enough to even want to invest or create

businesses, as entrepreneurs had been treated so badly when policies of The Green Book

were implemented.

In the last few years of the 1990s and early 2000s, the Libyan regime had had

enough of the crippling sanctions and isolation from the outside world, and seemed to be

turning over a new leaf. In 1998 the US offered to put the Lockerbie suspects on trial

under Scottish law in a court in the Netherlands, and if convicted, the bombers would

serve in a British prison. In 1999, diplomatic contact between Libya and Britain and the

US occurred for the first time in 18 years.54 They met and agreed that Libya would hand

over the Lockerbie suspects, but that the unilateral sanctions would not be lifted until

after the trial because Britain and the US wanted Libya to fully comply with the trial,

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compensate the victims’ families, and acknowledge the responsibility of Libyan officials

first. Libya did all of the above, and the UN sanctions were put on hold the second the

suspects were handed over in April of 1999.

Post-9/11 the Libyan government’s attitude softened again. It supported the US’

campaign against terrorism, and endorsed a two-state solution in Israel for the first time.

In 2003 the Libyan government renounced and gave over all of its WMDs.55 These

included a pledge to eliminate: all of its nuclear programs, all chemical weapons stocks,

and ballistic missiles with a range beyond 300km. Gadhafi clearly was worried that with

the US-instigated regime change in Iraq, that his regime would be next to be toppled. He

announced the end of his WMD programs only a few days after Saddam Hussein was

arrested.56 It could also be argued that Gadhafi wanted to smooth over relations with the

West in order to make his son Saif al-Islam al-Gadhafi’s transition to leading go more

smoothly.

Whatever his motives were, disarmament worked as a means to gain favor from

the international community, because later in 2003 all of the remaining sanctions were

lifted and oil companies began to return. In 2004 the US lifted the travel ban and a group

of US congressmen visited Libya, followed by Britain’s Tony Blair a few months later.

In the last ten years of the Gadhafi regime the economy seemed to be bouncing

back from the sanctions well. The lifting of the sanctions and privatization of state owned

enterprises in 2003 were praised by the outside world. Gadhafi explained these actions by

stating that “the country’s public sector has failed and should be abolished.”57 Despite the

apparent successes in Libya from the outside, on the inside things were not going well.

To put it simply, the regime attempted too much liberalization too quickly, and without

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regulation. Unemployment rose to 30% with the 2004 privatization of 360 state owned

companies.58

In 2007 salaries of government employees were raised significantly for the first

time in decades, but the many unemployed citizens of Libya resented this. On top of that,

in 2007 domestic fuel prices were allowed to rise which broke the social contract that the

government had built with its people. The state stopped subsidizing the lifestyle of the

masses and was no longer a welfare state. The angry masses began to (quietly) accuse the

regime of the corruption and favoritism that had been its policy since the start. On top of

this, the economy got worse and worse. The large and ineffective public sector still

employed a majority of the people, deflation went to 9.8 percentage points of the GDP,

high population growth which had previously forced the government to overemploy was

severely hurt by the layoffs, the damage of prolonged sanctions would take years to undo,

and the economy had still not been diversified beyond oil.59

The people of Libya were also wary of the possibility of Gadhafi’s son, Saif al-

Islam al-Gadhafi, succeeding his father in the coming years. Saif was controversial

internationally, as he attempted to send aid to Gaza and assisted in the release of the

convicted Lockerbie bomber, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. He was, however, popular inside

Libya. In the years before the Arab Spring, he painted himself as a reformer, and the

people were optimistic about him. As the General Coordinator of the People’s Social

Leadership Committee (PSLC) and Chair of the Gadhafi International Charity and

Development Foundation, he called for transparent elections, a new constitution, a new

penal code, authorization of NGOs, and a free press.60 After Gadhafi continually blocked

these suggested reforms, Saif’s chairmanship of the Gadhafi Foundation was demoted to

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‘honorary.’ The people were hopeful that he would be a different kind of leader than his

father, but the second the people expressed discontent, he went back on all of his old

policies and sided with his father, much to the dismay of the people.

Trouble for the regime began in mid-December, 2010 ,when the Gadhafi

International Charity and Development Foundation released a report that “regretted a

dangerous regression in civil society and called for authorities to lift their stranglehold on

the media.”61 Then, later in December, the foundation said that it would no longer

promote human rights in Libya. This showed a change for the worse in the regime’s

attitudes, and foreshadowed the violence to come.

Benghazi, Libya’s second biggest city had been punished by the regime since the

1970s for several anti-Gadhafi plots that had originated there. The regime had responded

to these plots by punishing the whole city, letting it fall into decay and disrepair. Raw

sewage was redirected into the lagoon downtown, and high unemployment was rampant

while little government aid was given to help. For this reason, the Arab Spring unrest in

Libya originated in Benghazi and in Cyrenaica as a whole.

With the fall of Ben Ali of Tunisia and Mubarak of Egypt, Gadhafi did not seem

concerned that his country could be next. However, on February 15th, 2011 the Libyan

people began to exhibit unrest. Gadhafi had lost legitimacy by flip-flopping on his

position on the West as his people’s opinion had stayed the same, so they felt free to

express their anger and demand change. The protests began as peaceful calls for action by

middle class social networkers, like the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. However,

violence began when the militant lower class joined in. Almost immediately, the

revolution was a mix of peaceful and violent protests and actions.

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The protests began outside police headquarters in downtown Benghazi with protestors

demanding the release of Fathi Terbil, a lawyer who was arrested for representing the

relatives of 1,200 men killed by Libyan security forces at Abu Salim prison in 1996. The

police responded to these protestors by firing water cannons and by sending in thugs to

attack the protestors with clubs and broken bottles.62The protests resumed the next day,

and got more and more violent. The regime hired Bangladeshi and Chinese militias to

attack the protestors. A day of rage was planned for February 17th through social media.

In the Day of Rage protests, soldiers and police opened fire with machine guns on the

unarmed crowds. This practice was counter-productive, because the more people died,

the more their friends and relatives were swayed to the rebel side.

Gadhafi remained oblivious to the protesters needs and demands even as they

continued for weeks. In interviews in March with BBC and France 24 in March, he

blamed the unrest on al-Qaeda and claimed that the demonstrators were on

hallucinogenic drugs -- the only way to explain their behavior. When asked if he would

step down, as Mubarak had in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gadhafi said no because he

“had no position to step down from.” He also claimed that only 150-200 people were

dead and that the Western media was distorting the size of the unrest.

It did not take long for the international community to get involved. This was

largely for oil-related reasons, but under the guise of humanitarian efforts. Libya was and

remains to be the only Arab Spring country where the international community became

involved so quickly. By March the US was financing the armed rebels and had CIA

agents on the ground training and working with the rebels and jihadists. On March 17th,

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the UN got involved when the Security Council approved resolution 1973 which

implemented a no-fly zone. Then, NATO led a bombing campaign from March 19th-31st.

The NATO campaign got complicated to say the least. 7,700 bombs and missiles

were dropped, aimed primarily at political and military targets.63 According to NATO,

The alliance-led operation was nearly flawless – a model air war that used high technology, meticulous planning and restraint to protect civilians from Colonel Gadhafi’s troops. We have carried out this operation very carefully, without confirmed civilian casualties.64

However, there is a very different side of the story being told on the ground in Libya.

There was a lot of inaccuracy and 40-70 civilians were killed, including 29 women and

children, while dozens others were wounded.65 The potential causes for inaccuracy are:

technically faulty bombs, poor or dated intelligence and near absence of experienced

military personnel on the ground who could help direct air strikes. There were several

horrifying instances of entire families getting wiped out, and accidental strikes against the

rebel groups that NATO was supposed to be supporting. Even now, NATO hasn’t looked

into mistakes made, which feeds ever-growing anti-Americanism in the region.

Regardless of the means, in the end Gadhafi fell and was killed on October 20th,

2011 in Surt. The official telling of events is that he was struck down in crossfire, but

numerous YouTube videos counter that statement. He was shot at close range by a group

of rebels. The next day, as no surprise the foreign oil companies returned.

During the first year after the fall of the regime, things seemed to be going very

well. The rebels established a transitional government called the National Transitional

Council (NTC), who willingly gave up power to the General National Congress (GNC)

after the first successful elections on July 7th, 2012. Their primary task has been and

continues to be the writing of a Constitution. Considering that the new government has

19

had to start completely from scratch in state building, for the first year after the revolution

things seemed to be going very well. Retail business is flourishing as never before, and

all schools are open and functioning again.66

Despite some post-revolution successes, there are still many large problems

facing the new Libyan government. A major one is the resurfacing of tribalism and

regionalism. Before colonialism, Libya had never been unified as one state, and does not

associate positive outcomes with unity. This fracturing of the country has made it easier

for militias to retain power in most of the country, and they don’t seem to be going

anywhere anytime soon. Despite some government programs that are attempting to buy

back militants’ weapons or integrate them into pre-existing government institutions, most

remain armed and, although they don’t have political power by way of elections, still

control a lot of the government by way of hijacking the oil industry. Detainees from the

revolution are still being held and tortured in jails not under government control. The

government must find ways to find a balance between paying them to put down their

arms and making them dependent on government patronage, as the last regime did. The

militias not only threaten the new government’s control, but stability as well.

The Islamists are also posing a problem for the new Libyan government. “All of

Libya’s main political parties maintain Islam as part of their political programs,”67 but

that is not the only problem. Immediately after the revolution, the Libyan people were

divided on how strong they thought the Islamists were. There was a general consensus

that they were the most organized, but there was disagreement over how much power

they could obtain. Some said, “The Islamists are organized so they seem more influential

than their real weight, they don’t have wide support, and when they dust settles, only

20

those with large-scale appeal, without the tunnel vision of the Islamists, will win.”68

However, others said “Everyday the Islamists grow stronger. When there is a parliament,

the Islamists will get the majority.”69

With the first elections in 2012, it appeared that the first group was initially right.

The NTC party gained more seats than the JPC Muslim Brotherhood affiliated party.

However, the tables changed with the passage of the Political Isolation Law in May of

2013 that banned ex-members of the Gadhafi regime from participating in the new

government. This proved problematic, because most people who possessed the leadership

skills to lead the new government were a part of the old regime, and were members of the

NTC party. With the passage of this law, the NTC lost a lot of its seats in congress and

the JPC came to power.

The Islamists are not the biggest problem that the new regime is facing. If the new

government is to be more successful than the last three, it must find ways to change how

it handles the economy. First, the new government must face the problems associated

with the old regime as well, then make sure to not make the same mistakes in the future.

A lack of entrepreneurship; a bloated public sector that served as the employer of first and last resort and at one time employed 80 percent of the active labor force; weak health-care and educational systems; unaddressed environmental problems; and decaying infrastructure, from government-owned housing to roads and oil pipelines.70

In order to be more successful than the last regime, the new government must succeed in

being the first Libyan leaders to diversify the economy, while at the same time increasing

transparency and slowly breaking away from the old regime’s reliance on trading

patronage and favoritism for stability.

21

The Gadhafi regime ultimately fell because it refused to learn from its

predecessors and continually made the same mistakes. The government acted primarily in

its own interest, and in the end this lost both the legitimacy and respect of the people. The

regime would have eventually fallen in an isolated incident had the other uprisings of the

Arab Spring never taken place, as the populace was both unhappy and aggravated by the

regime’s acceptance of the very neoliberal policies that it had gained popularity and

legitimacy by opposing in the first place. Gadhafi broke the social contract he had kept

with his people in exchange for friendlier relations with the West, and this is what lost

him his country and life. The challenge for the new regime will be to both address the

post-revolutionary issues facing the country, while also being mindful of the mistakes the

past regimes made and being the first government to actually act on the people’s behalf.

22

1 Collins, pg. 52 Collins, pg. 53 Roumani, pg. 4 Collins, pg. 55 Roumani, pg. 6 Collins states that the Ottomans returned to power in 1935, but Roumani states the year 1836. Regardless of who is right it does not change anything significant. 7 Collins, pg. 58 Collins, pg. 59 Collins, pg. 710 Fisher, pg. 18911 Collins, pg. 512 Letter from the Governor of Tripolitania Gen. Ameglioto the Ministry of Colonies, dated Oct. 23, 1913. Archivio Storico del Ministerodell' Africa Italiana, Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, (ASMAI), 134/3-17,1913.

13 Joffe, pg. 61614 Collins, pg. 615 Sanusi-run trade lodges that people could gather at and learn about the Sanusi order. This helped them spread their message and gain legitimacy. 16 Roumani, pg. 16117 Collins, pg. 918 Collins, pg. 1019 Roumani, pg. 16220 Collins, pg. 1121 Collins, pg. 1222 Collins, pg. 1223 Due to the lack of opportunities to receive a formal education during the Italian colonial period24 Collins, pg. 1225 Collins, pg. 1326 Vandewalle, pg. 1627 The New York Times, Anderson, August 16, 196928 The New York Times, September 2, 196929 The New York Times, Brady, October 4, 196930 McDermott, pg. 40031 The Idris regime had failed to develop the country sufficiently, and Libya was lacking basic civic institutions. 32 Collins, pg. 1633 Joffe, pg. 62234 "The Broadlines of the Third Theory…” lecture by Muannar Qaddafi (Libyan Ministry of Information and Culture, May, 1973).

35 McDermott, pg. 40636 McDermott, pg. 40437 A Gadhafi speech, cited by McDermott, pg. 40338 Vandewalle, pg. 1539 Vandewalle, pg. 2040 Vandewalle, pg. 2741 Vandewalle, pg. 2642 Vandewalle, pg. 1543 Vandewalle, pg. 22

44 The social contract consisted of the government providing jobs and economic security to the people in exchange for their obedience and cooperation. 45 Vandewalle, pg. 1846 Vandewalle, pg. 2747 McDermott, pg. 40648 A speech by Gadhafi, cited by McDermott, pg. 40349 Vandewalle, pg. 3450 These casualties increased international sympathy for Libya, counter to what the US intended. 51 Vandewalle, pg. 3652 Zoubir, pg. 3853 Vandewalle, pg. 3954 Zoubir, pg. 4355 Bahgat, pg. 356 Bahgat, pg. 557 A quote from Gadhafi, cited by Bahgat, pg. 1058 Vandewalle, pg. 22459 Bahgat, pg. 960 The Carnegie Endowment61 The Carnegie Endowment 62 The New York Times63 The New York Times64NATO in a statement, October, 201165 The New York Times66 Vandewalle, pg. 2567 Vandewalle, pg. 568 The New York Times69 The New York Times70 Vandewalle, pg. 7

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