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Diplomacy & Statecraft

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Kennedy and Touré: A Success in PersonalDiplomacy

Philip E. Muehlenbeck

To cite this article: Philip E. Muehlenbeck (2008) Kennedy and Touré: A Success in PersonalDiplomacy, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 19:1, 69-95, DOI: 10.1080/09592290801913734

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Diplomacy and Statecraft, 19: 69–95, 2008Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 0959-2296 print/1557-301X onlineDOI: 10.1080/09592290801913734

FDPS0959-22961557-301XDiplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 2008: pp. 1–47Diplomacy and Statecraft

KENNEDY AND TOURÉ: A SUCCESS IN PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal DiplomacyPhilip E. Muehlenbeck Philip E. Muehlenbeck

Entering the White House at the crest of the African independencemovement, John F. Kennedy and many of his advisors believed thatAfrica had surpassed Asia as the most permeable battlefield in the East–West Cold War struggle. While the battle lines of the Cold War hadalready been clearly drawn in Europe and in much of Asia, newly inde-pendent Africa was wide open for superpower competition. The centralcomponent of Kennedy’s approach to dealing with Africa was his use ofpersonal diplomacy with the leaders of that continent. This article is acase study of Kennedy’s first successful use of personal diplomacy with anAfrican head of State—Guinea’s Sékou Touré.

One of the most significant differences in the way John F. Kennedy andDwight D. Eisenhower fought the Cold War was that JFK perceivedbefriending Third World nationalism as a necessity, while Eisenhowerthought it was desirable but not at the risk of straining relations with hisEuropean allies. Entering the White House at the crest of the Africanindependence movement, Kennedy and many of his advisors believedthat Africa had surpassed Asia as the most permeable battlefield in theEast–West Cold War struggle.1 While the battle lines of the Cold War hadalready been clearly drawn in Europe and in much of Asia, newly inde-pendent Africa was wide open for superpower competition. The StateDepartment concluded that: “What we do—or fail to do—in Africa in thenext year or two will have a profound effect for many years.” The memo-randa continued by calling Africa “the greatest open field of maneuver inthe worldwide competition between the [Communist] Bloc and the non-Communist world.”2

Kennedy’s belief that the Cold War would be won or lost in the ThirdWorld was profoundly influenced by a speech made by Soviet leaderNikita S. Khrushchev on 6 January 1961, only days before Kennedy tookthe presidential oath. Khrushchev said it was the “historical mission” ofworld Communism to assist “wars of national liberation” in an attempt toend colonialism.3

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A remarkable phenomenon of our time is the awakening of the peoplesof Africa. . . . Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be unfortu-nate if they did not take advantage of new opportunities and did not lookfor new methods and forms that would best achieve the ends in view.4

Kennedy took Khrushchev’s speech seriously, reading the speech at dinnerwith friends and several times alone in the Oval Office.5 More notably heread portions of it aloud during the first meeting of his National SecurityCouncil and distributed copies to his entire staff. “It was a significant eventin our lives,” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara later remembered.6

Furthermore, two weeks after Khrushchev’s speech, Kennedy respondedby publicly announcing that his administration was also dedicated to sup-porting the legitimate rights to self-determination of Afro–Asian states.7

So while Africa was relatively unimportant to the United States economi-cally (representing only 4% of its imports and 3.5% of its exports in 1960),this shift in Soviet foreign policy caused a “sense of urgency” within theKennedy White House.8

The central component of President Kennedy’s approach to dealingwith Africa was his use of personal diplomacy in order to build a workingrelationship between himself and the leaders of that continent.9 Effectiveuse of personal diplomacy has been witnessed numerous times throughouthistory, from Franklin Roosevelt’s relations with Winston Churchill andJoseph Stalin to Henry Kissinger and Jimmy Carter’s use of the conceptin pursuing Middle East peace. For Kennedy this meant having both face-to-face conversations and personal correspondence with those Africanleaders which he hoped to improve US relations with. The National Secu-rity Council recognized how much Africans appreciated the attentionKennedy gave them and concluded that America’s most important assetin dealing with African nationalists was, “the President’s status and per-sonal relations” with African leaders, “on which we can draw heavily.”10

This policy was launched as soon as Kennedy entered the Oval Office.When he took office in January 1961 the United Nations General Assem-bly was in plenary session. Leaders from across the world were in NewYork City and virtually all wanted to visit the new American president.Kennedy made it clear to his staff that he wanted to meet with Africans.“If African leaders want to meet me, good. Invite them down here.”11

Many Africans came to visit Kennedy on that occasion, and they wouldcontinue to visit the White House at an unprecedented pace throughoutKennedy’s tenure. For instance, in April of that year, JFK invited theForeign Service staffs of all the African missions in Washington, as wellas African exchange students studying in the area to “Africa Day” cere-monies on the White House lawn where he mixed “at leisure with theguests.”12 He told the gathering that although “many thousands of miles

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Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy 71

of space may separate our continent from the continent of Africa, todaywe feel extremely close.”13

In sum Kennedy opened up the executive mansion to receive elevenAfrican heads of state in 1961, ten in 1962, and another seven in 1963.14

To put these numbers in perspective, up through the first term of GeorgeW. Bush, Kennedy had met more African leaders per month than any otherpresident in American history. The contrast is striking when one considers thatwhereas Kennedy averaged meeting one African head of state per month,Eisenhower had only averaged meeting one African leader per year.15

It was not uncommon for Kennedy’s staff to complain about theamount of time he spent with African guests, as he routinely allowed suchmeetings to run over their allotted time. The young president was genu-inely interested in these leaders’ backgrounds as well as their ideas aboutthe future of their countries and continent.16 The respect was mutual, withhis natural charm, grace, and informality Kennedy was able to put hisAfrican guests at ease by conveying to them his profound sympathy forAfrican nationalism. The new president also encouraged African leadersto correspond with him personally, in stark contrast to the Eisenhoweradministration which discouraged such correspondence.17

Additionally, after each White House meeting the visiting dignitarywas brought upstairs to the Kennedy family’s private quarters and intro-duced to the president’s wife and children. This gesture deeply touchedKennedy’s foreign visitors, particularly Africans, many of whom hadstudied in the United States and therefore knew first hand the pervasivenature of racism in 1960s America. Through the creation of this friendlyatmosphere he won the admiration of African leaders who believed hewas attempting to see African problems not as an ally of the Europeancolonial powers, but as the Africans themselves saw their problems.

John F. Kennedy’s first personal diplomacy success story in Africa wasin Guinea, and is the focus of this article. The Eisenhower administrationdismissed Guinea’s nationalist leader, Sékou Touré, as a Communistand for the most part refused to send any aid to his small West Africancountry. With the West having turned its back on his country, Touré wasforced to appeal to the Soviet Union for assistance. Moscow’s economic,military, and moral support influenced Guinea’s non-alignment to moveincreasingly closer towards the Soviet sphere. However, through the use ofpersonal diplomacy, Kennedy was able to sway Guinea back to a positionof neutrality and Touré eventually became slightly pro-Western.18

A WESTERN COLD SHOULDER AND EASTERN EMBRACE

In 1953, trade union leader Sékou Touré established himself as a folk herothroughout French West Africa after he organized a two-month strike in

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72 Philip E. Muehlenbeck

Conakry that resulted in a 20% wage increase for Guinea’s lowest paidpublic sector workers—the first major concessions for the workers ofFrench Africa. Two years prior the American consulate general in Dakarhad reported to the State Department that Touré was an “African communistleader.”19 While the 1953 strike garnered him acclaim in Guinea, inWashington it only served to further convince the incoming Eisenhoweradministration that Touré was a Communist.

Guinea became independent on 29 September 1958, after it was theonly French colony to reject Charles de Gaulle’s offer of increased auton-omy within a French Union of African states. The sticking point for Touréin rejecting the French referendum was that it did not contain a provisionto allow African states to opt for independence at a future time. Under theleadership of Touré, the majority of Guineans voted against ratifyingthe constitution of the Fifth French Republic and instead insisted uponcomplete and immediate independence from French rule. Touré trium-phantly explained: “We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery.”20

The next day de Gaulle angrily responded by cutting off all economicand technical assistance to Conakry. He announced: “Guinea can no longernominally receive any aid from the French state either for administrationor for funds for equipment.”21 Subsequently, nearly all French techniciansand civic officials left Guinea—paralyzing a country whose populationwas only 5% literate. Upon leaving, the French vindictively launched a“scorched-earth” policy to punish Guinea for having left the FrenchEmpire. The police force destroyed its barracks. Departing colonial offi-cials stripped their offices of all administrative records, as well as anythingelse potentially useful to the Guineans, including telephones and telephonewires, typewriters, maps, and medical supplies. In addition, the scholar-ships of Guinean students studying in France were revoked.22

Guinea was left with no banking institution, no currency of its own,nor any domestic capital accumulation. The prompt and complete Frenchexodus had left Guinea ill prepared for independence. A desperate Touréturned to the United States for economic aid. Out of deference to itsEuropean ally, the Eisenhower administration did not even respond toGuinea’s request.23 In order for Guinea to survive as a nation, Touré hadlittle choice but to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance. Ecstatic about theopportunity to increase its Third World image, Moscow gave immediatediplomatic recognition to the new state, and provided Touré with an exten-sive program of technical and economic assistance. The other EasternEuropean states quickly followed Moscow’s lead in recognizing Guineaand by 1960 even Mongolia had an embassy in Conakry.

Despite the fact that it had refused to assist Guinea, the Eisenhoweradministration became upset by the fact that Touré had established arelationship with and accepted aid from the Soviet Bloc. On 13 October

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Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy 73

Touré again wrote to Eisenhower requesting Washington’s recognitionof his government. The Guinean president stated that it was in the bestinterest of his country to remain aligned with the West and emphasizedhow America’s recognition of Guinea would contribute to that possibility.24

Again the American president ignored Touré’s plea for initiating a rela-tionship between their two countries.

Touré’s personal envoy to Washington, Diallo Telli, was also continu-ally rebuffed in his efforts to contact the Eisenhower administration. TheState Department repeatedly cited “deference to French sensibilities” asthe rationale for its decision to deny diplomatic recognition to Guinea,Conakry’s admission to the United Nations, and economic assistance, aswell as its delay in sending an ambassador to Conakry. Finally, afterFrance gave its blessing, the Eisenhower administration nominated JohnH. Morrow as the first United States ambassador to Guinea on 28 May1959—a full eight months after the Soviet Union had recognized the WestAfrican state.

Morrow later wrote in his memoirs that while being briefed at the StateDepartment for his post in Conakry he found it “difficult to ascertain the cur-rent United States policy in Africa in general, and in Guinea in particular.”25

Washington seemingly had little interest in cultivating relations with anation it had labeled as being “Communist.” Upon arriving in Conakry,however, Morrow quickly “reached the conclusion that this fearless, tough-minded African leader [Touré] was a fervent African nationalist” whowould not allow Moscow or any other power to dictate his policies.26

Despite the opinion of Morrow and the fact that Assistant Secretary ofState for African Affairs Joseph Satterthwaite had found “an exceptionallycordial atmosphere toward [the] U.S.” during his June 1959 visit to Guinea,Eisenhower had already decided not to invest much effort in courting the“Communist” Touré.27

Touré was initially optimistic that Washington would help ease Africancountries away from dependence on their European metropoles. Hebelieved that the United States was, “better situated than most Westernpowers to adopt correct policies towards Africa because it has no coloniesand it has a colonial past.”28 His early optimism soon soured overEisenhower’s support for the French use of force in Algeria, the treatmentof African and Asian diplomats in the United States, and Washington’sslow response in acknowledging Guinea’s independence. Furthermore,after Touré had spent months personally badgering the American ambassadorfor an English language program, the State Department responded bysending only one teacher to a country of 2.5 million people.29 A generalconsensus was formed in Conakry that the United States was not interestedin assisting the economic and political development of sub-SaharanAfrica.30

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TOURÉ VISITS THE US

In spite of the growing hostility between Eisenhower and Touré, the latterwas invited to make an official state visit to the United States. When Touréarrived in Washington D.C. on 26 October 1959, all of Africa was watchingto see how the Guinean president would be received. Vice-PresidentRichard Nixon and Secretary of State Christian Herter greeted Touré uponhis arrival at the airport and escorted their guest along a parade route on theway to Blair House, the president’s official guesthouse on PennsylvaniaAvenue. More than 250,000 people lined the streets of the nation’s capitalhoping to catch a glimpse of the man who had defied Charles de Gaulle.31

The next morning the two presidents and a handful of their advisors metat the White House. Their meeting was cordial but unproductive. Touré toldEisenhower how the abrupt French withdrawal from Guinea had crippledhis country. The Guinean president explained his acceptance of Soviet aidby saying that under the dire conditions Guinea faced at its independence,he would have “accepted help from the devil.” He noted that Soviet aid wasgiven to Conakry “without their [Guinea’s] having made a request for themof any kind either orally or in writing,” whereas Washington neglected tomake even a symbolic gesture of support to Guinea. Touré explained thatGuinea was still in a precarious position both economically and educationally,but did not request aid from his American host. Eisenhower offered 150scholarships for Guinean students to study in the United States andan English language-training program, but avoided discussing economicassistance.32

Following the meeting Touré embarked on a trip around the UnitedStates making stops that included New York, Raleigh, Chicago, andLos Angeles.33 The stop in North Carolina was historically significant as itwas the first time an American southern government had played host to anofficial bi-racial banquet.34 Yet the most significant event of the tour wasthe Guinean president’s meeting in Disneyland with the chairman of theSenate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Senator JohnF. Kennedy. The young senator told Touré that he was interested in theplight of Guinea and its independence. Touré responded by telling Kennedythat he had appreciated the senator’s stand against French colonialism inAlgeria and wished him further political success.35 Kennedy informedTouré that he wanted to go on record promising that if the Democratic Partywon the 1960 presidential election it would increase the United States’interest in Guinea and the other developing nations of Africa. With typicalKennedy wit he added that he wished Touré and his political party welldespite the fact that its symbol was an elephant.36

The Guinean delegation returned to Conakry still talking abouttheir meeting with John F. Kennedy. Eisenhower’s politically appointed

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ambassador to Conakry wrote that the Guineans who visited the United Stateswere more impressed with Kennedy than any other American they met.37

They praised his youth, his courage, his astonishing knowledge ofworld affairs in general, and of the problems of developing countries inparticular. They enjoyed the distinction drawn by Kennedy between thepolicies on Africa pursued by the two major American political parties.They believed what Kennedy had said concerning Guinea and Africa ifthe Democratic Party won the November 1960 election. . . . MinisterFodéba Keita, after apologizing for appearing to interfere in the inter-nal affairs of my country, told me that if he were an American, he wouldcertainly vote for Kennedy because of the quality of his leadership.38

In contrast, Dwight Eisenhower had not impressed Touré. The Guineanswere offended that Eisenhower had not welcomed their delegation at theairport after having recently done so for both Soviet Premier NikitaKhrushchev and Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos, and did notbuy the president’s excuse that an illness had prevented him from doingso. An additional affront stemmed from the fact that Touré’s personal sec-retary was not invited to the White House dinner held for the Guinean del-egation. Touré’s secretary was later invited, but only after an insultedTouré stated that if she did not attend the dinner, neither would any of theother Guinean women.39

Particularly frustrating for the Guinean leader was the fact that theState Department’s Bureau of European Affairs, which Eisenhower hadallowed to determine US–Guinean relations, had routinely declinedAmbassador Morrow’s requests of aid for Guinea.40 In April, Touré madea somewhat veiled criticism of the Eisenhower administration’s policy ofgranting aid:

[N]ations that really wish to aid Guinea or any other developingpeople don’t have to wait to be solicited. We are certainly not going todisguise ourselves as beggars to explain our indigence which every-body knows, which everybody can appreciate, and to which each onecan, loyally and in strict respect of our sovereignty, bring remedy.41

Furthermore, in August Touré wrote to Eisenhower appealing person-ally to the American president to take vigorous action in implementing aUnited Nations Security Council Resolution calling for the immediateremoval of all Belgian troops from the Congo. The Guinean nationalistasked Eisenhower to consider his letter, “to be a cry of alarm from Africa,humiliated and under attack by its enemies.” Touré added that withits “determining” role in world affairs a supportive United States could

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rectify the situation in only a few hours, thereby benefiting “the Africanpeoples and the entire world.” A week later the White House counteredwith a courteous but aloof response. For Touré, it must have been pain-fully clear that he could not expect Eisenhower’s support either in theCongo or in the development of his own nation.42

KENNEDY’S DETERMINATION TO PREVENT GUINEA FROM BECOMING AN AFRICAN CUBA

By mid-1960 the majority of the foreign policy establishment inWashington had relegated both Guinea and Touré to the Soviet camp.43

Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut led the charge by declaringSékou Touré a confirmed Communist beyond the hope of redemption.Kennedy, however, took another view. During his 1960 presidentialcampaign he alleged that it was the Republican administration’s neglectthat had pushed Guinea towards the Soviets. The Democratic candidatecriticized Eisenhower for his delay in sending an ambassador to Guinea,pointing out that the Soviet ambassador was in Conakry on IndependenceDay with offers of trade and aid, while Washington’s ambassador did notarrive until eight months later, “and today Guinea has moved toward thecommunist bloc because of our neglect.”44

The Guineans were pleased when they heard in August that Kennedywas sending to Africa a special fact-finding mission led by former NewYork Governor Averell Harriman. The group, which included Guinea onits itinerary, was instructed to provide the presidential candidate with rec-ommendations for future US policy towards the continent should he winoffice. Touré again became optimistic about the future of US–Guineanrelations and was jubilant when Kennedy was elected president inNovember.

Before Kennedy even took office, events in the Congo drasticallydampened US–Guinean relations. In September Congolese Prime MinisterPatrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu had each dismissedeach other from power prompting the country to descend into a state ofchaos in which four competing governments claimed legitimacy. Touréwas outraged by the role the Eisenhower administration played in grant-ing a seat in the United Nations General Assembly to the Congolese dele-gation which supported Kasavubu’s faction. The Guineans were ferventsupporters of Lumumba and believed that his group was the legitimateleadership of the Central Government of the Democratic Republic ofCongo.45

Touré angrily cabled President Eisenhower lambasting Washington’s“partisan position” towards the Congo. He implored Eisenhower to:

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Kennedy and Touré: A Success in Personal Diplomacy 77

[C]ease supporting the position of the enemies of the African emanci-pation, who are employing every possible means against the legitimateGovernment of the Congo to attack the unity and territorial integrityof the Congolese nation. If the United States maintains its presentposition the government of Guinea will refuse to take any part in theconciliation commission and will take any position in African affairsconsistent with Congolese interests.46

President Eisenhower publicly responded to Touré’s charges with a replycarried on the front pages of American newspapers. He asserted that theUnited States supported the creation of an independent Congo and respectedits territorial integrity. The American president further claimed that theUnited States had supported both African freedom and the emancipation ofall peoples of the world, and that Touré had a “serious misunderstanding” ofUS policy towards the Congo.47

The Guinean president told the American ambassador in Conakry that hewas “very unhappy” with the tone and public nature of Eisenhower’sresponse.48 As upset as Touré was with Eisenhower, he was equally sur-prised by the fact that Kennedy had indicated that he supportedEisenhower’s Congo policy. Touré had thought there would be a differenceof opinion between the two men and was keenly disappointed when helearned that the president-elect would not actively support Lumumba.

In the opening months of Kennedy’s presidency it looked to many as ifthe rift between Washington and Conakry was beyond repair. In April,Guinea graciously welcomed Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, who pre-sented Sékou Touré with the Soviet version of the Nobel Prize, the LeninPeace Prize (Fidel Castro was the other recipient that year). Touré publiclypronounced that his country and the Soviet Union held identical views oninternational affairs.49 After the Bay of Pigs invasion he affirmed to FidelCastro on behalf of the Guinean people: “our complete solidarity and ourtotal support for the cause of your revolution, which symbolizes the strug-gle for liberty of all dominated peoples.”50 Most damaging of all was aspeech Touré gave in the aftermath of Lumumba’s murder in which hesuggested Kennedy was responsible for “this crime against the Africanpeople.”51

The opinion in Foggy Bottom was that the new president should “writeoff” Guinea as being hopelessly lost to the Soviet orbit. It was fearedthat Moscow was attempting to build up Guinea as their “African Cuba” toserve as a beachhead to spread Communist influence and subversionthroughout the continent. President Kennedy, however, was personallyintrigued with the idea and challenge of dislodging Soviet influence fromGuinea. Despite his leanings toward the Eastern Bloc, Kennedy believedthat Touré valued his reputation as an African nationalist too much to

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become a Soviet puppet.52 Furthermore, Sékou Touré was a popular figurethroughout Africa due to the way he had stood up to de Gaulle, and wasnot a man to “write off” if the United States wanted to achieve influenceon the continent. With this in mind, Kennedy ordered William Attwood,his new ambassador to Guinea, to determine whether the Guineanpresident was an African nationalist or a Communist ideologue.

Years later Attwood reflected on the situation:

[T]he attitude of the State Department was to not do a thing—Guineawas beyond the pale; the French didn’t want us to [do] anything;therefore we should take our cue from the French. Others, includingthe President, were against letting this place turn into an African cub . . .our idea was to see what we could do. If these people were indeed neu-tralists, we might bring them around, give them a little aid, and showthem that cooperating with the West would benefit them more thanbecoming a Soviet dependency. Never mind what the Frenchthought.53

Attwood departed for Conakry intent on testing a theory that he sharedwith the new American president—that Third World leaders, “no matterhow radical their rhetoric, would rather work with us [the United States]than the Soviets, provided we dealt with them sympathetically andshowed some understanding of their problems.”54 Attwood’s first priorityin Conakry was to win Touré’s confidence. He decided to take a low-keyapproach and to spend a lot of time simply listening to Touré’s grievancesin an attempt to show his sincerity and lack of a predetermined agenda.Attwood informed Touré that the new administration supported Africanneutrality and that the United States government would not have a prob-lem with Guinea’s relationship with Moscow, so long as he did not takeorders from the Kremlin. He further pleased the Guineans by assuringthem that Washington’s policies toward their country would no longer bedecided in Paris.55

Attwood returned to Washington having concluded that Touré valuedhis reputation as a Pan–Africanist leader “too much to tarnish it by becominga Soviet stooge . . . and that he had courage and integrity.”56 He spoke ofthe Guinean president’s vision of African unity and the continent’s role asa buffer between East and West. He quoted Touré as having said that theGuinean “revolution” had rejected atheism, class struggle, and the idea of anelite and all-powerful party and therefore could never become Communist.57

Additionally, the American ambassador reported that Guinea was becom-ing disillusioned with its Soviet aid program, and added that “the time isripe for an American initiative” to sway Conakry away from the Sovietsphere.58

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Attwood suggested that the United States initiate modest aid to Guineaas an act of good faith in support of African non-alignment. Attwood’sproposal was strengthened after Attorney General Robert Kennedyreturned from the Ivory Coast where he had met with President FelixHouphouët-Boigny. Houphouët-Boigny convinced Robert Kennedy thatTouré was not a Communist but rather a well-respected African nationalist.RFK returned to Washington and enthusiastically backed Attwood’s pro-posed aid to Guinea.59 Additionally, John Kennedy had only a few weeksprior solicited the opinion of President Hastings Banda of Nyasaland whoin a 2 May 1961 White House meeting with the American president calledTouré an “African individualist” and not a Communist.60

Disregarding the opinion of French President Charles de Gaulle, whotold Kennedy that Sékou Touré was a Communist who had renouncedFrench aid in favor of Soviet friendship, Kennedy approved an aidprogram for Conakry and met with Attwood to hammer out the details.61

It was agreed that Guinea would be offered the construction of a dam onthe Konkouré River capable of providing power for light industry, staffingfor an English language teaching program, food aid, a training programfor Guinean administrative and technical personnel involved in industryand government, and a Peace Corps contingent.62

Attwood returned to Conakry to present Washington’s aid offer toGuinea, which Touré gratefully and cheerfully accepted. Meanwhile,President Kennedy met with the Guinean ambassador in Washington,Dr. Seydou Conte, to emphasize his immense interest in Guinea and itsdevelopment. JFK told the Guinean ambassador that he realized Conakrywished to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, but hoped that Touréwould always remember their friendly Disneyland meeting and neverforget that the United States was a country that wished to maintainfriendly relations with Guinea. In response to President Touré’s invitationfor him to make a state visit to Guinea, Kennedy asked Conte to passalong that while he appreciated the offer he would not be able to makeany trips anytime soon. Instead the president suggested that his brother-in-law, Peace Corps director Sargent Shriver, visit Guinea in his place andas his personal representative to consult with President Sékou Touré.63

SARGENT SHRIVER’S VISIT TO GUINEA

In early June 1961 Sargent Shriver flew more than seven thousand miles,round trip, just to spend two days with Conakry. Shriver and Touré hit itoff immediately. Ambassador Attwood remembered that:

Shriver’s stumbling French, infectious good humor, obvious sincerityand easy informality made a great hit with Touré and his cabinet,

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accustomed as they were to the stern and often patronizing Frenchand then to the stiff-necked Communist envoys, who rarely unbentenough to join in the joking, backslapping repartee that Africansenjoy.64

One such interlude that characterized the friendly banter between Shriverand Touré was when Shriver, in response to Touré’s remark that Guineawas a socialist country, said that America was the most socialistic countryin the world since its workers had the highest standard of living.65 Suchfrank and joking conversations made an indelibly positive impression onShriver’s hosts.

Shriver’s visit proved to be extremely productive. Two days before thePeace Corps director’s arrival, Guinea’s newspaper had attacked his orga-nization as being a cover for CIA operatives, now Touré welcomed theprogram into his country. The Guinean president was so pleased withShriver’s visit that he got up beside him during a press conference and ledthe crowd in a cheer never before heard in Guinea; “Vive les États-Unis,et vive le Président Kennedy!”66

Shriver’s visit was a clear example of the success of Kennedy’s use ofpersonal diplomacy in courting African leaders. In Guinea, family ties areextremely important and a “chief’s relative is always more of a VIP than aSecretary of State.”67 For this reason, the fact that Shriver came as theDirector of the Peace Corps and the personal representative of the presi-dent of the United States did not mean as much to Touré as the fact that hewas Kennedy’s brother-in-law. Upon returning to the United States,Shriver reported to Kennedy that his visit combined with the efforts ofthe Peace Corps could help move Guinea “from an apparently clear[Communist] Bloc orientation to a position of neutrality or even one oforientation to the West.”68

A YOUNG AMERICAN’S GUINEAN EXPERIENCE

That same summer a young American college freshman named VinceFarley volunteered to travel to Guinea to participate in Operation Cross-roads Africa. Described by a CBS documentary as a pilot project for thePeace Corps, Operation Crossroads Africa brought young North Americans(both Americans and Canadians) together with their African counterparts tobuild schools, youth centers, and medical clinics. Farley was excited tovisit this “vibrant, young country” and welcomed “the opportunity, andchallenge, of working in the West African country of Guinea.”69

Since the 1960 wave of independence had hit the continent, Africa hadbecome important to those interested in the US role in the Third World.Farley and many of his Crossroads companions had become “caught up in

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the enthusiasm surrounding Africa.” For Farley and several like-mindedindividuals, Africa truly was the “new frontier.”70

Upon arriving in Guinea, Farley was surprised at how “John Kennedy’svision of a new frontier had struck a deep resonance in Africa.” Pictures ofthe 1959 Disneyland meeting between Touré and Kennedy were “displayedeven in the smallest villages.”71 It was clear that the Guinean governmentwanted to affiliate itself with the ideas and image of the young Americanpresident.

Stationed in the small town of Mamou (about 100 miles northeast ofConakry), Farley saw pictures of Kennedy displayed in the most surpris-ing places. “We’d be walking five miles on bruce trails and we’d go into alittle hut and there was a picture of Kennedy and Touré.” Farley saw nopictures of any other foreign leader. Images of Khrushchev, Fidel Castro,or even Touré’s friend Kwame Nkrumah were nowhere to be found. Yet,“You’d go into a little village and there would be a mud hut. Inside therewould be a calendar on the wall with a picture of Kennedy.”72

A SHIFTING ORIENTATION

Despite this Guinean affection for Kennedy, in mid-summer a potentialobstacle in US–Guinean relations developed when Conakry decided to turndown the US offer to build a small dam at Souapiti on the Konkouré River.Guinea instead counter-proposed that Washington construct a mid-sizedhydroelectric plant at Kinkon, located on a tributary of the Konkouré. TheGuineans told Washington that they preferred to save the Souapiti locationfor the construction of a large hydroelectrical dam “from any source atsome future date.”73 The State Department was unenthusiastic about theGuinean counter-proposal for two reasons. First no survey had been com-pleted on the Kinkon site, so Washington had no information regarding thefeasibility of the project. More importantly, the State Department had pre-viously concluded that if Moscow constructed a dam at Souapiti it wouldcause an “overwhelming Soviet presence [that] will make achievement [of]general US objectives more remote if not impossible.”74 The US objectivein offering to construct a small dam at Souapiti was to prevent the Sovietsfrom undertaking a large project at that location. If Washington diverted itsaid to instead build a dam at Kinkon, the Souapiti project would remainopen for possible Soviet funding and influence.

Realizing the importance Touré placed on the Konkouré project, andeager to deny the Soviets the opportunity to fund the venture, Kennedysent a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk asking: “Is there anychance that we could finance the big dam in Guinea if we omitted all theother elements of our aid program?”75 Rusk responded that the totalcost of the project would be between $295–$350 million.76 Kennedy was

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hesitant to invest so much money in another West African dam at a timewhen the advisability of his decision to fund Ghana’s Volta River Projectwas being questioned. Fortunately, the good feelings created by Shriver’svisit proved to be enough to convince Touré to temporarily forget aboutthe possibility for a massive Konkouré project and instead accept theinitial American offer of the small dam at the Souapiti location. Thisinterlude is an effective demonstration of Kennedy’s interest in Guinea aswell as his relationship with Sékou Touré.

Guinea’s Cold War orientation shifted further toward the West whenin December 1961 Touré declared Daniel Solod, the Soviet ambassador,persona non grata and declined future aid from Moscow after Solod wasimplicated in an attempt to intervene in Guinean domestic politics. Tourétold Attwood that Solod was caught “red handed” fraternizing withGuinean students and organizing Marxist “study groups,” which Touré feltwas an attempt to build a cadre of Soviet-minded dissidents.77 PubliclyTouré said that these “study groups” were part of “a Marxist–Leninistgroup, based in Moscow, Paris, and Dakar, whose Machiavellian plan wasto unleash a Marxist revolution in Guinea”78

In May 1962, Kennedy won additional popularity points in Guineaduring forthright conversations with the Guinean ministerial delegation.During these meetings the president again expressed his support ofConakry’s Cold War non-alignment and said that he understood Guinea’sposition, citing the neutral policy that the United States had maintainedfor over 100 years. Kennedy thanked the delegation for the hospitalitytheir country had shown Sargent Shriver and stated that he “did not wantthe Delegation to leave thinking the US was not concerned with the prob-lems of Guinea.” At the end of the meeting he further stroked the egos ofhis guests by telling them that he believed their state was a “big smallcountry” (Guinea had been upset that the IMF and World Bank had desig-nated their nation as a “small country”).79

A SUCCESSFUL WHITE HOUSE VISIT

In the wake of Touré distancing himself from the USSR, Kennedy invitedthe Guinean president on an official state visit to Washington. A Bureau ofIntelligence Report informed Kennedy of something he already knew –thatTouré was one of the most influential men on the African continent, andthat Guinea itself occupied “a symbolic position which gives it a politicalimportance out of all proportion to its size.”80 The American president wasdetermined to take all measures to assure leaving a favorable impressionwith his important guest. Touré arrived in Washington on 10 October 1962and became the last head of state personally greeted by Kennedy (John, Jr.at his side) at the Washington National Airport. The two leaders were then

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taken by helicopter to the White House lawn where a Marine detachmentgreeted their arrival by playing the Guinean national anthem. At an ad-libpress conference the two heads of state reminisced about their previous1959 Disneyland meeting, with Touré saying:

I believe that the conversations we had on that occasion may have evenfurther contributed to your excellent understanding of the question ofAfrica, of the efforts of the people of that continent fighting for theirindependence. This is something to which you have tremendously con-tributed, Mr. President, and we know that.81

After the press conference the two adjourned to the White HouseRoom for a meeting that was “unusually cordial.”82 During their one-hour discussion, Touré spoke of his difficulties with the Soviet Blocand his country’s need for practical agricultural and economic assis-tance. President Kennedy replied that he was well aware of Guinea’sdifficulties and assured Touré of his willingness to be helpful in anyway he could. The two men agreed that a free, stable, and unified Africawas in the best interest of both of their countries. In conclusion, theGuinean president expressed his gratitude to Kennedy for having over-looked the Eisenhower administration’s misconceptions of him and hiscountry.83

Following their formal meeting, Kennedy took Touré upstairs to theresidential quarters where he was introduced to Jacqueline and CarolineKennedy and offered a glass of sherry. This unusual gesture made a dra-matic impression on Touré because “like most Africans, he attached moreimportance to being received by family than with regiments of honorguards.”84 At the subsequent luncheon, the Guinean president conversedwith Mrs. Kennedy in French and then made a public toast to PresidentKennedy saying: “Africa is independent today thanks to people likeyourself.”85 Later at a press conference at Blair House he stressed that hewas not a Communist, asking Americans: “Don’t judge us by what otherssay or what we say, but by what we do.”

It had been a short but successful meeting. William Attwood wrote ofthe encounter: “Touré was captivated by the Kennedy charm—a blend ofattentiveness, humor, frankness, and easy grace—and thereafter regardedhim as a friend he could confide in.”86 Upon returning home Sékou Tourésent an autographed photograph to the American president inscribed:“With the assurance of our desire for friendly cooperation with theGovernment and the people of America.”87 He addressed the Guinean peo-ple saying: “I . . . found in the United States a man quite open to Africanproblems and determined to promote the American contribution to theirhappy solution.”88 Kennedy wrote Touré thanking him for the photograph,

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adding: “I am grateful for your thoughtfulness and cordially reciprocatethe sentiments you expressed in the inscription.”89

COURTING OF TOURÉ PAYS DIVIDENDS

Touré’s state visit proved to occur at a propitious time—less than twoweeks later the Cuban Missile Crisis flared up. All throughout 1962 amajor focus of the State Department had been to limit, and where possiblescale back, Soviet civil air service to Africa. The US government fearedthat regular flight schedules of Aeroflot and C.S.A. (the Soviet andCzechoslovakian national airlines respectively) planes to African destina-tions would serve to spread Soviet influence and subversive activity.Washington was afraid of the possibility that the typically more than halfempty flights from Eastern Europe to Africa would serve as the perfectconduit to ship small arms to African rebels. More importantly, theonly way for Soviet planes to reach South America, the Caribbean, or theEastern United States (a possibility the State Department hoped to pre-vent) would be for them to land and refuel on the Western coast ofAfrica.90 For these reasons, precluding Moscow from obtaining landingrights in West Africa became an important national security considerationfor the Kennedy Administration.91

Guinea became the central focus of Moscow’s attempt to establish civilair service to Africa. The Soviet Union had renovated Guinea’s airport bylengthening its airstrips to accommodate jet traffic, and had proposedusing Conakry as a refueling stop for Soviet planes destined for Cuba,Brazil, and Ghana.92 During the Cuban Missile Crisis the Soviets hadplanned a Moscow–Havana airlift via Conakry.93 However, with thememories of his meeting with Kennedy fresh in his mind, President Tourépersonally rejected the Soviet request to refuel in Conakry beforeAmbassador Attwood could even raise Washington’s objection.94

Morocco, Senegal, and Ghana followed suit and the planned Soviet airliftwas grounded in the Soviet Union. JFK’s courting of Sékou Touré henceproved to be a success and paid tangible dividends during the tensest daysof the Cold War.

After having visited Touré in Guinea, Chester Bowles reported that theUnited States was “benefiting from widespread disillusionment with theUSSR and China and with communism both as an ideology and a techniquefor economic development.” African disillusionment, Bowles noted, wasparticularly strong in Conakry, where Touré had a “reassuringly clearperspective in regard to the forces which are shaping events not only inAfrica, but throughout the world.” Bowles added that, “(a)mong theAfrican leaders with whom I talked, Sékou Touré was the most impressive(emphasis in original).”95

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The Kennedy administration did not rest on its laurels. In mid-NovemberWilliam Trimble advised G. Mennen Williams which countries the assis-tant secretary of state for African affairs should visit on his upcoming trip toAfrica based on the relative importance of each prospective visit. Trimbleplaced Guinea on top of the list:

Conakry has been placed at the top of the list since it would provideyou an excellent opportunity to ensure that the momentum ofGuinea’s swing from the Soviet Bloc towards a more moderate andfriendly posture is maintained and, if possible, accelerated. Guineawill be passing through a difficult period during the next few monthsas it seeks to decrease its economic dependence upon the Bloc andobtain from the West the external assistance necessary for its survival.Your visit would thus be an effective follow up to Sekou Toure’s meet-ing with the President.96

After Williams’ visit, Guinea’s reorientation towards the West wasclearly apparent. In the year following their meeting in Washington,Touré and Kennedy became friends and frequently wrote each other longpersonal letters. Quite often these letters were delivered by personalenvoys, which further reinforced the sincerity of the Kennedy–Touré rela-tionship.97 In early May 1963, Attwood successfully lobbied for Shriverto return to Guinea to help inaugurate an American trade fair.98 FollowingShriver’s arrival on the inaugural flight of Pan American’s service toConakry, Touré embraced the Peace Corps director like an old friend.After Shriver gave a speech in French, the Guinean president respondedby stating: “Every African leader with a conscience must now recognizethe value of cooperation with the United States and that American assis-tance is, contrary to what we were told, the most disinterested, the mosteffective and the most responsive to our real needs.”99 Touré’s opinion ofWashington’s involvement in Africa had made a 180-degree turn from hisvehement attack on Eisenhower’s Congo policy only three years prior.

FRENCH INTRIGUE AT THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

A few weeks later during an Organization of African Unity (OAU) confer-ence in Addis Ababa, a French news agency reported a fictitious story thatthe Guinean delegation had sponsored a resolution criticizing Kennedy’shandling of the racial violence in Birmingham, Alabama.100 Touré thoughtthe story serious enough that he ordered the Guinean delegation to imme-diately visit the American ambassador to Ethiopia to inform him that thestory was false and ask that the embassy officials relay to Washington

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Touré’s support of Kennedy and his policies. In Conakry, Fodéba Keitadenounced the French news story as an attempt to “sabotage” US–Guineanrelations, saying: “We are independent now and want good relations witheverybody—especially America and Germany.”101 Meanwhile back at theOAU meetings, Guinean government official Diallo Telli attempted toenlist the support of other African heads of state to align with Guinea insupporting Kennedy’s civil rights policy, and Touré himself declaredthat he supported Kennedy’s handling of racial strife “without anyreservations.”102

Following the conference, Touré sent Kennedy a letter informing theAmerican president of the decisions reached at the meetings as well as anautographed copy of the OAU charter. The nine-paragraph letter, whichopened with the greeting “Dear Mr. President and Friend,” was extremelywarm and included the words “friend” or “friendship” six times. Inresponse, President Kennedy instructed his ambassador in Dar es Salaam(where Touré had gone to consult with Tanganyika’s Julius Nyerere fol-lowing the OAU meetings) to deliver to the Guinean president “a personalmessage of appreciation for [the] constructive public statements [made]by Touré regarding the President’s efforts in civil rights.”103 As “furtherproof of the personal confidence Touré had in Kennedy,” he sent DialloTelli to Washington to congratulate the Kennedy brothers for their effortsto promote civil rights. Telli also gave the American president a personalsummary of the OAU proceedings, because Touré felt that it was his“duty as a friend” to relay such information to Kennedy.104

PERSONAL DIPLOMACY SUCCESS

The final six months of John F. Kennedy’s life marked the high point ofUS–Guinean relations. In May 1963 Sékou Touré had told AmbassadorAttwood in no uncertain terms: “the Guinean people now regard Americaas their best friend.”105 By October, Moscow was so far out of favor inGuinea (after the Solod affair) that members of the Soviet embassy beganto initiate probing conversations with American diplomats in an attemptto ascertain Touré’s intentions.106 The Guineans not only dramaticallyreduced their dependence on Soviet aid, but also rejected most Frenchoffers of aid, and began “counting primarily on the US and [had] no inten-tion of being pushed back into the arms of the French.”107

Additionally, the United States became exempt from the charges ofimperialism that Touré often leveled at France and other NATO members.The leader who had once denounced Kennedy for involvement inLumumba’s murder in the Congo, now publicly commended the Americanpresident for promoting unity in that divided nation. Touré further prom-ised Kennedy (through Diallo Telli) that Guinea would not directly

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intervene in the Congo without first consulting with the White House, astark contradiction to when he had told Eisenhower that his governmentwould not cooperate with United States objectives in the region.108

Upon hearing of Kennedy’s assassination, Sékou Touré said: “I havelost my only true friend in the outside world.”109 Guinea’s ambassador tothe United States sent a telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk express-ing his country’s “heartfelt condolences,” adding: “Our sorrow is tremen-dous over the loss of this hero of whose courage and wisdom the worldstood in such great need.”110 The US embassy in Conakry reported:“People expressed their grief without restraint, and just about everybodyin Guinea seemed to have fallen under the spell of the courageous younghero of far away, the slayer of the dragons of discrimination, poverty,ignorance, and war.”111 In honor of his fallen friend, Touré made Guineathe first country in the world to issue a stamp honoring the life of JohnF. Kennedy.112

Through persisting in their conviction that Guinea was not a lost cause,the Kennedy administration was able to take advantage of Soviet errorsand move Guinea closer towards the West. Eisenhower’s ambassador toGuinea credits Conakry’s Cold War shift to the fact that: “PresidentKennedy had the foresight, wisdom, and courage to believe in 1961 thatTouré was a nationalist,” rather than a Communist.113 Equally importantwas Kennedy’s determination to court Ahmed Sékou Touré, demon-strated by such acts as when he personally intervened to ensure theapproval of aid for a palm oil processing plant in Guinea, which hadbecome tied up in bureaucratic tape at the Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID).114

The primary reason that Kennedy and Attwood were able to bask intheir “era of good feeling” with Touré was their perseverance and confi-dence in using personal diplomacy.115 For it was primarily the intimatebond created through Kennedy’s personal diplomacy that caused theGuinean leader to change his Cold War orientation. Having decided not totry to curry favor with Touré through military aid, the administrationinstead focused on the “[e]stablishment of good personal relations withinfluential Guinean leaders.”116 The actions of Kennedy, Attwood,Shriver, Williams, and Bowles helped strengthen ties between Touré andthe United States. Even Mrs. Attwood was praised by a Guinean govern-ment minister, who stated that her work “did more to build friendship forAmerica among our [Guinean] people” than all of Washington’s develop-ment projects.117 Kennedy’s courting of Sékou Touré was not unique, butrather is illustrative of the personal diplomacy strategy that the youngpresident utilized in his relations with many African leaders.118 Due to thesuccess of personal diplomacy, Americans in late 1963 were able to lookat Guinea’s support of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis,

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the Congo Crisis, as well as during the racial violence that rocked theAmerican South, and judge Sékou Touré not only by what he did—butalso on what he said.

NOTES

1. Ted Sorensen, interview with author, 19 October 2005, via telephone. TheKennedy administration felt that while the battle lines were already clearlydrawn in Europe (and to a lesser extent Asia) Africa was a region of the worldthat was still wide open in the superpower competition for influence.

2. State Department Paper, “Africa: Guidelines for Policy and Operations,”March 1962. National Security Files, Box 2: “Africa,” Folder “General, 3/62–4/62,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA (hereafter referred toas JFKL).

3. Decolonization had increased the Sino–Soviet rivalry. Peking was challengingMoscow’s leadership in the international Communist movement and criticizedthe Kremlin’s seemingly unenthusiastic support for Third World nationalism.Part of Khrushchev’s rationale for making this speech was in response to thiscriticism. See Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War:The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York, 2006), p. 305.

4. For a translation and State Department reaction to Khrushchev’s speech see“Report on Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Work-ers Parities,” State Department translation of speech given by Soviet leaderNikita S. Khrushchev on 6 January 1961 in Moscow. General Records of theDepartment of State. Box 65 “Records of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Mis-cellaneous Subject Files, 1961–1968,” Folder “DR––Personal Papers,”Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter referredto as NARA).

5. Robert Dallek in An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963 (Boston,2003), p. 350.

6. Robert McNamara quoted by Peter W. Rodman, More Precious than Peace: TheCold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York, 1994), p. 95.

7. Miloud Barkaoui, “Kennedy and the Cold War Imbroglio: The Case of Algeria’sIndependence,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 21 (Spring 1999), p. 34.

8. Renee Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the StateDepartment, and Civil Rights, 1961–1964.” Journal of American History, 87(September 2000), pp. 546–80.

9. For other accounts of the use of personal diplomacy in international relationssee: Klaus Larres, Churchill’s Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy (NewHaven, CT, 2002), E. Victor Niemeyer, Personal Diplomacy: Lyndon B. Johnsonand Mexico, 1963–1968 (Austin, TX, 1986), and Philip E. Muehlenbeck,“Betting on the Dark Horses: John F. Kennedy’s Courting of African National-ist Leaders” (PhD Dissertation, George Washington University, 2007).

10. Thomas Borstelmann, “‘Hedging Our Bets and Buying Time’: John Kennedyand Racial Revolutions in the American South and South Africa,” DiplomaticHistory, 24 (Summer 2000), p. 438.

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11. Kennedy quoted in G. Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans (Grand Rapids,MI, 1969), p. 161.

12. Kennedy quoted by Lawrence C. Hager, “Kennedy Administration PolicyToward Africa, 1960–1963: Progressive Change and Conservative Opposition”(Master’s Thesis, University of Massachusetts at Boston, 1993), p. 63.

13. President John F. Kennedy’s Remarks at a Reception Marking African FreedomDay, 15 April 1961. See John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The AmericanPresidency Project [online] (Santa Barbara, CA, University of California, SantaBarbara); available on the World Wide Web: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

14. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the WhiteHouse (Boston, 1965), p. 558.

15. “Visits to the US by Foreign Heads of State and Government, The UnitedStates State Department’s Office of the Historian,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/c1792.htm (Analysis by author using data found on aforementioned site).Data was computed by adding number of visits from African Heads of Stateduring President’s term, minus brief meetings at the United Nations GeneralAssembly. The number of visits was then divided by the number of months eachPresident served in office to reach a composite average of the number of Africanheads of state each President received per month. The results were as follows:Kennedy 0.800 per month, Carter 0.583, George H.W. Bush 0.563, GeorgeW. Bush 0.500 (through first term only), Reagan 0.427, Ford 0.345, Nixon0.343, Clinton 0.292, Johnson 0.230, Eisenhower 0.083.

16. David Newsom, interview with author, 26 October 2005, via telephone.17. See Memorandum from Secretary of State Christian Herter to President

Eisenhower, 13 August 1960. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of theUnited States, 1953–61, International Series, Box #27, Folder “Guinea,” DwightD. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS (hereafter referred to asDDEL).

18. Touré was only slightly pro-Western for a short period of time. After Kennedy’sdeath he swung back towards the East, largely because of neglect from the West.

19. Telegram American Consulate General in Dakar to the State Department,7 March 1951. See Ebere Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization inWest Africa, 1950–1960 (Rochester, NY, 2001), p. 221.

20. Touré quoted by Thomas Patrick Melady in Melday, Profiles of African Leaders(New York, 1961), p. 88.

21. De Gaulle quoted in Melday, Profiles, p. 88.22. Paris even considered using force (a naval blockade was discussed) to prevent a

shipment of Czech arms from reaching Conakry. See “Discusions between UK,US, and France on Guinea, 1959.” FO [Foreign Office Archives, Kew] 371/138836.

23. Charles de Gaulle had threatened to withdraw France from NATO if Washingtonaided Guinea.

24. Letter from the President of Guinea Sékou Touré to President DwightD. Eisenhower in Nwaubani, United States and Decolonization in West Africa, p. 213.

25. John H. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea (New Brunswick, NJ,1968), p. 23.

26. Ibid., pp. 82, 198.

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27. Satterthwaite quoted by Nwaubani, United States and Decolonization in WestAfrica, p. 211.

28. Touré quoted in Ibid., p. 229.29. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea, p. 74.30. Ibid, pp. 79–80.31. Ibid, pp. 93–5.32. “Memorandum of Conversation Between Guinean President Sékou Touré and

President Dwight Eisenhower, 27 October 1959, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1958–1960 [hereafter FRUS], Volume XIV, Africa (Washington DC,1992), 698–702. Also see, “U.S. Economic Assistance Program in Guinea,”4 October 1962. FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa (Washington DC, 1996).

33. In an embarrassing gaffe, representatives in New York had mistakenly put theGhanaian flag on Manhattan’s lampposts for Touré’s parade route down Broad-way.

34. West Africa, 31 October 1959.35. In 1957 Kennedy gave a controversial and well publicized speech on the floor of

the Senate denouncing the French war in Algeria, as well as the Eisenhoweradministration’s uncritical support of French colonialism.

36. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea, pp. 106–108.37. To read more about Harold Morrow’s appointment as Ambassador to Guinea

see, Ibid, pp. 3–32.38. Ibid., p. 108.39. Memorandum for President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 27 October 1959. Repro-

duced in Declassified Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, MI, 2003).40. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea, pp. 24–25, 100.41. Toure quoted in Ibid., pp. 99–100.42. Telegram from President Sékou Touré of Guinea to President Dwight

D. Eisenhower, 8 August 1960. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of theUnited States, 1953–1961, International Series, Box #27, Folder “Guinea,” DDEL.

43. See 436th Meeting of the National Security Council, 10 March 1960. DwightD. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961, NSCSeries, Box #12, Folder 436th Meeting of NSC, March 10, 1960, DDEL.

44. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 568.45. In fact it had been through the Soviet Embassy in Conakry that Lumumba first

made contact with Soviet officials. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s ColdWar, p. 297.

46. Telegram from President Sékou Touré of Guinea to President DwightD. Eisenhower, 20 November 1960. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as Presidentof the United States, 1953–1961, International Series, Box #27, Folder“Guinea,” DDEL.

47. Letter from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to President Sékou Touré ofGuinea, 25 November 1960. See “The American Presidency Project.”

48. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea, p. 216.49. Additionally, in August 1960 Touré had allowed the Soviets to use Conakry as a

staging ground and refueling stop in their airlift of weapons and ammunition tothe Congolese. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 312.

50. Touré quoted by Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 568.

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51. Ibid., 568. Touré also sent an angry telegram to Kennedy accusing the US ofhaving had a hand in Lumumba’s murder.

52. William Attwood, Twilight Struggle: Tales of the Cold War (New York, 1987),p. 226.

53. William Attwood, Oral history interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection,Georgetown University Library, Washington, D.C. (hereafter referred to asGeorgetown), p. 13.

54. Attwood, Twilight Struggle, p. 226.55. Ibid., 227–8 and William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure

(New York,1967), pp. 34–5.56. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 23.57. Ibid., p. 35.58. Telegram from Ambassador William Attwood to Bali, 12 May 1961, cited in

Thomas J. Noer, “New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa,” in ThomasG. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963(New York, 1989), p. 279.

59. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 9.60. Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy and

Dr. Hastings K. Banda, President of Nyasaland, 2 May 1961. See FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa, pp. 508–9.

61. Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy and PresidentCharles de Gaulle of France. President’s Office Files, Box 116a “Countries:France,” Folder “JFK Visit to de Gaulle, 5/31–6/2/61,” JFKL.

62. Paper authored by Ambassador William Attwood, “Suggested Approach toTouré” 18 May 1961. National Security Files, Box 102 “Countries: Guinea,”Folder “Guinea, 1/61–5/61,” JFKL.

63. Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy andGuinean Ambassador Dr. Seydou Conte, 26 May 1961. General Records of theDepartment of State, Classified Records of Assistant Secretary of State for AfricanAffairs, G. Mennen Williams, 1961–1966, Lot 68D8. Box 3, Folder “1961Memorandums of Conversations,” Record Group 59, NARA.

64. Attwood, Twilight Struggle, p. 228.65. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 44.66. Ibid., p. 45.67. Ibid., p. 43.68. Memorandum from Director of Peace Corps to President John Kennedy and

Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 20 June 1961. National Security Files, Box 102“Countries: Guinea,” Folder “Guinea, General, 6/61–8/61,” JFKL. Also seeMemorandum from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President JohnF. Kennedy, 1 July 1961 in FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa, 397–8. ForUS response to Shriver’s trip see Memorandum from President John F. Kennedyto Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 5 July 1961 in Edward Claflin, ed., JFK Wants toKnow: Memos from the President’s Office, 1961–1963 (New York, 1991), pp. 71–72.

69. Vince Farley, “Welcoming but Wary, Africa Awaits President Clinton’s Visit,”Editorial wrote for CNN.com (March 1998): see http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/africa/farley/#8 and Farley, interview with author, 10December 2003, via telephone.

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70. Farley, interview with author.71. Farley, “Welcoming but Wary.”72. Farley, interview with author.73. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President John F. Kennedy,

1 July 1961. In FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa, pp. 397–8.74. Telegram from the Department of State to American Embassy in Conakry,

Guinea, 24 June 1961. Ibid., pp. 394–6.75. Memorandum from President John F. Kennedy to Secretary of State Dean

Rusk, 5 July 1961. See Ibid., p. 399.76. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President John F. Kennedy,

15 July 1961. Ibid., pp. 399–400.77. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, 63 and Attwood, Twilight Struggle, p. 231.78. Touré quoted in “West Africa,” 30 December 1961. Touré also accused the

French ambassador of complicity in the plot for having allowed Guinean oppo-sition elements to use the French diplomatic post in Conakry to communicatewith “Guinean anti-party groups in Paris and Moscow.”

79. Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy andGuinean Delegation led by Moussa Diakite, Minister-Governor of the Bank of theRepublic of Guinea, 10 May 1962. National Security Files, Box 102 “Countries:Guinea,” Folder “Guinea, General, 4/62–6/62,” JFKL.

80. Research Memorandum from Bureau of Intelligence and Research DirectorRoger Hilsmen to the Acting Secretary of State, 5 October 1962. GeneralRecords of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box 2: “Office ofWest African Affairs, Country Files 1951–1963, Guinea,” Folder “History andBackground,” Record Group 59, NARA.

81. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962(Washington, DC, 1963), pp. 752–3.

82. New York Times, 11 October 1962, p. 1.83. Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy and

Guinean President Sékou Touré, 10 October 1962. General Records of theDepartment of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box 2: “Office of West AfricanAffairs, Country Files, 1951–1963, Guinea,” Folder “U.S. Guinean Relations16.1(6),” Record Group 59, NARA; and Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks,p. 106.

84. Attwood, Twilight Struggle, pp. 324–5.85. Touré quoted by Attwood in The Reds and the Blacks, 107. For description of

luncheon conversation between Jacqueline Kennedy and President Touré seeNoer, “New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa,” p. 279.

86. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 107.87. Memorandum from Acting Chief of Protocol William J. Tonesk to President

John F. Kennedy, 31 January 1963. General Records of the Department ofState Bureau of African Affairs. Box “Office of West African Affairs, CountryFiles, 1951–1963, Guinea,” Folder “Political Affairs: Prominent Persons ––Sékou Touré,” Record Group 59, NARA.

88. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 569.89. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Guinean President Sékou Touré,

4 February 1963. General Records of the Department of State Bureau of African

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Affairs. Box “Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–1963,Guinea,” Folder “Political Affairs: Prominent Persons––Sékou Touré,” RecordGroup 59, NARA.

90. See the nearly 100 documents pertaining to the dilemma of Soviet civil aviationin Africa in General Records of the Department of State, Under Secretary ofState for Political Affairs, George C. McGhee, Box 3 “Subject Files 1961–1963” and Box 1 “Subject Files 1961–1963,” Record Group 59, NARA.

91. James Wine, Georgetown, p. 18.92. Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 157. Also

see Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 104.93. Roger Hilsman, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for

Research and Intelligence, believed that at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisisthe Soviets had not yet transported nuclear warheads to Cuba, but thatMoscow had planned an airlift to transport the warheads to the island duringthe crisis. See Roger Hilsman, Oral history interview, Oral History Collection,Columbia University, New York, NY.

94. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 109.95. Chester Bowles Report on Africa Trip, 13 November 1962. President’s Office

Files, Box 21 “Staff Memoranda,” Folder “Chester Bowles Report on AfricaTrip, 11/13/1962,” JFKL.

96. Letter from William Trimble, Director of West Coast and Malian Affairs (StateDepartment) to G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for AfricanAffairs, 17 November 1962, William Trimble Papers, MC #27, Box 5, Folder 5“Africa Desk, Sep.–Dec. 1962,” Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, PrincetonUniversity, Princeton, NJ.

97. Dr. Saidou Conte and Diallo Telli often delivered letters from Touré toKennedy, while Sargent Shriver, William Attwood, G. Mennen Williams, andChester Bowles delivered letters from Kennedy to Touré.

98. See Letter from United States Ambassador to Guinea William Attwood toAssistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams,21 December 1962. General Records of the Department of State Bureau ofAfrican Affairs, Box “Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–1963, Guinea,” Folder “Shriver Visit,” Record Group 59, NARA; Letter fromWilliam Attwood to Alan Logan, Officer in Charge of Guinea Affairs, Bureauof African Affairs, 14 January 1963. General Records of the Department ofState Bureau of African Affairs, Box “Office of West African Affairs, CountryFiles, 1951–1963, Guinea,” Folder “Communications and Records, Corre-spondence with Chief of Mission,” Record Group 59, NARA; and Letter fromWilliam Attwood to J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Statefor African Affairs, 13 February 1963. General Records of the Department ofState Bureau of African Affairs, Box “Office of West African Affairs, CountryFiles, 1951–1963, Guinea,” Folder “Trade Promotion and Assistance, 1963Sargent Shriver Visit to Open Fair,” Record Group 59, NARA.

99. Touré quoted by Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 126.100. Apparently jealous of the close relationship forming between the United States

and Guinea, France had repeatedly tried to drive a wedge between the twocountries. French Foreign Office officials even privately admitted that they

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would prefer a Soviet Guinea over an “Americanized” Guinea (Attwood, TheReds and the Blacks, 130). Additionally, since he had received neither lycée noruniversity training in France, Touré unlike either Senghor or Houphouët-Boignyhad been little influenced by French traditions or culture and, therefore, felt lit-tle affinity for Paris.

101. Fodeba Keita quoted in Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 129.102. Memorandum of Conversation between Guinean Representative Diallo Telli

and President John F. Kennedy, 19 July 1963. National Security Files, Box 102:“Countries: Guinea,” Folder “Guinea, General, 6/63–7/63,” JFKL andAttwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 129.

103. Letter from the President of Guinea Sékou Touré to President John F. Kennedy,29 May 1963. General Records of the Department of State Bureau of AfricanAffairs, Box “Office of West African Affairs, Country Files, 1951–1963,Guinea,” Folder “Communication and Records: Correspondence between Pres-idents,” Record Group 59, NARA.

104. Ibid. Also for a memorandum of the discussion between Diallo and Kennedysee Memorandum of Conversation between Guinean Representative DialloTelli and President John F. Kennedy, 19 July 1963. National Security Files,Box 102: “Countries: Guinea,” Folder “Guinea, General, 6/63–7/63,” JFKL.

105. Touré quoted by Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 129.106. Memorandum of Conversation between Vladimir Dubinin, First Secretary of

the USSR Embassy in Guinea, and Donald E. Herdeck, Acting Deputy Chiefof US Mission in Guinea, 17 October 1963. General Records of the Depart-ment of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box 2 “Office of West African Affairs:Country Files, 1951–1963,” Folder “Political Affairs and Relations: SovietBloc–Guinean Relations,” Record Group 59, NARA.

107. State Department Report on Bilateral Talks with France, 5 June 1963. GeneralRecords of the Department of State, Under Secretary of State of PoliticalAffairs, George C. McGhee, Box 1: “Subject Files, 1961–1963,” Folder “Sino–Soviet Efforts in Africa,” Record Group 59, NARA.

108. Memorandum of Conversation between President John F. Kennedy and theGuinean Representative at the United Nations and Special Envoy of PresidentSékou Touré, Diallo Telli, 19 July 1963. National Security Files, Box 102:“Countries: Guinea,” Folder “Guinea, General, 6/63–7/63,” JFKL.

109. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 1029.110. Telegram from Guinean Ambassador to the United States, Karim Bangoura,

to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 23 November 1963. General Records of theDepartment of State Bureau of African Affairs, Box 2: “Office of West AfricanAffairs, Country Files 1951–1963, Guinea,” Folder “Communications &Records: General Correspondence,” Record Group 59, NARA.

111. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 1029.112. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, p. 107.113. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea, p. 280.114. Attwood, Twilight Struggle, p. 232.115. Ibid., p. 239.116. Secret State Department Report of “U.S. Activities Aimed at Offsetting or Pre-

cluding Sino–Soviet Efforts in Guinea,” March 1963. General Records of the

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Department of State, Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs, GeorgeC. McGhee, Box 1: “Subject Files, 1961–1963,” Folder “Sino–Soviet BlocEfforts in Africa,” Record Group 59, NARA.

117. Attwood, Twilight Struggle, p. 232. Ambassador Attwood’s wife, Sim, alongwith the wife of Gene Abrams (country director at the US embassy) volun-teered at a local Guinean hospital and were active in various other eventsaround the city. When Mrs. Attwood learned that the Guinean hospital whereshe worked was without an incubator, she and her husband sent a letter totheir hometown newspaper and their fellow townsmen raised $3,000 and sentan incubator (see William Attwood, Georgetown, p. 23). The Guineans wereappreciative of Mrs. Attwood’s efforts and noted the contrast between her andthe wives of Eastern European diplomats who rarely left their compounds.

118. Kennedy also used personal diplomacy to court other African leaders such asGamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere(Tanganyika), and Ben Bella (Algeria) among others. See Muehlenbeck,“Betting on the Dark Horses.”

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