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Finance and Growth : Evidence from Some Arab Countries

Dr Hussein A.Hassan Al-TamimiAssociate Professor of Finance &Banking

Department of Economics & FinanceCollege of Business and Management

University of SharjahP.O.Box 27272 ,Sharjah

United Arab EmiratesE- mail: darm2@emirates.net.ae

Dr. Mouawiya Al-Awad Assistant Professor Department of Economics College of Business & Economics University of UAE P.O.Box 17555,Al-Ain United Arab Emirates

E-Mail:MAwad@uaeu.ac.ae

Dr.Husni CharifAssistant Professor Department of Statistics College of Business & Economics University of UAE P.O.Box 17555,Al-Ain United Arab Emirates

E-Mail:chreif@ hotmail.com

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Finance and Growth : Evidence from Some Arab Countries

ABSTRACT

This paper estimates the causal relationships between financial

development and economic growth for selected Arab countries using

cointegration, Granger causality, and the impulse response function

techniques. The results indicate that, in the long run, it seems that

financial development and real GDP growth are strongly linked.

However, in the short-run, the linkage is weak as Granger causality tests

and the impulse response functions indicate that causality between real

GDP and financial development exists only in four cases. Moreover, for

these few cases, there is no clear evidence that financial development

affect or is affected by economic growth.

Keywords: Financial Development; Economic Growth; Granger Causality; Impulse

Response Functions.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, both phenomena, financial and economic development- affect

each other at all times and at all stages of development. Recent development in the

area of financial intermediation and the relation between finance and growth have

identified two different schools of thought with somewhat different policy

prescriptions, the first is the financial repressionist view, and the second is the

financial structuralist view. Both of these two views see finance as a critical element

of growth. However, some researchers express their skepticism over the fostering and

promoting role of financial institutions (passive role) and they consider finance in

general as unimportant factor in growth .An example of those researchers are

Robinson (1952); Gurley (1967); Stammer (1972) Van Wijnbergen (1983); Buffie

(1984).Part II and III of this paper highlight these two views, in addition we will

attempt to discuss the literature related to the relationship between financial

development and economic growth. Part IV details the empirical study, and part V

provides some concluding remarks.

II. THE FINANCIAL REPRESSIONISTS VIEW

The financial repressionist view considers low interest rates, caused by

arbitrarily set ceilings on nominal interest, and high and variable inflation rates, as

being the major obstacles to financial deepening, capital formation and economic

growth. The financial repressionist led by Shaw (1973), and Mckinnon (1973) takes

as an indicator of financial repression the widespread existence of negative real

interest rates, and claims that investment opportunities are abundant in financially

repressed economies, so that at low real rates of interest, desired investment exceeds

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desired savings. The financial repressionists also considered financial development

an essential factor in economic development, if not a prerequisite for it. They express

caution over government intervention policies, believing that governments in

developing countries have intervened extensively in the private market for goods and

resources, in addition to financial markets, but their intervention has in general led to

disruption rather than improvement.

Both McKinnon and Show reached their conclusion on the crucial role of a high-

interest rate policy from the experience of a small number of developing countries,

with more liberated economies (namely, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indonesia) which is

most appropriate environment to which to apply the financial repressionist view, and

it may not be sensible to generalize across all developing countries. It should be

mentioned here that interest rate is very sensitive matter in most Muslim countries in

which the Arab countries are part of them. For that reason we will not concentrate on

the financial repressionist view, instead the study will entirely rely on the financial

structuralist view.

III.THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURALISTS VIEWS

The financial structuralist view maintains that a widespread network of financial

institutions, a diversified array of financial instruments, and an expansion of the

activities of these institutions will have a positive effect on saving-investment

processes, and hence economic growth. The financial structuralists hypothesis can be

attributed first to Gerschenkorn (1962), and was derived from a historical

interpretation of the role of banks in the capital formation processes of early European

industrialization. Gerschenkorn concluded that the role of banks has been relatively

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small in both advanced and extremely backward countries, and relatively great in the

case of moderate backwardness. Other pioneering work relating to the financial

structuralists’ approach is that of Patrick (1966) who concentrates on the question as

to whether or not the financial structure is a result of economic growth i.e. a demand-

following phenomenon or is growth induced- a supply-leading phenomenon.

According to Patrick, “demand –following” financial development exists when real

growth has taken place, so the role of financial institutions is not seen to be crucial for

economic development and their reaction might be considered, therefore, as a passive

one. According to the supply –leading interpretation, financial institutions act as a

leading sector and their contribution to the economic development processes therefore

active rather than passive.

Goldsmith, who also takes the financial structuralist view, suggests that the

financial structure can be measured by the financial interrelation ratio (FIR), the total

financial assets to national wealth or national product. Goldsmith’s ideas can be

summarized: First, the FIR rises with a country’s level of economic development, and

is normally higher in developed economies than in developing ones. Second,

financial development starts with the creation of a banking system, the ratio of money

to national income first increasing with growth but later leveling off or declining.

Furthermore, as economic development proceeds, the share of the banking system in

the assets of the financial sector declines, and vice versa in the case of other financial

institutions (OFIs). Third, in most countries, a rough parallelism can be observed

between economic and financial development. However, the direction of cause and

effect in this obvious association is not clearly established, although there are a large

number of empirical studies have undertaken in this regards.

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It should be mentioned here, that the pivotal role of financial intermediaries in

which better financial intermediaries can enhance resource allocation and accelerate

growth has been emphasized by a large number of researchers, which is consistent

with the structuralist view. An example of those researchers are Schumpeter, 1911;

Gertler, 1988; Boyed and Prescott, 1986;Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990;King and

Levine, 1993b.

Gupta (1984) has attempted for the first time to answer the question of causality

between financial and real development. By exploring the methodology developed by

Granger and Sims (this methodology will be summarized in the next section), Gupta

conducted causality for a sample of fourteen developing countries, using quarterly

time series data with alternative indicators of financial development and with the

index of industrial production as a proxy for real development. He found that the

supply-leading phenomenon alone existed in eight countries out of fourteen he

examined, namely, Guatemala, Greece, Korea, Malawi, Philippines, Portugal, Spain,

and Taiwan. Conversely, he found that there was no confirmation at all for the

demand- following phenomenon existing alone. His results showed the coexistence

of both supply-leading and demand-following phenomena in four cases, namely,

Chile, India Mexico, and Singapore. In addition, Gupta found some bi-directional

causality (feedback) in two countries, namely Argentina and Israel. Jung (1986)

conducts causality tests for 56 countries, of which 19 are industrial countries. He

found that there exists some evidence indicating that LDCs have a supply-leading

causality pattern more frequently than a demand –following pattern.

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Demetriades and Hussein (1996) conduct causality tests for 16 developing

countries, indicates that causality between financial development and economic

growth varies across countries. In this study Demetriades and Hussein found about

half the countries detect a feedback relationship but several countries the relationship

runs from growth to finance (i.e. demand -following), suggesting that it is by no

means universal that financial development can contribute to economic growth. More

recent studies examine the causal relationship between financial development and real

per capita GDP growth and suggest the financial development has a large, casual

impact on real per capita GDP growth (See Rajan and Zingals, 1998; Demirgüc-Kunt

and Maksimovic, 1998;Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996).

Gregrio & Guidotti (1997) examine the relationship between long-run growth and

financial development, proxied by the ratio between bank credit to the private sector

and GDP. They found that this proxy is positively correlated with growth in a large

cross- country sample, but its impact changes across countries, and is negative in a

panel data for Latin America. Gregrio & Guidotti argue that the later findings are the

result of financial liberalization in a poor regulator environment.

Xu (2000) used a multivariate vector- autoregressive (VAR) approach to

examine the effects of permanent financial development on domestic investment and

output in 41 countries between 1960 and 1993.According to this study the results

reject the hypothesis that financial development simply follows economic growth and

has very little effect on it. Clearly, the findings of this study support the supply –

leading phenomenon.

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Ndikumana (2000) investigates the effect of financial development on domestic

investment in a sample of 30 sub- Saharan countries. He found that financial factors

are important determinants of domestic investment in sub-Saharan Africa. The

positive relationship between financial development and investment was documented

using four indicators, credit to the private sector, total liquid liabilities of the financial

system, credit provided by banks, and the index of combining these three indicators.

The results indicate that high financial development leads to high future investment

levels. This is consistent with other recent studies that suggest that higher financial

development leads to higher future economic activity and therefore higher future

economic growth (see among others, Levine et al. (2000); Beck et al. (2000); Aubhik

(2000); Neusser and Kugler (1998); Choe & Moosa(1998);Rousseau and Wachtel

(1998); Levine & Zervos(1998), (1996); Levine (1997); King & Levine (1993 a,b);

Bencivenga and Smith (1991); and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).

It can be concluded that most of the above mentioned empirical studies support

the supply-leading phenomenon. In contrast, few studies support the demand- leading

phenomenon i.e. financial development follows economic growth (see Locas, 1988

and Stern 1989).

IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

The purpose of this study is to investigate the causal relationship between financial

development and economic growth for selected Arab countries. For this purpose we

use cointigration tests( see Johansen,1988 and Johansen and Juselius,1990), Granger

causality (Granger, 1969, 1981, 1988; Granger & Weiss, 1983), and the impulse

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response- function to identify the effects of financial development on economic

growth and vice versa for a group of 8 Arab countries. The reason not to include all

the Arab countries is mainly based on the insufficient data availability. Financial

development is proxied by the ratio of private sector credit to base money following

the results of Pill and Pradham (1995) and Rother (1999) where they show that this

measure performs well better than other measures of financial development. Real

GDP is used as a proxy for economic growth, and in order to capture macroeconomic

policies that may be associated with economic growth. we used inflation and

government spending . The Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflates real GDP and the

inflation rate is calculated as the difference in the logarithms of the CPI rates.

Data are derived from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD- ROM. They

span from 1970 to 1995 for Algeria, 1975 to 1998 for Bahrain, 1952 to 1999 for

Egypt, 1970 to 1998 for Jordan, 1973 to 1998 for Kuwait, 1958 to 1998 for Morocco,

1964 to 1998 for Saudi Arabia, and 1963 to 1998 for Syria.

We applied two- step cointegration procedures prior to causality testing.First,we

tested for non-stationarity of the data using the familiar Augmented Dickey-

Fuller(ADF) test, Dickey-Fuller( 1979,1981).

We examine causality from one financial development to real GDP and the reverse

causality using the following three variable vector auto regression VAR(4) models:

ttktktt uECYYY +++++= −− ββα ...11 , ),0.(..~ ut diiu Σ (4)

Where tY is a vector of real GDP, the ratio of private sector credit to base money,

government consumption, and inflation, and k is the number of lags in the VAR

system, and tEC is an error correction series. We include an error correction series

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whenever cointegration is not rejected since cointegration among a set of variables

assumes that causality must exist among some of the variables in the set in at least one

direction. Granger causality tests of tY1 on tY2 are, then, performed through F-tests of

the significance of tY1 lags. In this regard the following notes should be made:

1. Bivariate cointegration is used to derive the EC whenever cointegration is not

rejected. The EC is added to the Granger Causality equation.

2. In the multivariate case: for Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi

Arabia, the cointegration equations include a trend in the data and an intercept

in the cointegration relations. For Egypt, only a constant in the cointegration

relations is included.

3. For the bivariate case: for Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia the

cointegration equations include a trend in the data and an intercept in the

cointegration relations. For Egypt and Kuwait, only a constant in the

cointegration relations is included.

4. In all cases, one lag is included in the cointegration tests based on the Schwarz

Baysian Criterion (SBC) and the Hannan-Quinn Criteria (HQC).

Table (1) shows the ADF unit root test results. Most variables are integrated of

order one I(1). However, inflation rates in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia

and government consumption in Bahrain and the ratio of private sector credit to base

money in Syria are stationary. Moreover, government spending in Algeria, Egypt,

and Jordan and real GDP in Bahrain are integrated of order two I(2). All of these

variables are excluded from the cointegration analysis. For Bahrain and Syria,

cointegration tests are not performed since one of the two main variables is not I(1).

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Multivariate cointegration tests are presented in table (2). Cointegration is not

rejected in 5 out of 6 cases, which indicates a strong long run association between

financial development and economic growth in the long run. For Algeria, Kuwait,

and Saudi Arabia, the results indicate the existence of one cointegrating vector while

for Egypt and Morocco the tests show that there are two cointegrating vectors at the

5% level of confidence. Only in the case of Jordan, cointegration is rejected.

In table (3) the results of Granger causality tests are presented. In 7 out of 10

cases, causality is rejected in both directions. This is a strong indication of the weak

relationship between financial development and economic growth in the short-run in

most of the 8 Arab countries. Causality exists in one direction in four cases: Egypt,

Kuwait, Bahrain and Morocco. For Egypt and Kuwait, and Bahrain it is shown as

expected that financial development causes economic growth ( i.e. supply-

leading).Both Egypt and Kuwait the direction of causality is statistically significant at

the 5% level, whereas it is at the 10% level in the case of Bahrain. For Morocco,

unexpectedly, it seems that economic growth causes financial development (i.e.

demand-following).

The short-run linkages between economic growth and financial development

are further explored using the impulse response functions, which are presented in

figures (1) through (8). These figures show the response of each of the two variables

to a one-time shock evoked to the other variable. The dotted lines represent a 95%

confidence intervals generated through a Monte Carlo integration by repeating the

estimation 100 times to generate standard errors. The response is considered

significant whenever the confidence interval shifts away from the zero line. The

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results support the evidence provided by the Granger causality tests. A shock to real

GDP evokes a significant response to financial development in only two cases: for

Bahrain and Morocco. The response of real GDP in Bahrain starts after a lag of

around three years and lasts around three years before it dies out. For Morocco, the

response also appears after three years and it lasts more than four years.

The response of financial development to a shock in real GDP is significant in

also two cases only. For Algeria, the response starts after around three years and it

lasts little more than two years. For Bahrain, the shock response starts after four years

and it lasts around two years before it dies out.

In all, the evidence does not support strong linkages between financial

development and economics growth in the short run. Moreover, for those cases where

there is an evidence of short run association, it is not clear in general whether

financial development causes economic growth or vise versa in the Middle East

countries.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The results indicate that, in the long run, it seems that financial development and

real GDP growth are strongly linked. However, in the short-run, the linkage is weak

as Granger causality tests and the impulse response functions indicate that causality

between real GDP and financial development exists only in four cases ,namely Egypt,

Kuwait Bahrain and Morocco. The results for Egypt , Kuwait and Bahrain reveal the

existence of supply-leading phenomenon which is expected as all these three

countries have relatively an advanced financial system and in turn diversified

financial instruments. For example Egypt has an active stock exchange since 1990

and the same in the case of Kuwait and Bahrain in which they also have an active

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stock exchange since 1977 in the case of Kuwait and 1989 in the case Bahrain .The

results for Morocco unexpectedly indicate the existence of demand- following

phenomenon. This phenomenon according to Patrick is the case of developed

countries in which Morocco is not one of them. The results are not expected because

the financial system in Morocco is not a highly sophisticated one as is the case in the

developed countries. For example it has inactive stock exchange although it was

established in 1929(Jbili et al. 1997), also Morocco’s GDP per capita is much lower

than those in developed countries, for instance it was $ 3,300 in 1999 compared

with $ 32,500 in United States, and 23,100 in Japan.

However, the findings do not strongly support what have been reached by most

of the empirical studies in which the supply –leading phenomenon is dominant in the

early stages of economic development or the positive role of the financial institutions.

The results for the other four countries( i.e. Algeria,Jordan,Saudi Arabia, Syria) do

not tell us whether it is the financial structure that induces economic development or

vice versa . The results for Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Syria are expected because

these three countries don’t have an advanced financial system, for example they don’t

have an organized financial markets which facilitate the diversification of financial

instruments and in turn make more funds available to finance economic development

process.

The results for Jordan is not expected because this country relatively has an

advanced financial system. For example it has an organized stock exchange since

1976 , in addition it has a diversified banking system, which includes 19 commercial

banks five of them are foreign banks.

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The weak or passive role of the financial institutions in half of the sample countries

might be consistent with Gurley’s(1967 a) view in which he expressed his skepticism

over the fostering and promoting role of the banking institutions. He has stated in this

connection:

…. recent experience strongly suggests that banking systems as intermediaries are

not highly essential to the growth process.

He argues that there are other channels or alternative techniques for finance to

generate high rates of saving and investment, such as central planning, fiscal policy,

foreign aid, and self-finance. It should be motioned here that the banking systems

have been dominated the financial system in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The

other five countries have somehow diversified financial systems and in turn

diversified financial instruments.

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Table (1): The ADF Unit Root Tests

Country Variable No. ofLags

ADFlevels

ADF firstdifference

Conclusion at the5% level

GDP 1 -3.363T -3.170N I(1)FD 1 -0.762N -5.317N I(1)GC 3 1.912N 4.101N I(2)Algeria

INF 1 0.716N -5.120N I(1)GDP 3 -2.602T -1.311N I(2)FD 1 0.568N -4.769N I(1)GC 5 -4.474C - I(0)Bahrain

INF 1 -2.654N - I(0)GDP 1 4.146N -4.043N I(1)FD 1 4.565C -3.006N I(1)GC 1 3.213T -2.947T I(2)Egypt

INF 1 -1.117N -9.295N I(1)GDP 1 0.910N -2.991N I(1)FD 2 -3.028T -2.562N I(1)GC 1 2.427N -2.580C I(2)Jordan

INF 1 -2.981C - I(0)GDP 2 -0.455N -5.275N I(1)FD 1 -2.367C -3.396N I(1)GC 1 -2.989T -7.164N I(1)Kuwait

INF 1 -3.945T - I(0)GDP 1 -2.505T -9.208C I(1)FD 1 1.372N -6.199N I(1)GC 1 5.290N -6.026T I(1)Morocco

INF 1 -1.269N -9.355N I(1)GDP 1 -3.030T -3.267N I(1)FD 2 1.324N -5.601N I(1)GC 1 -2.029C -4.360N I(1)

SaudiArabia

INF 1 -2.383N - I(0)GDP 1 1.034N -3.672N I(1)FD 1 -2.806N - I(0)GC 1 0.357T -4.622T I(1)Syria

INF 1 -2.912C -6.010N I(1)(T) Includes a constant and a trend

(C) Includes only a constant

(N) Does not include a constant nor a trend

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Table (2): The Multivariate Johansen Cointegration Tests

* denotes acceptance at the 5% level

Table (3): Granger Causality Tests between Financial Development and Real GDP

Country Null F Statistics P-ValueFD does not cause GDP 0.061 0.941Algeria GDP does not cause FD 0.935 0.413FD does not cause GDP 2.944 0.088Bahrain GDP does not cause FD 1.939 0.144FD does not cause GDP 3.950 0.028Egypt GDP does not cause FD 1.816 0.178FD does not cause GDP 0.117 0.890Jordan GDP does not cause FD 0.541 0.591FD does not cause GDP 7.426 0.006Kuwait GDP does not cause FD 0.954 0.385FD does not cause GDP 3.373 0.047Morocco GDP does not cause FD 5.471 0.009FD does not cause GDP 1.239 0.307Saudi Arabia GDP does not cause FD 0.406 0.671FD does not cause GDP 0.766 0.475Syria GDP does not cause FD 0.058 0.944

Country Null Eigenvalue LR StatisticsNone 0.767 30.308At most 1* 0.347 10.240AlgeriaAt most 2 0.000 0.000None 0.494 59.535At most 1 0.340 28.233EgyptAt most 2* 0.180 9.1333None* 0.158 7.366Jordan At most 1 0.096 2.721None 0.554 38.993At most 1* 0.408 18.821KuwaitAt most 2 0.204 5.698None 0.535 63.547At most 1 0.388 33.684At most 2* 0.295 14.552Morocco

At most 3 0.023 0.909None 0.4234 31.514At most 1* 0.238 12.792Saudi

Arabia At most 2 0.099 3.555

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Granger Causality with 1 lag

AlgeriaF-statistic 2.071868 Probability 0.165506F-statistic 0.000327 Probability 0.985746

BahrainF-statistic 4.519947 Probability 0.047596F-statistic 3.499213 Probability 0.077748

EgyptF-statistic 0.025684 Probability 0.873480F-statistic 0.648802 Probability 0.425304

JordanF-statistic 0.073284 Probability 0.789029F-statistic 0.027199 Probability 0.870447

KuwaitF-statistic 46.33056 Probability 0.000002F-statistic 1.161506 Probability 0.294647

MoroccoF-statistic 2.197550 Probability 0.147179F-statistic 4.478095 Probability 0.041517

Saudi ArabiaF-statistic 3.431571 Probability 0.074165F-statistic 0.165277 Probability 0.687328

Syria

Two Variables Causality Tests:

ALGFD does not Granger Cause ALGY 25 0.42160 0.66169 ALGY does not Granger Cause ALGFD 4.86339 0.01900 BAHFD does not Granger Cause BAHY 22 2.30553 0.13004 BAHY does not Granger Cause BAHFD 2.21852 0.13929 EGYFD does not Granger Cause EGYY 46 1.09976 0.34257 EGYY does not Granger Cause EGYFD 1.85130 0.16992 JORFD does not Granger Cause JORY 27 0.57061 0.57332 JORY does not Granger Cause JORFD 1.08896 0.35403 KUWFD does not Granger Cause KUWY 25 2.95829 0.07491 KUWY does not Granger Cause KUWFD 1.00634 0.38333 MORFD does not Granger Cause MORY 39 1.57394 0.22195 MORY does not Granger Cause MORFD 1.19014 0.31653 SAUFD does not Granger Cause SAUY 34 0.66438 0.52225 SAUY does not Granger Cause SAUFD 1.18084 0.32135 SYRFD does not Granger Cause SYRY 34 0.54035 0.58830 SYRY does not Granger Cause SYRFD 0.81191 0.45385

F-statistic 1.989143 Probability 0.168715F-statistic 0.008028 Probability 0.929203

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-1000

-500

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-0.25

-0.20

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (1): Impulse Response Functions for Algeria

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (2): Impulse Response Functions for Bahrain

-80

-40

0

40

80

120

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-0.08

-0.04

0.00

0.04

0.08

0.12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (3): Impulse Response Functions for Egypt

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-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (4): Impulse Response Functions for Jordan

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (5): Impulse Response Functions for Kuwait

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-0.04

-0.02

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (6): Impulse Response Functions for Morocco

20

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

800

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (7): Impulse Response Functions for Saudi Arabia

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of GDP to Financial Development

-0.04

-0.02

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Response of Financial Development to GDP

Figure (8): Impulse Response Functions for Syria

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