GOH KANG SIA & ANOR v HASIAH BTE MD ISA

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[2005] 1 MLJ 80

GOH KANG SIA & ANOR v HASIAH BTE MD ISA

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–120 OF 2003KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J1 SEPTEMBER 2004

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — High Court — Whether High Court could review findingsof liability when there was no cross–appeal by plaintiff — Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 33

Tort — Negligence — Contributory negligence — Sessions court judge found deceased 30%liable on basis of damage to deceased’s motorcycle and testimony of eyewitness that deceasedwas speeding — Whether eyewitness competent to assess speed of deceased’s motorcycle —Whether deceased contributory negligent

The plaintiff sued the defendants as the mother and dependant of one Zamani binHassan (‘the deceased’). In her statement of claim, the plaintiff contended that on 2October 1996 at about 6.15am, as the deceased was proceeding along Jalan SultanAzlan Shah from the direction of Jalan Tengah towards the direction of Bayan Lepas,the deceased or his motorcycle was collided into by a bus which suddenly and withoutwarning emerged onto the road and into the deceased’s path from a factory gate. Thegate was on the left of the road as one faced Bayan Lepas. The first defendant was theowner of the bus and the second defendant was the driver. The second defendanttestified that he was going to a factory to bring back the workers. To go to thisfactory, he had to proceed along Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah and then make a ‘U’ turn.According to the second defendant, he was on the centre lane and since he intended tomake a ‘U’ turn, he moved to the right lane. When he was about 50ft from the placewhere the ‘U’ turn was, he gave a right hand signal of his intention to move to theright lane. At the same time, he looked to the rear and noticed a motorcycle lightcoming from the rear. He then moved slowly to the right and soon after he had movedhe heard the sound of a collision coming from the rear. During hisexamination-in-chief, the second defendant changed his story and said that when hegave his right hand signal he was 300m from the place where the ‘U’ turn was situated.The sessions court judge found the second defendant liable but found the deceasedcontributory to the extent of 30% based on the damage to the motorcycle and on theevidence of the plaintiff’s witness (‘SP4’) that the deceased was speeding. SP4 was theeyewitness to the accident. According to SP4, they were both proceeding along JalanSultan Azlan Shah in the direction of Bayan Lepas at the material time. There were

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three lanes on the said road and SP4 was on the extreme left lane whilst the deceasedwho was riding ahead of him, was on the centre lane. Suddenly, he noticed a busemerging from a gate on the left, which was only meant for vehicles entering thepremises and not for vehicles to come out onto the main road. The rear||Page 81>> right tyre of the bus encroached into the deceased’s path and collided withthe deceased’s motorcycle.This was the defendants’ appeal against the decision of the sessions court judge.

Held, dismissing the appeal:(1) Section 33 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the Act’) provided that ‘In

the case of any civil proceedings in subordinate court the record of which hasbeen called for, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Courtmay give such orders thereon, either by directing a new trial or otherwise, asseems necessary to secure that substantial justice is done’. The operative words‘or which otherwise comes to its knowledge’ gave this court the right toreview the issue of liability. As such, based on s 33 of the Act, the High Courtcould, on the available evidence, review the findings of liability even thoughthere had been no cross-appeal by the plaintiff (see paras 22–24).

(2) It was obvious from the evidence of the second defendant that he wasprevaricating. Based on the evidence of the independent witness, the bus driverdid indeed emerge from the gate. The damage to the bus was over the rightrear wheel and not at the rear of the bus, thus indicating that the bus was in anoblique position by cutting across the path of the motorcycle when it collidedinto the bus. Although the second defendant had said that he would call hisemployer to testify that he had no business coming out of the gate and that hewas in actual fact driving along Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah with the intention ofmaking a ‘U’ turn some 800ft away, he failed to call this employer and failed togive any reasons for his absence. This was a classic instance to invoke s 114(g)of the Evidence Act 1950 against the defendants (see para 28).

(3) The learned sessions court judge had erred when she held that it was notimportant for the court to conclude whether the second defendant had emergedfrom the gate. The session court ought to have made a finding on this issuesince this was the crux of the plaintiff’s case, which was vehemently denied bythe defendants (see para 29).

(4) The eyewitness had testified that the gate was only meant for vehicles andbuses to enter into the factory area. Surely the defendants could havesubpoenaed the management that controlled the gate to at least testify thatvehicles could go in and come out of that gate. This was not done and the onlyevidence before the court now was that the second defendant had no businesscoming out of the gate (see para 30).

(5) SP4 said that he was riding his motorcycle at 50 to 60km per hour and that thedeceased was riding faster. SP4 was never asked how he was able to assess the

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deceased’s speed. Speed was relative and to some,||Page 82>> even a normal speed would be construed as speeding. Since therewas no observance in relation to the deceased’s speed, this court cannot holdthat the deceased was speeding (see para 32).

(6) Having found the second defendant liable, the next issue to consider waswhether the learned sessions court judge was correct in finding the deceasedcontributory to the extent of 30%. Looking at the damage to the motorcycle,there was nothing to show that the deceased was contributory negligent. Theevidence of SP4 that the deceased was speeding cannot be held against thedeceased because SP4 was not competent to assess the speed of the deceased’smotorcycle. If the deceased was going faster than him, then SP4 could not havebeen able to keep the deceased within his vision. Having discounted both thereasons given by the session court for finding the deceased as havingcontributed, the finding of contribution of 30% against the deceased was setaside. Accordingly, the second defendant was 100% liable (see paras 35–38).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah menyaman defendan-defendan sebagai ibu dan tanggungan Zamani binHassan (‘si mati’). Dalam pernyataan tuntutan beliau, plaintif berhujah bahawa pada 2Oktober 1996 lebih kurang 6.15am, tatkala si mati memandu sepanjang Jalan SultanAzlan Shah dari arah Jalan Tengah ke arah Bayan Lepas, si mati atau motosikal beliautelah berlanggar dengan sebuah bas yang secara tiba-tiba dan tanpa amaran timbul dijalan tersebut dan masuk ke jalan si mati dari pagar kilang. Pagar tersebut terletak dibahagian kiri jalan yang menghadap ke Bayan Lepas. Defendan pertama adalah pemilikbas tersebut dan defendan kedua adalah pemandunya. Defendan kedua telah memberiketerangan bahawa beliau sedang menuju ke sebuah kilang untuk membawa pulangpekerja-pekerja di situ. Untuk ke kilang tersebut, beliau perlu memandu sepanjangJalan Sultan Azlan Shah dan kemudian membuat satu pusing ‘U’. Menurut defendankedua, beliau berada di tengah lorong dan memandangkan beliau hendak membuatpusingan ‘U’, beliau telah masuk ke sebelah kanan lorong tersebut. Apabila beliau lebihkurang 50 kaki daripada tempat di mana pusingan ‘U’ dibuat, beliau memberikanisyarat tangan ke kanan sebagai tanda ingin menukar ke sebelah kanan jalan. Pada masasama, beliau melihat ke tepi dan menyedari lampu motosikal yang datang dari tepi.Beliau kemudian bergerak perlahan ke kanan dan sejurus selepas beliau bergerak beliauterdengar bunyi satu dentuman dari sebelah tepi. Semasa pemeriksaan utama, defendankedua telah mengubah cerita beliau dan menyatakan bahawa apabila beliau memberikanisyarat tangan ke kanan beliau berada 300m daripada tempat di mana pusingan ‘U’dibuat.||Page 83>>Hakim mahkamah sesyen mendapati bahawa defendan kedua bertanggungjawab tetapimendapati si mati menyumbang setakat 30% berdasarkan kerosakan motosikal dan atas

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keterangan saksi plaintif (‘SP4’) yang mana si mati telah memandu laju. SP4merupakan saksi utama kepada kemalangan tersebut. Menurut SP4, mereka berduamemandu sepanjang Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah ke arah Bayan Lepas pada masa matan.Terdapat tiga lorong pada jalan tersebut dan SP4 berada di lorong paling kirisementara si mati sedang memandu di hadapan beliau, berada di lorong tengah.Tiba-tiba, beliau ternampak sebuah bas timbul dari pagar sebelah kiri, yang hanyauntuk kenderaan masuk ke premis tersebut dan bukan untuk kenderaan keluar ke jalanutama. Tepi tayar kanan bas memasuki jalan si mati dan berlanggar dengan motosikal simati.Ini adalah rayuan defendan terhadap keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut:(1) Seksyen 33 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘Akta tersebut’)

memperuntukkan bahawa ‘In the case of any civil proceedings in subordinatecourt the record of which has been called for, or which otherwise comes to itsknowledge, the High Court may give such orders thereon, either by directing anew trial or otherwise, as seems necessary to secure that substantial justice isdone’. Perkataan-perkataan operatif ‘or which otherwise comes to itsknowledge’ memberikan mahkamah ini hak untuk mengkaji semula persoalanliabiliti. Oleh itu berdasarkan s 33 Akta tersebut, Mahkamah Tinggi boleh,berdasarkan keterangan yang sedia ada, mengkaji semula penemuan-penemuanliabiliti walaupun tiada rayuan balas oleh plaintif (lihat perenggan 22–24).

(2) Adalah jelas daripada keterangan defendan kedua yang beliau bercakap putarbelit. Berdasarkan keterangan saksi berasingan, pemandu bas memang munculdari pagar tersebut. Kerosakan pada bas adalah pada bahagian tepi tayar kanandan bukan pada tepi bas, oleh itu menunjukkan bahawa bas tersebut beradadalam kedudukan serong yang menghalang jalan motosikal tersebut apabila iaberlanggar dengan bas itu. Walaupun defendan kedua menyatakan bahawabeliau akan memanggil majikan beliau untuk memberi keterangan bahawabeliau tiada urusan untuk keluar dari pagar tersebut dan bahawa beliausebenarnya memandu sepanjang Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah dengan tujuanmembuat pusingan ‘U’ lebih kurang 800 kaki dari situ, beliau gagal untukmemanggil majikan tersebut dan gagal memberikan apa-apa alasan untukketidakhadiran beliau. Ini adalah contoh klasik untuk menggunakan s 114(g)Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap defendan-defendan (lihat perenggan 28).||Page 84>>

(3) Hakim mahkamah sesyen terkhilaf apabila beliau memutuskan ia tidak pentingbagi mahkamah membuat kesimpulan sama ada defendan kedua timbul daripagar tersebut. Mahkamah sesyen sepatutnya membuat penemuan berdasarkanpersoalan ini memandangkan ia adalah pokok persoalan dalam kes plaintif,yang secara bersungguh-sungguh dinafikan oleh defendan-defendan (lihatperenggan 29).

(4) Saksi utama memberi keterangan bahawa pagar tersebut hanya bertujuan untuk

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kenderaan-kenderaan dan bas-bas untuk memasuki kawasan kilang. Sepatutnyadefendan-defendan boleh menyampaikan sepina ke atas pengurusan yangmengawal pagar tersebut untuk sekurang-kurangnya memberi keteranganbahawa kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut boleh masuk dan keluar dari pagartersebut. Ini tidak dilakukan dan satu-satunya keterangan di hadapanmahkamah sekarang adalah bahawa defendan kedua tiada urusan untuk keluardari pagar tersebut (lihat perenggan 30).

(5) SP4 menyatakan bahawa beliau sedang menunggang motosikal beliau pada 50hingga 60km sejam dan bahawa si mati membawa lebih laju. SP4 tidak pernahditanya bagaimana beliau boleh menaksir kelajuan si mati. Kelajuan adalahrelatif dan kepada beberapa orang, kelajuan biasa juga boleh ditafsirkan sebagaimembawa dengan laju. Memandangkan tiada pemerhatian berkaitan kelajuan simati, mahkamah ini tidak boleh memutuskan si mati membawa dengan laju(lihat perenggan 32).

(6) Setelah mendapati defendan kedua bertanggungjawab, persoalan seterusnyaadalah untuk menimbangkan sama ada hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksanaadalah betul dalam penemuan yang si mati telah menyumbang setakat 30%.Melihat kepada kerosakan motosikal tersebut, tiada apa yang menunjukkanbahawa si mati turut menyumbang dalam kecuaian tersebut. Keterangan SP4bahawa si mati membawa laju tidak boleh digunakan terhadap si mati keranaSP4 tidak kompeten untuk menaksir kelajuan motosikal si mati. Jika si matimembawa lebih laju daripada beliau, SP4 tidak mungkin dapat melihat si mati.Dengan tidak mengambil kira kedua-dua alasan yang diberikan oleh mahkamahsesyen dengan penemuan yang si mati telah turut menyumbang, penemuanuntuk penyumbangan 30% terhadap si mati diketepikan. Sewajarnya, defendankedua adalah bertanggungjawab 100% (lihat perenggan 35–38).]

Notes

For cases on contributory negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 743–786.

For cases on the jurisdiction of the High Court, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed,2001 Reissue) paras 3724–3775.||Page 85>>

Cases referred toChan Sia Hock v C & C Group Sdn Bhd & Anor [1998] 5 CLJ 123 (refd)Chu Kim Sing & Anor v Abdul Razak bin Amin [1999] 6 MLJ 433 (refd)

Legislation referred toCourts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 29, 33, 34, 69(5)Evidence Act 1950 s 114(g)

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Rules of the High Court O 55 r 3

AJ Teoh (AJ Teoh & Co) for the appellants/defendants.Ramanathan (Ram Pillai & Assoc) for the respondent/plaintiff.

[2005] 1 MLJ 141

SHIVNATH RAI HARNARAIN (INDIA) LTD v THE OWNERSOF THE SHIP OR VESSEL MV ‘WIN MOONY’ (LR 8204846)

OF THE PORT OF VALLETTA, MALTA

HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — ADMIRALTY IN REM NO MT 1–27–2 OF 2004LOW HOP BING J6 OCTOBER 2004

Constitutional — Jurisdiction — High Court — Whether admiralty jurisdiction of courtproperly invoked — Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) s 20(2)(h), Courts of Judicature Act 1964s 24(b)

Shipping and Navigation — Action in rem — Arrest of ship — Ex parte application —Contract of carriage — Whether mate’s receipt a contract of carriage — Whether claim bestruck off in absence of contract between parties — Damages for wrongful arrest — Whethermalice and gross negligence be proven — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1)(b),Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) ss 20(2)(h), 21(4)

Shipping and Navigation — Admiralty — Jurisdiction — High Court — Whether admiraltyjurisdiction of court properly invoked — Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) s 20(2)(h), Courts ofJudicature Act 1964 s 24(b)

The plaintiff had claimed, inter alia, for a declaration that defendant do issue a cleanbill of lading to them. The plaintiff entered into a charterparty with Able Shipping Line,through Manco Shipping Co (‘the charterparty’), for the use and hire of the vessel MVWin Moony (‘the vessel’), for the carriage of 11,500 mt of bulk maize (‘the cargo’), inreturn for payment of freight of USD25 per mt. The vessel was under a voyage charterby Able Shipping Line from the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that notwithstandingthe availability of the cargo, the officers and crew of the vessel, at the instructions ofthe defendant, had wrongfully and in breach of duty, sailed out of the loading portwithout loading 2933 mt of the cargo, which resulted in the plaintiff suffering losses.The plaintiff claimed alleged that the defendant acknowledged receipt of 8567 mt of

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the cargo on board the vessel and, agreed with and represented to the plaintiff, to issuea bill of lading for the cargo evidenced inter alia by a mate’s receipt issued by the chiefofficer of the vessel.The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant has failed to issue the bill of lading inrespect of 8567 mt of the cargo received on board the vessel despite plaintiff makingfull payment for the freight under protest. The defendant wanted to issue conditionalbill of lading but the plaintiff refused on the ground it departed from mate’s receipt.The plaintiff, vide an ex parte application, obtained warrant of arrest and arrested theship. The defendant applied to this court for an order to strike out the plaintiff’s writ ofsummons and the warrant of arrest issued against the defendant on the grounds, interalia that: (1) the plaintiff’s claim did not fall within s 20(2)(h) of the Supreme||Page 142>> Court Act 1981 (UK) (‘the Act’) and accordingly the admiraltyjurisdiction of this court was not properly invoked, since there was no agreementrelating to the carriage of goods in the vessel between plaintiff and defendant; (2) theplaintiff’s ex parte application did not contain a full and frank disclosure of materialfacts.

Held, allowing the defendant’s application with costs:(1) Pursuant to s 20(2)(h) the Act, the jurisdiction of the court may properly be

invoked if there is an agreement relating to the carriage of goods in the vesselbetween the plaintiff and the defendant at the time the writ in rem was issuedand the vessel was arrested. A mate’s receipt has been described as a chose inaction, but it is not a contract of carriage. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim didnot arise out of an agreement of carriage under s 20(2)(h). As such, the plaintiffhas wrongly invoked the admiralty jurisdiction of this court and hence theirclaim was frivolous or vexatious under O 18 r 19(l)(b) (see paras 42, 47, 56and 76).

(2) In the absence of any contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, asrequired under s 20(2)(h) of the Act, there is no legal basis for the plaintiff toobtain a clean bill of lading from the defendant (see para 63).

(3) The power to issue a warrant of arrest under O 70 r 4 is discretionary andtherefore must be exercised judicially having regard to all established judicialprinciples, after considering relevant facts and circumstances, more so in exparte applications which are applications uberrimae fidei requiring full andfrank disclosure of all material facts (see para 86).

(4) The defendant has successfully established malice or gross negligence and thatthe arrest of the vessel is wrongful, for which the defendant was entitled to anaward of damages (see para 103).


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Plaintif telah menuntut, antara lain, untuk deklarasi bahawa defendan berhakmemberikannya bil muatan yang bersih. Plaintif memasuki carterparti dengan AbleShipping Line melalui Manco Shipping Co (‘carterparti tersebut’), untuk penggunaandan penyewaan pengangkutan kapal MV Win Moony (‘kapal tersebut’) untukmengangkut 11,500 mt bertih jagung (‘kargo tersebut’) sebagai balasan untukpembayaran muatan sebanyak USD25 per mt. Kapal tersebut berada di bawah carterpelayaran oleh Able Shipping Line daripada defendan. Plaintif mengadu bahawawalaupun dengan adanya kargo tersebut, pegawai dan anak kapal, kapal tersebut, atasarahan defendan, secara melanggar dan memungkiri tanggungjawab mereka denganberlayar tanpa mengangkut 2933 mt kargo tersebut, yang mana menyebabkan plaintif||Page 143>> mengalami kerugian. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa defendan mengakuterima 8567 mt kargo tersebut dalam kapal dan, telah bersetuju dan menyatakankepada plaintif untuk mengeluarkan bil muatan untuk kargo tersebut, antara lain,melalui resit ‘mate’s’ dikeluarkan oleh Ketua Pegawai kapal tersebut. Plaintif jugamendakwa bahawa defendan gagal mengeluarkan bil muatan berkenaan dengan 8567mt kargo tersebut yang diterima atas kapal walaupun plaintif telah membuat bayaranpenuh untuk muatan dengan bantahan. Defendan hendak mengeluarkan bil muatanbersyarat tetapi plaintif menolaknya atas alasan ia bercanggah dengan resit ‘mate’s’.Plaintif, melalui suatu permohonan ex parte, telah mendapatkan waran tangkap danmenangkap kapal tersebut. Defendan memohon ke mahkamah ini untuk membatalkanwrit saman dan waran tangkap yang diperolehi oleh plaintif terhadap defendan atasalasan, anata lain, bahawa: (1) tuntutan plaintif tidak termasuk dalam s 20(2)(h) AktaMahkamah Agong 1981 (UK) (‘Akta tersebut’) dan oleh demikian bidang kuasaadmiralti mahkamah ini tidak dibangkitkan dengan betul, kerana tiada perjanjianmengenai pengangkutan barangan dalam kapal tersebut di antara plaintif dan defendan;(2) permohonan ex parte plaintif tidak mengandungi pendedahan fakta material denganpenuh dan jujur.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dengan kos:(1) Menurut s 20(2)(h) Akta tersebut, bidang kuasa mahkamah boleh dibangkitkan

dengan betul jika terdapat perjanjian mengenai muatan barangan di dalam kapaltersebut di antara plaintif dan defendan semasa writ in rem dikeluarkan dankapal tersebut ditangkap. Resit ‘mate’s’ telah dikatakan sebagai hak dalamtindakan tetapi ia bukan kontrak pengangkutan. Dalam keadaan ini tuntutanplaintif tidak wujud melalui perjanjian pengangkutan seperti yang diperlukan dibawah s 20(2)(h) Akta tersebut. Oleh itu, plaintif telah khilaf dalammembangkitkan bidang kuasa admiralti mahkamah ini dan tuntutan plaintifadalah remeh dan menyusahkan di bawah A 18 k 19(1)(b) Kaedah-KaedahMahkamah Tinggi 1980 (lihat perenggan 42, 47, 56 dan 76).

(2) Apabila tiada kontrak di antara plaintif dan defendan seperti yang diperlukan dibawah s 20(2)(h) Akta tersebut, tidak terdapat alasan yang sah untuk plaintifmendapatkan bil muatan yang bersih daripda defendan (lihat perenggan 63).

(3) Kuasa untuk mengeluarkan waran tangkap di bawah A 70 k 4 adalah mengikut

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budi bicara dan dengan itu harus dibuat secara judisial dengan menimbangprinsip kehakiman yang sedia ada, selepas mengambil kira semua fakta dankeadaan yang relevan, lebih-lebih lagi di dalam suatu permohonan ex parte yangmerupakan permohonan uberrimae fidei yang memerlukan pendedahan faktayang material secara penuh dan jujur (lihat perenggan 86).||Page 144>>

(4) Defendan berjaya membuktikan kecuaian yang teruk dan niat jahat dan bahawapenangkapan kapal tersebut adalah salah,untuk yang mana defendan berhakdiberikan ganti rugi (lihat perenggan 103).]

NotesFor cases on admiralty jurisdiction, see contract of carriage, see 11 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 1151–1187.For cases on arrest of ships, , see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras931–1106.For cases on contract of carriage, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras1360–1363.

Cases referred toAlor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1

MLJ 241 (refd)AR Brown, McFarlane & Co v C Shaw Lovell & Sons and Walter Potts & Co [1921]

Lloyd’s Law Reports 36 (refd)Boey Oi Leng v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 405 (refd)‘Boukadovra', The [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 393 (distd)Brandt & Co & Ors v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd

[1923] All ER 656 (refd)British Imex Industries Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [1958] 1 QB 542 (refd)Brown, Jenkinson & Co Ltd v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd [1957] 2 All ER 844 (refd)Columbus Line Reederei GmbH v Dodwell Shipping (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1997] 2

SLR 73 (refd)Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Anor v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi [2004] 1 MLJ 456 (refd)‘Evangtlismos’, The 14 ER 45 (refd)Evmar, The [1989] 2 MLJ 460 (refd)Kum and Another v Wah Tat Bank Ltd and another [1971] 1 Lloyd’s LR 439 (refd)Leong Peng Kheong & Anor v Downtree Properties Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 MLJ 186 (refd)Maule, The [1995] 2 LRC192 (refd)Middle East Tankers and Freighters v Owner of the Vessel and Other Interested Party

In the Vessel of MV “IRA” [1996] 4 MLJ 109, 11 (distd)

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Nogar Marin, The [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 412 (refd)Noor Jahan bte Abdul Wahab v Md Yusoff bin Amanshah & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 156

(refd)Nordglimt ’, The[1987] 2 Lloyd’s Law Report 470 (refd)Ocean Gain Shipping Pte Ltd v Owner and/or Charterer of Demise of Vessel Dong

Nai Registered at Haiphong Port, Vietnam (The Dong Nai) [1996] 4 MLJ 454(refd)

Owners of the Ship or Vessel MT ‘Rowan’, The v The Owners of the Ship or Vessel orProperty ‘Singapura Timur’ [2003] 2 MLJ 441 (refd)

Pyrene & Co Ltd v Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1954] 2 All ER 158 (distd)Ralli Brothers v Paddington Steamship Company Limited; Mackintosh & Co (Third

Parties) [1900] 5 Com Cas 124 (refd)Schwarz & Co (Grain) Ltd v ‘St Elefterio’ (Owners) [1957] 1 Lloyd’s LR 283-288

(refd)||Page 145>>

Societe Generate & Ors v City Holdings (Pte) Ltd & Anor [1991] 2 MLJ 212 (refd)St Merriel, The [1963] 1 All ER 537 (refd)‘Strathnaver’ Walter Turnbull & Ors, The v The Owners of the Ship ‘Strathnaver ,’

Her Cargo and Freight[1875] AC 58 (refd)‘The Damavand’; Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Damavand’ v International Paint Ltd

[1993] 2 SLR 717 (refd)‘The Indriani’; Thye Nam Loong (S) Pte Ltd v Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Indraini’

[1995] 3 SLR 381 (refd)‘The Santorini I’; Owners of Cargo carried in the Ship ‘Santorini’ v Owners of the

Ship and Other Persons Interested in the Ship ‘Santorini [1994] 3 MLJ 709(refd)

Trade Star Line Corporation v Mitsui & Co Ltd [1996] 2 Lloyd’s LR 449 (refd)‘Varna’, The [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Law Report 253 (refd)‘Wigwam’; Inter Maritime Shipping (Pte) Ltd, The v MV ‘Wigwam’, Owners of

[1983] 1 MLJ 148 (refd)Wehner & Ors v Dene Steam Shipping Company & Ors [1905] 2 KB 92 (distd)

Legislation referred toAdministration of Justice Act 1986 [UK] s 3(4)Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 24(b)High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act (Cap 6) [Sing] s 3(1)9(i), (m)Rules of the High Court 1980 O 70 r 4(3), (6) ,(7)Supreme Court Act 1981 [UK] ss 20(2)(h), 21(4), 24(6)

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Ong Chee Kwan (Lee Ong & Kandiah) for the defendant.Sitpah Selvaratnam (Tommy Thomas) for the plaintiff.

[2005] 2 MLJ 318

MUHAMAD JAFRI BIN JANTAN & ORS v ZAINAL BIN MDRAIS

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO C–04–44 OF 2004ABDUL MALEK PCA, ARIFIN ZAKARIA AND TENGKU BAHARUDIN SHAH JJCA20 JANUARY 2005

Civil Procedure — Appeal — Cross appeal — Absence of cross appeal to counterclaim —Whether trial judge correct in omitting to consider counterclaim

Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Apportionment of liability — Collision betweenmotorcycle and motorcar involving pillion rider — Pillion rider — Entitlement to damages —Whether entitled to recover total amount of damages

The appellant (‘the second plaintiff’) was involved in a road traffic accident involving amotorcycle ridden by the first plaintiff and a motorcar driven by the respondent(‘defendant’). The second plaintiff was the pillion rider on the said motorcycle. Thesessions judge dismissed both claims by the plaintiffs and the counter claim by thedefendant. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court against the said decision. The trialjudge allowed the appeal and apportioned liability on a 50:50 basis between the parties.The second plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the HighCourt on the issue of the apportionment of liability. The primary issue before the courtwas whether the second plaintiff as the pillion rider was entitled to damages on 100%basis despite the fact that the court had found the rider of the motorcycle 50% liablefor the accident. The defendant submitted that the trial judge failed to address the issueof his counter claim and it was further submitted that the trial judge ought to haveallowed the counter claim against the first plaintiff which would have resulted in thereduction of amount awarded to the second plaintiff.

Held, allowing the appeal with costs:(1) The counter claim was a non-issue as there was no cross appeal by the

defendant and therefore, the trial judge was correct in not considering thecounter claim of the defendant (see para 8).

12


(2) The trial judge erred in law in holding that the second plaintiff was 50% liablefor the accident. Following the authorities cited, the second plaintiff as aninnocent passenger in a motor vehicle or a pillion rider was entitled to recoverthe total amount of damages against the defendant (see paras 10 and 11).


Perayu (‘plaintif kedua’) terlibat dengan satu kemalangan jalan raya yang melibatkansebuah motosikal yang dibawa oleh plaintif pertama dengan||Page 319>> sebuah kereta yang dipandu oleh responden (‘defendan’). Plaintif keduaadalah seorang pembonceng motosikal tersebut. Hakim sesyen telah menolakkedua-dua tuntutan pihak plaintif dan tuntutan balas defendan. Plaintif-plaintifmembuat rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap keputusan tersebut. Hakim bicaratelah membenarkan rayuan plaintif-plaintif dan membahagikan liabiliti di antarapihak-pihak pada kadar 50:50. Plaintif kedua telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuanterhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi atas isu pembahagian liabiliti. Isu utama dihadapan mahkamah adalah sama ada plaintif kedua sebagai pembonceng berhakmendapatkan ganti rugi 100% walaupun mahkamah mendapati pemandu motosikalbertanggungjawab 50% terhadap kemalangan tersebut. Defendan mengadu bahawahakim bicara gagal untuk memutuskan isu tuntutan balas defendan dan beliauselanjutnya menghujahkan bahawa hakim bicara sepatutnya membenarkan tuntutanbalas tersebut terhadap plaintif pertama yang akan membawa kepada penguranganjumlah award yang diberikan kepada plaintif kedua.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos:(1) Tuntutan balas tersebut tidak wujud sebagai satu isu oleh kerana tidak terdapat

sebarang rayuan silang dari responden mengenainya dan dengan itu, hakimbicara bertindak wajar dalam tidak mempertimbangkan tuntutan balas defendan(lihat perenggan 8).

(2) Hakim bicara telah tersilap pada undang-undang kerana memutuskan yangperayu sebagai seorang pembonceng motosikal bertanggungjawab 50%terhadap kemalangan tersebut. Menurut autoriti-autoriti yang dikemukakan,perayu sebagai seorang penumpang yang tidak bersalah sebuah kenderaanbermotor atau seorang pembonceng berhak untuk mendapat jumlah penuhganti rugi daripada defendan (lihat perenggan 10 dan 11).]

NotesFor cases on road accidents, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras1056–1288.For cases on collisions between vehicles, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002Reissue) paras 281–355.

13


Cases referred toDamai Cheras Sdn Bhd & Anor v Poothapillai Krishnamoorthy [1998] 1 MLJ 639

(refd)Jayakumar s/o Kuppusamy & Anor v Chen Kit Hong & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 376

(folld)Murugasan a/l Kuppusamy & Anor v Chiew Eng Chai [1999]4 MLJ 516 (refd)Oli Mohamed v Keith Murphy & Anor [1969] 2 MLJ 244 (folld)

||Page 320>>Reliance Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ishak bin Mohd Jaafar & Anor [1993] 4

CLJ 291; [1993] MLJU 10 (folld)Samsuri bin Saad & Anor v Chew Kit Toh (t/a Kit Thong Woh Hup) and Another

Appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 576 (folld)Wong Fook & Anor v Abdul Shukur bin Abdul Hakim (Wong Piang Loy, Third Party)

[1991] 1 MLJ 46 (folld)

Appeal from Civil Appeal No 12–15 of 2000 (High Court, Temerloh)

GP Lim (S Harcharan Singh Randhawa & Partners) for the appellant.B Shanta Mohan (VP Nathan & Partners) for the respondent.

[2005] 2 MLJ 571

VISWANATHAN A/L KUMARASAMY & ANOR vKAMALUDDIN BIN MOHAMED ARIFF

HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–04 OF 2003 (4)AZAHAR MOHAMED JC25 AUGUST 2004

Tort — Road accident — Negligence — Liability — Whether both parties equally at fault

The plaintiff, who was riding a motorcycle, collided with a tractor which was driven bythe first defendant. The plaintiff claimed for general and special damages arising frompersonal injuries sustained by him due to the said accident. Each party claimed that theother had encroached into his rightful path. When the matter came before the sessionscourt, the trial judge found both parties equally liable. Dissatisfied, the defendant filed

14


this appeal. The issue before this court was in respect of liability only.

Held, dismissing the appeal:(1) Judging from the evidence as a whole, the first defendant’s version of events

was unacceptable. Given the slight inclination of the road, poor visibility, thesize of the road and the tractor, coupled with the fact that the first defendantwas not an experienced driver, it was highly probable that the tractor wouldhave slightly encroached into the opposite side, and that on a balance ofprobabilities the accident occurred in the center of the road (see para 6).

(2) The plaintiff and the first defendant had committed almost the same act ofnegligence, ie by failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to drive theirvehicles on the correct side of the road. As such, both the parties contributedequally to the accident and each party is 50% to blame (see para 9).


Plaintif yang sedang menunggang motosikalnya berlanggar dengan sebuah traktor yangdipandu oleh defendan pertama. Plaintif menuntut ganti rugi umum dan ganti rugi khasyang timbul dari kecederaan yang dialaminya disebabkan oleh kemalangan tersebut.Masing-masing mendakwa yang pihak yang satu lagi memasuki laluan sahnya. Apabilaperkara ini dibawa ke mahkamah sesyen, hakim bicara memutuskan yang kedua-duapihak sama-sama bertanggungjawab. Tidak puas hati, defendan memfailkan rayuan ini.Isu di hadapan mahkamah ini hanyalah berhubung dengan liabiliti sahaja.||Page 572>>

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan:(1) Menimbang keterangan secara menyeluruh, versi kejadian defendan pertama

tidak boleh diterima. Memandangkan keadaan jalan menaik sedikit, darjahpenglihatan yang kurang, saiz jalan dan traktor, bersama dengan fakta yangdefendan pertama bukanlah seorang pemandu yang berpengalaman, ianyaberkemungkinan besar yang traktor tersebut telah memasuki sedikit ke arahyang bertentangan itu, dan pada imbangan kebarangkalian, kemalangan tersebutberlaku di tengah-tengah jalan tersebut (lihat perenggan 6).

(2) Plaintif dan defendan pertama telah melakukan perbuatan kecuaian yang hampirsama, iaitu gagal berwaspada dan gagal memandu kenderaan mereka padabahagian jalan yang betul. Dari itu, kedua-dua pihak telah sama-samamenyebabkan kemalangan tersebut dan masing-masing bertanggungjawab 50%(lihat perenggan 9).]

NotesFor cases on road accident, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras

15


887–1108.

Cases referred toBaker v Market Harborough Industrial Cooperative Society [1953] 1 WLR 1472

(refd)Ong Yam Chong & Anor v Chan Wah [1962] MLJ 184 (refd)Ramoo v Gan Soo Swee & Anor [1971] 1 MLJ 235 (refd)Rasidin bin Partorjo v Frederick Kiai [1976] 2 MLJ 214 (refd)

Ong Chee Yong (Ong & Ong) for the appellant.Meneka K a/p Kanasmoorthy (NM Tiong & Co) for the respondents.

[2005] 2 MLJ 576

TAN LEONG WEI & ORS v OMAR BIN AHMAD

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–380 OF 2002KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J18 AUGUST 2004

Tort — Road accident — Negligence — Liability — Apportionment of liability — Damages— Multiplier — Reduction of — Whether justified

The deceased, whilst riding his motorcycle, was involved in a road accident involving amotorcar driven by the first defendant, and a bus driven by the third defendant. Thesessions court found the first defendant 70% liable and the third defendant 30% liable.The latter appealed against the finding of liability found against him. The deceasedcross-appealed against the award of damages made.

Held, allowing the appeal and dismissing the cross-appeal:(1) The first defendant was totally liable. After the deceased was collided into from

the rear by the first defendant, he was flung onto the path of the oncoming busdriver. From the evidence, there was no liability against the third defendant (seepara 4).

(2) Following the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Chan Chin Ming &Anor v Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233, ie between the words ‘loss of support’as stated in s 7(3) and ‘loss of earnings’ as stated in s 7(3)(iv)(d) of the CivilLaw Act 1956, this court upheld the award of RM300 per month for 10 years

16


made to the deceased’s father (see para 10).


Si mati, semasa menunggang motosikalnya, terlibat dengan satu kemalangan jalan rayayang melibatkan sebuah kereta yang dipandu oleh defendan pertama dan sebuah basyang dipandu oleh defendan ketiga. Mahkamah sesyen memutuskan yang defendanpertama bertanggungjawab 70% dan defendan ketiga bertanggungjawab 30%.Defendan ketiga merayu terhadap keputusan yang dibuat terhadapnya mengenailiabiliti. Si mati membuat rayuan balas terhadap award ganti rugi yang dibuat.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dan menolak rayuan balas:(1) Defendan pertama bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya. Selepas si mati dilanggar

dari belakang oleh defendan pertama, beliau terjatuh ke laluan pemandu basyang sedang mara. Daripada keterangan, tidak terdapat liabiliti terhadapdefendan ketiga (lihat perenggan 4).||Page 577>>

(2) Mengikut perbezaan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Agung di dalam Chan ChinMing & Anor v Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233, iaitu di antaraperkataan-perkataan ‘kehilangan saraan’ sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan didalam s 7(3) dan ‘kehilangan pendapatan’ sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di s7(3)(iv)(d) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956, mahkamah ini mengesahkanaward RM300 sebulan selama 10 tahun dibuat kepada ayah si mati (lihatperenggan 10).]

NotesFor cases on road accident, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras887–1108.

Cases referred toChan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 (folld)Teow Teik Chai & Anor v Muhamad bin Hashim , Rayuan Sivil No P-04-95 Tahun

1995 (refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 s 7(3), (iv)(d)

DP Rajah (Rajah & Co) for the respondent/plaintiff.Veerasamy Rajendran (Dass, Jainab & Assoc) for first and second

appellants/defendants.

17


P Ramanathan (VP Nathan & Partners) for third and fourth appellants/defendants.

[2005] 3 MLJ 143

ASSAHARI BIN DAUD, WAKIL DIRI BAGI v MERIAM BTEISHAK & ORS

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO T–02–558 OF 2001ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN, ABDUL AZIZ JJCA AND JAMES FOONG J4 JUNE 2004

Civil Procedure — Judgments and orders — Amendment of — Jurisdiction of Court ofAppeal to correct order of High Court judge — Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 69 (4), (5)

Road Traffic — Negligence — Fatal accident — Appeal — Finding by High Court judgethat first defendant solely to be blamed for accident — Whether any merit in appeal

Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Appeal — Finding by High Court judge that firstdefendant solely to be blamed for accident — Whether any merit in appeal

The car driven by Assahari bin Daud (‘AD’) was involved in a collision with a busdriven by the second defendant and owned by the third defendant in a road accident atKampung Pasir Putih, Merchang, Terengganu. In this motor accident, two othervehicles were involved. AD died in the accident. Four suits were filed in connectionwith the said road accident. Subsequently, the four suits were consolidated.The personal representative of AD was the first defendant in the consolidated suit. Thesecond and third defendants brought in the third party, who was the administrator ofthe estate of AD.The learned High Court judge held that the effective cause of the accident was due tosudden swerving of AD’s car into the path of the bus. The judge found that the busdriver had exercised ordinary care and skill so as to avert the collision and that he didnot contribute towards the accident. Accordingly, the learned High Court judge foundAD solely to be blamed for the accident and affixed 100% liability against him. Thelearned judge held the third party wholly liable in the third party proceeding institutedby the second and the third defendants.This was the appeal by the first defendant. The third party did not lodge any appealagainst the High Court decision.

18


Held, dismissing the appeal:(1) Based on the finding by the High Court judge that AD was solely to be blamed

for the accident and with the learned counsel for the appellant conceding onthat finding, there was no merit in the instant appeal (see para 7).||Page 144>>

(2) Although the learned High Court judge had absolved the second and thirddefendants of liability, he went on to hold the second and third defendantjointly and severally liable in respect of the claim brought by the other plaintiffswho did not sue the first defendant. In the light of the attachment of the 100%liability on AD, the finding of the learned judge appeared to be irreconcilableand wrong in law (see paras 11 and 13).

(3) Since the purpose of a third party proceeding was for the losing defendant torecover indemnity from the third party over the fault created by the third partyand since the second and third defendants were held not to be blamed for theaccident, the issue of liability against the third party for indemnity should nothave arisen (see para 14).

(4) Section 69(4) and (5) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the Act’) enabledthis court to correct the error committed by the learned High Court judge inattaching liability against the second and the third defendants as well as thethird party by way of indemnity, notwithstanding that there was no appeal byany of them (see para 15).

(5) Having considered the provisions of the Act and in the light of the learnedjudge’s primary finding that AD was wholly to be blamed for the accident, itwas clearly erroneous and against the weight of the evidence to enter judgmentagainst the second and third defendants and make the third party indemnify thesecond and third defendants. To that extent, the orders of the learned HighCourt judge made against the second and the third defendants and the thirdparty were quashed (see para 16).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Kereta yang dipandu oleh Assahari bin Daud (‘AD’) terlibat dalam perlanggarandengan sebuah bas yang dipandu oleh defendan kedua dan dimiliki oleh defendanketiga dalam kemalangan jalan raya di Kampung Pasir Putih, Merchang, Terengganu.Dalam kemalangan ini, dua lagi kenderaan terlibat. AD mati di dalam kemalangantersebut. Terdapat empat guaman yang difailkan berhubung dengan kemalangantersebut. Guaman-guaman ini kemudiannya disatukan.Wakil diri AD adalah defendan pertama di dalam guaman yang disatukan ini. Defendankedua dan ketiga membawa pihak ketiga, iaitu pentadbir harta pesaka AD.Yang arif hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa kemalangan ini disebabkanoleh kereta AD yang dengan secara tiba-tiba membelok masuk ke jalan bas tersebut.

19


Hakim mendapati yang pemandu bas tersebut telah menggunakan ketelitian dankemahiran yang biasa bagi mengelak dari perlanggaran tersebut dan bahawa beliautidak menyumbang kepada kemalangan tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, yang arif hakimMahkamah Tinggi mendapati yang AD||Page 145>> bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya terhadap kemalangan tersebut danmenetapkan 100% liabiliti terhadapnya. Yang arif hakim memutuskan yang pihakketiga bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya di dalam prosiding pihak ketiga yang dibawaoleh defendan kedua dan ketiga.Ini merupakan rayuan oleh defendan pertama. Pihak ketiga tidak memfailkan sebarangrayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan:(1) Berdasarkan pendapat hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bahawa AD

bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya terhadap kemalangan tersebut dan peguamperayu mengakuinya, tiada merit di dalam rayuan semasa (lihat perenggan 7).

(2) Walaupun yang arif hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membebaskan liabiliti defendankedua dan ketiga, beliau memutuskan yang bahawa defendan kedua dan ketigasecara bersama dan berasingan bertanggungjawab terhadap tuntutan yangdibawa oleh plaintif-plaintif yang lain yang tidak menyaman defendan pertama.Keputusan yang arif hakim tampak tidak selaras dan salah di sisiundang-undang, memandangkan liabiliti 100% yang diletakkan pada AD (lihatperenggan 11 dan 13).

(3) Memandangkan tujuan prosiding pihak ketiga adalah untuk defendan yangkalah mendapat tanggung rugi dari pihak ketiga berhubung dengan kesalahanyang dibuat oleh pihak ketiga dan oleh kerana defendan kedua dan ketiga tidakdiputuskan bertanggungjawab terhadap kemalangan tersebut, isu liabilititerhadap pihak ketiga untuk ditanggung rugi tidak wajar dibangkitkan (lihatperenggan 14).

(4) Seksyen 69(4) dan (5) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘Akta tersebut’)membolehkan mahkamah untuk membetulkan kesilapan yang dibuat oleh yangarif hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dalam meletakkan liabiliti pada defendan keduadan ketiga dan juga pihak ketiga melalui tanggung rugi, walaupun tiada rayuandari mereka (lihat perenggan 15).

(5) Setelah menimbangkan peruntukan-peruntukan Akta tersebut dan berdasarkanpendapat primer yang arif hakim bahawa AD bertanggungjawab sepenuhnyadalam kemalangan tersebut, ianya jelas silap dan bertentangan denganketerangan untuk memasukkan penghakiman terhadap defendan kedua danketiga dan untuk membuat pihak ketiga menanggung rugi defendan kedua danketiga. Oleh yang demikian, perintah-perintah yang arif hakim terhadapdefendan kedua dan ketiga dibatalkan (lihat perenggan 16).]

Notes

20


For cases on amendment of judgments and orders, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,2001 Reissue) paras 3440–3441.||Page 146>>For cases on fatal accident, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras379–390.For cases on road accident, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras1056–1288.For judgments and orders generally, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2002Reissue) paras [10.9-001]–[10.9-026].

Legislation referred toCourts of Judicature Act 1964 s 69(4), (5)

CM Maran (VP Nathan & Partners) for the appellant.Indran Rajalingam (Zamani, Othman Bakar, Harpal Singh Grewal, Avinder Singh Gill,

Jasvinjit Singh and Joseph Au with him) (AJ Ariffin Yeo & Harpal, Omar & Joseph Au,Zamani Mohammad & Co and Sandu & Co) for the respondents.

[2005] 4 MLJ 301

CHENG BEE TEIK & ORS v PETER A/L SELVARAJ &ANOR

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO P–04–93 OF 2002ABDUL MALEK AHMAD PCA, ARIFIN ZAKARIA AND TENGKU BAHARUDIN

SHAH JJCA6 OCTOBER 2004

Civil Law Act — Damages — Fatal Accident — Loss of earnings — Statutory multiplier —Whether court may interfere with fixed statutory multiplier in calculation of loss of earnings independency and personal injury claims — Civil Law Act 1956 ss 7(3)(iv)(d), 28A

Statutory Interpretation — Construction of statutes — Rules of construction — Languageof statute — Language of statute imperative — Whether court may disregard mandatorynature of phrase in statute when interpreting such phrase

Tort — Negligence — Road Accident — Accident involving two motorcycles and amotorvan — Whether respondent totally liable — Apportionment of liability

21


The claim by the appellants arose out of a vehicular accident involving twomotorcycles and a motorvan. The first appellant was the rider of the first motorcycle,while the second appellant was the grandmother and dependant of the deceased pillionrider of the first motorcycle. The third appellant was the father and dependant of thedeceased rider of the second motorcycle. The first respondent was the driver of themotorvan and the second respondent was the owner thereof. The sessions court foundin favour of the appellants and held that the first respondent was totally liable for theaccident. This was an appeal by the appellants against the decision of the High Courtwho allowed in part the appeal by the respondents.

Held, dismissing the appeal on the issue of liability, allowing the appeal on thequantum in part:(1) The evidence before the court could not support the finding of the sessions

court that the first respondent was wholly to blame for the accident. The courtagreed with the analysis and reasons given by the High Court that both theappellants as riders of the motorcycles and the first respondent were equally toblame (see para 10).

(2) It was a cardinal principle of the interpretation of statutes that the court shouldlook first to the words of the statute itself, and if these words are plain, it wasnot permissible to consider what was the intention of the statute or theprevious history of the law. The words embodied in ss 7(3) and 28A of theCivil Law Act 1956 (‘the Act’) were plain that it was not open to the court toexplore what was the real intention underlying the said provisions or theprevious history of the law on this matter. Therefore, the years of purchase inthe present case should rightly be||Page 302>> 16, as provided under s 7(3)(iv)(d) of the Act, and no reductionought to be made on account of contingencies and other vicissitudes of life aswas practised prior to the enactment of the present s 7 of the Act (see para 19);Ibrahim bin Ismail & Anor v Hasnah bte Puteh Imat (as beneficiary and legalmother of Bakri bin Yahya and substituting Yahaya bin Ibrahim) & Anor andanother appeal [2004] 1 MLJ 525 followed.

(3) In the circumstances, the appeal on the quantum was allowed in part, byrestoring the awards of the sessions court and accordingly, whereverapplicable, the awards of High Court were set aside. Further, the sum ofRM10,000 for bereavement was awarded to the second appellant, which shewas entitled to under s 7(3A) of the Act (see para 31).


Tuntutan oleh perayu-perayu timbul daripada satu kemalangan motokar melibatkandua buah motosikal dan sebuah van. Perayu pertama adalah penunggang motosikal

22


pertama manakala perayu kedua adalah nenek dan dependen kepada penunggangbelakang motosikal pertama yang telah mati. Perayu ketiga adalah bapa dan dependenkepada si mati yang menunggang motosikal kedua. Responden pertama adalahpemandu van dan responden kedua adalah pemilik van tersebut. Mahkamah sesyenmemutuskan memihak perayu-perayu dan memutuskan responden pertamabertanggungjawab keseluruhannya untuk kemalangan itu. Ini adalah rayuan olehperayu-perayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang membenarkan sebahagianrayuan oleh responden-responden.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan atas isu liabiliti, membenarkan sebahagian rayuan atasquantum:(1) Keterangan di hadapan mahkamah tidak menyokong penemuan- penemuan

mahkamah sesyen bahawa responden pertama patut dipersalahkankeseluruhannya untuk kemalangan itu. Mahkamah setuju dengan analisis dansebab-sebab yang dikemukakan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa kedua-duaperayu sebagai menunggang motosikal- motosikal itu dan responden pertamaharus dipersalahkan sama rata (lihat perenggan 10).

(2) Ia adalah prinsip utama dalam tafsiran statut bahawa mahkamah sepatutnyamerujuk dahulu kepada perkataan-perkataan statut tersebut, sekiranyaperkataan-perkataan itu jelas, ia adalah salah untuk menimbangkan tujuan statutitu atau sejarah undang-undang sebelumnya. Perkataan-perkataan dalam s 7(3)dan 28A Akta Undang- Undang Sivil 1956 (‘Akta tersebut’) adalah jelas dan iabukan terpulang kepada mahkamah untuk mengkaji tujuan sebenar di bawahperuntukan atau sejarah undang-undang perkara ini. Oleh itu, tahun perolehan||Page 303>> dalam kes ini sepatutnya 16, seperti yang di peruntukkan dalam s7(3)(iv)(d) Akta tersebut, dan pengurangan tidak sepatutnya dibuat semasamempertimbangkan kontingensi-kontingensi dan jatuh bangun dalam kehidupanseperti mana yang dipraktik sebelum penggubalan s 7 Akta tersebut (lihatperenggan 19); Ibrahim bin Ismail & Anor v Hasnah bte Puteh Imat (asbeneficiary and legal mother of Bakri bin Yahya and substituting Yahaya binIbrahim) & Anor and another appeal [2004] 1 MLJ 525 diikut.

(3) Di dalam keadaan ini, rayuan atas kuantum dibenarkan sebahagiannya denganmengembalikan award mahkamah sesyen dan di mana sesuai, award-awardMahkamah Tinggi diketepikan. Lagipun, jumlah RM10,000 untuk bereavementadalah award kepada perayu kedua yang beliau layak menerima di bawah s7(3A) Akta tersebut (lihat perenggan 31).]

NotesFor cases on damages for fatal accidents, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 3268–3304.For cases on road accidents, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras1056–1288.

23


For cases on rules of construction, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue)para 1863–1878.

Cases referred toChan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 (refd)County Council of Hertfordshire v Rural District Council of Barnet [1902] 2 KB 48

(refd)Ibrahim bin Ismail & Anor v Hasnah bte Puteh Imat (as beneficiary and legal mother

of Bakri bin Yahya and substituting Yahaya bin Ibrahim) & Anor and anotherappeal [2004] 1 MLJ 525 (folld)

Jamiah bte Holan v Koon Yin [1983] 1 MLJ 103 (refd)Subramanya Sastry v Sheikh Ghannu AIR 1935 Mad 928 (refd)Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors and another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ

512 (refd)Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718 (refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 s 7, (1), (3), (iv)(d), 3A, 8, 28A

Appeal from: Civil Appeal No 12–128 of 2002 (High Court, Pulau Pinang)

Rhina Bar (Rhina Bar & Associates) for the appellant.Respondent absent.

[2005] 5 MLJ 34

MANOGHARAN A/L VEERAMUTHU & ANOR v FAUZIAHBTE MD ISA

HIGH COURT (SEREMBAN) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–20 OF 2004LOW HOP BING J13 JUNE 2005

Civil Law Act — Damages — Loss of earnings — Appropriate multiplier — Civil Law Act1956 s 28A(2)(d)(i)

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Prospective pecuniary loss — Loss of

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housekeeping ability and her children’s loss of her services — Whether claimable — Quantumof award should be reviewed

Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Apportionment of liability — Appeal on finding offact — Defendant held 100% liable — Whether trial judge had taken correct approach infinding of fact

On 12 September 1998, the plaintiff was riding a motor cycle from the direction ofLukut heading towards Teluk Kemang when the first defendant who was driving amotor van came out of a junction of Happy Garden, Port Dickson, without stoppingand collided with the plaintiff’s motor cycle at the junction. The plaintiff hadconsequently sustained personal injuries, for which the first defendant had been held100% liable, while the second defendant being the first defendant’s employer and theregistered owner of the motor van was held to be vicariously liable. The sketch planprepared by the investigating officer showed that there was glass splinters believed tohave originated from the front left side headlight of the defendants’ motor van, therebyconfirming that the collision had occurred while the plaintiff was on her right of way.

Held, dismissing the defendants’ appeal and allowing the plaintiff’s cross appeal:(1) The conflicting versions of the plaintiff and the first defendant made it

necessary for the trial judge to refer to the evidence given by the investigatingofficer, in particular his sketch plan. Having done that, the trial judge acceptedthe plaintiff’s version of the accident as the more probable version. This wasthe correct approach and the finding of facts could not be said to be against theweight of evidence. It was indeed beyond reproach (see para 16). There was noerror on the part of the trial judge in his finding that the first defendant was100% liable (see para 17).

(2) The trial judge had taken into consideration all the facts and circumstancesincluding all the medical reports tendered before him for the purposes ofawarding the quantum. Having examined his grounds of decision, this awardwas fair and reasonable, without any error and was hereby affirmed (see para22).||Page 35>>

(3) In relation to the plaintiff’s loss of housekeeping ability and her children’s lossof her services, the trial judge was correct in holding that it was claimable (seepara 25); Raja Zam Zam v Vaithiyanathan [1965] 2 MLJ 252; Daly v GeneralSteam Navigation Co Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 696; Mehmet v Perry & Anor[1977] 2 All ER 529 and Liong Thoo v Sawiyah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 286followed.

(4) Having regard to the clear words contained in s 28A(2)(d)(i) of the Civil LawAct 1956 governing loss of earnings in the instant case, and the preponderanceof authorities, the multiplier should be 16, which in the instant appeal the lower

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court had correctly applied (see para 39) dissenting judgment of Chan ChinMing v Lim Yoke Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 and Ibrahim Ismail & Anor v HasnahPuteh Imat & Anor and another appeal [2004] 1 CLJ 797 followed.

(5) The award on the plaintiff’s loss of housekeeping ability and her children’s lossof her services had to be in keeping with the current costs in obtaininghousekeeping services. While the normal cost of obtaining a foreign maid maybe about RM400 per month, there were other expenses to be incurred, eg thefees to the employment agency, incidental expenses such as food andaccommodation for a stay-in maid. The award of RM400 per month by thecourt below appeared not to be commensurate with current costs. In thecircumstances, the measure of damages for loss of housekeeping servicesshould be reviewed and enhanced to a more realistic and reasonable figure ofRM800 per month (see para 45).


Pada 12 September 1998, plaintif menunggang sebuah motosikal dari arah Lukutmenuju ke Teluk Kemang apabila defendan pertama yang memandu sebuah motor vankeluar dari simpang Happy Garden, Port Dickson, tanpa berhenti lalu berlanggardengan motosikal plaintif di simpang tersebut. Plaintif berikutannya mengalamikecederaan, yang mana defendan pertama telah diputuskan bertanggungjawab 100%,manakala defendan kedua yang merupakan majikan defendan pertama dan tuanpunyaberdaftar motor van tersebut diputuskan bertanggungjawab secara vikarius. Pelan lakaryang disediakan oleh pegawai penyiasat menunjukkan terdapatnya serpihan kaca yangdipercayai berasal dari lampu depan sebelah kiri motor van defendan, yang dengan itumengesahkan bahawa perlanggaran tersebut telah berlaku semasa plaintif berada dilaluannya.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan defendan-defendan dan membenarkan rayuan balasplaintif:(1) Versi plaintif dan defendan pertama yang bercanggah membuatkan ia perlu bagi

hakim bicara untuk merujuk kepada keterangan yang diberi oleh pegawaipenyiasat, terutamanya pelan lakar beliau. Setelah berbuat demikian, hakimbicara menerima versi plaintif sebagai versi yang lebih||Page 36>> mungkin berhubung dengan kemalangan tersebut. Ini merupakanpendekatan yang betul dan keputusan fakta tidak boleh dikatakan bercanggahdengan keterangan. Ianya tiada cacat cela (lihat perenggan 16). Tiada terdapatkesilapan pada keputusan hakim bicara yang memutuskan defendan pertamabertanggungjawab 100% (lihat perenggan 17).

(2) Hakim bicara telah mempertimbangkan semua fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaan termasuklah semua laporan perubatan yang dikemukakandi hadapannya untuk tujuan memberi jumlah award. Setelah meneliti

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alasan-alasan keputusannya, award ini adalah adil dan munasabah, tanpasebarang kesilapan dan dengan ini disahkan (lihat perenggan 22).

(3) Berhubung dengan kehilangan upaya plaintif mengurus rumahtangga dankehilangan khidmatnya yang dialami oleh anak-anaknya, hakim bicara adalahbetul dalam memutuskan yang ianya boleh dituntut: Raja Zam Zam vVaithiyanathan [1965] 2 MLJ 252; Daly v General Steam Navigation Co Ltd[1980] 3 All ER 696; Mehmet v Perry & Anor [1977] 2 All ER 529 dan LiongThoo v Sawiyah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 286 diikut.

(4) Setelah mempertimbangkan perkataan-perkataan jelas yang terkandung didalam s 28A(2)(d)(i) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 berhubung dengankehilangan pendapatan di dalam kes semasa, dan autoriti- autoriti, multiplieryang wajar adalah 16, yang mana di dalam rayuan semasa telah digunapakaisecara betul oleh mahkamah di bawah: penghakiman bertentangan Chan ChinMing v Lim Yoke Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 dan Ibrahim Ismail & Anor v HasnahPuteh Imat & Anor and another appeal [2004] 1 CLJ 797 diikut.

(5) Award berhubung dengan kehilangan upaya plaintif mengurus rumahtangga dankehilangan khidmatnya yang dialami oleh anak-anaknya hendaklah selarasdengan kos semasa untuk mendapat perkhidmatan pengurusan rumahtangga.Walaupun kos kebiasaan untuk mendapat seorang pembantu rumah asingadalah mungkin sekitar RM400 sebulan, terdapat perbelanjaan- perbelanjaanlain yang perlu dikeluarkan seperti yuran agensi pekerjaan, perbelanjaansampingan seperti makanan dan tempat tinggal pembantu rumah. Awardsebanyak RM400 sebulan yang diberikan oleh mahkamah di bawah tampaknyatidak selaras dengan kos-kos semasa. Dalam keadaan ini, ukuran gantirugiuntuk kehilangan perkhidmatan pengurusan rumahtangga hendaklah dikaji dandinaikkan ke angka yang lebih realistik dan munasabah iaitu RM800 sebulan(lihat perenggan 45).]

NotesFor cases on road accidents, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras1056–1288.For a case on loss of earnings under the Civil Law Act 1956, see 1 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 3309.For cases on damages for personal injury or death generally, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4thEd, 2004 Reissue) paras 275–1812.||Page 37>>

Cases referred toAbraham Ho Ah Loke v William Manson-Hing [1949] MLJ 37 (refd)Chan Chin Ming v Lim Yoke Eng (Lawful Mother of Oan Swee Hock, deceased)

[1994] 3 MLJ 233 (folld)

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Chew Soo Lan v Ludhiana Transport Syndicate & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 205 (refd)Daly v General Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 696 (refd)Ibrahim Ismail & Anor v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Anor and another appeal [2004]

1 CLJ 797 (folld)Kek Kee Leng v Theresa Bong Nyok Chin & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 61 (refd)Latip Che Ngah & Anor v Maimunah Zakaria [2002] 4 MLJ 266 (refd)Lim Hye Chua v Lim See Kiat [1940] MLJ 199 (refd)Foong Yit Voon v Yap Thian & Anor [1963] MLJ 104 (refd)Liong Thoo v Sawiyah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 269 (refd)Marappan & Anor v Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99 (refd)Mehmet v Perry & Anor [1977] 2 All ER 529 (refd)Ng Soo Ang v Chai Chuan Seng (Civil Appeal No P–04–18 of 1998) (refd)Pengarah Institut Penyelidikan Perubatan & Anor v Inthra Devi & Anor [1988]

1 MLJ 19 (refd)Raja Zam Zam v Vaithiyanathan [1965] 2 MLJ 252 (refd)Raji Transport Sdn Bhd & Anor v Idayu bte Zulkafli [2004] MLJU 36 (refd)Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors & another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ 512

(refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 ss 7(3)(iv)(d), 28A (2)(d)(i)

N Sumathi (SN Fam & Co) for the appellant.Toh Chin Chong (Toh Chin Chong) for the plaintiff.

[2005] 6 MLJ 49

CHOO OH KIM & ORS v MOK YUEN LOK & ORS (NAZAPROPERTIES SDN BHD, INTERVENER)

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–578 OF 2000MOHD NOOR ABDULLAH J25 APRIL 2005

Land Law — Sale of land — Consideration, adequacy of — Sale of land below market price— Action against special administrators appointed by Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad

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— Duty of care owed by special administrators to act in good faith — Assessment of truevalue of property — Whether wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of specialadministrators in discharging duty — Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 ss4(1), 25, 66(1), 66(2) & 71

The third plaintiff had obtained credit facilities of RM5 million from Malayan BankingBhd for the purpose of building a hotel on a piece of land, pursuant to which the landand hotel (‘the property’) was charged to the bank as security. The third plaintiff’ssubsequent failure to repay the loan rendered the charge vested in the third defendant(‘Danaharta’). The plaintiffs had earlier entered into a sale and purchase agreement(‘SPA’) with a purchaser over the shares in the third plaintiff for which they hadprocured three separate valuation reports of the property which assessed the value atRM42 million, RM43 million and RM43 million respectively. On 12 July 2000, the firstand second plaintiffs granted an unconditional banker’s guarantee over the property. Inorder to complete the sale, the purchaser was required to furnish an unconditional bankguarantee within 30 days from 12 July 2000 but the purchaser failed to do so and theSPA was ultimately aborted on the 12 August 2000. On the 24 July 2000 Danahartahad appointed the first and second defendants as special administrators (‘the SA’) overthe third plaintiff. The SA procured a valuation report of the property wherein thevalue was assessed at RM16.3 million and RM19.8 million. The SA subsequentlyadvertised a sale by tender of the property from 11 October 2000 to 15 November2000. It transpired that the first and second plaintiffs had applied for an extension oftime to complete their SPA transaction from the SA who rejected the application. TheSA proceeded with the tender exercised by accepting the highest bid of RM15 millionfrom Naza Properties Sdn Bhd, the Intervener to this civil suit, and subsequentlycompleted the sale. The plaintiffs brought an action against Danaharta and the SA fordamages and for losses incurred.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s application:(1) The Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd Act 1998 (‘the Act’) imposed a duty

to act in good faith on the part of the defendants in the discharge of their duties(s 71 of the Act). The duty of the first and second defendants in their capacityas special administrators were akin to the duty owed by||Page 50>> a mortgagee to the mortgager of the property to act in good faithfor the specific purpose of enabling the assets comprised in the security for thedebt to be preserved and realised for the purpose of obtaining repayment of thedebt (see para 41); Downsview Nominees Ltd & Anor v First City Corp Ltd &Anor [1993] 3 All ER 626 followed. Further, the mortgagee had a narrow dutyto take reasonable precautions to obtain the true value of the property at thetime of sale and was required to act in good faith but unless there was evidenceof deliberate or wilful misconduct on the part of the mortgagor, the duty totake reasonable precaution would not be extended to cover every possible stepan altruistic financier could have taken regardless of time, cost or effort (see

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para 42). Whenever an authority was vested with absolute power, thatauthority must exercise the power with restraint because the courts werejealous of absolute power being exercised absolutely (see para 45).

(2) The Act did not derogate from the entrenched proprietary right of a person thathe should not be deprived of his property save in accordance with the law. (seepara 34).

(3) The defendants were accorded immunity from civil suits provided that therehad been no wilful misconduct or gross negligence in the discharge of theirduties (see para 33).

(4) By ignoring the valuation reports procured by the plaintiffs, withholdingconsent for the extension of time for the plaintiffs’ sale and purchaseagreement, accepting the tender bid of RM15 million as the sale price for thetender, and further securing the payment of fees for estate agents, solicitors andfor their own services, the special administrators had acted dishonestly andshown total disregard for and wilfully caused consequential loss to theplaintiffs. The facts cumulatively show the special administrators’ wilful andgross negligence bordering on fraud against the plaintiffs and therefore thedefendants were liable to the plaintiffs (see para 43).

(5) The amount of damages liable to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs wasassessed at RM6.6 million being the value of the property less 20% due to thestatus of a forced sale by tender, less a further 10% for the plaintiffs’ failure toparticipate in the tender bidding, and finally less the sale price of RM15 million.The defendants were further liable for interest at the rate of 4% from the dateof filing of the suit until final settlement, plus costs (see paras 44 and 45).


Plaintif ketiga telah mendapat pinjaman sebanyak RM5 juta daripada Malayan BankingBhd bagi tujuan pembinaan sebuah hotel di atas sebidang tanah, yang mana tanah danhotel tersebut (‘hartanah tersebut’) dicagarkan kepada||Page 51>> bank sebagai cagaran. Kegagalan plaintif ketiga untuk membayarkemudiannya telah menyebabkan pinjaman itu menjadi pinjaman tidak berbayar di manaakaun dan cagaran dipegang oleh defendan ketiga (‘Danaharta’). Plaintif sebelum itutelah memasuki satu perjanjian jual beli bagi saham dalam defendan ketiga di manamereka telah memperolehi tiga laporan penilaian yang berasingan bagi harta tersebutyang menilainya pada RM42juta, RM43 juta dan RM43 juta masing-masing. Bagitujuan untuk melengkapkan jualan, pembeli dikehendaki untuk menyediakan satujaminan bank tanpa syarat dalam masa 30 hari daripada 12 Julai 2000. Pembeli telahgagal untuk berbuat demikian dan perjanjian tersebut akhirnya telah dibatalkan pada 12Ogos 2000. Pada 24 Julai 2000 Danaharta telah melantik defendan pertama dan keduasebagai Pentadbir Khas (PK) bagi plaintif ketiga. PK telah memperolehi laporanpenilaian bagi harta tersebut di mana ianya dinilai sebanyak RM16.3 juta dan RM19.8

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juta. PK kemudiannya mengiklankan jualan harta tersebut secara tender daripada 11Oktober 2000 hingga 15 November 2000. Plaintif pertama dan kedua telah memohonuntuk melanjutkan masa bagi melengkapkan transaksi perjanjian jualan daripada PKyang kemudiannya telah menolak permohonan tersebut. PK telah meneruskan tenderdengan menerima bidaan tertinggi sebanyak RM15 juta daripada Naza Properties SdnBhd, Pencelah (Intervener) bagi tindakan sivil ini, dan kemudiannya telahmelengkapkan jualan tersebut. Plaintif telah mengambil tindakan terhadap Danahartadan PK bagi ganti rugi dan kerugian yang dialami.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan plaintif-plaintif:(1) Akta Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd 1998 (‘Akta tersebut’) telah

mengenakan satu kewajipan untuk bertindak dengan suci hati terhadapdefendan-defendan dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab mereka (s 71 Aktatersebut). Tanggungjawab defendan pertama dan kedua dalam kapasiti merekasebagai pentadbir khas adalah sama dengan tanggungjawab pemegang gadaiankepada penggadai harta untuk bertindak dengan suci hati bagi tujuan spesifikuntuk membolehkan harta dalam cagaran atas hutang itu dijaga dandirealisasikan bagi tujuan untuk mendapat pembayaran balik hutang tersebut(lihat perenggan 41); Downsview Nominees Ltd & Anor v First City Corp Ltd& Anor [1993] 3 All ER 626 diikut. Lagipun, pemegang gadaian mempunyaitanggungjawab yang ketat untuk mengambil langkah yang sewajarnya untukmendapatkan nilai sebenar bagi harta tersebut pada masa jualan dandikehendaki untuk bertindak dengan suci hati kecuali apabila terdapat buktisalah laku yang disengajakan oleh pencagar, tanggungjawab untuk bertindakdengan suci hati tidak diluaskan bagi merangkumi setiap langkah yang mungkindiambil oleh seorang ahli kewangan yang altruistik tanpa mengira masa, kosatau usaha (lihat perenggan 42). Apabila sesuatu pihak berkuasa diberikankuasa mutlak, pihak berkuasa itu perlu menggunakan kuasa tersebut denganterkawal kerana mahkamah tidak mengakui penggunaan kuasa secara mutlak(lihat perenggan 45).||Page 52>>

(2) Akta tersebut tidak menjejaskan hak milikan yang kukuh seseorang itu iaituharta seseorang itu tidak sepatutnya dirampas kecuali dengan cara yang sah disisi undang-undang (lihat perenggan 34).

(3) Defendan-defendan diberikan kekebalan daripada tindakan sivil dengan syarattiada salah laku yang disengajakan atau kecuaian melampau dalam menjalankantanggungjawab mereka (lihat perenggan 33).

(4) Dengan mengabaikan laporan penilaian yang diperolehi oleh plaintif, menahankebenaran bagi lanjutan masa untuk perjanjian jual beli plaintif, menerimabidaan tender bernilai RM15 juta sebagai harga jualan bagi tender tersebut, danseterusnya membuat bayaran bagi agen hartanah, peguamcara dan juga bagikhidmat mereka sendiri, pentadbir khas tersebut telah bertindak secara tidakjujur dan tidak menghiraukan dan secara sengaja telah mengakibatkan kerugian

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kepada plaintif-plaintif. Fakta- fakta secara kumulatif menunjukkan kecuaianmelampau dan secara sengaja oleh pentadbir khas sehingga hampir merupakanpenipuan terhadap plaintif-plaintif dan oleh itu defendan-defendan adalahbertanggungjawab terhadap plaintif-plaintif (lihat perenggan 43).

(5) Nilai ganti rugi yang perlu dibayar oleh defendan-defendan kepadaplaintif-plaintif dinilai sebanyak RM6.6 juta iaitu nilai bagi hartanah itu setelahditolak 20% akibat daripada status jualan paksaan melalui tender, ditolakseterusnya 10% atas kegagalan plaintif-plaintif untuk mengambil bahagiandalam bidaan tender, dan akhir sekali ditolak harga jualan iaitu RM15 juta.Defendan-defendan selanjutnya adalah bertanggungjawab ke atas faedah padakadar 4% daripada tarikh pemfailan tindakan sehingga penyelesaian akhir,ditambah kos (lihat perenggan 44 dan 45).]

NotesFor a case on adequacy of consideration in a sale of land, see 8(2) Mallal’s Digest (4thEd, 2003 Reissue) para 3689.

Cases referred toDownsview Nominees Ltd & Anor v First City Corp Ltd & Anor [1993] 3 All ER 626

(folld)Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 MLJ 1 (refd)MBB v Lim Poh Ho [1997] 1 MLJ 662 (refd)

Legislation referred toFederal Constitution art 8(1)Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 ss 4(1)(a), 25, 66(1), 66(2), 71, 72,

item 5 2 Second Schedule

Mohd Ismail (John Khoo and Sunny Khoo with him) (Ismail, Khoo & Associates) forthe plaintiffs.||Page 53>>

V Vijakumar (Albar & Partners) for the first and second defendants.Tommy Thomas, (Adrian Gomez with him) (Tommy Thomas) for the third defendant.Mohd Noh bin Nasira (Nasira Aziz & Co) for the Intervener.

[2005] 6 MLJ 643

ASSETS INVESTMENTS PTE LTD v OSK SECURITIES LTD

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HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO D8(D3)–22–543 OF 1993ABDUL WAHAB SAID AHMAD J16 SEPTEMBER 2005

Tort — Negligence — Duty of care — Whether defendant owed plaintiff duty of care —Defendant a stock broking firm — Representations made by defendant — Reliance onrepresentation made — Whether damages foreseeable

Contract — Oral agreement — Whether defendant owed plaintiff duty of care in contract —Reliance — Representations made by defendant — Whether reliance on representation made

Konsortium Enterprises (‘Konsortium’), a company affiliated with the plaintiff,approached the defendant for a loan of RM10 million in the form of margin facility,against the security of shares in Metroplex. The defendant advised the plaintiff that thefacility offered was an asset swap transaction and not a margin facility. The QwinzyGroup in Hong Kong would be offering the facility. In support of the RM10 millionloan, 23 million Metroplex shares must be sold with the option to Konsortium to buythem back. Konsortium would be required to service option fees instead of interest.For services rendered, the defendant was to be paid a management fee equivalent to1% of the net value of the asset swap. An application was made to Bank Negara forapproval of the above transaction. Bank Negara did not approve it. The plaintiffreplaced Konsortium and proceeded with this transaction. The defendantrecommended United Islamic Investments Foundation (‘UIIF’) as the third party whowill buy the shares from the plaintiff. A sale and purchase agreement was subsequentlyentered into between the plaintiff and UIIF. To ensure that the option is open, theplaintiff made five monthly option instalments of HK$326,663.88 each in accordancewith cl 14 of the sale and purchase agreement. Qwinzy’s representative acknowledgedreceipt of the banker’s draft for the second option instalment. However, through theirletter dated 14 January 1993 UIIF and Qwinzy declared the option null, void andinvalid as the bank draft was ‘unacceptable as a valid payment as the name of the payeeis incorrect’. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s conduct of not immediatelyinforming the plaintiff of any discrepancy or disparity in the draft had prevented theplaintiff from making alternative arrangements for the option instalment to be made by1 December 1992. Because of this the plaintiff could not exercise its option to buyback the shares and thus suffered losses. The defendant denied that it owe anycontractual obligations to the plaintiff. The defendant said that even though it hadintroduced Qwinzy Corporate Services Ltd, ensuring Qwinzy’s viability or credentialswere not its responsibility. Further, the 1% fee was not for management services butthe fee for introducing Konsortium to Qwinzy.||Page 644>>The plaintiff’s learned counsel submitted six issues for the court to determine, inter

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alia: (i) whether the defendant owed the plaintiff any duty in contract; (ii) whether thedefendant owed the plaintiff any duty of care in tort; (iii) if the defendant owed suchduties to the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant was in breach of such duties; (iv)whether any losses that the plaintiff suffered were caused by such breach of duty; (v)whether the transaction was tainted with illegality and if so, whether the defendant wasentitled to rely on such equitable relief; and (vi) the quantum of damages.

Held, in favour of the plaintiff:(1) There was a contractual relationship between the parties as evinced in the

correspondence between the parties. The terms of the agreement was impliedfrom the said correspondence stipulated that the defendant, for a ‘managementfee’, would procure and manage an asset swap transaction with a third party(see para 53)

(2) The defendant, from its oral representations to the plaintiff, owed a duty ofcare to the plaintiff both in contract and tort (see para 54). From thecircumstances of the case, the defendant was not a mere introducer (see para55).

(3) An adverse inference should not be raised against the plaintiff for its failure tocall Ms Lo Yin Fun. The representations were made to PW1 in the presence ofMs Lo. Her witness statement was filed in court but she was not called.Adverse inference would be made when a party failed to call the principalpersons involved and who was in a position to give a first hand account of thematter in controversy. Here, the evidence of Ms Lo would corroborate and addcredence and consistency to plaintiff’s case. However, this did not mean that ifshe was not called the court should invoke s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950(see para 56).

(4) The defendant had made oral representations on the financial status and themanagement of Qwinzy. Further, assurances were made to the plaintiff throughPW1 by DW1. These representations and assurances were made to instil asense of confidence to the plaintiff. In the circumstances, the court acceptedthat plaintiff accepted and relied on those information (see para 57).

(5) Further, the court was satisfied that the defendant’s representations hadinduced the plaintiff to enter into the asset swap transaction. It was a step thatexposed the plaintiff to risks. If the plaintiff had not been so induced by thedefendant, the plaintiff would not have taken that step (see para 67).

(6) In the instant case, the damage was reasonably foreseeable and the loss sufferedby the plaintiff was not too remote. From the evidence it was clear that theplaintiff had fulfilled the three elements for the award of||Page 645>> damages, ie (i) the damage was reasonably foreseeable; (ii) therewas a close and direct relationship of proximity between the parties; and(iii) it was fair, just and reasonable to impose the liability in tort on thedefendant (see para 68).

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(7) On the issue of illegality, the defendant as a reputable stockbroking firm knewor ought to have known of the requirement of the Exchange ControlRegulations. It was their reputation that imparted a sense of confidence in theplaintiff to proceed with the asset swap. Moreover, it was on the defendant’ssuggestion that a foreign company was used to circumvent the regulations andthus they cannot now use this illegality defence to their advantage. It was anaffront to public conscience for the defendant to raise this illegality issue. Itwas not right for the defendant to advise the plaintiff to enter into thistransaction and subsequently raised illegality when sued (see para 63).


Konsortium Enterprises (‘Konsortium’), sebuah syarikat bergabung dengan plaintifmeminta defendan memberi satu pinjaman sebanyak RM10 juta dalam bentukkemudahan margin, yang dijamin oleh saham Metroplex. Defendan menasihati plaintifbahawa kemudahan yang ditawarkan adalah satu transaksi pertukaran aset (asset swaptransaction) dan bukannya kemudahan margin. Kumpulan Qwinzy dari Hong Kongmenawarkan kemudahan tersebut. Sebagai sokongan kepada pinjaman RM10 jutatersebut, 23 juta saham Metroplex mestilah dijual dengan opsyen kepada Konsortiumuntuk membelinya semula. Konsortium dikehendaki membayar yuran opsyen danbukannya faedah. Untuk perkhidmatan yang diberikan, defendan dibayar yuranpengurusan sebanyak 1% dari nilai bersih pertukaran aset. Satu permohonan dibuat keBank Negara untuk kelulusan transaksi tersebut. Bank Negara tidak meluluskannya.Plaintif menggantikan Konsortium dan meneruskan dengan transaksi tersebut.Defendan mencadangkan United Islamic Investments Foundation (‘UIIF’) sebagaipihak ketiga yang akan membeli saham-saham itu dari plaintif. Satu perjanjian jual belitelah dimasuki oleh plaintif dan UIIF. Untuk memastikan opsyen terbuka, plaintifmembuat lima bayaran ansuran opsyen berjumlah setiap satunya HK$326,663.88selaras dengan klausa 14 perjanjian jual beli tersebut. Wakil Qwinzy mengaku terimabank draf untuk ansuran opsyen kedua. Namun begitu, melalui surat mereka bertarikh14 Januari 1993 UIIF dan Qwinzy mengisytiharkan opsyen tersebut batal dan tak sahkerana bank draf tersebut ‘tidak dapat diterima sebagai bayaran yang sah kerana namapenerima tidak betul’. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa perbuatan defendan yang tidakdengan segera memberitahu plaintif berkenaan kecacatan dalam draf tersebut telahmenghalang plaintif dari membuat rancangan alternatif berhubung dengan ansuranopsyen yang perlu dibayar pada 1 Disember 1992. Oleh sebab itu plaintif tidak dapatmembuat opsyen untuk membeli balik saham-saham||Page 646>> tersebut dan dengan itu mengalami kerugian. Defendan menafikan yangia mempunyai sebarang obligasi kontrak kepada plaintif. Defendan mengatakan bahawawalaupun ia yang memperkenalkan Qwinzy Corporate Services Ltd kepada plaintif, iatidak bertanggungjawab untuk memastikan kebolehpercayaan Qwinzy. Selanjutnya,yuran 1% itu bukannya untuk perkhidmatan pengurusan tetapi ianya adalah yuranuntuk memperkenalkan Konsortium kepada Qwinzy.

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Peguamcara plaintif membangkitkan enam isu untuk diputuskan oleh mahkamah, interalia: (i) sama ada defendan mempunyai sebarang kewajipan kontrak terhadap plaintif;(ii) sama ada defendan mempunyai sebarang kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadap plaintifdalam tort; (iii) jika defendan mempunyai kewajipan sedemikian terhadap plaintif, samaada defendan telah mengingkari kewajipan tersebut; (iv) sama ada terdapat sebarangkerugian yang ditanggung plaintif akibat dari pengingkaran kewajipan tersebut; (v)sama ada transaksi tersebut dicemari kepenyalahan undang-undang dan jika ya, samaada defendan berhak bergantung harap kepada relif equiti; dan (vi) jumlah gantirugi.

Diputuskan, memihak kepada plaintif:(1) Terdapat hubungan kontrak di antara pihak-pihak seperti yang tertera di dalam

surat menyurat di antara pihak-pihak. Terma-terma perjanjian sebagaimanayang tersirat di dalam surat menyurat tersebut memperuntukkan bahawadefendan, atas bayaran ‘yuran pengurusan’, akan mendapatkan danmenguruskan satu transaksi pertukaran aset dengan satu pihak ketiga (lihatperenggan 53).

(2) Defendan, melalui representasi lisannya kepada plaintiff, mempunyai kewajipanberjaga-berjaga terhadap plaintiff dalam kontrak dan juga dalam tort (lihatperenggan 54). Dari keadaan-keadaan kes ini, defendan bukanlah juru kenalsemata (lihat perenggan 55).

(3) Satu inferens bertentangan tidak wajar dibangkitkan terhadap plaintif keranakegagalannya untuk memanggil Cik Lo Yin Fun. Representasi- representasidibuat kepada PW1 dalam kehadiran Cik Lo. Pernyataan saksi beliau telahdifailkan di mahkamah tetapi beliau tidak dipanggil. Inferens bertentanganhanya wajar dibuat apabila sesuatu pihak gagal memanggil saksi utama yangterlibat dan yang berkedudukan untuk memberi keterangan pihak pertamadalam perkara yang dipertikaikan itu. Di sini, keterangan Cik Lo bolehmenyokong dan menambah kepada kepercayaan dan konsistensi kes plaintif.Walau bagaimanapun, ia tidak bermakna jika beliau tidak dipanggil mahkamahpatut membangkitkan s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 (lihat perenggan 56).

(4) Defendan telah membuat representasi lisan mengenai status kewangan danpengurusan Qwinzy. Selanjutnya, jaminan-jaminan telah dibuat kepada plaintifmelalui PW1 oleh DW1. Representasi-representasi dan jaminan- jaminan initelah meyakinkan plaintif. Dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah||Page 647>> menerima yang plaintif telah menerima dan bergantung kepadamaklumat tersebut (lihat perenggan 57).

(5) Selanjutnya, mahkamah telah berpuashati yang representasi-representasidefendan telah mendorong plaintif untuk memasuki transaksi pertukaran asetitu. Ianya satu langkah yang mendedahkan plaintif kepada risiko. Jika plaintiftidak didorong oleh defendan, plaintif tidak akan mengambil langkah tersebut(lihat perenggan 67).

(6) Di dalam kes semasa, kerosakan munasabah boleh diramal dan kerugian yang

36


ditanggung plaintif tidak begitu jauh. Dari keterangan ianya jelas bahawaplaintif telah memenuhi tiga elemen untuk gantirugi diberikan, iaitu: (i)kerosakan secara munasabah boleh diramal; (ii) terdapat hubungan kedekatanyang dekat dan langsung di antara pihak-pihak; dan (iii) ianya adil, wajar danmunasabah untuk mengenakan liabiliti dalam tort ke atas defendan (lihatperenggan 68).

(7) Berkenaan dengan isu kepenyalahan undang-undang, defendan sebagai sebuahfirma broker saham mengetahui atau patut mengetahui keperluan ExchangeControl Regulations. Reputasi mereka yang memberi keyakinan kepada plaintifuntuk meneruskan dengan pertukaran aset. Tambahan lagi, ianya atas cadangandefendan bahawa sebuah syarikat asing digunakan untuk mengatasiperaturan-peraturan tersebut dan dari itu mereka tidak boleh sekarang inimenggunakan kepenyalahan undang-undang untuk pembelaan mereka. Ianyabertentangan dengan hati nurani awam untuk defendan membangkitkan isukepenyalahan undang-undang ini. Ianya tidak betul bagi defendan menasihatkanplaintif untuk memasuki transaksi ini dan kemudiannya membangkitkankepenyalahan undang-undang apabila disaman (lihat perenggan 63).]

NotesFor cases on the duty of care in negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002Reissue) paras 813–829.For cases on oral agreement generally, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003Reissue) paras 3987–4002.

Cases referred toArab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Steven Phoa Cheng Loon and other appeals [2003] 1

MLJ 567 (refd)Bank Nationale De Paris v Wuan Swee May [2003] MLJ 587 (refd)Caparo Industries plc v Dickman & Ors [1990] 1 All ER 568 (refd)Dr Abdul Hamid Rashid & Anor v Jurusan Malaysian Consultants [1997] 3 MLJ 546

(refd)Galoo Ltd & Ors v Bright Grahame Murray (a firm) & Anor [1995] 1 All ER 16

(refd)Glenie v McD&C Holdings Ltd [1935] SCR 257; [1935] DLR 561 (refd)

||Page 648>>Hedley Byrne & Co Ltdv Heller & Partners Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 575 (refd)Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 (refd)Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd [1941] 2 All ER

165 (refd)Kenny & Good Pty Ltd Mgica (1992) 147 ALR 568 (refd)

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Keppel Finance Ltd v Phoon Ah Lek [1994] 3 MLJ 26 (refd)Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 80 (refd)Malaysian International Merchant Bankers Bhd v Lembaga Bersekutu Pemegang

Amanah Pengajian Tinggi Islam Malaysia [2001] 1 MLJ 375 (refd)Moorcock, The (1889) 14 PD 64 (refd)Pan Global Equities Sdn Bhd v Taisho Co Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 CLJ 734 (refd)Susan Field v Barber Asia Ltd [2003] 712 HKCU 1 (refd)Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass [1971] 2 All ER 127 (refd)

Legislation referred toContracts Act 1950 s 74Evidence Act 1950 s 114(g)Exchange Control Act 1953

Philip Chai (Soo Thien Ming & Nashrah) for the plaintiff.Raja Addruse (Ranjit Singh and Jason Chan with him) for the defendant.

[2004] 2 MLJ 465

CHAI YEE CHONG v LEW THAI

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO A–02–476 OF 1999ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, MOHD NOOR AHMAD FCJJ AND ABDUL AZIZ

MOHAMAD JCA26 MARCH 2004

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Special damages — Loss of earnings — Plaintiffcontinued to work as tractor driver after accident — Plaintiff able to earn more after accident— Whether plaintiff suffered loss of earning capacity

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Special damages — Medical expenses —Treatment at private hospital — Whether reasonable that plaintiff sought or received treatmentat private hospital— Whether plaintiff entitled to recover expenses incurred for medicaltreatment at private hospital

Tort — Negligence — Accident at work — Liability of co-worker — Plaintiff instructed bydefendant co-worker to build embankment to prevent flooding of mine — Mine wall collapsed

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— Whether defendant co-worker negligent in failing to ask plaintiff to stop work — Duty ofcare to act affirmatively to protect person from injury — Whether there must be somethingoccurring after plaintiff had been placed in foreseeably risky position that would bring anobligation on defendant’s part to act affirmatively to protect plaintiff

The plaintiff was an employee of a company which operated a tin mine. The defendantwas the manager and director of the company. The plaintiff was instructed by thedefendant to build an embankment to prevent the rising water from flooding the mine,and whilst he was building the embankment, the mine wall collapsed and as a result ofwhich the plaintiff was buried and suffered serious injuries and damages. The cause ofthe collapse of the bund was not established. The plaintiff originally sued the companyas the employer of the plaintiff, and the defendant as the servant or agent of theemployer. Subsequently, the claim against the employer was discontinued as notmaintainable under the Employees’ Social Security Act 1969, and the writ andstatement of claim were amended so that the action was maintained only against thedefendant as a co-employee of the plaintiff. On the issue of liability, the learned HighCourt judge held, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to take any precaution for thesafety of the plaintiff by failing to ask the plaintiff to stop work and in failing to tell theplaintiff not to drive a tractor to raise the height of the bund over which the floodwater flowed and as such was negligent. On damages, the issues raised concerned theaward for medical expenses at a private hospital and loss of earning capacity. Theplaintiff was hospitalised for 73 days at the Ipoh General Hospital where he underwentone major operation to his hand. The plaintiff was admitted to a private hospital fourdays after his discharge from the Ipoh General Hospital and at the private hospital, amuscle flap and skin graft operation was done to his right leg and he was discharged.He was re-admitted to the private hospital where he underwent a vasculorized pediclefibular graft and bone graft operation to bridge the bone gap in the right tibia. A thirdoperation was done to remove screws, dead bone and necrotic tissue from the rightleg.||Page 466>> Garamycin beads were inserted along the infected right tibia. The learnedHigh Court judge allowed both these awards. This was the defendant’s appeal.

Held, allowing the appeal:(1) (per Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) There was a special relationship between

the plaintiff and the defendant and there was a duty of care on the part of thedefendant towards the appellant. However, on the facts on this case, it wouldnot be reasonable to find negligence on the part of the defendant for allowingor for not stopping the plaintiff from doing the work he was doing at the timeof the accident. The question to ask was whether a reasonable man would thinkthat to do the work at the time of the accident under the conditions thenprevailing was so dangerous that to allow the plaintiff to do it or not to stophim from doing it constituted negligence. In the instant case, the defendanthimself took out a tractor under similar conditions and was doing the same type

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of work himself. This showed that to do the work under such conditions wasnot so inherently dangerous that the defendant himself would not do it (seeparas 15–16).

(2) (per Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) If the treatment was sought at agovernment hospital, the full amount expended and paid by the person shouldbe awarded. However, if the plaintiff had sought treatment at a private hospital,he had to first prove that he was justified in seeking treatment at the privatehospital. In this regard, he must prove that: (a) the particular treatment was notavailable at the government hospital either due to the unavailability of thenecessary equipment, qualified doctors or other sufficient reasons; or (b)although the treatment was available at a general hospital, it was not availablewithin a reasonable period considering the urgency of the treatment; or (c) thetreatment at the government hospital, though available, was grossly inadequate.If the court was not satisfied that the plaintiff was justified in seeking treatmentat a private hospital, then, depending on the facts and the circumstances of eachcase, the court should either dismiss the claim altogether or award an amountnot exceeding one-third of the expenses. This one-third amount was not fixedby any written law but was arrived at as a matter of practice. If it was shownthat even one-third was excessive, considering the expenses that otherwisewould have been incurred in a government hospital, an amount less thanone-third may be awarded. Secondly, the plaintiff had to prove that the amountincurred was reasonable taking into consideration normal charges at other localprivate hospitals. The court may award what it considered to be a reasonableamount which may even be the full amount claimed (see paras 59–61).

(3) (per Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) In the instant case, there was ampleevidence to show that the plaintiff was justified in obtaining medical treatmentat the private hospital. During his stay at the Ipoh General Hospital, nooperation was done to his leg. Instead, he was discharged to follow up weeklyat the clinic only for wound inspection. In the circumstances, had liability beenfound in the plaintiff’s favour, he would have been awarded the full amount ofRM15,028 for medical expenses (see paras 66–68).||Page 467>>

(4) (per Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ) The plaintiff was a tractor driver at thetime of the accident and he was able to work and indeed worked as a tractordriver with a number of employers after the accident and was earning morethan before the accident. In the circumstances, he had not suffered any loss ofearning capacity (see para 71).

(5) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) When it came to a duty of care to actaffirmatively to protect someone from injury because one had placed him in aposition in which it was foreseeable that he might be injured, it was notsufficient to prove that the plaintiff was placed in such a position and that theinjury that was foreseeable occurred. That would be arguing for a duty of carenot to do something to cause injury. For there to be a duty of care to act

40


affirmatively to protect, there must be something occurring after the plaintiffhad been placed in such a foreseeably risky position that would bring on theobligation on the defendant’s part to act affirmatively to protect the plaintiff. Inthis case, there was no such occurrence. From the time when the defendantasked the plaintiff to raise the height of the bund to the time that the bundcollapsed, there was no evidence, for example, that the defendant had receivedsome indication that the bund was likely to collapse, so that it might be saidthat he was obliged to act affirmatively and tell the plaintiff to stop work andleave the bund (see para 88).

(6) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) In any case, there was no proof that thecollapse of the bund was foreseeable. So it was not a case of the defendantbeing responsible for placing the plaintiff in a position in which it wasforeseeable that he might be injured. But, more importantly, even if it weresuch a case, there was no evidence of something occurring after the plaintiffhad been placed in such a foreseeably risky position that would give rise to aduty on the defendant’s part to act affirmatively to protect the plaintiff (seepara 86).

(7) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) The learned judge did not expressly state afinding that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, defining itsnature and stating the basis for holding that there was such a duty of care. Butto find, as he did, that the defendant was liable, he must have first found thatthere was a duty of care. However, there was nothing in the law that wasconsidered by the trial judge that would warrant a finding, on the facts of thiscase, that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The trial judgetherefore erred in finding that there was a duty of care and that the defendantwas liable for having breached it (see para 90).

(8) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) On the basis of the evidence furnished bythe medical reports, the private hospital had given a more thorough treatmentto the plaintiff’s right leg, and treatment of a better kind than the governmenthospital had given, and this constituted proof after the event of thereasonableness of the plaintiff’s resort to the private hospital. The best andsafest guide was always to bear in mind the basic principle that a plaintiff wasentitled to recover all expenses reasonably incurred for medical treatment as aresult of his injuries, just as he was entitled||Page 468>> to recover all other expenses so incurred. Therefore, if it wasreasonable that a plaintiff sought or received treatment, whether from theoutset or midway, at a private hospital instead of a government hospital, or at aparticular private hospital instead of at some other private hospital, or at aprivate hospital abroad instead of locally, then he was entitled to recover theexpenses incurred for medical treatment at the private hospital. Whether it wasreasonable that he had sought or received medical treatment at the privatehospital must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. Also, it wouldnot be wise to lay down a guide as to the circumstances in which it would be

41


reasonable for a plaintiff to seek or receive treatment at a private hospital asone simply cannot foresee the likely ramification of circumstances. The law asto what is reasonable must be allowed to develop as cases are decided in thelight of their own particular and peculiar circumstances (see paras 104, 106).

(9) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) If resort to or receipt of treatment at aprivate hospital was unreasonable, the plaintiff would not be completelydisentitled to the medical expenses incurred as a portion of the medicalexpenses, which was not necessarily one-third of the medical expenses, wasallowable (see para 112).

(10) (per Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA) As to loss of future earnings, the evidenceshowed that the plaintiff’s injuries did not affect his work as a tractor driverand after his recovery, he was earning more as a tractor driver than he had beenearning in the mine where he was injured. As such, there should have been noaward for loss of future earnings (see para 120).


Plaintif adalah seorang pekerja sebuah syarikat yang menjalankan lombong timah.Defendan adalah pengurus dan pengarah syarikat tersebut. Plaintif telah diarahkan olehdefendan untuk membina sebuah empangan untuk menghalang air daripada naik danmelimpah ke dalam lombong tersebut, dan semasa beliau membina empangan tersebut,dinding lombong tersebut telah runtuh dan akibat daripada itu plaintif telah tertimbusdan mengalami kecederaan dan kerosakan yang serius. Sebab keruntuhan bentengtersebut tidak dapat dibuktikan. Plaintif pada asalnya telah menyaman syarikat tersebutsebagai majikan plaintif, dan defendan sebagai pekerja atau ejen majikan. Berikutan itu,tuntutan terhadap majikan tidak diteruskan kerana ia tidak boleh dikekalkan di bawahAkta Keselamatan Sosial Pekerja 1969, dan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan telah dipindaagar tindakan boleh dikekalkan hanya terhadap defendan sebagai majikan bersamaplaintif. Berhubung persoalan liabiliti, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan, antaralain, bahawa defendan telah gagal untuk mengambil apa-apa langkah keselamatanterhadap plaintif kerana gagal memberitahu plaintif supaya tidak memandu trak untukmenambahkan ketinggian benteng di mana air melimpah dan oleh itu adalah cuai.Berhubung kerosakan, persoalan-persoalan yang timbul adalah berkaitan award untukperbelanjaan perubatan di hospital swasta dan kehilangan kapasiti mendapat matapencarian. Plaintif telah dirawat selama 73 hari di Hospital Besar Ipoh di mana beliaumenjalani||Page 469>> satu pembedahan besar ke atas tangan beliau. Plaintif telah dimasukkanke hospital swasta empat hari selepas beliau keluar daripada Hospital Besar Ipoh dandi hospital swasta tersebut, satu pembedahan otot yang tersiat dan graf kulit telahdilakukan ke atas kaki kanan beliau dan beliau dibenarkan keluar. Beliau telahdimasukkan semula ke hospital swasta di mana beliau menjalani satu pembedahan grafpembuluh pedisel tulang betis dan graf tulang di bahagian kanan tibia. Satu

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pembedahan ketiga telah dilakukan untuk mengeluarkan skru-skru, tulang yang telahmati dan tisu nekrotik dari kaki kanan. Manik-manik garamycin telah dimasukkansepanjang tibia kanan yang rosak. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang bijaksana telahmembenarkan kedua-dua award tersebut. Ini adalah rayuan defendan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:(1) (oleh Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) Terdapat hubungan istimewa antara

plaintif dan defendan dan terdapat satu kewajipan berjaga-jaga di pihakdefendan terhadap perayu. Namun begitu, berdasarkan fakta kes ini, ia tidakmunasabah untuk mendapati kecuaian di pihak defendan kerana telahmembenarkan atau kerana tidak menahan plaintif daripada membuat kerja yangbeliau lakukan pada masa kemalangan tersebut berlaku. Persoalannya adalahsama ada seorang yang waras akan berfikiran bahawa dengan membuat kerjatersebut pada masa kemalangan berdasarkan keadaan pada masa itu adalahamat merbahaya dan untuk membenarkan plaintif melakukannya atau tidakmenahannya daripada melakukannya akan membentuk kecuaian. Dalam kessemasa, defendan sendiri telah memandu trak dalam keadaan yang sama danmelakukan jenis kerja yang sama. Ini menunjukkan bahawa untuk melakukankerja tersebut dalam keadaan sedemikian tidaklah dengan sendirinya merbahayayang mana defendan sendiri tidak akan melakukannya (lihatperenggan-perenggan 15–16).

(2) (oleh Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) Sekiranya rawatan dilakukan di sebuahhospital kerajaan, jumlah penuh yang dibelanja dan dibayar oleh seseorang ituhendaklah diawardkan. Namun begitu, sekiranya plaintif telah mendapatrawatan di sebuah hospital swasta, beliau terlebih dahulu perlu membuktikanbahawa beliau dapat memberi justifikasi dalam memperoleh rawatan di hospitalswasta. Dalam hal sedemikian, beliau perlu membuktikan bahawa: (a) rawatantertentu tersebut tidak disediakan di hospital kerajaan sama ada disebabkanketiadaan peralatan lengkap, doktor-doktor yang berkelayakan atausebab-sebab lain yang mencukupi; atau (b) walaupun rawatan tersebutdisediakn di hospital kerajaan, ia tidak dapat disediakan dalam tempoh yangmunasabah memandangkan tindakan perhatian segera rawatan; atau (c) rawatandi hospital kerajaan, walaupun disediakan, tidak mencukupi langsung.Sekiranya mahkamah tidak berpuas hati bahawa plaintif diberi justifikasi dalammendapat rawatan di hospital swasta, maka bergantung kepada fakta-fakta dankeadaan-keadaan setiap kes, mahkamah hendaklah sama ada menolak tuntutantersebut sama sekali atau mengawardkan sejumlah tidak lebih daripada satupertiga daripada perbelanjaan. Jumlah satu pertiga tersebut tidak ditetapkanoleh mana-mana undang-undang bertulis||Page 470>> tetapi diputuskan melalui amalan. Sekiranya ia dapat ditunjukkanbahawa jumlah satu pertiga tersebut juga adalah melampau, denganmengambilkira perbelanjaan yang sebaliknya dibelanjakan dalam sebuahhospital kerajaan, satu jumlah yang kurang daripada satu pertiga boleh

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diawardkan. Keduanya, plaintif telah membuktikan bahawa jumlah yangdibelanjakan adalah munasabah dengan mengambilkira caj biasa di hospitalswasta lain. Mahkamah boleh mengawardkan apa yang difikirkan jumlah yangmunasabah yang mungkin boleh merupakan jumlah penuh yang dituntut (lihatperenggan-perenggan 59–61).

(3) (oleh Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) Dalam kes semasa, terdapatketerangan mencukupi untuk menunjukkan bahawa plaintif diberi justifikasidalam mendapat rawatan perubatan di hospital swasta. Semasa berada diHospitak Besar Ipoh, tiada pembedahan telah dilakukan ke atas kaki beliau.Sebaliknya, beliau dibenarkan pulang dan datang setiap minggu ke klinik sahajauntuk membersihkan luka. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, sekiranya liabilitididapati berpihak kepada plaintif, beliau sepatutnya diawardkan dengan jumlahpenuh sebanyak RM15,028 untuk perbelanjaan perubatan (lihatperenggan-perenggan 66–68).

(4) (oleh Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMP) Plaintif adalah seorang pemandu traksemasa kemalangan berlaku dan beliau mampu bekerja dan sememangnyabekerja sebagai pemandu trak dengan beberapa orang pekerja selepaskemalangan tersebut dan mendapat pendapatan lebih daripada sebelumkemalangan tersebut. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, beliau tidak kehilangankapasiti mendapat mata pendapatan (lihat perenggan 71).

(5) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMP) Apabila bercakap tentang kewajipanberjaga-jaga untuk bertindak dengan tegas untuk melindungi seseorangdaripada kecederaan kerana seseorang itu telah meletakkan dirinya dalamkeadaan yang boleh diramal bahawa beliau mungkin akan cedera, ia tidakmencukupi untuk membuktikan bahawa plaintif diletakkan dalam keadaansedemikian dan bahawa kecederaan yang boleh diramal telah berlaku. Itumerupakan hujah tentang satu kewajipan berjaga-jaga dan bukan berbuatsesuatu untuk menyebab kecederaan. Ini adalah kerana untuk satu kewajipanberjaga-jaga wujud untuk bertindak dengan tegas supaya dapat melindungi,perlu ada sesuatu berlaku selepas plaintif diletakkan dalam kedudukan berisikoyang boleh diramal yang akan memerlukan obligasi di pihak defendan untukbertindak secara tegas agar dapat melindungi plaintif. Dalam kes ini, tidakberlaku sedemikian. Daripada saat apabila defendan menyuruh plaintifmenaikkan ketinggian benteng tersebut sehingga saat benteng tersebut runtuh,tiada keterangan, sebagai contohnya, yang defendan telah menerima apa-apapetanda bahawa benteng tersebut berkemungkinan akan runtuh, supaya ia bolehdikatakan bahawa beliau mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk bertindak dengantegas dan memberitahu plaintif untuk berhenti kerja dan meninggalkan bentengtersebut (lihat perenggan 88).

(6) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Dalam apa-apa kes, tiada buktimenunjukkan bahawa keruntuhan benteng tersebut dapat diramal.||Page 471>> Oleh itu ia bukan suatu kes di mana defendan adalahbertanggungjawab kerana meletakkan plaintif dalam keadaan di mana ia boleh

44


diramal bahawa beliau mungkin mendapat kecederaan. Tetapi, lebih pentinglagi, jika tiada keterangan tentang sesuatu berlaku selepas plaintif diletakkandalam kedudukan berisiko yang boleh diramal yang akan menimbulkan satukewajipan di pihak defendan untuk bertindak dengan tegas untuk melindungiplaintif (lihat perenggan 86).

(7) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Hakim yang bijaksana tidak dengan jelasmenyatakan satu penemuan bahawa defendan mempunyai kewajipanberjaga-jaga ke atas plaintif, dengan mentafsirkan sifatnya dan menyatakan asasmemutuskan bahawa terdapat kewajipan berjaga-jaga sedemikian. Tetapi untukmendapati, sebagaimana beliau lakukan, bahawa defendan adalahbertanggungjawab, beliau perlu terlebih dahulu mendapati bahawa terdapat satukewajipan berjaga-jaga. Namun begitu, tiada apa-apa di sisi undang-undangyang telah dipertimbangkan oleh hakim perbicaraan yang akan mewarankansatu penemuan, berdasarkan fakta kes ini, bahawa defendan mempunyai satukewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadap plaintif. Hakim perbicaraan oleh itu telahterkhilaf dalam memutuskan bahawa terdapat satu kewajipan berjaga-jaga danbahawa defendan adalah bertanggungjawab kerana telah melanggarnya (lihatperenggan 90).

(8) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Berdasarkan keterangan yangdikemukakan oleh laporan perubatan, hospital swasta telah memberikanrawatan terperinci ke atas kaki kanan plaintif, dan rawatan yang lebih baikdaripada hospital kerajaan dapat berikan, dan ini membentuk bukti selepaskejadian kemunasabahan plaintif ke hospital swasta. Panduan terbaik danselamat adalah untuk sentiasa prihatin tentang prinsip am yang plaintif berhakuntuk mendapat semula semua perbelanjaan yang dibelanjakan denganmunasabah untuk rawatan perubatan akibat daripada kecederaan beliau, samaseperti jika beliau berhak untuk mendapat semula semua perbelanjaan lain yangtelah dibelanjakan. Oleh itu, sekiranya ia munasabah untuk plaintif mendapatatau menerima rawatan, sama ada pada permulaannya taua separuh jalan, dihospital swasta dan bukan di hospital kerajaan, atau di hospital swasta tertentudan bukan di hospital swasta lain, atau di hospital swasta luar negara dan bukantempatan, maka beliau berhak untuk mendapat semula perbelanjaan yang telahdikenakan untuk rawatan perubatan di hospital swasta berkenaan. Sama ada iaadalah munasabah untuk beliau mendapat atau menerima rawatan perubatan dihospital swasta hendaklah bergantung kepada fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaankes. Juga, ia tidak wajar untuk memberi panduan berhubung keadaan di manaia adalah munasabah untuk plaintif mendapat atau menerima rawatan di hospitalswasta jika seseorang itu tidak boleh meramal kemungkinan kesan yangmerumitkan keadaan. Undang-undang berhubung apa yang munasabah harusdibenarkan berkembang kerana kes-kes diputuskan berdasarkankeadaan-keadaan tertentu dan terperinci masing-masingnya (lihatperenggan-perenggan 104, 106).||Page 472>>

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(9) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Sekiranya dengan mendapat ataumemperoleh rawatan di sebuah hospital swasta adalah tidak munsabah, plaintiftidak sepenuhnya tidak berhak mendapat perbelanjaan perubatan yang telahdibelanjakan sebagai sebahagian daripada perbelanjaan perubatan, yang tidaksemestinya satu pertiga daripada perbelanjaan perubatan, yang dibenarkan (lihatperenggan 112).

(10) (oleh Abdul Aziz Mohamad HMR) Berhubung kehilangan mata pencarianmasa hadapan, keterangan menunjukkan bahawa kecederaan plaintif tidakmenjejaskan kerja beliau sebagau pemandu trak dan selepas beliau pulih, beliaumemperoleh pendapatan lebih sebagai pemandu trak daripada apa yang beliautelah perolehi di lombong di mana beliau cedera. Oleh itu, tidak sepatutnya adaaward untuk kehilangan mata pencarian masa hadapan (lihat perenggan 120).]

Notes

For cases on accident at work under negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002Reissue) paras 593–653.

For cases on loss of earnings under special damages, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed,2002 Reissue) paras 1709–1712.

For cases on medical expenses under special damages, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed,2002 Reissue) para 1713.For negligence and breach of statutory duty, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras[80.122]–[80.232].

Cases referred toCarmarthenshire County Council v Lewis CC [1955] AC 549 (refd)Chin Lin Soon v Mat Daud bin Mat Zain & Anor [1996] MLJU 346 (refd)Chong Chee Khong & Anor v Ng Yeow Hin [1997] 5 MLJ 786 (refd)Chong Kam Seng v Herman bin Baharuddin [1992] 2 CLJ 413 (refd)Ellis v Home Office [1953] 2 All ER 149 (refd)Harcharan Singh a/l Saudagar Singh v Hassan bin Ariffin [1990] 2 CLJ 393 (refd)Hehir v Harvey [1949] SASR 77 (refd)Hj Ariffin Hj Ismail v Mohamad Noor Mohamad [2001] 2 CLJ 609 (refd)Johnson v Rea Ltd [1962] 1 QB 373 (refd)Lew Thai v Chai Yee Chong [1997] 5 MLJ 762 (refd)Lim Wee Heong dan satu lagi Iwn Nai Wah Hing dan satu lagi [1996] MLJU 394

(refd)Mooi Kim Ming & Anor v Tang Sia Bak [1988] 2 CLJ 797 (refd)Ng Aik Kian & Anor v Siah Loh Sia [1997] MLJU 143 (refd)

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Pengarah Institut Penyelidikan Perubatan & Anor v Inthra Devi & Anor [1988] 1MLJ 19 (refd)

Peraganathan a/l Karpaya v Chong Yuk Sang & Anor [1995] MLJU 246, [1996] 1CLJ 622 (refd)

Romuloo a/l Appalasamy & Anor v Tan Seng Kee & Anor [2000] 5 MLJ 655 (refd)Sambu Pernas Construction & Anor v Pitchakkaran [1982] 1 MLJ 269 (refd)Suriyati bte Takril v Mohan a/l Govindasamy & Anor [2001] 2 MLJ 275 (refd)Tajuddin bin Sheikh Daud v Wong Kin Yin [1989] 2 CLJ 237 (refd)Tang Sia Bak v Mooi Kin Meng & Anor Civil Appeal No 249 of 1987, Supreme Court

(refd)Yaakub Foong v Lai Mun Keong & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 317 (refd)

||Page 473>>

Legislation referred toEmployees’ Social Security Act 1969

Appeal from Civil Suit No P 1107/83 (High Court, Ipoh)

V Vijayasegaran (Maxwell Kenion Cowdy & Jones) for the appellant.R Siva Dharma (Sharmini Navaratnam with him) (Mathew Thomas & Liew) for the

respondent.[2004] 2 MLJ 661 - Udhaya Kumar a/l Karuppusamy and Anor v Penguasa Hospital DaerahPontian and Ors

[2004] 2 MLJ 661

UDHAYA KUMAR A/L KARUPPUSAMY & ANOR vPENGUASA HOSPITAL DAERAH PONTIAN & ORS

HIGH COURT (MUAR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–15 OF 1997JEFFREY TAN J19 MARCH 2004

Evidence — Adverse inference — Failure to produce material evidence — Medical recordsdestroyed after seven years since not needed for medico-legal reason — Whether s 114(g)Evidence Act 1950 could be invoked

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Evidence — Burden of proof — Negligence — Whether onus on plaintiff to show causativelink existed between resultant damage and negligent act

Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Damages — Loss of amenities and nursingcare — Severe mental retardation — Whether nursing care could be awarded when noevidence led on that claim

Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Standard of care — Medical practitioners— Whether treatment and diagnosis in accordance with standards of reasonably competentmedical men at the time

This was an action brought by a father (‘the second plaintiff’) on behalf of his mentallyretarded son (‘the first plaintiff’) whom the father claimed became retarded as a resultof delayed treatment and/or improper diagnosis and treatment by the first defendant orsecond defendant. The defendants on the other hand contend that there was nonegligence and or breach of duty on the part of the first and second defendants. Thedefendants could produce none of the medical records of the first plaintiff at thesecond defendant hospital. There was also no evidence adduced for nursing care by theplaintiffs.

Held, dismissing plaintiffs’ claim:(1) An adverse inference under s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 can only be

drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely onaccount of failure to obtain evidence. There was no withholding or suppressionof evidence in the instant case. It would not be unfair to say that thenon-availability of the inpatient records of the first plaintiff was brought aboutsolely by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs could not expect the defendants to keeptheir records forever. And the plaintiffs should not lay blame at the defendants’door for their own inertia (see para 31); Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987]1 MLJ 492 followed.

(2) The plaintiffs failed to offer proof that the diagnosis and treatment were not inaccordance with the standards of reasonably competent medical men at thetime. In the result, the plaintiffs had not proved negligence against the firstdefendant (see para 43).||Page 662>>

(3) It would be an absolute travesty if the defendants were made to answer for theplaintiffs’ failure to discharge the burden of proof. The onus was on theplaintiffs to show, on a balance of probabilities, that there was a causative linkbetween the resultant damage and the negligent act of the defendants as inWiltsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871. But the plaintiffsfailed to show that the resultant mental retardation was caused by any negligent

48


act of the defendants (see para 43).(4) The court awarded RM200,000 for loss of amenities due to severe mental

retardation and although no evidence was led it must stand to reason that thefirst plaintiff would need constant care. That would involve expense. The sumsought was moreover not unreasonable. The award was a sum of RM600 permonth towards pre-trial and post trial nursing care for 35 years (see para 44).


Ini adalah tindakan yang dibawa oleh ayah (‘plaintif kedua’) bagi pihak anaknya yangcacat akal (‘plaintif pertama’) yang mendakwa anaknya cacat akibat lambat untukberubat dan/atau diagnosis dan perubatan yang tidak sesuai yang diberikan olehdefendan pertama atau defendan kedua. Defendan-defendan pula mendakwa bahawatiada kecuaian atau kemungkiran tanggungjawab oleh defendan pertama dan defendankedua. Defendan-defendan tidak dapat kemukakan sebarang rekod perubatan plaintifpertama dalam hospital defendan kedua. Tiada keterangan juga dikemukakan olehplaintif-plaintif mengenai penjagaan jururawat.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif-plaintif:(1) Andaian bertentangan di bawah s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 hanya boleh

dibuat jika terdapat penyembunyian atau sekatan terhadap keterangan danbukan hanya kerana gagal untuk mendapatkan keterangan. Tiada keterangandisekat atau dihalang dalam kes semasa. Ia adalah tidak adil untuk mengatakanbahawa ketiadaan rekod-rekod pesakit dalaman plaintif pertama adalah akibatplaintif-plaintif semata-mata. Plaintif-plaintif tidak boleh diharapkan menyimpanrekod-rekod mereka selama-lamanya. Dan plaintif-plaintif tidak sepatutnyameletakkan kesalahan terhadap defendan-defendan akibat inersia mereka sendiri(lihat perenggan 31); Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 diikut.

(2) Plaintif-plaintif gagal untuk mengemukakan bukti bahawa diagnosis danrawatan tersebut tidak menurut standard pengamal perubatan berkelayakkanyang munasabah pada masa itu. Akibatnya, plaintif-plaintif tidak membuktikankecuaian terhadap defendan pertama (lihat perenggan 43).

(3) Ia adalah tindakan yang teruk jika defendan-defendan perlu menjawabkegagalan plaintif-plaintif untuk melepaskan beban bukti. Beban bukti||Page 663>> adalah untuk plaintif-plaintif menunjukkan, atas imbangankebarangkalian, bahawa terdapat kaitan penyebab antara kerugian yang dialamidan tindakan kecuaian defendan-defendan seperti dalam kes Wiltsher v EssexArea Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871. Tetapi plainti-plaintif telah gagaluntuk menunjukkan bahawa kecacatan akal yang dialami adalah akibat tindakankecuaian defendan-defendan (lihat perenggan 43).

(4) Mahkamah mengawardkan RM200,000 untuk kehilangan kemudahan akibat

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kecacatan akal yang teruk dan walaupun tiada keterangan yang diberikan, iaboleh difahami bahawa plaintif pertama memerlukan jagaan pada setiap masa.Ini memerlukan perbelanjaan. Wang yang dituntut adalah bukan tidakmunasabah. Keputusan adalah RM600 sebulan untuk penjagaan jururawatsebelum dan selepas perbicaraan untuk 35 tahun (lihat perenggan 44).]

Notes

For cases on failure to produce material evidence, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed,2003 Reissue) paras 184–186.

For cases on negligence, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras484–491.

For cases on professional negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 945–1013.For burden and standard of proof in civil cases, see 12 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysiaparas [210.018]–[210.021].For standard of care in negligence, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras[80.143]–[80.146].For damages in negligence generally, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras[80.126]–[80.232].

Cases referred toAhmad Daman Huri bin Hussein v Koo Chin Yau [1990] 3 MLJ 53 (refd)Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 IMSWLR 542 (refd)Battersby v Tottman (1985) 37 SASR 524 (refd)Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 (folld)Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771 (refd)Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1967] 2 MLJ 45 (folld)Dr Chin Yoon Hiap v Ng Eu Khoon & Ors and other appeals [1998] 1 MLJ 57 (refd)Dr Soo Fook Mun v Foo Fio Na & Anor and another appeal [2001] 2 MLJ 193 (refd)Elizabeth Choo v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 171 (refd)Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1988 unreported) (refd)E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 99 ALR 601 (refd)F v Chan Fanny [2003] 4 SLR 231 (refd)F v R [1984] 33 SASR 189 (refd)

||Page 664>>Gover v South Australia (1985) 39 SASR 543 (refd)Hong Chuan Lay v Dr Eddie Soo Fook Mun [1998] 7 MLJ 481 (refd)Hunter v Hanley [1955] SLT 213 (refd)

50


Inderjeet Singh a/l Piara Singh v Mazlan bin Jasman & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 646 (refd)Jamil bin Harun v Yang Kamsiah & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 217 (refd)Kamalam a/p Raman & Ors v Eastern Plantation Agency (Johore) Sdn Bhd Ulu

Tiram Estate, Ulu Tiram, Johore & Anor [1996] 4 MLJ 674 (refd)Kow Nan Seng v Nagamah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 128 (folld)McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008 (refd)Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492 (folld)Naxakis v Western General Hospital [1999] HCA 22 (refd)R (on the application of N) v Doctor M and others [2002] EWCA Civ 1789 (refd)Rogers v Whitaker [1992] 109 ALR 625 (refd)Wiltsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871 (refd)Yang Salbiah & Anor v Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 MLJ 292 (refd)

Legislation referred toEvidence Act 1950 s114(g)

Harjit Singh Nijar (Nijar & Nijar) for the plaintiffs.Alice Loke Yee Ching (Attorney General’s Chambers) for the defendants.

[2004] 3 MLJ 546

DATO’ SOO LAI SING v KUMPULAN SIERRAMAS (M) SDNBHD & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2(S5) 22–502 OF 2000AZMEL J3 JUNE 2004

Contract — Misrepresentation — Sale and purchase of property — Unique security featuresto be provided within housing estate — Whether purchaser relied on such features inpurchasing property — Time for execution of services — Whether failure to provide servicetantamount to misrepresentation — Whether standard of service promised sufficient andadequate — Contracts Act 1950 s 18

51


Contract — Damages — Sale and purchase of property — Breach — Failure to provideadequate security service — Negligence — Whether proven — Assessment of damages —Whether purchaser entitled to claim for loss of goods stolen — Contracts Act 1950 s 74(1)

In the promotional brochures and sales campaign for Sierramas Resort Homes (‘thehousing estate’), the first defendant had stated that a unique and special securityfeatures would be provided by the second defendant within the housing estate toensure the safety and tranquillity of its residents. The plaintiff purchased a housing lotand moved into the housing estate. Subsequently, he was robbed when the house wasbroken into (‘the said incident’). The plaintiff commenced an action against thedefendants for damages arising from the defendants’ failure, neglect and/orcarelessness which resulted in the said incident.The issues raised, inter alia, were: (i) whether the robbery was due to the failure,neglect and/or carelessness of the defendants; and (ii) whether the plaintiff’s claim fordamages due to the defendants’ negligence be allowed.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim:(1) On the facts, the first defendant did represent to the plaintiff that it would

provide special security features at the housing estate and for this reason, theplaintiff was completely persuaded to purchase a housing lot to later residethere. Such security features must exist and must be in operation at the timewhen any purchaser had come to stay in the house he purchased in the housingproject. Since the first defendant had failed to provide the special securityfeatures as represented, such omission tantamount to an act ofmisrepresentation (see paras 11 and 13).

(2) The second defendant had committed neglect and carelessness in maintainingthe security of the residence in the housing estate. The mobile guards on dutywere poor in covering the area concerned, in absence of the CCTV camerasand the electronic system to the perimeter fencing (see paras 17 and 18).

(3) The plaintiff was allowed to recover from the defendants the value of hispersonnel property lost during the robbery, in the form of special damagesamounting to RM486,988 plus interest at the rate of 8%pa from the date of thissuit till the date of settlement (see para 23).]||Page 547>>


Di dalam risalah promosi dan kempen jualan untuk Sierramas Resort Homes (‘tamanperumahan tersebut’), defendan pertama telah menyatakan bahawa satu sistemkeselamatan yang unggul dan istimewa akan disediakan di taman perumahan tersebutoleh defendan kedua bagi memastikan keselamatan dan keselesaan penduduk taman

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perumahan tersebut. Plaintif telah membeli satu lot perumahan dan pindah ke rumahdalam taman perumahan tersebut. Kemudiannya, dia telah dirompak bilamanarumahnya telah dipecahmasuk (‘insiden tersebut’). Plaintif memulakan prosidingterhadap defendan untuk ganti rugi yang disebabkan oleh kegagalan, kecuaian dan/ataukelalaian defendan-defendan yang mana telah menyebabkan berlakunya insidentersebut.Isu-isu yang dibangkitkan, antara lain, adalah: (i) sama ada kecurian tersebut berpuncadaripada kegagalan, kecuaian dan/atau kelalaian defendan-defendan; dan (ii) sama adatuntutan gantirugi plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan dibenarkan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif:(1) Berdasarkan fakta, defendan pertama sememangnya telah memberi representasi

kepada plaintif bahawa ia akan menyediakan sistem keselamatan yang istimewadi taman perumahan tersebut dan kerana sebab inilah, plaintif terpengaruhuntuk membeli satu lot di taman perumahan tersebut untuk menetap di situ.Sistem sekuriti sedemikian harus wujud dan berfungsi apabila mana-manapembeli mula menetap di rumah yang dibeli dalam taman perumahan tersebut.Oleh kerana defendan pertama gagal untuk menyediakan sistem keselamatanyang istimewa seperti yang dikatakan olehnya, maka kegagalan tersebutdianggap sebagai perbuatan salah nyata fakta (lihat perenggan 11 dan 13).

(2) Defendan kedua telah cuai dan lalai dalam menjaga keselamatan penghuni ditaman perumahan tersebut. Pegawai keselamatan bergeraknya lemah dalammengawal kawasan berkenaan, dengan ketiadaan kamera CCTV dan sistemelektronik pada perimeter berpagar (lihat perenggan 17 dan 18).

(3) Plaintif dibenarkan menuntut nilai harta bendanya yang telah dicuri daripadadefendan-defendan, dalam bentuk gantirugi khas berjumlah RM486,988 denganfaedah pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikh perbicaraan ini sehingga tarikhpenyelesaian (lihat perenggan 23).]

NotesFor cases on misrepresentation involving sale and purchase of property, see 3(2)Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 3890–3892For cases on damages involving sale and purchase of property, see 3(2) Mallal’sDigest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 2893–2997

Cases referred toTham Cheow Toh v Associated Metal Smelters Ltd [1972] 1 MLJ 171 (refd)

||Page 548>>

Legislation referred toContracts Act 1950 ss 18, 74(1)

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SS Tieh (Olivia Ho with him) (Paul Ong & Assoc) for the plaintiff.Maidzuara Mohammed (TM Yap with her) (Logan Sabapathy & Co) for the

defendants.

[2004] 5 MLJ 6

MOHD ZUKHAIRI ABD GHAPAR (AN INFANT SUINGTHROUGH HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ABDUL

GHAPAR BIN SAAD) v QUEK CHIAM KEE

HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–37 OF 2001LOW HOP BING J21 OCTOBER 2003

Tort — Negligence — Contributory negligence — Test of — Appeal against decision of trialcourt

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Personal Injuries — Contributory negligence —Apportionment of liability — Personal injury— Whether apportionment of liability fair,reasonable, justified and correct

The appellants (‘the plaintiffs’) appealed against the decision of the learned sessionscourt judge who found the first plaintiff and the defendant equally liable in a motorvehicle accident, and disallowed the plaintiffs’ claim for special damages by way ofhospital bills. The issue for the determination of the court was whether theapportionment of liability decided by the trial court was fair, reasonable, justified andcorrect.

Held, dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal with costs and affirming the sessions courtjudge’s decision:(1) The test of contributory negligence is based entirely on the conduct of the

plaintiff in that particular accident or case and is the same as in the case of achild as of an adult, modified only to the extent that the degree of care to beexpected must be proportionate to the age of the child. Where the issue ispurely a question of deciding what is the right apportionment, if any, of blameon two persons when they are suddenly involved in a traffic emergency, itwould not be possible for the appellate court to intervene and substitute a freshfinding instead of that which was found by the learned trial judge. On the facts

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and the law, the High Court judge was of the view that the conclusion arrivedat by the trial court on the evidence adduced before it pertaining to theapportionment of liability was fair, reasonable, justified and correct (see paras15, 18, 20–21); Jeremiah v Lee Yew Kwai [1966] 1 MLJ 59 followed.

(2) The meaning of the expression ‘special damages’ consists of out-of-pocketexpenses, such as hospital bills, and the burden of proof based on the balanceof probabilities in the evidence lies on the plaintiff. Since these hospital bills hadalready been fully settled by the second plaintiff’s employer directly and thesecond plaintiff paid nothing for these items, they did not form part of theplaintiffs’ out of pocket expenses and so the trial court is correct in dismissingthe plaintiffs’ claim for special damages, because to allow the special damageswould result in a duplicity of claim by the plaintiffs or to award specialdamages which were not actually incurred by the plaintiffs (see paras||Page 7>> 22–23); Sam Wun Hoong v Kader Ibramshah [1981] 1 MLJ 295 followed.


Perayu-perayu (‘plaintif-plaintif’) telah merayu terhadap keputusan hakim mahkamahsesyen yang bijaksana yang mendapati plaintif pertama dan defendan sama-samabertanggungjawab untuk satu kemalangan motor, dan tidak membenarkan tuntutanplaintif-plaintif untuk ganti rugi khas melalui bil-bil hospital. Persoalan untukditentukan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada pembahagian liabiliti yang diputuskan olehmahkamah perbicaraan adalah adil, munasabah dijustifikasikan dan betul.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan plaintif-plaintif dengan kos dan mengekalkan keputusanhakim mahkamah sesyen:(1) Ujian untuk kecuaian sertaan adalah berdasarkan keseluruhan perbuatan plaintif

dalam kemalangan atau kes berkenaan dan adalah sama dalam kes seorangkanak-kanak seperti orang dewasa, diubahsuai hanya setakat tahap berjaga-jagayang dijangkakan mestilah bersesuaian dengan umur kanak-kanak tersebut. Dimana persoalan adalah semata-mata persoalan untuk memutuskan pembahagianyang betul, jika ada, terhadap kesalahan dua orang apabila mereka tiba-tibaterlibat dalam satu kecemasan jalanraya, ia tidak mungkin untuk mahkamahperayu untuk campur tangan dan menggantikan satu penemuan baru yangbukan diputuskan oleh hakim perbicaraan mahkamah. Berdasarkan fakta-faktadan undang-undang, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi berpendapat bahawa keputusanyang dibuat oleh mahkamah perbicaraan atas keterangan dikemukakan dihadapannya berkaitan pembahagian liabiliti adalah adil, munasabah,dijustifikasikan dan betul (lihat perenggan-perenggan 15, 18, 20–21) ; Jeremiahv Lee Yew Kwai [1966] 1 MLJ 59 diikut.

(2) Maksud ungkapan ‘special damages’ meliputi perbelanjaan out-of-pocket,

55


seperti bil-bil hospital, dan beban bukti berdasarkan imbangan kebarangkaliandalam keterangan terletak atas plaintiff. Memandangkan bil-bil hospitaltelahpun diselesaikan oleh majikan plaintif kedua secara langsung dan plaintiffkedua tidak membayar apa-apa untuk butir-butir tersebut, ianya tidakmembentuk sebahagian daripada perbelanjaan sendiri plaintif-plaintif dan olehitu mahkamah perbicaraan adalah betul untuk menolak tuntutan plaintif-plaintifuntuk ganti rugi khas, kerana untuk membenarkan ganti rugi khas akanmengakibatkan penggandaan tuntutan olah plaintif-plaintif atau untukmengawardkan ganti rugi khas yang sebenarnya tidak terakru olehplaintif-plaintif (lihat perenggan-perengan 22–23); Sam Wun Hoong v KaderIbramshah [1981] 1 MLJ 295 diikut.]||Page 8>>

NotesFor cases on contributory negligence under personal injuries, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 501–508.

For cases on contributory negligence under tort, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002Reissue) paras 743–786.

Cases referred toAbraham v Choo Jit Fung & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 97 (refd)Bridge v Grand Junction Ry (1838) 150 ER 1134 (refd)Chan Peng Fook v Kan Pak Lee [1974] 2 MLJ 197 (refd)Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377 (refd)Chong Sooi Chuen v Yuen Lai Chun [1988] 2 MLJ 443 (refd)Cunningham v Harrison & Anor [1973] 1 QB 943 (refd)Goh Leng Kwan v Teng Swee Lin & Ors [1974] 2 MLJ 5 (refd)Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte

Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 (refd)Jag Singh (an infant) v Toong Foong Omnibus Co Ltd [1962] MLJ 78 (refd)Jeremiah v Lee Yew Kwai [1966] 1 MLJ 59 (folld)Kayser v London Passenger Transport Board [1950] 1 All ER 231 (refd)Lai Yew Seong v Chan Kim Sang [1987] 1 MLJ 403 (refd)Lee Tai Kau v Rajanderan Manickam [1995] 4 MLJ 163 (refd)Liong Thoo v Sawiyah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 286 (refd)Mohamad Safuan bin Wasidin & Anor v Mohd Ridhuan bin Ahmad (an infant) [1994]

2 MLJ 187 (refd)Nance v British Columbia Electric Ry [1951] AC 601 (refd)

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Ngooi Kim Chong v Subramaniam a/l Maruthan & Anor [1990] 1 CLJ 799 (refd)Ong Jin Choon v Lim Hin Hock & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 137 (refd)Passenger Transport Board [1950] 1 All ER 231 (refd)R v Southern Canada Power Co [1937] 3 All ER 923 (refd)Sam Wun Hoong v Kader Ibramshah [1981] 1 MLJ 295 (folld)Samar binte Mansor v Mustafa Kamarul Ariffin [1974] 2 MLJ 71 (refd)Tan Chwee Lian v Lee Ban Soon [1963] MLJ 149 (refd)Tey Siew Goh v Tay Tian Soo [1965] 1 MLJ 21 (refd)Tham Yew Heng & Anor v Chong Toh Cheng [1985] 1 MLJ 408 (refd)Wong Li Fatt William (an infant) v Haidawati bte Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497

(refd)

Legislation referred toEvidence Act 1950 s 73A

Summons No 53–300 of 1998 (Sessions Court, Melaka)

Francis Soh (Jerald Gomez & Assoc) for the plaintiffs.Azizan Abd Malik (Yacob & Rakan-Rakan) for the defendant.

[2004] 5 MLJ 77

KRISHNAN NAMBIAR A/L G PERABAKARAN (A MINORSUING THROUGH G PERABAKARAN A/L GOVINDAN) &

ORS v DR P MAHENDRAN & ANOR

HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–253 OF 1999LOW HOP BING J19 NOVEMBER 2003

Civil Procedure — Trials — Separate trials — Conduct of proceedings — Medicalnegligence — Whether there were separate issues to be tried — Whether separate trials to beconducted — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 rr 2, 3(2), O 37, O 92 r 4

The plaintiffs brought a suit against the defendant, alleging medical negligence. Duringthe trial, the defendants contended that the trial should proceed to determine both the

57


question of liability and quantum in one and the same proceedings, and not separately.In absence of a court order, the defendants submitted that the plaintiffs did not applynor intend to proceed with separate trials on liability and quantum. It was added thatthe second plaintiff had given evidence in chief regarding damages, but failed to pleadthe sum claimed under each item of special damages, besides failing to make discoveryof any document relating to expenses incurred. The defendants concluded that if theplaintiffs wish to now apply for an order for separate trials, they must state the groundsfor such order and the reasons for the delay in making the application. The plaintiffscontended that the court had the jurisdiction to try issues of liability and quantumseparately, on the basis of O 33 r 2, O 37 and O 92 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court1980; and submitted that there would be no prejudice to the defendants if the issues ofliability and damages were tried separately and that the trial has so far proceeded assuch.

Held, ordering the issues to be heard separately:In the hearing of a suit where the issues of liability and quantum are pleaded in theplaintiffs’ claim, the court is empowered to hear and determine liability first, therebyleaving the issue of quantum to be decided at a later stage. Therefore, the trial hereinshould be continued on the basis that liability is to be heard and determined first, andthat the issue of quantification of damages shall be determined in a separate proceedingshould the necessity arise in due course (see paras 10– 11).


Plaintif-plaintif telah memulakan satu guaman terhadap defendan, mendakwa kecuaianperubatan. Semasa perbicaraan, defendan-defendan telah menegaskan bahawaperbicaraan hendaklah dimulakan untuk menentukan kedua-dua persoalan liability; dankuantum dalam satu prosiding yang sama, dan bukan secara berasingan. Denganketiadaan perintah mahkamah, defendan-defendan telah berhujah bahawaplaintif-plaintif tidak memohon maupun berniat untuk meneruskan dengan perbicaraanberasingan berhubung liabiliti||Page 78>> dan kuantum. Ia menambah bahawa plaintif kedua telah memberikanketerangan utama berhubung ganti rugi, tetapi gagal untuk memplidkan jumlah yangdituntut di bawah setiap butiran ganti rugi khas, selain daripada gagal untuk membuatpendedahan apa-apa dokumen berkaitan dengan perbelanjaan yang ditanggung.Defendan-defendan membuat kesimpulan bahawa jika plaintif-plaintif berhasratsekarang untuk memohon satu perintah untuk perbicaraan berasingan, mereka perlumenyatakan alasan-alasan untuk perintah sedemikian dan sebab-sebab kelewatanmembuat permohonan tersebut. Plaintif-plaintif menegaskan bahawa mahkamahmempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar persoalan-persoalan liabiliti dan kuantumsecara berasingan, berdasarkan A 33 k 2, A 37 dan A 92 k 4 Kaedah-KaedahMahkamah Tinggi 1980; dan berhujah bahawa tiada prejudis akan berlaku ke atas

58


defendan-defendan jika persoalan-persoalan liabiliti dan ganti rugi didengar secaraberasingan dan bahawa perbicaraan tersebut telahpun bermula.

Diputuskan, memerintah persoalan-persoalan didengar berasingan:Dalam satu perbicaraan guaman di mana persoalan-persoalan liabiliti dan kuantumdiplidkan dlam tuntutan plaintif, mahkamah mempunyai kuasa untuk mendengar danmenentukan liabiliti dahulu, dan meninggalkan persoalan kuantum diputuskankemudian. Oleh itu, perbicaraan di sini hendaklah diteruskan berdasarkan liabilitididengar dan ditentukan dahulu, dan persoalan pengkuantitian ganti rugi hendaklahditentukan dalam satu prosiding berasingan jika keperluan timbul (lihatperenggan-perenggan 10–11).]

Notes

For cases on separate trials, see 5 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 4206.

Cases referred toCoenen v Payne & Anor, Payne v Coenen [1974] 2 All ER 1109 (folld)Federal Insurance Co v Nakano Singapore (Pte) Ltd [1992] 1 SLR 390 (refd)Hawkins v New Mendip Engineering Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 228 (folld)Healey v A Waddington & Sons [1954] 1 All ER 861 (folld)Smith & Co v Hargrove & Co [1886] QBD Vol XVI 183 (folld)Stevens v William Nash Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1550 (refd)Thanaraj a/l Manikam & Ors v Lower Perak Tamil Co-operative Society [1997] 4

MLJ 82 (refd)

Legislation referred toRules of the High Court 1980 O 33 rr 2, 3(2), O 37, O 92 r 4.Rules of the Supreme Court [UK] O 33 r 4(2)

Srimurugan (M Manoharan & Co) for the plaintiffs.PS Ranjan (Manmohan S Dhillon with him) (PS Ranjan & Co) for the defendants.

||Page 79>>

[2004] 5 MLJ 289

ROHANI A/P TENGKAH (WIDOW SUING ON HER BEHALFAND ON BEHALF OF HER TWO CHILDREN, AS

DEPENDANCE OF ZINUDDIN BIN SIPOH, DECEASED) v

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ZAINAL BIN LANI & ANOR

HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–173 OF 2000MOHD HISHAMUDIN J20 DECEMBER 2003

Civil Law Act — Damages — Dependency claim — Multiplicand — Whether wrongmultiplicand used — How multiplicand arrived at

Civil Law Act — Damages — Dependency claim — Award — Deduction from — Whetherone third deduction from award justified on grounds of contingencies and vicissitudes of lifeand accelerated payment — Civil Law Act 1965 s 7

Tort — Negligence — Contributory negligence — Whether established — Consideration offacts and circumstances

The plaintiff appealed against the decision of the sessions court judge, who in allowingthe plaintiff’s claim for negligence against the defendants, made a finding that theplaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and as a consequence, reduced theaward by 25%. The plaintiff appealed on the grounds that: (a) the judge erred inmaking a finding of a 25% contributory negligence against the plaintiff; (b) that thejudge used the wrong multiplicand of RM500 considering that the deceased’s salarywas RM1,300; and (c) that the judge had erred when he deducted 1/3 from the awardfor contingencies and vicissitudes of life and accelerated payments.

Held, allowing the appeal with costs in respect of contributory negligence and themultiplicand but disallowing in respect of the issue of deduction for contingencies(1) Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no basis to hold

that the defendant was guilty of contributory negligence (see para 13).(2) The modern trend of arriving at a multiplicand is by deducting a percentage

from the monthly earnings, instead of going through labouriously andpainstakingly in detail on the various expenditures incurred by the deceasedwhen alive, in order to determine his living expenses. Accordingly, a one thirddeduction was made from the deceased’s monthly earnings which meant thatthe multiplicand arrived at was RM900, after deducting RM400 from RM1,300(see paras 39–40).

(3) A one third deduction from the award for contingencies and vicissitudes of lifeand accelerated payment was maintained (see para 43).

Obiter dicta:The High Court judge resisted the temptation to remark that as there was no provision

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for a further deduction for contingencies and vicissitudes of life||Page 290>> and accelerated payment in the scheme of s 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956,and that that section had already specified or prescribed in detail what should beincluded and what should excluded or deducted and the method of calculation, incalculating the sum to be awarded, there was much force in the argument of thelearned counsel in the present case (see para 46).


Plaintif telah merayu terhadap keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen, yang dalammembenarkan tuntutan plaintif untuk kecuaian terhadap defendan- defendan, telahmembuat penemuan bahawa plaintif adalah bersalah kerana kecuaian sertaan dan akibatdaripada itu, telah mengurangkan award kepada 25%. Plaintif telah merayu atas alasanbahawa: (a) hakim telah terkhilaf dalam membuat penemuan 25% kecuain sertaanterhadap plaintif; (b) hakim telah menggunakan pengganda yang salah iaitu RM500dengan mengambilkira gaji si mati adalah RM1,300; dan (c) hakim telah terkhilafapabila memotong 1/3 daripada award untuk kontingensi dan jatuh bagun dalamkehidupan dan bayaran tambahan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos berkaitan kecuaian sertaan danpengganda tetapi tidak membenarkan berkaitan persoalan potongan untukkontengensi:(1) Berdasarkan fakta dan keadaan kes, tiada asas untuk memutuskan bahawa

defendan bersalah kerana kecuaian sertaan (lihat perenggan 13).(2) Trend moden untuk tiba kepada suatu pengganda adalah dengan memotong

satu peratusan daripada pendapatan bulanan, selain daripada meneliti secaramendalam pelbagai perbelanjaan yang dikenakan oleh si mati semasa hayatnya,bagi tujuan menentukan perbelanjaan hidup beliau. Oleh demikian, potongansatu pertiga telah dibuat daripada pendapatan bulanan si mati yang bermaksudbahawa pengganda yang diperolehi adalah RM900, selepas memotong RM400daripada RM1,300 (lihat perenggan-perenggan 39–40).

(3) Potongan satu pertiga daripada award untuk kontengensi dan jatuh bangunkehidupan dan bayaran tambahan dikekalkan (lihat perenggan 43).

Obiter dicta:Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi enggan membuat kenyataan bahawa tidak terdapat apa-apaperuntukan untuk potongan seterusnya untuk kontengensi dan jatuh bangun kehidupandan bayaran tambahan dalam skima s 7 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956, dan bahawaseksyen tersebut telahpun menspesifikasikan atau menetapkan secara terperinci apayang patut dikecualikan atau dipotong dan cara pengiraan, dalam pengiraan jumlahyang akan diawardkan, terdapat hujah yang kukuh oleh peguam yang bijaksana dalamkes semasa (lihat perenggan 46).]

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||Page 291>>

Notes

For cases on dependency claims, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para3267.

For cases on contributory negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 743–786.For contributory negligence, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia para [80.204].For maintenance of spouse and children, see 8 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2003Reissue) paras [140.376]–[140.386].

Cases referred toChan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yoke Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 (refd)Chang Chong Foo & Anor v Shivanathan [1992] 2 MLJ 473 (refd)Low Suit (m, w) Administratrix of the estate of Tan Mee Ho (J) and Tan Mee Kiau (f)

both deceased v Lim Sun Hiang t/a Syarikat Ta Thong & Anor [1992] 2 CLJ1035 (refd)

Marappan & Anor v Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99 (refd)Rebecca Mathew & Ors v Syarikat Kerjasama Serbaguna Gema Wong Siong Bhd &

Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 443 (refd)Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors and another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ

512 (refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 s 7(3)(iv)(c), (d)

Appeal from: Civil Suit No 53–1351 of 1998 (Sessions Court, Klang)

Daljeet Singh (Sarjeet Singh with him) (Daljeet S Sachdev & Co) for theappellant/plaintiff.

Adrian Thambyrajah (Azim Tunku Farik & Wong) for the respondents/ defendants.

[2004] 6 MLJ 253

KU PON & ORS v PEMANDANGAN SINAR SDN BHD & ORS

HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — CIVIL SUIT NO MT1 22–256 OF 1998

62


SURIYADI J24 JUNE 2004

Civil Procedure — Striking out — Application to strike out action — Whether cause ofaction existed

Tort — Negligence — Negligent publication — Factors to consider — Duty of care —Foreseeability — Proximity — Failure to obtain prior permission — Damages and losses —Whether proven — Whether breach of duty exists — Whether breach of confidence proven

The plaintiffs were family members of the three kidnapped victims. The first defendantowned a local Chinese daily, Sin Chew Jit Poh, whilst the second and third defendantswere respectively its editor and scriptwriter. The plaintiffs commenced an actionagainst the defendants for negligence and breach of confidence by publishinginaccurate facts or untruths as to the kidnapping incident in its edition dated 25 August1996.All three defendants had separately filed their respective applications to strike out thewrit pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’). Thesenior assistant registrar (‘the SAR’) dismissed the first and third defendants’applications but allowed the second defendant’s application. Dissatisfied both theplaintiffs, and the first and third defendants, filed their respective appeals (encls 23 and15) to judge in chambers against the SAR’s decision. At the outset of the appeal, bothparties had agreed that both encls viz 15 and 23, be heard together as they involvedidentical issues of fact and law and the decision would bind both enclosures.The issues before this court were: (a) whether the plaintiffs’ claim be struck out forwant of cause of action; (b) whether there was a general duty of care by the defendantsto the plaintiffs (if the answer was affirmative); (c) whether the plaintiffs should provethe damages or losses; and (d) whether the plaintiffs’ alternative cause of action, iebreach of confidence, stood against the defendants.

Held, striking out the plaintiffs’ claim with costs:(1) The power to strike out pleadings under O 18 r 19 of the RHC is not

mandatory but permissive, it is a discretion given to the judge to act on it,dependant upon all the facts before him. A court must apply reasonable latitudebefore arriving at some harsh decision, as the powers to dismiss an actionsummarily was coercive, drastic and draconian in operation. The discretionmust be exercised with the greatest of care and circumspection, only in theclearest of cases, the action on the face of the pleadings was obviouslyunsustainable and it||Page 254>> being too plain for comfort. The test was ‘on the face of thepleadings’ (see paras 8 and 11 ).

(2) To fall within the legally recognized torts of negligence, it was the duty of the

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plaintiffs to establish first that damages had been inflicted, secondly thosedamages complained of are actionable, thirdly that they as persons being oweda duty of care were the ones who suffered those damages or losses, andfourthly the defendants were the legitimate persons to be held responsible (seepara 18).

(3) The precept of ‘duty of care’ would very much depend on the foreseeability ofdamages, the relationship of proximity or neighbourhood and whether it wasfair and reasonable to impose such a duty. A cursory reading of the pleadingsrevealed that the damages sought for was dependant on that speculative ‘could’and ‘if’. Further, the plaintiffs also failed to establish the relationship ofproximity between the plaintiffs and the defendants, be it physical,circumstantial or causal (see paras 15, 18 and 26).

(4) In determining the prerequisite of it being fair, just and reasonable the courtwould take into consideration the principle of legal policy, the factor of whereto draw the line so as to avoid the floodgates of litigation being unleashed, theinterest of individuals who may already have the protection of statutes, factorof public awareness and deterrence against would-be offenders, where theparameters of liability should stop and the factor of freedom of press which hasa social and moral duty to the world at large. Therefore, it was unfair, unjustand unreasonable to impose such a liability in negligence against thedefendants. (see para 31).

(5) As s 13 of the Criminal Procedure Code makes it mandatory to report thecrime of kidnapping, there is thus no quality of confidentiality on theinformation received by the defendants from any source (see para 36).


Plaintif-plaintif adalah ahli keluarga kepada tiga mangsa penculikan. Defendan pertamamemiliki sebuah surat khabar tempatan dalam Bahasa Cina, Sin Chew Jit Poh,manakala defendan kedua dan ketiga masing-masing adalah penyunting dan penulisskrip surat khabar tersebut. Plaintif-plaintif telah memulakan tindakan terhadapdefendan-defendan atas alasan terdapat kecuaian dan pecah kerahsian denganmenerbitkan fakta-fakta yang tidak tepat dan tidak benar mengenai peristiwapenculikan di dalam edisinya bertarikh 25 Ogos 1996.Ketiga-tiga defendan telah secara berasingan memfailkan permohonan mereka untukmembatalkan writ menurut A 18 k 19(1)(a) Kaedah-||Page 255>> Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Penolong kanan pendaftar(‘PKP’) telah menolak permohonan defendan pertama dan ketiga tetapi membenarkanpermohonan defendan kedua. Tidak puas hati terhadap keputusan PKP tersebut,kedua-dua plaintif dan defendan pertama dan ketiga telah memfailkan rayuanmasing-masing (kandungan 23 and kandungan 15) kepada hakim dalam kamar. Padapermulaan rayuan kedua-dua pihak telah bersetuju bahawa kedua-dua kandungan iaitu

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15 dan 23, didengar bersama memandangkan persamaan persoalan fakta danundang-undang dan keputusan mahkamah akan mengikat kedua-dua kandungan.Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah: (a) sama ada tuntutan plaintif harus dibatalkanatas alasan kegagalan kausa tindakan; (b) sama ada terdapat kewajipan berjaga-jagayang umum oleh defendan-defendan kepada plaintif-plaintif (sekiranya jawapan bagiisu ini adalah afirmatif); (c) sama ada plaintif-plaintif harus membuktikan kerosakandan kerugian; dan (d) sama ada kausa tindakan sampingan plaintif-plaintif, iaitupemecahan kerahsian, dapat dibuktikan terhadap defendan-defendan.

Diputuskan, membatalkan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif dengan kos:(1) Kuasa pembatalan sesuatu pliding di bawah A 18 k 19 KMT bukanlah

mandatori sebaliknya hanya permisif, ia adalah budi bicara yang diberikankepada hakim untuk bertindak, bergantung kepada fakta-fakta di hadapannya.Mahkamah hendaklah menerimapakai garis panduan yang munasabah sebelummencapai satu keputusan yang berat, memandangkan kuasa untuk membatalkantindakan secara terus adalah bersifat memaksa, drastik dan melampaui masadalam pelaksanaanya. Budi bicara tersebut hendaklah dilaksanakan secaraberjaga-jaga dan berhati-hati, hanya dalam kes-kes yang nyata, tindakantersebut di bawah pliding secara jelas tidak dapat dipertahankan dan terlalubiasa untuk diterima. Ujiannya adalah ‘on the face of the pleadings’ (lihatperenggan 8 dan 11).

(2) Untuk dimasukkan di bawah prinsip undang-undang yang diiktiraf iaitu tortkecuaian, adalah tugas plaintif untuk membuktikan terlebih dahulu pertamanyakerosakan yang dialami, keduanya kerosakan tersebut yang dilaporkan itutermasuk dalam kategori yang boleh diambil tindakan, ketiga mereka sebagaipihak yang berhak kepada kewajipan berjaga-jaga adalah pihak yang mengalamikerosakan dan kerugian, dan keempat defendan-defendan adalah pihak sebenaryang bertanggungjawab (lihat perenggan 18).

(3) Peraturan ‘kewajipan berjaga-jaga’ adalah lebih bergantung kepadakebolehramalan kerosakan, hubungan kedekatan atau kejiranan dan sama adaadalah berpatutan dan munasabah untuk mengenakan kewajipan berjaga-jagaseumpama tersebut. Bacaan sepintas lalu terhadap pliding mendedahkanbahawa kerosakan yang dituntut adalah bergantung kepada spekulasi ‘boleh’dan ‘kalau’. Seterusnya, plaintif-plaintif juga gagal untuk membuktikan||Page 256>> hubungan kedekatan antara plaintif-plaintif dandefendan-defendan sama ada secara fizikal, ikut keadaan atau sebab dan akibat(lihat perenggan 15, 18 dan 26).

(4) Dalam menentukan prasyarat berpatutan, adil dan munasabah mahkamahhendaklah mengambil kira prinsip polisi undang-undang, factor dimana satugaris panduan diwujudkan untuk mengelakkan kebanjiran litigasi, kepentinganindividu yang mana telahpun mempunyai perlindungan statut, faktorpenyedaran awam dan pencegahan daripada pesalah-pesalah, dimana parameterliabiliti patut berhenti dan faktor kebebasan akhbar yang mempunyai tugas

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sosial dan moral kepada dunia keseluruhannya. Maka, adalah tidak berpatutan,tidak adil dan tidak munasabah untuk mengenakan liabiliti kecuaian sebegituterhadap defendan-defendan di dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan 31).

(5) Memandangkan s 13 Kanun Acara Jenayah menjadikan tugas untukmelaporkan jenayah penculikan sebagai peruntukan mandatori, maka, tidakterdapat kualiti kerahsian terhadap maklumat yang diterima olehdefendan-defendan daripada mana-mana sumber (lihat perenggan 36).]

Notes

For cases on striking out of actions, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001 Reissue)paras 160-161.

For cases on negligent publication, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 917–.For application to strike out, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2002 Reissue) para[10.6-075].

Cases referred toAbdul Rahim bin Abdul Hamid & Ors v Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Ors

[2000] 2 MLJ 417 (refd)Ancell v McDermott [1993] 4 All ER 355 (refd)Balden v Shorter (1933) 1 Ch 427 (refd)Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3

MLJ 36 (refd)Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (refd)Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RFC 41 (refd)Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562 619 (refd)Electro Cad Australia Pty Ltd & Ors v Mejati RCS Sdn Bhd & Ors [1998] 3 MLJ 422

(refd)Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Linsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC

210 (refd)Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd (1936) AC 85 (refd)Guay v Sun Publishing Co Ltd [1952] 2 DLR 479 (refd)Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partner Ltd [1964] AC 465 (refd)

||Page 257>>Honan Plantations Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor and another appeal

[1998] 2 MLJ 498 (refd)Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396 (refd)Liesbosch Dredger v SS Edison (1933) AC 449 (refd)

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McDonald’s Corp & Anor v Steel & Anor [1995] 3 All ER 15 (refd)Paul Law Ung Hua & Anor v Hong Wei Organisation Sdn Bhd [1996] 4 MLJ 489

(refd)Pilba Trading & Agency v South East Asia Insurance Bhd & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 53

(refd)Shapiro v La Morta (1924) 40 TLR 201 (refd)Smith v Litttewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 710 (refd)Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] 60 ALR 1 (Lexis) (refd)Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Tio Chee Heng [1975] 2 MLJ 1 (refd)Yuen Kun-yue v AG of Hong Kong [1987] 2 All ER 705 (refd)

Legislation referred toCriminal Procedure Code s 13Defamation Act 1957Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1)(a)

Frieda Krishnan (Lalitha Nagamuthu with her) (Shafee & Co) for the plaintiffs.Mubashir bin Mansur (Tan Joon Ho with him) (Skrine) for the defendants.

[2004] 6 MLJ 268

ANIKA INSURANCE BROKERS SDN BHD & ANOR vPUBLIC BANK BHD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO D1–22–891 OF 2002VINCENT NG J29 MARCH 2004

Civil Procedure — Striking out — Application to strike out action — Whether cause ofaction existed — Whether a principal-agent relationship exists between broker and insurancecompany — Privity of contract — Whether insurance company as undisclosed principal couldsue and be sued — Contracts Act 1950 s 179

Civil Procedure — Summary judgment — Setting aside — Whether there were triable issues— Wrong conversion of cheques — Whether issues of contributory negligence to be resolved

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— Whether defence under s 85 of Bills of Exchange Act 1949 available

Contract — Privity — Agency — Whether a principal-agent relationship exists betweenbroker and insurance company — Whether insurance company as undisclosed principal couldsue and be sued — Contracts Act 1950 s 179

The first plaintiff was a reinsurance broker which acted as agents for the secondplaintiff, an insurance company. Upon the first plaintiff’s confirmation of the risksreinsured, the second plaintiff remitted payments to be made to Sorema SA (Labuan),another reinsurance company. The first plaintiff had issued three cheques to arepresentative of Sorema SA (Labuan), Lee Meng Pang. The first plaintiff later foundout that the defendant had wrongfully credited the proceeds of the three cheques intothe account of Sorema SA (Services). Sorema SA (Labuan) disavowed any knowledgeor acceptance of risks on insurance policies undertaken by the second plaintiff. Theplaintiffs alleged that the defendant wrongfully converted their cheques and sought arefund. The senior assistant registar allowed the plaintiffs’ application for a summaryjudgment.The defendant appealed against the said decision and sought for the following: (i) videencl 16, to strike out the second plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it had noreasonable cause of action; and (ii) vide encl 22, to set aside the summary judgment inthat there were triable issues.

Held, dismissing defendant’s application in encl 16 but allowing appeal under encl 22:(1) In relation to encl 16, the second plaintiff’s cause of action was sufficiently

pleaded. The first plaintiff was acting as the second plaintiff’s agent as it merelytransmitted the moneys for the second plaintiff vide three cheques. There wasprivity of contract because the second plaintiff’s right to commence this suitwas derived from the principal-agent relationship between the plaintiffs, asprovided for by s 179 of the Contracts Act. Furthermore, an undisclosedprincipal could sue and be sued on a contract, even though the name and evenexistence were undisclosed (see paras 10 and 11).

(2) Regarding encl 22, the facts indicated that there were triable issues inascertaining whether the first plaintiff had negligently contributed to theirlosses, inter alia, by handing over the cheques to Lee Meng||Page 269>> Pang who ceased to be an employee of Sorema SA (Labuan). Inaddition, there was also the issue of vicarious liability on the part of the firstplaintiff to be considered at trial. The defendant might also succeed at the trialby invoking s 85 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1949 as a statutory protectionwhere a bank had acted in good faith and without negligence (see paras 24, 25and 27).

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Plaintif pertama adalah broker insuran semula yang berlaku sebagai agen plaintif kedua,sebuah syarikat insurans. Selepas mendapat pengesahan terhadap risikomenginsuranskan semula, plaintif kedua mengirimkan bayaran untuk SoremaSA(Labuan), sebuah syarikat insurans semula yang lain. Plaintif pertama mengeluarkantiga cek kepada Lee Meng Pang, wakil Sorema SA (Labuan). Kemudiannya, plaintifpertama mendapat tahu bahawa pihak defendan telah mengkreditkan hasil ketiga-tigacek dengan salah ke dalam akaun Sorema SA (Services). Sorema SA (Labuan)menafikan bahawa mereka mempunyai pengetahuan atau menerima risiko terhadappolisi insurans yang diakujanji oleh plaintif kedua. Kedua-dua plaintif menyatakanbahawa pihak defendan telah menukar cek mereka secara salah lalu menuntut bayaranbalik. Penolong kanan pendaftar telah membenarkan permohonan pihak plaintif untukpenghakiman terus.Pihak defendan membuat rayuan terhadap keputusan penolong kanan pendaftar(‘PKP’) dan memohon: (i) melalui lampiran 16, untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintifkedua atas ia tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang munasabah; dan (ii) melaluilampiran 22, untuk mengetepikan penghakiman terus atas alasan terdapat isu-isu yangperlu dibicarakan.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan defendan dalam lampiran 16 tetapi membenarkan dibawah lampiran 22:(1) Berkaitan dengan lampiran 16, pliding plaintif kedua telah sewajarnya

disempurnakan. Plaintif pertama telah bertindak sebagai agen kepada plaintifkedua kerana ia hanya menghantar wang untuk plaintif kedua menerusi tigacek. Terdapat priviti kontrak kerana hak plaintif kedua untuk memulakanguaman sivil wujud dari hubungan kedua-dua plaintif sebagai prinsipal dan ejen,yang diperuntukkan di bawah s 179 Akta Kontrak. Tambahan pula, prinsipalyang tidak didedahkan masih boleh mendakwa dan didakwa dalam kontrak,walaupun nama dan kewujudannya tidak disebut (lihat perenggan 10 dan 11).

(2) Berhubung lampiran 22, fakta-fakta menunjukkan bahawa terdapat isu-isu yangharus dibicarakan dalam menentukan sama ada plaintif pertama didapati turutcuai kepada kerugian, antara lain, semasa penyerahan cek-cek tersebut kepadaLee Meng Pang yang bukan lagi merupakan pekerja Sorema SA (Labuan) pada12 Julai 2001. Tambahan pula, terdapat isu liabiliti vikarius terhadap plaintifpertama yang perlu dipertimbangkan semasa perbicaraan. Defendan||Page 270>> juga boleh berjaya semasa perbicaraan dengan menggunakan s 85Akta Bil Pertukaran 1949 sebagai perlindungan statutori jika bank bertindakdengan suci hati dan tanpa kecuaian (lihat perenggan 24, 25 dan 27).]

Notes

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For cases on striking out of pleadings, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2001Reissue) para 4893.

For cases on setting aside of summary judgments, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed,2001 Reissue) paras 6065–6072

For cases on privity of contract involving agencies, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed,2003 Reissue) paras 4053–4054For striking out pleadings and actions see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2002Reissue) para [10.6-069].For cases on summary judgments, see 1 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2002 Reissue)paras [10.6-048]–[10.6-057].

Cases referred toBandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3

MLJ 36 (refd)Holt v Ely [1853] 1 E & B 794 (refd)Langton v Waite [1868] LR 6 Eq 165 (refd)Suppuletchimi v Palmco Bina Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 368 (refd)Teheran-Europe Co Ltd v ST Belton (Tractors) Ltd [1968] 2 All ER 886 (refd)Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Tio Chee Hing [1975] 2 MLJ 1 (refd)Yap Moi v Hong Leong Bank Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 614 (distd)

Legislation referred toBills of Exchange Act 1949 s 85Contracts Act 1950 s 179Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 68(1)Rules of the High Court 1980 O 14 O 18 r 19(1)(a)

Christene Tee (Raja Eleena Siew Ang & Assoc) for the appellant/defendant.Shaikh Abdul Saleem (Anad & Noraini) for the respondents/plaintiffs.

[2004] 6 MLJ 367

TAHAN INSURANCE MALAYSIA BHD v ONG CHOO TIAN@ ENG CHOO TIAN & ANOR

HIGH COURT (PENANG) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–144 OF 2003

70


KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J1 SEPTEMBER 2004

Insurance — Motor insurance — Liability — Third party claims — Statutory liability arisingunder s 90 of Road Transport Act 1987 — Insurance company defended insured against claimmade in earlier suit — Whether a waiver to right to repudiate claim

Road Traffic — Road — Definition of — Road Transport Act 1987 s 2

Tort — Damages — Negligence — Road accident — Claim for personal injuries —Proximity of events — Accident occurred on private property — Whether part of car must beon ‘road’ defined under s 2 of Road Transport Act 1987

The respondent was knocked down by her daughter-in-law (‘Yeow’) when the latter,whilst attempting to reverse the car out of the house, drove forward. The car’sinsurance policy was taken under the appellant The matter went before the sessionscourt who found Yeow 100% liable and entered judgment for the respondent. Therespondent then demanded settlement from the appellant. The appellant refusedpayment, contending that they were only liable for payment if the accident hadoccurred on a road as defined under s 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1987 (‘the Act’) but inthis case, it occurred within the house compound. Subsequently, the respondentobtained a summary judgment against the appellant for, inter alia, damages. Hence, thisappeal by the appellant.The main issues before this court were: (i) whether the accident occurred on a ‘road’within the definition of s 2 of the Act; (ii) whether the appellant was liablenotwithstanding the fact that when the accident occurred the plaintiff was on privateproperty; and (iii) whether the insurers, by defending the insured in the earlier action,had waived their rights to object to their statutory liability and were estopped fromdenying the plaintiff her judgment.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:(1) A five-foot path or way is a public thoroughfare. The car was at a place where

the public had access to, from which it collided into the respondent, although atthe moment of collision the place of collision was within the compound of thesaid house (see paras 13 and 14).

(2) At the precise moment when the negligent act occurred, part of the car wasclearly on the road. The subsequent act of wrongly putting the car into forwardmotion and thus causing the injury was the negligent act, arising out of the useof the car on the road (see para 20).

(3) The series of acts were so close and proximate that just out of the use of theroad, the negligent act occurred and the defendants were therefore liable. The

71


issue for the court to decide is how proximate was the resultant collision to hisentry into the private premises from the road.||Page 368>> In other words, when the negligent act occurred, at least a partof the car must have been on a road as defined in s 2 of the Act. On this issuetherefore, judgment was made in favour of the respondents (see para 22).

(4) The appellant were from the outset, non-committal. They wanted to have thebest of both worlds. They defended their insured with the intention ofmitigating their liability and negotiated quantum to reduce the sum payable.Although they put it on record that their defence was not to be construed aswaiving their right to repudiate a recovery claim, any reservation of their rightsought to be, vis-à-vis, between the defendants and their insured and driver.There is a statutory liability to meet in respect of third party claims. They couldnot place any condition against any third party from making a recovery claimagainst them for bodily injuries pursuant to their statutory liability (see paras 25and 26).


Responden telah dilanggar oleh isteri anaknya (‘Yeow’) ketika Yeow cuba untukmengalihkan kereta keluar dari rumah, telah memandu ke hadapan. Polisi insuranskereta tersebut telah dikeluarkan oleh perayu. Perkara ini dihadapkan ke mahkamahsesyen yang memutuskan bahawa Yeow 100% bertanggungjawab dan memberikeputusan yang memihak kepada responden. Responden kemudiannya memohonpenyelesaian daripada perayu. Perayu enggan membuat bayaran sambil mengadubahawa mereka hanya bertanggungan sekiranya kemalangan tersebut berlaku di atasjalan seperti yang ditafsirkan oleh s 2 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (‘Akta’), akantetapi dalam kes ini ia berlaku di dalam perkarangan rumah. Kemudiannya, perayutelah mendapatkan penghakiman terus terhadap perayu untuk, antara lain, pampasan.Maka, rayuan ini oleh perayu.Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah: (i) sama ada kemalangan tersebut berlaku diatas ‘jalan’ di bawah s 2 Akta; (ii) sama ada perayu bertanggungan, walaupun faktamenunjukkan bahawa kemalangan tersebut berlaku di perkarangan rumah.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos:(1) Sesuatu jalan kecil adalah untuk kegunaan awam. Kereta tersebut berada di

tempat di mana orang awam mempunyai akses kepadanya, daripada mana iatelah melanggar responden, walau pun pada masa kemalangan kawasankemalangan berada di dalam perkarangan rumah (lihat perenggan 13 dan 14).

(2) Tepat pada masa bila perbuatan kecuaian berlaku, sebahagian kereta tersebutberada di atas jalan. Tindakan silap seterusnya dalam memandu kereta kehadapan dan yang mengakibatkan kecederaan merupakan perbuatan kecuaian,yang timbul daripada penggunaan kereta tersebut di jalan berkenaan (lihat

72


perenggan 20).(3) Tindakan-tindakan selanjutnya sebegitu rapat dan berdekatan sehingga hanya

dengan menggunakan jalan, perbuatan kecuaian berlaku||Page 369>> dan pihak defendan didapati bersalah. Isu yang perlu diputuskanoleh mahkamah ini adalah betapa dekatnya perlanggaran kepada kemasukannyake dalam kediaman peribadi daripada jalan. Dalam erti kata lain, bilakemalangan tersebut berlaku, sekurang-kurangnya sebahagian kereta tersebutharus berada di atas jalan seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh s 2 Akta. Atas isuini, keputusan diberikan berpihak kepada responden (lihat perenggan 22).

(4) Perayu, daripada mulanya, tidak berpendirian. Mereka hendak menikmatikesenangan dari semua segi. Mereka telah membela pihak yang diinsuranskandengan niat untuk mengurangkan tanggungan dan telah berunding untukmengurangkan jumlah perlu dibayar. Walaupun mereka telah mengatakansecara bercatat bahawa pembelaan mereka bukanlah suatu pelepasan hakmereka untuk pembatalan mendapatkan semula tuntutan, penepian hak merekaharuslah dengan mengambil kira antara defendan, yang diinsuranskan danpemandu. Terdapat tanggungan statutori untuk diselesaikan berkenaan dengantuntutan pihak ketiga. Mereka tidak boleh membuat apa-apa syarat terhadapmana-mana pihak ketiga yang membuat tuntutan terhadap mereka untukkecederaan pada badan berpandukan tanggungan statutori tersebut (lihatperenggan 25 dan 26).]

NotesFor cases on liability under motor insurance, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002Reissue), paras 287–289.For cases on definition of roads, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue), para569.For cases on negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue), paras 193–217.

Cases referred toEvans v Employers Mutual Insurance Association Ltd (1935) All ER Rep 659 (refd)Griffin v Squires [1958] 3 All ER 468 (refd)Harrison v Hill (1932) SC (J) 13 (refd)Oxford v Austin [1981] RTR 416 (refd)Randall v Motor Insurance Bureau [1969] 1 All ER 21 (folld)

Legislation referred toRoad Traffic Act 1960 [UK] s 203(3)(a)Road Transport Act 1987 ss 2, 90(1)

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J Theeba Jothi (Kumar & Co) for the appellant.P Navaratnam (P Balachandran with him) (Syarikat P Subaiyyah) for the

respondents.||Page 370>>

[2004] 6 MLJ 376

BUJANG BIN MAT & ANOR v LAI TZEN HAI & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUCHING) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–21 OF 2003 III(I)CLEMENT SKINNER J3 AUGUST 2004

Tort –– Damages –– Personal injuries –– Liability –– Causing sudden danger on road ––Following too closely at unsafe speed –– Apportionment of liability –– Contributorynegligence –– Nursing care –– Whether correct multiplicand and multiplier used

Civil Procedure –– Damages –– General damages –– Provision for contingency ––Whether bound by Asainar bin Sainudin & Anor v Mohamad Salam Sidik

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants to recover loss anddamages for personal injuries suffered by them as a result of an accident involving theparties. The trial judge found the defendants 60% and the plaintiffs 40% liable. Thetrial judge also awarded special damages and general damages to the plaintiffs. Thedefendants as well as the plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the findings and thus the instantappeal and cross-appeal.

Held:(1) On the issue of liability, the trial judge did not err or incorrectly appreciate the

evidence before her. There was sufficient evidence on which the trial judgecame to her findings (see para 19).

(2) Based on the evidence, it would not be wrong to say that the first defendanthad created a sudden danger on the road by abruptly stopping the bus where hedid, which was the main cause of the accident. Thus, the trial judge did not errwhen she found the first defendant 60% liable for the accident (see para 21).

(3) Again on evidence, the trial judge was fully entitled to find that the first plaintiff40% liable as he was following the bus driven by the first defendant too closelyat a speed which was not safe to do so and which prevented him from taking

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the necessary evasive action after the situation of danger created by the firstdefendant by suddenly stopping the bus (see para 23).

(4) The trial judge is not bound to follow Asainar bin Sainudin & Anor vMohamad Salam Sidik, ie she must allow a 100% contingency to cater forincrease in future costs, as the case was not laying down any principle ofgeneral application (see para 40).


Plaintif memulakan satu tindakan terhadap defendan untuk mendapat kembalikehilangan dan ganti rugi bagi kecederaan diri yang dialaminya disebabkan olehkemalangan yang melibatkan kedua-dua pihak. Hakim bicara mendapati defendan 60%dan plaintif 40% bertanggungjawab. Hakim tersebut juga memberi award untuk gantirugi khas dan ganti rugi umum kepada plaintif. Defendan dan plaintif tidak berpuas hatidengan keputusan tersebut dan membuat rayuan dan rayuan balas.||Page 377>>

Diputuskan:(1) Dalam isu mengenai liabiliti, hakim bicara tidak silap ataupun salah dalam

menilai keterangan di hadapan beliau. Terdapat cukup keterangan pada manahakim bicara boleh sampai ke keputusannya (lihat perenggan 19).

(2) Berdasarkan pada keterangan, tidak salah dikatakan bahawa defendan pertamamenyebabkan bahaya yang mengejut di atas jalan dengan memberhentikan bassecara mengejut, yang mana merupakan penyebab utama kemalangan. Dari itu,hakim bicara tidak silap apabila beliau memutuskan yang defendan pertamabertanggungjawab 60% dalam perkara ini (lihat perenggan 21).

(3) Sekali lagi berdasarkan keterangan, hakim bicara berhak memutuskan bahawaplaintif pertama bertanggungjawab 40% dalam perkara ini kerana beliau telahmengikut terlalu dekat terlalu dekat bas yang dipandu oleh defendan pertamapada kadar kelajuan yang tidak selamat yang menghalang beliau dari dapatbertindak mengelak dari keadaan bahaya yang mana telah diujudkan olehdefendan pertama dengan memberhentikan bas secara mengejut (lihatperenggan 23).

(4) Hakim tersebut tidak terikat dengan kes Asainar bin Sainudin & Anor vMohamad Salam Sidik, iaitu beliau mesti membenar 100% kontingensi untukmemenuhi kenaikan kos masa hadapan, kerana kes tersebut tidak menetapkansebarang prinsip untuk kegunaan umum (lihat perenggan 40).]

NotesFor cases on damages for personal injuries, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002Reissue) paras 212–213.

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For cases on general damages, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras1932–1937.

Cases referred toAbdul Bin Karim v Ahmad bin Abdullah [1991] 2 CLJ 1490 (refd)Asainar bin Sainudin & Anor v Mohamad Salam bin Sidik (Suing through his

representative Sidikbin Sarmidi) [2002] 5 MLJ 104 (refd)Chandra Sekaran a/l Krishnan Nair & Anor v Ayub bin Mohamed & Anor [1994]

MLJU 82 (refd)Chandran v Mohammad Razali bin Jaafar [1992] MD 911 (refd)De Cotta v Tan Hock Lee [1972] 2 MLJ 173 (refd)Inderjeet Singh v Mazlan bin Jasman [1995] 2 MLJ 646 (refd)Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health Authority [1979] 2 All ER 910

(refd)Marappan & Anor v Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99 (refd)Mohd Yusof bin Abdul Ghani v Tee Song Kee & Anor [1995] MLJU 344 (refd)Muhammad Milshaddiq bin Juri v Rahmat bin Jamil [1993] MLJU 418 (refd)Nazori bin Teh & Anor v Teh Lye Seng & Anor [1996] 1 AMR 706 (refd)Ng Chun Loi v Hadzir & Ors [1993] 1 CLJ 323 (refd)Swee Boon King v Thong Tin Sing & Anor [1994] MD 1224 (refd)

||Page 378>>Tan Ah Kan v The Government of Malaysia [1997] 2 AMR 1382 (refd)Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani [1985] 2 MLJ 22 (refd)Tay Kheng Hong v Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] 30 MLJ 87 (refd)Waras Bin Beno v Khoo Hang Chuan & Anor [1991] 3 CLJ 2605 (refd)Wong Li Fan William (an infant) v Haidawati bte Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497

(refd)Yu Mea Lian & Anor v Government of Terengganu & Ors [1997] MLJU 252 (refd)Zainab bte Ahmad lwn Keretapi Tanah Melayu Bhd [2000] 5 MLJ 620 (refd)Zamri Md Som & Anor v Nurul Fitriyaton Idawiyah Nahrawi [2002] 1 CLJ 309 (refd)

Legislation referred toHighway Code r 22

Appeal from Summons No 53–18–2001–III (Sessions Court, Kuching)

Shankar Ram (Shankar Ram & Co) for the plaintiffs/respondents.

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Frank Tang (Tang & Partners) for the defendants/appellant.

[2004] 7 MLJ 513

ISITO ELECTRONICS SDN BHD v TEH AH KIAM & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO D5-22-968 OF 2001RAMLY ALI J13 NOVEMBER 2003

Companies and Corporations — Receivership — Receiver’s personal liability — Whetherreceiver and manager liable for contract entered on behalf of the company under receivership— Whether they are merely agents

Companies and Corporations — Receivership — Receiver’s personal liability — Whetherreceiver and manager can be liable for negligence in respect of performance of duty undercontract entered on behalf of company under receivership

The plaintiff brought this action claiming that the liability of the defendant as Receiverand Manager to a company is akin to a simple contract involving an offer, acceptanceand consideration. The plaintiff contended that an invitation to treat was made by thedefendant wherein the plaintiff made an offer to purchase the goods belonging tocompany under receivership. Subsequently the defendant made a counter offer. Theplaintiff accepted the counter offer. Later the plaintiff paid the purchase price. Theplaintiff further contended that there was a binding contract between the plaintiff andthe defendant, and when certain items of the goods were missing, the defendant hadbreached the contract and was liable for damages. The plaintiff also argued that thedefendant, as a Receiver and Manager of the Company, owes a duty of care in contractor in tort to ensure that the goods which were bought by the plaintiff are ready andavailable for collection by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that the defendant in thepresent case is a bailee in respect of those goods. Even though there are exclusionclauses in the contract, the plaintiff submitted that the defendant in this case cannotexclude liability. The defendant on the other hand submitted that it merely acted as anagent to the company.

Held, dismissing plaintiff’s claim with costs:(1) There was no contract between the plaintiff and the defendant personally in

respect of the said goods purchased by the plaintiff. There was no breach ofcontract or any duty of care by the defendant. Therefore, the question relatingto the defendant’s liability for any loss of the goods and to compensate the

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plaintiff did not arise (see para 44).(2) If at all the defendant was negligent in performing his duties as a Receiver and

Manager, the cause of action would belong to the Company (as principal) andto the debenture holder but not to the plaintiff to whom no general duty isowed by the defendant (see para 45).


Plaintif memulakan tindakan ini dengan menuntut bahawa liabiliti defendan sebagaipegawai penerima dan pengurus untuk satu syarikat adalah sama dengan satu kontrakyang biasa melibatkan tawaran, penerimaan dan||Page 514>> balasan. Plaintif menyatakan jemputan untuk membuat tawaran dibuatoleh defendan di mana plaintif membuat tawaran untuk membeli barang-barangkepunyaan syarikat yang di bawah penerimaan. Selepas itu defendan membuat tawaranbalas. Plaintif menerima tawaran balas tersebut. Kemudian plaintif telah bayar untukharga belian. Plaintif juga menyatakan terdapat kontrak yang mengikat di antaraplaintif dan defendan dan apabila terdapat barang-barang yang hilang, defendan telahmemungkiri kontrak tersebut dan bertanggungjawab untuk gantirugi. Plaintif jugaberhujah defendan sebagai pegawai penerima dan pengurus bagi syarikat tersebutmempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga di bawah kontrak dan tort untuk memastikanbahawa barang-barang yang dibeli oleh plaintif adalah sedia dan terdapat untukdipunggah oleh plaintif. Plaintif juga menegaskan defendan adalah bailee untukbarang-barang tersebut. Walaupun terdapat klausa pengecualian dalam kontrak ini,plaintif berhujah ia tidak boleh mengecualikan liabiliti. Defendan pula berhujah ia hanyabertindak sebagai agen kepada syarikat tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos:(1) Tiada kontrak di antara plaintif dan defendan secara peribadi mengenai

barang-barang yang dibeli tersebut. Tiada kemungkiran kontrak atau kewajipanberjaga-jaga oleh defendan. Oleh demikian soalan mengenai liabiliti defendanmengenai kehilangan barang-barang dan harus diberi pampasan tidak timbul(lihat perenggan 44).

(2) Jika defendan cuai dalam menjalankan tanggungjawabnya sebagai pegawaipenerima dan pengurus, kuasa tindakan adalah kepunyaan syarikat (sebagaiprinsipal) dan pemegang dibentur tetapi bukan kepada plaintif yang mana tiadakewajipan am dihutang oleh defendan (lihat perenggan 45).]

NotesFor cases on personal liability of receivers, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003Reissue) paras 605–607

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Cases referred toDownsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corp Ltd [1993] 3 All ER 627 (refd)Lathia v Dronsfield Bros [1986] BCLC 321 (refd)Ooi Boon Leong & Ors v Citibank [1984] 1 MLJ 222 (refd)Pernas Trading Sdn Bhd v Persatuan Peladang Bakti Melaka [1979] 2 MLJ 124

(refd)Photo Production Ltd v Sucuricor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (refd)Public Bank Bhd v Ng Chee Ping & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 449 (refd)Robert Bosch (SEA) Pte Ltd v Goh Ban Huat Bhd [1996] 1 AMR 714 (refd)The Chartered Bank v Yong Chen [1974] 1 MLJ 151 (refd)Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152 (refd)

Legislation referred toCompanies Act 1965 s 183(1)

||Page 515>>Contracts Act 1950 ss 1(2), 101, 104, 105, 135, 139, 140, 179, 183, 184(a)Rules of the High Court 1980 O 14A

Gamesh Perumal (Ringo Low & Associates) for the plaintiffIzabella De Silva (Iza Ng Yeo & Kit) for the defendant

[2003] 1 MLJ 149

Krishnan Rajan a/l N Krishnan v Bank Negara Malaysia & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S5–23–36 OF 2001ABDUL MALIK ISHAK J16 NOVEMBER 2002

Civil Procedure — Preliminary issue — Application for issue or question raised in pleadingsto be tried on preliminary basis — First defendant allegedly blacklisted plaintiff wrongfullypursuant to first defendant’s BMC Guidelines — Plaintiff sued defendants for defamation andnegligence — Preliminary issue or question on whether BMC Guidelines were ultra vires andunlawful under s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 — Whetheroutcome of preliminary issue or question would result or substantially result in disposal of case— Whether there would be a substantial saving of expense and time — Rules of the HighCourt 1980 O 33 r 2

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The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation and negligence arising out of anincident in which the first defendant was said to have wrongfully blacklisted theplaintiff under the first defendant’s ‘Biro Maklumat Cek Operational Framework andReporting Guidelines’ (‘BMC Guidelines’). The BMC Guidelines were issued by thefirst defendant pursuant to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 (‘the Act’). Thiswas the plaintiff’s application (in encl 16) for an issue or question raised in thepleadings of this suit to be tried on a preliminary basis under O 33 r 2 of the Rules ofthe High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) on the grounds that it would save considerable timeand costs. The issue or question to be tried was whether the BMC Guidelines wereultra vires and unlawful under s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act. Section 30(1)(mmmm) ofthe Act permitted the first defendant to establish a central bureau to collect informationrelating to the rejection by a paying bank of any cheque for reason of insufficient fundsin the account of the drawer of the cheque and to disclose any such information to anybank for the purpose only of assisting the bank to assess the eligibility of the saiddrawer to maintain or open any current account with the bank. The plaintiff’s counselsubmitted that s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act cannot be construed so as to give powers tocompulsorily blacklist a bad cheque offender. The first defendant’s contention was thatthis court should not invoke its discretionary powers under O 33 r 2 of the RHC sincethe determination of the preliminary issue or question would not substantially disposeof the cause or matter. This was because whether the BMC Guidelines were valid orotherwise, this court would still have to decide on the issue of whether the allegedmaintenance of the blacklist amounted to a defamatory statement. Furthermore,transmission of information to the first defendant in the instant case was in coded formand the question of whether there was publication can only be determined at the trialproper by way of viva voce evidence. In this regard, extrinsic evidence would berequired to be adduced to ascertain whether or not the maintenance of the blacklistamounted to publication. ||Page 150>>

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application:(1) Order 33 r 2 of the RHC conferred upon the court a wide discretionary power

to order any question or issue in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law orpartly of fact and partly of law, to be tried before, at or after the trial of thecause or matter. An application under O 33 r 2 of the RHC was not appropriatewhere the facts were in dispute or where extrinsic evidence was required to beadduced. The overriding consideration to take into account was whether theapplication would result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure. Inaddition, the court should also be wary and warn itself against the abuse of thisprocess (see p 154E–G).

(2) Even if the court were to find the BMC Guidelines to be ultra vires, thatoutcome would not result or substantially result in the disposal of the case. Theplaintiff’s actions for libel and negligence were distinct causes of action and

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independent of whether the BMC Guidelines were valid or otherwise. Thedisposal of the proposed question in encl 16 would not render the trial for theactions of libel and negligence unnecessary as this court must also determinewhether the legal ingredients for the actions of libel and negligence had beensatisfied. Accordingly, if this court were to try the preliminary point as framedin encl 16, there would not be a substantial saving of expense and time (see pp167E–F, 168G–I).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif mendakwa defendan-defendan untuk fitnah dan kecuaian yang timbul dari satukejadian di mana defendan pertama dikatakan telah dengan salahnya menyenaraihitamkan plaintif di bawah ‘Biro Maklumat Cek Operational Framework andReporting Guidelines’ (‘Garis Panduan BMC’) defendan pertama. Garis PanduanBMC dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama menurut Akta Bank Negara Malaysia 1958(‘Akta tersebut’). Ini merupakan permohonan plaintif (dalam lampiran 16) agar suatuisu atau soalan dibangkitkan dalam pliding guaman ini untuk dibicarakan atas dasarpermulaan di bawah A 33 k 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) atasalasan bahawa ia akan menjimatkan masa dan kos. Isu atau soalan yang harusdibicarakan ialah sama ada Garis Panduan BMC adalah ultra vires dan menyalahiundang-undang di bawah s 30(1)(mmmm) Akta tersebut. Seksyen 30(1)(mmmm) Aktatersebut membenarkan defendan pertama supaya mewujudkan satu pusat biro untukmengumpul maklumat berhubung dengan penolakan oleh satu bank pembayar atasmana-mana cek dengan alasan kekurangan wang dalam akaun pembayar cek dan untukmendedahkan maklumat demikian kepada mana-mana bank untuk tujuan semata-matamembantu bank menilai keupayaan pembayar tersebut untuk mengekal atau membukamana-mana akaun semasa dengan bank. Peguam plaintif berhujah bahawa maksud s30(1)(mmmm) Akta ||Page 151>>tersebut tidak boleh ditafsir sehinggakan memberi kuasa untuksemestinya menyenarai hitamkan seorang pesalah cek tendang. Hujah defendanpertama adalah bahawa mahkamah ini tidak harus menggunakan kuasa berdasarkanbudi bicara di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT oleh kerana penentuan isu atau soalan permulaantidak akan menyelesaikan kausa atau perkara secara substantial. Ini adalah kerana samaada Garis Panduan BMC adalah sah atau sebaliknya, mahkamah ini masih tetap harusmemutuskan isu tentang sama ada pengekalan senarai hitam yang dikatakan membawakepada satu pernyataan berfitnah. Tambahan pula, penyampaian maklumat kepadadefendan pertama dalam kes ini adalah berbentuk kod dan soalan sama ada berlakunyaterbitan hanya boleh diputuskan di perbicaraan sebenar melalui keterangan viva voce.Berhubung hal ini, keterangan luar perlu dikemukakan untuk menentukan sama adapengekalan senarai hitam berjumlah kepada terbitan.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif:

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(1) Aturan 33 k 2 KMT memberikan mahkamah kuasa berdasarkan budi bicarayang luas untuk memutuskan sebarang soalan atau isu dalam satu kausa atauperkara, sama ada mengenai fakta atau undang-undang atau sebahagian faktadan sebahagian undang-undang, untuk dibicarakan sebelum, semasa atauselepas perbicaraan sesuatu kausa atau perkara. Satu permohonan di bawah A33 k 2 KMT tidak wajar bila mana fakta-fakta dipertikaikan atau di manaketerangan luar perlu dikemukakan. Timbangan paling utama untuk diambilkira adalah sama ada permohonan tersebut akan mengakibatkan penjimatanmasa dan perbelanjaan yang substantial. Tambahan pula, mahkamah juga harusberwaspada dan berjaga-jaga terhadap penyalahgunaan proses ini (lihat ms154E–G).

(2) Jikapun mahkamah mendapati Garis Panduan BMC adalah ultra vires,keputusan tersebut tidak akan mengakibatkan atau secara substantialmengakibatkan penyelesaian kes. Tindakan plaintif untuk fitnah dan kecuaianmerupakan kausa tindakan berlainan dan bebas daripada sama ada GarisPanduan BMC adalah sah atau sebaliknya. Penyelesaian soalan yangdicadangkan dalam lampiran 16 tidak menyebabkan perbicaraan untuk tindakanfitnah dan kecuaian tidak perlu kerana mahkamah ini mesti juga memutuskansama ada unsur-unsur perundangan untuk tindakan fitnah dan kecuaian telahdipenuhi. Oleh yang demikian, sekiranya mahkamah membicarakan hujahpermulaan seperti yang dirangka dalam lampiran 16, penjimatan perbelanjaandan masa yang substantial tidak mungkin berlaku (lihat ms 167E–F, 168G–I).]

NotesFor cases on preliminary issue, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para4903.||Page 152>>

Cases referred toArab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Meridien International Credit Corporation Ltd

London [1993] 3 MLJ 193 (refd)Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Herbert Smith [1968] 2 All ER 1002 (refd)Chan Kum Loong v Hii Sui Eng [1980] 1 MLJ 313 (refd)Commonwealth Shipping Representative v P & O Branch Services [1923] AC 191

(refd)Dawson v Lunn (1984) 149 JP 491 (refd)Dominic J Puthucheary v Jet Age Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor; Module

Construction Sdn Bhd & Ors v Jet Age Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2MLJ 252 (refd)

Everett v Ribbands & Anor [1952] 2 QB 198 (refd)Federal Insurance Co v Nakano Singapore (Pte) Ltd [1992] 1 SLR 390 (refd)

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Fulcrum Capital Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Samsudin Abu Hassan; Rahaz Sdn Bhd & Anor(Interveners) and another case [2000] MLJU 610; [2001] 5 CLJ 73 (refd)

Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 (refd)Huang Ee Hoe & Ors v Tiong Thai King & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 51 (refd)Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474 (refd)Thanaraj a/l Manikam & Ors v Lower Perak Tamil Co-operative Society [1997] 4

MLJ 82 (refd)The Attorney-General & Ephraim Hutchings (Relator) v The Directors of the Great

Eastern Railway Company [1880] 5 App Cas 473 (refd)

Legislation referred toCentral Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 ss 2, 30(1)(mmmm)Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 r 2Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 ss s 43(3), 114

Amir bin Ismail (Goh Peng Hong and Tee Kim Chan with him) (Edmund Ponniah &Tee) for the plaintiff.

Porres Royan (Shook Lin & Bok) for the first defendant.Adibah Ishak (Nur Nadia bte Mohd Amin with her) (Michael Chen, Gan, Muzafar &

Azwar) for the second defendant.Chen Siew Mei (Raslan Loong) for the third defendant.

[2003] 1 MLJ 204

Sime Securities Sdn Bhd (formerly known as UMBC SecuritiesSdn Bhd) v Anthony Lee Sin Choy

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL PROCEEDINGS NO D5–22–5 OF 1996KANG HWEE GEE J3 DECEMBER 2002

Securities — Stokebroker — Negligence — Damages — Standard of care — Whetherlicensed stockbroker entitled to sell shares as it thought fit — Whether negligent in not sellingearlier at higher price — Whether failure to carry out client’s instruction, a breach on part oflicensed stockbroker

The defendant was a client of the plaintiff, a licensed stockbroker of the Kuala Lumpur

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Stock Exchange (‘KLSE’). The plaintiff’s claim in this case was in respect of thepayment of 50 lots of Cash shares which the plaintiff had purchased on the defendant’sinstruction. The defendant did not take up the shares when they were due for paymenton the eighth day of transaction (‘T+7’) as required under the rules of trading thenprevailing. Under the same rules, the plaintiff would be entitled to force sell themthrough the exchange by the ninth day of transaction (‘T+8’) and to remit any contragain or contra loss to the defendant’s trading account. But the plaintiff did not forcesell the shares on that day or on the subsequent days thereafter until the Cash counterwas suddenly suspended by the KLSE. The suspension was lifted and the counterreopened for trading a month later. Still the shares were not forced sold. The defendantthen instructed the plaintiff to sell the shares. The plaintiff sold them only some sevenmonths and three weeks later. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was for thepayment of the 50 lots of Cash shares purchased less the amount recovered by forceselling. The plaintiff also claimed a further late payment charge, costs and interests.The defendant denied owing the plaintiff the sum claimed. Instead, he counterclaimedon the basis that had the plaintiff sold the shares as instructed by him, he would have acontra gain instead of a contra loss when the shares were force-sold.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim and allowing the defendant’s counterclaim:(1) In the instant case, it was clear that the obligation of the defendant to pay for

the purchase of the shares by T+7 had not been varied. It followed therefore,the plaintiff’s failure to sell the shares on T+8 as mandated by the KLSE wasby its own default. No evidence was adduced as to why the plaintiff only soldthe shares some seven months after the date of transaction. One can thereforeconclude that the sale could not have been conducted bona fide to recover theplaintiff’s loss (see p 210A–B); UMBC Securities Sdn Bhd v Tan Chee Aan[2001] 3 MLJ 410 distinguished.||Page 205>>

(2) By failing to exercise its right to force sell the shares on T+8 as required underthe prescribed regulations for selling-out, the plaintiff must be taken to havewaived its right to sell them on that day. A failure on the part of the plaintiff tosell them as directed constituted a breach of an essential term of the contractexpress or implied to which the defendant would be entitled to claim damages(see pp 210H, 211B).

(3) A failure to carry out the instruction constituted a breach on the part of plaintiffof its obligation to sell the shares on the instruction of the defendant. Thedefendant was therefore entitled to counterclaim on the basis that had theshares been sold on his instruction, he could have made a substantial contragain instead of suffering a contra loss when the plaintiff force sold them(see p 211G–H); Keppel Finance Ltd v Phoon Ah Lek [1994] 3 MLJ 26distinguished.

84



Defendan adalah pelanggan plaintif, seorang broker saham berlesen dengan KualaLumpur Stock Exchange (‘KLSE’). Tuntutan plaintif dalam kes ini adalah berhubungpembayaran 50 lot saham-saham Cash yang mana telah dibeli oleh plaintif atas arahandefendan. Defendan tidak mengambil saham-saham tersebut apabila saham-sahamtersebut perlu dibayar pada hari kelapan transaksi (‘T+7’) sebagaimana yangdikehendaki di bawah peraturan-peraturan perdagangan yang wujud ketika itu. Dibawah peraturan-peraturan yang sama, plaintif akan berhak untuk memaksa jualsaham-saham tersebut melalui pertukaran tersebut menjelang hari kesembilan transaksi(‘T+8’) dan meremitkan apa-apa keuntungan atau kerugian kontra kepada akaunperdagangan defendan. Namun demikian plaintif tidak memaksa jual saham-sahamtersebut pada hari tersebut atau pada hari-hari berikutnya sehinggalah kaunter Cashtiba-tiba digantung oleh KLSE. Penggantungan tersebut telah ditarik balik dan kauntertersebut dibuka semula untuk dagangan sebulan kemudian. Namun begitusaham-saham tersebut masih tidak dipaksa jual. Defendan kemudiannya mengarahkanplaintif untuk menjual saham-saham tersebut. Plaintif telah menjual saham-sahamtersebut hanya selepas tujuh bulan dan tiga minggu. Tuntutan plaintif terhadapdefendan adalah untuk pembayaran 50 lot saham-saham Cash yang telah dibeli kurangdaripada jumlah yang diperolehi melalui jualan paksa. Plaintif juga menuntut cajbayaran lewat, kos dan faedah. Defendan menafikan berhutang dengan plaintif bagijumlah yang dituntut. Sebaliknya, beliau menuntut balas atas dasar bahawa jika plaintiftelah menjual saham-saham tersebut sebagaimana yang diarahkan oleh beliau, beliauakan mendapat keuntungan kontra dan bukan kerugian kontra apabila saham-sahamtersebut dipaksa jual.||Page 206>>

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dan membenarkan tuntutan balas defendan:(1) Dalam kes semasa, adalah jelas bahawa tanggungjawab defendan untuk

membayar saham-saham bagi pembelian saham-saham melalui T+7 tidakdiubah. Berikutan itu, kegagalan plaintif untuk menjual saham-saham tersebutpada T+8 sebagaimana yang diberi mandat oleh KLSE adalah melaluikegagalannya sendiri. Tiada keterangan telah dikemukakan berhubung kenapaplaintif hanya menjual saham-saham tersebut tujuh bulan selepas tarikhtransaksi tersebut. Seseorang boleh membuat kesimpulan bahawa jualantersebut tidak dikendalikan secara bona fide untuk mendapat balik kerugianplaintif (lihat ms 210A–B); UMBC Securities Sdn Bhd v Tan Chee Aan [2001]3 MLJ 410 dibeza.

(2) Dengan kegagalan untuk melaksanakan hak untuk menjual paksa saham-sahamtersebut pada T+8 sebagaimana dikehendaki di bawah peraturan-peraturanpenjualan yang dinyatakan, plaintif harus dianggap telah mengenepikan haknyauntuk menjual saham-saham tersebut pada hari tersebut. Satu kegagalan di

85


pihak plaintif untuk menjual saham-saham tersebut sebagaimana yang diarahkanmembentuk satu pelanggaran terma penting kepada kontrak secara langsungatau tersirat yang mana defendan akan berhak menuntut ganti rugi (lihat ms210H, 211B).

(3) Satu kegagalan untuk melaksanakan arahan membentuk satu perlanggaran dipihak plaintif terhadap tanggungjawab beliau menjual saham-saham tersebutatas arahan defendan. Defendan oleh itu berhak untuk menuntut balas atasdasar sekiranya saham-saham tersebut telah dijual atas arahan beliau, beliaumungkin dapat memperolehi keuntungan kontra yang besar dan tidakmengalami kerugian kontra apabila plaintif menjual secara paksa saham-sahamtersebut (lihat ms 211G–H); Keppel Finance Ltd v Phoon Ah Lek [1994] 3MLJ 26 dibeza.

NotesFor cases on negligence on the part of a stockbroker, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,2001 Reissue) paras 915–919.

Cases referred toAssociated Pan Malaysia Cement Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Teknikal & Kejuruteraan Sdn

Bhd [1990] 3 MLJ 287 (refd)Keppel Finance Ltd v Phoon Ah Lek [1994] 3 MLJ 26 (distd)UMBC Securities Sdn Bhd v Tan Chee Aan [2001] 3 MLJ 410 (distd)

Legislation referred toContracts Act 1950 s 64Rules for Trading by Member Companies r 8

||Page 207>>

R Yogeswari Rathakrishnan (Che Mokhtar & Co) for the plaintiff.Steven Puung (Isharidah, Ho, Chong & Menon) for the defendant.

[2003] 1 MLJ 273

Sri Inai (Pulau Pinang) Sdn Bhd v Yong Yit Swee & Ors*

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO P–04–8 OF 1998GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN AND ALAUDDIN JJCA19 NOVEMBER 2002

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Civil Procedure — Judicial precedent — Federal Court — Decision of High Courtoverlooked relevant decision of Federal Court — Whether High Court had acted contrary tothe doctrine of precedent

Tort — Negligence — Duty of care — Whether discharge of such duty dependent on facts ofparticular case — Whether degree of care dependent on magnitude of risk — Assumption ofresponsibility to perform professional or quasi-professional services for plaintiff relying onsuch services — Whether duty of care to be imposed — Assumption of responsibility andfactum of reliance may be express or inferred from circumstances of each case

Tort — Negligence — Duty of care — Whether pre-existing contractual relationshipnecessary for duty of care to arise

Tort — Occupier’s liability — Duty of care — Nature, scope and extent of duty owed bylandlord to lawful visitors of his tenant

Tort — Occupier’s liability — Duty of care — Whether duty of care owed by landlord ofpremises to lawful visitors of tenant

[* The judgment of the learned sessions court judge, Ho Mooi Ching, is publishedimmediately after this Court of Appeal judgment. See p 290.The first defendant(appellant) — a school, rented an old dwelling house from the second defendant (tenthrespondent) — a local authority.] The first defendant rented the house which belongedto the second defendant for use as a hostel to accommodate some of its students. Thesecond defendant despite knowing that young children would live in the old house, didnothing to upgrade the building to ensure that it was safe for use as a hostel by youngchildren. Subsequently a fire broke out in the house claiming the lives of severalchildren and causing serious injury to others. An action was filed in the sessions courtagainst the defendants in respect of the accident and at the conclusion of its trial, thesessions court judge found the defendants equally liable for the deaths and injuriescaused by the fire. The first defendant appealed to the High Court contending that thesecond defendant should be held solely liable. The second defendant cross-appealed forthe same purpose. The High Court however dismissed the appeal, allowed the crossappeal and awarded costs against the plaintiff. Whilst the High Court accepted thefindings of fact made by the sessions court judge, it found for the second defendantpurely on a point of law. The High Court decided that as a matter of law the seconddefendant whether as a landlord or a local ||Page 274>>authority owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. The first defendant thusappealed to the Court of Appeal with leave.

Held, allowing the appeal, setting aside the order of the High Court and restoring the

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order of the sessions court:(1) Whether the duty of care has been discharged in a given case depends on a

number of factors present or absent on the peculiar fact pattern of theparticular case. In other words, the degree of care that ought to be exerciseddepends among other matters on the magnitude of risk to which a plaintiff isexposed in particular circumstances. Presently, the law of tort imposes a dutyof care on a defendant who assumes responsibility to perform professional orquasi-professional services for a plaintiff who relies on those services. In suchcases the relationship between the parties is itself sufficient without more togive rise to a duty on the part of the defendant to exercise reasonable skill andcare in doing so. The assumption of responsibility and the factum of reliancemay be either express or may reasonably be inferred from the circumstances ofthe particular case. In the instant case, the sessions court judge would havebeen entirely justified in finding liability against the first defendant on the basisthat it had assumed responsibility for the safety of the innocent pupils whilethey resided at the hostel and the latter had in turn relied on the former to makethe hostel reasonably safe (see pp 281C–D, H, 282A–B); Government ofMalaysia & Ors v Jumat bin Mahmud & Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 103 andMohamed Raihan bin Ibrahim & Anor v Government of Malaysia & Ors[1981] 2 MLJ 27 followed; Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners [1964]AC 465; Smith v Eric S Bush [1989] 2 All ER 514 and Henderson v MerrettSyndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 referred.

(2) In Malaysia, the Federal Court decision of Lembaga Kemajuan TanahPersekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 accepted the proposition thatDonoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 overrides cases that preceded it wherecourts insisted upon a pre-existing contractual relationship in order for a dutyof care to arise. It is entirely up to our courts to develop our common lawjurisprudence according to the needs of our local circumstances. This is inkeeping with the common law tradition (see p 285D–E); Invercargill CityCouncil v Hamlin [1996] 1 All ER 756 and Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v HotelRasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 356 followed. Following thejurisprudence encapsulated in the case of Lembaga Kemajuan TanahPersekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283, a landlord of premises standsin sufficiently close proximity to the lawful visitors of his tenant. In accordancewith Malaysian common law, a landlord of premises owes a duty of care to thelawful visitors of his tenant (see p 286A, C–D); Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC428 distinguished; ||Page 275>>AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240 and LembagaKemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 followed;Travers v Gloucester Corporation [1947] 1 KB 71 and Sutherland ShireCouncil v Heyman [1985] 157 CLR 424 referred.

(3) The nature, scope and extent of the duty owed by a landlord to the lawfulvisitors of his tenant is to ensure that the premises that are let out are safe for

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the purposes for which they are meant to be used and the defect complained ofby the entrant must be a defect of which the landlord had knowledge or meansof knowledge (see pp 286D–287C); Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56 followed.

(4) The evidence on record showed that the second defendant, despite being alocal authority whose duty it was to enforce compliance of the UniformBuilding By-Laws 1986 (‘the By-Laws’), did not comply with those veryBy-Laws when letting out the building in question to the first defendant. It didnot take any steps to meet the requirements of the By-Laws in respect of theavailability of a safe exit for occupants in the event of a fire. It was well awarethat the building was to be used as a hostel for young children. In suchcircumstances the second defendant was not a bare landlord. It exposed theplaintiffs to the risk of injury by its failure to comply with the relevantBy-Laws. It knew the purpose for which its property was to be used. It wasalso well aware of the harm that would ensue to the children by reason of theabsence or inadequacy of fire escape exits. Accordingly, the second defendantas the landlord of the premises in question owed a duty of care to the lawfulvisitors of its tenant and was in breach of that duty (see pp 287F–288B);Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 and Lembaga Kemajuan TanahPersekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 followed.

(5) The High Court erred in important respects. By refusing to apply AC Billings& Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240 on the ground that it was a case decidedafter the coming into force of the Civil Law Act 1956, it overlooked thedecision of the Federal Court in Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan vMariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 which applied AC Billings and was adecision binding on it. The High Court had thus acted contrary to the doctrineof precedent. The High Court’s interpretation of s 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956did not also accord with the decision of Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel RasaSayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 356 which decision was also binding onit. As an appellate court will not disturb the apportionment of liability for anaccident made by the trial court except in the rarest of cases — and the presentcase was not such a case — the apportionment of equal liability by the sessionscourt had to be restored. The High Court had found the first defendant 100%liable on a ground of law with which the Court of Appeal could not agree (seepp 288E–F, 289C–D); AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240;Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283and Chung ||Page 276>>Khiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1MLJ 356 followed.


Defendan pertama (perayu) — sebuah sekolah, telah menyewa sebuah rumah kediaman

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lama daripada defendan kedua (responden kesepuluh) — satu badan berkuasa.Defendan pertama telah menyewa rumah tersebut yang dimiliki oleh defendan keduauntuk digunakan sebagai sebuah asrama bagi menempatkan beberapa orangpenuntutnya. Defendan kedua walaupun mengetahui bahawa budak-budak akan tinggaldi rumah lama tersebut, tidak membuat apa-apa pembaikan ke atas bangunan tersebutbagi memastikan ia selamat untuk digunakan sebagai sebuah asrama untukbudak-budak. Selepas itu satu kebakaran telah berlaku dalam rumah tersebut yangmeragut nyawa beberapa orang budak tersebut dan menyebabkan yang lain mengalamikecederaan serius. Satu tindakan telah difailkan di mahkamah sesyen terhadapdefendan-defendan berhubung kemalangan tersebut dan di penutup perbicaraannya,hakim mahkamah sesyen mendapati defendan-defendan bersama-samabertanggungjawab atas kematian dan kecederaan akibat kebakaran tersebut. Defendanpertama telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi dengan menghujahkan bahawa defendankedua sepatutnya menanggung tanggungjawab sepenuhnya. Defendan kedua telahmembuat rayuan balas bagi tujuan yang sama. Mahkamah Tinggi bagaimanapun telahmenolak rayuan tersebut, membenarkan rayuan balas tersebut dan mengawardkan kosterhadap plaintif. Walaupun Mahkamah Tinggi menerima penemuan-penemuan faktayang dibuat oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen, ia berpihak kepada defendan keduasemata-mata berdasarkan undang-undang. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskanbahawa berdasarkan undang-undang defendan kedua sama ada sebagai tuanpunyatanah atau satu badan berkuasa tidak mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga ke atasplaintif-plaintif. Defendan pertama oleh itu telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan dengankebenaran.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut, mengenepikan perintah Mahkamah Tinggidan mengekalkan perintah mahkamah sesyen:(1) Sama ada kewajipan berjaga-jaga telah dilepaskan dalam suatu kes bergantung

kepada faktor-faktor yang wujud atau tiada dalam corak fakta khusus kestertentu. Dalam perkataan lain, tahap berjaga-jaga yang patut ada bergantungkepada, antara perkara lain, besarnya pendedahan plaintif terhadap risiko-risikodalam keadaan-keadaan yang tertentu. Pada ketika ini, undang-undang tortmengenakan satu kewajipan berjaga-jaga ke atas defendan yang menerimatanggungjawab untuk melaksanakan khidmat profesional atau quasi-profesionaluntuk plaintif yang bergantung kepada khidmat tersebut. Dalam keadaandemikian, ||Page 277>>hubungan antara pihak-pihak adalah dengan sendirinya mencukupitanpa perlu menimbulkan satu kewajipan di pihak defendan untuk mengambilsikap mahir dan berjaga-jaga yang munasabah semasa berbuat demikian.Penerimaan tanggungjawab dan faktor pergantungan boleh dinyatakan atauboleh disimpulkan daripada keadaan-keadaan kes tertentu. Dalam kes semasa,hakim mahkamah sesyen mempunyai justifikasi dalam penemuan liabilititerhadap defendan pertama berdasarkan ia telah menerima tanggungjawabuntuk keselamatan penuntut-penuntut yang tidak bersalah semasa merekamenetap di asrama tersebut dan penuntut-penuntut tersebut juga bergantung

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kepada defendan pertama untuk menjadikan asrama tersebut selamat untukdiduduki (lihat ms 281C–D, H, 282A–B); Government of Malaysia & Ors vJumat bin Mahmud & Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 103 dan Mohamed Raihan binIbrahim & Anor v Government of Malaysia & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 27diikut;Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners [1964] AC 465; Smith v Eric S Bush[1989] 2 All ER 514 dan Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC145 dirujuk.

(2) Di Malaysia, keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Lembaga KemajuanTanah Persekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 menerima kenyataanbahawa Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 mengatasi kes-kes yangsebelumnya di mana mahkamah menegaskan perlunya satu hubungankontraktual wujud sebelum satu kewajipan berjaga-jaga timbul. Ia terpulangsepenuhnya kepada mahkamah kita untuk membentuk jurisprudens commonlaw menurut keperluan keadaan tempatan di sini (lihat ms 285D–E);Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] 1 All ER 756 dan Chung KhiawBank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 356 diikut.Mengikut jurisprudens yang terkandung dalam Lembaga Kemajuan TanahPersekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283, seorang tuanpunya tanahsuatu premis mempunyai keadaan berdekatan yang mencukupi terhadaptetamu-tetamu penyewanya yang sah. Menurut common law Malaysia, seorangtuanpunya tanah suatu premis mempunyai satu kewajipan berjaga-jaga kepadatetamu penyewanya yang sah (lihat ms 286A, C–D); Cavalier v Pope [1906]AC 428 dibeza; AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240 dan LembagaKemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 diikut;Travers v Gloucester Corporation [1947] 1 KB 71 dan Sutherland ShireCouncil v Heyman [1985] 157 CLR 424 dirujuk.

(3) Sifat, skop dan setakat mana kewajipan seorang tuanpunya tanah kepadatetamu-tetamu penyewanya yang sah adalah untuk memastikan bahawa premisyang disewakan adalah selamat bagi tujuan ia digunakan dan kerosakan yangdiadukan oleh orang yang masuk tersebut mestilah satu kerosakan yang manatuanpunya tanah mempunyai pengetahuan atau sumber pengetahuan (lihat ms286D–287C).||Page 278>>

(4) Keterangan atas rekod menunjukkan bahawa defendan kedua, meskipunmerupakan satu badan berkuasa tempatan yang mempunyai kewajipan untukmenguatkuasakan kepatuhan Undang-Undang Kecil Bangunan Seragam 1986(‘Undang-Undang Kecil tersebut’), telah tidak mematuhi Undang-UndangKecil tersebut apabila ia menyewakan bangunan yang dipersoalkan kepadadefendan pertama. Ia tidak mengambil apa-apa langkah untuk memenuhikeperluan-keperluan Undang-Undang Kecil tersebut berhubung kewujudansatu jalan keluar untuk penghuni-penghuni jika berlaku kebakaran. Ia jugasedar bahawa bangunan tersebut digunakan sebagai asrama untukbudak-budak. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, defendan kedua bukan seorang

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tuanpunya tanah kosong. Ia mendedahkan plaintif-plaintif kepada risikokecederaan oleh sebab kegagalannya untuk mematuhi Undang-Undang Keciltersebut yang relevan. Ia mengetahui tujuan hartanah tersebut digunakan. Iajuga memang sedar tentang kecederaan yang akan menimpa budak-budaktersebut oleh sebab ketiadaan jalan keluar kecemasan semasa kebakaran yangmencukupi. Sewajarnya, defendan kedua sebagai tuanpunya tanah premis yangdipersoalkan mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga kepada tetamu-tetamu sahpenyewanya dan telah melanggar kewajipan tersebut (lihat ms 287F–288B);Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 dan Lembaga Kemajuan TanahPersekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 diikut.

(5) Mahkamah Tinggi telah terkhilaf dalam aspek-aspek penting. Dalamkeengganannya untuk memakai AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC240 atas alasan ia merupakan satu kes yang diputuskan selepas penguatkuasaanAkta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956, ia telah terlepas perhatian tentang keputusanMahkamah Persekutuan dalam Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan vMariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 yang memakai AC Billings dan ia adalahsatu keputusan yang mengikatnya. Mahkamah Tinggi oleh itu telah bertindakbertentangan dengan doktrin duluan. Tafsiran Mahkamah Tinggi terhadap s 3Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 juga tidak bersependapat dengan ChungKhiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 356 dimana keputusannya juga mengikatnya. Memandangkan satu mahkamah rayuantidak akan campur tangan dalam pembahagian liabiliti suatu kemalangan yangdibuat oleh mahkamah perbicaraan kecuali dalam kes-kes yang jarang sekali —dan dalam kes sekarang bukan kes sedemikian — pembahagian liabiti yangsama rata oleh mahkamah sesyen harus dikekalkan. Mahkamah Tinggimendapati defendan pertama bertanggungjawab 100% atas satu alasanundang-undang yang Mahkamah Rayuan tidak bersetuju (lihat ms 288E–F,289C–D); AC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240; LembagaKemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 dan ChungKhiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor diikut.]||Page 279>>

NotesFor cases on the duty of care in negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000Reissue) paras 687–694.For cases on judicial precedent, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras3611–3612.For cases on occupier’s liability, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras1186–1189.

Cases referred toAC Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1958] AC 240 (folld)

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Cavalier v Pope [1906] AC 428 (distd)Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 356

(folld)Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (folld)Government of Malaysia & Ors v Jumat bin Mahmud & Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 103

(folld)Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (refd)Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 (refd)Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] 1 All ER 756 (folld)Jones v Bartlett [2000] HCA 56 (folld)Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan v Mariam & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 283 (folld)Mohamed Raihan bin Ibrahim & Anor v Government of Malaysia & Ors [1981] 2

MLJ 27 (folld)Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 151 ALR 147 (refd)Robbins v Jones [1863] 143 ER 768 (refd)Smith v Eric S Bush [1989] 2 All ER 514 (refd)Sri Inai (Pulau Pinang) Sdn Bhd v Yong Yit Swee & Ors [1998] 3 AMR 284 (refd)Stovin v Wise [1996] 3 All ER 801 (refd)Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] 157 CLR 424 (refd)Travers v Gloucester Corporation [1947] 1 KB 71 (refd)Union of India v United India Assurance Co Ltd AIR 1998 SC 640 (refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 s 3(1)Occupiers Liability Act 1957Uniform Building By-Laws 1986

Appeal from: Civil Appeal No 12–46 of 1995 (High Court, Pulau Pinang)

Jagdeep Singh Deo (Karpal Singh with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant.M Thayalan (Thayalan & Assoc) for the first to ninth respondents.Gurbachan Singh (Mohamed Aslam bin Mohamed Mydin and Meyappan with him)

(Presgrave & Matthews) for the tenth respondent.||Page 280>>

[2003] 2 MLJ 425

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HASSAN BIN DATOLAH v KERAJAAN MALAYSIA

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S4–21–49 OF 1995RAHMAH HUSSAIN J14 JANUARY 2003

Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Whether plaintiff had shown the causativelink between the resultant damage or injury and the act of the doctor — Whether the doctorhad exercised the requisite degree of skill and care as required of him by law — Whether thedoctor had acted properly and adequately according to competent medical practice — The‘Bolam’ test

The plaintiff, while returning from the ‘surau’ (place of worship), missed a step. He didnot fall but felt a slight pain at the back of his body. He did not seek any medicaltreatment immediately. He continued with his daily routine and went back to work.When the pain in his back became unbearable he went to seek medical treatment.There was no improvement in his condition. He was advised to seek further medicaltreatment from the General Hospital. He went to the General Hospital immediately. Hewas examined by Dr Yeow. After an x-ray was taken, Dr Yeow informed the plaintiffthat he needed to undergo an operation. Dr Yeow also assured him of recovery afterthe operation. Otherwise, he would be paralyzed. The plaintiff consented to theoperation, which was done. Subsequently, Dr Yeow did a second operation on theplaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action for negligence claiming that the operations hadcaused his paralysis.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s case with costs:(1) The activities engaged by the plaintiff prior to his admission to the hospital and

the delay in seeking medical treatment had aggravated his injury. The plaintifffailed to show the causative link between the resultant damage or injury and theact of the doctor (see p 429G); Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority[1987] 2 All ER 909 followed.

(2) Dr Yeow had properly administered a caution and properly explained to theplaintiff the risk of the surgery. Dr Yeow had adequately obtained writtenconsent from the plaintiff. The plaintiff too had never, at any time during theproceedings, brought forth any solid evidence to show that this was not done.Furthermore, the plaintiff had ample opportunity to pose any questions to DrYeow to clear any doubts that he might have had concerning the surgery hewas to undergo. This was not done. From the totality of the evidence, DrYeow had exercised the requisite degree of skill and care as required of him bylaw. Dr Yeow had acted properly and adequately according to competent

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||Page 426>>medical practice (see pp 431A, D–E, I); Bolam v Friern HospitalManagement Committee[1957] 2 All ER 118 followed.


Plaintif, semasa kembali dari surau (tempat ibadat) telah tergelincir. Beliau tidak jatuhtetapi telah merasa sedikit sakit di bahagian belakang beliau. Beliau tidak mendapatkanrawatan perubatan dengan segera. Beliau terus dengan rutin harian dan telah kembalibekerja. Apabila bahagian belakang beliau menjadi sangat sakit, beliau telah mencarirawatan perubatan. Beliau tidak bertambah sihat. Beliau telah dinasihatkan supayamendapatkan rawatan di Hospital Besar. Beliau telah pergi ke Hospital Besar dengansegera. Beliau telah diperiksa oleh Dr Yeow. Selepas x-ray diambil, Dr Yeowmemberitahu plaintif bahawa plaintif perlu menjalani pembedahan. Dr Yeow jugameyakinkan plaintif bahawa beliau akan pulih selepas pembedahan itu. Jika tidak,beliau akan menjadi lumpuh. Plaintif memberi kebenaran untuk pembedahan itu, yangtelah dijalankan. Selepas itu, Dr Yeow telah menjalankan pembedahan kedua ke atasplaintif. Plaintif telah memulakan satu tindakan untuk kecuaian and menuntut bahawapembedahan-pembedahan itu telah menjadikan beliau lumpuh.

Diputuskan, menolak kes plaintif dengan kos:(1) Aktiviti-aktiviti yang dijalankan oleh plaintif sebelum memasuki hospital dan

kelewatan di dalam mendapatkan rawatan perubatan telah menjadikankecederaan beliau semakin teruk. Plaintif telah gagal menunjukkan kaitanpenyebab di antara kecederaan yang timbul sebagai akibat dan perbuatandoktor (lihat ms 429G); Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987]2 All ER 909 diikut.

(2) Dr Yeow telah memberi amaran dengan betul dan telah menerangkan denganbetul risiko-risiko pembedahan itu. Dr Yeow telah mendapatkan keizinanbertulis daripada plaintif dengan cukup. Plaintif juga tidak pernah, padabila-bila masa di dalam prosiding, mengemukakan sebarang keterangan yangkukuh untuk menunjukkan bahawa ini tidak pernah dibuat. Lagipun, plaintifmempunyai banyak peluang untuk bertanya kepada Dr Yeow untukmenyelesaikan keraguan beliau yang mungkin ada berkenaan pembedahan yangbeliau perlu menjalani. Ini tidak dibuat. Daripada keseluruhan keterangan, DrYeow telah menggunakan tahap kemahiran dan berjaga-jaga yang diperlukan disisi-sisi undang-undang. Dr Yeow telah bertindak dengan betul dan secukupnyamenurut amalan perubatan kompeten (lihat ms 431A, D–E, I); Bolam v FriernHospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 diikut.||Page 427>>

NotesFor cases on professional negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue),

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paras 798–849.

Cases referred toBolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 (folld)Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909 (folld)Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors & Ors [1985] 1 All ER 643 (refd)

Kartar Singh ( Bachan & Kartar) for the appellant.Abdullah bin Hassan (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the respondent.

[2003] 2 MLJ 540

MAT ISA BIN SHUID v AMANAH RAYA BHD & ANOR

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–143 OF 2000SU GEOK YIAM JC28 MARCH 2003

Tort — Negligence — Highway — Motor accident — Apportionment of liability — Collisionfrom the rear — Whether both the deceased and defendant equally negligent for the accident

The first plaintiff was the administrator of the deceased. The second plaintiff was themother of the deceased. The deceased was riding his motorcycle when he collided intoa motorcycle in front of him which was being ridden by the defendant in the samedirection. As a result of the collision the deceased suffered loss and serious injuries.The deceased, subsequently, succumbed to his injuries. The plaintiffs’ case was that thecollision was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the defendant. At theconclusion of the trial, the learned sessions court judge found both the deceased anddefendant equally negligent for the accident which caused the deceased’s death andloss and apportioned liability at 50:50. The defendant appealed to the High Court.

Held, allowing the appeal only on the issue of liability:(1) Since the collision was from the rear, the liability should be apportioned higher

on the deceased than the defendant since the law requires the deceased to rideat a safe distance behind the vehicle in front to avoid contigencies such as thepresent case, where the vehicle in front suddenly turning right without givingadequate warning. The law, therefore, imposes a higher duty on the deceasedthan on the defendant (see p 544B–C).

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(2) In the premises, as there was a substantial misdirection of fact and law on thepart of the learned sessions court judge concerning apportionment of liabilitythe court allowed the appeal on liability and apportioned liability between thedefendant and the deceased at 30% and 70%, respectively (see p 544C–D).


Plaintif pertama adalah pentadbir si mati. Plaintif kedua adalah ibu kepada si mati. Simati sedang menunggang motorsikal beliau apabila beliau berlanggar denganmotorsikal di hadapan beliau yang ditunggang oleh defendan yang menuju ke arah yangsama. Akibat perlanggaran tersebut, si mati mengalami kerugian dan kecederaan teruk.Si mati, akhirnya, telah meninggal dunia akibat kecederaan tersebut. Kes plaintif adalahbahawa perlanggaran tersebut telah disebabkan oleh atau disumbangkan oleh kecuaiandefendan. Di akhir perbicaraan, hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana mendapati||Page 541>> bahawa kedua-dua si mati dan defendan adalah sama-sama cuai dalamkemalangan yang menyebabkan kematian si mati dan kerugian dan laibiliti dibahagikan50:50. Defendan telah merayu ke mahkamah ini.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:(1) Memandangkan perlanggaran adalah dari belakang, laibiliti adalah sepatutnya

dibahagikan lebih kepada si mati kerana undang-undang menuntut bahawa simati mesti menunggang motorsikalnya pada jarak yang selamat di belakangkenderaan yang di hadapannya untuk mengelakkan sebarang kemungkinanseperti di dalam kes semasa, di mana kenderaan di hadapan tiba-tiba membelokke kanan tanpa memberikan amaran yang secukupnya. Oleh itu,undang-undang mengenakan kewajipan yang lebih tinggi terhadap si mati daridefendan (lihat ms 544B–C).

(2) Oleh kerana terdapat salah arah yang besar dalam fakta dan undang-undang dipihak hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana berhubung pembahagian laibiliti,mahkamah membenarkan rayuan tersebut berdasarkan laibiliti danmembahagikan laibiliti tersebut antara defendan dan si mati pada kadar 30%dan 70%, masing-masing (lihat ms 544C–D).]

NotesFor cases on highway negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras733–736.

Civil Suit No 53-123-97 (Sessions Court, Teluk Intan)

Suresh Hari Krishnan ( Lim Him Wee & Co) for the appellant.Sarjeet Singh Sandu ( Sandu & Assoc) for the respondent.

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[2003] 3 MLJ 376

SUSAN CHEAH PIK YEE & ORS v MAYBAN FINANCE BHD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT PROCEEDINGS NO S22–22–551 OF1995

ABDUL HAMID SAID J3 MARCH 2003

Tort — Negligence — Banks — Loss of valuables from safe deposit boxes — Inadequatealarm system — Police unable to gain entry into bank as key-holding employees of bank notcontactable — Whether bank negligent

Tort — Negligence — Banks — Loss of valuables from safe deposit boxes — Lots of cashand valuables stored in strong-room of bank — Whether reasonably foreseeable to haveinfra-red motion detectors and seismic detectors installed in strong-room of bank

Tort — Negligence — Res ipsa loquitor — Cause of loss known — Whether doctrine of resipsa loquitor applicable

The plaintiffs had hired safe deposit boxes at the defendant’s branch at Taman Cheras,Kuala Lumpur (‘the branch’). There was a break-in at the branch sometime between 2March 1995 and 6 March 1995. Burglars tunneled underground, dug their waythrough the strong-room floor of the branch, broke open and emptied safe depositboxes therein. The plaintiffs claimed for delivery of their goods. Alternatively, theyclaimed for damages for the loss of their goods, interests and costs. The plaintiffspleaded causes of action in bailment, contract and tort although submissions proceedon the grounds of contract and tort only. The plaintiffs pleaded ‘res ipsa loquitor’. Theissue was whether the defendant was negligent. The facts revealed that at the materialtime, the branch was empty and no security guard was on duty. It was allegedhowever, that there was a comprehensive alarm system in operation. The system wasconnected to a Central Monitoring System (‘CMS’) where in the event of an alarmtriggering, the people monitoring the system would send a security team to thepremises, inform the police and also inform any one of two key-holding employees ofthe defendant branch. The facts further revealed that on 3 March 1995 at about11.59am, an alarm was triggered at the defendant’s branch. A security team was sentand the police were informed but they could not enter the branch premises as both thedefendant’s key-holders could not be contacted. The defendant submitted that the riskof a break-in the manner in which it occurred was too remote and such a break-in was

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not reasonably likely to happen. Because of such remoteness, the floor of the strongroom was not reinforced and neither was the defendant advised to connect the room tothe alarm system. The parties agreed to have the High Court judge determine liabilitywith damages to be assessed by the senior assistant registrar.||Page 377>>

Held, finding the defendant wholly liable for the loss, awarding costs to the plaintiffsand ordering damages be assessed by the senior assistant registrar:(1) On the facts, the cause of loss was known and res ipsa loquitor had no

application in the instant case. The issue was whether there was some want ofcare by the defendant (see p 381C–D); Wong Eng v Chock Mun Chong & Ors[1963] MLJ 204 and Russel v London & South Western Railway Co [1908] 24TLR 548 referred and Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 followed.

(2) In the instant case, when the alarm was triggered at the defendant’s branch, theCMS people sent their security people to the defendant’s premises. The policewere also informed. However, the CMS people and the police were not able toenter the premises as the two key-holders were not available. There was noinstruction from the defendant’s headquarters that one of the key-holders hadto be available all the time. Neither was there any explanation why both werenot available. The security system required the key-holders to be readilyavailable when the alarm was activated. The defendant had failed to do this.This was therefore a clear case of negligence on the part of the defendantand/or its agents. It was for the defendant to be aware of the existence ofdevices or detectors available and to use them to protect the plaintiffs’valuables. It was insufficient to rely only on the alarm unless the price of thesedevices was extremely excessive (see pp 381F–G, 382B, D–E); Shelton v ANZBanking Group [1984] VC LEX 329 followed.

(3) As a reasonable banker, the defendant should have foreseen that it was notsufficient to have a basic security system and/or devices in its premises thatstored so much cash and valuables. The security system did not have aninfra-red motion detector or seismic detectors. It was reasonably foreseeable tohave infra-red motion detectors on the floor of the strong-room as burglarswould be attracted to the valuables in the strong room and would employwhatever means to get at them. It was foreseeable that seismic detectors orinfra-red motion detectors would be valuable devices to protect the floor ofthe strong-room and the valuables therein (see pp 383H–384A).


Plaintif-plaintif telah menyewa peti-peti besi keselamatan di cawangan defendan diTaman Cheras, Kuala Lumpur (‘cawangan tersebut’). Satu kejadian pecah masuk telahberlaku di cawangan tersebut antara 2 Mac 1995 dan 6 Mac 1995. Pencuri-pencuri

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telah menggali lubang bawah tanah, dan menggali diri mereka sehingga sampai kelantai bilik kukuh cawangan tersebut, memecah buka dan mengosongkan peti-petitersebut. Plaintif-plaintif telah menuntut ||Page 378>>penghantarserahan barangan mereka. Secara alternatif, mereka menuntutganti rugi kerana kehilangan barangan, kepentingan mereka dan kos. Plaintif-plaintiftelah memplidkan kausa-kausa tindakan dalam bailmen, konrak dan tort walaupunpenghujahan-penghujahan dimulakan atas alasan-alasan kontrak dan tort sahaja.Plaintif-plaintif telah memplidkan ‘res ipsa loquitor’. Persoalan adalah sama adadefendan adalah cuai. Fakta-fakta mendedahkan pada masa matan, cawangan tersebuttiada orang dan tiada pengawal keselamatan sedang bertugas. Ia dikatakanbagaimanapun, bahawa terdapat satu sistem penggera keselamatan yang komprehensifyang berfungsi. Sistem tersebut disambungkan kepada Sistem Kawalan Utama (‘SKU’)di mana sekiranya penggera berbunyi, orang yang mengawal sistem tersebut akanmenghantar sepasukan keselamatan ke premis tersebu, memaklumkan pihak polis danjuga memaklumkan salah satu dari dua orang pekerja yang memegang kunci kepadacawangan defendan tersebut. Fakta-fakta seterusnya mendedahkan bahwa pada 3 Mac1995 lebih kurang pukul 11.59am, satu penggera telah berbunyi di cawangan defendan.Sepasukan keselamatan telah dihantar dan pihak polis telah dimaklumkan tetapi merekatidak dapt memasuki cawangan tersebut kerana kedua-dua pemegang kunci defendantidak dapat dihubungi. Defendan telah berhujah bahawa risiko berlaku kejadian pecahmasuk sebagaimana ia telah berlaku tidak boleh diduga dan satu kejadian pecah masuksedemikian secara munasabah tidak mungkin berlaku. Oleh kerana sifatnya yang tidakboleh diduga, lantai bilik kukuh tersebut tidak diperkukuhkan dan defendan tidakdinasihatkan untuk menymabungkan bilik tersebut kepada sistem penggera.Pihak-pihak bersetuju agar hakim Mahkamah Tinggi menentukan liabiliti dan ganti rugiditaksirkan oleh penolong kanan pendaftar.

Diputuskan, mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya untuk kerugiantersebut, mengawardkan kos kepada plaintif-plaintif dan mengarahkan ganti rugiditaksirkan oleh penolong kanan pendaftar:(1) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta, sebab kehilangan diketahui dan res ipsa loquitor tidak

terpakai dalam kes semasa. Persoalannya adalah sama ada perlunya ada sifatberjaga-jaga oleh defendan (lihat ms 381C–D); Wong Eng v Chock Mun Chong& Ors [1963] MLJ 204 dan Russel v London & South Western Railway Co[1908] 24 TLR 548 dirujuk dan Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 diikut.

(2) Dalam kes semasa, apabila penggera berbunyi di cawangan defendan,orang-orang di SKU telah menghantar pengawal-pengawal keselamatan merekake premis defendan. Pihak polis juga telah diberitahu. Namun begitu,orang-orang di SKU dan pihak polis tidak dapat masuk ke dalam premis keranakedua-dua pemegang kunci tersebut tiada. Tiada arahan daripada ibu pejabatdefendan bahawa satu daripada pemegang kunci dapat ||Page 379>>dikesan. Juga tiada penjelasan kenapa kedua-dua orang tidakdapat dikesan. Sistem keselamatan tersebut memerlukan pemegang-pemegang

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kunci tersebut sentiasa ada apabila penggera dipasangkan. Defendan telah gagalberbuat demikian. Ini dengan jelas satu kes yang cuai di pihak defendandan/atau ejen-ejennya. Adalah untuk defendan supaya sedar akan kewujudanalat-alat atau detektor-detektor yang ada dan untuk menggunakannya bagimelindungi barangan berharga plaintif-plaintif. Ia tidak mencukupi untuk hanyabergantung kepada penggera tersebut kecuali jika harga alat-alat tersebutterlalu mahal (lihat ms 381F–G, 382B, D–E); Shelton v ANZ Banking Group[1984] VC LEX 329 diikut.

(3) Sebagai seorang pegawai bank yang berfikiran waras, defendan sepatutnyaboleh meramal bahawa ia tidak mencukupi untuk mempunyai sistem dan/atauperalatan-peralatan keselamatan yang biasa dalam premisnya yang menyimpanbanyk wang tunai dan barangan berharga. Sistem keselamatan tidak mempunyaisatu ‘infra-red motion detector’ atau ‘seismic detectors’. Ia boleh diramalsecara munasabah untuk mempunyai ‘infra-red motion detectors’ di lantai bilikkukuh kerana pencuri-pencuri akan tertarik kepada barang-barang berhargadalam bilik kukuh tersebut dan akan berusaha apapun untuk mendapatbarangan berharga tersebut. Ia boleh diramal bahawa ‘seismic detectors atau‘infra-red motion detectors’ adalah alat peranti untuk melindungi lantai bilikkukuh dan barang-barang berharga di dalamnya (lihat ms 383H–384A).]

NotesFor cases of negligence by banks, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para592.For cases on res ipsa loquitor, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras861–886.

Cases referred toBolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 (folld)Government of Malaysia & Ors v Jumat bin Mahmud Anor [1977] 2 MLJ 103 (refd)Nanyang Development (1966) Sdn Bhd v How Swee Poh [1970] 1 MLJ 145 (refd)Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co Pty & Anor (Wagon Mound

No 2) [1967] AC 617 (refd)Russel v London & South Western Railway Co [1908] 24 TLR 548 (refd)Shelton v ANZ Banking Group [1984] VC LEX 329 (refd)Wong Eng v Chock Mun Chong & Ors [1963] MLJ 204 (refd)

||Page 380>>

Legislation referred toEvidence Act 1950 s 101 to 103

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( K Kulasekar Achan & Assoc) for the plaintiffs.( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant.

[2003] 3 MLJ 527

MUNIYANDI A/L PERIYAN & ANOR vERIC CHEW WAI KEAT & ANOR

HIGH COURT (TAIPING) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 11–1 OF 2001VT SINGHAM J15 MAY 2003

Civil Law Act — Damages — Fatal accident — Dependency claim — Whether 1/3 deductionon damages for loss of support to be made — Civil Law Act 1956 s 7(2)

Evidence — Documentary evidence — Agreed bundle — Admission of death certificatewhich indicated time of death — Whether defendants should be allowed to dispute time ofdeceased’s death

Road Traffic — Negligence — Road accident — Deceased motorcyclist lying on road aftercollision with cyclist — Second defendant’s motorcar collided into deceased — Seconddefendant saw people gathered at the scene but failed to avoid colliding into deceased —Whether a prudent driver who was confronted with similar situation would have immediatelyslowed down on seeing people gathered at the scene — Whether second defendant wasnegligent

Tort — Negligence — Causation — Deceased motorcyclist lying on road after collision withcyclist — Second defendant’s motorcar collided into deceased — Whether plaintiff succeededin establishing causative link between deceased’s death and negligent act of second defendant— Whether inference to be drawn from evidence was that deceased was alive when seconddefendant’s motorcar collided into him

Tort — Negligence — Contributory negligence — Deceased motorcyclist lying on roadafter collision with cyclist — Second defendant’s motorcar collided into deceased —Whether contributory negligence to be attached against deceased — Apportionment ofliability

This was an appeal by the first plaintiff against the decision of the magistrate indismissing his dependency claim for loss of support against the defendants arising out

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of a road accident on 10 July 1996, in which the first plaintiff’s son had died. Thedeceased had collided into the second plaintiff’s bicycle. Immediately after thecollision, and while the deceased was lying on the road, the defendant’s motorcarcollided into the deceased. The second defendant testified that the scene of theaccident was dark at the material time and by the time he saw the deceased, he was tooclose and could not avoid colliding into him. The second defendant admitted duringcross-examination that prior to colliding into the deceased, he did not know whetherthe deceased was alive or dead. In his police report, the second defendant stated thathe had arrived at the place of accident on 10 July 1996 at about 8.05pm and that hehad dragged the deceased for about ten feet after the collision. The time of deathstated in the death certificate was 8.25pm on 10 July 1996 and the place of death wasstated as ‘on the ||Page 528>>way to a clinic in Trong’. The post-mortem report stated the cause ofdeath as ‘multiple crush injuries with fracture dislocation of cervical vertebrae C2 C1due to motor vehicle accident’. The death certificate and the post-mortem report werein the agreed bundle of documents. The learned magistrate’s reasons for dismissing thefirst plaintiff’s claim were that: (a) the accident had occurred at 7.30pm and the seconddefendant only arrived at the place of accident at 8.05pm; (b) there were peoplegathered at the place of the accident and if the deceased was alive at the time when thefirst defendant’s motorcar collided into him, it was more possible that the people whowere gathered at the area would have given assistance; and (c) the plaintiff did notproduce evidence to show the time when the accident occurred.

Held, allowing the appeal:(1) The onus was on the first plaintiff to establish that there was a causative link

between the deceased’s death and the negligent act of the second defendant.Having regard to the contents of the death certificate, the post-mortem report,the evidence of the second defendant and his police report, there was sufficientevidence to indicate that the collision between the second defendant’s motorcarand the deceased occurred at about 8.05pm and the deceased died at about8.25pm while the deceased was on his way to a clinic at Trong. The sequenceof events indicated that the deceased was initially taken to the clinic at Trongfor treatment but when he died on the way, he was taken to the hospital atTaiping for post-mortem. Based on the totality of the evidence, the onlyreasonable inference that could be drawn was that the deceased must have beenalive when the second defendant’s motorcar collided into him and dragged himfor a distance of ten feet and he died on the way to the clinic at Trong. Thisinference can further be supported by the cause of death stated in thepost-mortem report. The multiple crush injuries which caused the death musthave been attributed by the second defendant’s motorcar which went over thedeceased. Consequently, by agreeing to the death certificate and thepost-mortem report, the defendants had admitted the contents as true andcannot now be allowed to retract from those admissions to the detriment of thefirst plaintiff’s claim against the second defendant (see pp 549G, 550B–F).

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(2) If the defendants were seriously disputing the deceased’s time of death, it wasonly prudent that they should not have agreed to the contents of the deathcertificate. Alternatively, the defendants’ counsel should have made it clear atthe beginning of the trial that it was a conditional agreement to the effect that itwas agreed subject to cross-examination of the maker or that it was agreed ||Page 529>>without prejudice to the right of the defendant to challenge thetime of death as stated in the death certificate. This conditional agreementwould have put the plaintiff’s solicitors on notice to consider whether furtherevidence was required on the issue as to the time of the death as stated in thedeath certificate. However, these steps were not taken by learned counsel forthe defendants. Therefore, the defendants’ counsel should not be allowed todispute the contents of the death certificate which supported the first plaintiff’sclaim against the second defendant (see pp 552D–F, 553C–D).

(3) In the circumstances, the evidence as contained in the death certificate and thepost-mortem report had on the balance of probabilities established causationand the link leading to the deceased’s death. Consequently, the burden wasshifted to the defendants to displace, contradict or raise rebuttal evidence butthey had failed to do so and were deemed to have accepted the evidence.Therefore there was no necessity for the plaintiff to prove what had alreadybeen agreed and admitted as evidence. Since the deceased cannot contradictany evidence put forward by the second defendant, the first plaintiff had to relyon the documentary evidence together with the oral evidence of theinvestigating officer to establish his case. Unfortunately, the learned magistratehad failed to consider this important aspect of the evidence and drew aninference on speculation. Had the learned magistrate considered that piece ofdocumentary evidence, being the death certificate together with the seconddefendant’s police report, it would have made a considerable difference to herconclusion where she held that the first plaintiff had not produced evidence asto the time when the accident occurred. The omission by the learned magistrateto consider the documentary evidence was fatal and rendered her conclusionunsustainable (see pp 553I–554B, E–F).

(4) The learned magistrate did not make a finding on the material facts andevidence before the court and neither did she sufficiently consider thedocumentary evidence which was agreed to without any qualification andmarked as exhibits. Her decision as a whole cannot be considered as a speakingjudgment. The reasoning of the magistrate was not based on the evidence butpurely on speculation and conjecture and without any legal basis (see pp547D–E, 548A).

(5) Any prudent driver who was confronted with a similar situation as faced by thesecond defendant would have immediately slowed down or even brought hismotorcar to a complete stop towards the left side of the road especially onseeing people gathered at the scene where it was dark and after having seen‘something’ on the middle of the road at a distance of 13ft. The second

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defendant did ||Page 530>>not mention in his police report of having taken any evasiveaction on approaching the scene. The scratch marks to a distance of six metresas shown in the sketch plan, the second defendant’s other admissions in hispolice report and his oral evidence in court for not being able to avoid theaccident despite having seen the deceased at a distance of 13ft would tend toshow that the second defendant must have been speeding and was not able tocontrol his motorcar to bring it to a stop in order to avoid the collision. Allthese omissions and admissions on his part clearly had established negligenceagainst the second defendant (see p 558F–I).

(6) In view of the inference drawn by the High Court that the deceased must havebeen alive at the time when the second defendant’s motorcar collided into him,the deceased ought to have at least sought help to remove himself away fromthe centre of the road so as not to cause any undue danger to other vehiclesapproaching the scene of the accident especially when it was dark. However,there was no evidence that the deceased had made any such attempt to beremoved to the side of the road. On the other hand, the deceased could alsohave been lying unconscious on the road. In any event, the deceased himselfcannot be free from blame for having created such a situation that mightendanger other road users including the second defendant. There must be somecontributory negligence attached against him on the facts in the instant appeal.Accordingly, damages had to be reduced to the extent that liability wasapportioned equally between the deceased and the second defendant (see pp561E–G, I).

(7) The issue that the deceased’s death was not caused by the second defendantwas not specifically pleaded by the second defendant. The denial was notsufficiently specific and did not clearly and definitely raise the issue that thedeceased was already dead when the second defendant’s motorcar collided intohim. By merely raising general averments or denials in the statement of defencewithout being specific was insufficient and cannot assist the second defendantto constitute such a denial as defence to the issue of causation. The seconddefendant should plead his own version of the facts and not merely deny thefact as pleaded in the statement of claim, as was done in the instant appeal (seepp 564B, F–G); Natesan v Goh Gok Hoon [1968] 2 MLJ 3 followed.

(8) Although the Court of Appeal case of Takong Tabari v Government ofSarawak & Ors and another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ 512 which enunciated a 1/3deduction on damages for loss of support, was still binding on the High Courtbased on the doctrine of stare decisis, nevertheless, as the 1/3 deduction was amatter of discretion based on the evidence, the High Court had a choicebetween Takong ||Page 531>>Tabari and the decision of another panel of the Court of Appealin Tan Phaik See (Ibu kepada Tan Hock San (si mati)) dan Tan Cheng Gek(Ibu Kepada Ng Chin Chai (si mati)) lwn Chuah Seng Boon Civil Appeal No

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P04–14 of 1996 where the Court of Appeal did not make the 1/3 deduction butdecided for a multiplier of 16 years. In the instant case, the High Court tookthe liberty to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tan Phaik See andaccordingly, the 1/3 deduction on damages for loss of support was not made(see p 569E–H); Tan Phaik See (Ibu kepada Tan Hock San (si mati)) dan TanCheng Gek (Ibu Kepada Ng Chin Chai (si mati)) lwn Chuah Seng Boon CivilAppeal No P04-14 of 1996 followed.

(9) The first plaintiff had stated in his evidence that the deceased worked part-timeafter school hours between 3pm–6pm and his evidence was supported by thatof the deceased’s employer. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the deceasedwas gainfully employed at the time of his death. Accordingly, a sum of RM75per month for ten years amounting to RM7,800 as loss of support, RM10,000towards bereavement and a sum of RM2,000 as funeral expenses were awardedto the first plaintiff. However, since the deceased had also contributed towardsthe accident, damages was reduced to the extent of 50% in contributorynegligence as against the deceased (see pp 574H–575A, D, 576A).


Ini adalah satu rayuan oleh plaintif pertama terhadap keputusan majistret yang menolaktuntutan tanggungan beliau untuk kehilangan penyara terhadap defendan-defendanyang timbul daripada satu kemalangan jalanraya pada 10 Julai 1996 di mana anak lelakiplaintif pertama telah meninggal dunia. Si mati telah berlanggar dengan basikal plaintifkedua. Selepas perlanggaran tersebut, dan semasa si mati terbaring di atas jalan, keretadefendan telah melanggar si mati. Defendan telah memberikan keterangan bahawatempat kejadian kemalangan tersebut gelap pada masa matan dan pada saat beliaunampak si mati, beliau berada terlalu dekat dan tidak dapat mengelak daripadamelanggarnya. Defendan kedua mengaku semasa pemeriksaan balas bahawa sebelummelanggar si mati, beliau tidak tahu sama ada si mati hidup atau mati. Dalam laporanpolis beliau, defendan kedua menyatakan bahawa beliau tiba di tempat kejadiankemalangan tersebut pada 10 Julai 1996 lebih kurang pukul 8.05pm adan bahawabeliau telah menarik si mati sejauh sepuluh kaki selepas perlanggaran tersebut. Masakematian yang dinyatakan dalam sijil kematian adalah pukul 8.25pm pada 10 Julai 1996dan tempat kematian dinyatakan sebagai ‘on the way to a clinic in Trong’. Laporanpost-mortem menyatakan sebab kematian adalah ‘multiple crush injuries with fracturedislocation of cervical vertebrae C2 C1 ||Page 532>>due to motor vehicle accident’. Sijil kematian dan laporan post-mortemtersebut diletakkan dalam ikatan dokumen-dokumen yang dipersetujui. Alasan-alasanmajistret yang bijaksana menolak tuntutan plaintif pertama adalah bahawa: (a)kemalangan telah berlaku pada pukul 7.30pm dan defendan kedua hanya tiba di tempatkemalangan pada pukul 8.05pm; (b) terdapat beberapa orang berkumpul di tempatkemalangan tersebut dan jika si mati masih hidup pada masa kereta defendan pertamamelanggarnya, ia lebih berkemungkinan mereka yang berkumpul di kawasan tersebut

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memberikan bantuan; dan (c) plaintif tidak mengemukakan keterangan untukmenunjukkan masa bila kemalangan tersebut berlaku.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:(1) Beban atas plaintif pertama untuk membuktikan bahawa terdapat hubungan

akibat antara kematian si mati dan tindakan cuai defendan kedua. Berhubungkandungan-kandungan sijil kematian tersebut, laporan post-mortem, keterangandefendan kedua dan laporan polis beliau, terdapat keterangan yang mencukupiuntuk menunjukkan bahawa perlanggaran antara kereta defendan kedua dan simati berlaku lebih kurang pada pukul 8.05pm dan si mati meninggal dunia lebihkurang pada pukul 8.25pm semasa si mati dalam perjalanan ke sebuah klinik diTrong. Urutan kejadian menunjukkan bahawa si mati telah dibawa ke klinik diTrong untuk dirawat tetapi apabil beliau meninggal dunia dalam perjalanan,beliau telah dibawa ke hospital di Taiping untuk post-mortem. Berdasarkankeseluruhan keterangan, satu-satunya inferens yang munasabah yang bolehdidapati adalah bahawa si mati mungkin masih hidup semasa kereta defendankedua melanggarnya dan menarik beliau untuk jarak sejauh sepulun kaki danbeliau telah meninggal dunia dalam perjalanan ke klinik di Trong. Inferens iniboleh disokong oleh sijil kematian dalam laporan post-mortem.Kecederaan-kecederaan patah yang pelbagai yang menyebabkan kematiantersebut mungkin telah disebabkan oleh kereta defendan kedua yang menggelekatas si mati. Akibatnya, dengan bersetuju akan sijil kematian dan laporanpost-mortem tersebut, defendan-defendan telah menagkuikandungan-kandungan yang berikut adalah benar dan sekarang tidaklah bolehdibenarkan menarik balik pengakuan-pengakuan tersebut untuk menjejaskantuntutan plaintif pertama terhadap defendan kedua (lihat ms 549G, 550B–F).

(2) Sekiranya defendan-defendan secara serius mempertikaikan masa kematian simati, ia hanyalah bijak jika mereka tidak sepatutnya bersetuju dengankandungan-kandungan dalam sijil kematian tersebut. Secara alternatif, peguamdefendan-defendan sepatutnya menjelaskan dari mula perbicaraan bahawa iasatu perjanjian bersyarat tertakluk kepada pemeriksaan balas ||Page 533>>pembuatnya atau bahawa ia telah dipersetujui tanpa prejudisuntuk hak defendan mencabar masa kematian tersebut sebagaimana yangdinyatakan dalam sijil kematian tersebut. Perjanjian bersyarat ini sepatutnyamemberi notis kepada peguamcara plaintif untuk mempertimbangkan sama adaketerangan selanjutnya diperlukan berhubung persoalan tentang masa kematiansebagaimana yang telah dinyatakan dalam sijil kematian tersebut. Namunbegitu, langkah-langkah tersebut tidak diambil oleh peguam yang bijaksana bagipihak defendan-defendan. Oleh itu, peguam defendan-defendan tidaksepatutnya dibenarkan mempertikaikan kandungan-kandungan sijil kematianyang menyokong tuntutan plaintif pertama terhadap defendan kedua (lihat ms552D–F, 553C–D).

(3) Dalam keadaan tersebut, keterangan yang terkandung dalam sijil kematian dan

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laporan post-mortem telah atas imbangan kebarangkalian membuktikanpenyebab dan kaitan yang membawa kepada kematian si mati. Akibatnya,beban telah berpindah kepada defendan-defendan untuk mengubah, menyangkalatau menimbulkan keterangan pematahan tetapi mereka gagal untuk berbuatdemikian dan dianggap telah menerima keterangan tersebut. Oleh itu tiadakeperluan untuk plaintif membuktikan apa yang telah dipersetujui dan diakuisebagai keterangan. Memandangkan si mati tidak boleh menyangkal apa-apaketerangan yang diutarakan oleh defendan kedua, plaintif pertama terpaksabergantung kepada keterangan dokumentar bersama keterangan lisan pegawaipenyiasat untuk membuktikan kes beliau. Namun begitu, majistret yangbijaksana telah gagal untuk mempertimbangkan aspek penting keterangan danmembuat inferens berdasarkan spekulasi. Jika majistret yang bijaksana telahmempertimbangkan keterangan dokumentar tersebut, iaitu sijil kematian danjiga laporan polis defendan kedua, ia akan membuahkan perbezaan yang ketaraterhadap kesimpulannya apabila beliau memutuskan bahawa plaintif pertamatidak mengemukakan keterangan berhubung masa bila kemalangan tersebutberlaku. Peninggalan oleh majistret yang bijaksana untuk menimbangkanketerangan dokumentar tersebut membawa padah dan menyebabkankesimpulannya tidak boleh dikekalkan (lihat ms 553I–554B, E–F).

(4) Majistret yang bijaksana tidak membuat penemuan atas fakta-fakta penting danketerangan di hadapan mahkamah dan beliau juga tidak dengan mencukupimenimbangkan keterangan dokumentar yang telah dipersetujui tanpa apa-apasyarat dan ditanda sebagai ekshibit. Keputusan beliau secara keseluruhan tidakboleh dianggap sebagai satu penghakiman secara lisan. Alasan majistrettersebut tidak berdasarkan keterangan tetapi semata-mata atas spekulasi dantekaan dan tanpa apa-apa asas undang-undang (lihat ms 547D–E, 548A).||Page 534>>

(5) Mana-mana pemandu yang berhati-hati yang berhadapan dengan situasi yangsama yang dihadapi oleh defendan kedua akan serta merta memperlahankanataupun memberhentikan keretanya ke sebelah kiri jalan jika ternampak orangramai berkerumun di tempat kejadian di mana ia adalah gelap dan selepasmelihat ‘something’ di tengah jalan pada jarak 13 kaki. Defendan kedua tidakmenyebutkan dalam laporan polis beliau yang beliau telah mengambillangkah-langkah mengelak semasa menghampiri tempat kejadian. Kesan-kesancalat dengan jarak enam meter sebagaimana yang ditunjukkan dalam pelanlakar, pengakuan-pengakuan lain dalam laporan polis dan keterangan lisanbeliau dalam mahkamah kerana tidak dapat mengelak kemalangan tersebutwalaupun nampak si mati dalam jarak 13 kaki sememangnya akan menunjukkanbahawa defendan kedua mestilah telah memandu dengan laju dan tidak dapatmengawal kereta beliau untuk berhenti bagi mengelak perlanggaran tersebut.Kesemua peninggalan dan pengakuan tersebut di pihak beliau dengan jelasmenunjukkan kecuaian terhadap defendan kedua (lihat ms 558F–I).

(6) Berdasarkan inferens yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Tinggi bahawa si mati

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mungkin masih hidup semasa kereta defendan kedua melanggarnya, si matisepatutnya sekurang-kurangnya meminta bantuan mengalihkan beliau daritengah jalan agar tidak menyebabkan apa-apa bahaya yang tidak berpatutankepada kenderaan-kenderaan lain yang menuju ke arah tempat kejadiankemalangan lebih-lebih lagi apabila ia gelap. Namun begitu, tiada keteranganbahawa si mati telah membuat apa-apa percubaan untuk dialihkan ke tepi jalan.Sebaliknya, si mati mungkin terlantar tidak sedar diri atas jalan tersebut. Dalamapa keadaanpun, si mati sendiri tidak terkecuali dari menjadi bersalah keranamewujudkan situasi yang mungkin membahayakan pengguna jalanraya laintermasuklah defendan kedua. Terdapat kecuaian sertaan ke atas beliauberdasarkan fakta-fakta rayuan semasa. Justeru itu, ganti rugi perludikurangkan setakat mana liabiliti dibahagikan sama rata antara si mati dandefendan kedua (lihat ms 561E–G, I).

(7) Persoalan berhubung kematian si mati tidak disebabkan oleh defendan keduatidak diplidkan secara spesifik oleh defendan kedua. Penafian tidak mencukupisecara spesifiknya dan tidak dengan jelas dan tapat menimbulkan persoalanbahawa si mati telahpun meninggal dunia semasa kereta defendan keduamelanggarnya. Hanya dengan menimbulkan penegasan-penegasan ataupenafian-penafian secara am dalam pernyataan pembelaan tanpa terperinciadalah tidak memadai dan tidak dapat membantu defendan kedua membentuksatu penafian sebagai satu pembelaan terhadap persoalan penyebaban.Defendan kedua sepatutnya memplidkan versi fakta-fakta beliau sendiri danbukan||Page 535>> hanya menafikan fakta yang diplidkan dalam pernyataan tuntutan,sebagaimana yang dilakukan dalam rayuan semasa (lihat ms 564B, F–G);Natesan v Goh Gok Hoon [1968] 2 MLJ 3 diikut.

(8) Walaupun kes Mahkamah Rayuan Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak &Ors and another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ 512 yang menjelaskan potongan 1/3 keatas ganti rugi untuk kehilangan penyara, adalah masih terikat ke atasMahkamah Tinggi berdasarkan doktrin stare decisis, namun begitu, oleh keranapotongan 1/3 adalah berdasarkan budi bicara berdasarkan keterangan tersebut,Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai pilihan antara Takong Tabari dan keputusanpanel lain di Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Tan Phaik See (Ibu kepada Tan HockSan (si mati)) dan Tan Cheng Gek (Ibu Kepada Ng Chin Chai (si mati)) lwnChuah Seng Boon Civil Appeal No P04–14 of 1996 di mana MahkamahRayuan tidak membuat potongan 1/3 tetapi telah memutuskan satu penggandauntuk 16 tahun. Dalam kes semasa, Mahkamah Tinggi bebas untuk mengikutkeputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Tan Phaik See dan sewajarnya, potongan1/3 ke atas ganti rugi untuk kehilangan penyara tidak dibuat (lihat ms 569E–H);Tan Phaik See (Ibu kepada Tan Hock San (si mati)) dan Tan Cheng Gek (IbuKepada Ng Chin Chai (si mati)) lwn Chuah Seng Boon Civil Appeal NoP04–14 of 1996 diikut.

(9) Plaintif pertama telah menyatakan dalam keterangan beliau bahawa si mati

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bekerja sambilan selepas waktu sekolah antara 3pm–6pm dan keterangan beliaudisokong oleh majikan si mati. Oleh itu, ia tidak boleh dipertikaikan bahawa simati memang bekerja pada masa kematiannya. Justeru itu, jumlah RM75sebulan selama sepuluh tahun yang berjumlah RM7,800 sebagai kehilanganpenyara, RM10,000 untuk kematian dan sejumlah RM2,000 sebagai belanjapengebumian telah diawardkan kepada plaintif pertama. Bagaimanapun,memandangkan si mati juga menyumbang kepada kemalangan tersebut, gantirugi tersebut dikurangkan sehingga 50% dalam kecuaian sertaan terhadap simati (lihat ms 574H–575A, D, 576A).]

NotesFor cases on causation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 720–732.For cases on contributory negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 743–786.For cases on damages for fatal accidents, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 3268–3304.For cases on road accidents due to negligence, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002Reissue) paras 430–464.||Page 536>>For cases on the agreed bundles of documentary evidence, see 7(1) Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1057–1066.

Cases referred toAng Koon Kau & Anor v Lau Piang Ngong [1984] 2 MLJ 277 (refd)Balachandran s/o Samy & Anor v Chew Man Chan & Anor [1995] 4 MLJ 685 (refd)Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370 (refd)Blay Pollard And Morris [1930] 1 KB 628 (refd)Borneo Co (M) Sdn Bhd v Penang Port Commission [1975] 2 MLJ 204 (refd)Burns v Devon’s Iron Works Ltd [1961] SC 102 (refd)Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 (refd)Chan Chin Min & Anor v Lim Yok Eng (Lawful Mother of Gan Swee Hock, deceased)

[1994] 3 CLJ 687 (refd)Chih Lim Neo v Sit Hoon Neoh (1889) 4 KY 492 (refd)Chin Hooi Nan v Comprehensive Auto Restoration Service Sdn Bhd & Anor [1995] 2

MLJ 100 (refd)China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Maltran Air

Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and another appeal [1996] 2 MLJ 517 (refd)Chu Choon Moi v Ngan Sew Tin [1986] 1 MLJ 34 (refd)Chung Hwa Ying v Phang Mun Mooi & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 693 (refd)

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Development & Commercial Bank Bhd v Num Tjuan Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 MLJ 47 (refd)English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd Dj & Winthers (Farms) Ltd v Ambic

Equipment Ltd, Verrechia (trading as Freight Master Commericials) vCommissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2003] 3 All ER 385 (refd)

Farrel v Secretary Of State For Defence [1980] 1 All ER 166 (refd)Goh Ya Tian v Tan Song Gou & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 317 (refd)Govinda Raju & Anor v Laws [1966] 1 MLJ 188 (refd)Guthrie Sdn Bhd v Trans-malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 33 (refd)Haji Mohamed Dom v Sakiman [1956] MLJ 4 (refd)Haron v Macaulay [1969] 1 MLJ 169 (refd)Henry Trading Co Ltd v Harun [1966] 2 MLJ 281 (refd)How Paik Too v Mohideen [1968] 1 MLJ 51 (refd)Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte

Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 (refd)Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 (refd)Johara Bi binti Abdul Kadir Marican v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anor [1981] 1

MLJ 139 (refd)Jones v Great Western Railway Company Vol 144 LT 194 (refd)

||Page 537>>Kanan a/l Subramaniam & Anor v Aman Syah bin Abadzyuid [2001] MLJU 630;

[2002] 6 CLJ 34 (refd)Kayat & Anor v Lim Yew Seng [1972] 1 MLJ 26 (refd)Koh Siak Poo v Sayang Plantation Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 65 (refd)Lee Soh Hua v Kow Lup Piow & Ors [1984] 2 MLJ 101 (refd)Lim Chai Oon & Anor v Normah bte Ismail & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 105 (refd)Lofthouse v Leicester Corporation The Times Law Reports 1948 Vol lxiv (refd)London Passenger Transport Board v Upson [1949] AC 155 (refd)Ma Clyde v Wong Ah Mei & Anor [1972] 2 MLJ 183 (refd)Maimunah bte Hassan, Administratrix of the Estate of Rozita bte Khamis, deceased &

Anor v Marimuthu & Anor [1993] 1 CLJ 119 (refd)Marappan & Anor v Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99 (refd)Mohd Nazari bin Ab Majit v Tan Keo Hock & Anor [1998] MLJU 382; [1999] 1 CLJ

601 (refd)Manager, Tuborg (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v PP [1990] 2 MLJ 173 (refd)Mohd Samsudin Ismail v Tan Yeow Hwa & Anor [2000] 7 MLJ 24 (refd)Natesan v Goh Gok Hoon [1968] 2 MLJ 3 (folld)Neo Chan Eng v Koh Yong Hoe [1960] MLJ 291 (refd)

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Pang Ah Chee v Chong Kwee Sang [1985] 1 MLJ 153 (refd)Pembangunan Maha Murni Sdn Bhd v Jururus Ladang Sdn Bhd [1986] 2 MLJ 30

(refd)Reliance Omnibus Co Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ishak bin Mohd Jaafar & Anor [1993]

MLJU 10; [1993] 4 CLJ 291 (refd)Rubaidah bte Dirin (Suing as widow of Basia bin Bahari, deceased, on behalf of

herself and the dependants of the deceased) v Ahmad bin Ariffin [1977] 1MLJ 677 (refd)

S Singaram v Fong Peck Moi & Anor [1976] 1 MLJ 237 (refd)Samar binte Mansor v Mustafa Kamarul Ariffin [1974] 2 MLJ 71 (refd)Samsuri bin Saad & Anor v Chew Kit Toh (t/a Kit Thong Woh Hup) and another

appeal [1996] 1 MLJ 576 (refd)Siti Ajar Mat Zain v Cindy Teoh & Anor [1997] 2 CLJ Supp 282 (refd)Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim v Marappan & Anor [1989] 1 CLJ 252 (refd)Sivalingam Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 (refd)State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490 (refd)Sundram v Arujunan & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 361 (refd)Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors and another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ

512 (refd)Tan Phaik See (Ibu kepada Tan Hock San (si mati)) dan Tan Cheng Gek (Ibu Kepada

Ng Chin Chai (si mati)) lwn Chuah Seng Boon Civil Appeal No P04–14 of1996 (folld)

Tan Song Gou v Goh Ya Tian [1983] 1 MLJ 60 (refd)||Page 538>>

Tay Ah Kow @ Tee Cha & Anor v Chua Hee Teng & Anor [1984] 2 CLJ 304 (refd)Teah Cheng Gaw v Elias Bin Abdul Ghani Civil Appeal No R2–12–118 of 1997 (refd)Ting Jie Hoo v Lian Soon Hing Shipping Co [1990] 2 MLJ 56 (refd)Tu Kon Lin and Too Kow Hing v Veronica Joseph (f), an infant and Pamela Joseph

(f), an infant and Anor Supreme Court Civil Appeal No 332 of 1986 (refd)Veronica Joseph (F), an infant and Anor v Tu Kon Lin and Anor [1987] 1 CLJ 81

(refd)Wilsler v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871 (refd)Wisma Punca Emas Sdn Bhd v DR Donal R O’Holohan [1987] 1 MLJ 393 (refd)Woon Ngee Yew & Ors v Ng Yoon Thai & Ors [1941] MLJ 37 (refd)Yew Lean Finance Development (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Gin Thong [1985] 1 CLJ 299

(refd)Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152 (refd)Yew You & Anor v Mah Poay Koh & Anor [1970] 1 MLJ 57 (refd)

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Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 ss 7(3)(iv)(d), (8), (11), 12(4), 28A(2)(d)Evidence Act 1950 ss 35, 58, 74

Daljit Singh ( Gurdev Daljit & Su) for the appellants.Thomas Su Keong Siong ( CK Leong & Co) for the respondents.

[2003] 4 MLJ 65

MEGAT NAJMUDDIN BIN MEGAT KHAS & ORS vPERWIRA HABIB BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–273–1999ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, MOHD NOOR AHMAD, ABDUL AZIZ JJCA25 JULY 2003

Land Law — Lien — Creation — Lien holders’ caveat — Deposit of title with bank —Intending purchaser deposited title with bank — Purchase subject to consent of StateAuthority — Whether purchaser could consent to creation of a lien over the land — Lienholders’ caveat lodged over the land — Whether such a lien holders’ caveat valid — NationalLand Code s 281

Legal Profession — Duty of care — Negligence — Solicitors advised that a lien holders’caveat would be sufficient security for a loan — Caveat held invalid for want of consent ofregistered proprietor — Whether solicitors ought to be held liable for loss

The appellants were practising solicitors. The respondents, a local bank, had engagedthe services of the solicitors to arrange for the execution, by Messrs Loo & SonsRealty Sdn Bhd, the registered owner of a piece of land (‘the landowner’), of a thirdparty first legal charge over the land, as security for an overdraft facility forRM700,000 (‘the first OD’) granted by the bank to one MAA Holdings Sdn Bhd (‘theborrower’). In the meantime, the landowner had entered into a sale and purchaseagreement (‘the SPA’) to sell the land to Land Holdings Sdn Bhd (‘the purchaser’).The original title deed to the land had been handed over by the landowner to thepurchaser. The letter of offer from the bank to the borrower in respect of the first OD,together with the title which had been deposited by the purchaser with the bank, wasgiven by the bank to the solicitors for the purpose of the engagement. The land was,however, subject to a restriction-in-interest which prohibited any transfer or the

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creation of any lease or security on the land without the approval of the StateAuthority. Since it would take time to obtain the consent from the State Authority, theborrower proposed the creation of a lien-holder’s caveat (‘LHC’) on the land. Thisproposal caused the solicitors to issue four different letters to the bank. The first lettercontained the solicitors’ advice that a LHC would be sufficient security for thedisbursement of the first OD. Even before the advice was given, the bank released thesum of RM200,000 to the borrower without any security whatsoever. The secondletter informed the bank that the solicitors had duly perfected the security over theland, by way of the LHC, for the first OD and the borrower could be allowed to utilizethe facility. The borrower then needed a further overdraft facility of RM500,000. Thebank instructed the solicitors to create a fresh LHC for the total sum of RM1.2m. Bythe third letter the solicitors advised that, since the earlier LHC did not stipulate anamed sum, that LHC was sufficient to secure the extra RM500,000 (‘the secondOD’). In the fourth letter the solicitors advised the bank to withdraw the LHC ||Page 66>>and to lodge a fresh LHC to enable the transfer of the land from thelandowner to the purchaser. Meanwhile, under the SPA, the balance of the purchaseprice was to be paid by the purchaser to the landowner within four months from thedate of the SPA, ie by July 1984, subject to the consent for the transfer and chargeover the land being obtained. The consent to transfer was not obtained until January1988, by which time the SPA had been determined. The bank commenced legal actionto enforce the LHC against the landowner and the purchaser. The LHC was held to beinvalid for failure to comply with the requirements for its creation under s 281(1) ofthe National Land Code (‘the NLC’) which provided that only the registeredproprietor of a land had the power or right to deposit the title for the purpose ofcreating a lien. The title in this case had been ‘deposited’ by the purchaser while thelandowner was still the registered proprietor (see Perwira Habib Bank (M) Bhd lwnLoo & Sons Realty Sdn Bhd dan satu lagi (No 1) [1996] 3 MLJ 409). The bank thensued the solicitors for breach of contract and negligence. The learned trial judge gavejudgment for the bank in the sum of RM3.3m with interest at 8%pa. The solicitorsappealed. Learned counsel for the solicitors argued that the bank did not ask for adviceand consequently could not have relied on the advice of the solicitors. The bank hadnever asked for specific advice in writing from the solicitors. The solicitors had merelyresponded to the borrower’s urgent request for the use of the first OD and theproposal to create a LHC over the land as reflected in the borrower’s letter to thebank. Counsel for the solicitors also argued that the failure in enforcing the LHC wasnot as a result of the solicitors’ alleged negligence. If the bank felt that the creation ofa LHC was insufficient to protect its interest, it ought to have asked for additionalsecurities or rejected the loan outright. By failing to do so, the bank was in error.Further, the finding on negligence went against the grain of the authorities. Thesolicitors had qualified their advice by stating that a LHC would only be sufficientsecurity at that point in time, pending the consent being obtained, and that thesolicitors had declined to make any representation as to the consent and the bank didnot seek any clarification or detailed advice from the solicitors on this.

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Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:(1) The fact that the bank never asked for specific advice in writing from the

solicitors did not absolve the solicitors from liability for the negligent advice.The learned judge had found and concluded that the instructing letter from thebank to the solicitors was very clear. The bank wanted a third party first legalcharge on the land. However, on the borrower’s request for a LHC, thesolicitors volunteered the advice that a LHC would be sufficient security. Thelearned judge was correct in his findings and conclusion. In respect of theearlier release of RM200,000, the trial judge, from his finding of facts,concluded that the solicitors ought not to be ||Page 67>>liable for that sum. Although the learned judge did not place anyemphasis on the real question of legal causation, the CA was satisfied, on thefacts, that the advice of the solicitors, that the LHC would be sufficientsecurity, was the cause of the bank disbursing the balance of the first OD, andsubsequently the whole of the second OD, to the borrower, to its detriment.There was an absence of causation only in respect of the first RM200,000because the solicitors’ advice was not the cause of its release. (see pp 75D–F,76A–B).

(2) By the expression ‘for some other purpose’ the learned judge was referring tothe purpose of executing a third party first legal charge on the land, for whichthe Title had been deposited by the purchaser with the bank. Though this maybe good for that purpose, under s 281(1) of the NLC, the right to grant a LHCover land belongs only to the registered proprietor or registered lessee of theland. Although the section did not distinguish between the forms of security,the facts as to who deposited the Title with the bank and who consented to thecreation of the LHC were, for the purpose of the section, material in decidingwhether or not the LHC was valid. Despite the fact that the bank did not askfor additional securities or reject the loan outright, the solicitors could notescape liability for the negligent advice on which the bank had relied and actedto its detriment. (see p 78C–F).

(3) In the face of the specific instruction from the bank to the solicitors for thecreation of a third party first legal charge in its favour and with the knowledgethat consent had not been obtained at that point of time, the solicitors in theirfirst letter advised the bank that a LHC would be in order and would besufficient security for the disbursement of the funds. This was followed by theirsecond letter advising the bank to allow the borrower to utilize the first OD inthe mistaken belief that they had secured a proper LHC. Before giving theadvice, the solicitors had failed to check with the landowner, of whom thesolicitors were aware, for confirmation that the landowner had, indeed,deposited the title and that it had no objections to the LHC being created. Itcould not be said that the bank had represented to the solicitors that the titlehad been deposited with the bank by the landowner. Even if such arepresentation had been made, and in view of the nature of their profession, the

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solicitors ought not to have presumed that the landowner had given its consentfor the creation of the LHC on the land. Brisol & West Building Society vMothew (1966) 4 All ER 698 (folld). (see p 80A–E).


Perayu-perayu beramal sebagai peguamcara. Responden, sebuah bank tempatan, telahmenggunakan khidmat peguamcara tersebut ||Page 68>>untuk menguruskan perlaksanaan, oleh Tetuan Loo & Sons Realty SdnBhd, tuanpunya berdaftar sekeping tanah (‘pemunya tanah’), suatu gadaian pertamasah pihak ketiga ke atas tanah tersebut, sebagai cagaran bagi kemudahan overdrafsebanyak RM700,000 (‘OD pertama’) yang diluluskan oleh bank tersebut kepadaMAA Holdings Sdn Bhd (‘peminjam’). Dalam pada itu, pemunya tanah telahmemasuki suatu perjanjian jual beli (‘PJB’) supaya menjual tanah tersebut kepada LandHoldings Sdn Bhd (‘pembeli’). Salinan asal geran tanah tersebut telah diserahkan olehpemunya tanah kepada pembeli. Surat tawaran pinjaman dari bank kepada peminjamberkenaan OD pertama, bersama-sama dengan geran tanah tersebut yang diletakkanoleh pembeli dengan bank, telah diserahkan oleh bank kepada peguamcara tersebutbagi tujuan khidmatan tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, tanah tersebut tertakluk kepadasuatu sekatan hak yang melarang sebarang pindahmilik tanah atau pembentukansebarang pajakan atau sekruiti ke atas tanah tersebut tanpa kelulusan Pihak BerkuasaNegeri. Memandangkan permohonan mendapatkan kebenaran akan memakan masa,peminjam mengesyorkan pembentukan suatu kaveat pemegang lien (‘KPL’) ke atastanah tersebut. Syor ini menyebabkan peguamcara tersebut mengeluarkan empat pucuksurat berlainan kepada bank. Surat pertama mengandungi nasihat peguamcara tersebutbahawa suatu KPL merupakan cagaran yang memadai bagi pengeluaran OD pertama.Malah, sebelum nasihat ini diberikan, bank telah melepaskan sejumlah RM200,000kepada peminjam tanpa sebarang sekuriti. Surat kedua memberitahu bank bahawapeguamcara tersebut telah menyempurnakan securiti ke atas tanah tersebut, secaraKPL, bagi OD pertama dan peminjam boleh dibenarkan menggunakan kemudahantersebut. Peminjam kemudian berkehendaki kemudahan overdraf seterusnya sebanyakRM500,000. Pihak bank telah mengarahkan peguamcara tersebut menyediakan KPLyang baru bagi jumlah RM1.2j. Melalui surat ketiga peguamcara tersebut menasihatkanbahawa, memandangkan yang KPL sebelumnya tidak menyentuh jumlah yangdipinjamkan, maka KPL tersebut adalah cagaran yang memadai bagi RM500,000tambahan (‘OD kedua’). Dalam surat keempat peguamcara tersebut menasihatkanbank menarik balik KPL tersebut dan memasuki suatu KPL baru bagi membolehkanpindahmilik tanah dari pemunya tanah kepada. Dalam pada itu, di bawah PJB, bakiharga belian perlu di bayar oleh pembeli kepada pemunya tanah dalam masa empatbulan dari tarikh PJB, iaitu sebelum Julai 1984, tertakluk kepada kebenaran bagipindahmilik dan gadaian ke atas tanah tersebut diperolehi. Kebenaran bagi pindahmiliktidak diperolehi sehingga Januari 1988, dan PJB pada masa tersebut telah ditamatkan.Bank memulakan guaman ke atas KPL terhadap pemunya tanah dan pembeli. KPL

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tersebut didapati tidak sah kerana kegagalan mematuhi peruntukan kewujudannya dibawah s 281(1) Kanun Tanah Negara (‘KTN’) yang memperuntukkan bahawa hanyaseorang tuanpunya berdaftar ||Page 69>>mempunyai kuasa atau hak meletakkan sesuatu geran tanah bagi maksudkewujudan sesuatu lien. Geran tanah dalan kes ini telah ‘diletakkan’ oleh pembeli,malahan pemunya tanah masih menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar (lihat Perwira Habib Bank(M) Bhd lwn Loo & Sons Realty Sdn Bhd & satu lagi (No 1) [1996] 3 MLJ 409). Banktelah menyaman peguamcara tersebut bagi kemungkiran kontrak dan kecuaian. Hakimperbicaraan yang bijaksana telah merekodkan penghakiman bagi pihak bank bagijumlah RM3.3j dengan faedah pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikah penghakiman.Peguamcara tersebut telah merayu. Peguam bagi peguamcara tersebut berhujahbahawa bank tidak pernah meminta nasihat maka tidak mungkin telah bergantungkepada nasihat peguamcara tersebut. Bank tidak pernah meminta nasihat khas bertulisdari peguamcara tersebut. Peguamcara tersebut hanya telah membalas permintaansegara peminjam bagi kegunaan kemudahan OD pertama dan syor bagi pembentukansuatu KPL ke atas tanah tersebut seperti dinyatakan dalam surat peminjam kepadabank. Peguam bagi pihak peguamcara tersebut juga berhujah bahawa kegagalanmenguatkuasakan KPL bukannya akibat kecuaian peguamcara tersebut. Sekiranyapihak bank mendapati pembentukan suatu KPL tidak mencukupi bagi melindungikepentingannya, pihak bank harus meminta cagaran tambahan atau menolak pinjamantersebut. Akibat kegagalannya berbuat demikian, bank telah melakukan kesilapan.Seterusnya, penemuan kecuaian tersebut melanggar aliran autoriti. Peguamcaratersebut telah mensyaratkan nasihat mereka dengan pernyataan bahawa sesuatu KPLhanya cagaran yang memadai buat masa itu, selagi kebenaran belum diperolehi, danpeguamcara tersebut enggan membuat sebarang representasi ke atas kebenarantersebut dan pihak bank tidak pernah meminta sebarang penjelasan atau nasihatterperinci dari peguamcara tersebut berkaitannya.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos:(1) Fakta bahawa pihak bank tidak pernah meminta nasihat khas bertulis dari

peguamcara tersebut tidak membebaskan peguamcara tersebut dari liabilitikerana memberi nasihat dengan cuai. Hakim yang bijaksana mendapati danmemutuskan bahawa surat arahan dari bank kepada peguamcara tersebutadalah sangat jelas. Bank menghendaki suatu gadaian pertama pihak ketiga keatas tanah tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, di atas permintaan peminjam bagisuatu KPL, peguamcara tersebut telah secara rela menawarkan nasihat bahawasuatu KPL merupakan cagaran yang memadai. Hakim yang bijaksana adalahbetul dalam penemuan dan keputusannya. Berkenaan dengan perlepasan jumlahRM200,000, hakim perbicaraan, berasaskan pendapat faktanya, memutuskanbahawa peguamcara tersebut tidak harus didapati bertanggungjawab bagijumlah tersebut. Walaupun hakim yang bijaksana tidak menitikberatkanpersoalan sebenarnya punca sebab dari segi undang-undang, MR berpuashati,berasaskan ||Page 70>>fakta, nasihat peguamcara tersebut, bahawa KPL merupakan

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cagaran yang memadai, adalah pendorong bank melepaskan baki OD pertama,dan seterusnya keseluruhan OD kedua kepada peminjam, dan mengalamikerugian. Hanya terdapat ketidakhadiran pendorong ini bagi jumlahRM200,000 memandangkan yang nasihat peguamcara tersebut bukan puncaperlepasannya (lihat ms 75D–F, 76A–B).

(2) Dengan penggunaan pepatah ‘bagi sesuatu sebab lain’, hakim yang bijaksanasedang merujuk kepada tujuan penyempurnaan gadaian pertama pihak ketigake atas tanah tersebut, yang menjadi tujuan pembeli memperletakkan gerantanah tersebut dengan bank. Walaupun ini memadai bagi tujuan tersebut, dibawah s 281(1) KTN, hak memberikan suatu KPL ke atas tanah hanyakepunyaan tuanpunya berdaftar atau pemegang pajakan berdaftar tanahtersebut. Walaupun seksyen tersebut tidak membezakan antara bentuk sekuriti,fakta-fakta siapakah yang meletakkan geran tanah dengan bank dan siapakahmemberi kebenaran pembentukan KPL tersebut adalah, bagi maksud seksyenini, material dalam mengenalpasti keesahan KPL tersebut. Walaupun pihakbank tidak meminta sebarang cagaran tambahan atau menolak pinjamantersebut, peguamcara tersebut tidak dapat melepaskan liabiliti bagi nasihat yangcuai yang bank telah bergantung kepada dan bertindak ke atas dan menanggungkerugian. (lihat ms 78C–F).

(3) Memandangkan arahan khas pihak bank kepada peguamcara tersebut bagipembentukan suatu gadaian pertama pihak ketiga di atas nama bank dandengan kesedaran bahawa kebenaran masih belum diperolehi pada masa itu,peguamcara tersebut dalam surat pertama mereka telah menasihatkan bankbahawa suatu KPL adalah sah dan memadai bagi pengeluaran pinjaman. Inidiikuti surat kedua menasihatkan bank membenarkan Peminjam menggunakanOD pertama di atas salah sangka mereka bahawa suatu KPL yang sah telahdiperolehi. Sebelum memberikan nasihat tersebut, peguamcara tersebut telahgagal mengenalpasti dari pemunya tanah, yang peguamcara tersebut sedar, bagimengesahkan bahawa pemunya tanah memang telah had meletakkan garantanah tersebut dan tiada sebarang bantahan kepada KPL dibentukkan. Tidakdapat dikatakan bahawa pihak bank telah membuat representasi kepadapeguamcara tersebut bahawa geran tanah tersebut telah diletakkan dengan bankoleh pemunya tanah. Jikapun representasi sebegitu telah dibuat, danmemandangkan sifat profesion mereka, peguamcara tersebut harus tidakmembuat andaian bahawa pemunya tanah telah memberikan kebenarannya bagipembentukan suatu KPL ke atas tanah tersebut (lihat ms 80A–E); Brisol &West Building Society v Mothew [1966] 4 All ER 698 diikut.]||Page 71>>

NotesFor cases on negligence of solicitors, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue)paras 1585–1596.For cases on the creation of liens, see 8(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue)

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paras 2712–2724.

Cases referred toBrisol & West Building Society v Mothew [1966] 4 All ER 698 (folld)Midland Bank v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp (a firm) [1979] ChD 384 (refd)Mohamed Ali v PP [1962] MLJ 230 (refd)Perwira Habib Bank (M) Bhd lwn Loo & Sons Realty Sdn Bhd & satu lagi (No 1)

[1996] 3 MLJ 409 (folld)

Legislation referred toEvidence Act 1950 ss 45, 114(g)National Land Code ss 281(1)Rules of the High Court 1980 O 40 r 1(1)

Civil Suit No S2–22–550 of 1990 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Manjit Singh (Balvinder Singh Henth with him) (Sri Ram & Co) for the appellants.WM Lee (GL Oh with her) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the respondent.

--

[2003] 4 MLJ 545

PUSPANATHAN A/L RAMIAYAH v ZAKARIA BIN OSMAN


Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Motor accident — Apportionment of liability —Collision from opposite direction — Two version of defendant’s evidence — Whethersessions court judge’s finding of 50:50 liability should be set aside — Whether defendantshould be totally liable based on evidence

The plaintiff was riding his motorcycle when he collided into a motorcar driven by thedefendant from the opposite direction. The plaintiff’s claim for negligence was that thedefendant failed to stop at the junction before emerging into the main road. As a result

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of the collision, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries. The defendant made a policereport and said that the plaintiff was proceeding from his opposite direction and thenentered into his path. However, in his evidence in court, he suddenly came up with asecond version, that the plaintiff had emerged from his left and across his path. Thelearned sessions court judge believed the defendant’s version rather than the plaintiff’sversion but found the defendant equally negligent for the accident and apportionedliability at 50:50. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s appeal and finding the defendant totally liable:(1) The defendant had not explained the difference between what was stated in his

police report and what was stated in his evidence in court. Surely if this waswhat happened, he would not have omitted to mention this version in his policereport which was made shortly after the accident. His significant failure toexplain why he said what he said in his police report must weigh heavily whenanalyzing his evidence. (see pp 548I, 549A–B).

(2) The learned sessions court judge had failed to consider the damages to the twovehicles. The damages to the defendant’s motorcar were mostly on the righthand side. Of significance was the fact that the front right wheel was bent andthe front right body and door, dented. These damages, together with the frontrim of the motorcycle being broken clearly showed an impact consistent withthe plaintiff’s version of the defendant emerging from the plaintiff’s left andturning right across the plaintiff’s path when the collision occurred (see p549C–D).

(3) Having considered all these aspects, it was clear that the learned sessions courtjudge’s finding of equal liability of both parties could not be supported by theavailable evidence. The evidence of the investigating officer who testified thatfrom his investigations he had ascertained that each party was proceeding fromthe opposite direction to one another also must be rejected. There was no basisfor such a conclusion. He led no evidence as to the type of investigations hehad done to enable him to arrive at such a conclusion (see p 549F–G).||Page 546>>


Plaintif sedang menaiki motorsikal beliau apabila beliau berlanggar dengan sebuahkereta yang dipandu oleh defendan dari arah yang bertentangan. Tuntutan plaintifuntuk kecuaian adalah di mana defendan telah gagal untuk berhenti di simpang sebelummasuk ke jalan utama. Akibat daripada perlanggaran tersebut, plaintif mengalamikecederaan serius. Defendan telah membuat laporan polis dan menyatakan bahawaplaintif telah datang dari arah bertentangan dan kemudian memasuki laluan beliau.Namun begitu, dalam keterangan beliau di mahkamah, beliau tiba-tiba timbul denganversi kedua, di mana plaintif muncul dari sebelah kiri beliau dan masuk ke dalam laluan

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beliau. Hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana mempercayai versi defendan daripadaversi plaintif tetapi mendapati defendan sama-sama cuai kerana kemalangan tersebutdan membahagikan liabiliti 50:50. Plaintif telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan plaintif dan mendapati defendan bertanggungjawabkeseluruhannya:(1) Defendant tidak memberikan penjelasan tentang perbezaan antara apa yang

dinyatakan dalam laporan polis beliau dan apa yangdinyatakan dalamketerangan beliau di mahkamah. Sekiranya itu yang sebenarnya berlaku, beliautidak sepatutnya tertinggal untuk menyebutkan versi ini dalam laporan polisbeliau yang telah dibuat sejurus kemalangan tersebut. Kegagalan nyata beliauuntuk menjelaskan apa yang telah dinyatakan oleh beliau dalam laporan polishendaklah diberi pertimbangan semasa meneliti keterangannya (lihat ms 548I,549A–B).

(2) Hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana telah gagal untuk menimbangkankerosakan terhadap kedua-dua kenderaan. Kerosakan ke atas kereta defendankebanyakannya di sebelah kanan. Paling ketara adalah bahawa tayar depansebelah kanan bengkok dan bahagian hadapan badan dan pintu kereta di sebelahkanan, remuk. Kerosakan-kerosakan tersebut, bersama dengan bahagian depanmotorsikal jelas menunjukkan satu kesan yang konsisten dengan versi plaintifyang mana defendan telah muncul dari arah kiri plaintif dan membelok ke kananmasuk ke arah laluan plaintif apabila perlanggaran tersebut berlaku (lihat ms549C–D).

(3) Setelah menimbangkan semua aspek berikut, adalah jelas bahawa penemuanliabiliti sama rata kedua-dua pihak oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksanatidak boleh disokong dengan keterangan yang ada. Keteranagn pegawaipenyiasat yang membuat keterangan bahawa daripada siasatan beliau telahdapat memastikan bahawa setiap pihak telah datang dari arah yangbertentangan antara satu sama lain juga harus ditolak. Tiada asas untukkesimpulan tersebut. Beliau tidak membuktikan apa-apa keterangan berhubungcara siasatan yang beliau telah lakukan untuk membolehkan beliau tiba kepadakesimpulan sedemikian (lihat ms 549F–G).]||Page 547>>

NotesFor cases on road accident, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras1056–1288.

Baldev Singh Bhar (Syarikat Baldev Bhar) for the appellant/plaintiff.P Ramanathan (VP Nathan & Partners) for the respondent/defendant.

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[2003] 4 MLJ 766

HWANG-DBS SECURITIES v HARUN BIN JASIN

HIGH COURT (PENANG) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12-304 OF 2002KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J13 OCTOBER 2003

Securities — Stockbroker — Shares — Shares pledged to remisier by customer — Failure todispose of shares — Trading loss incurred by customer — Whether stockbroker had a duty tomitigate customer’s loss

Securities — Remisier — Negligence — Failure to dispose customer’s shares quickly —Loss occasioned thereby Whether remisier negligent — Whether proper to recover such lossfrom customer

The plaintiff sued the defendant for trading losses amounting to RM160,693.31 andinterest of RM51, 463.28. The record revealed that on 22 April 1997, a sum ofRM160, 693.31 was due and owing by the defendant to the plaintiff. On the same daythe defendant pledged his 25,000 Denko Industrial Corporation Berhad (‘Denko’)shares to the plaintiff’s remisier. At that material date, a Denko share was valued atRM11 at its highest and RM10.30 at its lowest. However the plaintiff did not sell theshares to recover its losses. Whilst the defendant admitted owing the sum of RM160,693.31 he claimed he was not liable for the interest amounting to RM51, 463.28. Thedefendant claimed that once he had pledged his shares it was the plaintiff’s duty tohave sold the shares on the same day to recover its losses forthwith. The defendantpointed out that had the 25,000 shares been sold on that date, the plaintiff would haveobtained RM275,000 which would have more than covered its losses. In the sessionscourt, the plaintiff’s claim was allowed and the defendant thus appealed to the HighCourt.

Held, setting aside the judgment of the sessions court in respect of the interest sumonly:(1) There was no plausible reason given by the plaintiff as to why it did not sell the

shares pledged. On the facts, the total price of the shares when sold would havebeen more than sufficient to recover the losses. There was a duty upon theplaintiff to have mitigated the loss the defendant had to bear. Since time was anessential factor for consideration, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to haveprotected its own interest and at the same time ensure that the interest of itsclient was also protected by disposing of the shares when it was at its highest(see pp 768H–769B).

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(2) The plaintiff confirmed that the remisier into whose account the defendant’sshares were put, was its employee. The plaintiff treated the pledged shares asbelonging to the remisier. The remisier was obviously negligent in failing todispose of the shares quickly. It was therefore totally inappropriate for theplaintiff to||Page 767>> attempt to recover the interest from the defendant due to thenegligence of its own employee (see p 769B–E).


Plaintif telah menyaman defendan untuk kerugian perniagaan yang berjumlahRM160,693.31 dan faedah RM51,463.28. Rekod telah menunjukkan bahawa pada 22April 1997, satu jumlah RM160,693.31 kena dibayar an terhutang oleh defendankepada plaintif. Pada hari yang sama defendan telah menjaminkan 25,000 saham DenkoIndustrial Corporation Bhd (‘Denko’) kepada remisier plaintif. Pada tarikh yang mapanitu, saham Denko bernilai RM11 pada tahap paling tinggi dan RM10.30 pada tahappaling rendah. Akan tetapi plaintif tidak menjual saham-saham itu untuk mendapatkankembali kerugian beliau. Walaupun defendan mengaku berhutang sebanyakRM160,693.31 beliau menyatakan bahawa beliau tidak bertanggungjawab untukfaedahnya berjumlah RM51,463.28. Defendan mendakwa bahawa setelah beliaumenjaminkan saham-saham beliau ia adalah tanggungjawab plaintif untuk menjualsaham-saham itu pada hari yang sama untuk mendapatkan kembali kerugian beliau.Defendan mengatakan bahawa jika saham-saham itu dijual pada hari tarikh itu, plaintifboleh mendapat RM275,000 yang boleh mendapat kembali kerugian beliau. Di dalammahkamah sesyen, tuntutan plantif dibenarkan dan defendan telah merayu kepadaMahkamah Tinggi.

Diputuskan, menolak penghakiman mahkamah sesyen berkenaan jumlah faedah:(1) Plaintif tidak memberi alasan yang munasabah mengenai mengapa beliau tidak

menjual saham-saham yang dijaminkan itu. Pada fakta-fakta harga penuhsaham-saham itu selepas dijual boleh mendapat kembali kerugian itu. Terdapattanggungjawab pada plaintif untuk mengurangkan kerugian defendan.Memandangkan bahawa masa adalah faktor yang penting untukdipertimbangkan ia adalah perlu untuk plaintif melindungi kepentingan beliausendiri dan pada masa yang sama memastikan bahawa kepentingan anak guambeliau terlindung dengan menjual saham-saham pada masa ia bernilai palingtinggi (lihat ms 768H–769B).

(2) Plaintif telah mengesahkan bahawa remisier yang memegang saham-sahamdefendan adalah pekerjanya. Plaintif telah menganggap saham-saham yangdijaminkan sebagai saham-saham remisier itu. Remisier itu adalah cuai keranatidak menjual saham-saham itu dengan cepat. Oleh itu ia tidak berpatutan untukplaintif cuba mendapat kembali faedah daripada defendan oleh kerana kecuaian

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pekerjanya (lihat ms 769B–E).||Page 768>>

NotesFor cases on negligence of remisiers, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 1996 Reissue)para 776.For cases on stockbrokers, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed 1996 Reissue) paras791-792.

Cheah Ee Keong (Peter Huang & Richard) for the plaintiff.Latsmanan Ponnusamy (Khor Gaik Thiam & Latsmanan) for defendant.

[2003] 5 MLJ 456

ANG SOONG SENG & ANOR v NORAINI BTE DORALIK &ANOR

HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–156 OF 1999SURIYADI J21 MARCH 2003

Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Appellants found 100% liable — Respondentsinnocent passengers — Driver of respondents not joined as a party — Whether respondentshad legal right to proceed against any or all of the persons responsible for the accident

The respondents were passengers in a car, driven by the husband of the firstrespondent (driver of the respondents). They were then en route to work. Whenconfronted by thick smoke, which blocked his view, the driver of the respondents hadmaneuvred slightly to the right but returned to his original path as he saw an oncomingvehicle. Devoid of choice, except to drive through the said wall of smoke, he drovestraight into it, to be confronted by the presence of a steamroller. Due to the proximityof the latter vehicle, the driver of the respondents was unable to avoid it, resulting inhim crashing into the rear of that said steamroller. As a consequence of the collisionthe respondents suffered severe injury. The respondents subsequently filed a suitagainst the driver and owner of that steamroller, the current appellants, but noneagainst the driver of the respondents. The sessions court held the appellants 100%liable, and whereupon the general and specific claim had been granted. The appellantsappealed to the High Court.

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Held, dismissing the appeal:The respondents were innocent passengers. Being so positioned as mere spectators,they would have been unable to contribute in any way, positively or negatively towardsthe avoidance of a collision. The respondents therefore were within their legal rights toproceed against any or all of the persons responsible for the accident. The fact that thedriver of the respondents was not joined in, as a defendant by the respondents shouldnot be taken against them, as they, as innocent bystanders could not be compelled toproceed against anyone whom they did not wish to bring in. Whatever reasons theyhad were not for the court to enquire into. Once the court found the appellants asbeing responsible, however minimal, and with the court being unable to apportion theliability with anyone else, the appellants had to shoulder 100% responsibility (see pp459B–C, 460G–461A).


Responden-responden merupakan penumpang-penumpang di dalam kereta yangdipandu oleh suami responden pertama (pemandu responden-responden). Pada masaitu, mereka sedang pergi ke kerja. Apabila dihadapi dengan asap yang tebal yang telahmenghalang ||Page 457>>pandangannya, pemandu responden-responden telah mengendalikankereta itu sedikit ke kanan tetapi telah kembali ke jalan yang asal kerana beliau telahmelihat sebuah kenderaan yang datang. Tanpa mempunyai pilihan kecuali untukmemandu ke dalam asap itu, beliau telah memandu terus ke dalamnya dan telahdihadapkan dengan sebuah jentera penggelek jalan. Oleh kerana kenderaan itu dekat,pemandu responden-responden tidak dapat mengelakkannya dan ini mengakibatkankereta beliau melanggar bahagian belakang jentera penggelek jalan. Akibatperlanggaran itu, responden-responden telah mengalami kecederaan serius.Responden-responden telah memfailkan tindakan terhadap pemandu dan pemilikjentera penggelek jalan, perayu-perayu kini, tetapi tidak terhadap pemanduresponden-responden. Mahkamah sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa perayu-perayuadalah 100% bertanggungjawab, dan tuntutan am dan khusus telah diberi.Perayu-perayu merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut:Responden-responden adalah penumpang-penumpang yang tidak bersalah. Oleh keranamereka merupakan penonton, mereka tidak dapat menyumbang, sama ada secarapositif atau negatif, kepada pengelakkan perlanggaran itu. Responden-respondenadalah di dalam hak undang-undang mereka untuk menuntut terhadap mana-mana atausemua orang yang bertangungjawab untuk kemalangan itu. Responden-responden tidakpatut dipersalahkan atas fakta bahawa pemandu responden-responden tidak dibawamasuk sebagai defendan oleh responden-responden, oleh kerana mereka, sebagai orangyang berada di tempat kejadian yang tidak bersalah, tidak dapat dipaksa untuk

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menuntut terhadap sesiapa yang mereka tidak hendak membawa masuk. Apa-apaalasan yang mereka ada tidak patut dipersoalkan oleh mahkamah. Setelah mahkamahmendapati perayu-perayu bersalah, bagaimana minimum sekalipun, dan oleh keranamahkamah tidak dapat agih liabiliti kepada orang lain, perayu-perayu mesti memikultanggungjawab 100% (lihat ms 459B–C, 460G–461A).

NotesFor cases on road accidents, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue), paras887–1108.

Cases referred toChang Ming Feng & Anor v Jackson Lim @ Jackson ak Bajut [1999] 1 MLJ 1 (refd)Damai Cheras Sdn Bhd & Anor v Poothapillai Krisnamoorthy [1998] 1 MLJ 639

(refd)Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd and others [1961] 2 QB 162 (refd)Marrapan & Anor v Siti Rahmah bte Ibrahim [1990] 1 MLJ 99 (refd)Md Jailani Ta’at (MM83292) v Zoolkiplie Hj Abdul Rahman & Anor [1990] 2 CLJ

256 (refd)||Page 458>>

Oli Mohamed v Keith Murphy & Anor [1969] 2 MLJ 244 (refd)Tay Kheng Hong v Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] MLJ 87 (refd)Tea Hock Chong v Razali Hanafiah [1990] 1 CLJ 833 (refd)Wong Fook & satu lagi lwn Abdul Shukur Abdul Halim & satu lagi [1990] 2 CLJ 382

(refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 s 28A(2)(c)(ii)

Summons No 53–804 of 1996 (Sessions Court, Shah Alam)

Mani Raju ( Usha Nadarajah with her) ( Wong Seng Chow, Nadarajah & Co) for thedefendant/appellant.

Justin Morais ( Justin Morais & Co) for the respondent/plaintiff.

[2003] 5 MLJ 550

CHONG KOK WENG & ANOR (BOTH AS JOINTADMINISTRATOR AND ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE

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ESTATE OF CHONG KIT YIN AND CHUNG MUI LIM,DECD) v WING WAH TRAVEL AGENCY SDN BHD & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUITS NOS P531/81 AND P532/81ABDUL AZIZ JCA15 JANUARY 2003

Civil Law Act — Damages — Claim for damages — Deceased couple bought a full packagegroup tour from first defendant — Deceased stayed in different hotel due to absence ofreception for deceased couple at airport — Couple died due to coal briquet carbon monoxidegas poisoning in hotel room — Whether defendants liable — Civil Law Act 1965 ss 7, 8

Contract — Breach — Exemption clause — Deceased couple bought a full package grouptour from first defendant — Deceased stayed in different hotel due to absence of reception fordeceased couple at airport — Couple died due to coal briquet carbon monoxide gas poisoningin hotel room — Whether absence of reception for deceased couple was beyond firstdefendant’s control — Whether exemption clause applied to render first defendant not liable

Tort — Negligence — Duty of care — Deceased couple bought a full package group tourfrom first defendant — Deceased stayed in different hotel due to absence of reception fordeceased couple at airport — Couple died due to coal briquet carbon monoxide gas poisoningin hotel room — Whether first defendant answerable for delay in flight — Whether firstdefendant knew or could not have known that hotel was not safe for accommodation —Whether first defendant had done all that was reasonable to ensure that deceased couple wasmet on arrival — Whether case of negligence against first defendant could succeed —Whether deaths of couple a reasonably foreseeable consequence of breach

Tort — Negligence — Duty of care — Employees of airline company brought deceasedcouple to hotel after tour agent failed to meet couple — Couple died due to coal briquetcarbon monoxide gas poisoning in hotel room — Whether employees of airline company owedduty of care to deceased couple to ensure that they were accommodated at a safe place

Chong Kit Yin and Chung Mui Lim (‘the deceased couple’) bought a full packagegroup tour from the first defendant (‘Wing Wah’). The second defendant (‘KoreanAirlines’) provided them air carriage from Tokyo to Seoul, where they met theirdeaths. The tour group of 23 people (including the deceased couple), was originallybooked on Korean Airlines’ flight KE 704, scheduled to arrive at Seoul at 3.40pm on15 October 1978. There was a change of flight to flight KE 001, which was scheduledto arrive at Seoul at 7.30pm on the same day. Wing Wah arranged for the tour group’saccomodation at the Sheraton Walker Hill Hotel (‘the Sheraton’) in Seoul. Wing

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Wah’s ground agent in Seoul for the group was Lotte Travel Service Ltd (‘Lotte’). On3 October 1978, Wing Wah wrote to Lotte to inform them that the tour group wouldbe travelling from Tokyo to Seoul on 15 October 1978 on KE 001, instead of KE 704.The message, which||Page 551>> was air-mailed and postmarked 4 October 1978, was not received byLotte on time. Not having received information about the change of flight to KE 001,Ms Woo was sent by Lotte to welcome the tour group at Seoul’s Kimpo Airport at3.40pm and to transport the group to the Sheraton. When the tour group did not arriveon KE 704, Mr Wu of Lotte made enquiries with Korean Airlines in Seoul about thegroup but was informed that the group was also not on flight KE 001. Mr Wu alsoattempted to communicate by telephone with Wing Wah in Kuala Lumpur but was notsuccessful. Ms Woo susequently left the airport. The tour group finally arrived at theairport at about 8.26pm on flight KE 001. Mr Kim, the supervisor in the departure hallat Kimpo Airport brought the tour group to a restaurant and subsequently found an inn(‘the Eun-ha Inn’) in which the tour group could stay the night. Meanwhile, Mr Wuwas informed that the tour group had arrived. Mr Wu drove the coach to meet the tourgroup but could not find anyone. The curfew in Seoul had started by then and Mr Wucould only commence to search for the tour group at 4am when the curfew ended, butto no avail. On the following morning, four persons were found unconscious in a roomat the Eun-ha Inn with symptoms of gas intoxication. Two of the four persons werethe deceased couple. The cause of their deaths was certified to be coal briquet carbonmonoxide gas poisoning. These two actions were brought under ss 7 and 8 of the CivilLaw Act 1956 against Wing Wah and Korean Airlines by the joint administrator andadministratrix of the estates of the deceased couple to recover damages arising fromtheir deaths. The causes of action against Wing Wah were breach of contract andnegligence, and against Korean Airlines was negligence. The plaintiffs argued thatWing Wah committed two breaches of contract. One was in the belated arrival of flightKE 001 in Seoul at 8.26pm instead of at 7.30pm as scheduled. The second breach wasthe absence of reception for the deceased couple at the airport and in accommodatingthem at the Eun-ha Inn. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that Wing Wah had breached itsduty of care to the deceased couple in: (a) failing to ensure that the deceased couplearrived in Seoul at 3.20pm; (b) in causing them to arrive at 8.26pm without properarrangement being made for their accommodation in Seoul; (c) causing them to beaccommodated at the Eun-ha Inn which Wing Wah knew or ought to have known wasnot safe for accommodation; and (d) failing to make adequate arrangements with Lotteto ensure the deceased couple were met on arrival in Seoul and transported to theSheraton. The plaintiffs did not call any witnesses to testify as to the happenings in thenight between 15 and 16 October 1978 and instead sought to rely on three reports, P4,P5 and P9. P4 was the report to the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from theThird Secretary, Administration and Consular (‘Mohd Noor Hashim’) at the MalaysianEmbassy in Seoul, P5 was Lotte’s statement to the Malaysian Embassy and P9 was areport from Wing Wah’s tour leader. The plaintiffs also produced P7, which was aletter from Mohd||Page 552>> Noor Hashim to the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarding,

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among other things, a copy of the police report from the Kangso-gu Police Station, thepassports and personal effects of the deceased couple. The police report containedinformation about the cause of the presence of carbon monoxide in the inn. It appearedthat the operators of the Eun-ha Inn had had the heating system of the room inquestion changed from roller style coal briquet fireplace to hot water circulation style,but the finishing work that had to be done to the room after the change had been of aninferior quality so that, in the cement finishing beside a water tank and at both sides ofa window, there were cracks through which carbon monoxide gas seeped into theroom. Wing Wah’s holiday brochure contained a clause exempting Wing Wah fromliability ‘… for any injury, damage, loss, additional expenses, accidental delay or otherirregularity which may be caused either through wilful or negligent acts or commissionon the part of companies or individuals providing or engaged in transportation,accommodation or other services relating to the execution of the tour or throughnatural calamities or Government Regulations, strikes and other factors beyond itscontrol’.

Held,dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims:(1) The reports and the letters relied on by the plaintiffs were hearsay, in that they

were statements or based on statements of persons who did not appear andtestify. Therefore, they were inadmissible as evidence (see p 561E).

(2) Nowhere in their written submission did the plaintiffs expressly say that KoreanAirlines owed a duty of care to the deceased couple to transport them to theSheraton. The plaintiffs’ argument was that even if Korean Airlines’semployees did not know that the tour group was to be accommodated at theSheraton, their conduct in waiting at the restaurant with the tour group, insearching for accommodation and in eventually housing the members of thetour group at the Eun-ha Inn suggested an undertaking by those employees toact in the best interests of the deceased couple. The plaintiffs thereforeconcluded that those employees of Korean Airlines owed a duty of care to thedeceased couple to ensure that they were accommodated at a place that wassafe for habitation. The corollary was that if those employees had left the groupto their fate at the restaurant, they would have owed no duty of care to thedeceased couple. To find that a duty of care arose in such circumstances was topropose that the greater the length one would go to in endeavouring to helpsomeone, the greater was one’s duty of care to ensure, as a matter ofundertaking, that the help given ended in safety. No authority had been citedfor such a proposition but in any case, it did not strike the court as a correctproposition. It was unacceptable because it would discourage the rendering ofsuccour to those in distress (see p 562C–F).||Page 553>>

(3) The plaintiffs claimed that the breach in such duty of care laid in the employeesof Korean Airlines accommodating the deceased at the Eun-ha Inn when theyknew or should have known that it was not safe for accommodation. There was

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no evidence that those employees knew or should have known that it was not asafe accommodation. On the contrary, the evidence of the police report as tothe cause of the presence of carbon monoxide in the fateful room was primafacie proof that those employees could not have known that there was or wasgoing to be presence of carbon monoxide in one of the rooms of the inn. Infact, there was evidence that those employees themselves would have stayed atthe inn too had there been any more room to accommodate them (seep 562F–H).

(4) Accordingly, the plaintiffs had not proven that the Korean Airlines’ employeesowed the duty of care to the deceased couple but even if they did owe such aduty of care, they had not breached it. Therefore, it followed that the plaintiffshad failed to prove their case against Korean Airlines (see pp 562H–563A).

(5) The factors that operated to prevent Lotte meeting the tour group at theairport, namely the non-receipt in time of Wing Wah’s communication aboutthe change of flight and Mr Wu’s being informed by KAL that the group wasnot on flight KE 001 were factors beyond Wing Wah’s control and theexemption clause applied to render them not liable for the consequencesthereof on the deceased couple. As for the delay in flight KE 001, Wing Wahclearly cannot be liable for it because, according to the exemption clause, it wasa circumstance beyond their control. For those reasons, the plaintiffs failedagainst Wing Wah on breach of contract (see pp 564I–565A, D–E, G).

(6) The original flight KE 704 had been changed to KE 001 before the tour started.Any delay in the flight should not be answerable for by Wing Wah because theyhad no control over flights and flight operation. As for the accommodation,proper arrangements had been made for accommodation at the Sheraton. WingWah and its tour leader did not know or could not have known that the Eun-haInn was not safe for accommodation. The evidence was that Wing Wah haddone all that was reasonable to ensure that the deceased couple were met onarrival, but their letter informing Lotte of the change of flight was not receivedby Lotte before the event. Accordingly, the case of negligence against WingWah must fail. Even if there was a breach of duty of care on their part, thedeaths of the deceased couple were not a reasonably foreseeable consequenceof the breach (see pp 565H–566D, F).


Chong Kit Yin dan Chung Mui Lim (‘pasangan mendiang’) telah membeli pakejpelancongan berkumpulan daripada defendan pertama||Page 554>> (‘Wing Wah’). Defendan kedua (‘Penerbangan Korea’) membekalkanpengangkutan penerbangan udara dari Tokyo ke Seoul, di mana mereka menemui ajalmereka. Kumpulan pelancongan yang terdiri daripada 23 orang, termasuk pasanganmendiang, asalnya ditempah menaiki Penerbangan Korea KE 704, yang dijadualkan

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tiba di Seoul pada 15 Oktober 1978 jam 3.40pm. Pengangkutan telah ditukar kepadapenerbangan KE 001, yang dijadualkan tiba di Seoul pada hari yang sama jam 7.30pm.Wing Wah telah membuat penempahan bagi penginapan kumpulan pelancongantersebut di Hotel Sheraton Walker Hill (‘Hotel Sheraton’) di Seoul. Agen daratanWing Wah di Seoul bagi kumpulan tersebut adalah Lotte Travel Service Ltd (‘Lotte’).Pada 3 Oktober 1978, Wing Wah telah memutuskan surat kepada Lotte memberitahuLotte bahawa kumpulan pelancongan tersebut akan bertolak dari Tokyo ke Seoul pada15 Oktober 1978 di atas KE 001, dan bukannya KE 704. Utusan yang di hantar secarapos udara itu dan dicap pos 4 Oktober 1978, tidak sempat diterima oleh Lotte. Olehkerana tidak sempat menerima maklumat tentang perubahan penerbangan ke KE 001,Lotte telah menghantar Cik Woo untuk menyambut kumpulan pelancongan diLapangan Terbang Kimpo di Seoul pada pukul 3.40pm dan untuk membawa kumpulantersebut ke Hotel Sheraton. Apabila kumpulan pelancongan tersebut tidak tiba denganpenerbangan KE 704, En Wu dari Lotte telah bertanya dengan Penerbangan Korea diSeoul tentang kumpulan tersebut tetapi beliau diberitahu bahawa kumpulan tesebuttidak juga dijadualkan tiba dengan penerbangan KE 001. Encik Wu juga telah cubaberhubung dengan Wing Wah di Kuala Lumpur melalui telefon tetapi tidak berjaya.Cik Woo seterusnya telah meninggalkan lapangan terbang. Kumpulan pelancongantelah tiba dengan Penerbangan KE 001 pada jam 8.26pm. Encik Kim, penyelia didewan pelepasan di Lapangan Terbang Kimpo telah membawa kumpulan pelancongantersebut ke sebuah restoran dan seterusnya mencarikan penginapan di sebuah rumahpenginapan (‘Eun-ha Inn’) di mana kumpulan pelancongan itu dapat bermalam.Sementara itu, En Wu telah diberitahu bahawa kumpulan pelancongan itu telah tiba.Encik Wu telah memandu bas untuk menyambut kumpulan pelancongan tersebut tetapitidak dapat mengesan sesiapa. Perintah berkurung di Seoul telah bermula pada masaitu dan En Wu hanya dapat meneruskan pencariannya pada pukul 4am apabilahperintah berkurung itu tamat, tetapi masih tidak berjaya. Pagi seterusnya empat orangtelah ditemui dalam keadaan tidak sedar diri di dalam sebuah bilik di Eun-ha Inndengan tanda kemabukan gas Dua daripada empat orang tersebut adalah pasanganmendiang. Punca kematian mereka disahkan akibat diracun gas karbon monoksidaarang briket. Kedua-dua tindakan ini telah dibawa di bawah ss 7 dan 8 AktaUndang-Undang Sivil 1956 terhadap Wing Wah dan Penerbangan Korea olehpentadbir bersama harta pusaka pasangan mendiang bagi menuntut ganti rugi yangtimbul akibat kematian mereka. Kausa tindakan terhadap Wing Wah adalah bagipemungkiran kontrak dan kecuaian, dan terhadap Penerbangan||Page 555>> Korea bagi kecuaian. Plaintif-plaintif menyatakan bahawa Wing Wahmelakukan dua kemungkiran kontrak. Satu kerana penerbangan KE 001 yang lambattiba di Seoul pada jam 8.26pm dan bukannya pada jam 7.30pm seperti dijadualkan.Kemungkiran kedua adalah kerana pasangan mendiang tidak disambut di lapanganterbang dan juga kerana mereka ditempatkan di Eun-ha Inn. Seterusnya,plaintif-plaintif mendakwa Wing Wah telah memungkiri kewajipan berjaga-jagaterhadap pasangan mendiang kerana: (a) gagal untuk memastikan pasangan mendiangtiba di Seoul pada jam 3.20pm; (b) mengakibatkan ketibaan mereka pada jam 8.26pmtanpa sebarang perancangan betul untuk penginapan mereka di Seoul; (c)

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mengakibatkan mereka ditempatkan di Eun-ha Inn yang Wing Wah mengetahui atauharus mengetahui tidak selamat untuk penginapan; dan (d) kegagalan untuk membuatperancangan dengan Lotte untuk memastikan pasangan mendiang disambut semasaketibaan mereka di Seoul dan dibawa ke Hotel Sheraton. Plaintif-plaintif tidakmemanggil sebarang saksi untuk memberi keterangan ke atas kejadian-kejadian dimalam antara 15 dan 16 Oktober 1978 dan sebaliknya bergantung kepada tiga laporan,P4, P5 dan P9. P4 adalah laporan Kementerian Hal-Ehwal Luar Negara Malaysiadaripada Setiausaha Ketiga, Pentadbiran dan Konsular (‘Mohd Noor Hashim’) diKedutaan Malaysia di Seoul, P5 adalah kenyataan Lotte kepada Kedutaan Malaysiadan P9 adalah laporan ketua pelancongan Wing Wah. Plaintif-plaintif jugamengemukakan P7, yang merupakan surat dari Mohd Noor Hashim kapadaKementerian Hal-Ehwal Luar Negara Malaysia menghantar, antara lain, salinan laporanpolis dari Stesen Polis Kangso-gu, paspot-paspot dan barangan peribadi pasanganmendiang. Laporan polis mengandungi maklumat mengenai punca kehadiran karbonmonoksida di dalam Eun-ha Inn. Didapati pengusaha Eun-ha Inn telah menukarkansistem pemanasan bilik tersebut dari ‘roller style coal briquet’ kepada sistempengedaran air panas, tetapi kerja kemasan yang perlu dilakukan pada bilik tersebutselepas penukaran ini tidak dilakukan dengan baik mengakibatkan di kemasan simensebelah tangki air dan pada kedua-dua bahagian tingkap terdapat rekahan yangmembolehkan gas karbon monoksida meresap masuk ke dalam bilik itu. Risalahpercutian Wing Wah mengandungi klausa yang mengecualikan Wing Wah daripadatanggungjawab ‘… for any injury, damage, loss, additional expenses, accidental delayor other irregularity which may be caused either through wilful or negligent acts orcommission on the part of companies or individuals providing or engaged intransportation, accommodation or other services relating to the execution of the touror through natural calamities or Government Regulations, strikes and other factorsbeyond its control’.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif-plaintif:(1) Laporan-laporan serta surat-surat yang plaintif bergantung kepada merupakan

dengar cakap, memandangkan ianya kenyataan ||Page 556>>ataupun berdasarkan kenyataan orang yang tidak datang danmemberi keterangan. Oleh itu, ianya tidak boleh digunakan sebagai keterangan(lihat ms 561E).

(2) Tiada sebarang pernyataan dalam penghujahan bertulis plaintif-plaintif yangmenyatakan bahawa Penerbangan Korea mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jagaterhadap pasangan mendiang untuk membawa mereka ke Hotel Sheraton.Penghujahan plaintif-plaintif bahawa walaupun pekerja Penerbangan Koreatidak sedar bahawa kumpulan pelancongan itu sepatutnya menginap di HotelSheraton, kelakuan mereka menunggu di restoran dengan kumpulanpelancongan, mencari tempat penginapan dan seterusnya menempatkan merekadi Eun-ha Inn menunjukkan satu usaha yang dilakukan untuk kepentinganpasangan mendiang. Plaintif-plaintif seterusnya membuat kesimpulan bahawa

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pekerja Penerbangan Korea mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadappasangan mendiang untuk memastikan mereka ditempatkan di satu tempat yangselamat. Seterusnya jika pekerja penerbangan tersebut telah meninggalkankumpulan itu di restoran tersebut, mereka tidak mempunyai kewajipanberjaga-jaga kepada pasangan mendiang. Untuk mendapati satu kewajipanberjaga-jaga wujud dalam keadaan sebegini adalah untuk mengesyorkanbahawa selebih seseorang cuba membantu seseorang yang lain, begitu tingginyakewajipan berjaga-jaganya untuk memastikan bahawa, sebagai perkara akujanji,bantuan yang dihulurkan itu berakhir dengan selamat. Tiada autoriti yangdiberikan bagi proposi sebegini, malahan mahkamah tidak mendapati proposiini betul. Ia tidak dapat diterima kerana ia menggalakkan supaya bantuan tidakdiberi kepada mereka yang berada dalam kesukaran (lihat ms 562C–F).

(3) Plaintif-plaintif mendakwa bahawa kemungkiran dalam kewajipan berjaga-jagaterletak pada pekerja Penerbangan Korea menempatkan pasangan itu di Eun-haInn memandangkan mereka tahu ataupun seharusnya tahu tempat itu tidakselamat diduduki. Tiada sebarang keterangan bahawa pekerja tersebut tahuataupun harus tahu bahawa Eun-ha Inn bukan tempat penginapan yang selamat.Sebaliknya, keterangan laporan polis mengenai punca kehadiran karbonmonoksida di bilik tersebut adalah bukti prima facie bahawa pekerja itu tidaktahu bahawa terdapat atau akan terdapat kehadiran karbon monoksida disebuah bilik di rumah tumpangan itu. Malahan, terdapat keterangan bahawapekerja penerbangan tersebut akan menginap di rumah tumpangan tersebutjikalau terdapat kekosongan bilik (lihat ms 562F–H).

(4) Seterusnya, plaintif-plaintif tidak membuktikan bahawa pekerja PenerbanganKorea mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadap pasangan mendiang, tetapiwalaupun mereka mempunyai sebarang kewajipan berjaga-jaga, mereka tidakmemungkirinya. ||Page 557>>Oleh itu, plaintif telah gagal membuktikan kes terhadapPenerbangan Korea (lihat ms 562H–563A).

(5) Faktor-faktor yang menghalang Lotte daripada menyambut kumpulanpelancongan tersebut di lapangan terbang, terutamanya ketidakterimaan padamasa tepat komunikasi Wing Wah mengenai perubahan masa penerbangan danEn Wu diberitahu oleh Penerbangan Korea bahawa kumpulan tersebut tidakberada di penerbangan KE 001 adalah faktor-faktor di luar kawalan Wing Wahdan klausa pengecualian terpakai untuk menjadikan mereka tidakbertanggungjawab ke atas akibat kepada pasangan mendiang. Bagi kelewatanpenerbangan KE 001 pula, adalah jelas Wing Wah tidak bertanggungjawabbaginya kerana menurut klausa pengecualian, ia merupakan satu keadaan diluar kawalan mereka. Di atas sebab-sebab ini, plaintif telah gagal terhadapWing Wah bagi pemungkiran kontrak (lihat ms 564I–565A, D–E, G)

(6) Penerbangan asal KE 704 telah ditukarkan kepada KE 001 sebelumpelancongan tersebut bermula. Sebarang kelewatan pada penerbangan tersebuttidak boleh dipertanggungjawabkan kepada Wing Wah kerana mereka tidak

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ada kawalan terhadap penerbangan serta operasi penerbangan. Bagi penginapanpula, persediaan telah dibuat untuk penginapan di Hotel Sheraton. Wing Wahserta ketua rombongan mereka tidak tahu atau tidak dapat tahu bahawa Eun-haInn tidak selamat untuk penginapan. Keterangan adalah bahawa Wing Wahtelah melakukan segala yang munasabah untuk memastikan pasangan mendiangdisambut semasa mereka tiba, tetapi surat mereka yang memberitahu Lottemengenai perubahan dalam penerbangan tidak sempat diterima oleh Lottesebelum kejadian itu. Oleh itu, kes kecuaian terhadap Wing Wah mesti gagal.Walaupun jika terdapat kemungkiran kewajipan berjaga-jaga oleh Wing Wah,kematian pasangan tersebut bukan merupakan akibat kemungkiran yang dapatditanggapkan secara munasabah (lihat ms 565H–566D, F).]

NotesFor cases on claim for damages under the Civil Law Act, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4thEd, 1998 Reissue), para 2648.For cases on exemption clauses, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue), para2008.For cases on duty of care, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue), paras687-694.

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 ss 7, 8

Jagjit Singh( Jagjit Singh & Co) for the plaintiffs.||Page 558>>

RD Rajasingam ( Premshangar Venugopal and Muralidharan Balan Pillaiwith him) (Lewis & Co) for the first defendants.

S Radhakrishnan ( Shanti Mogan with him) ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the seconddefendants.

[2003] 6 MLJ 713

AZRI SHAHIMI BIN ABD KARIM & ANOR v AZMAN BINJANTAN

HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — RAYUAN SIVIL NO MT1–12 – 35OF 2001LOW HOP BING J

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24 JULY 2003

Road Traffic — Negligence — Collision between motorvan and motorcycle — Whetherinferences made by trial judge supported by evidence — Whether there was error of law orfact in the apportionment of liability

After a full trial, the learned sessions court judge (‘the learned trial judge’) came to afinding of facts that the first plaintiff was a motorcyclist travelling from the direction ofMasjid Tanah to Tg Bidara while the defendant was driving his motorvan in theopposite direction when a collision took place between these two vehicles. The learnedtrial judge accepted the evidence of the investigating officer who testified that the firstplaintiff’s motorcycle sustained serious damage to the front portion while the damageto the defendant’s motorvan was in the front right portion. The learned trial judgeaccepted the defendant’s version that the collision took place on his side of the road.This was an appeal by the first plaintiff against the decision of the learned trial judgewho apportioned the liability of the first plaintiff and the defendant as 85% and 15%respectively. The questions to be decided in this appeal were: (i) whether the learnedtrial judge’s finding of facts was based on the credibility of witnesses or on inferencesdrawn from other facts; and (ii) whether the finding was wrong.

Held, dismissing the appeal:(1) The finding of facts by the learned trial judge was based on the evidence of the

investigating officer and the sketch plan. In the light of the conflicting versionsof the first plaintiff and the defendant, the learned trial judge was at liberty toaccept and did accept the defendant’s version as credible. It was thereforebased on the credibility of the investigating officer and the defendant, andsupported by the sketch plan. Having regard to the entire evidence adduced forboth the first plaintiff and the defendant, the court was unable to see anythingwrong in that finding (see p 718D–E).

(2) The finding of the learned trial judge that the point of impact was at or aroundthe point where the pieces of glass were mostly found, was supported by thecases of Fatimah bt Derakman v Wan Jusoh bin Wan Kolok & Anor [1994] 4CLJ 537, and Abdul Rahman v Soon Ah Hai [1978] 2 MLJ 31. This was thetrial judge’s finding of a specific or primary fact based on conflicting testimony,and were not based on inferences drawn from||Page 714>> undisputed fact or facts deposed to by witnesses. In thecircumstances, the court did not think that the learned trial judge’s finding offacts was against the weight of evidence and so should not be interferred withon appeal (see p 719E).

(3) There was no error of law or fact in the apportionment of liability by thelearned trial judge. Therefore such apportionment should not be disturbed onappeal (see p 719G–H); Uval & Anor v Zainal [1970] 1 MLJ 74 followed.

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Setelah perbicaraan penuh, hakim mahkamah sesyen yang arif (‘hakim perbicaraanyang arif’) memutuskan keputusan fakta-fakta bahawa plaintif pertama adalahpenunggang motosikal yang sedang dalam perjalanan dari Masjid Tanah ke Tg Bidaramanakala defendan sedang memandu motorvannya dari arah yang bertentangan apabilaperlanggaran ini berlaku di antara kedua-dua kenderaan ini. Hakim perbicaraan yangarif telah menerima keterangan pegawai penyiasat yang memberi keterangan bahawamotosikal plaintif pertama telah mengalami kerosakkan yang serius pada bahagianhadapannya dan motorvan defendan mengalami kerosakkan pada bahagian hadapankanan. Hakim perbicaraan yang arif menerima versi defendan bahawa perlanggaranberlaku di bahagian jalanraya beliau. Ini merupakan rayuan plaintif pertama terhadapkeputusan hakim perbicaraan yang arif yang telah mengagihkan liabiliti plaintif pertamadan defendan sebagai 85% dan 15% masing-masing. Persoalan-persoalan yang perludibicarakan di dalam rayuan ini adalah: (i) sama ada keputusan fakta-fakta hakimperbicaraan yang arif berdasarkan kebolehpercayaan saksi-saksi atau pada inferensyang diambil daripada fakta-fakta lain; dan (ii) sama ada keputusan itu salah.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan itu:(1) Keputusan fakta-fakta itu oleh hakim perbicaraan yang arif berdasarkan

keterangan pegawai penyiasat dan pelan lakaran. Memandangkan versi-versiyang bercanggah plaintif pertama dan defendan, hakim perbicaraan yang arifmempunyai kebebasan untuk menerima dan telah menerima versi defendansebagai yang boleh dipercayai. Oleh itu, ia berdasarkan kebolehpercayaanpegawai penyiasat dan defendan dan disokong oleh pelan lakaran itu.Menimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan yang dikemukakan untuk plaintifpertama dan defendan, mahkamah tidak dapat melihat apa-apa yang salahdengan keputusan itu (lihat ms 718D–E).

(2) Keputusan hakim perbicaraan yang arif bahawa tempat perlanggaran itu adalahpada atau di sekeliling tempat di mana serpihan-serpihan kaca dijumpai,disokong oleh kes-kes Fatimah bt Derakman v Wan Jusoh bin Wan Kolok &Anor [1994] 4 CLJ||Page 715>> 537, dan Abdul Rahman v Soon Ah Hai [1978] 2 MLJ 31. Inadalah keputusan hakim perbicaraan pada fakta yang khusus atau utamaberdasarkan testimoni yang bercanggah, dan tidak berdasarkan padainferens-inferens yang diambil daripada fakta-fakta yang tidak dipertikaikanatau fakta-fakta yang dideposkan oleh saksi-saksi. Di dalam keadaan ini,mahkamah tidak berpendapat bahawa keputusan hakim perbicaraan yang arifbertentangan dengan kepentingan keterangan dan oleh itu tidak patut diganggupada rayuan (lihat ms 719E).

(3) Tiada kekhilafan undang-undang atau fakta di dalam pengagihan liabiliti oleh

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hakim perbicaraan yang arif. Oleh itu pengagihan itu tidak patut diganggu padarayuan (lihat ms 719G–H).]

NotesFor cases on collission between motorvan and motorcycle, see 11 Mallal’s Digest (4thEd 1996 Reissue) para 318.

Cases referred toA Perianayagam & Anor v Yeo Suan Tin & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 214 (refd)Abdul Rahman v Soon Ah Hai [1978] 2 MLJ 31 (refd)Baker v Market Harborough Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1472

(refd)Brown v Thompson [1968] 2 AER 708 (refd)China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Maltran Air

Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and Anor Appeal [1996] 3 CLJ 163 (refd)Chock Kek Ling v Patt Hup Transport Co Ltd & Ors [1966] 1 MLJ 120 (refd)Fatimah bt Derakman v Wan Jusoh bin Wan Kolok & Anor [1994] 4 CLJ 537 (refd)Ingram v United Automobile Service, Limited, and others [1943] 1 KB 612 (refd)Lee Suat Hong v Teo Lye [1988] 2 MLJ 537 (refd)Macgregor, The [1943] AC 197 (refd)Mohamed Bin Kasdi v Public Prosecutor [1969] 1 MLJ 135 (refd)Ong Yam Chong & Anor v Chan Wah [1962] 28 MLJ 184 (refd)Uval & Anor v Zainal [1970] 1 MLJ 74 (folld)

||Page 716>>

Appeal from: Civil Suit No 1-53-305 of 1997) (Sessions Court, Melaka)

Satvinder Singh (Manjeet & Associates) for the first plaintiff.R Nagarajah (Wong Seng Chow, Nagarajah & Co) for the defendant.

[2002] 1 MLJ 484

Asiah bte Kamsah v Dr Rajinder Singh & Ors

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CIVIL SUIT NO 21–47 OF 1991JAMES FOONG J

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20 JULY 2001

Tort — Assault — Consent — Patient suffered injuries after surgery — Written consent forsurgery not found — Evidence of witnesses considered — Whether consent for surgery given— Whether assault proved

Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Medical practitioner — Anesthetist —Patient suffered injuries after surgery — ‘Bolam’ test applied — Standard of practice acceptedby responsible body of skilled medical men — Short fall in post operative care of patient —Whether negligence proved

The plaintiff (suing through her brother and next of friend) was admitted to the TelokIntan District Hospital (‘the hospital’) to deliver her second child on 10 October 1988.Due to suspicion of fetus distress, she underwent a lower section caesarian operation(‘LSCS’) conducted by one Dr Karamjeet Singh with the approval of the firstdefendant, Dr Rajinder Singh, the gynecologist of the hospital at that time. For thisoperation, she went under general anesthesia applied by the second defendant. Thoughthe operation was successful with the delivery of a baby boy, the plaintiff did not fullyrecover from the operation. She suffered permanent irreversible brain damage. For herinjuries, the plaintiff was claiming damages against the defendants based on two causesof action, ie assault and negligence.

Held, dismissing the claims against the first and third defendants, and finding thesecond defendant liable for negligence, thus rendering the fourth defendant vicariouslyliable thereof:(1) The plaintiff could not render any evidence to support her claim in view of her

present mental condition. So the court was firstly deprived of the grantor ofconsent’s evidence: whether she did consent or refused such surgery. When thebest evidence was absent, the court had to move on to examine thecircumstantial evidence. Under such emergency situation, the court did notsuspect that the plaintiff did not give her consent to the operation and believedthe two doctors on their positive assertions that consent for the operation in awritten form was seen by them before surgery on the plaintiff was carried out.Just because such a form was not found in the hospital file did not necessarilyprove that there was no consent given by the patient. All relevant evidencemust be taken into consideration and in this case, after due evaluation, thecourt found that such written consent by the plaintiff existed before theoperation. Thus, the allegation of assault against the defendants must fail (see p489A–E).||Page 485>>

(2) Despite extensive cross examination of Dr Karamjeet Singh by plaintiff’scounsel, there was no evidence to support a finding that the doctor was

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negligent in the surgery according to the test set out in the established case ofBolam v Friern Hospital Management [1957] 2 All ER 118. The plaintiff musthave concurred with this since there was absolutely no reference in theplaintiff’s submission commenting on the negligent act of this particular doctor.When Dr Karamjeet was not liable for any negligent act relating to the surgicalaspect of the plaintiff then the first defendant, as head of the gynecologicaldepartment of the hospital and the person who gave the approval to DrKaramjeet Singh to proceed with the LSCS operation on the plaintiff, shouldnot be liable vicariously (see p 489G–I).

(3) Post operative treatment resulting from anaesthesia was the responsibility ofthe second defendant as the anesthetist in this case. However, the defendants’own witness, DW5 admitted that there was a short fall in the post operativecare of the patient. The court thus found that the second defendant guilty ofnegligence since he did not act in accordance with the practice accepted asproper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in this particular art — atest as set forth in Bolam’s case (see p 494E–G).

(4) There was no evidence to prove that the third defendant had been personallyliable for the injuries of the plaintiff nor was the hospital, for which the thirddefendant was the superintendent, proved to be negligent or had assaulted theplaintiff. Against the second defendant, the cause of action for negligence wasproven, but not that of assault. As the second defendant at that material time ofthe accident was an employee of the fourth defendant, the fourth defendant wasvicariously liable to the plaintiff for negligence (see p 494H–I).

(5) For pain, suffering and loss of amenities, the court awarded a sum ofRM200,000 for general damages. For special damages, the court awardedRM96,242.90 and RM76,650 for pre trial and post trial expenses respectivelyplus interest (see p 495B–G).


Plaintif (menyaman melalui abang beliau dan sahabat wakil) telah dimasukkan keHospital Daerah Telok Intan (‘hospital tersebut’) untuk melahirkan anak kedua beliaupada 10 Oktober 1988. Disebabkan rasa syak kecemasan janin, beliau menjalani satupembedahan caesarian bahagian bawah (‘PCBB’) yang dikendalikan oleh Dr KaramjeetSingh dengan kebenaran defendan pertama, Dr Rajinder Singh, ginakologi hospitaltersebut pada masa itu. Untuk pembedahan ini, beliau diletak di bawah anestesia amyang dikendalikan oleh oleh defendan kedua. Walaupun pembedahan tersebut berjayadengan kelahiran seorang bayi lelaki, plaintif tidak ||Page 486>>sedar sepenuhnya daripada pembedahan tersebut. Beliau mengalamikecacatan otak kekal yang tidak boleh dipulihkan seperti keadaan sedia kala. Untukkecacatan beliau, plaintif menuntut ganti rugi terhadap defendan-defendan berdasarkandua kausa tindakan; iaitu serangan dan kecuaian.

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Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan-tuntutan terhadap defendan-defendan pertama danketiga, dan mendapati defendan kedua bertanggungjawab untuk kecuaian, oleh itumenyebabkan defendan keempat bertanggungjawab secara vikarius:(1) Plaintif tidak dapat mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk menyokong

tuntutan beliau memandangkan keadaan mental beliau sekarang. Oleh itumahkamah pertamanya kehilangan keterangan orang yang telah memberikankebenaran tersebut: sama ada beliau memang telah membenarkan atau menolakpembedahan tersebut. Apabila keterangan terbaik tiada, mahkamah akan beralihuntuk memeriksa keterangan mengikut keadaan. Di dalam keadaan kecemasantersebut, mahkamah tidak mensyaki bahawa plaintif tidak memberikankebenaran beliau untuk dibedah dan mempercayai kedua-dua doktor tersebutberdasarkan penegasan positif mereka bahawa kebenaran untuk pembedahantersebut atas borang bertulis telah dilihat oleh mereka sebelum pembedahan keatas plaintif dilakukan. Hanya semata-mata kerana borang tersebut tidak dapatditemui dalam fail hospital tersebut tidak semestinya membuktikan bahawatiada kebenaran telah diberikan oleh pesakit. Semua keterangan yang berkaitanmestilah diambilkira dan dalam kes ini, setelah diteliti, mahkamah mendapatibahawa terdapat kebenaran bertulis tersebut oleh plaintif sebelum pembedahantersebut. Oleh itu, dakwaan serangan terhadap defendan-defendan mesti gagal(lihat ms 489A–E).

(2) Meskipun pemeriksaan balas terperinci dijalankan ke atas Dr Karamjeet Singholeh peguam plaintif, tiada keterangan untuk menyokong penemuan bahawadoktor telah cuai dalam pembedahan mengikut ujian yang dinyatakan dalamkes yang terkemuka Bolam v Friern Hospital Management [1957] 2 All ER118. Plaintif mestilah telah bersetuju dengan ini kerana tiada rujukan langsungdalam penghujahan plaintif mengkomen tentang tindakan cuai doktor yangberkaitan ini. Tatkala Dr Karamjeet tidak bertanggungjawab untuk apa-apatindakan kecuaian berhubung aspek pembedahan plaintif, maka defendanpertama, sebagai ketua bahagian ginakologi hospital tersebut dan orang yangmemberikan kebenaran kepada Dr Karamjeet Singh untuk meneruskan PCBBke atas plaintif, sepatutnya tidak bertanggungjawab secara vikarius (lihat ms489G–I).

(3) Rawatan selepas pembedahan yang diakibatkan oleh anestasia adalahtanggungjawab defendan kedua sebagai pakar anestasia ||Page 487>>dalam kes ini. Namun begitu, saksi defendan-defendan sendiri,DW5 telah mengaku bahawa terdapat kekurangan dalam rawatan selepaspembedahan pesakit tersebut. Maka mahkamah mendapati bahawa defendankedua bersalah kerana cuai memandangkan beliau tidak bertindak menurutamalan yang diterima sebagai yang betul oleh sekumpulan pakar perubatandalam bidang khusus ini — satu ujian yang dinyatakan dalam kes Bolam (lihatms 494E–G).

(4) Tiada keterangan untuk membuktikan bahawa defendan ketiga

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bertanggungjawab secara peribadi terhadap kecacatan plaintif maupun hospitaltersebut, di mana defendan ketiga merupakan penguasa, yang dibuktikan telahcuai dan menyerang plaintif. Terhadap defendan kedua, kausa tindakan untukkecuaian telah dibuktikan tetapi bukan untuk serangan. Memandangkandefendan kedua pada masa matan kemalangan tersebut adalah seorang pekerjadefendan keempat, defendan keempat adalah bertanggungjawab secara vikariuskepada plaintif kerana kecuaian tersebut (lihat ms 494H–I).

(5) Untuk kesakitan, kesengsaraan dan kehilangan kemudahan, mahkamahmengawardkan sejumlah RM200,000 untuk ganti rugi am. Untuk ganti rugikhas, mahkamah mengawardkan RM96,242.90 dan RM76,650 untukperbelanjaan pra perbicaraan dan selepas perbicaraan masing-masing bersertafaedah (lihat ms 495B–G).]

NotesFor cases on assault generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras5–10.For cases on professional negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000Reissue) paras 798–849.

Cases referred toBolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 (folld)

Hira Singh (Anit Kaur with him) (Asbir Hira Singh & Co) for the plaintiff.Raja Rozela bte Raja Toran (Federal Counsel) for the defendants.

[2002] 2 MLJ 129

Foo Fio Na v Dr Soo Fook Mun & Ors

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 08–25 OF 2001(W)STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD AND

MOHTAR ABDULLAH FCJJ19 NOVEMBER 2001

Civil Procedure — Appeal — Leave to appeal — Appeal to Federal Court — WhetherBolam test in medical negligence should apply in relation to all aspects of medical negligence— Whether to public benefit for court to reconsider application of case

This was an application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appealgiven on 5 April 2001. The main question for which leave was sought was whether the

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Bolam test in the area of medical negligence should apply in relation to all aspects ofmedical negligence.

Held, allowing leave to appeal:The question posed was one of importance upon which further argument and adecision of this court would be to public advantage. In this regard, the court’sattention had been drawn to later case jurisprudence from Australia and otherCommonwealth countries, which it was contended, had refined the Bolam test to suchan extent that it may now be necessary for this court to reconsider it (see p 130D–E).


Ini adalah satu permohonan untuk kebenaran membuat rayuan terhadap keputusanMahkamah Rayuan yang diputuskan pada 5 April 2001. Persoalan utama dalammemohon kebenaran adalah sama ada ujian Bolam dalam bidang kecuaian perubatanpatut diterapkan berhubung dengan semua aspek kecuaian perubatan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan kebenaran membuat rayuan tersebut:Persoalan yang diutarakan adalah penting di mana hujah selanjutnya dan satukeputusan mahkamah ini akan merupakan satu kelebihan untuk pihak awam. Di sini,perhatian mahkamah bertumpu pada kes jurisprudens terdahulu dari Australia danlain-lain negara Komanwel, di mana ia telah dihujahkan, telah memperincikan ujianBolam sehinggakan kini ia adalah perlu untuk mahkamah ini mempertimbangkannyasemula (lihat ms 130D–E).]

NotesFor cases on leave to appeal, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras891–945.||Page 130>>

Cases referred toBolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 (refd)

Appeal from: Civil Appeal No W–02–281 of 1999 (Court of Appeal, Kuala Lumpur)

Mohamad Ariff bin Md Yusoff (Rajashree a/p Suppiah and See Eng Teong with him)(Cheang & Ariff) for the applicant.

PS Ranjan (Manmohan S Dhillon with him) (PS Ranjan & Co) for the firstrespondent.

GL Ambrose (Chooi & Co) for the second respondent.

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[2002] 3 MLJ 341

Ngoi Thiam Woh v Maxwell, Kenion, Cowdy & Jones (sued as afirm) & Anor

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–894 OF 1999KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J5 JULY 2002

Tort — Defamation — Publication of proclamation of sale — Absence of conspiracy or fraudand negligence — Whether the first defendant defamed the plaintiff by causing theadvertisement of the proclamation of sale — Whether the plaintiff could sustain an action indefamation against the defendants — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 31, O 33 r 2 and O 8

The plaintiff borrowed a sum of money from the second defendant to pay the balancepurchase price of one unit of a condotel and this sum was to be repaid by 156 monthlyinstalments. The plaintiff executed a deed of assignment as a security for the loan infavour of the second defendant. The plaintiff defaulted in his instalment payments andthe first defendant, on instructions from the second defendant, issued a notice ofdemand dated 21 October 1997. Subsequently, the first defendant issued a notice ofdefault dated 22 November 1997 demanding that the plaintiff make good the allegeddefault upon the expiry of seven days, failing which the second defendant wouldexercise its rights to sell the plaintiff’s condotel. The defendants then on 9 January1998 advertised in The Star newspaper a proclamation of sale of the said condotel.The plaintiff filed a suit in the High Court in Ipoh, Civil Suit No 22–24–98 against thesecond defendant and others to restrain the second defendant from selling the said unituntil disposal of the case. Meanwhile, the first defendant filed an originating summonsunder O 31 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) which they withdrew andfiled a fresh originating summons under O 83 of the RHC. The second defendant filedanother suit in the Ipoh High Court vide Civil Suit No 22–68–99 against the plaintiff torecover the loan sum together with interest. During case management, it was agreedthat the court decide the case pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the RHC on two issues namely:(i) whether the first defendant, acting as solicitors for and on the instructions of thesecond defendant, defamed the plaintiff by causing the advertisement of theproclamation of sale dated 9 January 1998 and (ii) whether the plaintiff could sustainan action in defamation against the defendants upon the High Court in Ipoh havingheld in a civil suit filed by the second defendant against the plaintiff, that there was noconspiracy or fraud and negligence on the part of the second defendant.

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Held, dismissing the suit with costs:(1) In this case, there was an absolute assignment and the second defendant had an

absolute right to proceed to advertise the proclamation of sale and to auctionoff the condotel without ||Page 342>>applying for an order of the court. Since the second defendanthad the absolute right to proceed with the proclamation of sale, the firstdefendant, who acted as solicitors and thus as agents of the second defendant,was clearly acting within the law when it caused the advertisement to appear inThe Star, Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh &Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513 followed (see p 347G–H).

(2) In Civil Suit No 22–68–99 filed by the present second defendant against thepresent plaintiff claiming the loan sum, whilst the trial judge dismissed thesecond defendant’s claim, he however dismissed the present plaintiff’scontention of misrepresentation, conspiracy, fraud and negligence against thesecond defendants and related companies. Since the plaintiff was not appealingthe decision the finding of the trial judge must be accepted as correct (see pp347H–348A).


Plaintif telah meminjam daripada defendan kedua satu jumlah wang untuk membayarbaki harga belian sebuah unit condotel dan jumlah ini hendaklah dibayar balik melalui156 ansuran bulanan. Plaintif telah menyempurnakan satu suratikatan penyerahhakansebagai jaminan untuk pinjaman tersebut yang memihak kepada defendan kedua.Plaintif telah mengingkari bayaran-bayaran ansuran beliau dan defendan pertama, atasarahan-arahan daripada defendan kedua, telah mengeluarkan satu notis tuntutanbertarikh 21 Oktober 1997. Kemudiannya, defendan pertama telah mengeluarkan satunotis keingkaran bertarikh 22 November 1997 menuntut supaya plaintif memulihkankeingkaran yang didakwa itu selepas tamat tempoh tujuh hari, kegagalan yang manamenyebabkan defendan-defendan kedua melaksanakan hak mereka untuk menjualcondotel plaintif. Defendan-defendan kemudiannya pada 9 Januari 1998 mengiklankandi dalam akhbar The Star satu pengisytiharan jualan akan condotel tersebut. Plaintiftelah memfailkan satu guaman di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh, Guaman Sivil No22–24–98 terhadap defendan kedua dan pihak-pihak lain untuk menghalang defendankedua daripada menjual unit tersebut sehingga penyelesaian kes tersebut. Sementaraitu, defendan pertama memfailkan satu saman pemula di bawah A 31 Kaedah-KaedahMahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT tersebut’) yang mana telah mereka tarikh balik danmemfailkan satu saman pemula yang baru di bawah O 83 KMT. Defendan kedua telahmemfailkan satu guaman yang lain dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh melalui Guaman SivilNo 22–68–99 terhadap plaintif untuk mendapatkan balik jumlah pinjaman tersebutbersama-sama faedah. Ketika pengurusan kes, telah dipersetujui bahawa Mahkamahmemutuskan kes tersebut selaras dengan A 33 k 2 KMT atas dua isu iaitu: (i) sama ada

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defendan pertama, yang bertindak sebagai peguamcara untuk dan atas arahan-arahandefendan kedua, memfitnah plaintif dengan ||Page 343>>menyebabkan iklan pengisytiharan jualan bertarikh 9 Januari 1998 dan (ii)sama ada plaintif boleh mempertahankan suatu tindakan memfitnah terhadapdefendan-defendan setelah Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh memutuskan dalam guaman sivilyang difailkan oleh defendan kedua terhadap plaintif, bahawa tidak terdapat konspirasiatau fraud dan kecuaian oleh defendan kedua.

Diputuskan, menolak guaman tersebut dengan kos:(1) Dalam kes ini terdapat penyerahhakan mutlak dan defendan kedua mempunyai

hak mutlak untuk meneruskan bagi mengiklankan pengisytiharan jualan danuntuk melelongkan condotel tersebut tanpa memohon untuk mendapatkanperintah mahkamah. Oleh kerana defendan kedua mempunyai hak mutlak untukmeneruskan pengisytiharan jualan tersebut, defendan pertama, yang bertindaksebagai peguamcara dan oleh itu sebagai ejen defendan keluar, telah denganjelasnya bertindak di dalam lingkungan undang-undang apabila ianyamenyebabkan iklan tersebut dikeluarkan dalam akhbar The Star, PhileoalliedBank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513diikut (lihat ms 347G–H).

(2) Dalam Guaman Sivil No 22–68–99 yang telah difailkan oleh defendan keduasemasa terhadap plaintif semasa menuntut jumlah pinjaman tersebut, sementarahakim perbicaraan menolak tuntutan defendan kedua, beliau walaubagaimanapun menolak penegasan plaintif semasa mengenai salah-nyataan, konspirasi,fraud dan kecuaian terhadap defendan-defendan kedua dan syarikat-syarikatyang berkaitan. Oleh kerana plaintif tidak merayui keputusan tersebut, makakeputusan hakim perbicaraan mestilah diterima sebagai betul (lihat ms347H–348A).]

NotesFor cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue)paras 193–409.

Cases referred toAsia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (refd)MBF Finance Bhd v Ngoi Thiam Woh [2001] 7 CLJ 221 (refd)Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ

513 (folld)

Legislation referred toNational Land Code 1965 s 221Rules of the High Court 1980 O 31, O 33 r 2, O 83

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||Page 344>>

Ngan SH (Ahmad Yani with him) (Abbas & Ngan) for the plaintiff.Silvanathan (Rathi Nair with him) (Kean Chye & Sivalingam) for the first defendant.Loh Yen Zin (Jeyaratnam & Chong) for the second defendant.

[2002] 4 MLJ 167

Peter a/l Selvaraj & Anor v Cheng Bee Teik & Ors


Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Collision between two motorcycles and a motorvan— Apportionment of liability

The first plaintiff was the rider of motorcycle PDK 3393 (‘the motorcycle’) at allmaterial times and the second plaintiff was the grandmother and dependant of thedeceased pillion rider of the motorcycle. The third plaintiff was the father anddependant of the deceased rider of motorcycle PDF 8839 (‘Mua Yoo Sern’). The firstand second defendants respectively were the driver and owner of motorvan PAY 7446.On 23 December 1998 at about 11.45pm, the first plaintiff with his pillion and MuaYoo Sern were riding their respective motorcycles along Jalan Paya Terubongproceeding from the direction of Ayer Itam towards the direction of Relau. The firstdefendant was then proceeding from the opposite direction. The plaintiffs’ pleadedcase was that the first defendant overtook a vehicle ahead of him and encroached intothe plaintiffs’ path and collided into both the motorcycles. It was the pleaded case ofthe defence that the collision occurred as a result of both the motorcyclists encroachinginto the first defendant’s path from the opposite direction whilst racing with each otherand thereby crossing over a double line in the centre of the road. The learned sessionscourt judge found the first defendant totally liable for the accident and made variousawards for the parties. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the defendants appealedagainst liability and quantum.

Held, allowing the appeal:(1) The learned sessions court judge had erred in finding that there was a lorry

present. The defendants’ half of the road measured four metres, which wasapproximately about 13½ft wide. The first defendant said he was hardly about

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one foot from the left edge of the road. The second van driver testified that hisvan was five feet wide and that the first defendant’s van was similar in width.Even assuming there was a lorry, there was no evidence, neither of the size ofthe lorry nor how far it was travelling from its left edge of the road. Surely, ifthe first defendant was about to overtake the lorry, he must have encroached asubstantial distance into the plaintiffs’ path. However, there was no suchevidence. Only the front right side of the van had gone across the centraldouble lines. The possibility of a lorry being present which the first defendanthad alleged to have overtaken could not be accepted (see pp 172G–173A).||Page 168>>

(2) The learned sessions court judge erred when she failed to give due weight tothe mark ‘I’ on the sketch denoted as ‘kesan tayar’. The investigating officertestified that this was not a brake mark but a mark caused by the tyre after ithad punctured. The first defendant testified that when he began his journey, allhis tyres were in good condition. There was evidence of an impact to the tyreand the tyre had been punctured. The photograph showed the drag mark of thevan due to the punctured tyre, for a distance of 8.4m. The court was satisfiedthat the impact between the motorcycles and the van was at point ‘I’ whichwas clearly into the first defendant’s path. The failure of the learned sessionscourt judge to consider this vital piece of evidence had resulted in miscarriageof justice to the defendants (see p 173D–F).

(3) It was obvious that both the riders of the motorcycles had encroached into thefirst defendant’s path. The first defendant too could not have been driving onefoot from the left edge as he testified. He too must have been keeping more tothe centre when the collision occurred. The court, thus, found both the ridersof the motorcycles and the first defendant equally liable (see p 173F–G).


Plaintif pertama merupakan penunggang motosikal berdaftar PDK 3393 (‘motosikaltersebut’) pada semua masa material dan plaintif kedua merupakan nenek dantanggungan si mati pembonceng motosikal. Plaintif ketiga adalah ayah dan tanggungansi mati penunggang motosikal PDF 8839 (‘Mua Yoo Sern’). Defendan pertama dankedua masing-masing adalah pemandu dan pemilik van PAY 7446. Pada 23 Disember1998, kira-kira pukul 11.45 malam, plaintif pertama dengan pembonceng dan MuaYoo Sern menunggang motosikal masing-masing sepanjang Jalan Paya Terubong dariarah Ayer Itam menuju ke arah Relau. Pada masa itu, defendan pertama sedang menujudari arah bertentangan. Kes yang diplidkan oleh plaintif-plaintif adalah bahawadefendan pertama memotong kenderaan di hadapannya dan memasuki lorongplaintif-plaintif dan melanggar kedua-dua motosikal. Kes yang diplidkan oleh pihakpembelaan adalah pelanggaran berlaku akibat daripada kemasukan kedua-duapenunggang motosikal ke dalam lorong defendan pertama, dari arah bertentangan

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ketika berlumba antara satu sama lain dan dengan itu telah menyeberangi garisanberganda di bahagian tengah jalan tersebut. Hakim mahkamah sesyen yang arifmendapati defendan pertama bertanggungjawab pada keseluruhannya untukkemalangan tersebut dan membuat pelbagai award untuk pihak-pihak terbabit.Defendan-defendan yang tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan tersebut merayuterhadap liabiliti dan kuantum.||Page 169>>

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:(1) Hakim mahkamah sesyen yang arif terkhilaf dalam mendapati adanya sebuah

lori. Bahagian tengah jalan defendan-defendan berukur empat meter, lebarnyakira-kira 13½ kaki. Defendan pertama berkata beliau berada kurang dari satukaki dari bahagian kiri jalan tersebut. Pemandu van yang kedua memberiketerangan bahawa kenderaannya bersaiz lima kaki lebar dan van defendanpertama sama lebarnya. Jika pun ada lori, tiada keterangan tentang saiz loritersebut mahupun berapa jauh ia dipandu dari bahagian kiri jalan tersebut.Sudah pasti sekiranya defendan pertama hendak memotong lori tersebut, beliausemestinya memasuki jarak yang substantial ke dalam lorong plaintif-plaintif.Walau bagaimanapun, tiada keterangan sedemikian. Hanya bahagian depan vantersebut telah menyeberangi garisan berganda di tengah jalan. Kemungkinanadanya sebuah lori yang defendan pertama dikatakan telah memotong tidakboleh diterima (lihat ms 172G–173A).

(2) Hakim mahkamah sesyen yang arif terkhilaf apabila beliau gagal memberipertimbangan yang sewajarnya kepada tanda ‘I’ di dalam lakaran yangdilambangkan sebagai ‘kesan tayar’. Pegawai siasatan memberi keteranganbahawa itu bukan kesan brek tetapi kesan yang disebabkan oleh tayar setelah iapancit. Defendan pertama memberi keterangan bahawa apabila beliaumemulakan perjalanannya, semua tayarnya dalam keadaan baik. Terdapat buktipelanggaran kepada tayar dan tayar telah pancit. Gambar menunjukkan kesanheret van tersebut disebabkan oleh tayar pancit, untuk jarak sejauh 8.4m.Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa pelanggaran di antara motosikal dan vantersebut adalah di titik ‘I’ yang jelas memasuki lorong defendan pertama.Kegagalan hakim mahkamah sesyen untuk menimbang keterangan yang pentingini telah mengakibatkan kegagalan keadilan kepada defendan-defendan (lihatms 173D–F).

(3) Adalah nyata bahawa kedua-dua penunggang motosikal telah memasuki jalandefendan pertama. Defendan pertama tidak mungkin memandu satu kaki daripinggir kiri sebagaimana yang dikatakan. Beliau juga mesti memandu lebihdekat kepada bahagian tengah apabila pelanggaran berlaku. Justeru itu,mahkamah mendapati kedua-dua penunggang motosikal dan defendansama-sama bertanggungjawab (lihat ms 173F–G).]

Notes

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For cases on road accidents, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras887–1108

Cases referred toChan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 (refd)

||Page 170>>Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors and another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ

512 (refd)

Rajendran (Shamila with him) (Dass Jainab & Assoc) for the appellants/defendants.Rhina Bhar (Rhina Bhar & Assoc) for the respondents/plaintiffs.

[2002] 6 MLJ 471

Mohamad Khirul Mizan bin Shafie & Anor v Yue Ah Kai

HIGH COURT (TEMERLOH) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–6 OF 1999MOHD HISHAMUDIN J29 JULY 2002

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — General Damages — Assessment

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Quantum — Special damages — Loss of earnings— Whether the first plaintiff could claim RM500 per month as loss of earnings without anydocumentary evidence to support the claim — Whether the second plaintiff could claimRM400 per month as loss of earnings without any documentary evidence to support the claim

Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Whether plaintiffs were liable for the accident —Whether defendant was liable for the accident

This is an appeal against the decision of the sessions court dismissing the plaintiffs’action for damages in respect of injuries suffered as a result of an accident involvingthe parties. The learned sessions court judge found that the plaintiff failed to provetheir case on a balance of probabilities solely because of the position of the plasticsplinters, as shown by the sketch plan (P2), on the defendant’s side of the road. Onquantum, it was agreed that the defendant pay the first and second plaintiffs RM534and RM162, respectively, as special damages. On the issue of loss of earnings, the firstplaintiff claimed RM500 per month as he was employed by his brother as a mechanicand did not work for 18 months. This was confirmed by his brother although there

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were no documents pertaining to his employment. On the issue of general damages, thefirst plaintiff claimed for four types of injuries as a result of the accident. On loss ofearnings, the second plaintiff also stated that he worked as a mechanic with a salary ofRM400 per month and that he was unable to work for a year. His employer confirmedthis. On the issue of general damages, the second plaintiff claimed for three types ofinjuries that he suffered as a result of the accident.

Held, allowing the appeal with costs:(1) It was clear that the respondent/defendant (the driver of the bus) was guilty of

negligence as the evidence showed that the bus cut across the path of themotorcycle ridden by the plaintiffs, in a manner that the plaintiffs could notavoid a collision. There was no reason to doubt the credibility of the plaintiffs.They had been cross-examined and their testimony remained unshaken.Evidence regarding the nature of the damage to the two vehicles were allconsistent with the plaintiffs’ version. It was also pertinent to note that thedefendant, unlike the plaintiffs, was not able to explain how the accidentoccurred (see p 475F–H).||Page 472>>

(2) On the issue of loss of earnings, the evidence of the first plaintiff was supportedby the testimony of his employer, his evidence could not be rejected outright.However, in the light of the absence of supporting documents, the amount wasreduced to RM400 per month (see p 476E–F).

(3) In view of the absence of supportive documentary evidence of the secondplaintiff’s employment, the court reduced the amount for his loss of earnings toRM300 per month (see p 479B).

(4) The total amount of the awards for general damages for personal injuries forthe first plaintiff was RM66,000. From this amount, 10% was deducted foroverlapping, thus leaving a sum of RM59,400 (see p 478F–G).

(5) The total amount of the awards for general damages for personal injuries forthe second plaintiff was RM45,000. From this amount, a deduction of 10% foroverlapping was made, thereby leaving a sum of RM40,500 (see p 480C).


Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan mahkamah sesyen menolak tindakanplaintif-plaintif untuk ganti rugi bagi kecederaan yang dialami mereka akibat satukemalangan yang melibatkan pihak-pihak di dalam tindakan tersebut. Hakimmahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana telah mendapati bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah gagalmembuktikan kes mereka di atas imbangan kebarangkalian hanya berdasarkan di ataskedudukan serpihan plastik, seperti yang ditunjukkan di dalam sketsa plan (P2), beradadi sebelah jalan defendan. Berkenaan dengan kuantum, kedua-dua pihak telah bersetuju

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bahawa defendan membayar plaintif pertama dan plaintif kedua RM534 dan RM162masing-masing bagi ganti rugi khas. Berkenaan dengan kehilangan mata pencarian,plaintif pertama telah menuntut RM500 sebulan memandangkan yang beliau bekerjadengan abangnya dan telah tidak bekerja selama 18 bulan. Ini telah disahkan olehabang plaintif pertama walaupun tiada keterangan dokumentari mengenainya.Berkenaan dengan ganti rugi am, plaintif pertama telah menuntut bagi empat jeniskecederaan yang dialaminya akibat kemalangan tersebut. Bagi plaintif kedua,berkenaan dengan kehilangan mata pencarian, beliau telah mengatakan bahawa beliaujuga bekerja sebagai mekanik dengan gaji sebanyak RM400 sebulan dan bahawa beliautelah tidak bekerja selama satu tahun. Majikannya telah mengesahkan perkara tersebut.Berkenaan dengan ganti rugi am, plaintif kedua telah menuntut bagi tiga jeniskecederaan yang dialaminya akibat kemalangan tersebut.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan:(1) Adalah jelas sekali bahawa responden/defendan (pemandu bas tersebut) telah

cuai kerana keterangan menunjukkan bahawa bas ||Page 473>>tersebut telah memotong arah laluan motosikal yang ditunggangioleh plaintif-plaintif yang mana plaintif-plaintif telah tidak dapat mengelakdaripada berlakunya perlanggaran. Tiada sebab untuk meraguikebolehpercayaan plaintif-plaintif. Mereka telah diperiksa balas dan testimonimereka tidak berganjak. Keterangan berkenaan dengan kerosakan padakedua-dua kenderaan tersebut juga adalah konsisten dengan versiplaintif-plaintif. Adalah penting juga untuk diperhatikan bahawa defendan, tidakseperti plaintif-plaintif, telah tidak dapat menjelaskan bagaimana kemalangantersebut berlaku (lihat ms 475F–H).

(2) Berkenaan dengan kehilangan mata pencarian, keterangan plaintif pertama telahdisokong oleh testimoni majikannya. Keterangan beliau tidak boleh ditolaksama sekali. Walau bagaimanapun, dengan ketiadaan keterangan dokumentariuntuk menyokongnya, amaun tersebut telah dikurangkan kepada RM400sebulan (lihat ms 476E–F).

(3) Memandangkan tiada keterangan dokumentari untuk menyokong pekerjaanplaintif kedua, mahkamah telah mengurangkan amaun bagi kehilangan matapencariannya kepada RM300 sebulan (lihat ms 479B).

(4) Jumlah keseluruhan amaun ganti rugi am bagi kecederaan diri yang dialaminya,plaintif pertama telah diawardkan sebanyak RM66,000. Daripada jumlah ini,10% telah ditolak untuk mengambil kira pertindihan, menjadikannya sebanyakRM59,400 (lihat ms 478F–G).

(5) Jumlah keseluruhan amaun award ganti rugi am bagi kecederaan diri yangdialaminya oleh plaintif kedua adalah sebanyak RM45,000. Daripada jumlah ini,telah ditolak 10% untuk mengambil kira pertindihan, menjadikannya sebanyakRM40,500 (lihat ms 480C).

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NotesFor cases on assessment of general damages, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997Reissue) para 385.For cases on special damages, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras1412 (also paras 1450–1451).For cases on road accidents, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras887–1108.

Cases referred toAngappan v Phua Kim Cheng, Administrator of the Estate of Phua Teck Guan 6

Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1179 (folld)Chan Kau Tong v Ngoh Yong Sin [1965] 2 MLJ xxvi (folld)Chong Kam Siong v Herman bin Baharuddin 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue)

para 908 (refd)||Page 474>>

Er Siew Keng v Eng Thiang Lai [1990] 1 CLJ 488 (refd)Fauziyah bte Mansor v Abu Bakar bin Hussin 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000

Reissue) para 1143 (folld)Ji Wee Sin v Lim Chong Soon & Anor 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para

1074 (folld)Lee Eng Beng & Anor v Torairajah & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 121 (refd)Rohani bte Mamat & Ors v Wan Ismail bin Wan Talib & Anor 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th

Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 741 (folld)Rubiah Anuar v Lim Sang [1998] 3 CLJ Supp 314 (folld)Shuib bin Awang v Abdul Manan bin Abdul Latif 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000

Reissue) para 339 (refd)Sulaiman bin Aziz v Abd Razak bin Abd Wahab 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000

Reissue) para 1261 (folld)Victor Alphonse Sebastian & Anor v Lee Ah Leek 1987 2 MLJ xxi (refd)Yee Yat Wah v Hoo Wong & Anor 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,1997 Reissue) para 1278

(folld)

Appeal from: Summons No 53–77 of 1995 (Sessions Court, Temerloh)

G Dorai (G Dorai & Co) for the appellants.Clement Joseph (Dass Jainab & Assoc) for the respondent.

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[2001] 1 MLJ 35

Dr KS Sivananthan v The Government of Malaysia & Anor

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–27–1996PS GILL J27 MARCH 2000

Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Medical practitioner — Causation — —Contributory negligence — Plaintiff’s leg amputated — Plaintiff treated earlier by anotherdoctor — Whether causative link between resultant damage and negligent act

Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Medical practitioner — Standard of care— Advance stage of ischaemia — Amputation — Failure to maintain circulation chart andgive proper advice upon discharge — Whether contributory negligence

Evidence — Expert evidence — Medical opinion — Opinion on matters outside field ofexpertise — Whether medical expert may give evidence regarding handwriting andauthenticity of medical records

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 4 September 1983 andfractured his right leg. He was admitted to Ipoh General Hospital (‘GH’) on the sameday where a full length plaster of paris (‘POP’) was applied to his leg. He remained atGH until the next day when he decided to discharge himself at his own risk. He thenadmitted himself to Fatimah Hospital at Ipoh (‘FH’) on the same day (5 September1983). He was attended to by the appellant who immediately split the POP and did anoperative procedure (fasciotomy) on the plaintiff’s leg. On 12 September 1983, he putan internal fixator in the plaintiff’s leg. However, on 3 June 1984 the plaintiff’s leg wasamputated as the leg could not be saved. The issue before the trial court was in respectof the apportionment of the liability of the respondents as the third party and theappellant as the fourth party to the damages awarded to the plaintiff. At the end of thetrial the judge found both the third party and fourth party negligent and apportionedtheir contribution at 60% for the third party respondents and 40% for the fourth partyappellant. The appellant appealed. The question before this court was whether theappellant and the respondents were both negligent in their treatment of the plaintiff andif so whether liability should have been apportioned in the manner as determined by thetrial judge.

Held, allowing the appeal:(1) It would appear from the facts of the case that the respondents had failed to

153


maintain the circulation chart properly and to provide the necessary care to theplaintiff when the plaintiff needed it. If the chart had been maintained properly,timely action could have been taken in the early stages of the problem. Clearlythe staff at GH did not provide any fair and reasonable care to the plaintiff. Therespondents were also negligent in failing ||Page 36>>to give any proper advice to the plaintiff upon his discharge fromthe hospital. In fact at the time of discharge, the respondents should have giventhe plaintiff immediate medical treatment because the plaintiff’s leg was then atleast in a state of fairly advanced ischaemia (see pp 41F–G, I, 42C).

(2) Based on the reading of the circulation chart and evidence of medical experts,when the plaintiff was first attended to by the appellant, his leg was already at asevere level of ischaemia with some irreversible damage. This was in contrastto the finding of the trial judge who made a finding that the plaintiff was only ata fairly advanced ischaemic condition when the plaintiff arrived at FH. Thisfinding was erroneous (see p 43E–F).

(3) An expert should not give an opinion on matters outside his field of expertise.Clearly the evidence of the medical experts regarding handwriting andauthenticity of the records were not admissible evidence and should not havebeen accepted by the trial judge. As such, the trial judge was in error in makingthe finding that the fasciotomy was done on 12 September 1983 and not on5 September 1983 (see p 44D–E).

(4) A doctor is not negligent if he is acting in accordance to a practice accepted asproper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular artmerely because there is a body of opinion that takes a contrary view. Thus, thedecision by the appellant to do an internal fixation on the plaintiff’s leg by itselfwas not negligent (see p 45D–E); Bolam v Friern Hospital ManagementCommittee [1957] 2 All ER 118 followed.

(5) The onus was on the respondents to show on the balance of probabilities thatthere was a causative link between the resultant damage and the negligent actof the appellant. The trial judge apparently failed to direct his mind to the issueof causation. He erred in failing to appreciate the true extent of the plaintiff’scondition on arrival at FH. As such, if the appellant was found liable, hisliability should have been apportioned lower. Having said that, taking thisfindings of the judge to be correct, it would still appear to amount to aconclusion that the respondents had failed to prove causation on a balance ofprobabilities. This apportionment of liability on the appellant would have meantthat the respondents had failed to prove that the plaintiff would have recoveredeven if he had received proper treatment from the appellant (see p 46C, 47A,C–D).

(6) The appellant should not have been found negligent and the issue ofquantification of contribution should not have arisen. Thus, the appellant wasabsolved from all liability to the plaintiff and the respondents were thereforefully responsible for the plaintiff’s damages (see p 48F–G).

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||Page 37>>


Plaintif terlibat di dalam kemalangan kenderaan motor pada 4 September 1983 dankaki kanannya telah patah. Beliau telah dimasukkan ke Hospital Besar Ipoh (‘GH’)pada hari sama di mana balutan panjang Paris yang penuh (‘POP’) telah dibalut di ataskakinya. Beliau tinggal di GH sehingga keesokan hari apabila beliau keluar darihospital dengan risikonya sendiri. Kemudian beliau menerima rawatan di HospitalFatimah di Ipoh (‘FH’) pada hari yang sama (5 September 1983). Beliau telah dirawatoleh perayu yang dengan segera memotong POP tersebut dan melakukan prosedurpembedahan (fasciotomy) ke atas kaki plaintif. Pada 12 September 1983, beliau telahmasukkan fixator ke dalam kaki plaintif. Namun, pada 3 Jun 1984 kaki plaintif terpaksadipotong kerana kaki tersebut tidak boleh diselamatkan. Isu di hadapan mahkamahadalah berkenaan dengan pembahagian tanggungan responden-responden sebagaipihak ketiga dan perayu sebagai pihak yang keempat terhadap ganti rugi yangdiawardkan kepada plaintif. Pada akhir perbicaraan, hakim mendapati kedua-dua pihakketiga dan pihak keempat cuai dan membahagikan sumbangan mereka pada 60% untukresponden pihak ketiga dan 40% untuk pihak perayu keempat. Perayu telah merayu.Persoalan di hadapan mahkamah adalah sama ada perayu dan responden-respondenadalah kedua-duanya cuai di dalam memberikan rawatan kepada plaintif dan jika adasama ada tanggungan sepatutnya dibahagikan dengan cara yang ditentukan oleh hakimperbicaraan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:(1) Adalah jelas daripada fakta-fakta kes bahawa responden-responden telah gagal

untuk mengekalkan carta prestasi dengan betul dan memberikan perhatian yangsewajar kepada plaintif apabila plaintif memerlukannya. Jika carta dikekalkandengan baik, tindakan pada masa tersebut boleh diambil pada peringkat awalmasalah tersebut. Dengan jelas, kakitangan di GH tidak memperuntukkanperhatian yang munasabah dan baik kepada plaintif. Responden-responden jugaadalah cuai kerana gagal memberikan nasihat yang sewajarnya kepada plaintifselepas dilepaskan dari hospital. Malah pada masa pelepasan,responden-responden sepatutnya memberikan plaintif rawatan perubatan yangsegera kerana kaki plaintif adalah sekurang-kurangnya di dalam keadaanischaemia yang teruk (lihat ms 41F–G, I, 42C).

(2) Berdasarkan carta prestasi dan keterangan saksi-saksi perubatan, apabilaplaintif dirawat buat pertama kali oleh perayu, kakinya sudah berada dalamperingkat ischaemia yang buruk dengan kecederaan yang tidak boleh pulihsemula. Ini adalah bercanggah dengan penemuan hakim perbicaraan yangmembuat penemuan bahawa plantif dalam keadaan ischaemic yang agak teruksahaja

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||Page 38>>apabila plaintif tiba di FH. Penemuan tersebut adalah silap (lihat ms43E–F).

(3) Seorang pakar tidak sepatutnya memberikan pendapat berkenaanperkara-perkara di luar kepakarannya. Dengan jelas, keterangan pakarperubatan berkenaan dengan tulisan dan kebenaran rekod-rekod tidak bolehditerima sebagai keterangan dan tidak sepatutnya diterima oleh hakimperbicaraan. Dengan demikian, hakim perbicaraan adalah silap di dalammembuat penemuan bahawa fasciotomy telah dibuat pada 12 September 1983dan bukannya 5 September 1983 (lihat ms 44D–E).

(4) Seorang doktor bukanlah cuai apabila beliau bertindak menurut amalan yangditerima sebagai wajar oleh badan ahli perubatan yang bertanggungjawab yangmahir dalam bidang tertentu, semata-mata kerana terdapat pendapat berlainanyang mengambil pendapat yang berbeza. Dengan itu, keputusan perayu untukmembuat fixation ke atas plaintif dengan sendiri bukanlah cuai (lihat ms45D–E, H); Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER118 diikut.

(5) Beban adalah di atas responden untuk menunjukkan di atas imbangankebarangkalian bahawa terdapat hubungan akibat antara kerosakan yangdiakibatkan dan tindakan cuai perayu tersebut. Hakim perbicaraan dengan jelasgagal mengarahkan mindanya kepada isu penyebaban. Beliau silap kerana gagaluntuk menilai takat sebenar keadaan plaintif pada masa ketibaan di FH. Olehdemikian, jika perayu didapati bertanggungan, liabilitinya sepatutnyadibahagikan lebih rendah. Selepas memutuskan begini, mengambilpenemuan-penemuan hakim sebagai betul, adalah masih jelas untuk terjumlahkepada kesimpulan bahawa responden-responden telah gagal untukmembuktikan penyebaban (causation) di atas imbangan kebarangkalian.Pembahagian tanggungan tersebut ke atas perayu bermaksud bahawaresponden-responden gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa plaintif akan sembuhwalaupun beliau menerima rawatan yang sewajar daripada perayu (lihat ms46C, 47A, C–D).

(6) Perayu tidak sepatutnya didapati cuai dan isu pengiraan sumbangan tidak patuttimbul. Dengan itu, perayu dibebaskan daripada semua tanggungan terhadapplaintif dan responden-responden adalah bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya untukganti rugi plaintif (lihat ms 48F–G).]

NotesFor cases on medical opinion, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras1182–1183.For cases on medical practitioner generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000Reissue) paras 827–844.||Page 39>>

156


Cases referred toBolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 (folld)Christopher Rogers v Maree Lynette Whitaker [1993] 1 CLJ 449 (refd)Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v PP [1983] 2 MLJ 232 (refd)Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909 (refd)Kow Nan Seng v Nagamah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 128 (refd)Maynard v West Midlands RHA (HL) [1984] WLR 634 (refd)PP v Lin Lian Chen [1991] 1 MLJ 316 (refd)Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871 (refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 s 10(c)

Appeal from: Summons No 53–358–89 (Sessions Court, Ipoh)

PS Ranjan (PS Ranjan & Co) for the appellant.Shahidani bin Abdul Aziz for the respondents.

[2001] 1 MLJ 375

Malaysian International Merchant Bankers Bhd v LembagaBersekutu Pemegang Amanah Pengajian Tinggi Islam Malaysia

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–223 OF 1998SHAIK DAUD, SITI NORMA YAAKOB AND DENIS ONG JJCA13 JANUARY 2001

Banking — Banker and customer — Bank not ascertaining and verifying information insoliciting purchase of shares in a company — Whether bank a mere finder of purchasers ofshare in a company — Whether bank owes a higher duty of care than that of a mere finder

Banking — Banker and customer — Duty of care — Whether bank owes a legal duty of careto ascertain and verify all information supplied by a company before passing on to purchaser— Whether there was negligence

The respondent claimed that the appellant had represented and induced them to invest

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in a company resulting in a loss. The first representation was said to contain in a letterof offer sent by the appellant to the respondent in which it was stated that the directorsof the company had guaranteed a dividend of 24%pa. The other representations, whichcould be inferred from the oral and documentary evidence given to the respondent,were that the company was a respectable company and was of sound financialstanding. Subsequently the respondent discovered that the directors’s guarantee of24% dividend pa was in fact false. It also turned out that the company was in fact notof sound standing and subsequently went into receivership. The appellant admitted thatthey gave all those information but contended that all those information wereinformation obtained from the company and that the appellant’s role was merely that ofa finder, ie to get the respondent to be in touch with the company and the rest wasbetween the respondent and the company. The High Court entered judgment for therespondent. The appellant appealed.

Held, dismissing the appeal:In the light of the position of the appellant as merchant bankers, they could not beheard to say that they were merely playing the role of a finder of purchasers of theshares of the company. Being merchant bankers, they owed a higher duty to therespondent than that of a mere finder. The appellant ought to ascertain and verify allinformation supplied by the company before passing on to the respondent. Therespondent succeeded in establishing that the appellant owed a legal duty of care to therespondent and in making the representation, there was negligence which resulted in aloss to the respondent (see p 379B–D, F–G); Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller &Partners Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 575 followed.||Page 376>>


Responden menyatakan bahawa perayu telah merepresentasi dan mendorongresponden supaya melabur didalam sebuah syarikat yang mengakibatkan kerugian.Representasi yang pertama dikatakan mengandungi sepucuk surat tawaran yangdikirim oleh perayu, dimana pengarah-pengarah syarikat menjamin dividen sebanyak24%pa. Representasi-representasi yang lain yang dapat disimpul daripada keteranganlisan dan dokumentar yang diberi kepada responden adalah bahawa syarikat tersebutbereputasi baik dan mempunyai kedudukan kewangan yang kukuh. Berikutannya,responden mendapat tahu bahawa jaminan pengarah-pengarah mengenai dividen24%pa adalah palsu. Syarikat tersebut juga tidak mempunyai kedudukan kewanganyang kukuh dan telah memasuki jawatan penerimaan. Perayu mengaku memberimaklumat tersebut tetapi telah menegaskan bahawa segala maklumat diterima daripadasyarikat tersebut dan perayu hanya bertindak sebagai penghubung untuk menggesaresponden supaya menghubungi syarikat tersebut, dan yang lain adalah diantararesponden dan syarikat. Mahkamah Tinggi telah mencatatkan penghakiman untuk

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responden. Perayu merayu.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut:Memandangkan kedudukan perayu sebagai pegawai dagangan bank, perayu tidakboleh mengatakan bahawa mereka hanya bertindak sebagai penghubung pembeli sahamsyarikat. Sebagai pegawai dagangan bank, perayu mempunyai kewajipan yang lebihtinggi terhadap responden berbanding dengan penghubung. Perayu sepatutnyamemastikan dan menentusahkan segala maklumat yang diberi oleh syarikat sebelummemberikannya kepada responden. Responden telah membuktikan bahawa perayumempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadap responden, dan dalam membuatrepresentasi tersebut, terdapat kecuaian yang mengakibatkan kerugian kepadaresponden (lihat ms 379B–D, F–G); Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd[1963] 2 All ER 575 diikut.]

NotesFor cases on banker and customer, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras1271–1305.

Cases referred toHedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 575 (folld)

Appeal from: Suit No C–148 of 1981 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Porres P Royan (Shook Lin & Bok) for the appellant.Liza Chan (Liza Chan & Co) for the respondent.

[2001] 2 MLJ 193

Dr Soo Fook Mun v Foo Fio Na & Anor and another appeal

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEALS NO W–02–281 OF 1999AND NO W–02–344 OF 1999

GOPAL SRI RAM AND HAIDAR JJCA AND AZMEL J5 APRIL 2001

Civil Procedure — Judgment — Delay in delivering judgment — Effect on trial judge’sviews

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Civil Procedure — Particulars — Application for particulars not heard and determined bycourt — High Court’s failure to hear and determine appellant’s application — Whether mostserious and fundamental miscarriage of justice occasioned thereby — Detrimental effects onappellant — Appellant’s legitimate expectation to have his application heard and determined

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Facts not pleaded — Defendants having to meet unpleadedcharges of negligence — Whether prejudice thereby caused — Approach plaintiff should haveadopted

Evidence — Witness — Expert witness — Whether permissible for expert witness to studynotes of evidence to ascertain nature of evidence given

Professions — Medical practitioners — Negligence — Standard of care — Test of ‘ordinaryskilled man exercising special skill’ — The ‘Bolam’ standard — Reasons for maintaining the‘Bolam’ standard

Tort — Negligence — Causation — Burden of proving causation, on whom

Foo Fio Na (the first respondent in Civil Appeal No W–02–281–1999) hadsuccessfully sued Dr Soo Fook Mun (‘Dr Soo’) (the appellant in Civil Appeal NoW–02–281–1999) and Hospital Assunta (‘the Hospital’) (the second respondent inCivil Appeal No W–02–281) in negligence in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur (seeFoo Fio Na v Hospital Assunta & Anor [1999] 6 MLJ 738). The gist of her claim wasthat she suffered paralysis because of Dr Soo’s alleged negligence. Dr Soo (vide CivilAppeal No W–02–281) and the Hospital (vide Civil Appeal W–02–344–1999) bothappealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal in determining both appealsinter alia dealt with the following issues: (i) whether the failure of the High Court tohear and determine Dr Soo’s summons for particulars had occasioned a miscarriage ofjustice; (ii) whether causation had been established; (iii) the effect of the High Courtjudge’s four year delay in delivering judgment; (iv) whether the appellants had beenprejudiced by having to meet unpleaded charges of negligence; (v) whether it wasproper for Dr Soo’s expert to give evidence after reading the plaintiff’s evidence andthat of her expert during the trial; and (vi) the standard of proof of medical negligence.||Page 194>>

Held, allowing both Dr Soo’s and the Hospital’s appeals:(1) Nothing is clearer in adjectival law than a litigant’s right to have his

interlocutory applications heard and dealt with. In the present case, Dr Soo hada legitimate expectation to have his application for particulars heard anddetermined according to law. If he was unhappy with any decision made inrespect of his application, he was entitled to appeal. The failure of the HighCourt to hear and determine Dr Soo’s application for particulars therefore

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occasioned a most serious and fundamental miscarriage of justice. It not onlydeprived him of his basic right to have his application heard but it also deprivedhim of the substantive and valuable right to appeal against any decision madeagainst him. By refusing to determine his application the High Court effectivelyprecluded him from going further: no decision and so no appeal. The way inwhich the case was handled by the trial judge was an extreme example ofprocedural unfairness and oppression (see p 201A–D).

(2) During the trial a far more wide-ranging attack of an unpleaded case ofnegligence was raised against Dr Soo and the Hospital. Both Dr Soo and theHospital suffered serious prejudice by reason of having to meet the unpleadedcharges of negligence. Though counsel for the plaintiff sought to defend hisposition by relying on the usual difficulty that a plaintiff in a medical negligencecase faces in trying to prove negligence against a doctor, in the instant case, theplaintiff had the benefit of the advice of the expert called by her. It wastherefore open to her in the usual way to administer interrogatories to thedefendants to ascertain what, if anything, had been done wrong during thesurgery. The plaintiff could not complain for the failure of her solicitors toresort to the several procedural lines of attack provided to a litigant by rules ofcourt (see pp 206F–207A).

(3) The plaintiff’s case had to do with causation and the burden of provingcausation remained throughout with the plaintiff. However the plaintiff’smedical evidence when placed at the highest merely rendered uncertain thecause for her tragic condition. The written judgment delivered some four yearsafter the conclusion of the trial did not also contain any direction on the burdenof proof of causation that lay upon the plaintiff (see pp 202F, 205B, E–F).

(4) A long delay in delivering judgment, such as the four year delay in the instantcase, has the effect of diminishing the weight that the Court of Appeal normallylends to the views upon the credibility of witnesses made by a trial court. Thelonger the delay in delivery of a judgment after trial, the less weight the viewsof the trial judge are entitled to (see p 205H–I).

(5) It is a common occurrence for experts on one side to be present in court duringthe evidence of the other side. This is to enable the ||Page 195>>expert not only to advice counsel during cross-examination butalso to comment on the expert evidence of the other side when he in turn givesevidence. It avoids surprise and delay. If for any reason, an expert is unable tobe present when the other side is giving evidence, it is perfectly proper for himor her to later study the notes of the evidence to ascertain the nature of theevidence given (see p 207B–D).

(6) The test on the standard of proof of medical negligence that has always beenused in the Malaysian jurisdiction is the test formulated by McNair J in Bolam vFriern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (‘the Bolamtest’). The Court of Appeal ought not to alter the approach for two reasons.Firstly, as a matter of precedent it is not open to the Court of Appeal as an

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intermediate court of appeal to alter the law as that is a function reserved forthe apex court. Secondly, as a matter of practical justice, the Bolam test placesa fairly high threshold for a plaintiff to cross in an action for medical negligenceand it is right that it be so. If the law played too interventionist a role inthe field of medical negligence, it will lead to the practice of defensivemedicine. The cost of medical care for the man on the street would becomeprohibitive without being necessarily beneficial. For the time being, the Bolamtest maintains a fair balance between law and medicine (see pp 207E, 208A–B).

Obiter:(1) There may be particular cases where an inference of causation may be readily

drawn against a defendant warranting an explanation from him. In thosecircumstances, it may be entirely proper for the court to look to the defendantfor a reasonable explanation negativing causation. This is not a rule of law buta mere rule of common sense (see p 202F–G).

(2) In practice one finds it most difficult to get one doctor to testify againstanother. In fact it is a matter of notorious repute that doctors in this countrymake the most reluctant witnesses against their brethren (see p 206H).


Foo Fio Na (responden pertama dalam Rayuan Sivil No W–02–281–1999) berjayamendakwa Dr Soo Fook Mun (‘Dr Soo’) (perayu dalam Rayuan Sivil NoW–02–281–1999) dan Hospital Assunta (‘Hospital tersebut’) (responden kedua dalamRayuan Sivil No W–02–281) untuk kecuaian di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur(lihat Foo Fio Na v Hospital Assunta & Anor [1999] 6 MLJ 738). Intisari tuntutannyaadalah bahawa beliau mengalami kelumpuhan disebabkan kecuaian Dr Soo yangdidakwa. Dr Soo (lihat Rayuan Sivil No W–02–281) dan Hospital tersebut (lihatRayuan Sivil W–02–344–1999) kedua-duanya ||Page 196>>merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan, dalam memutuskankedua-dua rayuan antara lain mempertimbangkan isu-isu berikut: (i) sama adakegagalan Mahkamah Tinggi membicarakan dan memutuskan saman untuk butir-butirDr Soo merupakan satu ketidakadilan; (ii) sama ada sebab mengapa terjadinya kejadiantersebut telah dibuktikan; (iii) kesan kelewatan empat tahun oleh hakim MahkamahTinggi dalam menyampaikan penghakiman; (iv) sama ada pemohon-pemohon telahdimudaratkan dengan diminta menghadapi dakwaan kecuaian yang tidak diakui; (v)sama ada ia mengikut aturan bagi pakar Dr Soo memberikan keterangan setelahmembaca keterangan plaintif dan pakarnya semasa perbicaraan; dan (vi) piawaipembuktian kecuaian perubatan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan kedua-dua Dr Soo dan Hospital tersebut:(1) Tiada yang lebih jelas dalam undang-undang adjektival daripada hak litigan

agar permohonan interlokutorinya dibicarakan dan dipertimbangkan. Dalam kes

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ini, Dr Soo mempunyai harapan sah agar permohonan butir-butirnyadibicarakan dan diputuskan menurut undang-undang. Sekiranya beliau tidakpuas hati dengan apa-apa keputusan yang dibuat mengenai permohonannya,beliau berhak merayu. Kegagalan Mahkamah Tinggi membicarakan danmemutuskan permohonan untuk butir-butir Dr Soo merupakan satuketidakadilan yang serius dan asasi. Ia bukan hanya menafikan hak asasinyauntuk membicarakan permohonannya tetapi ia juga menafikannya hak merayuyang begitu penting dan berharga untuk menentang apa-apa keputusan yangdibuat terhadapnya. Dengan enggan memutuskan permohonannya MahkamahTinggi secara berkesan telah menghalang beliau dari meneruskan tindakannya:tiada keputusan, oleh itu tiada rayuan. Cara kes ini dikendalikan oleh hakimperbicaraan ialah satu contoh ketidakadilan prosedural dan penindasan yangketerlaluan (lihat ms 201A–D).

(2) Semasa perbicaraan, satu serangan yang berbidang jauh lebih luas atas keskecuaian yang tidak diakui dikemukakan terhadap Dr Soo dan Hospitaltersebut. Kedua-dua Dr Soo dan Hospital tersebut mengalami kemudaratanyang serius kerana terpaksa menghadapi dakwaan kecuaian yang tidak diakui.Walaupun peguam plaintif cuba mempertahankan kedudukannya denganbergantung kepada alasan kesukaran yang biasa dihadapi oleh plaintif dalamkes kecuaian perubatan menentang seorang doktor, dalam kes pertama, plaintifmendapat manfaat khidmat nasihat pakar yang diundang beliau. Oleh itu, beliaumempunyai kebebasan seperti biasa untuk mentadbirkan soal-siasat atasdefendan-defendan untuk memastikan apa, jika ada, yang telah dilakukansecara salah ketika surgeri tersebut. Plaintif tidak dapat mengadu ataskegagalan peguamnya menurut beberapa garis panduan prosedur ||Page 197>>yang diberi kepada seorang litigan melalui peraturan-peraturanmahkamah (lihat ms 206F–207A).

(3) Kes plaintif adalah mengenai isu sebab mengapa terjadinya kejadian tersebutdan beban pembuktian sebab tetap ada pada plaintif. Walau bagaimanapun,keterangan perubatan plaintif apabila diletakkan di kedudukan tertinggihanyalah menyebabkan tidak pastinya sebab bagi keadaannya yang tragik.Penghakiman bertulis yang disampaikan kira-kira empat tahun selepasberakhirnya perbicaraan tersebut juga tidak mengandungi apa-apa arahanmengenai beban pembuktian sebab yang ada pada plaintif (lihat ms 202F, 205B,E–F).

(4) Kelewatan yang lama dalam menyampaikan penghakiman, seperti kelewatanempat tahun dalam kes pertama, mempunyai kesan mengurangkan kepentinganyang lazimnya diberikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan kepada kebolehpercayaansaksi-saksi di mahkamah bicara. Lebih lama kelewatan dalam menyampaikanpenghakiman selepas perbicaraan, bertambah kurang kepentingan yangdiletakkan pada pendapat-pendapat hakim perbicaraan (lihat ms 205H–I).

(5) Ia kejadian lazim bagi pakar dari satu pihak hadir di mahkamah ketikaketerangan diberikan oleh pihak yang lagi satu. Ini adalah untuk membolehkan

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pakar bukan hanya menasihati peguam ketika pemeriksaan balas, tetapi jugamemberikan komen mengenai keterangan pakar pihak yang lagi satu apabilabeliau memberikan keterangan. Ini mengelakkan kekejutan dan kelewatan. Jikademi apa-apa alasan, seseorang pakar itu tidak dapat hadir apabila pihak yanglagi satu memberikan keterangan, ia mengikut aturan baginya menelaahnota-nota keterangan untuk memastikan jenis keterangan yang diberikan (lihatms 207B–D).

(6) Ujian piawai pembuktian kecuaian perubatan yang digunakan oleh bidangkuasaMalaysia ialah ujian yang dirumuskan oleh McNair J dalam Bolam v FriernHospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (‘ujian Bolam’).Mahkamah Rayuan tidak harus mengubah pendekatan tersebut demi duaalasan. Pertama, disebabkan duluan Mahkamah Rayuan sebagai mahkamahrayuan perantaraan tidak bebas mengubah undang-undang kerana itumerupakan fungsi mahkamah yang tertinggi. Kedua, disebabkan keadilanpraktikal, ujian Bolam mempunyai nilai ambang yang agak tinggi untuk dilepasiseseorang plaintif dalam satu tindakan kecuaian perubatan dan ini wajardilakukan. Sekiranya undang-undang memainkan peranan yang terlalu banyakcampurtangan dalam bidang kecuaian perubatan, ini akan mengakibatkanamalan perubatan defensif. Kos penjagaan perubatan orang kebanyakan akanbersifat pencegahan tanpa menjadi semestinya bermanfaat. Buat ketika ini, ujianBolam mengekalkan keseimbangan di antara undang-undang dan perubatan(lihat ms 207E, 208A–B).||Page 198>>Obiter:

(1) Mungkin terdapat kes-kes khusus di mana satu inferens sebab mengapaterjadinya kejadian tersebut boleh disimpulkan secara mudah terhadap seorangdefendan yang memerlukan satu penjelasan daripadanya. Dalam hal keadaansedemikian, ia mungkin mengikut aturan bagi sesuatu mahkamah merujukkepada defendan untuk mendapatkan satu penjelasan munasabah untukmembatalkan sebab mengapa terjadinya kejadian tersebut. Ini bukannya suatuperaturan undang-undang tetapi cuma satu peraturan akal fikiran (lihat ms202F–G).

(2) Dalam amalan, didapati ianya amat sukar untuk mendapatkan seorang doktoruntuk memberikan keterangan terhadap seorang doktor yang lain. Ia menjadiisu yang diketahui ramai bahawa doktor-doktor di negara ini enggan menjadisaksi terhadap saudara perubatan mereka (lihat ms 206H).

NotesFor cases on judgment generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras2447–2720.For cases on application for particulars generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,1998 Reissue) paras 3216–3227.

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For cases on facts not pleaded in pleadings, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998Reissue) paras 3534–3536.For cases on expert witness, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras2129–2130.For cases on negligence of medical practitioners generally, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4thEd, 1996 Reissue) paras 1324–1333.

Cases referred toBolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (folld)Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1967] 2 MLJ 45 (refd)F v R [1984] 33 SASR 189 (refd)McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008 (refd)Naxakis v Western General Hospital [1999] HCA 22 (Internet Ed) (refd)Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403 (refd)Penny v East Kent Health Authority [1999] Butterworths Direct Online Service

Official Transcripts (refd)Rogers v Whitaker [1992] 109 ALR 625 (refd)The Eurymedon [1942] 73 Lloyd’s LR 217 (refd)Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 860 (refd)Wong Chong Chow v Pan-Malaysia Cement Works Berhad [1980] 2 MLJ 75 (refd)

Appeal from: No S5–53–13 of 1987 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)||Page 199>>

PS Ranjan (MS Dhillon with him) (PS Ranjan & Co) for the appellant in Civil AppealNo W–02–281 of 1999.

S Kanagasabapathi (S Suresh with him) (RK Nathan & Co) for the first respondent inCivil Appeal No W–02–281 of 1999.

GL Ambrose (Chooi & Co) for the second respondent in Civil Appeal No W–02–281of 1999.

GL Ambrose (Chooi & Co) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No W–02–344 of 1999.S Kanagasabapathi (S Suresh with him) (RK Nathan & Co) for the first respondent in

Civil Appeal No W–02–344 of 1999.PS Ranjan (MS Dhillon with him) (PS Ranjan & Co) for the second respondent in

Civil Appeal No W–02–344 of 1999.

[2001] 2 MLJ 275

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Suriyati bte Takril v Mohan a/l Govindasamy & Anor

HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–21 OF 1999ABDUL MALIK ISHAK29 JANUARY 2000

Evidence — Adverse inference — Failure to call witness — Lorry driver sued for negligencein driving lorry — Plaintiff did not call repairer of motorcycle — Court not asked to drawinference — Whether adverse inference can be drawn against plaintiff — Evidence Act 1950 s114(g)

Evidence — Conflicting testimony — Approach to take — Credibility of evidence — Judge’spreference for one as against the other

Evidence — Conflicting testimony — Duty of trial court to consider facts and evidence —Findings of facts of trial judge — Role of appellate court in such cases

Evidence — Parol evidence rule — Evidence to add to police report — Whether permissible— Evidence Act 1950 s 92

Tort — Road accident — Apportionment of liability — Assessment of damages — Lorrycollided into motorcycle — Lorry driver 100% liable

The plaintiff was the rider of a motorcycle which was involved in a collision with alorry driven by the first defendant. The plaintiff testified that the defendant’s lorrycollided into the rear of her motorcycle when she stopped at a junction where thetraffic light was red. The plaintiff’s version of how the accident had happened talliedwith her police report. The first defendant advanced three different versions as to howthe accident had happened. His testimony in court was in sharp contrast with hisversion as contained in his police report. The trial court held that both parties wereequally liable and apportioned liability equally. The trial court also awarded damagesfor pain and suffering and loss of amenities at RM30,000 and cost of future surgery atRM3,000. The plaintiff appealed.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) The trial court should have preferred the evidence of the plaintiff as it wasconsistent with her police report whereas the first defendant’s versions weretotally at variance and inconsistent with his police report. The trial court failed

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to consider adequately the clear contradiction between the police report asopposed to the first defendant’s testimony in court. Had the trial courtconsidered the police report of the first defendant in its correct perspective andread it against the evidence of the plaintiff as a whole, an unmistakableconclusion would be arrived at in the road accident was due to the negligenceof the first defendant wholly (see pp 283A, 289C, F).

(2) The trial judge did not avail herself of the advantage of having seen and heardthe witnesses when they took the stand in the witness box. As an appellatecourt, the court was entitled to evaluate the evidence by reading the appealrecord and give due weight to it accordingly (see p 289G).

(3) The trial court was in error when it accepted the explanation of the firstdefendant in order to construe the meaning of the police report made by him.The ban contained in s 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the Act’) is allencompassing and it would certainly bar an embellishment of the police report.If there was an omission on the part of the first defendant to state a materialfact in his police report, he should not add to his police report by way of oraltestimony (see pp 290H–291A).

(4) The appeal record showed that the trial court was not asked to draw aninference under s 114(g) of the Act against the plaintiff for not calling therepairer of the motorcycle nor for not producing the photographs. The facts inthe present appeal was certainly not suitable to invoke the adverse inferenceunder s 114(g). There was no wilful withholding of evidence on the part of theplaintiff (see pp 283I–284A, 292D–E).

(5) The trial court took the easy way out in assessing the issue of liability. Therewas no assessment of the available evidence. There was certainly a duty on thepart of the first defendant to exercise due care when he was approaching thetraffic light bearing in mind that he was driving an eight ton lorry. It was a bigmotor lorry and this aspect of the factual matrix was not alluded to by the trialcourt at all (see p 284E–F, H–I).

(6) The trial court made a blunder when it misapprehended the facts and failed toconsider the medical disabilities of the plaintiff as evidenced by the medicalreport with the result that the trial court made a wholly erroneous estimate ofthe damage suffered. For pain and suffering and loss of amenities the courtawarded damages of RM37,000 to the plaintiff on the basis of 100% liability onthe part of the first defendant thereby setting aside and varying the award of thetrial court under this head. The sum of RM37,000 was fair and reasonable inthe circumstances of this appeal (see p 299G–I).

(7) To entitle the victim of a road accident to seek medical treatment at a privatehospital the victim in question need only show a semblance of reasonableness.In the present appeal, the sum of RM11,000 would be reasonable expenses forknee replacement surgery which the plaintiff propose to undergo in the nearfuture in a private hospital as quantified and recommended by two privatespecialists. There was no evidence that the plaintiff would remain in the

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employment of the government until her retirement and in the event she resignsprematurely, she would certainly not be entitled to a free medical treatment at agovernment hospital. Thus it would be fair and reasonable to award the sum ofRM11,000 to the plaintiff for cost of future surgery (see pp 302F, 303C–E).


Plaintif merupakan seorang penunggang motosikal yang terlibat dalam satupelanggaran dengan sebuah lori yang dipandu oleh defendan pertama. Plaintif memberiketerangan bahawa lori defendan melanggar bahagian belakang motosikalnya apabilaplaintif berhenti di satu simpang ketika lampu isyarat menyala merah. Versi plaintifmengenai kejadian kemalangan itu selaras dengan laporan polis beliau. Defendanpertama mengemukakan tiga versi berlainan mengenai bagaimana kemalangan tersebutberlaku. Kenyataan beliau di mahkamah berbeza sekali dengan versinya yangterkandung dalam laporan polisnya. Mahkamah bicara memutuskan bahawa kedua-duapihak sama-sama bertanggungjawab dan membahagikan liabiliti secara sama rata.Mahkamah bicara juga memberikan gantirugi untuk kesakitan dan kesengsaraan danhilang keupayaaan sebanyak RM30,000 dan kos surgeri akan datang sebanyakRM3,000. Plaintif tersebut merayu.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:(1) Mahkamah bicara sepatutnya memilih keterangan plaintif kerana ia konsisten

dengan laporan polis beliau manakala versi-versi defendan pertama semuanyaberlainan dan tidak konsisten dengan laporan polisnya. Mahkamah bicara gagalmenjelaskan percanggahan di antara laporan polis dan keterangan lisan beliau didalam mahkamah secara mencukupi. Sekiranya mahkamah bicaramempertimbangkan laporan polis defendan pertama dengan perspektif yangbetul dan membacanya sambil membandingkan keterangan keseluruhan plaintif,keputusan yang pasti dicapai adalah bahawa kemalangan jalan raya tersebutdisebabkan kecuaian defendan pertama (lihat ms 283A, 289C, F).

(2) Hakim perbicaraan tidak memberikan dirinya kelebihan memerhati danmendengar para saksi apabila mereka memberi keterangan di petak saksi.Sebagai mahkamah rayuan, mahkamah berhak menilai keterangan denganmembaca rekod rayuan dan memberikannya pertimbangan yang sewajarnya(lihat ms 289G).

(3) Mahkamah bicara tersilap apabila ia menerima penjelasan defendan pertamabagi menafsirkan maksud laporan polis yang dibuat oleh beliau. Larangan yangterkandung di s 92 Akta Keterangan 1950 meliputi semua perkara dan iapastinya melarang penokok-tambahan laporan polis. Jika terdapatnyapeninggalan oleh defendan pertama untuk menyatakan satu fakta yang materialdalam laporan polisnya, beliau tidak harus menokok laporan polisnya secaraketerangan lisan (lihat ms 290H–291A).

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(4) Rekod rayuan menunjukkan bahawa mahkamah bicara tidak diarahkanmembuat kesimpulan di bawah s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadapplaintif kerana tidak memanggil pembaiki motosikal atau mengemukakangambar-gambar foto. Fakta-fakta dalam rayuan ini memang tidak sesuai untukmenggunakan inferensi yang bertentangan di bawah s 114(g). Plaintif tidakpernah menahan apa-apa keterangan secara sengaja (lihat ms 283I–284A,292D–E).

(5) Mahkamah bicara mengambil jalan yang mudah dalam menilai isu liabiliti. Tiadapenilaian dibuat mengenai keterangan yang ada. Defendan pertama mempunyaitanggungjawab untuk memandu dengan cermat apabila menghampiri lampuisyarat memandangkan bahawa beliau sedang memandu lori lapan tan. Ia adalahsebuah lori bermotor yang besar dan aspek asas fakta ini tidak dirujuk olehmahkamah bicara tersebut langsung (lihat ms 284E–F, H–I).

(6) Mahkamah bicara melakukan kesilapan apabila ia salahfaham akan fakta-faktadan gagal mempertimbangkan kecacatan perubatan plaintif seperti yangdibuktikan oleh laporan perubatan tersebut, dengan akibat mahkamah bicaramembuat satu anggaran gantirugi yang tersilap. Bagi kesakitan dankesengsaraan dan kehilangan upaya, mahkamah memberikan gantirugi sebanyakRM37,000 kepada plaintif berasaskan 100% liabiliti oleh defendan pertama,dengan itu menolak dan mengubah keputusan penghakiman mahkamah bicarayang diketuainya. Jumlah RM37,000 adalah adil dan munasabah dalam halkeadaan rayuan ini (lihat ms 299G–I).

(7) Untuk memberi hak kepada mangsa kemalangan jalan raya mendapatkanrawatan perubatan di hospital swasta, mangsa tersebut hanya perlumemperlihatkan kemunasabahan. Dalam rayuan ini, jumlah RM11,000 ialahperbelanjaan yang munasabah bagi surgeri penggantian lutut yang bakaldihadapi plaintif di sebuah hospital swasta seperti yang dijumlahkan dandisyorkan oleh dua orang doktor pakar swasta. Tiada keterangan menunjukkanbahawa plaintif akan tetap bekerja untuk kerajaan sehingga persaraannya dansekiranya beliau berhenti kerja walaupun belum sampai masa, beliau pasti tidakakan mendapat rawatan perubatan percuma di hospital kerajaan. Oleh itu, iamemang adil dan munasabah untuk memberikan jumlah RM11,000 kepadaplaintif sebagai kos surgeri yang bakal dihadapi (lihat ms 302F, 303C–E).]

NotesFor cases on conflicting testimony generally, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998Reissue) paras 658–666.For cases on parol evidence rule generally, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998Reissue) paras 1476–1588.For cases on road accident, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras887–1108.

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Cases referred toAh Mee v PP [1967] 1 MLJ 220 (refd)Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370 (refd)Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856) 11 Exch 781, 25 LJ Ex 212, 4 WR 294

(refd)Chew Soo Lan v Ludhiana Transport Syndicate & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 205 (refd)Chong Kam Siong v Herman bin Baharuddin [1995] 2 CLJ 413 (refd)Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1942] AC 601 (refd)Davis v Hassan Times, 13 January 1967 (refd)Eh Khan Sio Eh Dum v Choo Chiu Nan (1981) MMD October (1991) (refd)Er Siew Keng v Eng Thiang Lai [1990] 1 CLJ 488 (refd)George v Ollukaran A (1975) K 163 (refd)Grant v Sun Shipping Co [1948] AC 549 (refd)Harris v Brights Asphalt Contractors Ltd [1953] 1 QB 617 (refd)Lalta v Majidunnissa 25 IC 749 (refd)Mathuri v Gurcharan 16 IC 25 (refd)Mohamad bin Mohamad Said & Anor v Perianayagam & Anor [1972] 1 MLJ 67

(refd)Mohamed bin Abdullah v Chah Hea Seng [1980] 2 MLJ 282 (refd)Mohamed Ali v PP [1962] MLJ 230 (refd)Multar v Lim Kim Chet & Anor [1982] 1 MLJ 184 (refd)Murugan v Lew Chu Cheong [1980] 2 MLJ 139 (refd)Padmraj v Gopikishen 56 IC 129 (refd)Pengarah Institut Penyelidikan Perubatan & Anor v Inthra Devi & Anor [1988] 1

MLJ 19 (refd)Ramrati v Dwarika A (1967) SC 1134 (refd)Rasidin bin Partorjo v Frederick Kiai [1976] 2 MLJ 214 (refd)Siddeswar v Bhubaneswaris A (1978) C 4 (refd)Tabarani bin Mohd Arsad & Anor v Chan Tenn Yeu [1999] 3 CLJ 188 (refd)Tan Sai Hong (widow) suing on behalf of herself and her two children as dependants

of Chong Sey Kow, deceased v Joremi bin Kimin & Anor (Tan Sai Hong(balu) wakil kepada harta pusaka Chong Sey Kow, si mati — Third Party)[1998] 1 AMR 522 (refd)

Victor Alphonse Sebastian & Ors v Lee Ah Leek [1987] 2 MLJ xxi (refd)Williamson v Rover Cycle Co (1901) 2 IR 619 (refd)Yaakub Foong bin Abdullah @ Foong Chin Siew v Lai Mun Keong @ Lai Mun &

Anor [1986] 1 CLJ 355 (refd)

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Legislation referred toEvidence Act 1950 ss 92, 114(g)

N Jegatheeson (John Ang & Jega) for the appellant/plaintiff.Joseph Clemons (Dass Jainab & Assoc) for the respondents/defendants.

[2001] 2 MLJ 450

Sinnatamby Seahomes Sdn Bhd v Perwira Habib Bank MalaysiaBhd

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 23–421 OF 1986JEFFREY TAN J7 MARCH 2001

Banking — Banker and Customer — Duty of care — Negligence or breach of mandate —Banker’s draft issued without authority signed in accordance with company’s mandate —Whether there was failure on part of banker to adhere to mandate prescribed — Whether therewas a general duty of care on banker

The plaintiff had charged its land to the defendant as security for credit facilitiesgranted by the defendant to Tulin Enterprise Sdn Bhd (‘TE’). By a resolution dated 24May 1982, TE appointed Sinnathamby Nadarajah as the sole ‘compulsory signatory’ ofits banking accounts. That resolution was handed to the defendant. By letter dated 15June 1982 (‘AB1’) TE notified the defendant that ‘so long as the charge on the landexists, no amendment to the operation of TE’s account shall be made without priorwritten consent of Sinnathamby Nadarajah (PW1’)’. By a letter dated 10 September1982 (‘AB2’), TE requested the defendant to issue a demand draft for RM199,000 infavour of Benquen (M) Sdn Bhd. On 8 October 1982, the defendant issued the demanddraft and debited TE’s account. PW1 had not instructed nor authorized that draft. Theplaintiff brought an action against the defendant praying for a declaration that thedefendant had wrongly debited RM199,000 from the account of TE and for an orderthat the defendant pay to the plaintiff the sum of RM362,952.56 (being RM199,000plus interest) paid by the plaintiff to the defendant to redeem its land. The plaintiff’scase was based on negligence or breach of mandate. The defendant’s defence was thatit was carrying out the instructions of TE, its customer. It was submitted that thedefendant did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff.

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Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim:(1) A banker who has negligently issued a bankers draft without authority signed in

accordance with the company’s mandate is liable for the loss. In the presentcase, the mandate to the defendant was ‘to honour all cheques, bills ofexchange, promissory notes, etc signed solely by PW1. The person authorizedby a resolution to draw on the account could only be changed by resolution.AB2 was not a resolution. There was no evidence of any meeting held norresolution passed to authorize those instructions. Clearly there was failure onthe part of the defendant to abide by the mandate prescribed in AB16-17(see pp 462H, 464B–C, E, H).

(2) It was not true that the duty of the defendant was solely within the four cornersof the charge. There was a general duty of care. There was a duty of care toensure that all drawdowns were ||Page 451>>authorized and done in a regular fashion. Any drawdown wouldaffect the security. The defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercisereasonable care with the security (see p 466D–E).

(3) The term ‘so long as the charge exists’ had been accepted by the defendantwithout reservation. The defendant should have rejected the security if it couldnot ensure that the term ‘so long as the charge exists’ would be adhered to.AB2 affected the security and liability of its chargor. The defendant could havescrutinized AB2 and not blindly accepted AB2 as a fresh mandate, which it wasnot (see p 467A–B).

(4) The liability of the draft was incurred because of a lapse or breach of duty.The chargor suffered a loss as a direct consequence of a lapse or breach of dutyowed by the chargee to the chargor. The argument that the plaintiff had nolocus standi had no merits whatsoever. The defendant must make good thatloss (see p 467B–C).


Plaintif telah mengadai tanahnya kepada defendan sebagai jaminan untuk kemudahankewangan yang diberikan oeh defendan kepada Tulin Enterprise Sdn Bhd (‘TE’).Melalui satu resolusi bertarikh 24 Mei 1982, TE telah melantik Sinnathamby Nadarajahsebagai satu-satunya ‘penandatangan wajib’ kepada akaun banknya. Resolusi tersebuttelah diserahkan kepada defendan. Melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 15 Jun 1982(‘AB1’) TE memaklumkan kepada defendan bahawa ‘selagi gadaian ke atas tanahtersebut wujud, tiada pindaan kepada operasi akaun TE sepatutnya dibuat tanpaterlebih dahulu mendapat kebenaran bertulis Sinnathamby Nadarajah (‘PW1’)’. Melaluisepucuk surat bertarikh 10 Septamber 1982 (‘AB2’), TE memohon defendan untukmengeluarkan satu draf tuntutan sebanyak RM199,000 untuk Benquen (M) Sdn Bhd.Pada 8 Oktober 1982, defendan telah mengeluarkan draf tuntutan tersebut danmendebit akaun TE. PW1 tidak mengarah atau memberi kuasa terhadap draf tersebut.

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Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan terhadap defendan memohon agar deklarasi yangdefendan telah tersilap mendebitkan RM199,000 daripada akaun TE dan untukperintah yang defendan bayar kepada plaintif sebanyak RM362,952.56 (iaituRM199,000 beserta faedah) yang dibayar oleh plaintif kepada defendan untuk menebustanahnya. Kes plaintif berdasarkan kecuaian atau pelanggaran mandat. Pembelaandefendan adalah bahawa ia telah menjalankan arahan-arahan TE, pelanggannya. Adalahdihujahkan bahawa defendan tidak mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadapplaintif.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif:(1) Seorang pegawai bank yang secara cuai mengeluarkan draf bank tanpa

mempunyai kuasa untuk menandatagan menurut mandat ||Page 452>>syarikat adalah bertanggungjawab terhadap kerugian tersebut. Didalam kes sekarang ini, mandat kepada defendan adalah ‘untuk melunaskansemua cek-cek, bil-bil pertukaran, nota-nota janji, dan lain-lain yangsatu-satunya ditandantangani oleh PW1. Orang yang diberi kuasa oleh resolusiuntuk membuka akaun hanya boleh ditukar melalui satu resolusi. AB2 bukansatu resolusi. Tiada keterangan yang apa-apa mesyuarat atau resolusi telahdiluluskan untuk membenarkan arahan-arahan berikut. Adalah jelas terdapatkegagalan di pihak defendan untuk mematuhi mandat sebagaimana yangdinyatakan di dalam AB16-17 (lihat ms 462H, 464B–C, E, H).

(2) Adalah tidak benar bahawa kewajipan defendan adalah semata-mata di dalamlingkungan gadaian tersebut. Ia merupakan satu kewajipan berjaga-jaga yangumum. Terdapat kewajipan berjaga-jaga untuk memastikan bahawa semuapengeluaran wang yang dibenarkan dan dibuat dengan cara biasa. Apa-apapengeluaran wang akan menjejaskan gadaian tersebut. Defendan mempunyaikewajipan kepada plaintif untuk menjalankan tanggungjawab yang munasabahterhadap gadaian tersebut (lihat ms 466D–E).

(3) Terma ‘selagi gadaian tersebut wujud’ telah diterima oleh defendan tanpaapa-apa keraguan. Defendan hendaklah menolak gadaian tersebut jika ia tidakdapat memastikan bahawa terma ‘selagi gadaian tersebut wujud’ akan dipatuhi.AB2 telah menjejaskan gadaian dan liabiliti penggadainya. Defendan sepatutnyaboleh meneliti AB2 dan tidak menerima secara membabi buta AB2 sebagai satumandat baru, di mana ia bukan (lihat ms 467A–B).

(4) Liabiliti draf tersebut telah terjadi akibat satu kesilapan atau pelanggarankewajipan. Penggadai mengalami kerugian akibat daripada kesilapan ataupelanggaran langsung kewajipan pemegang gadaian kepada penggadai. Hujahbahawa plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi tiada merit apa sekalipun.Defendan mestilah terima kerugian tersebut (lihat ms 467B–C).]

NotesFor cases on banker and customer generally, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998

173


Reissue) paras 1271–1305.

Cases referred toBadiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75

(refd)Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Galian Saham Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 MLJ 185 (refd)Bank of Montreal, v Dominion Gresham Guarantee & Casualty Co Ltd [1930] AC

659 (refd)||Page 453>>

Call in v Cyprus Finance Corp (London) Ltd (Catlin, Third Party) [1983] All ER 809(refd)

Co-operative Central Bank Ltd, The v Y & W Development Sdn Bhd [1997] 4 AMR3784 (refd)

Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1997]3 AMR 2361 (refd)

Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77 (refd)NKM Properties Sdn Bhd v Rakyat First Merchant Bankers Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 4

(refd)Public Bank Berhad v Abdullah bin Ismail: Pewira Habib Bank (M) Bhd v Nawi bin

Muhamad; Southern Bank Bhd v Halidah bt Ah Rahman [1987] 1 CLJ 65(refd)

Royal British Bank v Turquand [1855] 5 E & B 248 (refd)Standard Chartered Bank v Konwah Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors [1989] 2 MLJ 474

(refd)Standard Chartered Bank Ltd v Johnny Walker [1982] 1 WLR 1410 (refd)Tate and Lyle Food Distribution Ltd v Greater London Council [1981] 3 All ER 716

(refd)

Legislation referred toCivil Law Act 1956 s 11, Part VIIICourts of Judicature Act 1964 s 16(i)Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 [UK] s 3(1)Rules of the High Court 1980 O 42 r 12

V Sithanbaram (P Navaratnam with him) (Kumar Sitham & Co) for the plaintiff.Quah Boon Lee (JB Lim & Assoc) for the defendant.

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[2001] 3 MLJ 725

Payremalu a/l Veerappan v Dr Amarjeet Kaur & Ors

HIGH COURT (TAIPING) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–23 OF 2000VT SINGHAM JC11 JULY 2001

Evidence — Expert evidence — Medical opinion — Action by plaintiff against defendants formedical negligence — Whether necessary for plaintiff to adduce medical or expert evidence tosupport allegations of negligence against defendants

Tort — Negligence — Causation — Plaintiff lost eye following treatment at hospital forinjury sustained to eye — Whether causative link between plaintiff’s loss and action by firstand second defendant established — Whether existence of any objective fact from which todeduce loss suffered by plaintiff indicated negligence on defendants’ part

Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Medical negligence — Plaintiff lost eyefollowing treatment at hospital for injury sustained to eye — Whether defendants negligent intreatment of plaintiff’s injured eye — Whether defendants’ failure to send plaintiff to anotherhospital negligent — Whether failure to warn plaintiff of risks of treatment carried out by firstand second defendants negligent

Tort — Negligence — Res ipsa loquitor — Action by plaintiff against defendants for medicalnegligence — Res ipsa loquitor not pleaded in statement of claim nor raised at trial —Whether plaintiff entitled to raise doctrine on appeal

The plaintiff had gone to the Hospital Taiping on 20 September 1993 after he was hitin his right eye by a foreign body or object while cutting the grass in his housecompound. He was attended to by the first and second defendants, the consultant eyespecialists at the hospital, and informed that he needed an operation to remove the saidforeign body, and the facilities were only available at either Ipoh General Hospital orKuala Lumpur General Hospital. The plaintiff decided to go to the latter by himself,but was warded at Hospital Taiping in the meantime. The first defendant informed theplaintiff that prior to referral to Kuala Lumpur General Hospital, the rupture in his eyehad to be stitched and the procedure was performed on the plaintiff that same eveningunder general anaesthesia. The plaintiff suffered great continuous pain in his right eyeafter the operation and a second operation was carried out on his injured eye as aresult of the pain, after which his condition further deteriorated. On 23 September1993, the plaintiff’s right eye was removed and he filed a civil action against the twoeye specialists, the Director of Hospital Taiping and the Government of Malaysia (the

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first, second, third and fourth defendants, respectively), claiming damages for medicalnegligence. At the Sessions Court, Taiping, the plaintiff was the only witness and didnot call any medical or expert evidence to support his claim. The defendants submittedno case to answer at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The judge dismissed the plaintiff’sclaim and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the most important issue was whether theplaintiff had established any negligence against the defendants on a balance ofprobabilities that the first and second defendants had failed to conform to that degreeof skill required of them as eye specialists in the performance of the surgical treatmentand, consequently, whether they were negligent.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) On the facts of the case, the mere failure to send the plaintiff to the Ipoh

General Hospital or Kuala Lumpur General Hospital was not negligence per se,as negligence did not lie in the omission to send the plaintiff to the hospital (seep 740D–E). In any event, there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’sallegation that had he been sent to the Ipoh General Hospital or Kuala LumpurGeneral Hospital before the treatment at Hospital Taiping, his right eye couldhave been saved (see p 740G).

(2) There was a lack of evidence showing the causative link between the plaintiff’sinjury and the act of the first and second defendants. Although the court coulddraw an inference as to the causal link provided there was sufficient evidenceor positive proved facts, in the instant case, there were no objective facts fromwhich it could have been deduced, as a matter of reasonable deduction, that theloss of the plaintiff’s right eye, on face value, had shown some negligence onthe part of the first and second defendants (see p 741F–G). Taking intoconsideration the relevant principles of common law, the facts of the instantappeal and the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff hadfailed to prove on the balance of probabilities the causative link between the actof the first and second defendants and the injury to his right eye, which hadbeen hit by a foreign body or object (see p 743F–G); Dr Soo Fook Mun v FooFio Na & Anor and another appeal [2001] 2 MLJ 193; Dr KS Sivananthan vThe Government of Malaysia & Anor [2001] 1 MLJ 35 and Wilsher v EssexArea Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871 followed.

(3) A mere failure to give a warning about the treatment which the first and seconddefendants had carried out on the plaintiff was not negligence per se (see p743G–H); Liew Sin Kiong v Dr Sharon DM Paulraj [1996] 5 MLJ 193followed. However, in the instant appeal, sufficient warning of the risk hadbeen given to the plaintiff by the defendants before the treatment was carriedout. Nevertheless, even assuming that sufficient warning had not been given tothe plaintiff about the risk of the treatment, it could still not have constitutednegligence per se on the totality of the facts. In any event, the risk had to be ofa real and foreseeable kind but not ‘far-fetched or fanciful’ (see p 744C–D);Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 followed.

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(4) It was important for the plaintiff to have adduced medical or expert evidence tosupport the allegations contained in the statement of claim against thedefendants (see p 744E); Hong Chuan Lay v Dr Eddie Soo Fook Mun [1998] 7MLJ 48 followed. The testimony of a medical expert would have been mostmaterial to the issue of causation but, unfortunately, the plaintiff had opted notto call such evidence. Counsel for the plaintiff had been misconceived insubmitting that expert witness need not be called to prove medical negligence(see p 744H–I).

(5) It was not for the court to take notice or invoke the doctrine of res ipsaloquitor unless it was specifically pleaded or at least raised at the lower courtby the plaintiff. Unless res ipsa loquitor was specifically pleaded and relied onby the plaintiff, the defendants would not have known that the onus had beenthrown on them to give a reasonable explanation as to how and what hadhappened to the plaintiff’s right eye. If the plaintiff intended to throw theevidential burden on the other side, ample notice had to be given to thedefendants so that the defendants would be given the opportunity to negativethe burden, if any. In this case, since the plaintiff or his counsel had not takenthe initiative to address the sessions court judge on the issue of res ipsaloquitor, it was not the function of the appellate court to consider this issue infavour of the plaintiff (see pp 748F–G, I–749A).

(6) The plaintiff had failed to establish any negligence against the defendants aspleaded in the statement of claim and the defendants had rightfully exercisedtheir option by submitting no case to answer. It is settled law that it is not forthe defendants to disprove the allegations as contained under the particulars ofnegligence in the statement of claim, as the legal burden of proof still rests onthe plaintiff (see p 749G); Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] MLJ 253 andEastern Enterprises Ltd v Ong Choo Kim [1969] 1 MLJ 236 followed. In thiscase, the plaintiff had not satisfied the onus of proof placed upon him and thathe had failed to establish that the first and second defendants had departed fromthe standard of care to be expected and required of a reasonably competent eyespecialist (see p 749H–I); International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980]2 MLJ 86 followed.


Plaintif telah pergi ke Hospital Taiping pada 20 September 1993 setelah beliau matakanan beliau terkena satu benda atau objek asing semasa memotong rumput dikawasan rumah beliau. Beliau telah dirawat oleh defendan-defendan pertama dankedua, pakar perunding mata di hospital tersebut, dan telah diberitahu bahawa beliaumemerlukan satu pembedahan untuk membuang benda asing tersebut, danperalatan-peralatan tersebut hanya terdapat sama ada di Hospital Besar Ipoh atauHospital Besar Kuala Lumpur. Plaintif memutuskan untuk pergi ke Hospital Besar

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Kuala Lumpur sendiri, tetapi telah dimasukkan ke wad di Hospital Taiping buatsementara waktu. Defendan pertama telah memberitahu plaintif bahawa sebelumdirujuk ke Hospital Besar Kuala Lumpur, ruptur pada mata beliau perlu dijahit danprosedur tersebut telah dijalankan ke atas plaintif pada petang yang sama di bawah biusanestesia. Plaintif mengalami kesakitan berterusan yang amat pada mata kanan beliauselepas pembedahan tersebut dan berikutan itu keadaan beliau menjadi bertambahburuk. Pada 23 September 1993, mata kanan plaintif terpaksa dibuang dan beliau telahmemfailkan satu tindakan sivil terhadap kedua-dua pakar mata tersebut, PengarahHospital Taiping dan Kerajaan Malaysia (masing-masingnya defendan-defendanpertama, kedua, ketiga dan keempat), dengan menuntut ganti rugi kerana kecuaianperubatan. Di Mahkamah Sesyen, Taiping, plaintif merupakan satu-satunya saksi dantidak mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan perubatan atau pakar untuk menyokongtuntutan beliau. Defendan-defendan telah menghujahkan tiada kes untuk dijawab diakhir kes plaintif. Hakim telah menolak tuntutan plaintif dan plaintif telah membuatrayuan. Atas rayuan, persoalan yang paling penting adalah sama ada plaintif telahmenunjukkan apa-apa kecuaian terhadap defendan-defendan atas imbangankebarangkalian bahawa defendan-defendan pertama dan kedua telah gagal untukmematuhi darjah kepakaran yang dikehendaki daripada mereka sebagai pakar-pakarmata di dalam menjalankan rawatan pembedahan dan, akibatnya, sama ada merekatelah cuai.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut:(1) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta kes, kegagalan semata-mata untuk menghantar plaintif

ke Hospital Besar Ipoh atau Hospital Besar Kuala Lumpur bukan kecuaian perse, kerana kecuaian tidak terletak atas peningggalan untuk menghantar plaintifke hospital tersebut (lihat ms 740D–E). Dalam apa keadaanpun, tidak terdapatketerangan untuk menyokong dakwaan plaintif bahawa jikalau beliau telahdihantarkan ke Hospital Besar Ipoh atau Hospital Besar Kuala Lumpursebelum rawatan di Hospital Taiping, mata kanan beliau mungkin dapatdiselamatkan (lihat ms 740G).

(2) Terdapat keterangan yang tidak mencukupi bagi menunjukkan kaitan penyebabantara kecederaan plaintif dan tindakan defendan-defendan pertama dan kedua.Walaupun mahkamah boleh tiba kepada satu inferen berhubung kaitan sebabakibat dengan syarat terdapat keterangan yang mencukupi atau fakta-faktapositif yang telah dibuktikan, dalam kes semasa tiada fakta objektif dari mana iamungkin dapat disimpulkan sebagai satu perkara yang telah disimpulkan secaramunasabah, bahawa kehilangan mata kanan plaintif, pada dasarnya, telahmenunjukkan kecuaian di pihak defendan-defendan pertama dan kedua (lihatms 741F–G). Setelah mengambilkira prinsip-prinsip common law yang relevan,fakta-fakta rayuan sekarang ini dan keterangan yang telah dikemukakan bagipihak plaintif, plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan atas imbangankebarangkalian kaitan sebab akibat antara tindakan defendan-defendan pertamadan kedua dan kecederaan pada mata kanan beliau, yang telah terkena benda

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atau objek asing (lihat ms 743F–G); Dr Soo Fook Mun v Foo Fio Na & Anorand another appeal [2001] 2 MLJ 193; Dr KS Sivananthan v The Governmentof Malaysia & Anor [2001] 1 MLJ 35 dan Wilsher v Essex Area HealthAuthority [1988] 1 All ER 871 diikut.

(3) Kegagalan semata-mata untuk memberikan satu amaran tentang rawatan yangdefendan-defendan pertama dan kedua telah jalankan ke atas plaintif bukankecuaian per se (lihat ms 743G–H); Liew Sin Kiong v Dr Sharon DM Paulraj[1996] 5 MLJ 193 diikut. Walau bagaimanapun, di dalam rayuan sekarang ini,amaran yang memadai tentang risiko tersebut telah diberikan kepada plaintifoleh defendan-defendan sebelum rawatan tersebut telah dijalankan. Meskipunbegitu, walaupun dengan menganggap bahawa amaran yang memadai telahdiberikan kepada plaintif tentang risiko rawatan tersebut, ia tidak mungkinmembentuk kecuaian per se berdasarkan keseluruhan fakta-fakta. Di dalam apakeadaanpun, risiko tersebut mestilah jenis yang benar dan boleh diramal tetapibukan ‘tidak masuk akal atau merupakan khayalan’ (lihat ms 744C–D); WyongShire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 diikut.

(4) Adalah penting bagi plantif untuk mengemukakan keterangan perubatan ataupakar untuk menyokong dakwaan-dakwaan yang terkandung di dalampernyataan tuntutan terhadap defendan-defendan (lihat ms 744E); Hong ChuanLay v Dr Eddie Soo Fook Mun [1998] 7 MLJ 48 diikut. Keterangan seorangpakar perubatan adalah paling material terhadap persoalan sebab akibat tetapi,malangnya, plaintif telah memilih untuk tidak mengemukakan keterangansedemikian. Peguam bagi pihak plaintif telah salah tanggap dalammenghujahkan bahawa saksi tidak perlu dipanggil untuk membuktikan kacuaianperubatan (lihat ms 744H–I).

(5) Bukan untuk mahkamah mengambil perhatian atau menggunakan doktrin resipsa loquitor kecuali ia diplikan dengan khusus atau sekurang-kurangnyaditimbulkan di mahkamah bawahan oleh plaintif. Kecuali res ipsa loquitordiplikan dengan khusus dan plaintif bergantung kepadanya, defendan-defendantidak mungkin mengetahui bahawa tanggungjawab tersebut telah dipindahkanke atas mereka untuk memberikan satu penjelasan yang munasabah tentangbagaimana dan apa yang telah berlaku pada mata kanan plaintif. Sekiranyaplaintif berniat untuk memindahkan beban keterangan ke pihak yang lain, notisyang sewajarnya patut diberikan kepada defendan-defendan agardefendan-defendan dapat diberikan peluang untuk menafikan beban tersebut,jika ada. Di dalam kes ini, memandangkan plaintif atau peguam beliau tidakmengambil usaha untuk mengutarakan kepada hakim mahkamah sesyen tentangpersoalan res ipsa loquitor, ia bukan fungsi mahkamah rayuan untukmempertimbangkan persoalan ini untuk menyebelahi plaintif (lihat ms 748F–G,I–749A).

(6) Plaintif telah gagal untuk menunjukkan apa-apa kecuaian terhadapdefendan-defendan sebagaimana yang telah diplikan di dalam pernyataantuntutan dan defendan-defendan telah dengan betul menggunakan pilihan

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mereka dengan menghujahkan tiada kes untuk dijawab. Adalah undang-undangmatan bahawa bukan untuk defendan-defendan untuk membuktikan sebaliknyadakwaan-dakwaan sebagaimana yang terkandung di bawah butiran-butirankecuaian di dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut, kerana beban pembuktian disisi undang-undang masih terletak ke atas plaintif (lihat ms 749G); Selvadurayv Chinniah [1939] MLJ 253 dan Eastern Enterprises Ltd v Ong Choo Kim[1969] 1 MLJ 236 diikut. Di dalam kes ini, plaintif tidak berpuas hati dengantanggungjawab pembuktian yang diletakkan ke atasnya dan bahawa beliau telahgagal untuk menunjukkkan yang defendan-defendan pertama dan kedua telahdilepaskan daripada piawai berjaga-jaga yang diharapkan dan dikehendakidaripada seorang pakar mata yang secara munasabahnya kompeten (lihatms 749H–I); International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86diikut.]

NotesFor cases on medical opinion, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras1337–1338.For cases on causation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue)paras 609–617.For cases on professional negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,2000 Reissue) paras 798–849.For cases on res ipsa loquitor, see 12 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 861–886.

Cases referred to Abdul Kadir bin Mohamad v Kamarulzaman bin Zain & Anor [2001] AMR 599

(refd)Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v Mohamed Latiff bin Shah Mohd and another application

[2001] 2 MLJ 305 (refd)Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 (refd)Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1968] 1 All ER

1068 (refd)Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343 (refd)Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 (refd)Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1967] 2 MLJ 45 (refd)Dr Chin Yoon Hiap v Ng Eu Khoon & Ors and other appeals [1998] 1 MLJ 57 (folld)Dr KS Sivananthan v The Government of Malaysia & Anor [2001] 1 MLJ 35 (folld)Dr Soo Fook Mun v Foo Fio Na & Anor and another appeal [2001] 2 MLJ 193 (folld)Eastern Enterprises Ltd v Ong Choo Kim [1969] 1 MLJ 236 (folld)Elizabeth Choo v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 171 (refd)Esso Petroleum Co Ltd & Anor v Southport Corporation [1955] 3 All ER 864 (refd)Ghent and Ghent v Wilson [1956] OR 257, 2 DLR (2d) 160 (refd)Hong Chuan Lay v Dr Eddie Soo Fook Mun [1998] 7 MLJ 48 (folld)

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Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909 (refd)Hunter v Hanley [1955] SC 200 (Scot) (refd)International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86 (folld)Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (Suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte

Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 (folld)Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 (refd)Kamalam a/p Raman & Ors v Eastern Plantation Agency (Johore) Sdn Bhd Ulu

Tiram Estate, Ulu Tiram, Johore & Anor [1996] 4 MLJ 674Kapur v Marshall et al 85 DLR (3d) (refd)Laxman Balkrishna Joshi v Trimbak Bapu Godbole & Anor [1969] 1 SCR 206 (refd)Liew Sin Kiong v Dr Sharon DM Paulraj [1996] 5 MLJ 193 (folld)Low You Choy & yang lain v Chan Mun Kit & yang lain [1992] 3 CLJ 1550 (folld)M Shoba v Dr Mrs Rajakumari Unnithan & Ors AIR 1999 Kerala 149 (refd)Management Corp Strata Title No 1298 v Keller Piano Co (Pte) Ltd [1994] 2 SLR 78

(refd)Mariam bte Mansor v JD Peter [1975] 1 MLJ 279 (folld)Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd v Mohd Mastana bin Makaddas & Anor [1995] 2

MLJ 276 (refd)Mohd Samsudin bin Ismail v Tan Yeow Hwa & Anor [2000] 3 AMR 3445 (folld)Multar v Lim Kim Chet & Anor [1982] 1 MLJ 18 (folld)Nanyang Development (1966) Sdn Bhd v How Swee Poh [1970] 1 MLJ 145 (refd)Ng Chun Pui & Ors v Lee Chuen Tat & Anor [1988] RTR 298; [1988] 2 HKLR 425

(refd)Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v Aidi Abdullah [1985] 1 MLJ 30 (folld)Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403 (refd)Rich v Pierpont (1862) 3 F & F 35; (1862) 176 ER 16 (refd)Roe v Minister of Health & Anor [1954] 2 QB 66 (refd)Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] MLJ 253 (folld)Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 88 (refd)Swamy v Matthews & Anor [1968] 1 MLJ 138 (refd)Tan Ah Kau v The Government of Malaysia [1997] 2 CLJ Supp 16 (refd)Tan Kim Khuan v Tan Kee Kiat (M) Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697 (folld)Taw Too Sang lwn Chew Chin Sai & yang lain [2000] 5 CLJ 37 (folld)Tay Tong Chew & Anor v Abdul Rahman bin Haji Ahmad [1985] 1 MLJ 50 (folld)Tenaga National Bhd v Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 MLJ 673 (refd)Teoh Guat Looi v Ng Hong Guan [1998] 4 MLJ 525 (refd)

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Toh Ming Jee v Lau Yiik Ung [1994] 3 CLJ 391 (refd)UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4 (refd)Velupillai v Government Of Malaysia & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 63 (refd)Whitehouse v Jordan & Anor [1981] 1 WLR 246 (refd)Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871 (folld)Wong Choon Mei & Anor v Dr Kuldeep Singh & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 373 (folld)Wong Yiu Ming v To Chark Wah & Anor [1993] 1 HKC 510 (refd)Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 (folld)Yeoh Cheng Han v Official Administrator, Malaya [1972] 2 MLJ 74 (folld)

Legislation referred toEvidence Act 1950 ss 101, 102

Kerpal Singh (U Harcharan & Kerpal) for the appellant/plaintiff.Megat (Federal Counsel, Perak State Legal Adviser’s Office) for the

respondents/defendants.

[2001] 5 MLJ 8

Siti Rohani bte Mohd Shah & Ors v Haji Zainal bin Saifiee &Anor

HIGH COURT (MUAR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–40 OF 1998JEFFREY TAN J17 NOVEMBER 2000

Evidence — Witness — Conflicting evidence — Two versions of how accident happened —Which version consistent with incontestable evidence

Tort — Negligence — Road accident — Riding without valid licence — Failure to wearsafety helmet — Whether defendant encroached onto plaintiff’s side of the road — Whetherplaintiff contributed to cause of accident

The Muar Sessions Court had held that the appellants had not proved negligence onthe part of the respondents for the collision between the motorcycle ridden by theappellants and the motorlorry driven by the second respondent. The appellantsappealed against that decision. At the material time of the collision, the first appellant

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who was riding the motorcycle was travelling along Jalan Tanjong Olak towardsTanjong Olak, whilst the second respondent who was driving the lorry was travellingon the same road from the opposite direction and towards Pekan Bukit Pasir, Muarand the collision occurred at a sharp bend of the road. However, it was in seriousdispute as to how the collision occurred. According to the trial court, it was moreprobable that the first appellant was riding fast and lost control of her motorcycle andthe first appellant encroached onto the second respondent’s road. The trial court alsonoted that there was no damage to the lorry which shows that there were no physicalcontact between the middle section of the lorry and the motorcycle as alleged by thefirst appellant. It was also noted in the case that the first appellant who was 12 yearsold was riding without a valid licence.

Held, allowing the appeal:(1) In the final analysis, all proper inferences must be drawn from the incontestable

evidence, and the version to be preferred must be consistent or at least moreconsistent with the incontestable evidence. A version cannot be preferred, nomatter what, if it is inconsistent or more inconsistent with the incontestableevidence. In short, in this case, proper inferences were not drawn from theincontestable evidence (see p 13F–G).

(2) At the sharp bend, the first appellant was negotiating to the left, whilst thesecond respondent was negotiating to the right. Negotiating a right hand bend,the lorry could ‘cut corners’, and to say therefore that there was no possibilitythat the lorry could have encroached onto the motorcycle’s path was notlogical (see p 13G, 14B). Further, it was more than probable that the collisionbetween the giant solid lorry and the fragile motorcycle could have left thelorry without a scratch (see p 14D). The first appellant’s ||Page 9>>version was not improbable. The lorry could have encroached ontothe wrong side. The first appellant’s version was consistent or more consistentwith the incontestable evidence — the motorcycle collided into the side, be itrear wheel or middle section, of the lorry (see p 16A).

(3) It is very clear that riding or driving without a valid licence per se is notnegligent. Rather, it is the manner of the riding or driving and/or conduct on orin relation to the road that contribute to the cause of a motor accident orcollision. The fact that the first appellant was riding the motorcycle without avalid driving licence, without a safety helmet and even with a pillion rider,could not and did not enter into the cause of the collision. The fact of thematter was that on the balance of probabilities, the first appellant did not causeor contribute to the cause of the accident. Also, the first appellant did notcontribute to her injuries as she did not sustain any head injuries, and thewearing of a safety helmet would not have reduced her injuries (see pp18I–19C).

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Mahkamah Sesyen Muar telah memutuskan bahawa perayu-perayu tidak dapatmembuktikan kecuaian di pihak responden-responden bagi pelanggaran antaramotosikal yang ditunggang oleh perayu dan lori yang dipandu oleh responden kedua.Perayu-perayu telah merayu terhadap keputusan tersebut. Pada masa matanpelanggaran tersebut, perayu pertama yang menunggang motosikal tersebut sedangbergerak dari Jalan Tanjong Olak ke Tanjong Olak, sementara responden kedua yangsedang memandu lori tersebut sedang melalui jalan yang sama dari arah bertentangandan ke arah Pekan Bukit Pasir, Muar dan pelanggaran tersebut berlaku di selekohtajam di jalan tersebut. Namun, adalah suatu pertikaian yang serius bagaimanapelanggaran tersebut berlaku. Menurut mahkamah perbicaraan, adalah lebihberkemungkinan bahawa perayu pertama sedang memandu laju dan hilang kawalanmotosikalnya dan perayu pertama telah memasuki jalan responden kedua. Mahkamahperbicaraan juga mengambil perhatian bahawa tidak terdapat kerosakan kepada loriyang menunjukkan bahawa tidak terdapat sentuhan fizikal antara bahagian tengah loridan motosikal seperti yang dikatakan oleh perayu pertama. Adalah juga diambilperhatian di dalam kes ini bahawa perayu pertama yang berusia 12 tahun sedangmenunggang tanpa lesen yang sah.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut:(1) Di dalam analisa terakhir, semua inferens yang wajar mestilah dibuat daripada

keterangan yang tidak boleh dicabar, dan versi yang diutamakan mestilahkonsisten atau sekurang-kurangnya lebih konsisten dengan keterangan yangtidak boleh dicabar. ||Page 10>>Suatu versi tidak boleh diutamakan tidak kira apa sekalipun, jika iaadalah tidak konsisten atau lebih tidak konsisten dengan keterangan yang tidakboleh dicabar. Secara ringkas, di dalam kes ini, inferens yang wajar tidak dibuatdari keterangan yang tidak boleh dicabar tersebut (lihat ms 13F–G).

(2) Di selekoh tajam, perayu pertama sedang memusing ke kiri, sementararesponden kedua sedang memusing ke kanan. Semasa sedang memandu keselekoh kanan, lori tersebut boleh ‘terkeluar’ (dari lorongnya), dan untukmengatakan bahawa tidak terdapat kemungkinan bahawa lori boleh memasukidi jalan motosikal adalah tidak logik (lihat ms 13G, 14B). Selanjutnya, adalahlebih berkemungkinan bahawa pelanggaran antara lori yang besar danmotosikal yang kecil tidak meninggalkan sebarang kesan calar pada loritersebut (lihat ms 14D). Versi perayu pertama bukanlah tidak berkemungkinan.Lori tersebut boleh tersilap masuk ke dalam bahagian yang salah. Versi perayupertama adalah konsistten atau lebih konsisten dengan keterangan yang tidakboleh dicabar — motosikal tersebut telah melanggar di bahagian tepi, tidak kiratepi roda atau bahagian tengah, lori tersebut (lihat ms 16A).

(3) Adalah jelas bahawa menunggang atau memandu tanpa lesen semata-mata

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bukanlah cuai. Sebaliknya, ia adalah cara menunggang atau memandu dan ataubertindak di atas jalan raya yang menyumbang kepada punca kemalangankenderaan dan pelanggaran. Fakta bahawa perayu pertama sedang menunggangmotosikal tersebut tanpa lesen memandu yang sah, tanpa topi keledar dan jugabersama pembonceng, tidak dapat dan tidak menyebabkan punca pelanggarantersebut. Sebenarnya di atas imbangan kemungkinan, perayu pertama tidakmenyebabkan atau menyumbang kepada punca kemalangan tersebut. Juga,perayu pertama tidak menyumbang kepada kecederaannya oleh kerana beliautidak mengalami sebarang kecederaan kepala, dan penggunaan topi keledartidak akan mengurangkan kecederaannya (lihat ms 18I–19C).]

NotesFor a case on conflicting evidence, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para2096.For cases on road accident generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue)paras 887–1108.

Cases referred toChew Soo Lan v Ludhiana Transport Syndicate & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 206 (refd)Chua Kim Suan (Adminisratrix of the estate of Teoh Tek Lee decd) & Anor v

Government of Malaysia & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 394 (refd)||Page 11>>

Chu Kim Sing & Anor v Abdul Razak bin Amin [1999] 6 MLJ 433 (refd)Croston v Vaughan [1938] 1 KB 540 (refd)Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832 (refd)Rubie v Faulkner [1940] 1 KB 571 (refd)Searle v Wallbank [1947] AC 341 (refd)Vernev v Wilkins (1962) 106 Sol Jo 879 (refd)Yahya bin Mohamad v Chin Tuan Nam [1975] 2 MLJ 117 (refd)Yusoff bin Kassim v PP [1992] 2 MLJ 183 (refd)

Legislation referred toHighway Code [UK]Locomotives on Highways Act 1896 [UK]Motor Cars (Use and Construction) Order 1904 art II cl 6 [UK]Road Traffic Act 1987 ss 26, 39

Appeal from: Civil Suit No 53–161 of 1995 (Sessions Court, Muar)

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Harjit Singh Nijar (Nijar & Nijar) for the appellants.Lai Kuan Jean (Taye & Co) for the respondents.

[2001] 5 MLJ 70

Public Bank Bhd v Ng Yoon Lin

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO R1–11–121 OF 1998KC VOHRAH J1 NOVEMBER 2000

Banking — Banker and customer — Duty of care — Negligent release of fixed depositsavings to third party — Bank accepted forged power of attorney and grant replacement fixeddeposit receipt without customer’s verification — Whether breach of duty of care to customer

Tort — Negligence — Banker and customer — Negligent release of fixed deposit savings tothird party — Bank accepted forged power of attorney and grant replacement fixed depositreceipt without customer’s verification — Whether breach of duty of care to customer

The plaintiff had opened an account in the defendant bank as fixed deposit for a termof six months. She was given a fixed deposit receipt on the same day. By an agreementbetween the bank and the plaintiff, there was the necessity for the return of the depositreceipt before the deposit could be withdrawn. A third party, Mr Toh, was given aduplicate receipt in respect of the fixed deposit by the bank after it was reported thatthe original receipt had been lost. The plaintiff had never lost the original receipt. Shewas unaware that this Mr Toh had taken the duplicate receipt and that the bank was inpossession of a letter of indemnity purportedly signed by her. The magistrate who triedthe case found as a matter of fact that the plaintiff did not execute the letter ofindemnity. Mr Toh, using the duplicate receipt, then had the bank release the depositamount to him on the strength of what purported to be a power of attorney. Theevidence shows that the signature on the power of attorney was not the plaintiff’s andthat she did not donate the power. The magistrate gave judgment in favour of theplaintiff. She was of the view that the burden was on the defendant bank to be verycareful in taking all reasonable steps to verify that the signature was that of the plaintiffand that the bank should have taken steps to contact the plaintiff over the alleged lossof the original receipt.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:(1) It is quite obvious that the bank had given the duplicate receipt to a third party,

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Mr Toh, without the consent or approval of the plaintiff — no proof of suchconsent or authority was produced, and the bank had accepted the say so of thethird party that the original receipt was lost without verifying from the plaintiffif she had lost it (see p 74G–H).

(2) So far as the document purporting to be a power of attorney is concerned, it isnot marked as a certified copy under s 10 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1949read with s 76 of the ||Page 71>>Evidence Act 1950, and cannot constitute sufficient evidence of itscontents or that it was deposited in the office of the registrar (see pp 75I–76A).

(3) The bank was, without making an enquiry with the plaintiff, negligent inreleasing the deposit to a third party who had no authority to receive thedeposit on behalf of the plaintiff against a duplicate copy of the original receiptwhich had also been previously, without an enquiry having been made with theplaintiff, negligently released to the third party (see p 76A–B).

(4) The bank in giving the replacement receipt to a stranger breached its duty totake care and was negligent. The bank was also negligent in accepting thepurported power of attorney without checking on its validity and releasing themoney placed in the plaintiff’s account without the plaintiff’s authority (seep 76C).


Plaintif telah membuka satu akaun simpanan tetap bagi tempoh enam bulan di dalambank defendan. Beliau diberikan satu resit simpanan tetap pada hari yang sama.Menurut satu perjanjian di antara bank dan plaintif, adalah menjadi keperluan bagi resitsimpanan dikembalikan sebelum simpanan tersebut dapat dikeluarkan. Satu pihakketiga, En Toh, telah diberikan satu salinan resit simpanan tetap tersebut oleh banksetelah ia dilaporkan bahawa resit asal telah hilang. Plaintif sebenarnya tidak pernahhilang resit asal tersebut. Beliau tidak sedar bahawa En Toh telah mengambil salinanresit tersebut dan bahawa bank tersebut mempunyai satu surat tanggung rugi yangkononnya ditandatangani oleh plaintif. Majistret yang membicarakan kes ini mendapatibahawa plaintif tidak melaksanakan surat tanggung rugi tersebut. Encik Toh, denganmenggunakan salinan resit tersebut, meminta bank mengeluarkan amaun simpanantersebut kepadanya berdasarkan apa yang dikatakan surat kuasa wakil. Keteranganmenunjukkan bahawa tandatangan pada surat kuasa wakil bukanlah tandatanganplaintif dan beliau tidak menyerahkan kuasa tersebut. Majistret memberikanpenghakiman kepada plaintif. Beliau berpendapat bahawa beban adalah pada bankdefendan untuk berhati-hati dalam mengambil semua langkah yang wajar untukmengesahkan bahawa tandatangan tersebut ialah tandatangan plaintif dan bank tersebutjuga seharusnya mengambil langkah menghubungi plaintif atas pengataan kehilanganresit asal tersebut.

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Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut dengan kos:(1) Adalah jelas bahawa bank telah memberikan satu salinan resit kepada satu

pihak ketiga, En Toh, tanpa izin atau kelulusan plaintif — tiada bukti izin ataukuasa sedemikian telah dikeluarkan, dan bank telah menerima bulat-bulat cakappihak ketiga bahawa resit asal telah hilang tanpa pengesahan ||Page 72>>plaintif sama ada dia telah kehilangan resit tersebut (lihatms 74G–H).

(2) Berkenaan dokumen yang dikatakan surat kuasa wakil tersebut, ia tidakditandakan sebagai satu salinan yang diperakui di bawah s 10 Akta Surat KuasaWakil 1949 dibaca bersama s 76 Akta Keterangan 1950, dan tidak bolehmembentuk keterangan yang mencukupi bagi kandungannya atau bahawa iatelah disimpan di pejabat pendaftar (lihat ms 75I–76A).

(3) Bank tersebut, tanpa membuat pertanyaan dengan plaintif, adalah cuai dalammengeluarkan simpanan tersebut bagi satu pihak ketiga yang tidak mempunyaikuasa untuk menerima simpanan tersebut bagi pihak plaintif berdasarkan satusalinan resit asal yang sebelum ini, juga tanpa membuat pertanyaan denganplaintif, dikeluarkan secara cuai kepada pihak ketiga (lihat ms 76A–B).

(4) Bank tersebut dengan memberikan resit ganti kepada seorang yang tidakdikenali telah melanggari kewajipan berjaga-jaganya dan telah cuai. Banktersebut juga cuai dalam menerima apa yang berupa surat kuasa wakil tanpamemastikan kesahannya dan mengeluarkan wang yang dimasukkan ke dalamakaun plaintif tanpa kuasa plaintif (lihat ms 76C).]

NotesFor a case on duty of care of the bank to the customer, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,1998 Reissue) para 1278.For cases on negligence between banker and customer, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4thEd, 2000 Reissue) paras 583–591.

Cases referred toVoo Foot Yiu v Oversea Chinese Banking Corp Ltd [1936] MLJ Rep 169 (refd)

Legislation referred toBanker’s Book Evidence Act 1949Powers of Attorney Act 1949 ss 3, 4, 10

Appeal from: Summons No 72–6806–92 (Magistrates’ Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Jordan Sugunasingam (Iza Ng Yeo & Kit) for the appellant.KS Lam (KS Lam & Co) for the respondent.

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[2001] 5 MLJ 101

Kapt (B) Haji Mohamad bin Ismail v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2 (S4)–22–544 OF 1995(2)KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J28 SEPTEMBER 2000

Tort — Negligence — Damages — Negligence of defendant led to publication of defamatoryadvertisement by Official Assignee — Whether plaintiff can claim for loss of reputation innegligence — Whether plaintiff entitled to claim for general damages without proving loss

The defendant bank sued the plaintiff for credit facilities granted to the plaintiff andsubsequently obtained judgment in default. A receiving order and an adjudication orderwere made against the plaintiff on 5 July 1993 and he was thus adjudicated a bankrupt.The plaintiff then negotiated with the bank which agreed to accept RM60,000 in fullsettlement. However, an advertisement from the Official Assignee (‘the OA’) that theplaintiff is a bankrupt appeared in the Utusan Malaysia on 10 February 1994 directingall debtors of the plaintiff to make payment to the OA directly. The plaintiff then filedan application on 17 February 1994 to annul the orders made against him and theorders were annulled on 9 March 1994. On 16 November 1995, the plaintiff filed thissuit against the defendant bank. The plaintiff contended that the advertisement of theOA had affected his good name and reputation and that he had been brought intopublic odium, hatred and disrepute and that this had affected his business. The plaintiffalso pleaded that the defendant was negligent in failing to take the necessary action toannul the receiving and adjudication orders and also in failing to inform the OA thatthe plaintiff had settled the debt in full. As liability had already been found against thedefendant in negligence, the court was called upon to consider if the plaintiff hassucceeded in showing he had suffered loss by way of general damages. The learnedsenior assistant registrar held that the plaintiff had failed to prove damages. Theplaintiff appealed.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal:(1) The plaintiff in this case cannot claim for mere loss of reputation in negligence

and cannot claim damages in negligence without proving the economic loss hehas sustained (see p 109C); Spring v Guardian Assurance plc & Ors [1994] 3All ER 129 followed. If the plaintiff intends to claim damages for injury toreputation or to feelings, he ought to proceed to file a suit for defamation. Butthen the plaintiff cannot properly sue the defendant in defamation because the

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publication of the advertisement was by the OA, and that was done pursuant tohis duty to do so. Furthermore, such publication was of true facts in that theplaintiff was indeed adjudicated a bankrupt on 5 July 1993 (see pp 107I,109G).||Page 102>>

(2) Further, another issue that militates against allowing the appeal is the delay onthe part of the plaintiff to file the application. Unless expressly agreed that thedefendant bank would file the application to annul the receiving andadjudication orders, the plaintiff should, after receiving the defendant’sconfirmation that it would support the plaintiff’s application to annul, file theapplication. Instead the plaintiff was content to let the defendant put in theapplication. This delay on the part of the plaintiff has been unexplained (see p110A–B).


Bank defendan mendakwa plaintif untuk kemudahan kredit yang ditunaikan kepadaplaintif dan berikutan itu memperolehi penghakiman ingkar. Satu perintah penerimaandan perintah penghukuman dilaksanakan terhadap plaintif pada 5 Julai 1993 dandisebabkan itu dia dihukum bankrap. Plaintif kemudiannya berunding dengan bankyang bersetuju menerima RM60,000 sebagai penyelesaian penuh. Akan tetapi, satuiklan dari pegawai pemegang harta (‘PPH’) bahawa plaintif seorang bankrapditerbitkan di dalam akhbar Utusan Malaysia pada 10 February 1994 mengarahkansemua penghutang plaintif membuat bayaran terus kepada PPH. Plaintif kemudiannyamemfailkan satu permohonan pada 17 Februari 1994 untuk membatalkan perintah yangdibuat terhadapnya dan perintah-perintah tersebut dibatalkan pada 9 Mac 1994. Pada16 November 1995, plaintif memfailkan guaman ini menentang bank defendan. Plaintifberhujah bahawa iklan PPH telah menjejaskan nama baik dan reputasinya dan bahawadia telah dibenci, dipandang rendah dan diberi nama buruk oleh masyarakat dan initelah menjejaskan perniagaannya. Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa defendan cuai dalamkegagalannya mengambil tindakan yang perlu untuk membatalkan perintah-perintahpenerimaan dan penghukuman tersebut dan juga dalam kegagalannya memberitahuPPH tersebut bahawa plaintif telahpun menjelaskan hutang tersebut sepenuhnya. Olehkerana liabiliti telahpun didapati pada defendan untuk kecuaian, mahkamah diserumempertimbangkan sama ada plaintif berjaya membuktikan bahawa beliau telahmengalami kerugian dalam bentuk ganti rugi umum. Penolong kanan pendaftarmemutuskan bahawa plaintif gagal membuktikan kerugian, lantas plaintif merayu.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan plaintif:(1) Plaintif dalam kes ini tidak boleh membuat tuntutan hanya untuk penjejasan

reputasi kerana kecuaian dan tidak boleh menuntut ganti rugi kerana kecuaiantanpa membuktikan kerugian ekonomi yang dialami (lihat ms 109C); Spring v

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Guardian Assurance plc & Ors [1994] 3 All ER 129 diikut. Jika plaintif berniatmenuntut ganti rugi untuk penjejasan reputasi atau perasaan, beliau sepatutnyamemfailkan guaman fitnah. Tetapi, plaintif tidak ||Page 103>>dapat mendakwa defendan untuk fitnah secara sempurna keranaterbitan iklan itu dilakukan oleh PPH, dan ia dilaksanakan menurut tugasnya.Lagipun, terbitan tersebut berdasarkan fakta yang benar kerana plaintif memangdihukum bankrap pada 5 Julai 1993 (lihat ms 107I, 109G).

(2) Selain itu, satu lagi isu yang menghalang rayuan tersebut ialah kelewatanplaintif dalam memfailkan permohonan tersebut. Kecuali jika telah dipersetujuisecara nyata bahawa bank defendan akan memfailkan permohonanmembatalkan perintah-perintah penerimaan dan penghukuman tersebut, plaintifsepatutnya, setelah menerima pengesahan defendan bahawa ia akan menyokongpermohonan plaintif untuk membuat pembatalan, memfailkan permohonantersebut. Sebaliknya, plaintif membiarkan defendan membuat permohonantersebut. Kelewatan plaintif ini tidak dijelaskan (lihat ms 110A–B).]

NotesFor cases on damages for negligence, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue)paras 160–174.

Cases referred toAddis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488 (refd)Balfour v Attorney General [1991] 1 NZLR 519 (refd)Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney General [1989] 3 NZLR 148 (refd)Foaminol Laboratories Ltd v British Artid Plastics Ltd [1940] 2 All ER 393 (refd)Joyce v Sengupta & Anor [1993] 1 WLR 337 (refd)Lonrho plc & Ors v Fayed & Ors (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 (refd)Marbe v George Edwardes (Daly’s Theatre) Ltd & Anor [1928] 1 KB 269 (refd)South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants &

Investigations Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 282 (refd)Spring v Guardian Assurance plc & Ors [1994] 3 All ER 129 (folld)Thurston v Chartles (1904–05) 21 TLR 659 (refd)Uniphone Sdn Bhd v Chin Boon Lit & Anor [1998] 6 MLJ 441 (refd)Wilson & Anor v United Counties Bank Ltd [1920] AC 102 (refd)

V Rajadevan (R Thayakugan with him) (Rajadevan & Associates) for theappellant/plaintiff.

Yoong Sin Min (Siti Zeenath Shaik Ibrahimwith him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for therespondent/defendant.

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[2001] 6 MLJ 669

Jub’il bin Mohamed Taib Taral & Ors v Sunway Lagoon SdnBhd

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S9(S4)–23–72 OF 1998TEE AH SING J8 AUGUST 2001

Civil Law Act — Damages — Fatal accident — Dependency claim — Whether deductionshad to be made for contingencies, other vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment indetermining multiplier — Calculation of multiplicand — Whether bonus to be included incomputation of deceased’s monthly salary — Civil Law Act 1956 s 7

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Action for — Loss of dependency — Whetherdeductions had to be made for contingencies, other vicissitudes of life and acceleratedpayment in determining multiplier — Calculation of multiplicand — Whether bonus to beincluded in computation of deceased’s monthly salary — Civil Law Act 1956 s 7

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Fatal accident — Dependency claim — Whetherdeductions had to be made for contingencies, other vicissitudes of life and acceleratedpayment in determining multiplier — Calculation of multiplicand — Whether bonus to beincluded in computation of deceased’s monthly salary — Civil Law Act 1956 s 7

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — General damages — Assessment — Claim forexpenses to buy food and drinks — Tuition fees and Al-Quran classes — Laundry expenses —Child-minding expenses — Damages for nervous shock — Bereavement

Damages (Personal Injury or Death) — Special damages — Death due to accident —Claim for costs of fresh milk that plaintiff consumed to overcome difficulty in sleeping —Whether supported by medical evidence — Claim for costs of mineral water for sprinklingdeceased’s grave — Whether use of mineral water required under Muslim law — Claim fortravelling expenses for seeking specialist medical treatment — Funeral expenses

Tort — Negligence — Nervous shock — Plaintiff witnessed accident and death of deceased— Chronic post traumatic stress disorder — Determination of liability in respect of nervousshock — Test established in Mcloughlin v O’Brien — Close relationship — Proximity oftortious event — Means by which the shock was caused

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This was a claim brought by the plaintiffs for loss of dependency under s 7 of the CivilLaw Act 1956 (‘the Act’) and for other general and special damages against thedefendant. The deceased died as a result of injuries sustained after she had fallen off atrain at the defendant’s theme park. The first plaintiff (‘SP1’) was the deceasedhusband and the second and third plaintiffs were her children, aged eight and five yearsof age at the time of her death. The deceased was 29 years old when she died. Prior toher death, she worked as a clerk with Bank Simpanan Nasional and drew a basic salaryof RM1,140 per month. The deceased had received teller allowance, overtime and‘pelarasan gaji’ amounting to RM70, RM100 and RM150 per month ||Page 670>>respectively (‘the allowances’). The deceased’s minimum bonus wasequivalent to one month’s pay. According to SP1, the deceased had contributed a sumof RM780 to the family, which consisted of child care for the children, fares for thechildren’s school bus, children’s clothings and savings with Lembaga Tabung Haji forthe children. The defendant did not contest the issue of liability and the issue for thecourt to deal with was in respect of the quantum of damages that the plaintiffs wereentitled to. In respect of general damages, the plaintiffs claimed: (a) additionalexpenses to buy food and drinks; (b) expenses for the children’s tuition fees andAl-Quran classes; (c) laundry expenses; (d) expenses for looking after the two children;(e) damages for nervous shock suffered by SP1 and the second plaintiff; and (f)bereavement. According to a psychiatric specialist, after the deceased’s death, SP1suffered from chronic post traumatic stress disorder for a period of six months. As forspecial damages, the plaintiffs claimed: (a) the costs of fresh milk amounting toRM2,376 that SP1 had to consume over a period of two years to overcome hisdifficulty in sleeping; (b) the costs of mineral water amounting to RM422.40 for use insprinkling the deceased’s grave; (c) the costs of flowers at RM40 per month forputting on the deceased’s grave; (d) travelling expenses of RM20 per month forfortnightly visits to the deceased’s grave; (e) travelling expenses of RM195 for seekingspecialist medical treatment; (f) funeral expenses of RM5,000; and (g) RM20 for thedeath certificate, RM80 for the post mortem report and RM5 for the police report.

Held:(1) The deceased was 29 years old at the time of death and pursuant to s 7 of the

Act, the number of years of purchase was 16 years. Based on the authority ofChan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yoke Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233, deductions hadto be made for contingencies, other vicissitudes of life and acceleratedpayment. Further, there was the possibility of SP1 remarrying, despite hispresent firm disinclination to do so. Accordingly, the most appropriate numberof years purchase was 10 years and not 16 years (see pp 680A, H–681A).

(2) Although the deceased had received bonus equivalent to at least one month’ssalary in the past, bonus was prospective and speculative and therefore shouldnot be taken into account in the computation of the deceased’s monthly salary.Accordingly, the deceased’s monthly salary was calculated at RM1,460, whichcomprised of the basic salary and the allowances. After deducting the sum of

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RM692.21 as stated in the statement of last drawn salary, the deceased’s takehome pay amounted to RM768 (rounded up from RM767.79). As thedeceased’s take home pay was only RM768 per month, SP1’s argument thatthe deceased had contributed RM780 to the family was not accepted. Afterdeducting the deceased’s monthly living expenses of RM150 from ||Page 671>>the take home pay, the multiplicand arrived at was RM620(rounded up from RM618). Accordingly, the loss of dependency was RM620per month and the total loss of dependency was RM620 per month x 10 x 12months or RM74,440 (see pp 682G–H, 683B–D).

(3) The second and third plaintiffs had lost their mother’s love and since such aloss could not be assessed in monetary terms, it could not support a claim fordamages. Therefore, the second and third plaintiffs’ claim of RM20,000 forloss of love and affection was disallowed. Although damages could not berecovered for the loss of their mother’s love, they could be recovered for theloss of those services capable of being valued in terms of money which thedeceased would have rendered to them as their mother had she survived (see p683D–E).

(4) The claim of additional expenses to buy food and drinks at RM500 per monthwas disallowed because it was not part of the services of the deceased as a wifeand mother. What SP1 should have done was to employ a cook or ahousekeeper to cook food and prepare drinks on a monthly basis and if theamount paid to the cook or housekeeper was reasonable, this sum could thenbe claimed because the deceased would have performed the service of cookingand preparing drinks if she were still alive (see p 684G–H).

(5) The defendant did not challenge SP1’s evidence that he had to incur expensesof RM150 and RM80 per month for the children’s tuition fees and Al-Quranclasses respectively and that prior to the deceased’s death, she had tutored andtaught the Quran to the two children. However, even if the deceased were aliveshe would not have been able to give the children proper tuition when theyreach secondary school. As such, the multiplier should be six years for thechildren’s primary school years. As such, RM10,800 was awarded for thetuition fees. In respect of the Al-Quran classes, the plaintiffs had asked for amultiplier of six years and accordingly a sum of RM5,760 was awarded to theplaintiffs (see p 685D–F).

(6) The plaintiffs’ laundry was done by the deceased prior to her death. After herdeath, SP1 spent RM40 per month on the laundry expenses. Taking intoconsideration that there was a possibility that SP1 might remarry, a multiplierof eight years was appropriate. Therefore, a sum of RM3,840 (RM40 permonth x 8 x 12 months) was awarded for laundry expenses (see p 685F–G).

(7) The defendant did not challenge the testimonies of SP1 and the child-minderregarding the amount paid by SP1 for the child-minding services. As there wasa likelihood that SP1 might remarry, an appropriate multiplier was eight years.Accordingly, in respect of the claim for expenses for looking after children, the

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||Page 672>>plaintiffs were awarded RM19,200 (RM200 per month x 8 x 12months) (see p 686D–E).

(8) The costs of the flowers and travelling to the deceased’s grave could not beclaimed because the flowers were placed by SP1 on his own volition as Muslimlaw did not make it obligatory to do. Furthermore, the costs of the flowers andtravelling to the deceased’s grave came under the claim for bereavement.Travelling expenses incurred by SP1 for seeking specialist medical treatmentwas however allowed (see pp 692I–693B).

(9) The test established in McLoughlin v O’Brien [1983] 1 AC 410 fordetermination of liability in respect of nervous shock centred on therequirements of a close relationship, proximity of a tortious event and themeans by which the shock was caused. In the instant case, the requirement of aclose relationship had been satisfied as SP1 and the deceased were husband andwife. In regard to the other requirements, SP1 was seated next to the deceasedon the runaway train and witnessed how the deceased was flung out of the trainand fell to the ground. SP1 saw the injuries sustained by deceased due to thefall (see pp 686I–687A).

(10) Based on evidence of the psychiatric specialists, it was clear that SP1 had fullyrecovered and was not suffering from any psychological illness at present andSP1 was able to perform his work properly. As such, a sum of RM5,000 wasawarded in respect of the chronic post traumatic stress disorder suffered bySP1 from 20 November 1997 till 21 May 1998 (see p 690D–E).

(11) In respect of the second plaintiff’s claim for nervous shock, the counsellor atthe Public Services Department (‘SP5’) who had attended to the secondplaintiff was not an expert in child psychology as she did not have a medicaldegree. The evidence of SP5 and the contents of her reports did not show thatthe second plaintiff was suffering from any psychiatric illness and therefore, hisclaim for nervous shock was disallowed (see p 691B–C).

(12) P1 was entitled to claim as damages for bereavement of RM10,000 pursuant tos 7(3A) read with s 7(3B)(a) of the Act (see p 691D).

(13) There was no medical evidence to show that it was necessary for SP1 toconsume fresh milk to overcome his difficulty in sleeping. The usage of mineralwater was done on SP1’s own volition as Muslim law did not make itobligatory to do so. Therefore, the claims for the costs of fresh milk andmineral water were disallowed (see p 692A–E).

(14) P1 did not furnish any particulars on how he had spent RM5,000 as funeralexpenses. Since the defendant’s counsel had conceded that a sum of RM2,000was reasonable for funeral expenses, a sum of RM2,000 was awarded asfuneral expenses despite the lack ||Page 673>>of proof in support of the claim. Similarly, the amounts claimedfor the death certificate, post mortem report and police report were awardedalthough no receipts were produced by the plaintiffs (see p 694A–D).

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Ini adalah tuntutan yang dimulakan oleh plaintif-plaintif untuk kehilangan penanggungdi bawah s 7 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 (‘Akta tersebut’) dan untuk ganti rugiam dan khas terhadap defendan. Si mati telah meninggal dunia akibat daripadakecederaan yang dialami setelah beliau jatuh daripada tren di taman rekreasi bertemadefendan. Plaintif pertama (‘SP1’) adalah suami si mati dan plaintif-plaintif kedua danketiga adalah anak-anaknya, berumur lapan dan lima tahun semasa kematiannya. Simati berumur 29 tahun semasa meninggal dunia. Sebelum kematian beliau, beliaubekerja sebagai kerani dengan Bank Simpanan Nasional dan membawa pulang gajipokok RM1,140 sebulan. Si mati menerima elaun juruwang, kerja lebih masa danpelarasan gaji masing-masing berjumlah RM70, RM100 dan RM150 sebulan(‘elaun-elaun tersebut’). Bonus minimum si mati sama dengan bayaran satu bulan gaji.Menurut SP1, si mati telah menyumbang sejumlah RM780 kepada keluarga, yangterdiri daripada penjagaan anak-anak, tambang bus sekolah anak-anak, pakaiananak-anak dan simpanan di Tabung Haji untuk anak-anak. Defendan tidak mencabarpersoalan liabiliti dan persoalan untuk dikendalikan oleh mahkamah adalah berhubungkuantum ganti rugi yang berhak diperolehi plaintif-plaintif. Berhubung ganti rugi am,plaintif-plaintif telah menuntut untuk: (a) perbelanjaan tambahan untuk membelimakanan dan minuman; (b) perbelanjaan untuk yuran tusyen dan kelas Quran;(c) perbelanjaan dobi; (d) perbelanjaan menjaga kedua-dua anak-anak; (e) ganti rugiuntuk kejutan saraf yang dialami oleh SP1 dan plaintif kedua; dan (f) kematian isteri.Menururt pakar psikiatrik, selepas kematian si mati, SP1 mengalami gangguan tekanankronik akibat kejadian traumatik untuk tempoh enam bulan. Untuk ganti rugi khas,plaintif-plaintif menuntut: (a) kos susu segar berjumlah RM2,376 yang SP1 perlu ambilselama tempoh dua tahun untuk mengatasi masalah tidur beliau; (b) kos air mineralberjumlah RM422.40 untuk kegunaan merenjis ke atas kubur si mati; (c) kos bungaberjumlah RM40 sebulan untuk diletakkan ke atas kubur si mati; (d) perbelanjaanperjalanan berjumlah RM20 sebulan untuk menziarah kubur si mati setiap dua minggu;(e) perbelanjaan perjalanan berjumlah RM195 untuk mendapatkan rawatan pakarperubatan; (f) perbelanjaan pengebumian; dan (g) RM20 untuk sijil kematian, RM80untuk laporan pos mortem dan RM5 untuk laporan polis.

Diputuskan:(1) Si mati berumur 29 tahun semasa kematian dan menurut s 7 Akta tersebut,

jumlah tahun perolehan adalah 16 tahun. Berdasarkan ||Page 674>>autoriti Chan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yoke Eng [1994] 3 MLJ233, potongan mesti dibuat untuk kontingensi, jatuh bangun dalam hidup yanglain dan bayaran awal. Tambahan pula, terdapat kemungkinan SP1 berkahwinsemula, walaupun sekarang beliau dengan tegas rasa keberatan untuk berbuatdemikian. Sewajarnya, jumlah tahun perolehan adalah sepuluh tahun dan bukan

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16 tahun (lihat ms 680A, H–681A). (2) Walaupun si mati telah menerima bonus sama dengan lebih kurang gaji sebulan

sebelum ini, bonus adalah dijangka dan spekulatif dan oleh itu tidak sepatutnyadiambilkira dalam pengiraan gaji bulanan si mati. Sewajarnya, gaji bulanan simati dikira berjumlah RM1,460, yang terdiri daripada gaji pokok danelaun-elaun tersebut. Selepas memotong jumlah RM692.21 sebagai mana yangdinyatakan dalam penyata gaji terakhir, si mati telah membawa pulang gajiberjumlah RM768 (dibulatkan daripada RM767.79). Memandangkan si matimembawa pulang gaji hanya RM768 sebulan, hujah SP1 bahawa si mati telahmenyumbang RM780 kepada keluarga tidak boleh diterima. Selepas memotongperbelanjaan sara hidup bulanan si mati berjumlah RM150 daripada gaji yangdibawa pulang, angka yang hendak didarab adalah RM620 sebulan dan jumlahkehilangan penanggung adalah RM620 sebulan x 10 x 12 bulan atau RM74,440(lihat ms 682G–H, 683B–D).

(3) Plaintif-plaintif kedua dan ketiga telah kehilangan kasih sayang ibu danmemandangkan kehilangan sedemikian tidak boleh dinilai dengan wang ringgit,ia tidak boleh menyokong tuntutan untuk ganti rugi. Oleh itu, tuntutanplaintif-plaintif kedua dan ketiga berjumlah RM20,000 kerana kehilangan kasihsayang tidak dibenarkan. Walaupun ganti rugi tidak boleh diperolehi untukkehilangan kasih sayang ibu, mereka boleh mendapatkannya untuk kehilangankhidmat yang boleh dinilaikan dalam bentuk wang yang telah diberikan oleh simati kepada mereka sebagai seorang ibu jika beliau masih hidup (lihat ms683D–E).

(4) Tuntutan untuk perbelanjaan tambahan untuk membeli makanan dan minumanberjumlah RM500 sebulan tidak dibenarkan kerana ia bukan sebahagiandaripada khidmat si mati sebagai seorang isteri dan ibu. Apa SP1 sepatutnyatelah lakukan adalah untuk menggajikan seorang tukang masak atau pembanturumah untuk memasak makanan dan menyediakan minuman secara bulanan danjika jumlah yang dibayar kepada tukang masak atau pembantu rumah adalahmunasabah, jumlah ini mungkin boleh dituntut kerana si mati mungkin akanmelaksanakan khidmat memasak dan menyediakan minuman jika beliau masihhidup (lihat ms 684G–H).

(5) Defendan tidak mencabar keterangan SP1 bahawa beliau telah membelanjakanmasing-masing RM150 dan RM80 sebulan untuk yuran tusyen dan kelasAl-Quran anak-anak dan bahawa ||Page 675>>sebelum kematian si mati, beliau telah melatih dan mengajarkedua-dua orang anaknya Quran. Namun begitu, walaupun jika si mati masihhidup, beliau tidak mungkin memberikan anak-anak tusyen dengan sempurnaapabila mereka masuk ke sekolah menengah. Oleh itu, pendarab sepatutnyaenam tahun untuk persekolahan rendah anak-anak tersebut. Berhubung dengankelas Al-Quran, plaintif-plaintif telah meminta pendarab untuk enam tahun dansewajarnya sejumlah RM5,760 diawardkan kepada plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms685D–F).

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(6) Dobi plaintif-plaintif telah dilakukan oleh si mati sebelum kematian beliau.Selepas kematian beliau, SP1 telah menghabiskan RM40 sebulan untukperbelanjaan dobi. Dengan mengambilkira bahawa ada kemungkinan SP1mungkin akan berkahwin semula, pendarab yang sesuai adalah lapan tahun.Sewajarnya, berhubung tuntutan untuk perbelanjaan dobi, jumlah RM3,840(RM40 sebulan x 8 x 12 bulan) telah diberi (lihat ms 685F–G).

(7) Defendan tidak mencabar keterangan SP1 dan penjaga anak-anak tersebutberhubung jumlah yang dibayar oleh SP1 untuk khdimat penjagaan anaktersebut. Memandangkan terdapat kemungkinan bahawa SP1 mungkin akanberkahwin semula, pendarab yang sesuai adalah lapan tahun. Sewajarnya,berhubung tuntutan untuk perbelanjaan menjaga anak-anak, plaintif-plaintiftelah diawardkan RM19,200 (RM200 sebulan x 8 x 12 bulan) (lihatms 686D–E).

(8) Kos bunga dan perjalanan untuk ke kubur si mati tidak boleh dituntut keranabunga yang diletakkan oleh SP1 adalah atas kerelaan beliau sendiri keranaundang-undang Islam tidak menjadikannya wajib berbuat demikian. Tambahanpula, kos bunga dan perjalanan untuk ke kubur si mati adalah di bawah tuntutanuntuk kehilangan. Perbelanjaan perjalanan yang dialami oleh SP1 keranamendapatkan rawatan pakar perubatan bagaimanapun dibenarkan (lihat ms692I–693B).

(9) Ujian yang ditentukan dalam McLoughlin v O’Brien [1983] 1 AC 410berhubung liabiliti tentang kejutan saraf berkisar mengenai keperluan satuperhubungan rapat, kaitan kedekatan kejadian tort dan sumber kejutan tersebutberlaku. Di dalam kes sekarang, keperluan satu perhubungan rapat telahdipenuhi kerana SP1 dan si mati adalah suami isteri. Berhubung dengankeperluan lain, SP1 telah duduk di sebelah si mati atas tren dan menyaksikanbagaimana si mati tercampak keluar tren tersebut dan jatuh ke tanah. SP1melihat kecederaan yang dialami oleh si mati disebabkan jatuh tersebut (lihatms 686I–687A).

(10) Berdasarkan keterangan pakar psikiatrik, adalah jelas bahawa SP1 telah pulihsepenuhnya dan tidak mengalami apa-apa gangguan psikologi sekarang danSP1 mampu melaksanakan kerja beliau dengan betul. Oleh itu, jumlahRM5,000 diawardkan berhubung ||Page 676>>gangguan tekanan kronik akibat kejadian traumatik yang dialamioleh SP1 daripada 20 November 1997 hingga 21 Mei 1998 (lihat ms 690D–E).

(11) Berhubung tuntutan plaintif kedua terhadap kejutan saraf, kaunselor di JabatanPerkhidmatan Awam (‘SP5’) yang telah merawat plaintif kedua bukan pakardalam psikologi kanak-kanak kerana beliau tidak mempunyai sarjana mudaperubatan. Keterangan SP5 dan kandungan laporan beliau tidak menunjukkanbahawa plaintif kedua mengalami apa-apa gangguan psikiatrik dan oleh itu,tuntutan beliau untuk kejutan saraf tidak dibenarkan (lihat ms 691B–C).

(12) SP1 berhak untuk menuntut ganti rugi kehilangan sebanyak RM10,000

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menurut s 7(3A) dibaca bersama s 7(3B)(a) Akta tersebut (lihat ms 691D).(13) Tiada keterangan perubatan untuk menunjukkan bahawa adalah perlu untuk

SP1 minum susu segar bagi mengatasi masalah beliau untuk tidur. Kegunaan airmineral telah dilakukan atas kerelaan beliau sendiri kerana undang-undangIslam tidak menjadikan ia wajib berbuat demikian. Oleh itu, tuntutan-tuntutanuntuk kos susu segar dan air mineral tidak dibenarkan (lihat ms 692A–E).

(14) SP1 tidak mengemukakan apa-apa butiran tentang bagaimana beliau telahmembelanjakan RM5,000 untuk perbelanjaan pengebumian. Memandangkanpeguam defendan telah bersetuju bahawa sejumlah RM2,000 adalah munasabahuntuk perbelanjaan pengebumian, sejumlah RM2,000 diawardkan untukperbelanjaan pengebumian kerana bukti yang tidak mencukupi untukmenyokong tuntutan tersebut. Begitu juga, jumlah yang dituntut untuk sijilkematian, laporan pos mortem dan laporan polis telah diawardkan walaupuntiada resit-resit dikemukakan oleh plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 694A–D).]

NotesFor cases on fatal accidents, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras2655–2688 and 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) para 249.For cases on dependency claim in fatal accident, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1997Reissue) paras 299–310.For a case on assessment of general damages, see 6 Mallal’sDigest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) para 385.For cases on special damages, see 6 Mallal’sDigest (4th Ed, 1997 Reissue) paras 1450–1451.For cases on nervous shock, see 12Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 775–777.

Cases referred toChan Chin Ming & Anor v Lim Yoke Eng [1994] 3 MLJ 233 (folld)McLoughlin v O’Brien [1983] 1 AC 410 (folld)

||Page 677>>Neo Kim Soon (Administrator of the estate of Phanna Manneechuang, deceased) v

Subramaniam a/l Ramanaidu & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 435 (refd)Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v Aidi Abdullah [1985] 1 MLJ 30 (refd)Pang Koi Fa v Lim Djoe Phing [1993] 3 SLR 317 (refd)Rebecca Matthews & Ors v Sykt Kerjasama Serbaguna Gema Wong Siong Sdn Bhd &

Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 443 (refd)Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors and another appeal [1998] 4 MLJ

512 (refd)Yeap Ching Hock v Kaijima Tasei Venture [1973] 1 MLJ 230 (refd)Zainab bte Ismail v Marimuthu & Anor [1955] 21 MLJ 22 (refd)

Legislation referred to

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Civil Law Act 1956 ss 7(3)

Mohd Yaacob (Azmer Md Saat with him) (Lianah Yaacob & Zulkepli) for theplaintiffs.

David Lingam (David Lingam & Co) for the defendant.

Documents

GOH KANG SIA & ANOR v HASIAH BTE MD ISA