Upload
birmingham
View
0
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=reuj20
Download by: [University of Birmingham] Date: 20 January 2016, At: 08:24
International Journal of Housing Policy
ISSN: 1461-6718 (Print) 1473-3269 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reuj20
How not to be an egalitarian: the politics ofhomeownership and property-owning democracy
James Gregory
To cite this article: James Gregory (2016): How not to be an egalitarian: the politics ofhomeownership and property-owning democracy, International Journal of Housing Policy
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2015.1115224
Published online: 20 Jan 2016.
Submit your article to this journal
View related articles
View Crossmark data
How not to be an egalitarian: the politics of homeownership
and property-owning democracy
James Gregory*
Housing and Communities Research Group, School of Social Policy, Universityof Birmingham, London United Kingdom
This paper offers a critical evaluation of the narrative of ‘property-owningdemocracy’ (POD) in contemporary housing policy and in the political culturesof the UK and the USA. It describes and contrasts two competinginterpretations of POD. The dominant interpretation permeates the politics ofhousing in Britain and the USA. It is based on the assumption thathomeownership creates virtuous and independent citizens, is stronglyassociated with the conservative ideal of the small state, and is firmlyembedded in both policy and the accepted terms of political debate.
In contrast to this, there is a less dominant, egalitarian interpretation of POD,which seeks to promote a view of property and citizenship based more onsolidarity and interdependence. This interpretation of POD tends to viewproperty more broadly, including smaller savings and even extending to massownership in industry. But it also typically neglects the political reality of PODas a homeownership ideology and the anti-welfare dynamic it has created. Thispaper therefore argues that the egalitarian (re)interpretation of POD ispolitically and sociologically na€ıve, and that it is offers an untenable counter-narrative to the politics of welfare retrenchment. A more egalitarian housingpolicy needs to start from a different place.
Keywords: property; democracy; citizenship; independence; homeownership
Introduction
Property-owning democracy (POD) is firmly back on the agenda in British policy
and politics. With the election of a Conservative majority government, the politics
of homeownership is livelier than it has been for many years, with policy increas-
ingly matching rhetoric. In the previous coalition government potential buyers were
given help to raise a mortgage deposit under Help to Buy, and now the government
is pushing ahead with plans to extend the totemic Thatcherite policy of Right to
Buy to housing association tenants. Contrasted to this, we have seen the election of
Jeremey Corbyn � a signed up member of old Labour � as the new leader of the
*Email: [email protected]
� 2016 Taylor & Francis
International Journal of Housing Policy, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2015.1115224
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
Labour Party, now the official opposition to the government. At face value, it would
seem that we are back to an old polarity of left and right; of the social value of pub-
lic housing opposed straightforwardly to an alternative vision of the moral suprem-
acy of private property and homeownership.
Nevertheless, for the last two decades there has been a sustained attempt by the-
orists and politicians of the left to not just seek an accommodation with homeown-
ership and private property, but also to actively appropriate the language of
property-owning democracy. Successive ‘new’ Labour governments embraced the
Right to Buy and, taking Ackerman and Alstott’s ‘stake-holder society’ as a recent
starting point, theorists have advocated a variety of more inclusive accounts of
POD, where both property and a feeling of democratic inclusion are spread far
more widely (e.g.; Ackerman & Alstott, 2000). Yet, as this paper argues, this pro-
gressive attempt to colonise the language and ideology of POD is misguided: in
practice it legitimates, rather than subverts, a deeply regressive housing policy that,
in turn, underpins the ideology of the small state and welfare retrenchment.
This type of argument will not be entirely new to many housing theorists. There
has, for example, been extensive analysis of the ideology and policy of the Right to
Buy, the vanguard policy of POD in Britain (Forrest & Murie, 1988; Malpass,
2005; Murie & Jones, 2006). There has also been extensive critical analysis of the
related American vision of a homeownership society (Ronald, 2008; Shlay, 2006).
More recently, there has been a growing body of literature on the potential (and per-
ils) of a shift to an asset-based welfare system largely founded on private housing
wealth. This literature places due stress on the way in which homeownership has
been used as part of a broader transfer of risk from the state to the individual (e.g.
Doling & Ronald, 2010; Fox O’Mahony & Overton, 2015). What it does not do,
however, is explore the underlying ideology of this shift.
This paper seeks to provide this deeper understanding. It does so by drawing on
recent developments in political theory, which offers a systematic attempt to bypass
a negative critique of the inequities of POD by reconstructing it in egalitarian fash-
ion. This theoretical approach draws on both Rawlsian and republican political the-
ory, and intersects at a number of points with the literature and policy of asset-
based welfare that has developed in Britain and the USA over the last two decades
(O’Neill, 2012). The aim of this paper is to build upon the insights of these litera-
tures to address the specific question: is greater homeownership � the lodestone of
POD � a sound egalitarian strategy for those who want to see a more equal and
socially inclusive society? The conclusion of this paper is that it is not.
The order of argument
The first section sets out the case for a radical new approach to housing policy,
briefly outlining the place of housing, and especially homeownership, in entrenched
inequalities of wealth and opportunity in both Britain and the USA. The following
2 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
two sections then set out the egalitarian vision of a POD in which a more equal dis-
tribution of property has a transformative effect on both the individual and society.
Here we will see that one of the weaknesses of egalitarian POD is that it neglects
the huge importance of homeownership in the countries (USA and Britain) that
could most reasonably be said to actually be property-owning democracies in prac-
tice. Nevertheless, the great merit of this literature is the way in which it directly
engages with the relationship between ownership and questions of citizenship; not
just in terms of more typical concerns with the distribution of property and material
inequality, but also with the hypothesis that ownership has a transformative effect
on the way in which individuals think about both themselves and their place in the
world. This, I will suggest, offers crucial insights for housing theorists.
This paper then moves from the ideal of an egalitarian POD to an examination
of the actual practice and political reality of POD in Britain, comparing it with the
closely related ideal of a ‘homeownership society’ in the United States. In both
countries there is of course a clear tenure split, with far more owner-occupation
than any other form of housing, though this dominance of owner-occupation is
more historically entrenched in the USA than in Britain, and there is a racial dimen-
sion to the ownership question that does not arise in Britain to anything like the
same extent. What is particularly interesting in the context of the peculiarly British
political discourse of POD is that it cannot be fully understood without an apprecia-
tion of its essentially dyadic nature; whereas homeownership is presented as a
means of creating virtuous citizens, social housing is increasingly depicted as creat-
ing the vice of welfare dependence. Seemingly positive arguments for ownership
are often actually arguments against social housing. These sections therefore con-
trast two behavioural aspirations for POD: an egalitarian vision of greater self-
esteem for all and a sense of shared solidarity, and a more hierarchical and individu-
alistic vision of a small state. Crucially, it is this second, conservative vision of
POD that we actually see in practice, and which is already deeply embedded in pol-
icy and political culture. It is also, unlike the broader aspirations of egalitarian
POD, overwhelmingly a doctrine of homeownership.
The final two sections introduce a distinction between a minimal and libertarian
conception of independence, which sees homeownership as means of weaning indi-
viduals off the welfare state, and a more egalitarian and social conception of
‘interdependence’. The paper discusses the challenges of moving towards
interdependence in a democracy that is dominated by the aggregation of
consumer preference, which presents a further obstacle to the egalitarian vision of
POD as a practical strategy. The conclusion of these sections is that egalitarian
POD will be unable to supplant the deeply embedded political culture of a conser-
vative POD � either in Britain or the USA � and that it is therefore a poor egalitar-
ian strategy. The remainder of the paper outlines an alternative egalitarian strategy
that recognises the inherent limitations of homeownership as a welfare mechanism,
International Journal of Housing Policy 3
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
and which highlights the importance of a strong welfare state, while also recognis-
ing the legitimate place of owner-occupation in a fair society.
The problem of inequality: housing wealth and social hierarchy
There is no doubt that, for anyone concerned with economic inequality, the current
pattern of property ownership is a serious problem. Some basic facts about the dis-
tribution of wealth illustrate this. We will see that this distribution is not solely a
result of individual endeavour or the hard work and good judgment of owners; there
have also been concerted efforts by central government to assist owners through a
range of subsidies.
From 2006 to 2008 the net total of individual wealth in the UK (assets minus
debts) was £9 trillion, 39 per cent of which was housing wealth (£3.5 trillion) and
39 per cent private pension wealth (Rowlingson & McKay, 2012). The good news
for POD advocates is that housing wealth has spread over the last 30 years, with the
rate of homeownership increasing from 57 per cent in 1981 to 63.5 per cent in 2013
(down from a peak of 70 per cent in 2003) (Department for Communities and Local
Government [DCLG], 2012). The bad news is that this still leaves a very large,
excluded, minority.
Moreover, the downward UK trend in owner-occupation is set to continue. In
2005, the last Labour government held an aspiration that 75 per cent of the population
would live in owner-occupied housing (HM Treasury and ODPM 2005). On current
affordability trends, however, this seems rather fanciful. Across England, the ratio of
median earnings to median house prices has risen from 4.21 in 2000 to 6.72 in 2013,
down from a peak of 7.23 in 2007 (DCLG, 2012, Live Table no. 577). This is largely
due to a chronic short fall of housing supply across all tenures in the UK, with an
average of just over 177,000 homes completed each year from 2000 to 2013, when
the consensus view is that we need to be building 240,000 homes a year to keep pace
with household changes (Barker, 2004). But there has also been a stagnation in wage
growth since 2003, and a continuing squeeze on middle income households.
At the same time, within the home-owning population, there has been a notable
trend that belies the superficial picture of a wider distribution of housing wealth.
Regionally there is a significant variation in net housing wealth amongst owner-
occupiers in the UK, with median net housing wealth standing at £205,000 in 2009,
while the bottom quarter of owner-occupiers held net property wealth of £85,000 or
less (Lowe, Searle, & Smith, 2012, p. 110). This is, in part, a reflection of
regional variations in housing values (the most recent available aggregated
regional data, from 2012, points to a contrast between median house prices in the
South East of £236,000, compared to £122,000 in the Northeast (DCLG, 2012,
Live Table no. 582). Moreover, increasingly we are seeing different types of hous-
ing wealth. Most obviously there is a difference in the degree of wealth stored in
the home, with some 95,000 properties (overwhelmingly in London) estimated to
4 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
be worth more than £2 million (Giles, 2014). This has recently fed into political
debates, with pre-election calls from the Labour party for a mansion tax on high
value properties. This issue remains on the agenda with the new party leadership,
and it is an issue we shall return to in the concluding section of this paper. The
immediate point, however, is that the wider distribution of homeownership does
not straightforwardly imply greater equality.
In the USA the distribution of wealth is even more unbalanced. At the time of
the crash in 2008, housing wealth was roughly a half of all household net worth
($52.9 trillion), at 25.4 trillion dollars (Iacoviello, 2011). Between 1999 and 2005
new owners benefited from a median net wealth increase of between $11,000 and
$88,000. For those who owned before 1999 median wealth nearly doubled from
$152,000 to $289,000 (Schwartz, 2009). With a comparable rate of homeownership
(approximately 65 per cent) to the UK rate, the USA also contains a very significant
rump of non-owners.
Furthermore, within both Britain and the USA there is also a long established
and very substantial subsidy for these homeowners. For many years debt-financed
homeownership in Britain was subsidised through tax relief on the interest pay-
ments, and owner occupiers still do not have to pay any tax on the wealth that is
accumulated through increases in the value of the home as an asset. At its peak in
1990/1991 mortgage interest tax relief in Britain came to £7.7 billion (Malpass,
2008, p. 10), while in 2014 the same type of relief in the USA came to $71.7 billion
(JCT, 2010, 2014). Britain has since abandoned this form of subsidy, but it has
become almost inviolable in the USA, even during recurring bouts of attempts to
shrink the state, hence: ‘The mortgage interest deduction, uniquely among the pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code, was taken “off the table” by the Reagan
administration during the tax reform debate’ (Carliner, 1998, p. 301). All this, of
course, is to be viewed in the context of the long history of federal intervention in
the secondary mortgage market through ‘Freddie Mac’ and ‘Freddie Mae’.
Yet while continuing central support for homeownership in the USA is clearly
strong, it is in Britain that we have seen the most direct support, mostly notably
under the policy of the Right to Buy. Introduced by the 1980 Housing Act, the
Right to Buy obligated local authorities to sell public housing to sitting tenants at
discounts of up to 60 per cent of the open market value for houses and 70 per
cent for flats. The value of this subsidy has recently been estimated to total £150 to
£200 billion between 1980 and 2009, a period in which some 2.5 million council
houses were sold to tenants (Hills, 2013, p.187). This policy intervention seemed to
be dying a natural death over the last decade, as a majority of the most desirable
homes had already been sold off and remaining tenants were less likely to be able
to afford to buy (Murie & Jones, 2006). However, the previous Conservative led
coalition government introduced a renewed Right to Buy agenda with an increased
discount of up to £75,000 across England, with a range of additional discounts for
first-time buyers in the open market. At present the government is also seeking to
International Journal of Housing Policy 5
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
extend the Right to Buy to housing association tenants, threatening to further resi-
dualise the social housing sector as a whole. As a result, the inequalities of wealth
and property that worry egalitarian minded thinkers and policy makers are likely to
widen, presenting an even greater problem of inequality. The need for a nuanced
response to such government sponsored inequalities of wealth is therefore as press-
ing as ever.
The ideal of egalitarian POD: ends and means
As we have just seen, egalitarian POD has been developed against a background of
deep and entrenched inequalities of wealth and property, with negative consequen-
ces for social and economic equality. Egalitarian POD therefore calls for the wider
distribution of wealth. But in a sense this is a means to a more complex end. This
greater distribution is not just a means of sharing wealth and opportunity as a pre-
requisite of a fairer society, and nor is it simply a means of tackling poverty. Rather,
the distribution of wealth is to have a transformative role in creating a society based
on a more socially inclusive vision of citizenship.
Unsurprisingly there is no single theory or ideal of POD in the literature. More-
over, until relatively recently these more theoretical accounts would be unlikely to
use the language of ‘property-owning democracy’ as their main term of reference;
preferring, for example, the language of ‘basic capital’ or ‘stake-holding’. This pic-
ture is complicated by the overlapping language of ‘asset-based welfare’, which
can without undue distortion be subsumed under the label of egalitarian POD within
political theory, but which brings with it a range of different understandings in pol-
icy discourse, and especially recent housing policy. This is an issue we shall return
to in the final stages of this paper.
A key hero in ideal accounts of POD is the eighteenth century American radical
Thomas Paine, who advocated the provision � as a basic right � of a minimum
capital grant to all citizens, to be funded out of inheritance tax. The American wel-
fare theorists Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott pick up this tradition and argue, in
Stakeholder Society, that all citizens should be given a one-off gift of $80,000
when they come of age (Ackerman & Alstott, 2000). While Ackerman and Alstott’s
account is not explicitly framed in the language of POD, it has been picked up and
adapted by recent advocates of POD (a number of these positions are collected in
O’Neill 2012). Ackerman and Alstott’s proposal is to be funded by a wealth tax on
the richest 2 per cent of American citizens and can be spent in any way that the indi-
vidual chooses, thus adding a libertarian flavour to the debate. In some thinking,
however, this kind of proposal comes with restrictions on the ways in which the
stake can be spent or invested. Thus, Stuart White in Britain advocates a similar
scheme but also seeks constraints on behaviour (White, 2012). A typical restriction
would limit the use of the stake to spending on the acquisition of property (includ-
ing businesses) or investment in one’s own human capital; for example, using the
6 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
stake to fund university education or training at a later stage (White, 2003). How-
ever, this conditionality was not borne out in policy practice. The (now discontinued)
Child Trust Fund gave all British children born after September 2002 £250 at birth
(with an extra £250 for children from low income households) and the opportunity
for the family to add to the fund. At the age of 18 the beneficiary could continue to
invest or spend the funds in any way.
POD, however, is not confined to personal assets, and there is typically a strong
emphasis in the theory literature on collective ownership and responsibility. We see
this when we turn to the relationship between property and democracy � with
recent calls for worker participation and more democratic control of the means of
production, including employee ownership or (less radically) wider commercial
ownership through greater public participation in shareholding (Roemer, 1994).
Recent market socialist literature offers further nuance: for example, the idea that
investment coupons be distributed to individuals, allowing them to invest in a num-
ber of competing mutual funds, thus allowing individuals access to the returns from
capital, as well as a degree of influence over the use of capital (Roemer, 1994).
More radically, we could perhaps see direct voting mechanisms giving all workers
a direct say (Hussain, 2012).
It is not just modern incarnations of socialist thinking that have been driving the
development of egalitarian POD. In recent years egalitarian minded liberals and
republicans have also joined the debate. Famously, Rawls’ liberalism includes a
very strong account of distributive justice as a well as an account of political liberty.
The difference principle, chosen in the hypothetical original position, states that
social and economic equalities are just only if they are (a) tied to positions and offi-
ces open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and (b) maximise
the wellbeing of the least advantaged members of society. For many years this was
read as an endorsement of welfare state capitalism; roughly speaking, the classic
post-war model of welfare, based upon income transfers and public services. For
many writers now drawing on Rawls’s critique of welfare state capitalism, a central
concern is the potential for traditional welfare models to create a dynamic of
stigma, in which welfare claimants are seen at best as grateful supplicants of cash
transfers (O’Neill, 2009). Rawls’ later repudiation of this model in favour of a vari-
ant of POD thus plays an important role in the egalitarian theory of POD.
In terms of this political theory, recent republican thinking is equally important,
though it differs from Rawlsian liberalism in seeing political participation as an
active duty of citizenship, rather than just a right. Nevertheless, the key similarity is
that republicanism sees a greater distribution of property as a condition of non-
domination, in which no one citizen is in a position � by simple chance of birth or
luck � to lord it over another (Lovett, 2010; Pettit, 1996, 1997; Wartenberg, 1990).
Property ownership is thus a condition of equal dignity and, by extension, the
avoidance of the stigma associated with traditional welfare models. The concern
with stigma is very important for the argument in this paper too. But, as we shall
International Journal of Housing Policy 7
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
see, the shared Rawlsian and republican concern � and the broader egalitarian POD
concern with welfare and stigma � is misdirected: it misses the crucial role of
broader institutional structures, notably (and paradigmatically) clumsily targeted
social housing, in entrenching stigma.
There are, unsurprisingly, a range of complexities and disputes within this egali-
tarian literature. We can, however, distil the common essence to four core
propositions:
(1) Excessive concentrations of wealth threaten to (a) dominate politics and (b)
threaten equality of opportunity. With regard to (a) an obvious example is
the huge corporate sponsorship of presidential campaigns in the United
States; (b) manifests itself in the growing controversy in Britain in the
career advantages conferred by family wealth, allowing the lucky to finance
unpaid internships.
(2) Asset-ownership has a transformative effect: property is not just a useful
tool or a means to an end; it can change our ends and our outlook on the
world. In republican terms there is also a potentially educative effect: own-
ership can give citizens a stake in society and thus make them more active
participants in the democratic process. This, we should note, is not the
same as assuming that there is a pent up desire for participation that is
inhibited by a lack of property.
(3) Property ownership creates a sense of self-respect and greater respect in the
eyes of others. One of the central claims here is that, by giving the poor suf-
ficient capital, we avoid placing them in the position of grateful supplicant
reliant on regular state ‘hand-outs’. It therefore creates a virtuous sense of
independence. This claim has a mutually reinforcing dual edge: property
has a transformative effect on the individual’s self-worth because of the
greater control it gives them over their life, but it also changes the way that
they are seen by their fellow citizens.
(4) A final claim is that POD is a pragmatic strategy for greater equality. Thus,
Rawls tells us: ‘When a practical decision is to be made between POD and a
liberal socialist regime, we look to society’s historical circumstances, to its tra-
ditions of political thought and practice, and much else’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 139).
The assumption is that POD goes with the grain of a political culture in which
property has come to have paramount social and economic importance.
Of these four claims it is the last three that are of concern in this paper. I do not
address the first proposition primarily because I believe it to be largely correct,
diagnostically at least, to say that large concentrations of wealth distort the demo-
cratic process and hinder equality of opportunity. The political feasibility of the
level of distribution required to achieve this, however, is another matter. More trivi-
ally, there is insufficient space in this paper to pursue this line of enquiry.
8 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
In contrast, the other three claims are all highly contestable � and yet largely
uncontested. Within the world of egalitarian minded policy makers, as well as in
the explicit articulations of POD theory, propositions (2) and (3) are nevertheless
something of an article of faith, based on the assertion of its most famous policy
champion, Michael Sherraden: ‘…income only maintains consumption, but assets
change the way people think and interact with the world’ (Sherraden, 1991, p. 6).
(See Prabhakar, 2008 for a full and fruitful discussion.) For Sherraden, this asset-
based welfare is a way of helping the poorest � or at the least the poorer � in soci-
ety not only to survive but to feel the sense of dignity, confidence and inclusion that
egalitarian POD aspires to. Yet, as we shall see in the following section, this notion
that ‘assets change the way people think and interact with the world’ is entirely up
for grabs: the point is that we need to know the nature of the transformation; we
need to know how new owners will think of themselves and the world they are in. It
may well be a positive transformation for the individual, but this does not necessar-
ily mean that there will be a new cohort of citizens sympathetic to egalitarian ideals.
Indeed, the conservative POD we are about to examine pursues a policy of asset-
ownership largely for the very opposite reason, as a means of creating a more indi-
vidualistic society with a residual welfare state.
This brings us to proposition (4) in the egalitarian POD distillation. This is the
claim that POD is a pragmatic strategy for creating a more egalitarian society
because it goes with the grain of our political culture. There are two immediate
points to make before we examine this claim in greater depth. The first is that the
current political culture of POD is profoundly and intentionally inegalitarian. The
second is that, in marked contrast to both the policy framework of asset-based
welfare and the versions of POD found in political theory, the actual political cul-
ture of POD is overwhelmingly based on homeownership.
This clearly invites us to examine the potential for an egalitarian POD policy
programme to have a transformative effect on society as well as on the individual.
First, however, for the empirical claim that egalitarian POD runs with the grain of
contemporary political culture. In the following sections we will see that this is not
the case. We will also see some of the content that conservative POD gives to prop-
ositions (2) and (3).
The Conservative tradition of property-owning democracy
Property-owning democracy first entered the political stage in Britain as a slogan
when coined by the Conservative MP Noel Skelton in 1923 (Jackson, 2005). His
belief was that the greater distribution of property would foster greater indepen-
dence and self-reliance amongst individuals. Notably, Skelton’s POD included not
just personal property and homeownership but also agricultural small-holdings and
co-operative business models based on profit sharing. As we shall see, this quite
broad conception of POD is not the vision that came to dominate British politics
International Journal of Housing Policy 9
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
later in the century. The end shape of what I am calling political POD becomes
clearer in 1946, when Anthony Eden tells the Conservative Party Annual Confer-
ence that, ‘ownership of property is not a crime or a sin, but a reward, a right and a
responsibility that must be shared as equitably as possible amongst all our citizens’
(cited in Jackson, 2005).
While there may have been a ‘One Nation’ element to this unobjectionable aspi-
ration, over at least the last fifty years the state led redistribution of property in both
Britain and the USA has been increasingly motivated by a commitment to social
hierarchy. A relatively brief examination of the language and practice of housing
and welfare policy in Britain over the last 40 years makes this clear. According to
Margaret Thatcher, council houses were ‘breeding grounds of socialism, depen-
dency, vandalism and crime’; whereas home ownership created all the virtues of
the ‘good’ citizen (Campbell, 2008, p. 234). This dyad is linked directly to another,
one that continues to have great contemporary salience: ‘the Victorians had a way
of talking which summed up what we were now rediscovering � they distinguished
between the “deserving” and “undeserving poor”’ (Thatcher, 1995, p. 627). The
Victorians were also, famously, said by Thatcher to exemplify the ‘vigorous
virtues’ that made Britain great. These central virtues were thrift and self-help. But
there was also a direct link to the educative role of POD. Ownership was to teach
the virtue of independence, turning the citizen away from the state and to the
market. Nor was it to be thought of solely as an opportunity or a right; it was also a
duty.
A similar conclusion is to be found 30 years later in the continued conservative
assumption that homeownership should be a reward for good behaviour. Hence, Iain
Duncan-Smith gives us the following prescription for mending ‘Broken Britain’: ‘we
want to encourage tenants’ aspirations: we propose rewarding social tenants’ con-
structive behaviour with equity shares in their homes. With the privilege comes the
responsibility of maintaining one’s own assets; and in the long run this will transform
our estates’ (Duncan-Smith, 2008). Note here the assumption of a significant behav-
ioural change associated with ownership, though a less overt stress on responsibility
to exercise independence. This is provided instead by David Cameron:
Generations of families are trapped in social housing, denied the chance to break out orto buy their own property. I don’t want a child’s life story to be written before they’reeven born, and a responsible housing policy which helps people up and out of depen-dency can help rewrite that story. (Cameron, 2009)
That housing policy is one in which home ownership � the foundation the
political POD � stands at the top of a clear hierarchy of social status, with social
housing tenants cast as a burden on other citizens. In the context of current policy
there is a clear overlap between this attitude to public housing and other compo-
nents of the welfare state, notably the argument that income transfers ‘reward’
10 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
unemployment. Taken together, this has led to public housing tenants in Britain
experiencing a form of welfare stigma probably experienced by no other group.
For all advocates of (egalitarian and inegalitarian) POD, the solution is to use
property ownership as a means of reducing reliance on the state, regardless of
whether or not the receipt of help is framed in terms of an unquestionable right, or
as a charitable gift. But what particularly marks out what I am calling the ‘political’
narrative of POD is that stigma serves a legitimate social function: you should feel
ashamed if you don’t work or rely on others to meet your housing needs. Indeed,
when we look beyond the more recent history of property and democracy it is nota-
ble that the poor law system that operated in Britain all the way up until 1948 (albeit
much amended in practice from the early nineteenth century) made an explicit link
between property and citizenship: one could only vote as a male property owner,
and that right was lost if an individual was forced to turn to the state for assistance.
This property-owning democracy was literally a democracy that included only
property owners � and its legacy lives on and reverberates through the language of
housing and welfare today.
Property-owning democracy and the American Dream
In the United States there is an equally strong tradition of property and citizenship
discourses. Until very recently, when it was picked up by John Rawls, this has not
been conducted in the language of POD, and POD is still largely confined to aca-
demic and theoretical discourse. If we were to seek an equivalent the American
Dream would likely be the most appropriate choice. This of course contains a range
of aspirations and cultural assumptions � but it is also clear that homeownership is
one of the most crucial goods of the dream. This is embedded in legislative history
from at least the late nineteenth century, when the 1886 Homestead Act explicitly
set out homeownership as the prize for immigrants to the USA, thereby embedding
strong associations between citizenship and ownership (Ronald, 2008, p. 138).
Indeed, so powerful are the associations between homeownership and citizenship
that some commentators even suggest that the right to own is regarded as being
more foundational than the right to vote (Shlay, 2006).
As we shall see, there are echoes of this in G. W. Bush’s ‘ownership society’ of
the early 2000s. But, as in the British case, there is also a more egalitarian account,
starting with the New Deal of the 1930s and leading up to Bill Clinton’s explicit
1994 injunction to the Department of Housing and Development to widen access to
the American Dream of homeownership (Ronald, 2008, p. 148). In the USA, this
strand of thinking and policy action was inevitably influenced by its history of racial
discrimination, which not only drove much of the ghettoisation of American public
housing, but also allowed individuals and banks to systematically refuse to sell
or lend to black Americans or other ethnic minorities. A key moment in this history
is the 1968 Fair Housing Act, which made it illegal to refuse to rent or sell a
International Journal of Housing Policy 11
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
property to someone on grounds of race. This, of course, could not itself break the
strong link between race, poverty and economic inequality, so ownership still
remained out of reach for a great majority of Black American and Hispanic house-
holds. To this end, the Clinton administration placed a special emphasis on the
needs of Black and Hispanic households when it pledged to create 8 million more
owner occupiers, bringing the rate of owner-occupation amongst Afro-Americans
(43 per cent in 1993) and Hispanic Americans (40 per cent) far closer to the rate
(70 per cent) amongst the white population (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, May 1995, p. 17). Following this, in 2002 George W Bush explicitly
pledged to create 5.5 million new minority homeowners within ten years (The
White House, 2002).
There are some practical policy questions about the merits of such a policy as a
means of social and economic inclusion. The clearest illustration of this is the fate
of sub-prime mortgages after the 2008 crash. But the deeper issue is the nature of
the transformation desired by advocates of homeownership for minorities. Of
course, some will have deeply held egalitarian beliefs. But it is safe to say that
Bush (and perhaps even Clinton) do not number amongst this group. When we
looked at the actual political culture of POD in Britain, it was clear that this is over-
whelmingly a conservative, small state culture. Ownership is to wean citizens off
the welfare state. A very similar picture emerges in the USA, where there has been
a slow but sure move to a capital investment state, based on the transfer of risk
away from collective provision and to the individual as a saver and consumer of
financial goods (Quadagno, 1999). The following comment on Bush’s homeowner-
ship aspirations neatly summarises the point:
Like Thatcher’s, his rhetoric about ownership is grounded in the idea that private prop-erty and personal savings represent the best and the most legitimate source of securityfor the individual. For conservatives, Social Security privatization has long been partof a broader neo-liberal agenda that aims at fighting economic redistribution whileincreasing the reliance of citizens and workers on individualistic, market-based formsof protection. (B�eland, 2006, p. 21)
The right of centre think tank, the Cato Institute, also expresses the ideology
succinctly: ‘…individuals are empowered by freeing them from dependence on
government hand outs and making them owners instead’ (Clark, 2013). And, less
directly, G. W. Bush asserted at the beginning of his second term that ‘… if you
own something, you have a vital stake in the future of our country. The more own-
ership there is in America, the more vitality there is in America, and the more peo-
ple have a vital stake in the future of this country’ (Bush, 2004).
Bush clearly made a positive and opportunity case for ownership, seeking to
expand it widely; but, just as conservative ‘property-owning democracy’ is ulti-
mately based on the duty of ownership, so too is ‘ownership society’.
12 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
Two interpretations of independence
Let us now turn again, briefly, to proposition (3). This tells us that POD encourages
a virtuous sense of independence, self-respect and respect in the eyes of others. In
the account of conservative POD in the previous section this characteristic of POD
is indeed plainly present. But it should also be equally clear that the appeal in con-
servative POD is to a type of independence that egalitarian POD would eschew.
The lesson here is that proposition (3) is radically under-determined: it relies on
concepts � independence, respect, virtue � that can lead in very different directions,
depending on the precise normative content they are given. Egalitarians are likely to
respond with reference to a huge literature on precisely this topic, with finer and finer
detail on the meaning of these concepts (see Anderson, 1999 for a full discussion).
But this is not the decisive point in the context of POD as an egalitarian strategy.
The key issue is whether or not POD as it actually exists is compatible with the kind
of content given to independence by egalitarian theorists and policy makers. Without
entering into any detail, it is a reasonable economy to characterise the kind of inde-
pendence that egalitarians want in terms of Berlin’s ‘positive’ freedom; something
like the freedom to fully participate in society, to interact with others on equal terms.
In this crucial respect egalitarian independence is closer to a concept of equal interde-
pendence than it is to more literal, everyday uses of independence.
In stark contrast, the independence of conservative POD is more literal, and far
closer to the idea of ‘negative’ freedom. This is the independence of detachment, of
self-reliance, and of separation from the collective institutions of the welfare state.
In this vision the virtuous citizen is independent in so far as she is not a burden on
her tax-paying fellow citizens. Of course, this is something of a caricature. But it
drives home the point that proposition (3) is radically incomplete. We need to know
what type of independence POD is expected to foster. To just assume that it will
foster interdependence is to pre-judge the issue in favour of egalitarian POD, when
the compatibility of POD with (conservative) independence versus (egalitarian)
interdependence is precisely the contested issue at stake.
We have seen in the previous section that there is little reason to think that POD
as currently practised is favourable to the egalitarian interpretation of proposition
(3). Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility that we could move to a dif-
ferent political culture and a different type of POD. In the following two sections
we will examine one possible strategy for such a transition: a strong dose of demo-
cratic interaction � a curative for the atomising independence of contemporary
political culture in the USA and Britain.
1. Bringing democracy back in
Thus far, I have mainly described the political sociology of property ownership and
welfare in Britain and the USA. But, of course, POD is also about democracy. The
sensible principle that we should go with the grain of our political culture, rather
International Journal of Housing Policy 13
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
than fighting it tooth and nail in the name of an ideal account of justice, therefore
requires us to consider the practice of democracy in America and Britain.
In Britain, the New Labour agenda also included a wholesale acceptance of the
role of markets in democratic decision making � the very means by which Thatcher
sought to ‘change the soul’. Indeed, the consumer-citizen arguably only really came
of age under Labour’s public service reforms of the early 2000s. Thus, the political
context of the left’s belated recognition of the role that the welfare state could play
in dispersing wealth and property is deeply enmeshed with the very same type
of democracy that I have associated with an inegalitarian and political POD.
The two features of this narrative � the dispersal of wealth and property and the
valorisation of consumer choice � are in principle distinguishable. But the fact
remains that the actual political culture of Britain is far closer to a consumer
democracy than it is to any notion of a ‘strong’ democracy � or to an understanding
of ownership and independence that is compatible with a recognisably egalitarian
account of society.
Indeed, the point of a market-based democracy is that it aggregates preferences
through individual consumer choices (and the occasional election of competing
elites). There is very little room for debate about the nature or desirability of these
preferences. For the early Hayekian adopters of this model, this was precisely the
point; governments and societies have no business in judging what individuals
want. To do so leads to the inefficiency and oppression of state socialism � now
vanquished in all quarters by the great public choice agenda in public services.
How far this principled defence of market democracy really is at play is, of course,
open to debate. Much of the history of POD in Britain has seemed to be more about
populist electoral politics, with a number of commentators seeing the Right to Buy,
in particular, as an overtly partisan (and largely successful) attempt to garner work-
ing class electoral allegiance to the Conservative Party (Jones and Murie, 2008;
Pattie, Dorling, & Johnston, 1995).
Leaving this short-term populism aside, however, there are, once again, two
serious and historic considerations that tell against the assumption of proposition
(4). First, our contemporary understanding of property does not fit the intuitions of
theoretical POD; and, second, the democratic culture of both Britain and the USA
is market-based and inherently atomistic, rather than being interactive and based on
mutual recognition.
Somewhat ironically, it is one of the strongest egalitarian advocates of POD,
Stuart White, who offers one of the most precise dissections of the social psychol-
ogy of the political POD I have just described. In the process he at least tacitly rec-
ognises the normative indeterminacy of proposition (3), with the social psychology
of property ownership potentially leading to what I have described as independence
rather than interdependence.
Thus, borrowing from Tocqueville’s analysis of the individualistic impulse of
modern democracies, White draws a distinction between two individualising and
14 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
negative effects (White, 2012). The first effect is the cognitive error of over estimat-
ing one’s independence from the common resources and rules of a functional soci-
ety. The second individualising effect is effective; private ownership encourages an
emotional attachment to our immediate circle of family and friends and an indiffer-
ence to the rest of society. Unsurprisingly, White claims that there is a corrective to
this rather unattractive democratic culture � another dose of (strong) democracy �and suggests that the individualising tendencies of POD could be limited by a local
democracy, as ‘participation in local political bodies makes citizens more aware of
their interdependence, so correcting the illusion of self-sufficiency generated by the
wide dispersion of moderate wealth’ (White, 2012, p. 139). Other writers turn to
industrial democracy and workplace democracy for similar though less clearly
articulated reasons.
But the problem with this strategy is not hard to grasp: its direction is circular,
requiring sufficient democratic appetite to start the socialising process in the first
place, when the worry that led to the advocacy of more democracy was that there is
in fact very little such appetite. This kind of circularity, I should stress, is not in itself
objectionable or incoherent. The whole notion of path dependency � in which insti-
tutional and social outcomes are reinforced by self-sustaining processes � depends
on a similar circularity. For example, inadequate unemployment benefits undermine
support amongst higher income groups, and that loss of support can lead to even less
generous (and more targeted) payments. Likewise, the more public housing is tar-
geted on the poor, the more that the general population disassociate themselves from
this good � and the harder it comes to fund the greater supply (and coverage) that is
needed if public housing is to be viewed favourably by the general population. But
my point is that there needs to be some radical interruption of that path to set if off
in a more democratic direction, and there is little in the theoretical literature to sug-
gest that the egalitarians have really grasped this challenge.
2. Breaking the impasse: homeownership, interaction and ‘interdependence’
I have been arguing that the last of the POD propositions I listed in section 4 is
sociologically na€ıve. Far from being a pragmatic strategy for creating a more
socially inclusive and interdependent society, it runs hard against the grain of policy
and political culture in both Britain and the USA. This final section therefore argues
that a better strategy for achieving such ends would be to concentrate not on owner-
ship per se but the way in which it interacts with other tenures, as well as with dif-
ferent aspects of the welfare state.
This is not intended to be a defence of the status quo. Nor is it a denial that prop-
erty and wealth could, and should, be distributed more equitably. Rather, the point
is that the further distribution of property � and homeownership in particular � can
actually entrench inequalities. There are three points to be made here. The first is
that a wider distribution of homeownership may lead to something like a two-tier
International Journal of Housing Policy 15
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
welfare state, with homeowners adequately insured against old age and the need for
a retirement income, but with an excluded rump having to rely on an ever more resi-
dualised traditional welfare state. This scenario has been suggested elsewhere (e.g.
Malpass, 2008) and, given the declining rate of owner-occupation, it is likely that
such a rump would be a large rather than a small minority. Moreover, within the
home-owning majority there could be very uneven welfare coverage, with some
households able to use greater wealth to finance better old-age provision and care.
This means that, in practice, egalitarian minded advocates of homeownership need
to develop a policy framework that uses housing wealth in a way that does not open
up new inequalities. One way of doing so would be something like the idea of a
mansion tax, which could be used to shore up more traditional forms of welfare pro-
vision. We should not, however, forget that the challenge for egalitarian POD is to
create the kind of political context in which this is a realistic proposal. Overt redis-
tributive polices such as a mansion tax (itself a relatively modest proposal) are per-
haps best viewed as end-point rather than a starting point.
The second point is that the political culture of POD, though deeply engrained in
Britain and the USA, is historically contingent. It could in principle be challenged
and changed. But in order to so it is vital to recognise the nature of this contingency,
and in particular the place of what this paper has referred to as proposition (2) of
egalitarian POD; the claim that property ownership has a transformative effect
on the individual, changing ‘the way people think and interact with the world’
(Sherraden, 1991).
Earlier in this paper it was argued that this claim is under specified. How prop-
erty changes the way in which people think and interact with the world is in fact the
precisely the issue that is up for grabs. Indeed, we have seen that the political cul-
ture of POD tends towards a world view that encourages a particular self-perception
of independence, which creates a certain type of (minimal) interaction with society
and the welfare state. This is clearly a very serious difficulty for advocates of egali-
tarian POD. Yet there is a sense in which it is made more difficult by the way in
which the egalitarian account of property is framed. For their major mistake is to
share the conservative assumption that it is the ownership of property itself that has
a transformative effect on individuals, rather than the relationship both between
owners and between owner-occupation and other tenures. This gives us reason to
believe that there is a necessary and intrinsic asset ‘effect’ that comes with owner-
ship. But if this is the case it becomes very hard to challenge the POD status quo.
To do so, we would need an account of why the intrinsic effects of homeownership
have not in fact led us in an inegalitarian direction.
In fact, there is no need for this. Thankfully there is no actual evidence of such
an intrinsic effect. A long-running debate seeking to identify a pure asset-effect has
failed to yield any convincing empirical evidence (see Kleinhans & Elsinga, 2010;
McKay & Kempson, 2003; McKnight & Karagiannaki, 2013; Richards & Thyer,
2011; Shlay, 2006; Zielewski et al., 2009). The key point at issue here is that, while
16 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
there are strong correlations between homeownership and a range of positive out-
comes, there is no real evidence that it plays a true causal role. This may be bad
news for egalitarian advocates of POD, but it is good news for those who want
homeownership to form a significant part of a fair and progressive society. Recog-
nising the contingent impact of homeownership allows a more nuanced egalitarian
strategy, based not on ownership per se but on the different ways in which it can
structure social relations.
This brings us to the third and final point. The democratic component of an
egalitarian housing strategy need not be framed in the terms set out by the compet-
ing versions of POD we have examined in this paper (on the one hand, a demanding
participatory democracy, and on the other hand a minimal and rather thin
consumer or market democracy conservative POD). In the previous section we saw
that one of the central challenges for egalitarian POD is to create a form of demo-
cratic culture that offers more than the individualistic atomisation and self-interest
described by Tocqueville. We also saw that the proposed solution �more participa-
tory local government � relied on what it sets out to create, an appetite for interac-
tion and collective decision making. But Tocqueville was famous also for his
assertion that democracy is cultural as well as institutional. It is a culture, when
(and if) it really exists, of equal respect and equality of status. In this vision welfare
goods and services would be distributed in a way that does not create stigma � or
the republican’s domination � for the beneficiaries. In part this will come from a
more universal approach to welfare provision that avoids the creation of poor out-
sider groups (see Esping-Anderson, 1990; Larsen, 2008; Rothstein, 1998), and in
particular an outgroup of social renters. But it will also need to come from a clearer
articulation of the social subsidy that has assisted so many owner-occupiers, break-
ing down the binary distinctions that make for social hierarchy rather than a culture
of democratic equality.
Conclusion
This democratic equality of status does not come from out of the blue; it too is con-
tingent. But it is a contingency that housing policy is well placed to shape. There are
two clear candidates for a policy framework in which homeownership could play a
positive role in this regard. The first is through a policy of social and economic mix
within neighbourhoods. This is a path well-travelled in housing policy debates, and
there is a large literature on the potential benefits of neighbourhood effects on pov-
erty, with social mix often suggested as a means to the end of greater social exclusion
(Tunstall & Fenton, 2006). As we have just seen, there is also a well-known applica-
tion of the framework of welfare regimes to questions of welfare and stigma. But to
date there has actually been very little attention paid to the way in which a mix of
relatively affluent owner-occupiers and lower-income renters may shape broader atti-
tudes to welfare, and of the possibility that such a mix may change the ways in which
the affluent owner ‘thinks and interacts with the world’. The second candidate is the
International Journal of Housing Policy 17
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
extension of shared ownership (currently less than 2 per cent of all housing in the
UK). The aim here would not simply be to offer a thin slice of the POD pie to more
people, but to shape a policy narrative around shared ownership in such a way that a
positive story is told about its hybrid nature, bridging the often binary distinction
between ‘independent’ owners and ‘dependent’ social tenants. These, of course, are
only the briefest of suggestions. It is unlikely that even taken together they will have
a transformative effect on society. But taken in conjunction with other structural
reforms � for example, greater security and something like a living wage at the bot-
tom end of the labour market � such an approach to homeownership may indeed
form part of a coherent egalitarian strategy.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
References
Ackerman, B., & Alstott, A. (2000). The stakeholder society. Yale: Yale University Press.Anderson, E.S. (1999). What is the point of equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287�337.B�eland, D. (2006). What ownership society: Debating housing and social security reform in
the United States. SEDAP Research Paper No. 150. Hamilton, ON: McMasterUniversity.
Barker, K. (2004). Delivering stability: Securing our future housing needs. Barker review ofhousing supply � final report � recommendations. London: HM Treasury.
Bush, G.W. (2004). Remarks to the National Federation of Independent Businesses.Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88270
Cameron, D. (2009). Strong Foundations: Building homes and communities � Nurturingresponsibility. Policy Green Paper No. 10. Retrieved from https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Green%20Papers/Housing-Green-Paper.ashx
Campbell, J. (2008). Margaret Thatcher, Volume Two: The iron lady. London: VintageBooks.
Carliner, M.S. (1998). Development of federal homeownership policy. Housing PolicyDebate, 9(2), 299�321.
Clark, A. (2013). The aftermath of the general financial crisis for the ownership society:What happened to low income homeowners in the US? International Journal of HousingPolicy, 13(3), 227�246.
Doling, J., & Ronald, R. (2010). Home ownership and asset-based welfare. Journal of Hous-ing and the Built Environment, 25(2), 165�173.
DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government). (2012). Statistical data set:Live Tables on Housing Market and House Prices. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-housing-market-and-house-prices
Duncan-Smith, I. (2008). Preface, housing poverty: From social breakdown to social mobil-ity. London: The Centre for Social Justice.
18 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
Forrest, R., & Murie, A. (1988). Selling the welfare state: The privatisation of public hous-ing. London: Routledge.
Fox O’Mahony, L., & Overton, L. (2015). Asset-based welfare, equity release and the mean-ing of the owned home. Housing Studies, 30(3), 392�412.
Giles, C. (2014, July 3). ONS data weaken case against mansion tax. The Financial Times.Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2701e860-0297-11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html#axzz3wYsenAn7
Hills, J. (2013). Wealth in the UK: Distribution, accumulation, policy. Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press.
HM Treasury and ODPM. (2005). The government’s response to Kate Barker’s review ofhousing supply. London: Author.
Hussain, W. (2012). The Rawlsian argument for Democratic Corporatism. In M. O’Neill &T. Williamson (Eds.), Property-owning democracy: Rawls and beyond (pp. 180�201).Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
Iacoviello, M. (2011). Housing Wealth and Consumption. Retrieved from http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1027/ifdp1027.htm
Jackson, B. (2005). Revisionism reconsidered: ‘Property-owning democracy’ and egalitarianstrategy in post-war Britain. 20th Century British History, 16(4), 416�440.
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). (2010). Estimates of federal tax expenditures for years2010-2014. Washington, DC: Author.
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation). (2014). Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures forFiscal Years 2012-2017. Retrieved from https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?funcDstartdown&idD4503
Jones, C., & Murie, A. (2008). The Right to Buy: Analysis and evaluation of a housing policy(Vol. 18). Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
Kleinhans, R., & Elsinga, M. (2010). ‘“Buy your home and feel in control”: Does home own-ership achieve the empowerment of former tenants of social housing?’ InternationalJournal of Housing Policy, 10(1), 41�61.
Lovett, F. (2010). A general theory of domination and justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Lowe, S., Searle, B., & Smith, S. (2012). From housing wealth to mortgage debt: The emer-
gence of Britain’s asset-shaped welfare state. Social Policy and Society, 11(01), 105�116.Malpass, P. (2005). Housing and the welfare state: The development of housing policy in
Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave.Malpass, P. (2008). Housing and the new welfare state: Wobbly pillar or cornerstone? Hous-
ing Studies, 23(1), 1�19.McKay, S., & Kempson, E. (2003). Savings and life events. London: Corporate Document
Services.McKnight, A., & Karagiannaki, E. (2013). The wealth effect: How parental and own asset-
holdings predict future advantage. In J. Hills (Ed.),Wealth in the UK: Distribution, accu-mulation, policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murie, A., & Jones, C. (2006). The right to buy: Analysis and evaluation of a housing policy.Oxford: Blackwell.
O’Neill, M. (2009). Liberty, equality and property-owning democracy. Journal of Social Phi-losophy, 40(3), 379�396.
O’Neill, M. (2012). ‘Political values, principles of justice, and property-owning democracy’.In M. O’Neill & T. Williamson (Eds.), Property-owning democracy: Rawls and beyond(pp. 75�101). Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
Pattie, C., Dorling, D., & Johnston, R. (1995). A debt-owing democracy: The political impactof housing market recession at the British General Election of 1992. Urban Studies, 32(8), 1293�1315.
International Journal of Housing Policy 19
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016
Pettit, P. (1996). Freedom as antipower. Ethics, 106, 576�604.Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.Prabhakar, P. (2008). The assets agenda. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Quadagno, J. (1999). Creating a capital investment welfare state. American Sociological
Review, 64(1), 1�10.Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.Richards, K., & Thyer, B. (2011). Does individual development account participation help
the poor? A review. Research on Social Work Practice, 21, 348.Roemer, J.E. (1994). A future for socialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Ronald, R. (2008). The ideology of home ownership: Homeowner societies and the role of
housing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.Rothstein, B. (1998). Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal
welfare state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Rowlingson, K., & McKay, S. (2012). Wealth and the wealthy: Exploring and tackling
inequalities between rich and poor (pp. 81�84). Bristol: Policy Press.Schwartz, H. (2009). Subprime nation: American power, global capital, and the housing bub-
ble. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Sherraden, M. (1991). Assets and the poor: A new American welfare policy. New York, NY:
M.E. Sharpe.Shlay, A. (2006). Low-income homeownership: American Dream or delusion? Urban Stud-
ies, 43(3), 511�531.Thatcher, M. (1995). The downing street years. HarperCollins.The White House. (2002). President Hosts Conference on Minority Homeownership.
Retrieved from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021015-7.html
Tunstall, R., & Fenton, A. (2006). In the mix: A review of mixed income, mixed tenure andmixed communities. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (May 1995). The national homeown-ership strategy: Partners in the American dream. Washington, DC: Author.
Wartenberg, T. (1990). The forms of power: From domination to transformation. Philadel-phia, PA: Temple University Press.
White, S. (2003). The civic minimum: On the rights and obligations of economic citizenship.Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, S. (2012). Property-owning democracy and republican citizenship. In M. O’Neill & T.Williamson (Eds.), Property-owning democracy: Rawls and beyond (pp. 129�147).Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
Zielewski, E.H., Ratcliffe, C., McKernan, S.-M., Johnson, L., & Sherraden, M. (2009).Evaluation design for the next phase evaluation of the assets for independence program:Final literature review. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
20 J. Gregory
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f B
irm
ingh
am]
at 0
8:24
20
Janu
ary
2016