FALL 2003 - Fort Benning

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theInfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

FEATURES30 DIGITAL BATTLE COMMAND BAPTISM BY FIRE

Lieutenant Colonel John W. Charlton33 MORAL AUTHORITY AT SMALL-UNIT LEVEL

Dr. Burton Wright III35 MEDICAL AND CASUALTY EVACUATION FROM POINT OF INJURY TO

LEVEL II CARE: WHAT EVERY INFANTRY LEADER SHOULD KNOWCaptain Craig W. Bukowski

DEPARTMENTS

1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE 3 LETTERS 4 INFANTRY NEWS 8 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

8 SOUTHCOM COMMANDER INTERVIEWEditor, Infantry Magazine, interviews General James T. Hill

11 REDUCING LOSSES IN COMBAT - A LOOK AT AVOIDABLE CASUALTIESDr. John E. Johnston, Jr.

17 BREAKOUT FROM YUDAM-NI, CHOSIN RESERVOIR, KOREA, 1950Captain Douglas G. Schaffer, USMC

21 VIRTUAL SIMULATIONS AND TRAININGMajor Wilfred Rodriguez, Jr.

26 HEAVY TEAM LOGISTICS REPORTING AT JRTCCaptain Dean J. Dominique

27 THE SEARCH FOR A NEW FIRE SUPPORT WEAPON FOR MOUTGordon L. Rottman

39 TRAINING NOTES39 INDIRECT FIRES FIRST: THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

Editor, Field Artillery Magazine, interviews Major General Paul D. Eaton42 TACTICAL DECISION GAME

Lester W. Grau43 ARMOR AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTIVE TERRAIN AT

JRTCMajor Richard R. Rouleau

44 BATTALION MDMP IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENTLieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. Buchanan, Major Todd Wood, Major Jim Larsen

47 USING THE FORWARD OBSERVER IN MECHANIZED INFANTRY OPERATIONSCaptain Chris Langland-Schula

49 INFANTRY CAREER NOTES50 BOOK REVIEWS53 SOLUTION TO TACTICAL DECISION GAME

Lester W. Grau

FALL 2003 Volume 92, Number 1

PB 7-03-1

BG BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEYCommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor, INFANTRY

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

SFC MICHAEL MUNOZContributing Artist

Photos: (clockwise from left) ASoldier with the 325th InfantryRegiment gets ready to fire hisweapon during a squad tacticsdrill in Iraq (photo by Staff Sgt.Stacy L. Pearsall). U.S. troopssurround an Iraqi man duringOperation Iraqi Freedom (U.S.Army photo). An 82nd AirborneDivision paratrooper standswatch on a berm outside an Iraqitown (photo by Specialist JasonB. Baker). Iraq map providedcourtesy of Private Joshua J.Abston, U.S. Army Infantry Cen-ter Directorate of Intelligenceand Security.

This medium is approved for official dissemina-tion of material designed to keep individualswithin the Army knowledgeable of current andemerging developments within their areas ofexpertise for the purpose of enhancing theirprofessional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. Schoomaker

General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 0325903

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY

It was a true pleasure to be part of theInfantry Conference held last month. TheUnited States Infantry has never been

stronger than it is today. The infantry Soldier isand will remain the bedrock of our nation’sfighting force. Since October 1918, Fort Benninghas been the foundation of the Infantry, producingtrained, adaptive Soldiers and their leadersimbued with the warrior ethos. Fort Benningwill support the war on terror with one foot incurrent operations by providing Soldierenhancements for the current force now, and withone foot in the future by leveraging technologyand defining requirements to meet the needs of the future force.We will continue to provide adaptive Soldiers and leaders to theforce who will dominate the combined arms, joint, and coalitionbattlefield. Finally, we will blend evolving doctrine withtechnological advantages to build a future force that can dominatefull spectrum operations.

In the past two years, we have seen the diverse and vital missionof the Infantry School pay huge dividends in the quality, tenacity,and valor of our graduates who have dismantled two dictatorialregimes and put their leaders to flight. It is our Army that mustoften bear the brunt of the danger and pay the highest price in thedefense of freedom, and in every conflict of this century and inpast centuries the Infantry has been the point of the spear. Thetrained, competent, confident infantrymen we produce and theadaptive, innovative leaders inculcated with warrior ethos whomthey follow are the culmination of Soldier and leader developmentprograms that started here and continue as they join their unitsaround the world. Our vision and future focus for the Infantrydescribe today’s adversary, his environment and tactics, andexplain the value of today’s deployments to the Army and thenation.

Our nation owes our successes in the global war on terror tothe visionary trainers, doctrine writers, and logisticians of decadespast and present, whose planning and foresight have contributedso much to how we train, deploy, and sustain the infantry force.The information management potential now at our fingertipsenables us to draw upon satellite imagery, electronic and humanintelligence, and other all-source information and immediatelydisseminate relevant, real-time information to those who need it:

THE STATE OF THE INFANTRY

FALL 2003 INFANTRY 1

the staffs and commanders of our infantry units. Buteven as we are meeting present-day threats we arepreparing for foes unseen and challenges yet to come.While aggressively prosecuting the war on terror, weare constantly assessing future requirements anddemanding that our enormous industrial andtechnological base examine ways to meet the needsof Soldiers who will follow us. We recognize theuniversal, asymmetrical threat posed by terrorists, andembrace the concept of multinational interdependencein future conflicts. We also recognize the pivotal roleof the combined arms team in joint operations,something that has been amply demonstrated over the

past two years. Finally, we continue to infuse lessons learned frompast and present operations into our training and doctrine products.By accomplishing this, we will field — and sustain — a force thatdominates the full spectrum of the environment in which it is requiredto operate.

This future focus on systems to support the infantrymanincludes Soldier as a System concept, the Future Combatsystem (FCS), the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI),

development and fielding of weapons of greater lethality, andincreased emphasis on preparing for forced entry and urbanoperations. We continue to train and equip the Soldier in thefuture force with the latest need-based weapons and sustainmentand survivability enhancements, doctrinal guidance, and trainingthat replicates as closely as possible the conditions under whichhe fights. Our initiatives in the FCS program include those thatsupport the infantry combat vehicle and its supporting variants.These varients include mobility, force protection, fire power, targetacquisition, communications and information management andweapon systems that sustain our decisive edge on the battlefield.Our experience as proponent for the Stryker combat team isvaluable in these efforts.

The Stryker is being deployed to combat in the next severalweeks, capping a rapid development, testing, fielding and trainingprogram that has been unparalleled in the history of equippingour force. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team is an Infantry centricorganization capable of rapid deployment, tactically mobile onceon the ground, and possessing significant firepower. The platformis protected to withstand rounds up to 14.5mm, has a remoteweapon station, can move on improved roads at 60 miles an hour

2 INFANTRY FALL 2003

and is C-130 deployable. The vehicle is quiet, reliable and provenin tests and operational evaluations. But the Stryker BrigadeCombat Team is more than just a unit with a great vehicle; it is allabout the synergistic effect of tough Soldiers trained to standard,the best equipment available and a support system that is the envyof the world. The Stryker is ready to join the fight and win.

Lethality is a key component of this equation, becauseour success — and our credibility as an Army — willalways rest upon our demonstrated ability to kill or

capture the enemy through the use of close combat, fire, andmaneuver. It gives a potential adversary pause if he knows theconsequences of his actions is swift and certain destruction. Thefanaticism and tenacity of an opponent will avail him little, forwe have already engaged tougher and more determined opponentsthroughout our nation’s history. Nor have we lost sight of thecollective effectiveness of the combined arms team. Artillery haslong been hailed for its lethality, a reputation that has been justlyearned in two world wars and lesser conflicts, and today we areexamining ways of teaching leaders to employ artillery to a greaterextent and more effectively, but in the close fight — the last 400meters relies on disciplined small arms fire delivered by aggressiveinfantrymen that carry the day. It is with this in mind that we arecontinuing to emphasize basic rifle marksmanship as thecornerstone of an infantryman’s training, even as we examinepotential improvements to those individual and crew-servedweapons that decide the close fight.

Any discussion of the Infantry’s vision must consider bothtoday’s adversary and his likely successors. The term asymmetricalwarfare is recent, but the concept is not; its elements ofunpredictability, surprise, and multidimensional action at pointsof supposed vulnerability have been employed by both Americaand her adversaries in every conflict since the AmericanRevolution. The sophistication of the adversaries we now face islargely a function of technological advances of the past threedecades. The use of motorcycles to dart unobtrusively throughcongested areas and traffic to attack convoys, the proliferation ofimprovised explosive devices, instant communication using state-of-the-art data links, and attempts to shape public opinion hereand abroad are refinements of old techniques, and our abilities toneutralize them are already reducing their effectiveness. The rolesand risks of noncombatants have changed as well. Today we seemosques, schools, hostages, and unarmed civilians used asinstruments of enemy operations, something that further increasesthe friction of war and increases risk to our Soldiers. The battlefieldhas to some extent now become one of complex terrain and built-up areas, demanding that we continue to address the tactics,techniques, and procedures of forced entry and urban operations.We cannot afford to regard refinements to the rules of engagementas something of limited use, and only applicable to today’sadversaries; the skills we forge and hone today are good ones, and

will pay dividends in future operations. The ability to confidentlytransition from combat to non-combat operations is essential intoday’s contemporary operating environment, and remains anothercritical element of our training.

Today’s threat finds Active Army, Reserve, and National Guardcomponents engaged in more deployments than at any time sincethe Korean War, and to areas where combat actions and real threatsare the rule rather than the exception. Today, over 180,000 Soldiersare deployed in 65 countries. These circumstances demand a greatdeal of our Soldiers, and they are more than up to the tasks setbefore them. And they are adaptive. The biggest combat multiplierwe had in the 1970’s was our recent combat experience against atough, competent adversary in Southeast Asia. Ours was an Armywhose officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers had beentested and tempered in the fire of Vietnam, and the Warsaw Pactarrayed against us in Europe could claim no such competence.The combat experience gained by the components of our one Armycan only be hinted at in training: that combat edge, those leadershiptechniques, instincts and reactions learned by being there havegiven the Infantry a fighting edge that we have not seen sinceVietnam, a fact that potential adversaries should consider.All branches have benefited from this, combat, combat support,and combat service support alike. The war on terror may be along one, but we have broken the back of two hostile regimessince September 11, 2001 and the remnants of those regimes arein disarray. When one considers the caliber of today’s ArmyInfantrymen, and the doctrinal and tactical leaps that we havemade in the past 10 years, one cannot help feeling both proudand confident: proud that we are part of the world’s premierfighting force, and confident that the security and future of thisgreat nation and her people are in good hands.

The Infantry School has come a long way in the past 85years, and we continue to train and field the finestInfantrymen this great nation has ever sent forth to

defend America and her institutions. Join us in this effort. Feedbackfrom the field is the bedrock of our efforts to improve the mobility,lethality, and survivability of the infantry force. We need yourinput, in the form of articles for Infantry Magazine and from yourcomments addressed to the Infantry Forum and Infantry Online.

We solicit your assistance in our efforts to create a morecurrently relevant sequel to “Infantry in Battle”, that timelessanalysis of World War I infantry tactics first published under thedirection of Colonel George C. Marshall in 1934. Our recountingof battles and engagements from Somalia to the present must becaptured for our future leaders. We are always alert to ways wecan better do our job of training the force. Give us your assessmentsof the proficiency and readiness of the Soldiers and leaders wesend to our units around the world and your recommendations forimprovements to equipment, doctrine, and training. Follow me!

One Infantry — Our Infantry


JANUS SIMULATION IS ACOMBAT MULTIPLIER

“Fighter 6, this is Charlie 6, we areREDCON 1.”

These are the famous last words beforethe wily OPFOR begins to teach theBLUEFOR a lesson in tactics during theJanus simulation. This mission was nodifferent, but what I did learn was the valueof the simulation system in preparing futureleaders at the company and task force levelto do battle in today’s operationallyconstrained environment. Janus has beenimplemented in the Infantry Captain’sCareer Course to allow future companycommanders the ability to implementoperations orders that they continuouslyplan for and brief throughout the courseonto a simulated battlefield.

I had the opportunity to fight an armorcompany team defense in battle positionsin the Janus simulator for ICCC. After arigorous orders process that included ahumbling backbrief to my SGI, I now hadto put my money where my mouth was andfight my plan. My company team consistedof one mechanized infantry platoon (M2A2BFV X 4, Javelin X 3), two armor platoons

(M1A1 Abrams MBT X 4), one FISTvehicle, and the company trains found inan armor company table of organizationand equipment (TO&E). The mission wasto defend in battle position to destroyapproaching enemy forces in anengagement area to prevent the enemy fromenveloping the division main effort.

Janus provided each acting platoonleader and me with our own cubicle thatconsisted of one computer, one Janusoperator, and two CB radios. The Janusoperator’s main mission was movingvehicles, soldiers, and equipment depictedon the computer screen based on thedecisions we made. I briefed my graphicsto the Janus operator, who put them intothe system. This took approximately onehour. This allowed the acting platoonleaders to see the graphics on theircomputer screen. They were able toimmediately begin developing their platoonengagement areas. I was surprised at theease in preparing the system to execute themission.

The actual fight lasted approximatelyone hour. Receiving spot reports from theacting platoon leaders, calling andadjusting indirect fire, attempting to mass

direct fires on the enemy’s point ofpenetration, providing SPOTREPSto the TF commander, maneuvering

platoons based on OPFOR actions, andmaneuvering the TF reserve to fill gaps

were some actions that occurred during thebattle. We were able to conduct a detailedafter-action review (AAR) that included areplay of the battle that was six minutes long.

The operators were also able to depicteach action of the OPFOR andBLUEFOR in detail to include:location and amount of artillery fired,catastrophic, mobility kills locationand how vehicles were destroyed (i.e.

direct or indirect fire.)I found Janus very realistic in three

areas of vital importance: Command and control during the

fog of battle,

Reporting and passing informationto subordinates and superiors, and

Conducting adjacent unitcoordination with another company teamtied into the fight. The three tasks listedabove were to be simultaneously completedwhile attempting to successfully maneuvermechanized units on the battlefield.

Lessons learned include better adjacentunit coordination to prevent the OPFORfrom exploiting the seam between companyteams, and an ammunition resupply plan.The battle didn’t stop when my tanks wentblack on ammo, and accurate reporting to theTF commander let him decisively commit hisreserve. My decisions to maneuver forceswere based solely on the SPOTREP’s that Ireceived from my acting platoon leaders. Thisdepicts a same environment that futurecompany commanders will face whilefighting our future battles inside of their tank,Bradley fighting vehicle or M577.

This system also assists every leader indeveloping the confidence and improvingplans necessary to win on today’s nonlinearbattlefield. This process can be done atbattalion, company, and platoon levelOPD’s very easily. All one would need isan example OPORD and the Janus(civilian) operators. The Janus operatorsat Fort Benning are so willing to assist aunit in training that they will write theOPORD for the unit if time is not availableor the unit needs to focus on battlefieldcommand and control for an upcoming fieldproblem.

I recommend the Janus system tocommanders who are looking for anefficient way to establish/develop SOP’s,and TTP’s, or who would like to refinetactics before executing a field problem.The Janus simulation system can beeffectively used in a constrained timeenvironment and provides a valuabletraining tool for any unit whose, “trainnever seems to stop.”

-- CAPTAIN JAMES J. SMITH

Student, Infantry Captain’s Career Course

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When the Army Shooting Team wins in competitionsaround the world, its success is not only due to theamazing talent of the Soldiers who are the world’s

greatest shooters, but the victories are also attributed in a largepart to the talent and hard work of some very dedicated Armygunsmiths.

The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit Custom Firearms Shop atFort Benning, Ga., produces top-quality, match-grade rifles, pistolsand shotguns, as well as much of the ammunition for the ArmyMarksmanship Unit. The shop has a long history of researchand development, including developing and testing the M-21and M-24 Sniper Systems, Special Reaction Teams Rifles,testing and maintaining the Barrett 50-caliber Sniper Rifle anddevelopment or modification to special operations forcesweapons.

“The AMU truly has the best small arms gunsmith team in theDepartment of Defense,”said USAMU Deputy Commander Mr.Robert W. Aylward. “Possibly their most unique skill is the abilityto take what they have learned in creating the most accuratecompetition firearms and transferring this knowledge into bettercombat weapon systems. They take great pride in their ability totake a problem that is presented, usually with extremely shortsuspense, and produce a real solution. On a monthly basis, aproblem is received from the field, and the gunsmiths respond byproducing answers that give the command a more reliable, sometimesspecialized, but always lethal, combat weapon system. Giving theforce what they need when they need it is the shop’s mission.”

The most recent achievements by the shop is the accurizationof the M-16A2 rifle and the M-9 pistol, in which the gunsmiths,machinists and ammunition technicians transformed the reliablecombat weapons into match-winning equipment.

Modifications made to the M-16A2 rifle by U.S. ArmyMarksmanship Unit gunsmiths transformed the reliable combatweapon into a rifle with pinpoint accuracy, even at 1,000 yards.This accuracy contributes to the USAMU Service Rifle Team’ssuccess in interservice and national marksmanship championships,according to USAMU Service Rifle Coach Donald L. Heuman.“Despite the prevalent belief that the M-16A2 could never be used

PAULA J. RANDALL PAGAN

Custom Firearms Shopkeeps Soldiers on


Infantry MuseumAnnounces New Exhibit

Infantry Museum photos

At left, Saddam Hussein’s initialsare engraved on the pistol grip cap.Above, Saddam Hussein’s signatureis also engraved into the rifle’sbarrel.

A rifle believed to have belonged to Saddam Hussein is now on displayat the Infantry Museum on Fort Benning, Ga.

A Heym 9.3x74R rifle was recently presented to theNational Infantry Museum by First Sergeant Michael Hibbsof Company A, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized), on behalf of the Soldiers ofCompany A. The rifle was discovered during a search of oneof Saddam Hussein’s presidential palaces during OperationIraqi Freedom and is believed to have belonged to SaddamHussein himself. The 9.3x74R is one of the oldest Europeanbig-game cartridges, and has long been used for hunting largeand dangerous game around the world. The round is .366caliber and generates muzzle energy approximating that ofthe .300 Winchester Magnum.

The Model 55B Heym rifle was manufactured in Suhl,Germany, and the action is engraved on all sides with scenesof African big game. The book market value of such a rifle,omitting its connection to the former President of Iraq, is listedat $8,995; this is but one example of the difference betweenthe lavish lifestyle of Saddam Hussein and that of his subjects.

successfully in competition, theMarksmanship Unit devoted itself toproving how successful it could be.”

Modifications made to the M-16A2 byUSAMU gunsmiths include addinginterchangeable sight apertures, two stagetriggers, a barrel sleeve and redesigning thebarrel to prevent warping. Until thesemodifications were made, the M-16A2 wasnot a competitive weapon, according toUSAMU Service Rifle shooters.

The gunsmiths and shooters determinedthat the barrel of the M-16A2 warpedslightly as a result of heat generated byrepeated firing and also by sling tension.The warped barrel, along with the largeaperture on the rear sight hindered theaccuracy of the weapon. A size choice ofthe rear-sight aperture and the introductionof a redesigned barrel that withstandswarping along with a barrel sleeveimproved the performance of the servicerifle.

USAMU gunsmiths and ammunitiontechnicians say they are still working onfurther improvements to the M-16A2 rifle,not only for competition but also as a moreaccurate and effective combat weapon. Theunit believes the M-16A2 is the premierweapon on the competitive firing line andon the battlefield. That is why USAMUgunsmiths have worked closely with theU.S. Army Special Operations community

on improving the combat effectiveness ofthe M-16A2.

Special Operations asked the USAMUto apply its M-16A2 competition accuracyand reliability technology in support of therequirement for a 5.56 mm Special PurposeRifle. AMU helped to develop the SpecialPurpose Rifle to include barrel configuration,freefloat handguard and optical and accessorymount technologies, mechanical partsimprovement and match quality ammunition.

The collaboration between the AMUshop and the Special Forces community hasresulted in match-grade accuracy beingapplied to the Special Operations PeculiarModification and Special Purpose RifleVariant initiatives. Because of the shop’sability to design, manufacture and makemodifications to weapons andammunition, the SpecialPurpose Rifle Variant has beendesignated as the U.S. SpecialOperations community Mk-12rifle and fielded to all SpecialOperations Forces Armywide.

Besides the Mk-12 riflebeing fielded to all U.S. ArmySpecial Forces and Rangerunits, it is also being reviewedfor adoption by the NavalSpecial Warfare Command; thematch combat ammunition isfielded to all Special

Sergeant First Class Steven C. Young, NCOIC of the USAMU Ammunition Loading Facility,primes brass for long-range bolt rifles.

USAMU photos


Operations units and is being reviewed forpossible fielding to Army combat units,according to Sergeant First Class Steven J.Holland of the 5th Special Forces Group.

“USAMU technology andmarksmanship training to operational unitswithin the Army Special Operationscommunity have proven timely andbeneficial,” Holland continued. “The rifleand ammo were used extensively in supportof Operation Enduring Freedom and weredetermined to be instrumental in thepositive outcome of several firefights whereSpecial Operations forces were fighting anumerically superior enemy. Through theaccuracy and reliability of the Mk-12, theoperators won the day and remained safeby using the ballistic advantage providedby the Mk-12. The Mk-12 is also deployedand being used to great advantage in thecurrent operation in Iraq.”

Since the early 1990s, ArmyMarksmanship Unit gunsmiths have beenexperimenting with ways to enhance theballistic performance and reliability of theM-9, the Army’s semiautomatic 9 mmpistol. The objective has been to increasethe accuracy and durability.

“The M-9 is a good pistol,” gunsmith StaffSergeant John M. Haidu said. “It’slightweight, reliable, has a high magazinecapacity and shoots a universal-sizecartridge.”

The gunsmiths said the modificationsare important not only to the USAMU’smission to compete and win incompetitions, but they are also importantto the rest of the Army. They said themodified M-9 might someday be integratedinto specialized Army organizations suchas military police or Special Forces unitsand eventually perhaps the entire Army. Infact, the USAMU makes a special effort toshare its research and development lessons

A USAMU ammunition technician measures grains ofpowder for M-16A2 rounds.

learned with all the Army’s proponents for small arms.“The M-9 has been highly accurized in the modification process

to provide our shooters with a weapon of pinpoint accuracy,”gunsmith Staff Sergeant Joe D. Harless said. The gunsmiths, whowere responsible for the weapon’s transformation from thedevelopmental stage to production, said the process involved fine-tuning all the pistol’s main components — the barrel, slide, frameand trigger. One initiative to improve the M-9, according togunsmith Specialist Samuel A. Hatfield, was to reduce the wearcaused by repeated pounding of the steel slide against the aluminumframe. To do this, gunsmiths place oval steel inserts in the pistol’sframe to act as a buffer against the slide and minimize its movementwhile in battery. The gunsmiths also replaced the weapon’s barrelwith an accurate match-grade barrel and placed set screws in theframe to stabilize the bottom rear of the barrel.

“All the components are fitted,” Harless said. “The result isthat you have a slide that’s fitted to the frame and a barrel that’sfitted to the slide, which reduces tolerances within the weapon andallows greater accuracy. Also, steel-on-steel contact is better thansteel on aluminum; it’s much more durable.” Another improvementwas the adjustment of the triggering system, which allows the shooterto fire the accurized M-9 by exerting a mere 4 pounds of pressure onthe trigger — the minimum allowed by rules governing the servicepistol match — as compared to the 7 1/2 or greater pounds of pressurerequired to fire the standard-issue pistol. “Shooters want a particularfeel of their trigger when they are competing,” gunsmith Specialist

Craig S.Nelson said.“With theproper matingof all relatedcomponents,we give themwhat theywant.”

N e l s o nadded that bypolishing thesurfaces andchanging the

angles of the components, it makes the trigger pull seem like it’sa lot less than 4 pounds.

Along with this, the gunsmiths also replaced both front and rearsights to allow for a better sight picture; the new sights were fabricatedin the shop. They also developed a new harmonic tuner, whichdampens the vibrations of the barrel.

“Our goal is to give our shooters the technical edge to win,”gunsmith Specialist James T. Wilson III said. “The great wins ofour pistol team positively prove that we have achieved that goal.I’m proud to be in the Army Marksmanship Unit and to see allthe hard work that we do turn into major victories for the Army.”

The USAMU Custom Firearms Shop gunsmiths are continuingtheir work on further improving the modified M-9 pistol.

“We’re always looking for an easier, better and more cost-effective process,” Harless said. “The gun is great, but we stillhave a long way to go.”

Since tomorrow’s modified M-9 will be even more accurate andreliable, USAMU Service Pistol Team Coach Ray Arredondo said

the pistol hasunlimited potential.

“I foresee that atsome point in thefuture, the modifiedM-9 will phase outthe .45-caliberservice pistol incompetition today,”Arredondo said.According toWilliam O. Harden,chief of the USAMUCustom FirearmsShop, USAMUgunsmiths haveworld-class talentfor what they do.“Our gunsmithshave a special talentand skill developedthrough years oftechnical educationand experience. Atruly great gunsmithonly comes along once in a great while. We are fortunate to have thebest assigned to this fine unit,” Harden said. “They have to beexceptionally gifted at building guns and ammunition in order toenable our Soldiers to be all they can be in competition. It is truly ateam effort. The gunsmiths will continue to work toward improvingthe combat capabilities of America’s fighting forces through researchand development of current and future weapons systems.”

Another factor in the success of the M-16 are the adjustmentsmade to the ammunition. USAMU ammunition techniciansassembled match-grade 600- and 1,000-yard loads. Keepingabreast of the constant demand for world-class match ammunitionfor the shooters of the Army Marksmanship Unit is far from easy.Yet the Soldiers of the USAMU Shop’s Ammunitions LoadingSection, say it’s a challenge they eagerly face.

Only three Soldiers, Sergeant First Class Steven C. Young andStaff Sergeants John R. Gertz and Douglas E. Mitten are responsiblefor the thousands of rounds produced each year. Some days whenpreparing for upcoming matches, the Soldiers load as many as 3,000rounds, each measured and adjusted to within 500ths of a grain.

The men produce ammunition for rifles and pistols and performmany tests on each cartridge case, propellant, primer and bullet,but say quality is the section’s priority.

Quality control for the ammunition section is much more in-depth than at comparable facilities, said Sergeant First Class StevenC. Young, NCOIC of the USAMU Ammunition Loading Facility.USAMU’s ammunition technicians continually check to ensurethat the quality of the components fits USAMU standards.Cartridge cases are checked for weight, hardness, dimensions andthickness, while bullets are air gauged for consistency.

The role of these Soldiers and the quality of their product areparamount to the success of the USAMU shooters in competition,Young said. “We have to produce ammunition that outperformsthe gun, which in turn has to outperform the shooter,” Gertz said.

INFANTRY NEWS


USAMU service rifle gunsmith SpecialistThomas A. Grieve inspects the rear sits on anM-16A2 rifle.

A USAMU service pistol gunsmith inspects the slideon an M-9 pistol.

In addition to dominating national and international marksmanship competitions, the champion shooters

of the U.S. Army Marksmanship UnitService Rifle Team have also been busypassing along their shooting techniques toother U.S. Army Soldiers, including someof the most highly decorated in the historyof our nation.

The Service Rifle Team, headed by StaffSergeant Jared N. van Aalst, conducted anadvanced rifle marksmanship clinic forseven members of the 5th Special ForcesGroup (Airborne) of Fort Campbell, Ky.,at Easley and Pool ranges on Fort Benningin December 2002.

“We do advanced rifle marksmanship trainthe trainer for all units, but now we’re doingtactical training for special operations unitsor any type of sniper section,” van Aalst said.“It went very well. The idea we’re trying topush is that our type of competitive shootingtraining ties in with tactical training. Thebiggest thing for Soldiers is understandingthe limitations of their weapons and alternateshooting positions.”

“We did this training so our detachmentcould improve long-range marksmanshipcapability,” said Captain Heath Harrowerof the 5th SFG. “We’re getting differenttraining ideas that we can use and we’resharing ideas on training and equipment.We’re also getting techniques that we canemploy for our sniper teams.”

According to Harrower, the USAMUService Rifle shooters emphasize basic rifle


PAULA J. RANDALL PAGAN

USAMU shooters sharetechniques with Special

Forces Soldiers

“That way shooters have all the advantagesto improve themselves and the equipmentdoesn’t impede their performance. If the am-munition produced here isn’t up to the high-est standards, the shooters are at a disad-vantage.”

Maintaining the number of rounds andthe high quality demanded sometimes is atangible pressure the Soldiers can feel.One-tenth of a grain of gunpowder in amismeasured round changes the impact ofthe bullet enough to cause a top shooter tolose a competition.

“All it takes is one round with thewrong powder charge to lose a nationaltitle,” Mitten said. “That’s how importantit is for us to be here doing our job.”

Despite the constant demand for qual-ity ammunition, the ammunition techni-cians rarely fall behind. Constant commu-nication between the ammunition techni-cians and the shooters, as well as periodicchecks of the ammunition bunker, helpkeep the Soldiers on top of the demand.

In their off-duty time, the ammunitiontechnicians search for even higher qualityby striving to create new combinations ofgunpowder, primers, casings and bulletsthat will outperform the unit’s currentstandard.

“We’re always looking for better waysto streamline our production process to im-prove production flow and product qual-ity,” Young said. The ammunition techni-cians constantly test the various ammuni-tion components and equipment for qual-ity and reliability. Each product they useis evaluated for internal purposes so as tosupplement commercially published re-sults. Manufacturers are not the only onesinterested in the USAMU testing results.Frequently the Marksmanship Unit is inun-dated with telephone calls for informationand advice. According to Young, many oth-ers are concerned with accurate ammunitionhave called wanting load data.

Despite the continued interest from thecompetitive shooting community, theMarksmanship Unit will only give minortechnical advice and not specificinformation about the manufacturingprocess since the ammunition they produceis designed specifically for use in USAMUcustom-built firearms.

“Our mission remains the same,” Hardensaid. “We’re trying to find that combinationthat makes or breaks the game.”

marksmanship skills. “But it’s more thana refresher course,” he said. “It builds onthe fundamentals.”

Both on the ranges and in theclassroom, the Special Forces Soldierslearned from the Service Rifle Team howto read and correct for the wind, rangeestimation and reading the mirage.

“The two most important things to workon are trigger squeeze and sight alignment;it’s what we’ve been emphasizing,”Harrower said. “We learned variations anddifferent techniques for trigger squeezeemployed by a sniper team when engagingtargets. We also used the Noptel (acomputerized marksmanship trainingsystem), which was a very effective tool totrack sight alignment before, during andafter the shot.”

Besides shooting on the USAMUranges, the elite Soldiers also toured theUSAMU Custom Firearms Shop wherethey spoke with USAMU gunsmiths,machinists, reloaders and ammunitiontechnicians who build and modifyUSAMU weapons and ammunition.

“I was very impressed with the gunshop. There is a lot of knowledge here thata unit could use and a lot of answers to befound here on weapons, ballistics andbullets,” Harrower said. “This training hasenhanced our long-range shootingcapability and it was very worthwhile. Wewould do it again and recommend it forother members of our unit.”

U.S. Army Service Rifle shooterSpecialist Aaron F. Rebout (left)gives a few marksmanship tips toCaptain Heath Harrower of the5th Special Forces Group atEasley Range.USAMU photo


An Interview with General James T. Hill Commander, U.S. Southern Command

Q What do you see as major priorities for SOUTHCOM

during your tenure?

A When I came in, I developed three major priorities where I put my

personal investment: the war on terrorism;Colombia, what happens in Colombia andthe concomitant support for democracythroughout the region; and thirdlyexpanding the knowledge of my area ofresponsibility within the community.

Q Two of SOUTHCOM’s major tasks are the defense of U.S.

interests within your geographical areaof responsibility and assisting thedevelopment of foreign militaries withinthat region. How have the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001 and subsequentevents affected those missions?

A Well, I think they certainly have galvanized it, and they have

allowed me to discuss with other militariesand governments in the region that, just likethe United States, all of those countries musttransform their militaries to meet the realthreats in the world — the threats of the 21stcentury, not the threats of the 20th century.And I think that (with) the experiences of 9-11, (there’s) the realization that what used tobe a drug war is really a counter-terrorismwar, and that it affects everybody in the region.

Q One of the priorities for the Army Transformation is the

fielding of the Stryker Brigade Combat

Teams (SBCT).What potentialdo you see fortheir employ-ment in theexecution ofS O U T H C O Mmissions?

A Well,short of

some major confrontation in Cuba, I don’tsee U.S. armed forces at war or in battle inLatin America. If they were, if there was amajor confrontation, either in Cuba or insome other place, the Stryker brigade asdesigned is a perfect fit because of its focuson smaller scale contingencies and itsability to operate in complex and urbanterrain.

Q Over the last two decades, at JRTC, NTC and in accounts of

ground actions in Afghanistan, we haveseen what appears to be a decreasingreliance on the use of indirect artillery fires,with something like a 20-percent utilizationwith a corresponding reduction of relianceon mortars, in favor of close air support.How can we better train and condition ourinfantry leaders to understand andeffectively employ artillery?

A I’ve been concerned about that whole issue for a long time. When

I was the FORSCOM G-3, that 20-percentutilization rate during the first five days’search and attack phase certainly was thenorm, in fact that was a pretty good unit.There were lots of units that were wellbelow that. In my view, what has to happen— and what is increasingly happening, Ibelieve — is a better understanding that

indirect fire is the artilleryman’s problem.What do I mean by that? I mean I amCompany Commander Hill or PlatoonLeader Hill, and I am out and engage in afirefight. The artilleryman sitting aroundwaiting for me to direct him to shoot ismaking a mistake. His whole role in life isindirect fire, and he needs to be screamingthat in the infantryman’s ear. And I see lessand less of that, unless the infantry unitcommander really puts his finger on it andforces that artilleryman to begin to do that.It was a lesson we learned in Vietnam, andsomehow we forgot over time. It has a lot, Ithink, to do with fear of rules of engagement,and not using ROE aggressively enough, andit also has a lot to do — in my opinion —with how we measure success at JRTC.

What we have done is teach a lot ofyoung infantrymen that it’s OK to play lasertag, that it’s OK to conduct fire andmaneuver or fire and movement beforeestablishing a solid base of fire. And a solidbase of fire includes everything you’ve got,direct and indirect. Once you’ve achievedfire superiority, then you can in factmaneuver on the battlefield. But we toooften begin maneuvers at JRTC withoutusing that indirect fire, and it costscasualties at JRTC, and I think we’reteaching a bad lesson. A lot of it has to dowith MILES and how you count it, and I’veheard all of that. In my mind that’s anexcuse; we ought to do better with that.

Q As we prepare to engage the enemy in urban settings, how

can we better incorporate theemployment of artillery fires to supportthe MOUT fight?

A I think we have to practice it more, and we’re not doing that in some

areas, and you have to have better precision

Infantry Magazine Editor Russell A. Enosat down with General James T. Hill, com-mander of the U.S. Southern Command at theMarshall House , Fort Benning, Ga. Here is atranscript of that interview:


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

weapons systems which you’re coming toin the Stryker brigades. If you look at aStryker brigade, I think you’ll see themmaking better use of it. It’s got the systemsto use them, it practices a little more, trainswith them more, and makes greater use ofthem.

Q WHINSEC recognizes the criticality of remaining relevant

to your theater engagement plan, anddesigns their curriculum accordingly. Inorder to ensure this relevance, is there asystemic recurring way for yoursubordinate commands to transmit theirneeds to WHINSEC?

A Yes, and in fact, I just left a WHINSEC Board of Visitors

meeting where we talked about that. Wedo have almost continuous interface withSOUTHCOM headquarters andWHINSEC. Yearly, we bring together theSecurity Assistance Officers (SAO) out ofthe region, gather them in my headquarterswhere we discuss their goals for theircountries and how that fits into both theSecretary of Defense’s theater engagementactivities and mine. Then we will bringthose SAO’s together with the WHINSECpeople and together we do a thoroughcurriculum review to ensure that what wesee as plans for country X are in fact beingmarried up with what is being done atWHINSEC.

Q What advice would you offer to U.S. Army infantry captains

considering applying for an assignmentin SOUTHCOM?

A SOUTHCOM is a terrific place. The whole region, Central and

South America and the Caribbean, arewonderful places to be. I think the officerneeds to decide if he’s going to be aninfantryman or a foreign area officer(FAO). The SOUTHCOM in theaterassignments, except for a few PEPassignments, are almost all FAO-related.Therefore, an individual structuring hiscareer ambitions and his goals as he’scoming out of the Infantry CaptainsCareer Course needs to make his mindup as to what he wants to do as hecontinues his career.

Q How can Fort Benning and the other branch schools better

prepare officers, NCO’s, and enlistedsoldiers for assignments withinSOUTHCOM? Do you feel, for example,that the soldiers coming intoSOUTHCOM are adequately trained inlanguages?

A I think that essentially all FAO’s that come to us and go downrange

are pretty skilled in languages. You haveto make a commitment to that, and you haveto say to a soldier that he has to go off tolanguage school and do all those things thatare necessary for this, but I see this as beingbeyond the capabilities of Fort Benning.That would fall to the service schools suchas the Defense Language Institute.

Q Reading General Hagenbeck’s interview in Field Artillery

magazine, and based upon the experienceof 10th Mountain Division, we note thatthe most responsive close air support wasfrom the Apache, followed by A-10’s, andat night by AC-130 gunships. In dealingwith the nations within your area ofresponsibility, do they regularly planand/or train for the employment of suchassets in contingencies?

A Not well enough. The Colombian Army Chief and I have an ongoing

discussion about greater use of indirect firesystems and close air support. They don’thave enough of it to go around. I encourageall the countries in the region to think morecombined arms and think more joint. AndI always tell them that the United Statesmilitary became joint at the point of acongressional gun in 1986 — we weredragged into it. If we’re honest withourselves, we’re still not as joint as weought to be. I have seen the Colombianmilitary in particular making some prettygood headway in that regard.

Q As we continue to refine our continental U.S.-based con-

tingency forces as a response to crisesaround the world, what capabilities doyou think we should stress more than weare doing presently?

A I think that philosophically we’ve all got the right approach. The

Army, in my view, has led the way with thedevelopment of the Stryker brigades. If wedid anything wrong, it was in not stressingearlier and stronger that we were going tomove the Stryker brigades by air and sea.As the I Corps commander, I developedplans and sold them to both of the last twoPacific Command commanders, includingthe current one, that using a combinationof air and sea, C-17’s and fast sea lift, Icould in fact move a Stryker brigade withall its combat capability and a corpscontrolling headquarters anywhere in thePacific faster than you could get a MarineExpeditionary Unit (MEU) there, assumingthe MEU was not already afloat.

Now, that’s not to say that we want totake over the MEU’s mission. We don’t.The MEU, the 82d Airborne, the Rangers,all of those people are wonderful for forcedentry, but as soon as that airfield or thatport — or a combination of the two — canbe available, you can move a Strykerbrigade in a hurry anywhere in the Pacific.That in my view is strategic mobility, andif we — and by this I don’t mean just theArmy — do anything, we get too caughtup in the discussion of moving stuff by air,and we’re not going to move it all by air.There isn’t enough air to go around. Weneed to do a better job at this. And we’rebeginning to do that. At the end ofMillennium Challenge, we used the JointVenture — a 313-foot ocean-going, high-speed Australian-built catamaran — tomove 14 Stryker infantry carriers, about 20soldiers, and other equipment fromCalifornia back up to Fort Lewis, and it’s asuperb transportation system.

Q In some of our readings, I’m getting a sense that we’re

having some problems changing ourmindset on purely combined armsoperations in favor of joint coalition-typeoperations. What is your assessment ofthe progress we’ve made in shifting theparadigm that we’re now following as weprepare for joint operations?

A I think that we are, that we’ve made great strides with that as

well. You can make too much out of theAfghanistan experience in terms ofcoalition forces, and take too much awayfrom those lessons learned. That was a veryunique experience. But no matter where


General James T. Hill assumed command of the UnitedStates Southern Command on August 18, 2002. General Hillpreviously served as the Commanding General, I Corps andFort Lewis. He is from El Paso, Texas, and was commissionedinto the Infantry following graduation from Trinity University in SanAntonio, Texas, in 1968. A graduate of the Command andGeneral Staff College and the National War College, he also holdsa Master’s degree in Personnel Management from CentralMichigan University.

After completion of the Infantry Officer Basic, Ranger, andAirborne Courses, and an initial assignment at Fort Hood, Texas,General Hill served with the 2-502d Infantry (at that time, part ofthe “Always First” Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) inthe Republic of Vietnam as a rifle platoon leader, recon platoonleader, company executive officer, and company commander.

General Hill’s other key assignments include: CompanyCommander, 3d Ranger Company, Fort Benning, andCommander, Company A, 2d squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Hood;Battalion Operations Officer and Battalion Commander, 1-35thInfantry, Schofield Barracks; Staff Officer, Strategy, Plans, andPolicy Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, HQDA;Aide-de-Camp to the Chief of Staff of the Army; and specialProject Officer for the Chief of Staff of the Army. General Hillcommanded the “Always First” Brigade, 101st Airborne Division(Air Assault) from August 1989 until July 1991, including servicein Southwest Asia during Operations DESERT SHIELD andDESERT STORM. General Hill served as Chief of Staff of the101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from August 1991 throughOctober 1992.

He then served as the Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs on the Joint Staff from October 1992 to July 1994,when he assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander(Support), 24th Infantry Division (Light), including service in Haitias Deputy Commanding General, Multinational Force, andDeputy Commander, United States Force, Haiti, United NationsMission, Haiti. He later served as Deputy Chief of Staff,Operations, Forces Command, from June 1995 until June 1997.In June 1997, he became Commanding General of the 25thInfantry Division (Light) and served in that position until he wasnamed Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis, inSeptember 1999.

you go you’re going to have to fight in a joint and a combinedatmosphere. So you must train for it. As we develop technology,though, there is a problem here, and that is that our technology sofar outstrips the forces that we’ll be fighting alongside. This maycreate problems for us, I believe, in terms of synchronization,command and control, and other areas. We even have it today inthe digital world. If you are in the digital Army at Fort Hood, youwould assume that as soon as the digital Stryker brigades roll inthere that they could communicate. And the answer is they cannot.They can, but there are some major adjustments that have to bemade to the digits and some tuning that must be done. And that’sus now, in a highly technical world.

When I was at Fort Lewis, I went on an exercise with theMarines, and we couldn’t even talk FA tasks to each other. Weworked it out after about a day and a half, but they were in adifferent software package than we were. And so if we take anAdvanced Field Artillery Tactical System to Pakistan and you wantto talk to their artillery, how do you link the two together — withgreat difficulty... So it does create problems for you, but it’s justanother challenge to overcome, and you’ve got to continue movingforward. Again, every time we were working the Stryker brigadesout at Fort Lewis the nay sayer would say, “ Well, you won’t beable to talk to this unit, or that unit … what happens if yourcomputers crash…” Well, you know, those are challenges toovercome, not to be afraid of. Your option at that point is to standstill, unless you’re not afraid to take some of those risks. You’vegot to push the technology envelope out there in reasonable ways,and I think that the Army, in particular again, has done a wonderfuljob of that. We don’t get enough credit for it, but we’ve sure doneit.

Q We’ve touched on the issue of lessons learned, and in reading some of our professional publications I’m

sensing that too many things based upon isolated events aregetting labeled as lessons learned rather than being treated asobservations. How do you see that?

A I think that’s a true statement. We as a military jumped to conclusions, for example, after Kosovo. And we can

leap to some of the same conclusions over Afghanistan. Whattook place in Afghanistan may or may not take place in Iraq. Sowhat that says to me is that you had better still have a pretty goodconventional thought process in your mind if events do not takeplace in the way you want them to. I get very uncomfortableabout making leap-ahead conclusions over one small battle.

Q What message would you send to combined armssoldiers worldwide?

A I would tell combined arms infantrymen worldwide that it is truly combined arms, and that when you go to war

take your artillery. When you go to war, be able to talk to the AirForce. When you go to war, be able to talk to the Marine Corpsand the Navy and be sure that you’ve practiced with them. Long,long gone are the days when we could all do this by ourselves. Ijust finished reading a great new book, Rick Atkinson’s An Armyat Dawn. It’s great reading in terms of combined and jointactivities — and the lack thereof — in the North African campaign,

and the resultant loss of life. While it’s true that we have come along way since then, some of the teaching points we see over andover again are:

• Never underestimate your enemy,• Don’t assume things away, and• Be able to communicate with your forces and with other forces.It really is great reading. It’s gotten great reviews. He’s the

same author who wrote Crusade, which I believe is the best bookto come out of the Gulf War. He does his homework, and it’s agood read. It’s good history and pretty quick reading.

Reducing Losses in Combat

DR. JOHN E. JOHNSTON, JR.

American troops have not sustained casualties on themagnitude of those sustained in World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. As a result, our officer and

noncommissioned officer leaders have not been exposed tohandling troops in a major conflict in which rifle companies havebeen known to routinely sustain debilitating casualties. Thishappened to the 90th Infantry Division, in which I served duringWorld War II. The division entered combat on D+1 on Utahbeachhead with 14,000 men, fought continuously over 330sequential days (of the 100 divisions in the European Theater ofOperations, the 90th had the most days in combat) and sustainedmore than 22,000 casualties — the fourth largest number ofcasualties of the 100 divisions. Three division commanders andmany regimental and battalion commanders were relieved in lessthan a month. Yet all of the units from battalion to divisionoperating in Third Army, the 90th Infantry Division was the onlyunit recommended for a citation by General George Patton at theend of the war. The 90th therefore makes an excellent test samplefor discussion.

Definition of Avoidable Casualties

“Avoidable” casualties in combat are those that — given properprecautions — could have been avoided. An implication of thisdefinition is that there must be another subset of casualties thatare inevitable. This, of course, is not the meaning here. In anycombat, casualties are likely to occur, but this discussion considersonly the subset of casualties that could have been prevented.“Avoidable casualties” are defined as those generated by obviousand foreseeable errors. If casualties do not result from such errors,then they cannot be classified as avoidable. Frequently, there is afine line between avoidable casualties and other casualties thatarise in the course of tactical operations.

Foreseeable Errors Partially Created by the CombatEnvironment

We tend to think of the enemy as the unique creator of potentialforeseeable errors. But this is only partially true. The combatenvironment itself contributes heavily to the potentially foreseeableerrors. There are many parameters that affect the combatenvironment. A few of the most important factors include the

A Look at AvoidableCasualties

terrain, weather conditions, long term battle stress, and situationalcombat events that create errors of omission and commission.

Terrain. Much of our basic training involved learning how tomake the best use of terrain in combat. Several elementalforeseeable errors come to mind—failure to build overhead coveron one’s foxhole when the opportunity and time permit; aforeseeable error of omission; taking cover among trees when it isunnecessary; taking up positions on prominent points such as roadjunctions, stand-out buildings and prominent terrain features,again when it is not necessary to do so.

On the other hand, if a building such as a tower is occupied toserve as an artillery observation post, then we have a combatpriority that overrides any consideration of personal security. Ifcasualties occur among the artillery observers, these may simplybe a function of their tough, dangerous mission, and not avoidable.

The distinction should be made that if there is no immediateongoing combat priority, casualties that occur may fall into theavoidable category. It is evident that the foreseeable combat errorsdiscussed repetitively in basic training are so simple that theycould easily be avoided. But they have been violated, from theindividual level up through every echelon, all the way into thestaff strategic planning level.

Weather Conditions. The errors initiated by weatherconditions are easily seen but are seldom acted upon in time tokeep them from resulting in unnecessary casualties.

As an example, the necessity of changing the individual infantrySoldier’s camouflage uniform to white during winter combatmonths should be obvious, yet the German Army command staffoften completely failed to provide proper camouflage for theirinfantrymen during winter months. The immediate consequenceof this foreseeable error caused a tremendous number of German



PROFESSIONAL FORUM

casualties generated by dark uniformsthat made them stand out when theymoved. The Russian troops intheir white sheets, blendingwith the snow background,were almost impossible to seewhen they moved. (TheGerman Army at leastpartially rectified thismistake during the Battleof the Bulge.)

Unfortunately, ourcommand staff at thestrategic level learned little from this.The proper camouflage for winter fightingapparently was seldom considered. A fewof our more ingenious infantry recognizedtheir high commands’ oversight andprovided their own camouflage by stealingwhite bed sheets from German houses. Afew of these individuals participating in thisso-called “criminal activity” against enemycivilians were threatened with courtsmartial. Their immediate commandingofficers had to step in to prevent theseactions and save their men from becomingcasualties of our own legal system.

The second — and even more important— condition affecting front-line troopsliving day in and day out in the open issevere winter conditions. For Soldiers whoare not properly clothed, combat moraleand efficiency are markedly reduced andresult in a tremendous increase inpreventable casualties. The misery of suchconditions for the individual Soldier resultsin an acceleration of battle exhaustion, asevere reduction in morale, and a markedincrease in susceptibility to disease,including pneumonia, influenza, trenchfoot, and frostbite.

One might have thought that theGerman high command would have learnedthe most obvious lesson from Napoleon’swinter campaign disaster in Russia, wherea great many of his casualties werepreventable—caused not by the RussianArmy but by the Russian winter itself.Since the German leadership failed torecognize this error, many Wehrmachttroops found themselves fighting in theRussian winter in summer uniforms.

Although not entirely lacking in winterclothing the way the Germans were on theRussian front, the U.S. Army was still notproperly equipped for the European winter

that occurred in 1944 — the worst in halfa century.

It is interesting to note that GeneralGeorge Patton, who always considered thewelfare of his men his first priority,somewhat corrected the overt error of highcommand by sending out raiding parties tosteal heavy winter clothing and blanketsfrom the rear areas of adjacent Americanunits. This resulted in an overall gain inmorale, efficiency, and the desire of theindividuals in his units to carry out withenthusiasm General Patton’s everycommand, but at a great cost to the men ofthose adjacent units.

Battle Stress, Long Term. Long-termbattle stress is generated by the intensity ofthe combat, its duration, and the conditionsassociated with it. The chief initial impactof such stress is exhaustion and especiallymental lethargy. Carried to the extreme, itresults in a complete psychologicalbreakdown in which a Soldier cannotfunction effectively at all.

The mental lethargy of individuals andthe combat unit should be the main concernof unit leadership. Mental lethargy causesoversight in predicting errors that wouldnot otherwise be overlooked. While combatleadership cannot correct the psychologicalproblem, it may certainly be able to preventpredictable errors.

Errors of Omission and Commission.We can think of quite a few situationalevents that create predictable errors. Onesuch event is that of green troops under firefor the first time. Panic, if it occurs,generates predictable troop errors withdisastrous results. Another situationalevent is the effect of friendly fire on yourown troops, fratricide in today’s terms.

A Combat Unit’s Measures ofPerformance. In general, we can

recognize four parameters to measure thecombat performance of a unit, whether itis an army, a division, or an infantry

platoon: strength, efficiency, morale,and effectiveness.

Every combat unit has amaximum strength before

battle, which generallychanges little. Continuouscombat degrades unit

strength, and such lossesmust be countered by a

continual influx of trainedreplacements. The mathematical

measure of this degradation at any point intime is expressed in terms of a percentageof the unit’s strength prior to the action.Obviously, if the replacement rate does notequal or exceed the casualty rate, the unitstrength will continue to drop until the unitbecomes completely ineffective. There is alower limit to this ratio, which if penetratedon the downside results in the unit beingconsidered combat ineffective. Generally,a unit that has sustained casualties of 30percent or more is considered combatineffective. If this ineffectiveness persists,usually the only course of action open tothe commander is to assimilate the unit’smembers into other units.

This almost happened to the 90thInfantry Division, since it had sustainedsuch heavy losses during the first month ofthe Normandy Campaign. The staffcommand of Operation Overlord requestedthat General Omar Bradley break up thedivision for replacements. He refused,replacing three ineffective divisioncommanders in less than a month alongwith many poor leaders at the regimentaland battalion level.

Efficiency is the measure of effective andaggressive leadership, high performance oftactical teamwork under fire, battleexperience, and each member’s knowledgeof the others’ capabilities and the supportof each member for each other and the unitas a whole. Of these four parameters, theefficiency of a combat unit is by far the mostimportant. A high order of efficiencyreduces casualties, increases morale, and— unless the enemy has overwhelmingstrength — increases the unit’seffectiveness. The efficiency of a unit willalso rise or fall according to which side hasthe most and best weapons. The measureof combat effectiveness is the ratio of the


casualties of a given force to the total casualties over a certainperiod.

Let’s now assume a high efficiency level initially but also ahigh combat intensity level, creating continuously a large numberof casualties. Let’s also assume that these casualties areimmediately replaced so that the strength of the unit remains highwithout continuing to degrade. The question to be asked is whathappens to the effectiveness under this scenario. The answer isthat the unit’s morale and effectiveness can drop to zero. That isbecause the expert leaders — those members of the combat teamwith battle experience, a high order of training, and the interactivesupport of each other and the unit as a whole — are gone. Withcontinually high casualty rates, the unit over time is severelydegraded. Even though the replacements are assumed to be ableto keep the unit’s strength level constant, we now have a unitwhose leaders and men are strangers and must learn to worktogether. Tactical teamwork is absent because the replacementsdo not know each other and their leaders. In the end, the unitloses effectiveness.

Many nations have tried to alleviate this problem by withdrawing the unit from combat, reconstituting it, and giving it a limited amount of retraining before

sending it back to the front. This was time consuming, of course;the unit would no longer be operationally available during thistime. The United States chose to do the opposite, replacingcasualties by sending replacements directly to the unit in combatwithout withdrawing the unit. This generally worked well onlybecause of our superior number of well-trained troops and oursuperiority in weapon systems, particularly aircraft and artillery.This increased the effectiveness for our units and placed Germantroops at a disadvantage. For most of our units, we had lowcasualty rates, and the replacements could be readily absorbedinto a unit and also integrated into the teamwork of the unit.This method will not work if the casualty attrition rate is high,however. General Patton recognized the importance ofdegrading the enemy units’ efficiency by the shock ofoverwhelming “surprise” attacks. This raised the enemyattrition rate and dramatically damaged the enemy units’leadership and cohesion.

It should be obvious now that reducing the total casualties overtime can help both the efficiency and the effectiveness of the unit.Aside from superior tactical skills, the only other method ofreducing the casualty attrition rate is to reduce the number ofavoidable casualties. And the only way to reduce this type ofcasualties is to avoid foreseeable errors. The following are realsamples from the combat log of the 90th Division — as well asunits at higher echelons — in generating both potential and actualavoidable casualties by failing to recognize and take measures toprevent them.

By studying some of these avoidable casualties, we can classifythem into three categories:

• Unnecessary casualties that affect only the Soldierscommitting the foreseeable errors — not the internal technicaland tactical operations of the unit.

• Unnecessary casualties within the unit that affect and degradeboth the technical and the tactical operations of the unit or adjacentcombat units.

• Foreseeable errors of high command (division, corps, army,and overall command) that affect and degrade all subunits.

Many men of the 90th Division correctly dug foxholes on thereverse side of the hedge rows, but failed to cover them with atleast two feet of earth. This error was committed during the staticcombat in Normandy, resulting in a large number of casualtiesfrom German 88mm and 150mm air bursts and additional treebursts from quick fuses.

In another example, prior to a company assault on a village, a105mm artillery battalion was provided in support. The firstbattalion volley landed between the infantry jump-off line andthe village, but closer to the jump-off line. Because the greentroops had not been trained to distinguish incoming artillery firefrom outgoing, and had not been told of the coming barrage, theyimmediately ran to the rear, throwing down their arms. Theartillery concentrations advanced into the village, from which noenemy small arms fire was returned. The enemy had vacated thevillage. It took more than an hour to round up the panic-strickentroops. With many similar episodes during the Normandycampaign, it is hard to believe that at the end of the war, the 90thInfantry Division was the only combat unit in Third Army thatwas recommended for a unit citation by General Patton.

The foreseeable errors with respect to this action — whichwould have led to casualties if the enemy had been in the village— were the following:

• Failure of the artillery liaison officer to inform the infantrycommander that he was going to receive artillery support.

• Failure of leadership to instill and enforce discipline.• Failure to teach infantry not only the difference between the

sounds of incoming and outgoing artillery fire, but also thedifference between sounds of high-velocity shells and low-velocityhowitzer fire. This training is important, because during WorldWar II artillery fire generated three times as many casualties assmall arms fire.

We have seen here the most insidious condition that affectstroops — panic. Panic causes Soldiers to block their thinkingprocesses so that easily recognizable errors are completelyoverlooked, resulting frequently in large numbers of casualties.The following is a tragic example of casualties caused by panic,in this partial quote from Martin Blumenson, formerly a staffmember of the Army’s Office of the Chief of Military History:

Innumerable examples in the official unit records makeevident the inefficiency of the 90th Division. The St. Germainaction is perhaps the best example and certainly the mostconvenient illustration of how bad the division was. It showsthe division at its worst. The small part of the division involvedwas typical of the whole.

The Island of St. Germain, the objective of the action, is alow mound of earth surrounded by swamps and was athwartthe division zone of advance.

Panic causes soldiers to block their thinking pro-cesses so that easily recognizable errors are com-

pletely overlooked, resulting frequently in largenumbers of casualties.


From the beginning of the attack, troops of both battalionshad displayed a disinclination to engage the enemy. Strongand accurate fire nourished this reluctance, and the terrainfacilitated those who wished to avoid crossing the open spaceof marsh and river into the bridgehead. Stragglers individuallyand in groups drifted unobtrusively out of the battle area. Atleast four hundred men made the difficult passage through theswamp to establish a bridgehead.

German artillery fire continued throughout the night. Theextreme darkness and the inability of small unit commandersto recognize recently arrived replacements facilitatedunauthorized trips to the rear by demoralized men.

Shortly after daybreak, three enemy tanks appeared on oneflank, an armored car appeared on the other. As theycommenced to fire, German infantry, about forty men, attacked.

American troops in the bridgehead became panic stricken.Many did not fire their weapons. Groups of Soldiers fell

back and waded the river toward safety.The bridgehead force was reduced from 400 to less than

300 men. They congregated in two large fields at the edge ofthe island. Hedgerows surrounded each of these fields on threesides. The side to the rear was open and invited escape. The

enemy provided the only restraint to wholesaleretreat by automatic weapons and mortar fire.

About the time that regimental headquartersbegan to suspect the deteriorating situation, a shelllanded in a corner of one field on the islandinflicting numerous casualties on a large numberof men huddling next to each other in fear. At thispsychologically sensitive moment, though there wasactually little firing and few Germans were in view,cries of “cease fire” swept across the two fieldswhere men in the bridgehead had gathered. Agroup of American Soldiers started forward towardthe enemy with their hands up. Some displayedwhite handkerchiefs; others joined them or fledacross the river. The force in the bridgeheaddisintegrated, the Germans remaining inpossession of St. Germain.

Casualties were high, 100 men dead, 500wounded, 200 captured, and 300 missing inaction.

It is difficult to count all of the errors andparticularly to determine which ones contributedmost to this catastrophe. The first error, and maybethe most important, was the complete failure ofleadership, resulting in the panic, which in turnresulted in other overlooked errors. The oneprominent foreseeable error that really stands outis the clustering of a large group of terror-strickentroops, which resulted in heavy casualties when ashell found its mark in the congested group.

At the other extreme we have the hardened,experienced combat Soldiers — nearing completebattle exhaustion from months of fighting —enduring the awful winter environment of snow insubzero temperatures. This created foreseeable

errors that normally would be recognized, but these conditionswere completely disregarded.

One evening during a temporary halt, an undamaged, heatedbuilding became available for temporary relief of weeks ofenvironmental torture. Unfortunately, because of crowdedconditions, the ground floor and the cellar were not available toall, and the remainder had to bed down in the attic. This wouldhave been fine except for the German 150mm howitzer fireinterdicting the area, a few shells creasing the roof and falling inthe back yard.

Although those in the attic easily saw their errors and theconsequences, their attitude in an exhausted state was: “If mynumber is not on one of those shells, it won’t hit me, and if it is,it doesn’t matter where I am.” Again this false logic was generatedby the physical and psychological condition of the individuals.

Soldiers (mainly infantry) who are not involved in the technicaloperations of a lower echelon unit will usually be able toaccomplish their mission unless errors are committed at any onetime by an overwhelming number within the unit.

In general, though we have presented an exception, theunnecessary casualties of the lower echelon units are few and donot affect the strength and efficiency of the unit. If this is true,why should we place any importance upon these isolated

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

During World War II, a medic carries a wounded German prisoner of war.U.S. Army photo


casualties? In some cases, highlyspecialized technical individuals can createforeseeable errors resulting in unnecessarycasualties that completely degrade the unit’seffectiveness. Let me cite an example.

During the Battle of the Bulge in thesevere winter of 1944, the 90th Division’sHeadquarters Battery, 345th Field ArtilleryBattalion, was able to set up a commandpost in a house in a small village. Inbedding down for the evening, both firedirection teams selected a large first-floorroom — the only room with a fireplace —and soon put it to good use. Unfortunately,the room faced the direction of the enemy,and the village was receiving 150mmhowitzer fire throughout the night.

About midnight when the two firedirection teams were asleep, the enemyscored a direct hit and blew the brick wallof the room in on top of both teams. Thehole in the wall was big enough to drive alarge truck through.

We went into what was left of the room,expecting to find both teams wiped out.The fact is that we were able to drag all ofthem out alive from under furniture andbrick, a small miracle. The fact that therewere only minor lacerations and only a fewSoldiers temporarily unconscious, speaksvolumes as to how lucky the battalion was:First, the enemy had used a quick fuseinstead of a delayed fuse. Second, the shellhad missed the windows by only a few feet.

It is illogical to simply refuse to acceptany risk, just for the sake of avoidingcasualties. But even if there is small riskthat the enemy will obtain a direct hit byunobserved fire, a leader must take intoaccount the consequences of taking such arisk. One fire direction team, taking therisk and being wiped out, results in tragicconsequences that the commander mightbe forced to accept. Since one fire directionteam remains, the efficiency andeffectiveness of the artillery battalionpartially remain. But if both teams becamecasualties in the same incident, this is anentirely different matter. Both theefficiency and the effectiveness of theartillery battalion would be significantlydegraded. Here the consequence was largethough the risk was small. In short, acommander must weigh the risk and itslikely gains against possible consequences.

With respect to the errors of highcommand, as we ascend the chain of

command involving larger and larger units,the consequences on subordinate units ofsuch errors increase exponentially. Wehave already seen the devastatingconsequences of both German and U.S.commands’ failure to supply both winterclothing and winter camouflage.

In the enormous complexities ofstrategic planning for the invasion ofNormandy, the high command wasabsolutely blinded to an obvious, highlyforeseeable, and extremely simple errorof omission: They forgot to analyzecombat tactics in the Normandy bocagecountry and to put into place trainingdoctrine on how to fight in this country.The Germans did not commit this error

of omission and were expert in the tacticaluse of the area. The result of this simpleerror cost the Americans thousands ofunnecessary casualties as they sought tofight their way through the hedgerows.

Using the Enemy’s OverlookedForeseeable Errors

We should not just stop training everyechelon to recognize and avoid potentialerrors. But we should take advantage offinding the enemy’s weaknesses andthings he has overlooked, and take actionto inflict the greatest possible casualtieson him. The weapon systems best ableto do this are first the artillery, which notonly has the long-range reach but alwaysthe element of surprise, and secondarily,the Air Force.

There are times when it is easy toidentify the enemy’s errors of omission orcommission, resulting in an easy analysisof how best to inflict casualties on him.Frequently, the analysis of how to generateenemy casualties is quite difficult. Hereare two examples from the combat log ofthe 90th Infantry Division:

We should not just stop trainingevery echelon to recognize andavoid potential errors. But weshould take advantage of findingthe enemy’s weaknesses andthings he has overlooked, andtake action to inflict the greatestpossible casualties on him.

In the first case, an enemy infantryplatoon occupied a large semi-wreckedbuilding on a prominent road junctionbehind their front line, on which we hadregistered one of our batteries only hoursbefore.

Our observer noted that the enemy washaving some sort of party, which includedthe consumption of alcoholic beverages. Inorder to maximize the number ofunnecessary enemy casualties, a decisionwas made to delay the fire mission to allowthe enemy Soldiers to become inebriated.The mission was fired about one hour aftertheir occupation of our registration point,with devastating results.

In the second case, the analysis of howto generate numerous casualties from theforeseeable error of commission was notquite so simple. This occasion was thecombat stalemate at Metz, where the U.S.Third Army was opposed by strong Germanforces occupying three strong forts (Lorient,Driant, and Koenigsmacher) with manyconcrete bunkers in front of these forts.These strong points and forts for the mostpart appeared to be impervious to artilleryfire. The stalemate had been created bythe diversion of large amounts of fuel andartillery ammunition originally assigned tothe U.S. Third Army and subsequentlytransferred to the British army of GeneralMontgomery. The resulting stalemate atMetz was similar to that of the trenchwarfare of World War I, with heavyAmerican casualties and little or noprogress against the entrenched Germanforces.

During the very early morning hoursevery day, a very limited number ofGermans were observed by our forwardobservers venturing forth from their strongpoints to relieve themselves and obtain alittle fresh air and exercise. These strongpoints, of course, were out of range of smallarms fire.

These small enemy groups were not onlylimited in number but also extremelyscattered, hardly presenting a worthwhileartillery target. Further, after one grouphad enough exercise and fresh air, theywould retreat to their bunkers and the nextsmall group would scatter forth.

The enemy was obviously well aware oftheir error in exposing themselves toartillery fire, but reduced the risk by notpresenting a concentrated target. The


problem for our division was how toencourage the enemy to become carelessand generate a concentrated target ofpersonnel.

To take advantage of the enemy’s errorof commission was a most difficultproblem, but one officer genius indivisional artillery came up with asolution. The division requested andobtained a large quantity of propagandaleaflet shells, designed to detonate highin the air, scattering leaflets over the widearea of ground. While the leaflets hadno effect in causing the German Soldiersto desert, they nevertheless were picked upand read, along with the stories and picturesthat the leaflets contained, after which theywere used for toilet paper. It also came tothe attention of the divisional staff that ourpropaganda leaflets were of a softer tissuethan the German military issue of toiletpaper.

During the daily barrage of leaflets, strictorders went out to our artillery battalionsthat no high-explosive was to be firedexcept in an attack of our infantry.

At first, there was considerable suspicionand little change in the number andconcentration of personnel. But as the dailydose of leaflets with no high explosivecontinued, the number and concentrationof the German Soldiers increaseddramatically. Further, since the number ofleaflets per day was limited, those that didnot get out of their bunkers right awayfound that they had to wait for the followingday to obtain their issue of softer toiletpaper.

When it was determined that there wasno significant increase in the number ofconcentration of enemy personnel, ourdivisional, and corps artillery threw involley after volley of high explosivefollowing the initial concentration ofleaflets. The Germans never again trustedour propaganda efforts.

As with every operational aspect ofcombat, it is teamwork that pays off; so itis that the most effective way to reduceunnecessary casualties is the effective useof good leadership and teamwork inrecognizing and avoiding foreseeableerrors.

At the same time, i t is up toindividuals to make their own securityagainst committing foreseeable errors. Itis one thing to commit to an extremelyhigh order of risk because the tacticaloperation requires it for success. It isquite another thing to take dangerousrisks when the tactical operation istemporarily dormant or static and doesnot warrant taking such risks. As anexample, one of our men, leisurelyobserving 40mm antiaircraft fire onenemy planes, was struck in the chest bya falling round and killed instantly. Thiswas a wasted casualty, a man no longeravailable to his team because of hisdubious pleasure in observing antiaircraftfire.

Thus the primary responsibility ofkeeping unnecessary casualties to aminimum resides with every member of thecombat unit, from rifle squad up to army,and we must instill and reinforce in basictraining the general principles of

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

recognizing and avoiding foreseeableerrors. And we can later reinforce it intraining and in discussion classes, with bothofficers and noncommissioned officersleading the discussions.

In combat it is up to the leaders toensure, insofar as is possible, that their mendo not become trapped into making obviousmistakes that can result in their death orinjury. Within a unit containing manymilitary occupational specialties, theforeseeable errors committed result not onlyin exponential damage to the performanceof the unit, but also in the performance ofthe overall command.

At the same time, officer andnoncommissioned officer leaders mustconstantly be alert to errors on the part ofthe enemy, and analyze how best to causesuch errors to be turned to our advantage.This gives us double leverage in reducingour own unnecessary casualties andincreasing his.

Finally, at the top level of command, itis imperative that foreseeable errors not beoverlooked. Failure to recognize and totake preventive action can cost thousandsof lives, as it most certainly did in theNormandy Campaign.

Dr. John E. Johnston, Jr., entered militaryservice in July 1943, at the age of 19, and wasassigned to the 345th Field Artillery Battalion, 90thInfantry Division, U.S. Third Army. He landed onD+1 with the 345th, the first medium artillerybattalion landing on Utah Beach, and was with thebattalion for more than 330 days of continuouscombat. He now runs his own market forecastingcompany.

CHOSIN RESERVOIR

AT YUDAM-NICAPTAIN DOUGLAS G. SCHAFFER, USMC

THE BATTLE OFChosinReservoir

Ebb and Flow November 1950-July 19511

1 Graphics used in this article are from Ebb And Flow, November 1950 - July1951, The United States Army in the Korean War, Center of Military History,United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1990.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division,successfully used the characteristics of the offense duringthe breakout operation from Yudam-ni to relieve Fox

Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, at Toktong Pass, ChosinReservoir (also known as Changjin Reservoir), Korea, December1–3, 1950.

A whirlwind of events occurred during the opening months ofthe Korean War. Among these events was the invasion of SouthKorea on June 25, 1950 by the North Korean People’s Army(NKPA), which crossed the 38th Parallel and pushed the Republicof Korea (ROK) forces into a small perimeter surrounding thesouthern port town of Pusan. The Marines were ordered to Pusanto help defend the perimeter. After four weeks of combat, whenthe situation was under control, the Marines were embarked onnaval ships for the brilliant turning movement, the amphibiouslanding at Inchon.

With the successes gained from Pusan and Inchon, GeneralDouglas MacArthur ordered the U.S. 8th Army and ROK forcesto pursue the fleeing NKPA. The U.S. 8th Army would operate inwestern Korea, and X Corps in eastern Korea — both with ordersto cut off the NKPA’s effort to flee to the north. The 1st MarineDivision, attached to the X Corps, landed at the northeastern portof Wonsan on October 25, 1950 for operations that would takeUN forces north toward the Yalu River, which was the border ofManchuria and Communist China (see Map 1).

The plan was to move the X Corps north of the Chosin Reservoirto cut off the retreating NPKA and any Chinese Communists Forces(CCF) already in the country or moving south from Manchuria.The 1st Marine Division, attached to X Corps, was composed ofthe 1st, 5th, and 7th Marine Regiments.

The 1st RCT (Regimental Combat Team) had engaged theNKPA south and west of Wonsan and had alerted all the elementsof the X Corps that hostile forces were in the area. The Chineseforces used guerrilla warfare tactics. With little artillery and noair support, the Chinese used heavy mortars and machine gunsbut relied mostly on the infantryman. With the respect for U.S.air power and the devastating effects of artillery, the Chinesegenerally fought at night and sought tactical penetrations intocommand, logistical and supporting arms systems of UN forces.The Chinese actions and tactics against the Marines were initiallysuccessful because the Marines were using scattered companydefensive positions instead of tight battalion perimeters.

As the X Corps moved north, the scheme of maneuver was tohave the 1st Marine Division move west of the Chosin Reservoirand U.S. Army units move east of the reservoir. The division alsohad the responsibility of securing the main supply route (MSR)

along the route north. Unknown to the X Corps, the CCF hadencircled UN forces and were waiting for orders to begin an attackthat was to destroy X Corps.

The 1st Marine Division’s 5th and 7th RCTs were in Yudam-ni, defending a large perimeter of approximately four miles incircumference and cautiously moving closer to the Yalu when theCCF attacked. Although the Marines knew that CCFs were in thearea and had made previous contact with them, intelligence reportsdid not report or estimate accurately the size of the force, or relatethat overwhelming CCFs had attacked the 8th Army in westernKorea.

When CCFs launched the first attack on November 27, 1950,the Marines fought as individual companies and battalions againsthuman-wave assault tactics. The Marine situation was tenuous atbest. Two CCF divisions attacked from the northwest of theMarines’ perimeter, and a third division had encircled thesoutheast, blocking the MSR and trapping two rifle companiesand associated attachments in non-mutual supportive positions(see Map 2).

Company C of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, short one platoon,was approximately four miles south of Yudam-ni. Four milesfarther south on the MSR, Company F (2d Battalion) in ToktongPass was at full strength in a more isolated position, reinforced byheavy machine guns and an 81mm mortar section from the

Map 1



weapons company. Prior to the attacks thenight of November 27–28, Company F’scommander — knowing that he was on hisown without hope of making it to theregimental perimeter until the followingday —formed a tight perimeter. At 0230,the CCF attacked on a 270-degree arc (threefourths of the company perimeter). Withone platoon initially overrun, the reserveelements fought and tenuously held theperimeter. By 0630, November 28, theChinese had received so many casualtiesthat the attack could no longer beconsidered organized.

As the RCT commanders at Yudam-niconsolidated their lines and realigned forcesinto one main perimeter, 1st MarineDivision Commander General Oliver Smithordered them to attack south towardHagaru-ri to reopen the MSR as well asrescue Company C, 1st Battalion, andCompany F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.

At 1015 on November 28, the rescueattempt for the two companies stranded onthe MSR to Hagaru-ri commenced.Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’s 1stBattalion attempted first to reach CompanyC from Yudam-ni. After five hours offighting, marching, and climbing, 1st

Battalion was stillabout one mile fromCompany C. In a rapidenvelopment to thewest, the battalion’sCompany B movedwith the aid of close airsupport and 81mmmortars fires andsucceeded in pushingto the perimeter andenabling thewithdrawal ofCompany C.Company F wassupposed to fight northalong the MSR andlink up with 1stBattalion. This wasnot possible, however,with the number ofcasualties thatCompany F hadsuffered and thenumber of Chineseforces in the area. TheRCT commander —not wanting to have anentire battalion

surrounded by enemy forces — ordered that1st Battalion return to the main perimeter.The relief force returned at 2110.

The RCT commanders believed that allforces were required for the defense of theperimeter, but they were also required tomount another relief effort for Company F.In a second attempt to accomplish thisrelief, the commanders formed a compositebattalion of the units in reserve within theperimeter at Yudam-ni. At 0800 onNovember 29, the composite battalionmoved south on the MSR but was hit withheavy machine-gun fire 300 yards outsidethe perimeter. The Marines could plainlysee the CCF on the ridgelines but continuedto fight south. After attacking 4,500 yardssouth along the MSR, Marine planesdropped messages to the compositebattalion and the regimental headquarters,informing them that the enemy wasentrenched in a formidable force on bothsides of the MSR. After consideration atthe regimental headquarters, the relief forcewas ordered to return to the main perimeterbefore it could be surrounded.

Company F survived a third night onToktong Pass. One Marine was wounded;three CCF companies perished.

When the composite battalion did notfunction as expected, General Smithordered that 5th Regiment take charge ofprotecting the Yudam-ni perimeter and that7th Regiment conduct operations to clearthe MSR to Hagaru-ri. The “March to theSea” had begun. The manner in which thewithdrawal was conducted is an importantelement of the Marine Corps’ legacy.

As the two RCT commanders plannedthe reorganization and redeployment offorces, the regiments formed a secondcomposite battalion to cover the weakportions of the perimeter. Additionally, asthe battalions maneuvered — reforming theperimeter and breakout force — there waslittle contact from the CCF. It is likely thatthis was a tactical failure of the CCF on agrand scale, especially since the Marineswere vulnerable and made all themovements during daylight hours.

The decision was made that 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, would attack overland instead of down the MSR and relieveCompany F from the east. The remainderof the 7th RCT would pave a way for allother forces, including the wounded,vehicles, and equipment to move southfrom the Yudam-ni perimeter.

Early on December 1, the 2d Battalion,5th Marines relieved 1st Battalion, 7thMarines in place, to allow it to carry outthe assigned mission of relieving CompanyF. The initial breakout took an enormousamount of effort to create the gap in theCCF lines, which was not secured until1930 on December 1, 1950. LieutenantColonel Davis evacuated his dead andwounded to the main perimeter. Oneadditional company was attached to hisbattalion at the last moment because of theday’s combat losses. This battalion cut thelast physical ties with Marine units atYudam-ni and attacked east and south.

The planning process for 1st Battalion’smarch to Toktong Pass was swift. Theconcept of operations and scheme ofmaneuver was developed and approved inapproximately 20 minutes. The plan wasto take two 81mm mortars and six heavymachine guns, each manned with doublecrews so they could carry enoughammunition. It was also decided that allMarines would carry their sleeping bags,an extra bandolier of small armsammunition, and extra stretchers —initially to carry ammunition and thencasualties. The Marines in the battalion

Map 2

INFANTRY NEWS


reserve and headquarters company carried an extra 81mm mortarround. Extra radios were carried with the unit, ensuringduplication of assets and positive communications with the Yudam-ni perimeter. Other mission considerations were that all woundedand sick would remain with the main breakout force. TheseMarines would drive the vehicles and provide convoy security.

At 2100 on December 1, catching the enemy off guard, 1stBattalion broke out of the perimeter and headed east and south inthe effort to relieve Company F at Toktong Pass (see Map 3).After a day of fighting, reorganizing, absorbing replacements,issuing orders, evacuating wounded, and neither sleeping noreating a hot meal, the mission continued. The effects of the combatwere pushing the Marines to the end of their mental and physicalendurance.

The night of December 1, 1950 was dark, and the temperaturewas16 degrees below zero. Land navigation was difficult,particularly in the deep draws and valleys that 1st Battalion, 7thMarines crossed. The lead elements were losing sight of theguiding star when they descended from the ridges. Also, duringthis phase of the movement, the column was drifting toward theenemy lines, which 1st Battalion was trying to avoid. The leadersnoticed the problem, and passed the word to the front to changecourse, but it was not effective. Many, if not all the Marines, hadthe hoods of their parkas over their heads and were fighting theinternal battles of fear and exhaustion as well as the dangerousenvironment around them. Lieutenant Colonel Davis attemptedto use artillery fire and white phosphorus rounds on designatedhills to help guide the movement. This technique did not producethe desired results. Davis then personally ran to the head of thecolumn to orient movement on the correct azimuth of attack.

All the Marines were exhausted, including the leaders. Whenissuing orders or directions, Davis insisted that the companycommanders repeat all orders to make sure they were what hedesired and that he had, in fact, issued the orders accurately.

Small arms fire increased as the battalion drifted toward theenemy. The order to prepare for an attack of the enemy positionwas issued and promptly executed. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,had caught the enemy off guard again and destroyed a platoon-sized outpost with only a few Marines wounded. As the battalionwas reorganizing for continued movement toward Company F,men began collapsing from fatigue. The effort to get them movingagain required the direct action and leadership of the officers andNCOs. The battalion continued to move unchecked until ColonelDavis rested his battalion after 20 hours of combat and movement.

During the time 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was movingoverland, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was attacking south on theMSR (see Map 4). The pressure that 3d Battalion maintained onthe CCF, and the fact that it probably appeared to be a much morelucrative objective to the CCF, enabled 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,to move as effectively as it did. Also, since the perimeter at Yudam-ni was shrinking, the CCF probably thought they could takedecisive action and destroy the Marines in the perimeter as wellas the units moving on the MSR.

After the brief respite, 1st Battalion continued the attack towardCompany F. Correcting for the drift toward enemy lines, the reliefforce had closed to one and one half miles from the beleagueredcompany’s position. The radios that 1st Battalion, 7th Marinescarried and used were not functioning properly or were out ofrange of Company F and the main force at Yudam-ni. The 1stBattalion, was unable to contact Company F to ensure that the81mm mortars or heavy machine guns did not fire on the reliefforce. The 1st Battalion, continued to march toward CompanyF’s perimeter, and radio contact was finally established.

A final attack was mounted — again with the aid of close airsupport and 81mm mortar fires — and Company B reached theCompany F perimeter at 1125 on December 2, 1950. Company Bate an air-dropped meal and immediately continued the attackwest to the high ground that would lead to securing Toktong Pass.

Company A pushed out and secured a perimeter to the eastof Company F’s perimeter (see Map 3).

In an attempt to entice the enemy to move and revealtheir positions in and around Toktong Pass, 1st Battalion,7th Marines, started warming fires. The Chinese were notexpecting an attack from troops who were warmingthemselves; 1st Battalion changed tactics again andlaunched three simultaneous attacks on three different CCFstrong points. The surprise attained by this action caughtthe CCF off guard. They fell back, running in the directionof 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which was within a mile ofToktong Pass along the MSR. The 3d Battalion, 5thMarines, then called an air strike, which was the leadingfactor in a CCF regiment’s complete elimination.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, reached Hagaru-ri at1900 on December 3, 1950. Behind the battalion leadingthe way were vehicles loaded with wounded and dead,artillery howitzers, a tank and the remainder of two Marineregimental combat teams. The last elements of the rearguard from Yudam-ni entered the Hagaru-ri perimeter at1400 on December 4, 1950. Thus, the 1st Marine Divisionwas united, with the exception of the two infantry battalionsthat were to the south at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.

Map 3

Captain Douglas G. Schaffer is acompany commander in 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, at 29 Palms, Calif. When he wrotethis article, he was attending the InfantryCaptains Career Course at Fort Benning.


Overcoming numerous obstacles —including continuous attacks, the relentlesscold, a blown bridge in a narrow mountainpass and a 78-mile march to the sea — the1st Marine Division and all included forces,the majority of the equipment, wounded anddead were evacuated on naval shipping atthe port of Hungham. The campaign endedwhen UN forces destroyed the entire portfacility in a great explosion.

As commander of 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, Lieutenant Colonel Davis used thecharacteristics of the offense during thebreakout operation from Yudam-ni torelieve Company F, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, 1st Marine Division, at ToktongPass. Field Manual 100-5, Operations,describes the characteristics of the offenseas the combination of surprise,concentration, tempo, and audacity.

Davis achieved surprise on numerousoccasions during December 1-3, 1950 by“striking the enemy at a time or place or ina manner for which it is not physically ormentally ready.” (FM 100-5, p. 7-1). Aprime example is when 1st Battalion, 7thMarines, continued the breakout attackforce from Yudam-ni in a direction otherthan south on the MSR. The battaliongained freedom of action when itencountered CCFs and attacked from adirection the CCF was not anticipating.The most decisive surprise during the entireaction was when the battalion conductedthree simultaneous attacks from CompanyF’s position on Toktong Pass. This wasmost decisive because it enabled 1stBattalion to secure the entire pass and drivethe preponderance of the enemy force intothe direction of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.

Three significant reasons that helpedachieve surprise for 1st Battalion: First, ifdetected during the breakout, CCF may haveassumed that the battalion was actuallyother CCF forces, because the Marines werein the CCF rear areas. Second, CCFcommanders may have thought that onebattalion would contribute little againsttheir CCF actions. Third, when thebattalion did attack, it was in a directionopposite of the CCF defenses—that is, inthe rear or flank of the enemy. The CCFfocus was the destruction of the mainMarine force at Yudam-ni and the denialof the use of the MSR to the UN forces.

Colonel Davis achieved concentration ofhis forces during the breakout by massing

the effects of his battalion formation andweapon systems as well as exploiting thesuccess from his actions (FM 100-5, p. 7-2). Concentrating his force, he attackedCCF units during the overland march byusing combined arms, close air support,mortars, and machineguns. The effectivecombination of these weapon systemsreduced the number of individualinfantrymen required and saved the forcecountless casualties. “Speed, security, anddeception are essential to successfulconcentration …” which Colonel Davisconstantly ensured by keeping the battalionmoving after the breakout and afterattacking the enemy outposts (FM 100-5,p. 7-2). Ensuring that the battalion movedon the correct azimuth of advance alsoattained speed. The best example ofdeception is the warming fires in theperimeter that were started before thesimultaneous attack of the enemy outposts.Additionally, Davis made a consciousdecision to leave the sick and wounded menat Yudam-ni, doubled up on the crew-servedweapons crews, and instructed his battalionthat the movement was to be conducted insilence. All of these issues added to thesecurity of the force.

Tempo is “the rate of speed of militaryaction; controlling or altering that rate isessential for maintaining the initiative”(FM 100-5, p. 7-2). Davis maintained thetempo during the breakout of the Yudam-ni perimeter by keeping his lead companyup front, even though the Marines wereexhausted from the fight to pass throughthe CCF lines. Stopping to move anothercompany forward would have permitted the

CCF to maneuver, delay, or block theoperation. After the attack on the CCFoutpost, Lieutenant Colonel Davis kept thebattalion moving. In addition to being aforce protection issue, the Marines probablywould have frozen from the sweat thatformed during the attack, but Davis keptmoving and maintained the initiative andtempo over CCF forces. This action alsoaided in the security of the force by notremaining in a position that the CCF knewof. Resting the Marines and permitting thebattalion to sleep maintained the tempobecause the rested Marines were able toregain their momentum in a few hours.Colonel Davis rested and fed his Marinesbefore launching another attack on the CCFdefensive outposts in Toktong Pass. Davisconstantly adjusted the tempo andsucceeded in keeping the CCF off balance.

“Audacity is a key component of anysuccessful offensive action.” (FM 100-5, p.7–3) The entire plan of allowing aninfantry battalion to move overland in themountains of North Korea, operatingindependently of its parent unit, is bold –particularly if the maneuver unit becomesdecisively engaged. Company F’s buildingof warming fires in its positions, along withthe unexpected launching of threesimultaneous attacks, demonstrates theeffective application of the characteristicsof the offense.

Marines begin withdrawing from Yudam-Ni after the Battle of Chosin Reservoir.

INFANTRY NEWS

VIRTUAL

SIMULATIONS

& INFANTRY

TRAINING

MAJOR WILFRED RODRIGUEZ, JR

The best training is live, realistic, challenging METL-supported training, executed to standard on terrainsimilar to where you will fight. Nothing replaces live

training with live ammunition with the whole unit in the field.That is an honest and time proven truth. Unfortunately, in actualityresources — space, ammo, time — are scarce, and we are verychallenged to do all our training in the field for a myriad of reasons.Training areas are busier (and also super eco-managed) and notas plentiful as in the past. Ball and tracer ammunition andgrenades are scarce. Missiles are expensive, and small armsrounds’ usual priority of issue is to support marksmanship. Whatabout time, the second most important resource next to the troopsthemselves? How many iterations of that platoon attack can I getin before I have to clear the range? Would preliminary trainingbefore the live fire make more of a limited opportunity? Howoften do we get those opportunities with all those conflictingrequirements and mandated training?

For those of you who visited a video arcade lately, don’t youwonder why someone hasn’t figured out how to link those realisticshoot or be shot games out there together and let the individualchoose a route versus going down the same old hallway everytime? The holodeck simulation from the Starship Enterprise isstill decades away, but today we can train a whole platoon alongthe lines of the above vignette. The purpose of this article is tointroduce you to the utility of a virtual simulation and energizeyou and the infantry community to pursue a dismounted Infantryfocused virtual simulation.

Applying Virtual Simulations

The Modeling and Simulations (M&S) Handbook definesvirtual simulations as…

digital representations of environments, organizations,systems, other entities, and processes with players operatingvirtual prototypes in a synthetic environment (i.e., realpeople operating simulated systems). Virtual M&S put thehuman in the loop (HITL) in a central role by exercisingmotor control skills (e.g., flying an airplane), decision skills(e.g., committing fire control resources to action), orcommunicating skills (e.g., as members of a command,

W HUMP! The breaching charge did its job and put a man-sized hole in the side of the farm house, but Bravo Team, 2ndsquad had sustained casualties in completing the breach. Only

one man got back from laying the breaching charge. SGT Makuch wasfirst out from the railroad ties as he led his fire team through the dark thelast 20 meters to the farmhouse. SSG Hicks trailed Alpha team, ready tobring in Bravo Team as soon as they seized the foothold in the house. 1LTMiramontes had already called for smoke and shifted 2nd and 3rd squads’fire and was bringing up the Strykers led by SFC Dunn. 1LT MiramontesNVG’s were comparatively limited, and the Strykers would be better ableto identify and suppress enemy positions with their enhanced optics andfirepower. He monitored his squad leaders’ chatter as they adjusted theirSoldiers’ suppressive fires and got ready to follow first squad.

SGT Makuch brought his fire team straight into the breached roomand shot an enemy Soldier as he turned to fire. SSG Hicks ordered Makuchto take the next room as Bravo Team made the leap across the open area.Bravo Team just made it into the initial room as an enemy grenade wentoff outside and Alpha started clearing the next room. PVT Kim from secondsquad saw the window the grenade came out of and promptly put an M203round in the window. His team leader popped smoke in the open area tocover the team’s bound as Kim told him what he saw and why he wasshooting. Alpha Team’s 1st squad stacked and tossed in a flash bang tothe room on the left per platoon SOP and rushed into the room to find twodazed civilians. Bravo team followed the same procedure in the room tothe right. SSG Hicks reported the farmhouse clear as SFC Dunn reportedthat the Strykers had caught the enemy fire team running out the back.

As 1LT Miramontes entered the farmhouse, an enemy automatic grenadelauncher started pounding the building from down the street. It was maskedby the surrounding buildings, and he had already learned that bringingin Strykers too early risked an RPG ambush. He requested help from hisCO, who directed him to illuminate the building with a PAC4 and changeradio frequencies to direct Spectre gunship fires. Three 105mm roundslater, the enemy 40mm fire ceased.

The lights came on and 1LT Miramontes came out of his simulator.“Much better Miramontes, and good shooting Kim, you probably savedyour squad with that shot. Miramontes, let’s get your platoon into theAAR room and talk distribution of fires.”

“Sir, we cleared the building this time and…”“And you lost a fire team, Miramontes., They say three is a charm, but

let’s see if there was something Bravo team or the support by fire squadcould have done better. Remember, tomorrow we’re going out to McKennaMOUT Site!”



control, communication, computers,intelligence, surveillance,reconnaissance [C4ISR] team).Current state-of-the-art virtual M&Sbring the system (or subsystem) andits operator together in a syntheticor simulated environment.The aviation community has used virtual

simulations for more than half a century.The armor community has had a virtualsimulation tool since the late 80’s (SIMNETand now Close Combat Tactical Trainer[CCTT] is a networked simulationconsisting of numerous vehicle simulators).That is longer than some of today’s Soldiershave walked the planet. What types of taskslend themselves to virtual simulation?

According to the Modeling andSimulations (M&S) Handbook,

Virtual M&S provide understandingof human reactions and decisionprocesses and human-machineinterfaces. Output supports initialand early user evaluation. VirtualM&S provide a platform for crewtraining prior to live exercises andtests, or realistic mission rehearsalin preparation for actual combatoperations. Linked to othersimulators, the interaction of multipleweapon systems can be examined,leading to changes in tactics orengagement rules.Our tankers and Bradley crews have

used virtual simulations for years to greateffect. Couldn’t traditional infantry benefitfrom a virtual simulation, a simulation thatstarts at the individual level but — equallyimportantly — gets the whole unitinteracting together in a virtual battlefield,operating in those environments andagainst those threats we are likely to face?A simulation is needed that gives theinfantryman training value in offensive anddefensive scenarios in the types of terrainwe will fight in like MOUT, dense forestand jungle, and incorporates the combinedarms team and its effects? Now there aresome great simulations out there, eachdesigned for a very specific skill or task set.Specifically, the Weaponeer, EngagementSkills Trainer (EST) and call for firesimulators do great jobs for their trainingniches. None of them make Soldiers(emphasis on the plural and implying units)take cover, return fire, report, communicatewith other real Soldiers/units (above the

squad level), integrate artillery fires andother combined arms simultaneously (as incombat). I’m talking about a full spectruminfantry centric networked multi-simulatorsimulation focused at training Infantry fromsquad to company with the effects andparticipation of the combined arms team.Let’s call this simulation concept FullSpectrum Infantry & Leadership EnhancedReality or FUSILIER. Two centuries ago,soldiers called fusiliers, who were armedwith light flintlock muskets, fought onbattlefields using tactics and formationstrained on the parade field. I propose thattoday’s Infantry use a simulated and muchmore challenging training ground thanthose of the past. In the past, there havebeen four primary obstacles that havehindered development of a full spectrumInfantry simulation. Today, we havelearned how to overcome those obstacles.

Previous Obstacles to theDevelopment of FUSILIER andToday’s Solution

For one thing, virtual Infantry centricsimulation was just technically too hard.Infantry is typically not employed on virtualflat and/or open terrain. When it is, realismand utility suffer. The Infantry fight isterrain intensive and while a tank can hidebehind a hill, infantrymen seek coverbehind a fallen tree, in a small culvert oreven next to the curb of a road. Buildingsare another can of technological wormscalled multi-elevated structures (MES).Portraying buildings — ones you can getinside and that have multiple floors, stairs,doorways, windows etc. — requires a lotof memory. Now challenge a simulatorwith the tasks of tracking 30-120infantrymen — and however many OPFOR— moving across complicated terrain with

their changing lines of sight (versus 14tanks in a less terrain intensiveenvironment for tankers) and the processorspeed/memory demon becomes obvious.Although I’ve simplified this problemconsiderably for this article, a book couldeasily be written to more fully address thechallenges in portraying a realistic Infantryfight.

Recent computer advances in hardwareand software have largely overcome theargument that simulations are technicallytoo hard to accomplish. The problem of nothaving enough power to push a simulationis generally a thing of the past, withprocessors today operating at 2.8 gigabytesor faster. Advances in memory and videocard technology make it possible to runcomplex simulations on desktop PCs.Software enhancements have made leapsand bounds by better using hardwarecapabilities to improve Graphic InterfaceUnits (GUI or picture). Given a detailedterrain database at the one-meter posting,today’s software can routinely constructterrain with features that infantrymen willencounter, such as tunnels, curbs,doorways, stairs, or the inside of a fullydepicted building located on one commonterrain. For instance, the Shugart-GordonMOUT site at JRTC is available now invirtual form, and is exact in detail to theShugart-Gordon MOUT site on the ground.Simulations that involve virtual-immersedsimulators are available today for theindividual soldier. Much like the CCTTtanks and Bradley simulators — where eachvehicle is immersed in a common syntheticterrain base — there are simulatorsavailable today that place players from aSoldier up to a platoon in common syntheticterrain capable of interacting with eachother, as well as with vehicle simulatorsand OPFOR. The most significanttechnical hurdle left is to put all the piecesin place and actually demonstrate acomplete company fight with the requisitenumber of entities. Later, I will explain aproposed solution that is largely in placetoday at Fort Benning.

While the development of an Infantryvirtual simulation has been less urgent inthe past, today’s base closures, training arearestrictions, maneuver damage, hostcountry regulations and ecological concernshave all impacted on training areaavailability. Real world deployment costs

Couldn’t traditional infantrybenefit from a virtual simulation,

a simulation that starts at theindividual level but — equallyimportantly — gets the wholeunit interacting together in a

virtual battlefield, operating inthose environments and against

those threats we are likely toface?

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


have reduced the dollars available for live fire training. The needis obvious. Yesterday’s Infantry deployed, trained, and fought.Tomorrow’s force will train, deploy, and fight, requiring thatInfantry be ready to execute as soon as they hit the ground. Asimulation tool leveraging our limited live training resources,providing a training gate and including assets not readily available(MOUT, AC130, Apaches) would pay big dividends. Rememberthe vignette? We also need a mission rehearsal tool where we cantrain today where we will execute tomorrow. Finally, Land Warriorand FBCB2 are just around the corner. Those skills are highlyperishable. Couple that with the training limitations listedpreviously and the need to develop basic proficiency before we godo live training becomes even more important. Virtual simulationsare a potential answer.

Another obstacle has been a perception that Infantry tasks andskills were too simple to warrant the cost and effort of a multi-million dollar simulation. “What does it take to give a soldier arifle, send him in the woods and go kill the enemy?” went theargument. In reality, anyone who has had to plan and execute amission requiring an Infantry unit to conduct a movement, executea mission, and then return to refit and rearm only to start thesecond iteration can fully understand the effort required to makethis happen. The advent of Land Warrior, complete FBCB2fielding and ongoing transformation will only make the task morecomplicated, further supporting the case for the development ofan Infantry simulation to support these superb additions to ourinventory. Now let me tell you what FUSILIER can do to improveour training, starting with what we expect it to do.

FUSILIER Required Capabilities

FUSILIER must provide us a tool to make more efficient use ofthe limited resources of training areas, ammo, troops, and time. Itmust be as realistic as possible and model the up close dismountedInfantry fight. Realism enhances training effectiveness. Realismis not limited to not limited to merely stimulating senses; it includesMETL tasks in real world environments under challengingconditions, using your personal equipment.

Here is a conceptual list of capabilities.� Models the up-close, dismounted Infantry fight, and

specifically:* Compartmentalized terrain (MOUT, dense forest,

jungle, mountain);* Direct fire engagements with supporting fires to

suppress or kill the enemy;* Supports small unit maneuver at realistic speed to

model fire and maneuver tasks at squad through company;* Models the close fight;* The enemy is presented as a thinking, tactically

sound opponent using all his capabilities.� Realism

* Battlefield (sights, sounds, smells);* Stress (see above, threat of death vs. don’t let your

buddy down, don’t embarrass yourself, desire to win,obedience);

* Challenge (level of difficulty, fatigue, wounds);

* Maximizes use of our unit’s equipment that isaccurately modeled;

* Use unit’s organic equipment especially technology(M4, M203, SAW, flash-bangs, frags, smoke grenades, starclusters, illumination, binoculars, thermals, NVG’s, laserpointers, GPS, LRF and link into FBCB2).� Trains the whole unit (you don’t develop a

championship football team by focusing on the quarterbackalone; you scrimmage with the whole TEAM).� LEADERSHIP

� Integrates the combined arms team. At a minimumincorporates:

* Aviation (lift & attack),* Mechanized vehicles (Infantry carrying)* Armor* Artillery* CAS

� Land Warrior and FBCB2 capable.

� Includes the fog of war (civilians, intelligence,mistakes).

Technology available today in the Squad SyntheticEnvironment at Fort Benning

Two key concepts that are integral to the success of FUSILIERare integrating all of the unit’s Soldiers and leadership. The bottomline is that building a simulation that only models key individualsand leaders develops a very high speed Training Exercise WithoutTroops (TEWT) machine and in the end reinforces a managerapproach versus a leadership model. Infantry leaders are warriorswho should be trained to lead Soldiers on the battlefield and notmanage machine/robotics or information systems. You don’t trainteams (units) by just training leaders (TEWT). Omitting Soldiersfrom training with their leaders denies opportunities for Soldiersto learn from their leaders and leaders to learn from theirsubordinates. Scaling back the simulation to not includesubordinates eliminates an opportunity to build team cohesionand reduces the training benefit for C2 tasks and SOPreinforcement. Including Soldiers into training conducted by theirleaders inspires Soldier confidence in their leaders and esprit decorps at squad/platoon/company. Additionally, not includingsubordinates robs them of an opportunity to learn how to becomeleaders themselves and more practically, to take charge of the unitshould the leader become incapacitated.

There are several arguments against taking the simulation downto the lowest level. They mainly revolve around individual taskscan be trained better in the field, the contention that technologycan model subordinates well enough, and that the cost of expandingsimulation to include lower echelons would be prohibitive.Obviously, individual tasks can be trained better in a live trainingenvironment, and indeed all training can be done better in a livetraining environment. Sure, the individual soldier gets someindividual training benefit in virtual simulations but his majorcontribution to training is his presence. Leaders get trained byleading Soldiers, and this is particularly true of the Infantry. Youcan not train a unit without having the majority of its Soldiers

The Squad Synthetic Environment is comprised a fully immersed environment, which is also calledstand up (at left) and desktop computer mode (right).


present and the majority of tasks in MTPsare not just leader tasks. Second, today’stechnology does not model individualSoldiers’ behavior well enough, especiallyin compartmentalized terrain. Electronicsoldiers bump into walls, each other anddoors in MOUT environments or requiresignificant guidance that leaders cannotgive in the heat of battle. Even iftechnology could model Soldier behaviorto the fidelity required, we shouldn’t do itfor the reasons already identified. That typeof technology would make very significantcontributions in robotics and is anotheressay. Finally about cost, fully immersedvirtual simulators are not cheap and whenyou multiply that number by a 100 aFUSILIER site becomes prohibitivelyexpensive. The solution is modelingsubordinates in a less fully immersedenvironment, a desktop computer-joystickversus a special room and equipment toimmerse each Soldier in the virtualenvironment.

Today’s Potential Solution

Today at Fort Benning there is a virtualInfantry simulation called Squad SyntheticEnvironment (SSE). It is used to researchand develop new concepts and technologyto support tomorrow’s Infantry and ongoingtransformation. It has fielded up to aplatoon of infantry with a couple of vehiclesin a virtual battlefield. It also models effectsof the combined arms team (artillery,aircraft, etc) and has even been tied to theAC130 virtual simulator at Hurlbert Field.A successful experiment was recentlyconducted where the AC130 simulator flew

into the virtual battlefield in SSE at FortBenning where FSO’s from the 3rd RangerBN and ETACs at Fort Benning directedAC130 fire into the virtual battlefield anddestroyed an enemy company.

The SSE is configured to supportresearch and development. One squad ofthe platoon operates in a fully immersedenvironment (the focus of experiments) andtwo squads operate in the virtual battlefieldthrough desktop computers (modeling flankunits or OPFOR). The immersedenvironment (or stand up, SU as we call it)consists of a 10x10-foot blacked out roomwith the front wall being a screen wherethe soldier views and interacts with hisvirtual environment. A projector 20-footbehind the screen projects the virtual viewonto the screen. A Soldier wears a sensorso the SU’s sensors can determine hisposture and render an appropriate view (i.e.a soldier in the prone can see much less ofthe are in front of him versus when he isstanding up). The Soldier’s M4 mockuphas a thumb joystick on the left side of theweapon where he inputs major movement(running, walking, crawling) into thesimulator. The SU’s sensors pick up theSoldier’s real movement (leaning, takinga step to the left/right) inside the SU givingthe Soldier the ability to look aroundcorners by moving in the SU. Just a few ofthe capabilities of the SU are reloading,grenades, flash bangs, smoke, flares,emplacing C-4, and NVG’s. The SU’s arenetworked to desktop Soldiers who have allof the capabilities of the fully immersedstand up environment but input theiractions via a joystick. All of this iscontrolled and recorded at the station of the

Battlemaster, who also controls semi-autonomous forces (SAF) to model flankunits, the OPFOR — the OPFOR couldeven be some additional desktop simulatorsto provide for the most realistic OPFORactions — and additional battlefield effects(i.e. artillery if there is not an artillery cell).The exercise is observed here by the leaderin charge of the study who selects keypoints, views and communications fordiscussion during the AAR. You can readmore about SSE capabilities, methods andweapons at the Army Modeling andSimulation Office Web site atwww.amso.mil and click on majorsimulation systems.

For training, SSE would be reorganizedas portrayed below to become FUSILIER.Leaders, the focus of training, are placedin fully immersed environments with themembers of fire teams manning low costdesktop stations so they can participate andobserve the training exercise, respond tocommands and take over for their leadersshould their leaders become incapacitated.Fiber optic links could be used to bring inother simulators such as the AC 130described earlier. Fielding to units shouldinclude an organic terrain databasegenerating cell so units could generate theirown terrain based on local training areasbut also real world contingency areas sounits can arrive on station with multiplemission rehearsals under their belt. Today,no Stryker simulator exists but as that isdeveloped and fielded with FBCB2 it couldalso be linked to FUSILIER along withother systems and combat multipliers(artillery effects station). SSE served asthe testbed for Land Warrior .6 and is

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Major Wilfred Rodriguez, Jr., is the virtualsimulations branch chief for the DismountedBattlespace Battle Lab at Fort Benning. Hisprevious assignments include commanding amechanized rifle company in the 3d AD duringDesert Storm and as a platoon leader and assistantS-3 in the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault). Major Rodriguez is a graduate of theUnited States Military Academy.

Figure 1

presently being tested as the trainer for LandWarrior (VICTER program). There is anongoing effort to integrate it with LandWarrior 1.0. As that effort comes to fruitionin the next year, the Army would have avirtual trainer very capable of carrying it intothe Objective Force time frame.

Figure 1 portrays a simulation suite tosupport training of an Infantry company. Theplatoon suite of FUSILIER would be one-thirdof the company suite. The company suite alsogive the option of integrating battalion assetsand combat multipliers to expand thecollective training affect of the system.Mortar platoons can set up in nearbylocations. Using digital fire commands sentfrom the forward observer in FUSILIER, themortar platoon executes fire missions in directsupport cleared by the BN FSO in the TOCmonitoring the battle. FUSILIER operatingLand Warrior software and Stryker simulatorsalso would incorporate FBCB2 and exercisethose skills at the company and battalion


level. Armor, close air, civil affairs, livetraining with sister companies using localtraining areas (or deployed to far awaytraining areas) all are potential trainingexercises to be developed by the aggressiveS-3 or commander.

FUSILIER, Infantry’s FutureSimulator

Scarce training resources, a changingand increasing threat, increasedOPTEMPO and new explosive technologyare driving the Infantry community to findinnovative techniques to train. With theSBCT fielded, Land Warrior on thehorizon, and Future Combat Systemsheralding the Objective Force, traditionaltechniques of training will be hard pressedto keep infantrymen at the technical edgewhile maintaining their time tested and trueInfantry skills. Virtual simulations are apotential solution to training resource

scarcity, integrating highly lethal and costlycombat multipliers and developing theskills to use them. These virtualsimulations could serve as an excellenttraining gate to gain a certain level ofproficiency before units execute costly, rareand dangerous live training These samevirtual simulations make mission rehearsalfor far flung or quickly developingcontingency operations possible. Ouraviators and tankers have already trainedon virtual simulations for decades, and nowit is time for Infantry to reap the benefitsof 21st century technology as it trains tomeet tomorrow’s challenges.

What’s the slant? A call comes over the radio statingthat the slant is 8/7/3 — eight tanks, seven Bradleyfighting vehicles and three dismount squads.

Everyone understands what this means. It is standing operatingprocedure, a way to abbreviate critical information. But what aboutthe logistics slant? A logistics slant is fundamentally the same, exceptthat it refers to the logistics basic load instead of the combat slant.

At the Joint Readiness Training Center, an armor/mechanizedcompany team is attached to the light infantry brigade for therotation. The heavy team support component is usually a sliceelement that has no normal combat service support players, suchas the battalion S-4 and a fully functioning field trains commandpost. The logistics slant is a fast and simple technique of identifyingcritical ammunition and fuel requirements and simplifying thelogistics status report (LOGSTAT) to the company and field trainscommand post.

The command post will generally request to know what suppliesthe platoons have on hand and what they need in order to generatea LOGSTAT. By using a logistics slant, the command post can

gather the on-hand supplies and quickly determine the amountsrequired.

The example used in the table is based on a 2 x 2 companyteam attached to a light brigade for a JRTC rotation. The tankcompany task organized with two Bradley platoons is equal to 10tanks and eight Bradleys. This is a quick and easy way to determinerequirements, and it can be easily tailored to mission loads thatmay differ from the basic loads listed in Field Manuals (FMs) 17-15, Tank Platoon, and 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon andSquad (Bradley). This format also can be used for platoon, section,squad, or even fire team level.

A logistics slant that is understood by all combat service supportplayers will enable the company team to go into battle witheverything they need and concentrate on the mission at hand.

SUPPLY BASIC LOADSLANT

(SUPPLY X BASIC

LOAD)

COMPANYTEAM BASIC

LOAD

LOGISTICS

SLANT

M1A2 (Reference FM 17-15)

M1 120 mm

.50 cal MG

7.62 mm

JP8

42 rounds

900 rounds

11,400 rounds

10

10

10

10

420 rounds

9,000 rounds

114,000 rounds

5,040 gallons

/420

/9,000

/114,000

/5,040

M2A2 (Reference FM 7-7J)

504 gallons

M2 25 mm

.50 cal MG

7.62 mm

JP8

900 rounds

7 rounds

2,200 rounds

8

8

8

8

7,200 rounds

56 rounds

17,600 rounds

1,400 gallons

/7,200

/56

/17,600

/1,400175 gallons

Dismount Infantry and Crew (Reference FM 7-7J)

5.56 Link

5.56

600 rounds

210 rounds or 7 magazines

6

28

3,600 rounds

5,880 rounds or196 magazines

/3,600

/5,880/196

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

CAPTAIN DEAN J. DOMINIQUE

LOGISTICSSLANT

HEAVY TEAM LOGISTICS

REPORTING AT JRTC:

At the time the article was written, Captain Dean J. Dominique was the SeniorArmor/Mech CSS Observer Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center,Fort Polk, La.


With the emphasis today on military operations inurban terrain (MOUT), it is surprising that there areno fire support weapon systems now in the inventory

or under development that are truly optimized for thatenvironment. There are a number of compact, single-shot,shoulder-fired rocket launchers are available that can blast holesthrough heavy building construction materials. These are idealweapons for Soldiers who must have a way to defeat hardenedenemy fighting positions and blow breach holes in buildings topermit entry.

Current WeaponsToday’s infantry has a variety of excellent weapons that are

useful in MOUT. The 40mm Mk 19 Mod 3 grenade machine gunhas more than sufficient range in built-up areas, a high rate offire, and excellence in providing suppressive fire. But even withhigh explosive dual-purpose (HEDP) projectiles, it lacks sufficientpenetration of concrete and masonry. It will penetrate 12 inchesof pine logs, 16 inches of sand-filled cinder blocks (two layers),and 20 inches of sandbags (two layers). Their behind-the-targeteffects, however, are somewhat limited.

Other weapons capable of breaching and defeating enemypositions within defended buildings include the M136 (AT4) lightantiarmor weapon (LAW) and the XM141 bunker defeat munition(BDM). The M136 has a high-explosive antitank (HEAT) warheadthat makes it less than effective against fortified buildings. TheBDM has an HEDP warhead, but it is a one-shot, disposableweapon like the M136. The BDM will penetrate 8 inches ofreinforced concrete, 12 inches of brick (three layers), or 3 feet oftamped earth or sandbags (three layers) backed by 6-by-6-inchtimbers. Besides destroying enemy positions, it can be used tobreach walls for egress. The BDM has an effective range of 15-250 meters. The M98A1 Javelin surface attack guided missile

GORDON L. ROTTMAN

MOUT WeaponsThe search for a new fire support weapon

system will defeat virtually any tank in the world, but it is extremelyexpensive to use for knocking out field fortifications.

There appears to be a sentiment among many that using high-velocity, rocket-propelled, guided or unguided weapons againstMOUT targets is less than desirable. Whether the rocket’s warheadis intended for antiarmor or anti-material (buildings,fortifications), such weapons are expensive, do not always providethe optimum terminal effect on the target, sometimes prevent firingfrom confined areas, and create a substantial backblast signature.The backblast also poses a hazard to the crew when fired at a highangle such as the upper floors of buildings.

A frequently suggested option it to resurrect the 106mm M40A1recoilless rifle, which was the mainstay battalion-level antiarmorweapon until the introduction of the TOW system in the early1970s. The Israelis and others still employ the 106mm and haveused it effectively in MOUT. Provided with HEAT, high explosiveplastic-tracer (HEP-T), and antipersonnel-tracer (AP-T) (flechette)rounds, it has been used effectively in MOUT operations by U.S.forces in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and other areas, butit also has limitations. It produces a major backblast signatureand hazard, and this, coupled with its long barrel, restricts its usein built-up areas. Too, its design limits the way it can be mountedon a vehicle. It would be almost impossible to mount it on aHMMWV to allow 360-degree traverse, much less provide enoughelevation to engage elevated targets. It would make little sense tofield a weapon with inherently limited traverse. Its ammunitionis heavy and difficult to manhandle.

What might be the most desirable characteristics for a highlymobile, vehicle-mounted, crew-served weapon capable ofproviding effective fire support in a MOUT environment?Preferably, this weapon would be effective for fire support in otherenvironments such as deserts, plains, forests, jungles, hills, andmountains. Certainly no weapon can be ideal for all terrain andconditions, but one weapon can be effective for most.

The 40mm Mk 19 grenade machine gunis one weapon that can be useful inMOUT. The weapon has more thansufficient range in built-up areas, a highrate of fire and excellent at providingsuppresive fire.



Terminal effectsThe terminal effects are, of course, the

most important consideration. The mostcommon construction materials in urbanenvironments are hollow cinder block,brick (backed or not backed by wood frameconstruction), comparatively thin andlightly reinforced concrete, stone, timber,and wood frame. Stone, concrete, andmasonry walls separating property (such ascourtyards and compounds), rubblebarricades, multiple-layered sandbags, andwrecked civilian vehicles may be used asprotective cover by the enemy. High-velocity HEAT rockets are not necessarilythe most effective warhead to use againstsuch targets. HEAT round behind-the-target (barrier) effects are less thandesirable with only limited fragmentation,both from the warhead and secondaryfragmentation for the barrier materials.The penetrating plasma jet is narrow andwill injure only those in its immediate pathwhile generating only limited blast over-pressure. Most HEAT warheads arerelatively thin-walled, being essentiallycarriers for shaped charges. What we needis a more robustly constructed highexplosive (HE) warhead on which a delayfuse may be fitted to allow it to punchthrough moderate building materials bykinetic energy and detonate behind thetarget barrier to inflict the maximumamount of damage by blast, fragmentation,and over-pressure. The availability ofdifferent types of projectiles is desirable asit provides additional target attack optionsand capabilities. Most rocket weapons andrecoilless rifles are limited to HEAT orHEDP warheads.

A short-barrel, low-recoil weapon caneasily be mounted on a vehicle andtraversed without restriction in confinedareas. The lack of a backblast reduces thefiring signature and over-pressure inconfined areas, prevents the possibility ofcrew injury, eliminates restrictions in itsmounting and the directions in which itmay be fired from a vehicle, and allows itto be fired at a high angle to engage targetswell above ground level.

Range is not a major issue for weaponsin MOUT, but a multi-purpose weapon witha sufficiently long range offers utility inother environments. Accuracy and a highrate of fire are certainly desirablecharacteristics for any weapon. Such aweapon, at one time, was in the U.S. armed

forces inventory and was of comparativelylow cost.

81mm Mk2 mortarThe 81mm Mk 2 Mod 1 direct-fire

mortar was developed by the Navy’s Bureauof Ordnance (at Naval Weapons Station,Crane, Indiana,) in the early 1960s. Itspurpose was to provide offshore patrol boatswith a comparatively lightweight direct andhigh-angle fire weapon capable of engagingboth watercraft and targets ashore. Thisextremely useful weapon was adopted bythe Coast Guard in 1962 and first mountedon large cutters serving as weather shipsin the Atlantic and Pacific. One of theirmissions was to fire illumination flares toaid commercial and military aircraft thatwere forced to ditch at sea. The 81mm wastested in the Caribbean and found to bemuch more effective in this role than the3-inch gun firing star shells and could befired at a higher rate.

The Coast Guard was experiencingdifficulties with its worn-out20mm automatic cannons

mounted on cutters. In 1964 the CoastGuard recommended that a .50-calibermachine gun be piggyback-mounted on themortar. The prototype was built at the CoastGuard Yard, Curtis Bay, Maryland. Thistwo-in-one gun provided a more flexibleover-and-under mounting with twodissimilar weapons that required only oneweapon station and one crew. This was amajor benefit because of the space andmanning limitations on small craft. It wasdiscovered that the heavy mortar and itsrobust mount provided a very stablemounting, which allowed a high degree ofcontrol for the machine gun. A .50-caliberon a standard flexible mount is difficult tocontrol because of the weapon’s heavyrecoil. The piggyback system was mountedon a flatbed truck and test fired at DahlgrenProving Grounds, Virginia, in late 1964.Two were then mounted aboard a CoastGuard cutter at Norfolk, Va., for successfultest firing at sea. The machinegun had tobe reconfigured for right-hand feed, asimple field modification as the mortar’ssight was on the left side. A 200-roundmachine gun ammunition container wasfitted on the right side.

These mortars saw wide use on smallNavy and Coast Guard craft in Vietnam.One mortar/machine gun combination wasmounted on various coastal patrol and

riverine craft, including fast patrol craft or“Swift boats,” Point-class Coast Guardcutters, river monitors (modified LCM-6landing craft, mechanized), assault supportpatrol boats, Osprey-class fast patroltorpedo boats, and Asheville-class patrolgunboats. There was at least one instancewhen an 81mm direct-fire mortar wasmounted in the cargo bed of a ¾-ton cargotruck at a Special Forces camp in Vietnam.

The design of the direct-fire mortar wasentirely different from any mortarpreviously in U.S. service. It consisted ofa smoothbore 81mm barrel fitted on acarriage and a recoil slide. Locking leverswere provided on the carriage to lock themortar at a specified elevation anddeflection, but it was mainly used as a freeswinging (traverse and elevation) weapon.The barrel was fitted with a trigger firingmechanism on the base. An artillery-likerecoil cylinder was fitted on top of thebarrel. A basket arrangement was fitted onthe barrel’s base end to protect the gunnerfrom the recoiling barrel, which was only10 inches. This entire assembly wasmounted on a fixed tripod fitted to areinforced ring base fixed to the boat’s deck.

The muzzle-loaded mortar was firedeither by drop-fire or the trigger system.Adjustable elevation and traversing stopswere provided on the tripod and carriageto prevent the weapons from firing into theboat or its structures. The mortar andmachine gun could not be firedsimultaneously, but an HE round might bedirect-fired into a target, followedimmediately by .50-caliber bursts.

Coast Guard-induced modificationsprovided an extended handle to traverse themortar more effectively, and the bottom wascut out of the recoil protection basket sothat expended .50-caliber cases, previouslytrapped in the basket, would not interferewith the mortar’s recoil.

The barrel of the mortar was elevated tobetween 30 and 35 degrees, and the roundwas muzzle-loaded and then trigger-fired.It was not to be loaded for trigger-firingwhen elevated higher than 35 degrees, butit could be drop-fired from 35 to 71.5degrees elevation. The drop-firing ofmechanical time (MT) fused rounds wasnot authorized.

HE rounds were used for direct andhigh-angle fire against enemy watercraftand shore targets. White phosphorus (WP)could be used for the same purpose or to

PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Gordon L. Rottman is a retired master sergeant with active SpecialForces, National Guard airborne infantry and LRRP, and Army Reserve MilitaryIntelligence experience. He is currently a special operations scenario writerfor Cubic Applications, Inc., Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La.He has published 25 military history books. His e-mail is [email protected].

lay smoke screens, either to blind the enemy or to screen friendlymovements. WP rounds impacting on the surface of the watercreated a smoke screen between the boat and the enemy craft orthe shore. Illumination rounds were ideal for providingillumination to identify suspect watercraft at night. In theory atleast, the direct-fire mortar could engage helicopters at close ranges(approximately 1,000 meters) by firing HE rounds with variabletime (VT) fuses to achieve an air burst. It is doubtful that thiswas ever tested, much less actually attempted, but it may still beviable.

The mortar was 65 inches long from the muzzle to therear end of the recoil basket, and it had a height of 47inches from the base of the tripod to the top of the

machinegun (33 inches from base of tripod to centerline of 81mmbarrel). The weapon stood higher, though, as it was normallymounted atop a raised base ring. The mortar and tripod weighed593 pounds without the 84-pound machinegun. It had an effectivedirect-fire range of approximately 1,000 meters and, in the high-angle indirect fire mode, some 3,900 meters. Its direct-fireminimum safe range was 50 meters. Its rate of fire was 10 roundsper minute (rpm) trigger-fired and 18 rpm drop-fired. It could beelevated from 0 to 71.5 degrees and depressed from 0 to 30 degreeswithout depression stops. Its line-of-sight, open yoke-type sight,allowed accurate direct-fire and reasonably accurate indirect fire.

The 81mm Mk 2 Mod 1 mortar could be mounted in the cargobed of an M998A1 or M1038A1 cargo/troop carrier HMMWV,with an add-on armor kit to allow 360-degree traverse. This mightnecessitate a steel reinforcing plate in the cargo bed to support themount, but this would provide additional mine protection. A readyammunition locker, protected from small arms fire andfragmentation, would be fitted in the forward end of the cargobed, and .50-caliber ammunition racks could be fitted over thewheel wells. Although the Navy version did not have a shield,some were retrofitted and a shield might be advisable for closecombat. One small crew operates two weapons with a broad rangeof capabilities from a single mobile weapons station, greatlyincreasing the system’s capabilities. A crew of four would berequired—squad leader/gunner, loader/fuse-setter, ammunitionhandler, and driver.

The effects of the different 81mm rounds — and the abilityto employ them in the direct-fire role — make it an extremelyversatile weapon for MOUT. Direct or indirect HE fire withsuper quick (SQ) fuses would be excellent against personneland soft targets. Direct-fire hits on lightly armored and thin-skinned vehicles would also be effective. Multiple direct hitswith SQ fusing could also be used to open breach holes inbuildings and walls. HE set for 0.5-second delay would beextremely effective against buildings and field fortifications.The HE round is sufficiently robust (thick-walled) to penetratemasonry and other typical construction materials and detonateinside causing a tremendous amount of damage. When firedat a low-angle, delay-fused rounds can be skipped off the groundjust short of a target to airburst above it. WP rounds may beused for close-in smoke screening, while delay-fused WP roundscan be used to penetrate building walls and create incendiaryeffects. Another means of creating an incendiary effect wouldbe to set the MT fuse on illumination rounds to 10 seconds,fire it through a building window or other opening, and then

eject the magnesium flare after the round impacted inside thebuilding. Illumination rounds may be fired from the Mk 2 mortarin the normal manner as well.

A possible technique is to mount a small laser range finder onthe mortar and a range scale with corresponding delay times forMT fuses fitted on a bracket beside the sight for the loader to setthe fuse. The target is lased, the MT fuse set for the range, andthe round trigger-fired to air burst over the target.

The Navy effectively employed HE rounds with variable time(VT) fuses from the direct-fire mortar with both direct and indirectfires. These were used to achieve air bursts over troops in theopen and those concealed in open-topped firing positions and densevegetation. WP air bursts in this manner were also effective todrive the enemy out of open positions and other cover. The Navyfielded the 81mm Mk 120 Mod 0 antipersonnel round in 1969.This unique round was used only in the direct-fire mortar. Theblunt-nosed cartridge contained 1,300 1¼-inch long flechettes(small fin-stabilized darts) intended for direct fire on close-rangetargets, mainly personnel. It was loaded, then trigger-fired with amaximum effective range of 183 meters to defend against nearambushes on rivers and canals. It was also effective in strippingcamouflage from concealed bunkers. When fired, the cartridgeactivated within 3 meters of the muzzle to spray flechettes in ashotgun-like blast. Such a round might fulfill the requirementsfor an antipersonnel round now being developed for the 105mmStryker mobile gun.

The .50-caliber machine gun using armor-piercing incendiaryammunition would make this weapon system even more versatile,as it provides a direct fire capability that is effective againstpersonnel, buildings, light field fortifications, thin-skinnedvehicles, and helicopters. The fact that both mortar and machinegun can be elevated to 71.5 degrees makes the system especiallyuseful in MOUT. A Mk 19 grenade machine gun could be mountedinstead of a .50-caliber. Other options include the 25mm ObjectiveCrew Served Weapon (36.6 lbs) or the 30mm ASP-30 combatsupport weapon (114.6 lbs). These weapons are highly effectivein MOUT.

Whether or not the direct-fire mortar mounted on a HMMWVis employed as a replacement for the Stryker mortar carrier or toaugment it is a moot point. The most effective means and at whatechelon it would be assigned would have to be determined throughfield exercises and computer war-gaming. Three HMMWVs canbe carried in a C-130 transport, six in a C-141B, eight in a C17A,and 15 in a C-5A. Two can be sling-loaded under a CH-47D andone under a UH-60A. The vehicle-mounted, direct-fire 81mmmortar and .50-caliber combination would be an ideal fire supportsystem for light, airborne, and air assault infantry battalions inMOUT and virtually any other environment with perhaps fourassigned to a battalion. Such a mobile system would greatlyimprove the firepower and target engagement capabilities of anylight infantry unit.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W. CHARLTON

I had 13 separate map sheets in the bustle rack of myBradley when I crossed the Line of Departure (LD) intoIraq. Each was specially cut and numbered so that my Task

Force operational graphics lined up correctly on the map. I hadthe current map sheet on my 18-by-24 inch map board while theextra map sheets were stored away in a map case. When I reachedthe end of a particular map case, I had to take the map boardapart, pull the adjacent map sheet out of the map case (hence thenumbering system), and attach the new map to the map board.Invariably, these map changes usually happened onthe move and at night. My driver and I spent nearlytwo days cutting, aligning, and marking these mapsheets prior to the start of the war. Leaderseverywhere were doing the same drill. We wereusing 1:100,000 scale map sheets for the operation.When you have to travel over 700 kilometers, youmake some sacrifices in detail to limit the numberof map sheets you have to carry. We compensatedfor the lack of detailed maps by using imagery andengineer terrain team products.

Sometimes I had to juggle both my map boardand the imagery at the same time such as when we began ourattack into Talil Airfield on the first day of the war. We hadcrossed about 200 kilometers of open desert enroute to our objectiveand then attacked right into a dense urban environment. I wasusing the 1:100,000 scale maps for the long approach march andimagery for the actual attack. Since it was a night attack, I wasalso trying to maintain control of a small flashlight so I could seeall these battle command aids.

What I should have spent the entire time focusing on was thesmall screen attached to my COAX door. It had been accuratelytracking my location as well as the location of my key leaders andadjacent units the whole time. It had a database of maps of various

BAPTISM

BY

FIREOne Lieutenant

Colonel’sConversion toDigital Battle Command

scales and satellite imagery for all of Iraq. Of course, I’m describingthe Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Battalion (FBCB2)system. 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) received a lesssophisticated version called the BLUEFOR tracking system. It didn’thave all the refinements of the full FBCB2 suite, but it did offer basicmessaging and situational awareness capabilities. Contractorsinstalled the systems in key leader vehicles throughout the division.They also gave us crash courses on how to use the system.

So why wasn’t I using the system that much on the first attack ofthe war? The answer is simple: confidence. I had only received ashort burst of training on the system and had never really put it to the

test. I knew how to use it but did not have enoughexperience with this new battle command system to giveme the confidence to rely on it in combat. As a result, Ifell back on my “Old School” battle command techniquesof juggling maps in the turret of a Bradley. I didn’tcompletely ignore the new system … I just didn’t fightwith it. I managed to make it through the first coupledays of combat using my trusty map sheets but little didI know that my days of relying on paper map productswere about to come to an end. My own personaltransformation to digital battle command would come

during our operations in a little Iraqi hotspot called As Samawa.Task Force 1-15 Infantry initially wasn’t supposed to fight in

As Samawa. We were headed northwest to linkup with 2ndBrigade Combat Team south of Karbala. However, shortly afterwe began our movement west, I received a fragmentary order tomove to As Samawa and relieve 3/7 Cavalry. Our mission was toisolate As Samawa from the V Corps main supply route to thesouth. Saddam Fedayeen forces had infested As Samawa and werea tremendous threat to logistics units moving along the supplyroute. The problem was that I didn’t have any imagery of thetown since we hadn’t planned on fighting there. This meant wehad to use our 1:100,000 scale maps to produce operational

So why wasn’t Iusing the system

that much on the firstattack of the war?

The answer issimple:

confidence.


Photo by Sergeant First Class David Dismukes

Baptism

by

FireMy Conversionto Digital BattleCommand

change to imagery (and zoom in on the imagery too), change scale,and even change the color of the grid lines on the map (actually avery handy feature). I didn’t have to worry about changing mapsheets — the screen updated as I moved. I didn’t need a flashlight toread the maps and imagery since the screen had an adjustablebacklight. The FBCB2 imagery wasn’t quite as clear as a hard copyproduct but it was definitely suitable for every mission we executed.It enabled us to navigate through the narrow streets and alleys ofBaghdad or determine if a canal road was suitable for tracked vehiclemovement. I relied solely on FBCB2 imagery for all urban operations.If I had to pick the single best thing about FBCB2, it would be themaps and imagery capabilities.

Even though I had a limited number of systems in my Task Force,FBCB2 greatly improved my abilityto battle track friendly units and

improve my overall situationalawareness. I not only knew where

my scouts and companycommanders were; I also knew thelocation of all adjacent units andcommand posts. This greatlyfacilitated linkups. I didn’t have tocall and get a location of a companycommander. I could see his iconon the screen and FBCB2 wouldguide me to his location. I amcertain that FBCB2 battle

tracking capabilities wereinstrumental in preventingfratricide. This was particularlyimportant in urban areas wherefriendly units frequently

converged and were often maskedby buildings and other structures.Finally, FBCB2 allowed me to trackthe progress of the battle and knowif things were going according toplan. When my Task Force seizeda key highway intersection south

of Baghdad, I could see the companycommander icons at each blockingposition and I knew we had controlof the objective. That cut down on

a lot of radio traffic and allowed leaders to concentrate on the fightinstead of giving frequent situation reports.

Shortly after arriving at As Samawa, my Task Force received themission to send a company-sized force to seize a piece of terrain tothe west and establish blocking positions. The mission was similarto the one the Task Force was given in As Samawa: isolate the built-up area and protect the V Corps supply route to the south. I had fourcompanies (two armor and two mechanized infantry) so the loss ofcombat power would not degrade my operations in As Samawa. Theproblem was that the company’s objective was seventy kilometerswest of As Samawa. There would be no way to communicate withmy separated company using our organic FM radios. Even usinga RETRANS station, the distance was too far (FM radios weretypically good for about 10–20 kilometers during the war). Thecompany Enlisted Tactical Air Controller had satellitecommunications but that could only be used for controlling close

graphics. The graphics were almost useless since the maps showedvirtually no detail of the As Samawa urban area. Fortunately, one ofmy company commanders was getting pretty skilled at using theFBCB2 graphics feature, and he transferred my acetate graphics todigits. What an amazing difference it made. We could switch mapscales and even use digital imagery allowing us to see every street inthe town in relation to our graphic control measures. We used theMission Data Loader (MDL) to transfer the graphics to every systemin the Task Force, and we were ready to go.

Even though I was impressed with the abilities of the FBCB2system, I still wasn’t confident enough to go fully digital - I wasstill fighting off my map board. My complete conversion to digitalbattle command would not come until the infamous sandstorm ofMarch 23, 2003. We wereconducting a reconnaissance inforce to find and destroy SaddamFedayeen forces. I was planningon using the sandstorm as cover forour movement, and we planned touse railroad tracks as a handrail toguide us into our positions. I hadtwo scout sections along to providesurveillance on the objective. Bothcompany commanders and the scoutshad FBCB2 as did my track. Wewere all using FBCB2 1:50,000scale maps to track our movementsince the sandstorm created “zerovisibility” conditions. We wereliterally moving by dead reckoningthrough the sandstorm, using theFBCB2 system.

We ran into problems abouthalfway through the movement whenwe tried to navigate around the AsSamawa train station. Even the1:50,000 maps did not show all thedetails of the train station. Vehicleswere getting stuck on the convergingtracks and had to maneuver aroundseveral buildings that weren’tidentified on the maps. The sandstormmade it impossible to see oursurroundings and we had several breaks in contact. One of thecompany commanders suggested we all switch from maps to imageryand would then be able to see the details of the train station and helpus get around it. We were literally maneuvering by instruments likepilots do in bad weather but the imagery and GPS functions of theFBCB2 system allowed us to bypass the train station in the middle ofa sandstorm. The experience of being forced to use and rely on FBCB2during a combat mission under impossible weather conditionscompleted my conversion to digital battle command. I never usedanother paper map product for the rest of the war and fought everyfight thereafter using FBCB2.

Digital Battle Command: What Works WellFBCB2 has revolutionized tactical battle command in many ways.

I’ve already mentioned the digital maps and imagery as being atremendous capability. I literally had the entire countries of Kuwaitand Iraq at my fingertips. I could pan across the maps, zoom in,


need to increase the funding and fieldingpriorities for digital battle command systems.I would include Intelligence, Surveillance,and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems in the toppriority category as well but we’ll stick todigital battle command systems for now.Simply put, we need to convert our entiremilitary to interconnected digital battlecommand systems. Every tank, helicopter,ship, supply truck, and command post shouldbe equipped with some type of digital battlecommand system. Many of our mechanizedtactical operations centers are still based onarchaic M577s and modular tents. Everycommand post in the military must be mobile,survivable, interconnected, and digital. Thereal challenge will be providing digital battlecommand systems to dismounted infantry andspecial operations forces, but today’stechnology has solutions for them as well.

Digital battle command must be fullyintegrated into our doctrine and ourinstitutional training. Officers and enlistedSoldiers should be trained at every level onthese systems and how to use them toenhance planning and execution of military

air support and for emergency medicalevacuations. The only way I could maintaindaily communications with the company wasthrough FBCB2. Because the FBCB2 systemwe were using was all satellite based, grounddistance was not an issue and I was able tosend and receive text messages with myseparated company. The Task Force waseventually pulled off As Samawa, and wemoved about 200 kilometers to link up with2nd BCT south of Karbala. I still had acompany securing the separate objective butwe were able to maintain continuouscommunication and FBCB2 allowed them tolater linkup with us south of Karbala. Theentire separate company mission simplywould not have been possible without thesatellite communication capabilities ofFBCB2.

The Road to Digital BattleCommand

This article has discussed the FBCB2system and its employment in combat. Inthe course of our operations, we identifiedsome potentially useful improvements thatcould be made to the system, but these arebetter addressed in another forum, lest wereveal potential vulnerabilities in anunclassified medium. FBCB2’s capabilitieswere decisive during combat operations inIraq. Never before have ground commandersbeen able to navigate, maintain situationalawareness, and communicate to the degreethey could using FBCB2 during OperationIraqi Freedom. This was the first time thesystem was used on a large scale in combatand it was a huge success. FBCB2 helpedprevent fratricide and enabled U.S.commanders to conduct operations at a muchmore rapid pace than the enemy. I simplynever want to go into combat without FBCB2— it’s that good.

The real purpose of this article is to providefeedback on the advantages of using a digitalbattle command system in combat. This issuegoes beyond the context of a particularmachine or system. The compelling issue isthat the Army and Department of Defense

Command and control vehicles line up outside the Task Force 1-15 Infantry Tactical OperationsCenter in western Baghdad. One M577 contained FBCB2.

LTC John W. Charlton briefs reporters south of Baghdad using satellite imagery. “Hard copy” imag-ery allowed leaders to identify the details of urban areas but was large and bulky. FBCB2 containeddigital imagery for the entire country of Iraq and was more practical and easier to fight with.

Courtesy photos


Lieutenant Colonel John W. Charlton is thecommander of 1-15 Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division(Mechanized). His battalion recently returnedfrom 13 months of t raining and combatoperations in Kuwait and Iraq. Task Force 1-15Infantry fought eight major engagements during21 days of intense combat during Operation IraqiFreedom and was the first U.S. unit to attackacross the Euphrates River toward Baghdad. Hehas a master’s degree in computer informationsystems and is a graduate of the Army’s Schoolof Advanced Military Studies.

operations. Our Army and Joint doctrineshould be updated to exploit the capabilitiesof these new systems just like we updatedoctrine to exploit the capabilities of newweapon systems. Our training and doctrineshould allow our Soldiers to master digitalbattle command systems so they aren’tforced to convert to using it during combatlike I did.

Maybe I didn’t have enough training ordidn’t fully understand the full capabilitiesof the FBCB2 system and perhaps the“FBCB2 Lite” version that we were usingpales in comparison with the real thing. Allthat is probably true, but misses the point. Ifought in combat with a very good digitalbattle command system that had some minorproblems and — based on my experience —I am convinced that digital battle commandis the key to success in current and futureconflicts. As we look at lessons learned fromOperation Iraqi Freedom, we need to embracedigital battle command and recognize itsimportance in twenty-first centurywarfighting.

The military services often consignthe whole of moral leadership tothe realm of rectitude — that is,

the individual leader as an upright, honestindividual. There is nothing at all wrongwith expecting leaders to behave in anethical manner, but leadership is morecomplex than that. One could not describeNapoleon as a particularly moral or ethicalman — in fact, quite the opposite. Yet, hehad great moral authority over his Soldiers.

Why?There is good reason for demanding that

today’s leaders be moral in their behavior.It is rather hard to demand high moralsfrom Soldiers if their leaders are not moralthemselves. It is just this lack of moralitythat results in situations such as My Lai.

How do leaders obtain authority? First,they get it through law. There are statutesthat govern leadership in the military calledArmy Regulations, which prescribepenalties if orders are not obeyed. Thislegal basis for orders has been a vital partof successful military forces, almost sincethe first Soldiers. Roman infantry leaders,by law, were given enormous control oftheir Soldiers.

Roman commanders could punish theirSoldiers for the simplest offenses. For entireunits that did not do their duty in battle, therewas the judgment of decimation — theexecution of every tenth man until all weregone or the punishment was suspended.

During World War II, commanders alsohad considerable legal authority, butbecause of the excesses at LitchfieldDisciplinary Barracks in England and theaftermath of the scandal — the DoolittleBoard — much of the power of the officercorps to discipline Soldiers at lower levelswas taken away. Today, officers have muchless legal authority at lower levels.

An officer, or NCO for that matter,achieves authority by being a professional— that is, being a better Soldier than allthose under his command. Obviously,Soldiers are not going to follow a completeidiot into battle — at least, not for long.

The Army develops its professional coreof officers by using a system of mentoring,increasing responsibilities, and training.Officers start at low levels, and then by bothexperience and training are entrusted withgreater and greater responsibilities. Mostarmies today use a similar system. It worksand has worked for hundreds of years.

But the most important aspect ofsuccessful leadership is the level of moralauthority used by leaders to win in battle.History shows that this is a matter ofsituations often outside the control of theleader concerned. The leader may inherita situation for which moral authority cannotproduce obedience or may be too farremoved to exercise it.

Take the Duo, as they were called inWorld War I — Field Marshal Paul vonHindenburg and General Eric Ludendorff.They, in effect, ruled Germany for aboutthe last 14-15 months of the war. At theend, they lacked moral authority because iteroded over time, and they, particularly

Ludendorff, did not understand the concept,or did not care that it had eroded. Theironly answer was to enforce disciplinerigidly, but this did not make the situationany better. The rot had progressed beyondthe power of discipline to restore the balance.

Another case involves a battalioncommander in Vietnam as recorded byKeith Nolan in Ripcord: Screaming EaglesUnder Siege, Vietnam, 1970. Thecommander — Lieutenant Colonel AndreLucas — is a subject of differing opinionsin his own battalion. There are those wholike him — largely in the officer or seniorNCO ranks — and those who do not —normally private Soldiers. The formerbelieved that Lucas was a competentcommander, and the latter thought he

risked their lives without carefulconsideration.

The principal reason for this has nothingto do with Lucas himself but the way heexercises command. The system of usinga command and control helicopter in battlehad begun long before he arrived inVietnam. It was used by all the majorcommanders as a way to “see” thebattlefield, but how much of the battle theyactually saw was open to question. Incertain types of terrain, this worked, butnot in the area around II Corps. There theterrain restricted visibility so that while thebattle was going on, and the commanderwas trying to exercise control, he could notreally see anything. He depended solelyon what he was being told through radioconversation.

This is what griped the “grunts.” Theycould not believe that Lucas could see whatwas going on, or get a feeling for the actionsimply by listening to his companycommanders through his radiotelephone.There is some truth to this, and the gruntswanted him to come down to ground leveland be with them all the time.

They concluded this on the basis of theorders he gave, and his frequentdisagreements with the companycommanders of his own units who wereright there. One captain ruined his careerby directly challenging his commander’stactical view of the situation. Nolan pointsout, though, that this had some effect onLucas, and on the attack — to which thecaptain had objected — was later called off.

In one of the final chapters of the book,Captain Hawkins and his company havebeen having a very successful operationuntil Lucas orders them to move along aparticular line to a new location. Thecaptain does not want to go this waybecause he believes — rightly, as it turnsout — that he is heading into a potentialambush. Lucas had a skewed opinion ofwhat was going on. He could see parts ofthe terrain better than his troops on theground, but that was all. They had a feelingabout the situation that he could not be a

BURTON WRIGHT III

The Hardest Key to Leadership:

Moral Authority at the Small Unit Level

... the most important aspect ofsuccessful leadership is the

level of moral authority used byleaders to win in battle.


The late Dr. Burton Wright, III, served on active duty in the 7th InfantryDivision; in the Weapons Department of the Infantry School; and as anassistant professor of military science, Missouri Western State College. Hewas serving as the U.S. Army Chemical Branch historian in Fort LeonardWood, Mo., at the time this article was written. He was a 1966 ROTC graduateof Creighton University, and held a master’s degree and a doctorate fromFlorida State University.

part of. He could not understand because he wasn’t on the ground.Unlike the grunts, Lucas had a better view of the larger picture,

but he may not have articulated that to those on the ground. Hisknowledge in space and time was better from his perch high above,and he was in contact with other units, other sources of information,and he had to put them together while directing a battle he couldnot physically see.

Today, the Army is transforming itself by using technology.No longer will officers be able to view the entire number of theirSoldiers over a long battlefield. Their vision, however, may be abit better because the drones above the battle will be able to seethrough fog, trees, etc., to show the enemy’s true layout. Thismust be made clear to the troops so that they know the commandercan see the whole picture, including their smaller part of it.

But if moral authority depends to a degree on physical presence,this could be a problem in the future. Leaders will now be voiceson a radio system, and the problems of the Vietnam commandand control ships will be compounded even more. What if acommander of a major unit is removed, and a new voicecomes on line that the subordinates may or may notrecognize. Are you likely to obey someone you don’t knowsimply because that person’s rank issuperior?

In other words, the more remotetechnology makes commanders, the harderit will be for them to exercise the force ofmoral authority. This could be a biggerproblem in the technological age.Technology, to some degree, separatesSoldiers from their leaders and from otherSoldiers as well. They can do more bythemselves. This tends to reinforce the ideaof independence when someone knowstechnology and uses technology instead ofanother individual with less knowledge.

For instance, what if you know how to make a program workon the computer, and your boss doesn’t really know how to do it?Who is superior now? The boss still is, by the threat of moralauthority, but how long will that last under stress?

The biggest problem will be at the small unit level whereindividuals command by force of presence and ability, notnecessarily by law. At the end of World War I, Hindenburg andLudendorff may have controlled their immediate levels ofcommand, but they did not control the larger units of their ownarmy. The Soldiers would defend but would no longer attack.

By April 1918, the German army was on its last legs. Officershad trouble getting their Soldiers to do much more than defendagainst attacks. Morale had reached rock bottom. Ludendorff inparticular blamed everyone but himself for the situation.

He viewed the problems as a lack of discipline. To some degree,he was right, but there can be no useful discipline in the long runif there is no moral authority. When an officer orders an NCO topunish a Soldier for a transgression, what happens if the NCOdoes not act on the order? The German Army was tired, it nolonger had any fight left in it, and the Soldiers wanted to go home.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff failed to realize that they had losttheir moral authority. After the end of the war, they blamed the“spineless” civilians who “stabbed them in the back” when it wasthe Army’s own fault for their lack of victory. This would lead to

an unfortunate repetition with Hitler and the German Army. Inthe end, the loss of World War II was their fault and not his.

Moral authority in combat is based on two pillars—that thesubordinates believe the commander issuing the orders has agood tactical understanding of the situation and trust him, andthat the individual giving the orders has been on the groundand not orbiting over the battlefield in a command and controlship.

You will never get the Soldiers to believe a commander hasthe knowledge unless they see him on the ground with them.That’s where moral authority comes from and history supportsthis.

Napoleon’s morality wasn’t of the best, but thousands ofFrenchmen died for him all over the world, with many shouting“Vive le’ Emperor!” Why? Because he had demonstrated hiscourage many times before, and he could often be found up frontwhere his Soldiers could see him.

Frederick the Great cared little about his Soldiers as humanbeings, and that’s a matter of fact. Whether they were fed or

clothed interested him little — only what they coulddo in combat mattered. Frederick’s generalship

was often suspected as he won as many battlesas he lost. He was often careless with tactical

dispositions and as a result, his army lostthousands of men.

Yet these very same Soldiers wouldgladly have died for him. Was it the irondiscipline of the Prussian Army orsomething else? Frederick, whatever elsehis tactical faults were — and he hadmany — was seen up front with the men.They believed that up front, he knew whathe was doing and so followed his orders.

That hasn’t really changed in warthrough the centuries. Commanders must

be on the spot. When General Berry was in Vietnam with the101st would often spend a night with troops on the firebase whenhe could have been back at division main having a drink and asteak dinner.

His choosing to spend time with his troops magnified his moralauthority over them. They followed because he showed he caredby sharing their dangers. Remember that Joshua Chamberlainof the 20th Maine in the American Civil War had great moralauthority over his men because he stood up in the middle of hisposition on Little Round Top right with them. He didn’t directhis regiment from a safer place to the rear.

Robert E. Lee removed two brigade commanders fromcommand after Gettysburg for commanding from the rear. Lee,too, understood that the force of moral authority is based on beingthere, up front. Technology must take that into considerationand find a way to compensate for it, or the system will fail.


MEDICAL AND CASUALTY EVACUATION FROM POINT OF INJURY TO LEVEL II CARE:

CAPTAIN CRAIG W. BUKOWSKI

“Casualty evacuation requires extensive plans,preparations, battlefield initiative, andcoordination. The effectiveness of casualtyevacuation influences the unit’s morale andcombat effectiveness.”

— FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion

Successful medical and casualty evacuation at the NationalTraining Center (NTC), other Combat Training Centers (CTC),and in combat scenarios largely depends on quality medicaltreatment and rapid evacuation to some type of definitive care. Itsounds simple, but getting to that level of success depends uponcomprehensive planning, systems, and training to standard. Therehave been three major negative trends affecting medical andcasualty evacuation at the NTC in the past year.

Those three trends are:�Lack of home station medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and

casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) training,�Lack of established standing operating procedures (SOPs), and

�Inadequate medical planning.Identifying and addressing these prior to any deployment will

greatly enhance success on any battlefield. This article reviewsthose trends and offers a way to be successful concerning medicaland casualty evacuation from the point of injury (POI) to a LevelII medical treatment facility (MTF). The NTC, like the otherCombat Training Centers, is not the place to learn how to conductcombat and support operations — it’s the place to learn how to dothem better.

A task must first be understood and practiced to a baselinelevel of competency before it can be improved upon.

The first trend observed is a lack of home station medicaltraining. Failure to adequately train prior to deployment is anissue faced by most battalion task forces (BN TF).

The TF usually conducts ranges, company lanes, and a BNfield training exercise (FTX) prior to any deployment. Normally,medical platoon personnel provide range and lane coverage for

WHAT EVERY

INFANTRY

LEADER

SHOULD KNOW

real-world injuries only. During the BN FTX, the medical platoonestablishes the battalion aid station (BAS) and practices sendingambulances or treatment teams forward if they are lucky. Rarelydo they ever see any simulated casualties and almost never evacuatethem to a Level II MTF. Enhanced first aid (provided by combatlifesavers), emergency medical treatment (provided by company/platoon medics/trauma specialists, MOS 91W) and evacuationfrom the POI seldom occurs. When a BN TF conducts its firstfew force-on-force battles at the NTC, the killed in action (KIA)rates are usually well above 70 percent .

The contributing factors to this excessive KIA rate are timeand distance, poor land navigation, and communication. Mostcasualties are evacuated, but not in the appropriate time to savethem based on their injuries.

Time and distance factors are especially real at the NTC and incombat theaters of operations like Afghanistan and Iraq. Thehilltop just over the valley that appears a few kilometers away tothe inexperienced is actually 10 or 12 kilometers away. The desertthat appears flat is in fact riddled with hidden wadis/depressionsand unseen washboards that slow vehicular travel to a crawl. Unitsare not accustomed to training for CASEVAC and MEDEVACoperations over such long distances. If land navigation skills arepoor and driving with night vision goggles (NVGs) is not familiar,the ambulances and non-standard CASEVAC vehicles will getlost. Communications are also easily cut off by these long distancesand mountains that loom up from the desert floor, adding to a lossof situational understanding.

Units able to identify the trend of ignoring medical and casualtyevacuation training during home station training events, and thataggressively plan for the such operations tend to have higher successrates at the NTC. One way is to deliberately plan medical events.

Medics from Task Force 1-64 from the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart,Ga. evacuate a simulated causality during a combined live fire exercise.

Sergeant First Class David Dismukes


Plan for exercises that require the useof combat lifesavers, company/platoonmedics, and require casualty and/or medicalevacuation from POI to the BAS using bothstandard and non-standard evacuationassets.

Incorporate the use of simulatedcasualties in realistic settings. Enforceproper treatment protocols and evacuationprocedures creating realistic constraintsand stress.

Incorporate night driving and mountednavigation into all training exercises. Testthe communications systems over roughterrain and extended distances. Requirethe use of OE-254 antennas, proper radioprocedures, and reporting.

These tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTPs) — when incorporatedinto CO/BN FTXs — will allow the medicalplatoon, companies, and combat trains toestablish communications procedures.

The second major trend observed is thelack of SOPs. SOPs and/or Combat ServiceSupport (CSS) and medical drills enablethe modular medical concept to workeffectively.

Procedures and/or drills mightbe simply defined as a standard wayfor completing common tasksoccurring on the battlefieldrepetitively in the same basicmanner that has been proveneffective. As an observer controllerat the NTC, it has occurred to methat there are three major groupsof procedures/drills that must beestablished for evacuating thecasualty from the POI to a Level IIMTF or an ambulance exchangepoint (AXP) that affect the medicalplatoon/BAS operations. Thoseprocedures/drills are required fromthe POI to the casualty collectionpoint (CCP), from the CCP to theBAS, and from the BAS to theLevel II MTF or an AXP.

Establishing a procedure or drillfor POI to CCP rests mostly withthe company/platoon medics andthe first sergeant. Battle drills andtactical standing operatingprocedures (TSOPs) should be

established on how they will getthe casualty from the fightingposition or vehicle to the CCP.This requires coordination forsignals involving casualty

marking, identification, repositioning offorces, and certain triggers requiringspecific actions involving medicalpersonnel and non-standard CASEVACvehicles. The system concludes with a

proven method for triage at the CCPincorporating the use of delayed,immediate, minimal, and expectant(DIME) areas. Success is achieved if thesystem allows for quick evacuation fromPOI to CCP and rapid initial treatment isadministered to the most severely injured first.If the marking system or triage method isn’tsynchronized, less critical casualties willinadvertently get treated before the mostcritical. Once an effective system isestablished, it must be understood by everySoldier and leader. Always incorporatecombat lifesavers (CLS) and consider theuse and placement of non-standardevacuation assets. Some units now haveMGators, (modified all terrain vehicles)which the first sergeants usually controls(one per company). These MGators areespecially useful to evacuate casualties fromplatoon CCPs to the company CCP and insome instances, to the BAS.

In figure 4.1, the company CCP islocated in a covered and concealed positionwith the company trains. The platoon CCPsare located at the platoon’s rear. All CCPsare identified with both day and nightmarking systems and contain a triage area.Non-standard CASEVAC vehicles arepositioned forward with a M996 or M997ground ambulance designated for littercasualties at the company CCP. The firstsergeant coordinates patient flow betweenthe platoon CCPs and the company CCPwhile the senior company medic conducts

figure 4.1

Specialist Adam Nuelken

During training, Sergeant Crystal Hoon (left) testsInfantryman Private John Shuman (right) on clearingan obstructed airway.


triage. Communication of 9 line MEDEVAC requests areconducted via the company trains assets or ambulances back tothe BAS and S1 and S4.

“Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage,munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columnsand in their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere withthe movements of troops and will still be near at hand.”

— Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini

The procedure/drill from CCP to BAS focuses largely ondistance, routes and security, and operational procedures at theBAS. “Operational procedures” refers to the set up andfunctionality of the BAS with regards to patient flow, triage,treatment, and various other functions required for successfuloperation. In some cases, the BAS will split into two treatmentteams: the main aid station (MAS) and a forward aid station(FAS). Often, the MAS and FAS will conduct echelonment(bounding) during an offensive operation to maintain doctrinaldistance during the fight. Whether evacuation is from CCP to theMAS, FAS or BAS, the system essentially remains the same.

Doctrinal distance is considered to be 1 to 4 kilometers and/or1 or 2 terrain features behind the unit supported, emphasizingmission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civilianconsiderations (METT-TC). Failure to maintain this is a commonerror. Usually, the distance becomes extended due to poorplanning, failure to commit medical assets forward, lack of clearlydefined triggers, or communications failures.

Movement of medical assets must be carefully planned duringthe military decision making process (MDMP), especially duringthe wargaming phase, and incorporated into task force synchmatrices, decision support templates (DST), and executionchecklists in order to ensure that the medical plan is well integratedand synchronized with the tactical plan. This is crucial in order

Figure 5.1 Operational Procedures at a Level I MTF(BAS,MAS, FAS)

to strike a balance between minimizing evacuation times anddistances, and protecting medical assets.

Routes and security must be clearly defined, reconnoitered, andrehearsed. Short concealed routes are optimal, but are not alwaysan option. If concealment isn’t an option, then additional securityis needed. Commanders are not usually willing to sacrifice combatpower to secure medical assets. It’s definitely a calculated riskoften overlooked during home station training due to the lack ofOPFOR and minimal training time. The best solution seen inrecent rotations at the NTC is to strategically place non-standard5-ton cargo vehicles with mounted .50 caliber machine guns. Thisnot only offers non-standard CASEVAC, but enhanced securityas well.

Finally, the BAS, MAS, or FAS must have a viable system ofpatient flow. This is where the operational procedures for theLevel I MTF (BAS, MAS, FAS) are realized. There must be clearlymarked entrance and exit routes for traffic, clearly marked patientdownload areas, and an established DIME casualty triage area.The patients should flow through treatment according toprecedence and be organized into a holding/staging area forevacuation to an AXP or Level II MTF. One method for this isprovided in Figure 5.1.

Not depicted are the landing zone for MEDEVAC andCASEVAC aircraft and a temporary morgue for KIAs and DOWs.The landing zone should be marked and placed according toMETT-TC and specific aircraft requirements. The mortuary affairscollection point (MACP) should be placed nearby and out of viewfrom the patients. If the BAS is colocated with the combat trains,the S4 should be consulted for placement. KIAs are not consideredto be a medical responsibility and are not to be transported withcasualties or in a medical evacuation vehicle. FLAs depicted infigure 5.1 is a non-doctrinal reference to an M997 or M996 groundambulance.

The third system involves evacuation from the BAS, MAS, orFAS to an AXP or Level II MTF. A Level II MTF is established

by the forward support medical company (FSMC) inthe brigade support area (BSA) or a treatment team fromthe FSMC may locate with a forward logistics element(FLE) and establish a Level I MTF. The differencebetween Level I and Level II care is the addition ofdental, lab, X-ray, and patient hold capabilities.Coordination must be done between the TF medicalplatoon leader, FSMC CDR and BDE medical plannersfor locations of AXPs, FSMC, treatment teams withLevel l FLEs, and availability of air evacuation assets,both medical and non-standard. Distances should be asshort as possible and triggers must be established. TheFSMC is responsible for transporting casualties fromthe BAS to level II. Graphics, rehearsals, and landnavigation are crucial to success. Communications arealso critical for command and control (C2) of evacuationassets rearward. One way is shown in figure 6.1

The third trend observed is the lack of or inadequatemedical planning. The best intentions and highestmotivation still cannot solidify a poorly plannedoperation.


Figure 6.1

Specialist Adam Nuelken

When this article was written, Captain CraigW. Bukowski was the Light Infantry Task ForceMedical Trainer for the National Training Center atFort Irwin, Calif.

Field manual 4-02.4, Medical PlatoonLeader’s Handbook, provides definitiveguidance on health service support (HSS)planning for medical platoon operations.The Medical Service Corps (MS)lieutenant, who is the acting platoon leader90 percent of the time, oversees platoonoperations for the surgeon and conductsmost of the medical planning. TheProfessional Officer Filler System(PROFIS) physician and PA may assist theMS lieutenant with the HSS planning. TheMS lieutenant needs to spearhead themedical planning for the TF, with the PAand BN surgeon as the medical technicalexperts.

When MDMP, mission analysis, andcourse of action (COA) development occur,the MS LT needs to be there. Too often,the MS LT is not involved and the BN S4develops the medical plan. If they are lucky,the S4 and the MS LT have a good workingrelationship and information gets properlydisseminated. Primary focus during theplanning phase should be medical assetvisibility, location during the phases of theoperation, triggers, and security. Too often,planning is done on unfoundedassumptions.

Rehearsals are critical to any operationand often affect its success or failure. TheBDE combat service support (CSS)rehearsal is crucial for coordinating AXPsand evacuation to the Level II MTF. Airevacuation is also briefed along withpriority of support. At a minimum, the MSLT should attend. Many successful BNTFs use the BN CSM as a key element forCSS operations specifically focusing onCASEVAC. Often, the BN CSM willattend along with the PA and BN surgeon.

The TF CSS rehearsal is where medicalsupport and CASEVAC really cometogether. The rehearsal should be wellorganized and attendance is the key tosuccess. Usually run by the TF XO, everycompany 1SG, senior company medic, S1,S4 and TF CSM must run through theiractions throughout the operation by phase.The MS LT should be allowed to brief theHSS overview, not the S4. If the BAS splitsand conducts echelonment, (bounding) ormoves independently, the medical platoonsergeant will assume responsibility of oneaid station and should brief his actionsaccordingly during each phase of theoperation. Triggers must be solidified withactions for each. Casualty collection points,

non-standard CASEVAC platforms, andsecurity should be locked in. If conflictsarise, solutions should be devisedimmediately rather than later. Finally,graphics should be updated and, mostimportantly, disseminated down to thelowest level.

Medical and casualty evacuationtraining at home station with realisticconstraints involving real world andsimulated casualties is essential. Ensuringtime and distance factors, AXPs, and mostimportantly, evacuation from POI to LevelI MTF and Level I MTF to Level II MTFmust be visited. Without stressing theentire system prior to deployment, the unitcannot expect it to materialize during theheat of battle.

Establishing solid evacuation andtreatment procedures or drills andinvolving the entire BN TF is the first steptowards success. Improvements will bemade along with adjustments based on themission and METT-TC.

Finally, ensuring the right medical focusand involvement in the entire militaryplanning process and rehearsals solidifiesthe execution.

Successful procedures or drills that arewell planned and trained prior to executionsave lives and bolster mission success.

Private Shawn Stremmel, a Linebacker driverfor Battery B, 1st Battalion, 3d Air DefenseArtillery, performs an intravenous injection.


Q As the Chief of the Infantry, youand the Chief of Field Artillery

have joined to send the messagethroughout the Army “Indirect fires firstis the American way of War.” What doesthat mean?

A Another way to say it is, “Never send a Soldier, when a bullet (of

some caliber) will do.” The intent is for theinfantry to engage the enemy withsomebody else’s ordnance — indirect fireor close air support (CAS) or some othermeans — and we need to apply those effectsto avoid having to commit Soldiers in theclose fight.

Now, that’s not to say we are “walkingaway from the close fight” — we’re not.The close fight is what the infantry is about.

The close fight has been called the “RedZone.” I like the “Last 100 Yards.” It’s thatdirect fire rifle range of Soldiers’ eyes ontarget, day or night. The infantryman is our“final answer” after we’ve done all we canwith indirect fire effects.

So, what prompted the need for thatmessage? We’ve had some training problems

that surfaced atour CombatTraining Center(CTCs) for anynumber ofreasons. By reflex,infantrymen andtankers under-stand their directfire systems. Wetrain at theindividual level all the way up to the collectivelevel on our direct fire systems. We spend alot of time on tank gunnery, Bradley gunnery,rifle marksmanship and antitank missilesystems. That’s great — that’s what we doand we must do it well.

But when things get busy leading intothe Last 100 Yards, the first thing we needto do is call for indirect fire ... and thatalso needs to be by reflex. We’ve got toapply indirect fire and CAS planning to killthe target with anything from the M203 40-mm high explosive (HE) through 60-mm,81-mm and 120-mm mortars into theartillery of 105-mm, 155-mm to MLRS(multiple-launch rocket system) toATACMS (Army tactical missile system)— the entire panoply of indirect fires.

Part of the problem is that we don’treward the use of indirect fires at ourtraining centers well enough, particularlymortars. There’s work to be done toreplicate the real effects of fires in training.We have fire markers, but there is a delay.

In comparison, the Soldier hasimmediate satisfaction when he lays a guntube of some sort on a target and executesdirect fire. He gets the kill indicator, theblinking lights, immediately.

Feedback on indirect fires for theattacking Soldier in training is not quite assophisticated. We’re moving in the rightdirection, but we’re not there yet.

In the Last 100 Yards, the 11B NCOlooks to his lieutenant to arrange for killingfires from somebody else’s asset, not justapply direct fires, and rightly so. This isparticularly true of light infantrymen whocan’t carry all of the killing power availableon their backs.

As it is, every light infantryman carriestwo, three, four 60-mm mortar rounds tobring them into the area of operations. Buthe can’t carry enough “stowed kills” todeliver all the effects he needs. We have totrain our infantry lieutenants to call for andadjust indirect fires and captains to planand execute indirect fires by reflex.

Q What aspects of integrating and synchronizing fires and

maneuver in the close fight make it sodifficult?

A In training when Soldiers are pressing toward an objective, we

shift from 155mm to the 120mm to 81mm,60mm and 40mm to ensure the last thingthe enemy sees is an indirect round beforeour infantryman is on him. The desired endstate, of course, is to kill the enemy orrender him unable to respond to ourinfantry assault. That takes practice.

We don’t practice integrating andsynchronizing fires in home station trainingoften enough to execute them by reflex.

When Major General Dave Petraeus, CGof the 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault), was a brigade commander, he

Indirect Fires First :The American Way of War

An interview with Major General Paul D. EatonInterview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis,

Field Artillery magazine editor

This interview was conducted May 30 atFort Benning, Ga., when Major GeneralEaton was Chief of Infantry. He handed overcommand of the U.S. Army Infantry Centerand School June 9. He is currently serving asCommanding General of the CoalitionMilitary Assistance Training Team, which isresponsible for manning, equipping andtraining the new Iraqi army. This article wasalso published in Field Artillery magazine.


TRAINING NOTESstarted “walk and shoot” home stationtraining to practice those skills. He walkedaround the impact area and presenteddilemmas to his leaders, for example howto take an objective in certaincircumstances. Then he had indirect firesystems live fire to help the leaders takethe objectives. This made the lieutenant orcaptain react immediately to a combatdilemma and execute a fires and maneuvermission. (For more information on thistraining, see the article “Walk and ShootTraining” by Colonel David H. Petraeusand Major Robert A. Breman, Infantry,January-February 1997.)

Q What are the initiatives in the Infantry School to ensure the

Soldier uses indirect fires first?

A The first thing we did was recognize we had a problem.

Then we took a long look at three leaderdevelopment courses: officer’s basic course(OBC), captain’s career course (CCC) andthe precommand course (PCC). What wefound is that we focused a lot of training atthe individual knowledge level as opposedto the application of fires — how tointegrate fires with a maneuvering forcethat is constantly changing. For example,we were teaching the lieutenants how tocall for and adjust fires and the captainsindirect fire capabilities and the basics ofstatic indirect fire planning. If you want tosynchronize fires and maneuver in anoverall fight, you’ve got to get beyond these“Skill-Level Two” tasks.

What did we change? In the basic course,we pared down the knowledge-basedinstruction and gave them disks with thatinformation to study on their own. Now wefocus on not only the call-for-fire and adjustfire tasks –because those are a big part of whatthey need to know — but also on risk estimatedistances (REDS) and the concept of thespatial relationship between maneuver andfires so they can continue to echelon fires asthey maneuver. The idea is to ensure thelieutenant understands indirect fire is not anafterthought when his initial reaction fails —indirect fire is first.

Also, we just opened our GUARDFIST(guard unit armory device, full-crewinteractive simulation trainer) facility andare exploiting its capabilities to trainlieutenants to execute indirect fire missions.Before GUARDFIST, our only virtual

simulation with indirect fire was the CCTT(close combat tactical trainer), which isgreat for collective training, but not idealfor what we are trying to teach thelieutenants.

We would like to institute walk andshoot training, but resources are an issue,in terms of ammo, time and indirect fireassets to implement the training. That’s along-term goal.

In the CCC, we raised the standards ofour indirect fire instruction. We hold thestudents responsible for the informationtaught in OBC and encourage them torefresh their knowledge via the Internet.We’ve also reduced the classroom ratiofrom one instructor for every 200 studentsto one over 40 for the knowledge-basedportion of indirect fire instruction. We focusthe classroom instruction on concepts —echeloning fires, determining tacticaltriggers, working with REDS, determiningwhat rounds will give them the effects theywant, etc.— before they go into the executionphase in small group instruction. Certainly,these captains will have FSOs (fire supportofficers) to help them in their companies, butthey’re on their own during the course.

During small group instruction, theSGIs (small group instructors) train thecaptains to be rabid disciples of indirectfires. The captains have to plan operationsfor a variety of organizations, such as lightinfantry, mechanized infantry and SBCT(Stryker brigade combat team) infantry, ina number of different environments so theyunderstand the factors that affect the fight,including direct and indirect fires. If theycan’t demonstrate the ability to integratefires into their plans, they don’t graduate.

The students also execute their plansusing constructive simulations, such asJanus, BBS (brigade/battalion battlesimulation), MPARS (the mission,planning and rehearsal system) and thedevelopmental full-spectrum command(FSC). Right now, we are the only schoolwith MPARS, a great new systemchampioned by Lieutenant General(Richard A.) Cody when he was the CG ofthe 101st. Unlike Janus and BBS, MPARSprovides students a virtual look or “flythrough” capability during the fight asopposed to the old top-down God’s eyeview. It allows student companycommanders to see their simulatedinfantrymen, tanks and Bradleys along withthe effects of indirect fires as they fight —see the results of their planning, theirexecution of fires and maneuver, theirdecision making.

The key is to prepare them to employnot only mortars and artillery, but alsoArmy aviation and CAS — all forms offires available to them — beforecommitting their infantrymen. We aredrawing on the recent experiences of our75th Ranger Regiment’s use of CAS inAfghanistan.

We also are using and continuing todevelop FSC to provide an urban operationssimulations program that’s interactivevirtual combat training against a thinkingenemy, thanks to FSC’s artificialintelligence capability. FSC allows studentsto employ company-level mortars, but weneed more funding to fully integrateindirect fires, CAS and Army attackaviation — our major complaint about anotherwise excellent program.

In partnership with Major General Eaton, Major General Michael D. Maples,

Chief of Field Artillery, is working to improvethe integration of fires in the close fight. He is instituting a number ofinitiatives to improve the confidence and competence of leaders and fire sup-porters. These include “walking” shoots vice static call-for-fire training; in-creasing the rigor on instruction, such as in the two-day Light Fire SupportOfficer (FSO) Lane Training exercise for FA Officer Basic Course (FAOBC)lieutenants and 13F Fire Support Specialists; integrating close air support(CAS) into the mounted lane training for FAOBC lieutenants; increasing thetactical focus of the FA portions of the Precommand Course; increasing theoutreach to/interface with the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Combat Train-ing Centers and Infantry School; and pushing for Infantry, Army, Aviation andEngineer officers and NCOs to be assigned to the FA School to work on com-bined arms exercises and instruction.


We depend on simulations to train thesynchronization of fires with maneuver inthe schoolhouse and build the skills neededfor combat. You can do all the planningand visualizing of time-distance factors “onpaper” you want, but you must see anddirect the dynamic synchronization of firesand maneuver repetitively to be able to doit in combat — recognize when things startto break down and practice resynchronizingthem.

Q How are you preparing brigade and task force commanders to

better integrate all their available assetsin combined arms operations —including indirect fires and CAS assets?

A Not well. We only have them for two weeks before they go to Fort

Leavenworth (Kansas) for the final part ofPCC.

We’ve added a two-hour block ofinstruction on how to give commander’sguidance for fire support. We also introducethem to essential fire support tasks (EFSTS)to allow them to communicate with theirtechnical advisors, their FSCOORDs (firesupport coordinators) and FSOS. Thesenew commanders went to CGSC(Command and General Staff College, FortLeavenworth) back in the mid-1990s, andthe concept of the EFST wasn’t even in“white paper” yet. I admit that two hoursis not adequate if they are not alreadyprepared.

We are developing instruction for PCCstudents to teach them how to plan andconduct walk and shoot training at theirhome stations. Ideally, I’d like to resourcea walk and shoot with lieutenants andcaptains playing all the fire support rolesand align it with the PCC instruction as anobserved execution event. But, again, thisis a long-range goal.

Top priorities that will help commandersin home station training are increasingmortar STRAC (standards in trainingcommission) allocations to resource walkand shoots and increasing STRAC for ourfamily of full-range mortar training rounds.Walk and shoot training is becomingstandard in our light divisions. The FieldArtillery has been resourcing this trainingvery well, but we are behind on mortarrounds. Right now, units have to “harvest”mortar rounds from individual and squadtraining to have only a few to fire during

walk and shoots — not enough rounds tobe effective.

We have rewritten our combined armstraining strategy to recommend that anytime a platoon or higher trains in any FTX(field training exercise) or LFX (live-fireexercise) indirect fires be integrated-mortars and artillery. Our mortar STRACrecommendation will resource this strategyfully.

The family of full-range mortar trainingrounds will mitigate the limitations oftraining at our posts where the impact areasare either offset from our direct fire rangesor not adjacent to them at all. Because therounds don’t explode, they don’t produceduds. The rounds will allow commandersto turn virtually any live-fire exercise intoa CALFEX (combined arms live-fireexercise) using organic mortars. We alreadyhave a full-range training round for 120-mm mortars with the 60-mm round beingfielded as we speak; the 81-mm round isawaiting material release.

Q Based on what you’ve seen in the news about Operation lraqi

Freedom and read in initial reports, didunits apply indirect fires first?

A Yes. The feedback is that units applied indirect fires far more

agilely and at a faster pace than we’ve beenused to seeing. We should note that theseSoldiers trained intensely and had theluxury of some pretty sophisticated live-firetraining before they embarked on combatoperations.

The 75th Rangers’ ability to draw upon“over the shoulder” assets was very effective— hence, our interest in CAS and indirectfires.

Q What subject haven’t we discussed that we should?

A We need to be able to employ ACAS in infantry and armor

formations when we don’t have a TACP (aUSAF tactical air control party). We needto proliferate the TACP function so thatwhen we don’t have enough Air ForceETACs (enlisted tactical air controllers) inour ground force units, we can supplementwith fire supporters trained in the ETACskill sets.

Afghanistan showed that we need theETAC function at much lower levels than

we are resourced for. We already have mostof the training tools needed to train firesupporters in that function, or they areinbound. We must train and do the hardwork up front — not wait until we deployour ground forces into combat when they’llneed timely CAS.

Q What message would you like to send to Army and Marine Field

Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A You’re doing the Lord’s work, and we appreciate it. To illustrate the

infantryman’s expectations for lethalindirect fires swiftly delivered, we recentlyhad to deploy a mobile training team to fieldthe 120-mm mortar to one of our divisionsin Afghanistan because it did not deploywith artillery.

We absolutely must have a combinedarms approach to prosecuting warfare.Indirect fires, in fact, are the American wayof delivering killing power while theinfantry closes on the objective.

Major General Paul D. Eaton served asChief of Infantry from October 29,2001 untilJune 9, 2003. He is currently theCommanding General of the Coalition MilitaryAssistance Training Team (CMATT) underthe Coalition Provisional Authority.

Eaton’s previous assignments includecommanding the lst Brigade in the 3d InfantryDivision (Mechanized) in Germany; 3dBattalion, 14th lnfantry of the 10th MountainDivision (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, NewYork; and C Company, 2d Battalion, 22dInfantry in the 8th Infantry Division(Mechanized), also in Germany. Additionalassignments include serving as the AssistantDivision Commander (Maneuver) in the 1stArmored Division, Germany, where hedeployed to Bosnia in support of theStabilization Force (SFOR); DeputyCommanding General of Fort Benning andAssistant Commandant of the InfantrySchool; Deputy Commanding General forTransformation at Fort Lewis, Washington;G3 (Operations) of the 10th MountainDivision during Operation Restore Hope inSomalia; and Executive Officer to the J3 ofthe Joint Staff at the Pentagon.

He holds a master’s degree in FrenchPolitical Science from Middlebury College inParis, France, and is a graduate of the classof 1972 at the U.S. Military Academy at WestPoint.


Tactical Decision Game:Seizing and Holding an Enemy Training Center

in Afghanistan with a Tactical Air Assault

TRAINING NOTES

LESTER W. GRAU

Situation — You are the commander of an Air Assault riflecompany.

Your mission is to conduct an air assault to secure an LZ neara confirmed enemy surface-to-air missile training center(STINGERs) in Afghanistan in order to allow the remainder ofyour battalion to land and destroy the training center.

You conducted an in-depth preparation for the mission 48 hoursin advance, and were provided with detailed information on theenemy occupying the base as well as overhead imagery and detailedmaps that identified dead space in the approach to the objective,likely enemy fighting positions and fire sacs, as well as key targetsto be destroyed with indirect and Apache fires.

Your company landed on the LZ without any problems andquickly secured it, but the remainder of the battalion was cut offand forced to land 20Km from your position due to effective ADAfires from the training camp and the surrounding hills. After

driving off the remainder of the battalion, the enemy began toattack you in platoon size elements from the north and the south.

After fighting all day, your company is down to 4 magazinesper man, 400 rounds per SAW and 240B, and 50x 60mm rounds.In addition, although the remainder of the battalion is trying tobreak through to your location, they have met heavy resistanceand will not be able to reach your location until the next morning,and no supplies can be brought in by air.

You have support from 2 OH-58s and 2 Apaches, but theirability to place effective fires on the objective is limited due to theADA threat. You also have priority of fires from the Brigade’s105mm howitzer battalion.

At 2300 hours, your battalion commander called and orderedyou to conduct an attack at night to seize the training camp NLT0300 to prevent the enemy from continuing ADA training andattacks against U.S. aircraft.

You have 20 minutes to develop a concept and issue it to you subordinates.


The purpose of this article is to outline potential missions,as well as tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs),for a heavy team when it deploys to the Joint Readiness

Training Center (JRTC) and fights in restrictive terrain. TheseTTPs were validated more than 20 years ago during the VietnamWar and were highlighted in several after-action reviews andstudies, including Armored Combat in Vietnam, by General DonnA. Starry (Arno Press, New York, 1980.) Quoted material isborrowed from that book.

“The first debate on the use of armored units arose duringplanning for the deployment of the 1st Infantry Division.”

Movement to Contact

The search-and-attack technique is the most frequently usedform of fighting at the JRTC and usually does not include theheavy team because a hasty map analysis indicates more restrictedterrain than is actually available. When a properly done modifiedcombined obstacle overlay (MCOO) with satellite photos and otherterrain-analyzing tools is used during the military decision-makingprocess, it reveals semi-restricted terrain that will support heavyteam operations. When the heavy team is used, it is generally asa finishing force. Most recently, though, we have seen examples,purely by accident, in which the heavy team, down to section level,through fire and maneuver has proved to be a very effective forcein the “find and fix” part of the “find, fix, and finish” and thelight infantry company as the finishing force through its stealth.

“Two significant facts emerge from these engagements.First, contrary to tradition, armored units were used as afixing force, while airmobile infantry became the encirclingmaneuver element. Second, the armored force, led by tanks,has sufficient combat power to withstand the mass ambushuntil supporting artillery, air, and infantry could be brought into destroy the enemy. Engagements with armored elementsforcing or creating the fight and infantry reinforcing orencircling were typical armor action in 1966 and 1967.”When used during tactical operations, these techniques cause

high casualties on the opposing force (OPFOR). The firsttechnique requires the light infantry to infiltrate at night andestablish an ambush site in the general vicinity of an enemy-emplaced obstacle or potential enemy location. Armor/mech forcesare then used primarily during daylight hours (can be executed atnight) to gain contact with the enemy. Once contact is made,armor/mech forces use fire and maneuver to turn the enemy inthe direction of the ambush. The ambush is sprung, and the enemyis destroyed with virtually no fratricide due to control measuresimposed upon the armor/mech forces and the armored capabilitiesof the vehicles to prevent this.

These forces are able to make contact with the enemy quicklyfor two reasons. One is their mobility to cover more ground faster,and the other is that when stationary or as part of a convoy theyare favorite targets of the enemy “satchel man.”

“Rapid reinforcement of a unit in combat was nicknamed‘pile on.’”The second technique requires light infantry to be as mobile as

the armor/mech forces. This is accomplished either in the formof airmobile operations to a landing zone close by, or motorizedinfantry in sandbagged HMMWVs, 2½-ton, or 5-ton trucksmaneuvering to establish a hasty ambush point.

“Contrary to established doctrine, armored units in Vietnamwere being used to maintain pressure against the enemy inconjunction with the envelopment by airmobile infantry.”In either case, planning on the part of the maneuver

commanders and leaders require clear and concise task andpurpose, clearly defined fire control measures (direct and indirect),graphic control measures distributed to all personnel, the abilityto identify friend or foe, and a thoroughly rehearsed plan withstrong junior leaders executing a decentralized plan.

Route Security and Convoy Security

Armor/mech units routinely function in this role at the JRTCand often have difficulty in the execution. Several techniqueshave been tried and the most successful of them incorporatecombined arms operations.

“The primary route security technique used in the highlandswas to establish strong points along a road at criticallocations, and each morning have a mounted unit sweep adesignated portion of the route. The unit then returned tothe strongpoint where it remained on alert, ready to dealwith any enemy action in its sector.”A combination of convoy escort, active patrolling, and

strongpoint operations has been the most successful techniquesused so far.

“. . . the division abandoned the strongpoint system in favorof offensive patrolling missions several thousand metersfrom main routes, a tactic that made a much more effectiveuse of armor.”Combined arms teams have proved to be the most successful

when incorporating aviation as advanced reconnaissance, armor/mech as the escort/security force (in accordance with Field Manual(FM) 17-15), and engineers to assist in route clearance, artillery/mortar indirect fire support on preplanned targets, and/or hip-shots and light infantry infiltrating near potential enemy ambushpoints or critical areas, clearing the area of enemy and linking upwith armor/mech teams escorting convoys through sector.

ARMOR and MECHANIZEDInfantry Operations

in Restrictive Terrain at JRTCMAJOR RICHARD R. ROULEAU


Major Richard R. Rouleau was attending the Command and GeneralStaff Course at the time the article was written. He has served in variousassignments, including the 133d Engineer Battalion, 2d Squadron, 6thCavalry; 2d Battalion, 72d Armor; 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry; and 3dSquadron, 16th Cavalry. He was commissioned as an armor officer in1991 from Niagara University.

“In an effort to change this situation armored leadersdeveloped several techniques. One, nicknamed thunderrun, involved the use of armored vehicles in all-nightroad marches using machine gun and main tank gun firealong the roadsides to trigger potential ambushes. Whilethis procedure increased vehicle mileage andmaintenance problems, it often succeeded indiscouraging enemy road mining and ambushes.”Above all, this is indeed a combat operation when the enemy

is operating around the clock in all sectors and the restrictionsand techniques developed are similar to those encountered andused in Vietnam.

Aviation/Forward Support Battalion (FSB)Assembly Area Security

There may be an occasion when platoons from the armor/mech may be sliced to support the security plan of assemblyareas. The tendency for these unit planners is to lock thesemobile units into static positions. By doing this, the unit —whether they realize it or not — has now brought the fight toits perimeter, most likely meeting the enemy commander’sintent of disrupting operations in those areas.

“The success of the defense hinged on the mobility ofthe armored units, the heavy firepower-artillery and airsupport, and the tactics used. The armored vehicles hadnot been dug in and were not fenced in with wire.Throughout the attacks, ACAV’s and tanks continuouslymoved backward and forward, often for more than twentymeters, to confuse enemy gunners and meet the attackhead on. The movement added to the shock effect of thevehicles, for none of the enemy wanted to be run over.In addition, reinforcing platoons carried extraammunition on their vehicles and provided resupplyduring battle.”One of the more successful techniques again is using the

combined arms team, preparing a defense outside the wiresimilar to that of defending a battle position developing anengagement area on the most likely avenues of approach tothe assembly area for both mounted and dismounted forces.By doing this again, the unit can capitalize on all itscapabilities; that is, killing the enemy where we want to,engaging at maximum ranges with aviation, indirect, and directfires.

In an environment of combat teams, task forces andexpeditionary forces, the need for understanding combinedarms operations continues to be a challenge during real-worldcontingency missions and at the Joint Readiness TrainingCenter. The armor/mech team is a viable combat force in anyenvironment and should not be counted out in any mission,once a proper analysis has been completed determininglimitations and capabilities required for the mission.

“You can ask me for anything you like, except time.”— Napoleon Bonaparte

It is 2100 on the second day of a rotation at the Joint ReadinessTraining Center (JRTC). The commander of Company A receivesa radio message from the battalion tactical operations center(TOC) that says, “The scouts have located a suspected CortinianLiberation Front (CLF) cache point in the vicinity of LZ FALCON.Your mission is to destroy CLF and the cache no later than 2330tonight to prevent the enemy from resupplying its forces in AORakkasan. You will get three UH-60s for three lifts and the take-off time for the first lift is 2300. What are your questions?” Thecompany commander quickly plots the grids and realizes that thepickup zone (PZ) is over two kilometers away, and that the onlyway to make it to the PZ is to move now. As the company movesto the PZ, the commander quickly formulates his ground tacticalplan, landing plan, loading plan, and staging plan. At 2240 hours,Company A arrives at the PZ, the commander finishesdisseminating the order as the aircraft approach, and mostplatoons get on the aircraft without a clear understanding of themission or of what is expected.

This scenario is played out time after time during most unitrotations to the JRTC. But why? Is our time management thatpoor? Does our doctrine fail to support quick mission planning?The answer to both questions is yes. As an Army, we are poortime managers during planning, and the current military decision-making process (MDMP) at the battalion level is inefficient. Thesolution we have developed addresses more efficient timemanagement by modifying the process. This article will addressvarious tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for overcomingtime management and mission planning.

The MDMP as described in Field Manual (FM) 101-5, StaffOrganizations and Operations, may work well for corps anddivision-level operations. The complexity of operations at thoselevels dictates that multiple courses of action (COAs) be developed,analyzed, and compared in exacting detail to attain the best possiblesolution to each problem. Division and corps headquarters aregenerously staffed with real experts in their respective fields.Moreover, those who receive the orders generated by division andcorps MDMP (brigades and divisions) are staffed with their ownexperts, capable of dissecting each order and initiating their ownMDMPs.

Such is not the case for a typical infantry battalion. At thebattalion level, operations are not (or should not be) very complex,

BATTALION MDMP INA TIME-CONSTRAINED

ENVIRONMENTLIEUTENANT COLONEL JEFFREY S. BUCHANAN

MAJOR TODD WOODMAJOR JIM LARSEN


TRAINING NOTES

and as a whole, the staff lacks experienceand the company commanders andspecialty platoon leaders have no staffs.

This ponderous process has taken on alife of its own. Many practitioners forgetthat the MDMP is a means, not an end.Instructors, evaluators, and observercontrollers delight in critiquing a unit’sMDMP. “After all,” many seem to think,“the MDMP is a recipe book . . . if I add allthe ingredients in the right sequence andcook to order, I’ll create a masterpiece.”The problem is that the best process in theworld can still generate a poor plan. Whatis important is getting a workable plan tothe consumers early enough that they canaccomplish the mission.

The TTPs we use are a combination oftechniques currently in vogue at the combattraining centers and many of our branchschools. There is nothing new orrevolutionary in our system, but it worksfor us. This system is not the answer to allof our decision-making problems. In fact,the intent of this article is not to provide“the answer,” but rather to offer some TTPsand, more important, to stimulate thoughtabout how a battalion can get a workableplan to the companies early enough to havea positive, instead of negative, effect on theprobable outcome.

Time Management

General George S. Patton, Jr., once saidthat execution, rather than planning,amounts to 95 percent of missionaccomplishment. He also directed thatarmy-level orders “should not exceed a pageand a half of type-written text with the backof the page reserved for a sketch map.” Asa result, commanders were able to conducttheir own planning, preparations, andrehearsals instead of having to wait for ahigher headquarters to crank out anexhaustive operations order (OPORD). Aside benefit is that when the consumers donot have to sift through a half-inch thickdocument to find the few pieces of valuableinformation. They can be more efficient intheir planning, and once again, devote moretime to rehearsals.

Rehearsals are critical in achieving tworesults: First, everyone understands eachpart of the plan, and second, everyone isfully prepared to act when the plan doesnot go exactly according to the script. The

perfect plan (if one hasever existed) never won abattle, but Soldiers whounderstood the plan andthen executed it won thefight.

At the battalion level,those rehearsals consist ofat least a maneuver orcombined arms rehearsal,a fire support rehearsal, areconnaissance rehearsal,and a combat servicesupport (CSS)/CHSrehearsal. At the squadand platoon levels, therehearsals are bothmission-specific andgeneral —namely thecritical battle drills for agiven operation. Withoutthe sound management ofavailable time, rehearsalsare often the first items tobe cut.

When a one-third/two-thirds time managementtool is used, most units aregreatly stressed. Aprobable scenario follows:The brigade staff gets theorder from the division onDay 1, with an executiontime of Day 3. Thebrigade issues its order onDay 2, and the battalion issues its order onDay 2½. This leaves the companycommander less than one day to plan andrehearse. By the time the squad leaderreceives his order, his squad is moving tothe objective.

We have been effective in using a one-fifth/four fifths rule. It is generally appliedthe same way as the one-third/two-thirdsrule, but with a few exceptions. The firstexception is to develop a detailed time linethat supports the rule and a staff welltrained and disciplined to follow that timestandard. The second is that the battalionexecutive officer (XO) dedicates a block oftime for company commanders. Thisamounts to two-fifths of the total timeavailable — “blocked” to the companies inwhich the battalion staff will not plan anyrehearsals, back briefs, or meetings — thusallowing companies time to focus on themission without interruption. It is our

experience that any one event can expandto fill the available time. When the timeavailable to the battalion is cut from one-third to one-fifth of the total time, there isnot much time to waste. The result is oftenan order that is less than perfect, but wemake up for the imperfection with agenerous helping of rehearsals at all levels.

Commander Involvement

Probably the most important aspect ofour battalion’s planning process is theinvolvement of the commander. We don’twaste the time or energy having the staffdevelop, war game, and then comparevarious courses of action. We use thedirected or “focused” course-of-actiontechnique. The commander, S-2, S-3, andfire support officer (FSO) attend the brigadeOPORD. Immediately after this order, thecommander sketches out a course of action

Figure 1 Commander’s Guidance


and then modifies it on the basis of S-2, S-3, and FSO input. Upon return to the TOC,the staff gives a quick mission analysisbrief, and then the commander solicitsinput on the course of action from the XOand the command sergeant major (CSM).Given those modifications, the commanderdevelops his commander’s guidance.

Below is an outline of the Commander’sGuidance Checklist we use at thecompletion of mission analysis. Althoughit may seem a bit too detailed, it focusesthe staff; essentially it is “how I see theterrain; how I see the enemy; how I see us;and here’s what I want you to do”:

As you can see by our format, thecommander’s guidance is a fairly detaileddescription of the way the commander seesthe enemy, the terrain, and our unit. Hepersonally drafts the course of action anddetermines what critical decisions he or theenemy commander must make — along withcorresponding draft commander’s criticalintelligence requirements (CCIRs). Finallyhe directs the course of action and providesplanning guidance for each BOS. We havethe format for the commander’s guidanceprinted on carbon paper so that copies arereadily available for the staff to use in buildingthe order, without having to depend on a copymachine. That planning guidance is alsoattached to Warning Order 2 to thecompanies, so that the company commanderscan get on board early in the process.

Battalion MDMP Sequence

A condensed description of ourbattalion’s MDMP is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 MDMP Sequence

Figure 3 Matrix Order

Following thecommander’s guid-ance, the staff does aquick suitability, fea-sibility, and accept-ability check of theCOA, and the S-3refines it. He thenbriefs the staff on therefined COA to setthe stage for the wargame. The purposeof our war game isnot to analyze andcompare courses ofaction, but to syn-chronize the one wehave selected and

identify or refine the decision points andCCIRs. Immediately after the war game,the staff finalizes the OPORD for publica-tion.

The Matrix Order

Another way to improve time manage-ment and facilitate the orders process is touse a quick and easily transferableOPORD format (see Figure 3). This for-mat also doubles as the warning order(WARNORD)/fragmentary order (FRAGO)format. The order itself is a pre-printedform that is made of transferable carbonpaper. This allows us to write WARNOs,FRAGOs, and OPORDS without being wed-ded to a computer or a copy machine. Theformat is a blocked matrix order, with allthe parts of the five-paragraph OPORD.There is not alot of room foru n n e c e s s a r yverbiage in atwo-page ma-trix order, sothe staff has todistill the vari-ous tasks, pur-poses, and coor-dinating in-structions intowhat is trulyimportant forthe companycommanders .The companyc o m m a n d e r sdon’t have to

search for those important details, and theresult is a better common understanding ofthe plan. Note that each staff officer is re-stricted to a one-page annex only. Belowis the base order found in our TACSOP.

Warning orders are written on thisformat, with whatever information isavailable, to put out to subordinate units.As the staff continues with planning, a newwarning order is written that incorporatesnew information and information alreadypublished. This allows the subordinateunits to begin parallel planning. Most ofthe operations order is written after theCOA and before the war game. At theconclusion of the war game, we publish thefinal operations order.

Units will continue to conductoperations in time-constrainedenvironments — and many with unclearguidance and plans — unless commanderstake control of time management and adjustthe MDMP process.

Although we never seem to have enoughtime or information to execute a mission,the key to success is to issue quick and clearorders, parallel plan with higher, adjacent,and subordinate headquarters, and rehearsethe plan thoroughly. If they get a perfectplan too late, we will all fail. Our squadsand platoon win the fight. If they get aworkable plan early enough to aid inmission preparation, we will all succeed.

When this article was written, LieutenantColonel Jeffrey S. Buchanan, Major ToddWood, and Major Jim Larsen were assigned tothe 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division.


TRAINING NOTES

How many times have you heardsomeone say, “We don’t needspecialized infantrymen,

because anyone can pull the trigger on anM16?” Never, right? That is because thisstatement makes no allowance for theunique skills, teamwork and mindset thatform the effectiveness of the infantrySoldier. However, this same argument isused to dismiss another highly skilled andprofessional Soldier, the forward observer(FO). “We don’t need FOs anymore,because anyone can call for fire.” This isespecially prevalent in the mechanizedinfantry. I don’t think this is becauseanyone doesn’t think FOs are useful, but Ido feel it is because there hasn’t beensufficient attention given to training theplatoon leader (PL) and FO to worktogether in combat operations.

FUNCTION OF THE FORWARDOBSERVER

The first step to this is establishing whatrole an FO fills in the platoon. FM 7-7Jhas a good start in Chap. 2, Section VII:Fire Support. In short, the FO is theplatoon’s subject matter expert on indirectfires. This includes assisting the PL withfire planning, working to establish indirectfire priorities, and ensuring that the squadleaders understand the role of indirect firesin the operation. It also includes makingsure the platoon understands thecapabilities of indirect fires, as well as theirlimitations.

The second part is the execution of firesupport during the mission. This is

where FM 7-7J falls sadly short, andwhere units need the most practice. TheFO, through a thorough understanding ofthe commander’s intent and plan ofexecution of the operation, uses indirectfires to best support that operation. TheFO identifies targets, and requests fires toengage those targets that the commanderand platoon leader feel warrant the use ofindirect fires. The FO then adjusts thosefires to ensure they achieve the desiredeffect on the targets in question.

Your FO is specially equipped andtrained to execute this mission. He doesn’tjust know how to call for fire (CFF); it isingrained into him. FOs understand theCFF so thoroughly that they make jokeswith it. Just as a maneuver Soldier istrained to react to a threat with direct fireand maneuver, the FO is trained to reactwith indirect fires. The FO also has beentrained to identify and accurately locatetargets at a significant distance utilizingbinoculars, a map, and sometimesspecialized lasers like the AN/GVS-5 LaserRange Finder (MELIOS) or Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (G/VLLD pronounced gl-ID). He is alsotrained to read maneuver and artillery mapgraphics. Finally, the FO team has a radiowith the frequencies to all of the indirectfire assets available.

UTILIZING THE FORWARDOBSERVER

That information is fine, but how doesa platoon leader in the mechanized infantryuse his FO? The commandment is this:

Get your FO out of the Bradley, even if heis separated from the PL. While the FOshould stick with the PL during theplanning process and orders, when it comestime to execute, it is a whole new ballgame.A FO needs to stay close to the PL duringlight operations; the same is not true inmechanized operations. The reason is this:The pace of light infantry is limited to thespeed of a Soldier on foot. This means thatit easy to get separated, and once separated,it can be extremely difficult to link backup. Thus, the FO needs to stay right nextto his PL in order to assist him as thesituation unfolds.

In the mechanized world, the speed islimited to the pace a Bradley can set. Thisopens up many options on both themaneuver and fire support side. The firstthing I can tell you is this: Indirect firesare useless without eyes on the target! Nomatter how good your intelligence is, only50 meters can make the difference betweenturning dirt over and destroying enemypersonnel and equipment. Thus, if thatplanned target is off within the margin oferror of a six-digit grid, your fires can bealmost ineffective. Since indirect fire cangive you more firepower than an entireplatoon, you need the best set of eyes youcan get to watch and control those fires.Those eyes belong to your forward observer.This means you have got to get that FO outof the Bradley! If your FO is in the rear ofyour vehicle, he might as well be back inthe rear detachment for all the good he isdoing you.

Make sure you have good radio contactwith the FO and somehow get him into a

LIEUTENANT CHRIS LANGLAND-SHULA

Using the

FORWARD OBSERVER

in Mechanized Infantry

Operations


TRAINING NOTES

putting him on a nearby hill, or it can mean infiltrating him inprior to the attack. How to get that FO into position is up to thePL, but it must be done. This takes proper planning and tacticalpatience, but will pay off handsomely when done.

Once in position, the FO can send in targetlocations and red-hot intelligence on enemydispositions. While assigned to the 1-9 IN (M) ,I listened once as one of my FOs sent intelligenceall the way up to brigade. The FO can also engagethose targets with indirect fire. However, keepin mind those fires belong to the maneuver leader,not the FO. Do not allow that FO to fire withoutyour authorization, so that you can be sure yourtroops can be best served by those fires. Byensuring that the FO completely understandswhat you want to accomplish with your plan, he will be able tosupport you brilliantly.

Conversely, if you ignore the FO, leave him in the back of yourBradley, or otherwise prevent him from getting eyes on target,you have made your job much harder. In Korea, I saw a verysimple trend — when FOs were in position to observe fires andmaneuver, commanders paid attention to them, and the missionswere successful. When the FOs were kept back, left in the Bradleysor ignored, the missions failed. It was that simple. I think thebest example was one new company commander who instructedhis platoon leaders over the radio that, “We don’t have time towait for the artillery. Attack now.” His company was completelydestroyed by the dug-in OPFOR.

Once the mission is completed, the platoon is often well pastthe FO’s location. This is not a problem if it is considered in theplanning process. One option is having a passing element pickthe FO team up. Some good choices are the company Fire SupportTeam (FIST), the first sergeant, or a trailing platoon. Your FOcan link up with you during reconsolidation.

ENSURING CLOSE COOPERATION WITH YOURFORWARD OBSERVER

Here is some advice on how to better integrate your FIST andFOs into your operations.� First, if your FISTers don’t already live and work with

your unit, bug your chain of command to get them over to you.

Keep them on your company’s training schedule. In additionto the greater integration of training between the FIST and thecompany, this helps the FIST to build their own skills. Thereason for this is simple: Artillery battalions tend to abuse their

FISTers, putting them on details, taskings, andother non-mission essential tasks which take awayfrom their training time. These chores take awayconsiderable time from the maneuver and artillerytraining and often result in FISTers spending alltheir time in the field or doing details. This canresult in poor individual skills and similarly poorplatoon and company integration. Keeping themaway from the artillery battalion can help alleviatethis.� Second, ask your company Fire Support

Officer (FSO) to give classes to the platoon leaders and forwardobservers on combined arms operations. Your FSO has receiveda good deal of training in this area, and along with your companycommander and slice element leaders (such as engineers and airdefense) can really help bring the team together. Also, involveyour FOs in your infantry training. The better they understandhow you do business, the better they will know how to supportyou while in the field.

While in the field, make sure your company commanderenforces this rule: Your FO belongs to you, the platoon leader, notthe company FSO. Even if there are not enough FOs for eachplatoon, while that FO is working with you, he is yours andanswers to the platoon leader. The FSO is the companycommander’s fire support expert, not the FO’s boss in the field.With this authority comes responsibility, however. Use yourFO like just another infantryman, and don’t be surprised whenthe company commander finds another place for him. FOs arefar too effective at their jobs to pull security on halts or toserve as the platoon leader’s Radio Telephone Operator (RTO).That can result in the FO not being where he needs to be whenhe needs to be there, particularly when the unexpected occurs.

Perhaps the best thing to remember when dealing with a FOis this: Not only does he have access over his radio to morefirepower than a mech platoon could ever wish for, he is anexpert at using it. If he can see a target, he can either kill it orset the platoon up for success in killing that target themselves.If he sits in the back of a Bradley, he is useless. Don’t throwaway the enormous combat power that your FO controls.

TRAINING NOTES

Lieutenant Chris Langland-Shulaserved as a Company Fire SupportOfficer with 1-9 IN (M) at Camp Hovey,Korea, from 1998-1999. At the timethe article was written, he was servingas a platoon leader with 6-27 FA(MLRS) at Fort Sill, OK.

If he (forward observer)sits in the back of a

Bradley, he is useless.Don’t throw away the

enormous combatpower that your FO

controls.


Army Deploys Digital PhotoSystem

The Department of the Army’s PhotoManagement System (DAPMIS) becameoperational in early September.

As of September 19, 2,902 official DAphotos had been submitted via the new sys-tem. Only 42 of those photos have been re-jected due to resolution problems.

DAPMIS, a web-enabled, e-business sys-tem, provides a digital means for Armyphoto labs to electronically transmit offi-cial military photographs for promotionboard consideration, said Ken Washington,DAPMIS coordinator, U.S. Army Total Per-sonnel Command. This month, PERSCOMissued a message to the field outlining pro-cedures.

The normal procedure, which began Oct.1, is for photo labs to now digitally uploadmilitary photographs to a central repository.The DAPMIS goal is to have a full reposi-tory of digital photos by December 31, 2003.This applies to staff sergeants and above,chief warrant officers two and above andfirst lieutenants and above to colonels.

For the present, hard-copy photos willstill be forwarded to the servicing person-nel services battalion or military personneloffice as well, according to the message.This process will be eliminated once theArmy Selection Board System is fully imple-mented and career managers have the ca-pability to display photos from the DAP-MIS repository.

“The DAPMIS system is the Army solu-tion for automating the DA Photo process,”Washington said. “This system supports allSoldiers, active and reserve components andis a great aid to the Army Selection BoardSystem, career management activities andcommanders.”

Washington added that photo labs willgive first priority for digital photographs toSoldiers in zones of consideration for anyupcoming centralized selection board.

The PERSCOM message notes an im-portant change to photo lab procedures.After Oct. 1, photo lab technicians will con-centrate solely on taking photos, rather thanalso inspecting a Soldier’s uniform to en-sure proper wear.

Soldiers will have the opportunity to re-view their photo on their Army KnowledgeOnline (www.us.army.mil) account. Theyhave three workdays to either accept or re-ject the photo taken. Soldiers can find theDAPMIS site by linking to the “What’sNew” page on AKO. DAPMIS will auto-matically accept any photo taken as the of-ficial photo of record if the Soldier does notverify it within the three-working day limit.

The message states that it is the Soldiers’responsibility to inform their unit com-mander if they reject the photo, and to makearrangements with the photo lab to havetheir photo retaken. Soldiers preparing fordeployment and who are in the zone of con-sideration for promotion will be given pri-ority at photo labs. Soldiers currently de-ployed will have their digitized hardcopyphoto scanned into the DAPMIS system.

“DAPMIS will save Soldiers’ time be-cause they will no longer have to visit thePersonnel Office to deliver their photo,” saidSgt. Maj. Freddie L. Davis, Jr., the top-en-listed Soldier for visual information withthe Chief Information Officer, G-6, at thePentagon. “Soldiers can view their currentphoto and official file on-line. DAPMIS alsoeliminates having to sort through five orsix different opinions to figure out whetherthe photo is a good photo or not.

“This will help the Army achieve its goalof becoming network centric,” he added.“Soldiers can do their part by visiting theirphoto lab to get their DA photo taken andput into DAPMIS.”

“With DAPMIS, we get a system that isfaster, more responsive and Soldierfriendly,” said Lt. Col. Curtis H. Nutbrown,action officer with the Strategic PartneringDirectorate for Army Knowledge Manage-

ment, Chief Information Office and G-6.“DAPMIS supports the Army’s migrationof business and customer support applica-tions to Army Knowledge Online, the ArmyPortal (www.us.army.mil). The goal is to useAKO as the one-stop information site forthe Army.”

OERS Can Be E-mailed From Iraq,Afghan Theaters

Officers deployed to Afghanistan andIraq can now have their officer evaluationreports e-mailed or transmitted by digitalsenders to the U. S. Army Personnel Com-mand.

“We have limited OER transmittal tothese theaters because their mail and cou-rier systems are not as mature as those inother locations,” said George Piccirilli, chiefof PERSCOM’s Military Systems Division.“The key to the success of the new programis a quality, readable report for an officer’spersonnel file. If it’s poor quality, we’ll haveto reject it.”

Personnel officers in Kuwait, Uzbekistanand other countries in the theater of opera-tion can also e-mail OERs, PERSCOM of-ficials said. they said signed OERS shouldbe sent as either TIF or PDF files.

There will be no requirement to send theoriginal copy of the OER to PERSCOMonce a quality report has been received andplaced in an officer’s official military per-sonnel file.

As with routine mail operations, the OERattachment will be printed and entered intoa daily, senior rating profile based on re-ceipt date time group of the e-mail,PERSCOM officials said.

Personnel officers interested in transmit-ting OERs by digital senders or by e-mailshould contact the military support divisionby calling (703) 325-9660 or DSN (315)221-9660.


Call to Glory: The Life and Times of aTexas Ranger. By Michael J. Gilhuly,M.D., J. D., and Marilyn Gilhuly.1st Books Library, 2001. 376 Pages.Reviewed by Russell A. Eno, InfantryMagazine editor.

Few writers of historical fiction have theresources and expertise to draw upon theirown genealogy as source materials, butMichael and Marilyn Gilhuly have done soadmirably in this account of the three Wileybrothers’ lives and adventures in the yearsshortly before and after the Civil War. Thethree lived and fought in Texas during thosetumultuous decades beginning in 1862 andlasting until the Texas Rangers became theguardians of peace and stability on what wasto be a dangerous frontier until the late 1800’s.

The book opens in March, 1862, withan account of the battle for possession ofthe strategically critical Glorieta Pass eastof Santa Fe, New Mexico Territory. In thisaction, the 2nd, 4th, and 7th Texas MountedRifles were facing an assault by Federaltroops under command of Colonel (laterGeneral) Edward R.S. Canby. MichaelGilhuly, West Point ’68, is a veteran of theVietnam War, and his accounts of theunfolding battle are seen through the eyesand laid down in the words of a Soldierwho has endured combat.

The characters are credible,unembellished Americans dealing withcircumstances they neither sought noravoided, but instead faced and dealt within the best traditions of the Republic ofTexas and the American character. Readersof this superb book will understand theevolution of the toughness thatcharacterized those on the frontier, at a timewhen danger was far more imminent anddeath more violent than at almost any timein our nation’s history. The resourceful,self-reliant frontiersman of today’s screenwas a reality in the middle of the 19th

century, when the traits we now point towith such pride spelled the differencebetween success and failure and —literally— life and death.

With the War behind them, ourcharacters were faced with the transitionfrom tactical decisions and operations tothe establishment of a society in whichsettlers, merchants, and former Soldierscould resume the routine of their lives.During that period, violence and thoseaccustomed to employing it were ever-present, and the Texas Rangers respondedas the only force available to providestability.

The plot’s dialog tends to decelerateoccasionally, and indeed the interplaybetween characters, just as in life, has itsslow moments, but this is not a major flaw,nor does it impair the readability of thisfine book. If you want to learn about thenature of the Civil War in the West, devoidof charts and maps, this is the book to read,for it is history seen over the shoulders ofthe men and women who lived — and died— in writing it.

An American Soldier: The Wars ofGeneral Maxwell Taylor. By John M.Taylor. Presidio Press, 2001 (1989).Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed,U.S. Army, Retired.

In the 15 years since his death in 1987,General Maxwell D. Taylor has been thesubject of several biographies, none morefavorable than An American Soldier,written by Taylor’s eldest son, who is a finehistorian and biographer in his own right.In his latest work, the younger Taylor seeksto provide an objective biography thatstrikes a balance between portraying the“personal” Taylor he knew and the Soldier-statesman whose actions andrecommendations merit closer scrutiny.The general who emerges from these pagesis a pragmatic officer who combined apenchant for battlefield leadership with asense of strategic analysis that twopresidential administrations foundindispensable.

Interestingly enough, the author divideshis text into four sections that address the

key aspects of his father’s career. The firstsection takes the reader through Taylor’syears as a student of the military profession,intent on developing the leadership skillsnecessary to command American Soldiersin battle. From West Point, where Taylorgraduated in 1922, to Rome, where heconducted a highly-publicized missionbehind enemy lines to determine thefeasibility of an airborne assault, Taylorearned a reputation as a no-nonsense officeron whom senior headquarters could dependin time of crisis. Not surprisingly,Eisenhower selected Taylor to command the101st Airborne Division on the eve of theNormandy invasion.

Taylor continued to refine his leadershipskills in the book’s next section entitled“The Warrior.” From Normandy toBerchesgaden and from Berlin toPanmunjom, Maxwell Taylor demonstratedhis ability to lead Soldiers in combat.Ironically, Taylor was initially absentduring the division’s defense of Bastogne,which he called the 101st AirborneDivision’s “finest hour” of the war. Taylorsubsequently said that his absence there wasone of his greatest disappointments inWorld War II.

At the completion of the war, Taylorserved as superintendent of the U.S.Military Academy, where with the urgingof Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower, heintroduced a course in military leadershipinto the curriculum. The younger Taylorcorrectly identifies the resignation of anunusually high number of cadets duringTaylor’s superintendency as one of the mostcomplex and frustrating periods in WestPoint’s history.

By far the most interesting section of thisbiography is the author’s analysis of hisfather as a strategist during the presidenciesof Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson.Regrettably, the younger Taylor offers littlethat is not present in Taylor’s ownautobiography, Swords and Plowshares.

As Army Chief of Staff from 1955-1959,General Taylor remained frequently at oddswith Eisenhower’s defense policies, and the


author is less than objective in acceptinghis father’s view that Ike’s defense policieswere fundamentally unsound. Taking hiscase to the public by writing a scathingcriticism of Eisenhower’s military strategyby advocating a switch from massiveretaliation to a more flexible response,Taylor attracted the attention of President-elect John Kennedy, who appointed him hisspecial military representative and laterChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Taylor’s term as chairman and later asU.S. ambassador to South Vietnamproduced mixed results, not the least ofwhich was an increased American militarypresence in Southeast Asia. Contrary tothe author’s claim that his father had noprivate agenda, or aspirations to greaterauthority, Taylor consolidated his authorityin the Joint Chiefs at the individual chiefs’expense. As ambassador, there remains agreat deal of controversy concerning how“tight a ship” Taylor ran as the principalcoordinator of the U.S. presence in Vietnam.To the younger Taylor’s credit, he doesconclude that by 1965, few in the Johnsonadministration, including AmbassadorTaylor, seriously considered withdrawal andthe vast majority were certainly unwilling toface any option that acknowledged thepossibility of defeat by a third-rate power. Asmilitary victory continued to be elusive, theambassador remained a hawk on bombing,but a dove on the rapid escalation of groundtroops that William Westmoreland and theJoint Chiefs advocated.

In the final analysis, Maxwell Taylorbequeathed to his nation a lifetime ofselfless service. Though many observershave questioned his personal motives, fewcan deny that in addition to a distinguishedmilitary career culminating in the nation’shighest military officer, Taylor was astrategist whose “geopolitical wisdom”made him an indispensable presidentialadvisor. An American Soldier could bemore objective in the portrayal of its subjectprior to the Johnson era, but this biographyprovides the reader with a remarkableinsight into the life and career of one ofthis nation’s preeminent Soldier-statesmen.

In the final analysis, John Taylorsucceeds in portraying his father as a farmore complicated Soldier-statesman thanthe general’s contemporaries initiallyobserved. The author is not so successfulin painting an objective picture of MaxwellTaylor.

One More Bridge to Cross: Loweringthe Cost of War. By John Poole. EmeraldIsle, NC: Posterity Press, 1999. 142pages. $9.50, Softbound. Reviewed byLieutenant Colonel Greg Wilcox, U.S.Army, Retired.

One More Bridge to Cross is a secondbook by John Poole; the first was: The LastHundred Yards: The NCO’s Contributionto Warfare. Some may not make theassociation between the big red book (TheLast Hundred Yards) and the little blue book(One More Bridge to Cross), but JohnPoole’s passion for Soldiering is more thanon display. It is a challenge to each andevery Soldier to pick up this book, read itand learn. While “Gunny” Poole’s targetaudience is clearly the NCO corps of boththe Army and the Marine Corps, this bookis a “must read” for the officer corps andnew Soldiers as well.

In One More Bridge, Poole puts togetherthe ingredients of how to fight and win inthe 21st Century. Shedding the conceptsand precepts by which we train today, Poolelays down the need for a new type of Soldierwho can merge the concepts of physical,mental and moral warfare from the bottomup. Further, he lays down a doctrine oflaissez faire for the over-managingCourtney Massengales (Once an Eagle);something the bureaucracy will not be ableto abide. At the same time, Poole knows,as we all do, that the American NCO corpscan and will train despite the obstacles thechain-of-command has placed in its path.The question is, will they be allowed to trainfor the next war or the last war? It wouldserve the Army and Marine Corps well ifthis book were placed on the respectiveprofessional reading lists for all officers.

Can this book be criticized? The answeris yes, but consider the source. Thosereviewers who would criticize it on tacticalgrounds will only demonstrate their owntactical shortcomings, if not deficiencies.Poole is a tactician’s tactician. Those whowould criticize teaching infantrymen howto think will demonstrate their ignoranceof the requirements of close combat. TheIsraelis, who understand close combat, puttheir most intelligent Soldiers in theInfantry. The critics of the moral elementof this book will only identify the reviewersas not having studied or understood the lateColonel John Boyd, USAF, who may havebeen the most relevant military theorist of

the past century, for understanding thenature of war and how to fight. Americanmilitary professionals seldom get beyondthe physical level of warfare, and then it iswarfare taught to us by Napoleon usingmass armies and muskets. The mental andmoral aspects of war are lost on mostSoldiers — with the possible exception ofour Special Operations Forces, who haveshown a glimmer of understanding in thecampaigns in Afghanistan, the Philippines,and a hundred other unadvertisedbattlegrounds.

We have to learn how to fight the mentaland moral wars. Maneuver warfare is astate of mind, a way of thinking. It is theway we can learn to win mentally againstterrorism. Moral war is engaging theenemy on a plane quite different from eitherthe physical or the mental, but it is a warthat we have to learn how to win. The cultof worldwide terrorism has attacked us inall three planes, and we must respond inall three planes if we are to eradicate thethreat to our way of life.

John Poole wants every Soldier andevery Marine to understand the importanceof fighting this new kind of war on all threeplanes. We cannot afford to have ourSoldiers calling our own allies “Gooks” andtreating them as subhuman. We cannotafford to have our infantry act as mereautomatons and follow the overabundantsupply of doctrinal manuals that telleverybody how we fight — thus making uspredictable. We cannot afford to fight 19thCentury linear battles of attrition againstnimble, adaptive, Ninja-like enemies.

If there is a criticism to be laid at thefoot of John Poole, it is that he is toodefensive in regard to the predominant roleof the NCO Corps in training. Poole isborne out by the recent Army War Collegemonograph on training in the Army,“Stifled Innovation? DevelopingTomorrow’s Leaders Today, April 2002,”by Colonel Leonard Wong, U.S. Army,Retired. Leonard Wong tells it like it is inthe Army. John Poole tells it like it is inthe Marine Corps. Training has becomecentralized to the extent that even companycommanders have virtually no influence onhow their own companies are trained.

The American NCO corps is the envy ofevery Army in the world, and we are blessedto have such men who still view service asa virtue and training as a commandment.Since the beginning, the NCO corps has been


as the backbone of the American professionof arms.

It is the officer corps of the Army —and particularly the Infantry — that needsto understand Poole’s message and adaptthe way we think about war, the way wetrain for war, and the way we fight.

Follow this excellent thought-provokingbook up and read Poole’s newest book:Phantom Warrior. Learn how the Al Qaeda— like other fourth-generation warfightersbefore it — fights.

Somalia on Five Dollars a Day: ASoldier’s Story. By Martin Stanton.Presidio, 2001. 299 Pages. $24.95,Hardcover. Reviewed by LieutenantColonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army(Retired).

Somalia on Five Dollars a Day is notan African country tour guide for theimpoverished international traveler. It isthe interesting anecdotal account of then-Major Martin Stanton’s service as S-3(operations officer) of the 2d Battalion, 87thInfantry, 10th Mountain Division (LightInfantry) in Somalia during OperationRestore Hope in 1992-1993. Soldiersserving in Somalia during that periodreceived imminent danger pay of $150 permonth — or about $5 a day.

Task Force 2-87 was a component of theUnified Task Force (UNITAF), thetransitional force between the UnitedNations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOMI) and UNOSOM II. Stanton led thebattalion’s advance party, arriving inSomalia on 13 December 1992. Task Force2-87 was responsible for humanitarianrelief sector Marka, south of Mogadishu.

Stanton is at his best chronicling the“kaleidoscope of different experiences” thathe participated in or observed personally,occasionally including “lessons learned”from operations. The first section of thebook outlines the organization, role, andresponsibilities of an infantry battalion, itsstaff sections, and subordinate units, plusthe battalion’s service in Florida in the wakeof Hurricane Andrew. Section 2 narratesthe arrival of the battalion in Somalia,including early operations and debacle ata food warehouse at Wanwaylen on 31December 1992. The remainder of thevolume generally chronicles the unit’ssubsequent activities in the Shabele Valley

BOOK REVIEWS


trying to “ensure that relief supplies weredistributed to feeding centers, suppressbanditry, disarm the warlords, and separatefighting factions.” According to the author,“the whole Somalia mission was adisorganized mess.”

On other issues, however, the authorseems on less sure ground. He states thatthe Somalia operation was the firstintervention of the “new world order,”when in fact UN operations in the formerYugoslavia and Cambodia began earlier. Inanother passage, the author refers to“Khat,” a bush with leaves that contain atype of amphetamine, which are chewed bythe natives, stating that it “grows only inparts of Kenya”; it actually grows innumerous eastern African and ArabianPeninsula locations. A helpful six-page“Glossary” is included, but a number ofabbreviations and definitions areinaccurate. This book is well illustratedwith a number of photographs and threemaps, and the appendices includeoperations plans and the rules ofengagement for the unit while employed.

This book was written as “both a historyand a remembrance,” as well as a “tributeto the officers and men of Task Force 2-87Infantry” in Somalia. This personal storyof an infantry battalion operating inSomalia, and the unit itself, accomplishedits mission. Clearly, the Soldiers in thebattalion earned their imminent danger payof $5 per day.

How Wars are Won. The 13 Rules ofWar From Ancient Greece to the War onTerror. By Bevin Alexander. CrownBooks, 2002. $26.95, Hardcover.Reviewed by Colonel ChristopherTimmers, U.S. Army, Retired.

Every cadet at West Point and, I assume,pretty much any other college or universitywith pretentions to producing the officerclass of our Armed Services learned theNine Principles of War. My classmates andI learned these principles by means of asimple abbreviation: MOSS MOUSE.Thus we have: Mass, Objective, Surprise,Simplicity Maneuver, Offensive, Unity ofCommand, Security, Economy of Force.

Mr. Alexander, without saying sodirectly, somewhat incorporates theseprinciples into his 13 reasons wars are won.From “Land an Overwhelming Blow,” to“Defend, Then Attack,” he cites historical

examples of how commanders won the day.His rules, though, are largely confined

to individual battles, battles that were wonbut did not lead to decisive victories andthe subjugation of an opposing state.Gustavus Adolphus’s victories in the ThirtyYears War did not lead to vanquishing theHoly Roman Empire; the destruction of aRoman army at Cannae in 216 BC did notresult in Carthaginian supremacy in theMediterranean Sea and the destruction ofRome. Indeed, Carthage lost all three ofthe Punic Wars. The book’s main focusseems to be how battles, not wars, are won.

The observation aside, this bookprovides an illuminating look at a numberof key battles and leaders in the history ofwestern warfare. The author does notoverlook the impact of technologicaladvances in weaponry from the Welshlongbow of the middle ages to thedestructive effectiveness of the minie-ballin the American Civil War. But one aspectof how wars are won is not dealt withsufficiently, and that is leadership.Leadership as distinct from generalship canbe defined as the ability to motivate men toendure hardship, danger, certain loss of lifeor limb, all for a commander. Commanderslike Napoleon possessed generalship; they(he) embraced new tactics or technologyand could see results of an intended actionbefore it was executed. But what makesgenerals most successful and ultimatelywins wars is leadership.

Leadership is what keeps armies movingon long campaigns, over great distances,against impossible odds. No weaponssystems or tactical brilliance can substitutefor it.

Interestingly enough, though, before weeven launch into a discussion of anyprinciples of rules, he tells us that theseprinciples are largely a thing of the past.They are not as relevant because of theincreasing lethality of high-tech weaponry,which renders large armies on openbattlefields extremely vulnerable. Anengaging hypothesis, although only onecountry has such technology (guess who?).Events currently unfolding in the MiddleEast may vindicate Alexander’s hypothesis,but I don’t know how many unmannedPredator aircraft, satellites, and sensors wewill have to oppose massed armorformations and fast-moving mechanizedinfantry. Only time will tell.

SOLUTION ...


Continued from page 44

TACTICAL DECISION GAME

LESTER W. GRAU

Seizing and Holding an Enemy Training Center in Afghanistan with a Tactical Air Assault

Editor’s Note: This exercise is basedupon an actual Soviet operation conductedagainst Afghan Mujahideen forces in 1985,by the 12th Air Assault Company, andincludes comments by the staff of Russia’sFrunze Military Academy.

12th Air Assault Company’s seizure ofa mujahideen training center:

After a full day of combat, The 12th

AASLT Company realized that theirsituation was becoming critical.Ammunition was beginning to run out, menhad to fire single shots rather than bursts.The battalion main force was unable tobreak through and reinforce the company.The company commander reviewed thesituation and determined that they mustattack at nightfall. The commander orderedhis 3rd platoon to seize the southeast slope

of hill 2825 to distract the enemy. The 1st

and 2nd platoons would envelop the enemyfrom the west and the east at 14 0230 OCT85, simultaneously attacking from twodirections to seize the base, captureammunition, and then hold the base until thebattalion arrived. His plan worked, and by14 0400 OCT 85 his company had taken thebase without casualties. They had capturedthree DShK heavy machine guns, tworecoilless rifles, 17 individual small arms andammunition. The enemy tried to retake thebase at 14 0600 OCT 85, but was driven off.When the main body of the battalion arrived,they punished the enemy badly and forcedhim to withdraw, denying the enemy theopportunity to retake the base.

Frunze Commentary/ Lessons Learned:This vignette demonstrates that a

soldier’s combat load is essential: proper

equipping of air assault personnel,including sufficient ammunition, rations,water, and radio batteries. Additionally,one must ensure that there is uninterruptedresupply and safe LZs to conductemergency resupply missions. Resupplycan determine the course of the battle and—as important as it and casevac are to missionaccomplishment—the length of timeneeded to complete the mission will dependon how well the direct coordination withaviation was done. One must consider theweather conditions and the effectiveness ofthe enemy’s air defense. The closer the LZsare to the objective or the fewer there are,the harder it will be to resupply forces andconduct casevac. From this and previousbattles, it was determined that in order tofight independently for three or four days,each air assault trooper would need to carryan approximate load of 35-40 kilograms,so when regular resupply is guaranteed, thesoldier’s load could be lightened or tailored.

Editor’s Commentary:The air assault company ran out of

ammunition after a day’s combat, basedpartially on Soviet doctrine: small armsare used to suppress the enemy andeventually it may kill the enemy. Thestandard AK-47 fire selector switch goesfrom safe to full automatic to semiautomatic,which demonstrates the Soviets norm ofautomatic weapons fire, unlike U.S. doctrine,that uses crew-served weapons to suppressthe enemy while small arms are used todestroy the enemy. The standard U.S. assaultrifle selector switch goes from safe tosemiautomatic to three round burstdemonstrating the norm of semiautomatic/controlled weapons fire. An army facing fora guerilla war needs to devote more time torifle marksmanship. It saves on ammunitionconsumption. Frequently in the mountains,bolt-action rifles with better range andaccuracy proved to be of better use. However,the rapid firing assault rifle proved mostuseful in ambushes.

Edited from: The Bear Went Over theMountain: Soviet Combat Tactics inAfghanistan, Edited by Lester W. Grau,second printing August 1996, pp. 94-97.

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