European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist governance arrangements: lobbying and policy-making patterns in a comparative perspective

European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralistgovernance arrangements: lobbying and policy-making patterns in a comparative perspective

Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson*Jean Monnet Visiting Professor, Schuman Centre for Advanced Study, EuropeanUniversity Institute, I-50016 Florence, Italy; Uppsala Theory Circle, Departmentof Sociology, Uppsala University, Box 821, 75108 Uppsala, Sweden

International Journal of Regulation and Governance 2(2): 129�175

AbstractLegislative and policy-making processes within democratic struc-tures are multi-agent, collective decision processes. Interest repre-sentation, including lobbying, may have a substantial effect notonly on policy outcomes, but also on the structure of democraticinstitutions themselves. In view of current trends and challengesfacing democratic institutions, better understanding of theprocesses and mechanisms by which policy-making and lobbyingoperate is particularly important. This paper applies the newinstitutionalism to the comparative analysis of governance andpolicy-making in different political systems, particularly those inEurope and the US. Pluralist and neo-corporatist arrangements ofinfluence articulation are distinguished and contrasted. It is arguedfurther that these do not correspond to or fit EU (European Union)arrangements for policy-making and lobbying. A model of EU ar-rangements is outlined. The article considers the degree of open-ness, flexibility, extent of predictability, and patterns of policyproduction and development in the different systems. The EU sys-tem, which is a type of �organic� or informal democracy, operateswith highly flexible but well-organized procedures to engage inter-est groups from industry and civil society as sources of informationand expertise and to act as brokers in EU policy-making; delibera-tion and negotiation typically result in consensus. We concludethat many of the advantages of the EU system with its flexibilityand adaptability to sectoral specific issues and conditions are asource of its problems of non-transparency and �democratic deficit.�

* Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden and De-partment of Sociology, South Stockholm University College, 14189 Huddinge, Sweden

Tom R Burns and Marcus Carson130


IntroductionGroup-interest articulation and pressure-group politics ingeneral are processes by which sub-groups of a societal popula-tion attempt to influence policy-making and regulation in pur-suit of their particular interests and goals.1 These processes arepart and parcel of what we often mean by democracy. However,such activity places significant strains upon democratic institu-tions that they were neither designed nor expected to deal with.This consideration is especially significant in the light of otherdevelopments that have tested the limits of democratic institu-tions: globalization, the increasingly technical nature of manypublic issues, increasing specialization and the accelerating paceof change, among others (Kaase and Newton 1995; Burns1999). Held (1996) points out correctly that ‘the history of ...political institutions reveals the fragility and vulnerability ofdemocratic arrangements.’ The fact that interest-group pres-sures and lobbying have the capacity to amplify many of theother forces straining democratic systems makes it especiallyimportant and urgent that we more thoroughly understandthese mechanisms and processes.

This paper, adopting a new institutional approach (Bulmer1994; Burns and Carson 2002; Burns and Flam 1987; Marchand Olsen 1989; Meyer, Scot, Rowan, et al. 1983; Pierson 1996;Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Thomas, Meyer,Ramirez et al. 1987, Warleigh 2002, among others), comparesand analyses distinct governance and policy-making systems fo-cusing on group-interest representation, pressure-group politicsand lobbying, and participation in policy-making. The underly-ing premise is that institutions matter in the definition of prob-lems, in establishing agendas, and in formulating solutions.2 The

1 In this pursuit of interests, success often comes at the expense of other groups in asociety. Such a view of pressure groups is elaborated by, among others, Becker (1983,1985) who analyses the competition between pressure groups as a game. This game iszero-sum with regard to influence, and negative sum with regard to taxes and subsidies.What one interest wins in the form of subsidies, the other loses due to increased taxes.Since all of this is distributed and administrated by a central authority, there are alsocosts, or ‘dead weight losses’, where no one gains.2 An institution is a complex of relationships, roles, and norms, which constitute andregulate recurring interaction processes among participants in socially defined settingsor domains. Any institution organizing people in such relationships may be conceptual-ized as an authoritative complex of rules or a shared rule regime, which commands loyalty,authority, and commitment among members of a given community (Burns,

European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist governance arrangements 131


first section provides an initial characterization and comparisonof two historically prominent types of policy-making and lobby-ing systems: pluralist and neo-corporatist type systems. In thesecond section, we introduce the EU system and compare andcontrast it with neo-corporatist and pluralist systems. The dis-tinction between closed, well-structured policy systems, on theone hand, and open, fluid policy systems, on the other hand, isparticularly stressed. The third section is a short, concludingsection with tables comparing the three systems.

Interest representation and lobbying in contrastinggovernance and policy-making systems3

Both neo-corporatist and pluralist systems entail ‘elitist democ-racy’—the domination of rule-making and policy-making

Baumgartner, and Deville 1985; Burns and Flam 1987; Burns and Carson 2002 ).Institutions are exemplified by, for instance, family, a business organization or govern-ment agency, markets, democratic associations, and religious communities. Each struc-tures and regulates social interactions in particular ways; there is a certain interactionlogic to a given institution. More precisely: (1) An institution defines and constitutes aparticular social order, namely positions and relationships, defining the actors (indi-viduals and collectives) that are the legitimate or appropriate participants (who must,may, or might participate) in the institutional domain, their rights and obligations vis-à-vis one another, and their access to and control over resources. In short, it consists ofa system of authority and power. (2) It organizes, coordinates, and regulates social in-teraction in a particular domain or domains, defining contexts – specific settings andtimes – for constituting the institutional domain or sphere. (3) It provides a normativebasis for appropriate behaviour including the roles of the participants in that setting –their interactions and institutionalized games – taking place in the institutional domain.(4) The rule complex provides a cognitive basis for knowledgeable participants to inter-pret, understand, and make sense of what goes on in the institutional domain. (5) It alsoprovides core values, norms, and beliefs that are referred to in normative discourses, thegiving and asking of accounts, the criticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes inthe institutional domain. Finally, (6) an institution defines a complex of potential nor-mative equilibria which function as ‘focal points’ or ‘coordinators’ (Schelling 1963;Burns and Roszkowska 2003).3 ‘Lobbying’ has become a common term in speaking about the activities of associationsand NGOs and other pressure groups in EU policy-making and regulation (Andersenand Eliassen (1991, 1995, 1997), Bern (1994), Marks and McAdam (1996), Mazeyand Richardson (1993), Pedler and van Schendelen (1993), Potters (1992), Streeckand Schmitter (1991), van Schendelen (1993), Wallace and Wallace (2000), Wallace andYoung (1997)). However, the forms and mechanisms differ substantially from otherpolitical systems such as European national systems and the US. This is one of the mainpoints of this paper. Nevertheless, interest group articulation and political pressure arepart and parcel of a common understanding and experience of modern democracy.

footnote 2 continued



4 There have been several attempts to formulate systems of classifications of policy net-works (Jordan and Schubert 1992; Schneider 1992; Rhodes and Marsh 1992; vanWaarden 1992). Consideration of these would take us beyond the scope of this paper.We prefer initially to work with two general types of networks for the sake of simplicity.In practice, the networks in which we are interested are empirically described and ana-lysed. On a more theoretical-methodological level, our approach takes as a point ofdeparture the different ways societies organize power, construct agency, and estab-lished governance in different types of organizations, organizational domains, andpolicy-making processes (Burns and Flam 1987; Jepperson and Meyer 1991). A majorimplication of this perspective is that different types of state structures/political systemsimply differences in policy-making arrangements and processes and, therefore, differ-ences in pressure group and lobbying patterns (Flam 1994).5 Such arrangements were never effectively established in France, Italy, Spain, UnitedKingdom, among other European countries, although there were attempts.6 Adams (2002b) argues that neo-corporatism at the state level is being eroded by EU(and global) challenges, but this is a matter beyond the scope of this paper comparingdifferent systems of governance.

processes by elites within the framework of democratic nation-states (Table 1).4 The Scandinavian countries, Netherlands,Austria, and, to a certain extent, Germany have representedcases of until recently what were relatively tightly organized neo-corporatist systems, although with considerable variation amongthem.5 (Adams 2002a; Berger 1981; Katzenstein 1984;Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter,et al. 1996; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). These societiesregulated social tensions and conflict with explicit integrativestrategies and well-defined societal and public agents as well asparticular organizational arrangements and procedures. Theneo-corporatist type of social organization exhibited in, for in-stance, tripartite or multipartite institutions, includes organs forrepresentatives of capital, labour, and government to participatein consultation, bargaining, and collective decision-makingprocesses. The complex of organs has not simply been an ‘addi-tional sphere’. Rather, it has provided an institutional frame-work on another level. Within the neo-corporatist institutionalframe, rule formation and regulatory processes take place at themacro level in relation to, for instance, ‘market’ and ‘state’, andto issues such as wages, pensions, working conditions, taxes,economic policies, and social policies. In particular, they havedealt with the interfaces – and contradictions – between ‘state’,‘market’, and the agents representing them.6

The US, in contrast, exemplifies pluralist principles. Hereonly limited attempts are made at integration and regulation of



Neo-corporatist

Integrative, multi-lateral consultation anddecision-making. Particular actors orclasses of actors are empowered and heldcollectively responsible. Engagement,commitment, and interlinkages arerelatively formal and stable. Principles ofinclusive involvement in rule-making, rule-interpretation and implementation areexplicit and provide normative force.

Institutionalization and regulation of inter-organizational relationships, conflict, andconflict resolution according to norms offairness (not only procedural, but substan-tive). In general, high degree of attempts atsocietal integration and regulation.

Norms of inclusion and �compromise�,�collective benefit,� �redistributive norms�.

Organizational or societal power is animportant factor in influencing policy-making but mediated by rules, includingdistributional norms. Social power alsoexercised on the basis of appeal to key orcore norms.

Relatively high predictability and cer taintyof policy processes and outcomes undernormal conditions, but less flexibility than apluralist system.

Source Burns and Flam (1987, p. 380)

Table 1 Pluralist and neo-corporatist systems of social organization and policy-making

Pluralist

Unilateral and bilateral decision-making,hence fragmented. In principle, a highdegree of access. However, engagement,commitment, and interlinkages may berelatively unstable (or uncertain) in anygiven rule-making, rule interpretation, andimplementation process.

Minimum formal institutionalization andregulation of inter-organizational relation-ships, conflicts, and conflict resolution. Thestate simply guarantees associationalfreedom and contractual rights. In general,relatively low degree of state intervention,regulation, and integration.

Norm of access but not necessarily ofinclusion, nor of �collective benefit� and�fairness.� Such norms may be advocated butare vulnerable to challenge or de-legitimation.

Resource power is important in influencingpolicy-making or actors involved. Compro-mise may be pursued as a strategy, butshifts in bargaining power are followedrather quickly and often dramatically byshifts in strategies. Compromise and thepursuit of mutual advantage are based onself-interest (�enlightened�?) and are notnormatively grounded in or derived fromnormative force.

Relatively high uncertainty and low socialpredictability in many policy areas.Particularly high uncertainty and lowpredictability in peripheral policy areascompared to core or strategic areas(relating, for instance, to economicinterests and capitalist institutions).Relatively high flexibility.



social tensions and conflict through highly organized, macro-level multilateral negotiations. In the multilateral consultationsand decision-making of neo-corporatism, even actors represent-ing interests that are more peripheral may become involved, al-though the extent and quality of involvement varies considerably(see later). Indeed, this is a distinctive feature of the system: theconscious incorporation (even co-optation) of peripheral actors,after they have mobilized, into the policy-making process. In thisway, peripheral institutions and key groups in these domainshave opportunities to express their opinions about – and to tryto prevent or reduce – negative, unintended impacts on theirown spheres. They become involved in the rule formationprocess as ultimate veto groups, providing also powerful incen-tives for them to abide by the outcome (conditions of co-optation). The involvement itself provides incentives for thosefrom a particular periphery sphere to coordinate their strategieswithin the more encompassing frame. For example, mobilizedgroups may enhance their influence on central, organized deci-sion-making by functioning as a ‘segment’. This also has the sec-ondary effect of providing an organizational basis for morecoherent structuring and regulation of the segment in whichthey are engaged. This institutionalization of multilateral con-sultation and decision-making, along with segmentation of pe-ripheral domains, tends to reduce the problem of incoherentstructuring and regulation in modern societies—a problemcharacterizing a pluralist system.

In sum, a neo-corporatist model emphasizes the articulationof interests through highly organized, stable relationships be-tween government and interest organizations; the state is sub-stantially interventionist with respect to economy and society,shaping, managing, coercing domestic interest group relations,and behaviour. The pluralist, interest-group model focuses onmore competitive and less formal or structured mechanisms andpathways of influence. And, in general, the state is less interven-tionist than in the neo-corporatist arrangement (Andersen andEliassen 1991, 1995, 1996b).

Andersen and Eliassen (1996b) have argued that these twowell-established models are inadequate for investigating and un-derstanding the process of interest representation within the EU.We concur and believe that the difference in these two perspec-tives may well have more to do with the way in which policy-making and lobbying have evolved in the American and



European national political contexts than in the particular func-tions of lobbying and policy-making in the political process—orthe ways in which lobbyists proceed in plying their trade. Amongother things, they suggest identifying the differing institutionaland situational conditions within historically given, macro-struc-tural contexts. The strategic choices available to actors in theprocess of lobbying tend, therefore, to look significantly differ-ent in diverse systems, as we show later.

The lobbying, consultation, and negotiation in both of thesedistinct institutional arrangements within democratic systemsallow some affected groups and interests to make their voicesheard and to influence to varying degrees policy processes andtheir outcomes. Economic power as well as political weight –including mobilization to lobby – are the foundations for influ-ence over rule and policy-making in a pluralist system. Weakergroups can gain entry in a given situation, for instance, throughfinding resource-rich and influential allies. But they generallyhave few opportunities to remain in and influence the systemunless they make up a substantial organization or movement, orare otherwise able to independently institutionalize their ownorganizational structure and resource base. Wealthy and power-ful groups are often in a position to countervail the demands ofsubstantial interests including voter majorities. Such establishedpower is occasionally thwarted by mobilized organizations, po-litical parties, mass demonstrations, and media attention, result-ing in elite concessions. However, these concessions may bereversed once mobilization subsides and/or established powerscounter-attack, and offset. In addition, pluralist systems arerelatively ineffective at the integration of multiple domains orsectors and addressing the problems of incoherence, negativeinteraction effects, and unintended consequences (Burns andFlam 1987).

Neo-corporatist systems have their vulnerabilities and failingsas well. One of the problems concerns the matter of representa-tion—the fact that peripheral groups feel, in many instances,that they have not been sufficiently taken into account, or havebeen co-opted. Nonetheless, they have ‘participated,’ ‘beenheard,’ and are ‘recorded in the protocols’—it may be claimedthat these groups’ overarching ideology and proposals have, infact, been properly taken into account. Periodically, there maybe revolts and re-negotiation about the terms of participation,including the rules and organizing principles for consultation,



deliberation, and negotiation (Andersen and Burns 1992). Ingeneral, neo-corporatist regimes have much less flexibility thanpluralist regimes—both in terms of who participates, what arerelevant issues, and how are they to be handled, and by whom(Adams 2002b). A highly turbulent and changing environmentis particularly problematic for a neo-corporatist system and setsthe stage for crisis and instability. The issues may concern whatprecisely is the directorial role or the most effective policies forthe interventionist state under substantially changed economicand social conditions. This might concern the emergence of aservice or information economy or an aging population; or thequestion of which emerging units or segments should be in-cluded or excluded from incorporation. Andersen (1986) pointsout several conditions under which well-developed corporatistsystems break down or experience substantial failures:n a substantially new economic or social challenge emerges; or

an entirely new sphere or domain of activity arises. Estab-lished organizing principles and norms are difficult to applyat the same time that practical experience with and knowledge of the new conditions are, of course, minimal;

n powerful external agents (e.g. multi-national corporations),which do not share the neo-corporatist ideology and institu-tional frame, break out or refuse to enter in and therebycontribute to challenging and destabilizing the entireneo-corporatist system.

In sum, a neo-corporatist system is designed to operate as anintegrated whole, through mechanisms of centralization and co-ordination of multiple segments, as well as of institutionalizedprocedures of negotiation and conflict resolution. A high degreeof policy coherence and continuity may be achieved; this may beat the expense of flexibility and adaptability. In a pluralist sys-tem, on the other hand, there is considerable autonomy of seg-ments and their agents. Initiatives can come from many differentagents and directions, with the economically powerful agentshaving, of course, substantial advantages in these processes.Coordination, to the extent it occurs, takes place through alli-ance formation, multiple bilateral and ad hoc or temporary mul-tilateral negotiations. Typically, flexibility and adaptability areaccomplished at the expense of coherence and continuity inpolicy-making. The rules of exclusion (and openness) of the twosystems also differ. There is more apparent openness in a pluralist



system, but the openness is difficult to exploit, in many in-stances, without substantial economic resources or some form ofpolitical currency, such as the kind of credibility and legitimacythat some public interest organizations enjoy. In a pluralist sys-tem there may be de facto closure because of resource limitations,whereas in a neo-corporatist system, exclusion is more formal orinstitutionalized.

In general, the capacity to mobilize resources – power – is im-portant in both systems. But as suggested above, economicpower is a particularly strategic resource in a pluralist system.Moreover, it is ‘right and proper’ to use such power, as long asone plays according to the rules of the game. In a neo-corporatist system, while power, in particular economic power,is important, normative argument and fitting in or adhering tothe logic of integration and coherence plays a key role (as also inthe EU, see below). Thus, participants should (or are expectedto) exhibit a concern for collective benefit, just or fair distribu-tion, and readiness to compromise self-interest—all of whichcountervail to some extent pure power factors. Thus, the sus-tained participation of weak or peripheral groups – through ex-plicit inclusion principles – is achieved to a much greater extentas a result of their institutionalized roles in the policy-makingprocess. Participation gives some substantial opportunities ofinfluence even to relatively weak agents, because there are normsof recognition, collective deliberation, and self-sacrifice in neo-corporatist systems.

The EU system in comparative perspectiveEU policy-making arrangements7

Several of the most distinctive features of the EU type of governance characterizing the EU can be summarized as follows(Schmitter 1996).1 There is no single locus of clearly defined supreme authority.2 There is no established and relatively centralized hierarchy of

public offices but rather multiple hierarchies and networks.3 There is no predefined and distinctive ‘public’ sphere of compe-

tence within which the EU can make decisions binding on all.

7 This section draws on earlier work characterizing the EU and several of the keymechanisms of its operation [see Burns, Carson, and Nylander (2001); Andersen andBurns (1996); Burns and Nylander (2001)].



4 There is no fixed and (more or less) contiguous territory overwhich it exercises authority (for instance, Denmark, Sweden,and England are outside on some matters, in particular thenew monetary union with the Euro).

5 There is no unique capacity for the direct implementation ofits decisions (laws, policies) upon intended individuals andgroups.

6 There is not a pervasive ability to control the movement ofgoods, services, capital, and persons within its borders.

7 There is no unique recognition by other polities, membershipin international organizations, and exclusive capacity to con-clude international treaties (since member states retain muchof this).

8 Many agents, and a variety of types of agents, are engaged inEU governance, and they expand and adapt it in a variety ofways.

While there is considerable agreement on such descriptions ofthe EU, there is little consensus on what precisely is the EU’sform of governance. Indeed, it continues to be described in vari-ous ways. For example, some see it from an inter-governmentalperspective (Moravcsik 1998), focusing on the intentions andpreferences of member states. Member states meet and negoti-ate in inter-governmental conferences, and revise the Treaty(that is, the series of EU treaties commencing with the Treaty ofRome (1958)). However, treaty articles can be quite vaguely for-mulated, giving considerable room for interpretation and, as Hix(1999) points out, ‘…treaty reform is a blunt instrument. Whensigning treaties, governments cannot predict the precise implica-tions of treaty provisions and new decision-making rules, or ex-actly how the Commission will behave when granted newpowers’. Nugent (1995) stresses, more over, ‘Treaty provision isno guarantee of policy development nor is lack of provision aguarantee of lack of development’. Thus, EU policy outcomesare generally not understandable as simply the output of nego-tiations among member states (although this aspect must betaken into account); in addition, the relative importance of suchnegotiations appears to have dwindled. The EU is also seen as atype of federative, or possibly confederative, system. Again, thischaracterization does not fit very well either. Arguably one of themost influential perspectives views the EU as a unique form ofmulti-level governance with loosely coupled segments and



networks (Kohler-Koch 1997; Peterson 1995, among others).8

Networks of policy-making agents and lobbyists crisscross andoverlap, extending across functional areas. Some configurationsof actors in a policy area or domain are very issue-specific. Oth-ers make up more or less institutionalized policy communities –with established norms and principles for organizing policy-making – which addresses a variety of issues.

The EU consists of a complex of institutions—an inter-institu-tional arrangement. But this is true of any modern state. What isunique about the EU is that the boundaries between the func-tions and roles of its different institutions are unclear and shift-ing. For instance, the three basic branches of government –legislative, executive, and judiciary – are discernible in the EU,but demarcation lines are fuzzier than in most national systems(Hix 1999; Warleigh 2002). Warleigh (2002) stresses that ‘boththe initial design of the EU structure, and the way it has since

8 The EU ‘state’ (in contrast to Weber’s (1968) general characterization of a state) is suigeneris, but is likely to become a more common form in the context of heterogeneouspopulations, societal differentiation, and globalization (Burns 1999; Burns, Jaegur, andKamali et al. 2000b). It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by‘legislative action’, but lacks tax and welfare systems. The administrative staff is ori-ented to, and partially regulated by, an administrative and legal order. It is important toadd that in the EU, this regulation is very loose and flexible, allowing extraordinaryinitiative and freedom of action of the main administrative body, namely the Commis-sion. It also allows the participation of a large number of other agents without constitu-tional or formal roles, such as interest groups and lobbyists.

The key agents and representatives of the EU institutional arrangements claim bind-ing authority in certain areas (single market as well as areas of competence defined bythe Treaties), not only over member states and their citizens, but over all relevantactions taking place in the area(s) of its jurisdiction. This authority is regulated by leg-islation, as well as judicial and other relevant normative orders—that is, it is legitimate.

In this sense, the EU ‘state’ is an authoritative association of governance groundedalmost entirely on legitimacy and material interests in diverse jurisdictional areas. Theexercise of EU authority is regarded as legitimate only insofar as it is ‘delegated’ by themember states or prescribed by them, e.g. in EU mandates (in treaties, etc.). Hence, itis an ultimate authority derived from general agreements (treaties) or principles. Thereis a framed or bounded exercise of authority, which is essential to any jurisdiction andcertainty of authority.

Note that Weber defined the modern state as a compulsory association with a terri-torial basis. The EU clearly fails in meeting this criterion. Even the criterion of territoryis problematic since the EU has flexible boundaries: when it comes to the Euro, the‘territory of jurisdiction’ is truncated. When it comes to market regulation, it is ex-panded to include to a large extent Norway and Switzerland.

Note also that monopoly over the use of force is not essential to the EU jurisdictionand continuity of authority, at least thus far. Legitimate use of force by the EU is onlypermitted for the time being by its member states or as prescribed by them.



developed, relied upon complex interdependencies between theinstitutions rather than a strict and clear separation of powers asin the constitution of the US. In addition, the Union is (presum-ably) still evolving (Marks and McAdam 1996). The founders ofthe EU were unable to create a new federal state since the neces-sary support was lacking at both elite and popular levels. In-stead, they set in train a process which binds the member statesand the EU institutions ever more closely together, while leavingthe difficult constitutional problems such as the separation ofpowers and relationship between the different tiers of govern-ment to be decided gradually or simply emerge organically.’ Inshort, there is unclear separation of powers in the EU Treaty(which has served thus far as a type of constitution). These con-ditions provide very substantial opportunities for entrepre-neurial and informal politics (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns1999), much more so than in typical modern states (see later).9

The EU arrangement entails, roughly speaking, democratic rep-resentation and legislative function (European Parliament), ad-ministrative or executive order (the Commission), judiciary (theEuropean Court), legislative body with quasi national represen-tation (the Council of Ministers), an inter-governmental nego-tiation framework (the European Council with heads of memberstate governments), among others. As any large complex of institu-tions (Machado and Burns 1998), the EU entails many cross-cur-rents and tensions as a result of conflicting values and interests andsubstantially contradictory institutional arrangements (Burns,Carson, and Nylander 2001). The particular ways in which thesecross-currents conflict, coexist, and reinforce one another shapes

9 To be more precise, the Treaty does not define precisely the material limits of EU ju-risdiction (Weiler 1999). Weiler (1999) points out that in most federal (that is, explicitlymulti-level) systems, the relationship between the general polity and its constituentunits is conceptualized by the principle of enumerated powers, but in the case of the EUno core of sovereign state powers was left beyond the reach of the EU (based on severaldoctrines supported by the European Court of Justice, that which makes EU law thelaw of the land; the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law, that is, EU law trumps con-flicting national law; the doctrine of implied powers, e.g., the competence of the EU tonegotiate and include international treaties; the doctrine of human rights. As we haveargued recently (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001), the single market principle – andcommunity issues – can be used for many different initiatives. Where will it stop? Wetend to agree with Weiler (1999) that under the present, highly flexible and in manyways effective arrangements, there is no stopping the train. Some of the support for anew constitution is apparently motivated by a genuine interest in putting limits to thegrowth of community competencies (Weiler 2000).



the environment in which policy-making and policy developmenttakes place.

The EU is then not only a segmented, multi-level system, buta highly open and dynamic system with poorly defined bounda-ries between its functions, jurisdictions, and authorities; thisalso characterizes the relationship between the EU and its mem-ber states. Among other things, the lack of precise boundariesand well-defined functions and responsibilities makes for lack ofclarity about authority relationships as well as about responsibility for policy initiatives and failures. These conditions of perva-sive vagueness and ambiguity also contribute to the notoriousnon-transparency of the EU. Boundary unclarity and opennessoffers great freedom and opportunities for entrepreneurs, boththose within the system and many outside of it (who have re-sources and/or are organized and want to influence policy or re-structure the system in practice).10 This is a major factor inmaking for a highly dynamic and expanding system. Such EUentrepreneurship operates, of course, under some constraints.These include general constitutional and institutional con-straints, as well as the opposition of other agents. An importantfactor in the EU, for example is nationally-oriented agents whoseek to block the increasing expansion of EU powers and struc-tures, that is, to maintain a status quo with substantial sover-eignty (Burns and Nylander 2001).

In the type of governance that the EU embodies, the directinfluence of people through formal representative democracyhas only a marginal place (Andersen and Burns 1996; Schmitter1996; Weiler 1999). Individual citizens voting in free, equal, fairand competitive Euro-elections exercise little or no influenceover the composition of Euro-authorities, much less bring abouta rotation of those in office. For instance, a majority vote generated

10 The freedoms have parallels, in a certain sense, to those of a market. They allow powerful private and public actors, but above all the Commission itself, extraordinary (inthe perspective of a normal democratic state) initiative and freedom in what they do,who they engage or collude with, and thus a degree of agency that is uncommon withinmost ‘democratic states’ (for the latter do not permit such degrees of freedom for government agencies. Even in tyrannical regimes, where government agents may enjoyconsiderable freedom, individuals and groups of society must worry about arbitraryand, therefore, unpredictable action from the tyrant). Given this relative freedom from con-straints, EU-wide initiatives are grounded or justified in terms of the ‘single market,’ ‘Euro-pean standards,’ ‘European quality,’ European-wide problems. The substantialopportunities for initiatives allow for possible gains in power, resources, and legitimacy.



by the European electorate at large cannot be translated into aneffective and predictable change in government or policy. TheEU is not, in general, a political system in which rulers are held accountable by citizens for their public policies andactions, and where competing elites offer alternative pro-grammes and vie for popular support at the European level. Inthis sense, it is not a typical political democracy (Andersen andBurns 1996; Schmitter 1996), although it satisfies general cul-tural notions of democracy (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns1999).11 These conditions have led to critique and discussionsabout a ‘democratic deficit’. There has been, however, somepartial developments increasing democratic accountability. Forinstance, food safety problems beginning with BSE (bovinespongiform encephalitis or ‘mad-cow disease’) have not onlytriggered crises of confidence in the safety of food; they have alsothreatened to further undermine the legitimacy and authority ofthe EU, and particularly the Commission (Burns, Carson, andNylander 2001). Intense pressure from NGOs and citizengroups was clearly felt, and continues to be, although new chan-nels of accountability remain quite different than those in amore typical parliamentary democracy.

Clearly, the EU is not a state in the traditional European oreven contemporary international sense. It is a new form of su-pra-national authority (see footnote 8). It is still in principlebased on strong national systems which have surrendered – orare surrendering – degrees and types of national sovereignty in awide spectrum of policy areas. European Community law haspriority over any conflicting law of a member state. However, therate of implementation and degree of compliance varies considerably, between, for instance, Italy and Denmark, to take twoextremes.

Entrepreneurship and lobbyingThe Commission plays the key role in initiating legislation.12

When final decisions are made, the Council is the major actor.

11 Although parliamentary institutions are considered the core of western political sys-tems, they are currently undergoing systematic erosion (Andersen and Burns 1996;Burns 1994; 1999; Burns et al. 2000b.12 Generally speaking, the Commission is the single most key actor in EU policy-mak-ing (Nylander 2000; Pollack 1998). This is, in part, because of its organizational, tech-nical, and discursive capabilities, its key role in agenda setting, preparing investigations,and preparing legislation. It has the role of initiating (or responding to inquiries about)



Parliament has been politically weak, with limited initiative orpositive influence. However, the role and strength of Parliamenthas been progressively increased, first in the Treaty ofMaastricht (1992) and more recently, in the Treaty of Amster-dam (1997). At the same time, the Commission has furtherstrengthened its position through linkages and coalition build-ing with European lobbyists and interest associations. Indeed, ithas been an explicit policy of the European Commission to en-courage direct contact with specialized affected interests andorganizations, and those who mobilize expertise. This takesplace above all in diverse, specialized policy networks and sub-governments. In a system that lacks conventional democratic le-gitimacy and accountability, this can be seen as an alternativeapproach to developing some form of constituency and the le-gitimacy it entails. ‘Public’ authority is dispersed in these ar-rangements, which integrate public and private agents. There isnot only the lack of a clear centre of authority, but also very weakformal procedures regulating access to sub-governments andpolicy networks.13

More than a thousand advisory and consultative bodies havebeen established, so called Euroquangos, involving representatives

policy-making as well as mediating interests within the EU governance structure. But itis important to note that it does not operate as a traditional public administration. It is,on the one side, more responsive to pressures on it, more like a political assembly, andon the other, enjoys much greater flexibility and freedom of action in how it proceeds indealing with any particular issue or policy area. It is both responsive to interest pres-sures but also takes its own initiatives in shaping and balancing interests. For instance,in pursuit of the liberalization of electricity markets, it formulated the agenda, helpedshape a lobby of industrial electricity users, and encouraged them to appeal to the Eu-ropean Court if the national public utilities refused to accept liberalization (Nylanderand Engstrand 1999). In general, it may make use of its formal resources and proce-dures as well as mobilize external resources, experts, and procedures, including keyagents and networks outside its domain. The Commission is particularly influentialwhen it has legal competence, a mandate, or established praxis in an area, when it is inpossession of, or can mobilize, greater expertise and information than most competingor opposing agents, when it can refer to established principles, norms, rules, and proce-dures of policy-making, when it can define its policies in universalistic or at leastneutral terms, or can resolve conflicts among interests, including between or amongmember states (Nylander 2000).13 When specific national interests are strong (e.g. agricultural and food issues), theprocess may take the form of (or revert to) international bargaining among the memberstate representatives.




of both interest organizations and Community institutions.Roughly two-thirds of them were formed by the Commission(van Schendelen 1998). Seventy of the Commission committeesare consultative committees, which are formally institutionalized arrangements. Of the council committees, there are 150advisory committees, 60 management committees, and 80 regu-latory committees (van Schendelen 1998). More generally, thereare in the EU elaborate networks of contact between a multitudeof societal interests and lobbyists, on the one hand, and EU in-stitutions, on the other. Indeed, governance networks with theinvolvement of public and private actors are the real core of thepolitical system. Of course, there continues to be a ‘representa-tive authority’ in the system. Formal decisions are taken by theCouncil of Ministers (representing the member states) and,increasingly, the European Parliament representing the ‘Euro-pean peoples.’

Generally speaking, the EU has a high degree of openness tovarious types of representation, not only national and popularforms, but forms for engaging many different types of specialinterests and political agents. Among the most prominent formsof representation is through ‘lobbying.’ The EU is characterizedby vast networks of lobbyists (Andersen and Eliassen 1991,1995, 1997; Andersen and Burns 1996). Since 1987, EU lobby-ing has virtually exploded.14 Estimates of the number of lobby-ists operating in Brussels go up to 10 000 or more depending onhow lobbyists are defined. The highest count includes all whoact to gain and maintain access to key actors at the EU level ofdecision-making. This includes those who come to Brussels topursue particular issues as well as those more permanently posi-tioned in the European capital (Andersen and Eliassen 1991,1995, 1997; Greenwood 1997; Wallace and Young 1997). EarlierBrussels lobbyists were, to a large extent, the same types of ac-tors exercising influence at national levels. First and foremost,these were national and European interest associations. For

14 The key institutional development that set off the exponential growth in lobbying andthe emergence of entirely new types of lobbying groups was the passage of the SingleEuropean Act (1987). This made EU policy-making an important political arena. Thestage was set for vital and profound decision-making processes in Brussels. Before1987, lobbying of the main EU institutions was mostly done by representatives of na-tional organizations, who often also presented the views of special interests within thecountry involved. The major channel of influence was through national representationof the Council (Andersen and Eliassen 1991).



instance, in 1980, European federations for agriculture, labour,industry, business, commerce, and finance had by far the strong-est representation in Brussels. The interest groups on the EUscene today include associations and NGOs ‘representing’ suchsectors of society as education, culture, social services, environ-ment, consumers, public health, and women (Wallace 2000).

EU institutions have increasingly engaged – and interact with– an extraordinary range of ‘lobbyists.’ The Commission has de-veloped a comprehensive network of contacts that cut across,and in many instances are independent of, member states andnational representatives. Increasingly, it is necessary for lobby-ing to be based on broad alliances representing a more ‘Euro-pean’ perspective.’ The EU system is more lobbying-orientedthan any European national system (Andersen and Burns 1996).Private and public interest groups from within and outside theEU can be influential in shaping decisions either through formalconsultation or by acting as sources of information, expertise,strategic advice, and mediation between other actors (Green-wood 1997; Warleigh 2002)

‘Lobbying’ in the EU operates according to the normativedemocratic principle that directly affected parties may claim theright to participate in and influence policy- and law-making.This is the basis for specialized self-representation in particularpolicy networks or sub-governments. At the same time, expertiseplays a central role in the deliberation, negotiations, and deci-sion-making. The technical aspect, including technical exper-tise, disciplines the political bargaining in the specializednetworks or sub-governments. It also provides a language andmeans of framing problems and their solutions, that is, tostructure the discourses and negotiations of policy.15 In sum,

15 The concept of framing captures the deliberate definition of a particular issue and theparticular context in which it should be understood (Diani 1996; Gottweis 1998; Snow,Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1992). Framing has proved a very use-ful concept in research on EU policy, above all because of the stress on deliberation,persuasion, negotiation, ‘soft measures,’ etc. (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001).Specific EU research developing and applying the concept of framing are found inDudley and Richardson (1999); Harcourt (1998); Nylander (2000); Radaelli (1995,2002), among others. The concept of framing stems from Goffman’s (1974) dramatur-gical approach and is developed in the literature on social movements. Building onGoffman, some of the main representatives of this research, Snow and Benford (1986)define frames as ‘schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive,identify, and label occurrence within their life space and the world at large’. Snow,Worden, and Benford (1992) argue that framing is a process-derived phenomenon,



representation, participation, and political influence are not pri-marily based on, or linked to, EU citizenship. They are based onspecialized, organized interests, and the mobilization of relevantexpertise.

Diversity and characteristic features of policy-makers and lobbyists in EU governance

Initiatives for policy and legislation may come from the Com-mission, from members of Parliament, or from member states,or from powerful and diverse lobbyists. In general, great num-bers and variety of entrepreneurial agents are formally and in-formally involved in EU governance.

The Commission as entrepreneurThus far, in the history of the EU, the major public entrepreneurhas been the Commission and its various Directorates General(DGs), for instance DGI, External relations, DGII (Economicand financial affairs), DGIII (Industry), DGIV (Competition),DGV (Employment, industrial relations, and social affairs),DGVI (Agriculture), DGXII (Science, research and develop-ment), DGXXIV (Consumer policy and health protection). TheCommission is not only active in the consultation process, en-gaging lobbyists and experts, but also is a key agent in its ownright (although there is considerable variation among DGs inthis regard). Some DGs are in a strong position, others muchmore weak and unsure of their mandate. Even with a mandate(or ‘competence’), it takes time to build up networks of experts,develop legitimizing discourses with arguments, and gain au-thority and influence in relation to other DGs as well as otheragents in the EU complex. In each policy sector, a DG strives fora ‘constituency of support’ (Richardson 1996).

which involves agency at the level of reality construction. However, framing does notimply complete constructions of phenomena, but rather that some elements are empha-sized over others, and that particular interpretations of reality are made. Thus,Goffman’s frames are designed to avoid complete relativism but to show multiple reali-ties (Collins 1988). Framing means roughly putting a frame around a picture, but it isessential to recognize that there are several layers of frames. Around the first frame, alarger frame could be put, and a smaller frame can be put within the first frame. Inother words, some frames are more fundamental than others. Fundamental policyframes are often referred to as policy paradigms (see conclusion).




Literature on the EU often describes the Commission as astrategic actor, or involved in ‘policy entrepreneurship’ (Cram1997, Majone 1996, Matlàry 1997; for a conceptualization ofpublic entrepreneurship, see Woodward, Ellig, and Burns(1994). The Commission has the task of balancing and mediat-ing national interests as well as interest-group opinions in orderto come forward with proposals that will be also accepted by theCouncil of Ministers and the European Parliament, and the en-gaged associations and NGOs across Europe. However, it is alsoan agent with goals of its own. One raison d’être of the Commis-sion is to promote European integration, and it uses alternativevenues and means for achieving its goals. The Commission oftenco-operates with the ECJ (European Court of Justice) to pro-mote European integration, since the ECJ shares with the Com-mission a preference for deeper integration (Pollack 1998).Those adhering to the inter-governmental view of the EU con-sider the Commission only as an agent expressing the will of themember states. Our research and that of others shows that theCommission is a powerful actor in its own right and a majorentrepreneur in EU policy-making and institutional reform.

Diffusion of policy initiative (or delegatedentrepreneurship)

One characteristic of the Commission is that it relies on a con-stituency of external consultants and lobbyists for part of itspolitical/policy support. It organizes this support in part, byopening up spaces for ‘outside actors’, associations, NGOs, andother representatives of interests, etc. to play entrepreneurialroles. In this way, initiatives may come from any number ofsources, including not only interests and lobbyists, but also tech-nicians.

Typically, a private entrepreneur has greater discretion andfreedom of action than public entrepreneurs, because of the ex-pectations that public entrepreneurs will be monitored, their ini-tiatives will be transparent, and their actions subject to publiclaw and norms, and accountability (Woodward, Ellig, and Burns1994). This holds in general, but there are important exceptions,particularly in the case of the EU, where democratic norms oftransparency and accountability are still weak. But legitimacyfor initiating and carrying through a policy remains important,and policy entrepreneurs must establish it one way or another inthe EU public space. For instance, a lobbyist who wishes to push



through a new policy will require that the matter be taken up bya legitimate policy actor, e.g. an appropriate DG. On the otherhand, the Parliament has found it difficult to be an initiator ofpolicy, although they are able to block in some cases, and theyare expanding their public power, which, ultimately, can betranslated into initiatives. The Parliament needs a qualified ma-jority in order to come forth with its ‘own initiative’. This hasproven difficult. Not only is the ‘legitimacy of the actor’ a majorfactor, but the ‘legitimacy of the problem area’ is also a point ofcontention. Some problem areas of initiative are considered (orhave been) ‘national’. This does not preclude EU policy initia-tives, but it requires developing an argument why the areashould become a matter of concern for the EU. One has todemonstrate – provide evidence and arguments – about why theproblem is a ‘legitimate problem for EU action’ (Burns, Carson,and Nylander 2001; Burns and Nylander 2001). Such issues orproblems are, among others, (1) EU integrated market problemsor problems of common standards of market products, whichhave high legitimacy for EU initiatives; (2) new problems notdealt with at the national level; (3) global problems that call forcollective solution; and (4) regulatory gaps.

Multiple-access policy systemThe EU is a multi-access policy system in that entrepreneursmay gain access and exercise influence at various points andlevels. Of course, some points are more readily open, or givemore likely influence over the policy process and outcome, thanothers. For instance, if a matter is already on the agenda of theCommission and the agent agrees with its thrust and likely out-come, then it may simply try to add weight through the Com-mission or through contacts to the Commission. If, however, theinterest is at odds with the Commission’s orientation and likelyproposal, then it may have to consider such channels as the na-tional authority or political leadership or the European Parlia-ment. Or, in case an opposition is established and operates in thepolicy process organized by the Commission, the agent will findit advantageous to throw its weight in with the opposition. Al-though the Commission is the key agent with the legitimacy andpower to formally initiate policy, various entrepreneurial actorsmay put an issue on the policy agenda. Policy entrepreneurs pro-vide problem-solving perspectives as well as new arguments anddiscourses. The more radical the proposal, or the perspective,



the greater the resistance. A radical proposal requires consider-able power, possibly normative or legal power, as in the case ofpushing through the liberalization of electricity markets; or itcalls for the mobilization of support, the formation of alliances,and the formulation of an argument that is difficult to counter,given the ethos and governing principles of the EU. In the caseof electricity liberalization, the single market principle as well asthe principle of opposition to monopoly were the basis for theargument and mobilization supporting a paradigm shift andreframing electricity distribution problems (Nylander 2000;Nylander and Engstrand 1999). Normative arguments werehighly effective in developing environmental policies as well as‘mainstreaming gender’ in EU policies.

In sum, several of the EU’s key institutional arrangements,cultural elements, and dynamics can be characterized as follows.1 As in any complex institutional arrangement, there are con-

tradictions in values and rule complexes, manifested as zonesof stress and tension, for example at the boundary regionsbetween particular institutional arrangements such as theEuropean Parliament and the Commission; between the EUCommission and Parliament, on one side, and the Council ofMinisters, on the other; or between groups representing di-verse values and institutional arrangements such as thosesupporting more centralized European policy-making andthose supporting national sovereignty and decentralization.

2 The tensions and conflicts result not only out of different in-stitutionalized values and organizing principles, but also outof actors’ struggles for power as well as attempts to realizeparticular values. One major cleavage is that between thoserepresenting and struggling for centralized EU power andthose representing and struggling for member state sove-reignty and formal democracy (see later). The former may actin the name of the EU and take initiatives, in part trying toexpand its powers and domains of responsibility and author-ity for policy-making and regulation.16

16 What is particularly characteristic of the supranational/national cleavage is that itcuts across most legislative and policy areas. Along such lines, Hooghe and Marks(1997) stress this distinctively European dimension of contestation: ‘nationalism versussupranationalism,’ which depicts the conflict about the role of national state as the su-preme arbiter of political, economic, and cultural life. At one extreme are those whowish to preserve or strengthen the national state; at the other extreme are those whowish to press for ever closer EU and believe that national identities can co-exist with an



3 While the roles and functions of the different EU institutionsare specified in the Treaty of Rome (1957) (with revisions inthe Single European Act (1986), Maastricht (1992), and Am-sterdam (1997) treaties making up a type of constitution),these are not precisely specified and the roles are negotiableand shifting. Boundaries are also negotiable and flexible, notonly within the institutional arrangements of the EU but be-tween the EU and external agents, particularly the manynon-government agents and private interests. In general, thesuccessive treaties have created a framework on which tobuild, rather than boxes within which to operate. There is aculture of democratic governance (entailing not only forms ofparticipation, deliberation, argumentation, and negotiationbut also general values such as democracy, rule of law, dueprocess, the necessity of expertise (rationality)). The cultureinforms and provides a point of departure for deliberationand collective decision-making as well as multiple innova-tions in concrete policy arenas and developments. (This ismuch more open-ended than that operating within institu-tional arrangements that are relatively fixed since it provides

overarching supranational (European) identity.’ The reactions to the Maastricht Treaty,especially in Denmark but also in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, suggestcontinuing controversy around the question of national sovereignty, EU sovereignty,and forms of democratic governance.

The cleavage between the Commission and the Parliament in opposition to theCouncil, and between the EU and national governments relate to centre-peripherypower struggles within the EU (for instance, as found in earlier state and empire forma-tion. One major pattern entails a ‘central movement’ competing with and winning over(as well as losing in some instances to) peripheral agents (and movements). The pointis that the EU as an expansive, transformative order does not proceed linearly ormonotonically. While there are multiple interests and interest configuration with incen-tives – and resources – to develop the ‘centre’ – and this process attracts additionalagents, resources, and makes for careers, alliances etc., there are plenty of opponents.Among the key entrepreneurs carrying the EU project further, elaborating it and deep-ening it are the Commission, global business, and public interest lobbyists; as well asexperts of diverse kinds who find opportunities and niches in the dynamic EU order).This explains why the EU expansion and transformation does not take over completely,why it is piecemeal, and subject to a variety of constraints and countervailing forces(Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001). Also, the centre-periphery dialectic is compli-cated by the fact that member states, through the Council of Ministers and the Euro-pean Council, also influence community processes. So, the EU can be seen as an instrument ofmember states rather than a purely usurping power (Weiler 1999).




substantial opportunities for introducing and developing or-ganic forms of governance).17

4 The EU shapes and regulates a variety of areas: markets,technologies and technical developments, environment,some aspects of welfare (Burns, Carson, and Nylander 2001)including public health, issues of citizen rights, and some as-pects of foreign policy, particularly commercial and tradepolicy. In addition to making rules (including its own rulesand procedures) and regulating, the EU also resolves con-flicts, redistributes resources, and defines collective problemsand possible solutions, specifically at the ‘EU level’. There isa stream of problems, issues, and predicaments that can bedefined or established as EU concerns and put on the grow-ing policy and legislative agenda.

5 A great variety of entrepreneurs (inside and outside of EUinstitutions) raise issues (and search for issues and constitu-encies) and try to solve problems in EU terms, drawing onEU authority, discourses, allies, and resources (Burns andNylander 2001). They contribute in this way to also repro-ducing or expanding EU values, principles, and institutionalarrangements. These are part of a general ‘EU movement’without necessarily ‘coordinating’ or colluding with one an-other.

6 There are multiple modes of policy-making, with modes dif-fering by arena and sector as well as by the agents involved inan issue, initiative, negotiation (Carson, Nylander, and Burns[2001]; Wallace [2000], Warleigh [2000]). For example, ‘in-ternational negotiation’ at the level of the Council entails ne-gotiating treaties and new global initiatives. The EuropeanParliament, the Commission itself, and the Council may ini-tiate a comprehensive policy process as, for instance in 1986,they adopted a joint declaration against racism and xenopho-bia, followed by a number of other related resolutions anddeclarations of intent during the early 1990s (Burns, Carson,and Nylander 2001). Negotiation and implementation of thestructural funds brought the Commission into direct relation

17 This is a major factor underlying the organic character of EU governance (see below),which is often ‘democratic’ in some respects (Andersen and Burns 1996; Burns 1999).The future constitution, now under preparation by the Convention, may make the EUinto a more fixed, less fuzzy arrangement. However, the trend in contemporary govern-ance is toward more organic forms and practices (Burns et al. 2000b).



with regions and sub-national authorities (Wallace 2000). Inthe area of electricity (moves to liberalization and formationof a single European market), the Commission interactedwith national public utilities (often powerful agents in thehome context) and eventually helped mobilize large indus-trial consumers to pressure utility monopolies to accept mar-ket liberalization. In a number of prominent areas ofpolicy-making such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, a vastnetwork of industrial associations, powerful enterprises, andNGOs and other public interest organizations are involved inEU policy-making together with the Commission (and anumber of its DGs) and the European Parliament.

7 A number of factors drive innovation and development in theEU, with diverse public and private entrepreneurs exploitingthe freedom and opportunities in the system: (i) expansion inthe size of the EU requiring institutional innovation;(ii) centre-periphery struggle; (iii) technological and globali-zation transformations, which, among other things, generateproblems that are often of a community character, for in-stance, telecommunications, biotechnological developments,industrial agriculture; (iv) in the context of transformations,structures are generated offering opportunities for economic,political or other types of gain, possibilities of power, status,and prestige, etc.; (v) democratic deficits; (vi) institutionalfailings and regulatory gaps (as in the case of EU food crises);and (vii) cultural transformations in connection with theconstruction of European identity (Delanty 1995, 1998), inpart through addressing concrete collective problems such asthe conflict and violence in South-East Europe and in inter-acting (competing and negotiating) with the US on tradepolicy, environment, new technologies such as GMOs (ge-netically modified organisms), etc.

8 The increasing Europeanization proceeds hand-in-hand withthe gradual erosion of ‘national sovereignty’ in a number ofpolicy domains – such an evolution will continue (Burns andNylander 2001; Weiler 1999). The development is not con-verging to a single centre, but is instead leading to apolyarchic complex. In other words, there is a movementfrom the level of European member states to a higher,polycentric level. But the expansion and deepening of EUregulation is constrained and selectively developed as a resultof opposition from those with vested interests in, and



representing and struggling for, member state sovereigntyand more conventional ideas of democracy. This struggle ismanifested in the debates and struggles at the convention onan EU constitution.

On a more general level, there is in the EU a well-establishedculture of democratic governance (with understandings, beliefs,values, and norms as opposed to merely formal constitution ofgovernment (Burns 1994)). This provides the basis for the formsand evolution of EU governance.18 The EU can be characterizedas a type of ‘organic democracy’ (Andersen and Burns 1996).This refers to a number of contemporary forms and practices ofgovernance that diverge from the principles of formal, repre-sentative democracy based on territory; distinctions between‘public’ and ‘private’ are vague or fuzzy; procedures for delibera-tion, negotiation, and decision-making are diverse and readilyadapted to sectoral needs or requisites of specific policies;governance may range from a mostly public agency set-up (‘gov-ernment’) through mixed forms, to largely ‘private forms’(Andersen and Burns 1992, 1996; Burns 1994, 1999).19 Theseforms are democratic in the sense that ‘voice’ and ‘participation’are to a greater or lesser extent available in matters that affectparticular interests (not because they refine or extend citizen de-mocracy or parliamentarism). This conception does not referonly to ‘organic government,’ where state agents reach out intoand steer many realms of society. Of course, this also goes on,but in an organic democracy, we find agents of civil society,

18 Governance has become a useful concept with which to refer to EU developments(but also emerging national forms), because of mixtures of private and public, informaland formal, irregular and regular, non-standard ‘laws’ and ‘regulations’, etc.19 The EU countries experience a deep cleavage between the emerging diffuse culture oforganic democracy and traditional concepts of national parliamentary democracy. Thishas resulted in conflicts and recurring mobilizations in opposition to the EU state, justas we find tensions and conflicts between formal parliamentary democracy and organictypes of democracy within most modern nation-states (Burns 1994,1999). The tensionsand struggles within the EU over questions of sovereignty and centralized control havecontributed to a reassessment of the role of national parliamentary forms. For many,these are especially symbolic of national sovereignty, and of popular democracy. At thesame time, ironically enough, a great deal of major ‘public policy-making and rule-making’ in modern states takes place outside of the domain of authority and responsi-bility of Parliament and the central government, although these institutions remainlargely responsible, or at least accountable, for such decisions (Burns 1999; Burns et al.2000b).



NGOs, business associations, companies and unofficial privateactors, who engage in governance activities, often on their owninitiative, claiming their ‘democratic rights’ and recognition oftheir expertise and experience. In general, there is the interpen-etration of state agencies and agents of civil society. Althoughgovernment representatives (of agencies) are partners or media-tors in many of the organic processes, they are not in a positionto unilaterally decide or implement rules, whether they concernthe economy, research, education, or technological development(Kohler-Koch 1995). In short, ‘hierarchy’ gives way to ‘reciproc-ity’ and ‘multi-lateral systems,’ and the boundaries between‘public’ (and government) and ‘private’ (contractual) becomesfuzzy. Finally, there are particular organizing principles andrules of the game governing discourse, negotiation, and deci-sion-making in any given policy network or community. Particu-larly important value orientations or values are the pursuit of thecommon good and finding positive sum agreements (Kohler-Koch 1995).

EU policy-making compared to neo-corporatist andpluralist policy-making systems

The three systems can be compared on the basis of, on the onehand, the organizing principles for arranging or conductingpolicy-making activities and, on the other hand, the number andvariety of actors.20 In the view of some researchers, the EUpolicy-making apparatus represents a new composition of struc-tural elements, differing substantially from either neo-corporatist or pluralist orders (Burns, Carson, and Nylander2000; Burns and Nylander 2001; Weiler 1999). The EU as a sys-tem of policy-making and legislation is usually more organizedand formalized than typical pluralist systems such as those in theUS. On the other hand, it is more open to multiple interests andhas much more differentiated and specialized governance andpolicy-making structures than do most neo-corporatist systems.

Among the major institutional and structural differences, wehave stressed the centralized and institutionalized character ofthe neo-corporatist system, as opposed to the polycentric andshifting structure of the liberal/pluralist system of policy-making. The EU represents a complex hybrid in which there is

20 In work we have come across recently, Weiler (1999) compares the EU system to neo-corporatist and con-associational systems.



increasing ‘centralization’ in the form of the gradual crowdingout of ‘national sovereignty’ in a number of policy domains. Thisis true, for instance, in energy, pharmaceuticals, and economicpolicy (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001). But this centraliza-tion is not converging to a single authoritative centre, but is in-stead evolving into a central polyarchic complex. In effect, thereis a marked, but selective movement from the level of Europeanmember states to this supranational, polycentric level. The ex-pansion and deepening of EU regulation is constrained and de-veloped selectively as a result of opposition from those withvested interests in, and representing and struggling for, memberstate sovereignty and national parliamentary democracy (Burnsand Nylander 2001).

In a neo-corporatist system – as well as in some sectors of theEU (Carson, Nylander, and Burns 2001) – policy processes arecarried out in accordance with well-defined institutional ar-rangements. Certain procedures and norms make for orderli-ness, conflict resolution, and more or less predictable outcomes.But established procedures and norms are not per se necessarilyintegrating and stabilizing. Some contribute in a particularsocio-political context to instability and unpredictability. This isthe case of the neo-corporatist system – as well as some EUpolicy sectors — that ignore deep cleavages and substantial mi-norities. This may occur when these are not defined as an inte-gral part of the system – and therefore not included indeliberative and conflict-resolution processes. Pluralist systemsare more open and flexible to emerging groups and interests, ifthe latter can mobilize resources or find powerful allies. How-ever, such systems leave the policy process exposed to powerful,resource-rich interests (at the expense of resource-poor inter-ests) as well as self-proclaimed interests who can readily mobi-lize resources or allies. Pluralist systems are also vulnerable tothe chaotic introduction of problems or issues as well as ‘solu-tions’ or strategies. In other words, the policy process is vulner-able to ‘garbage-can’ type policy-making (March and Olsen1976; Andersen and Burns 1992).

Any modern society is characterized by multiple cross-cleavages. But these cleavages articulate differently, and are medi-ated differently in different policy-making systems. There is for-mal as well as informal bridging and regulation of cleavages inneo-corporatist systems. The cleavages are relatively well-defined and institutionalized in particular ways in a pluralist



system. There is more fluidity, more self-definition and self-rep-resentation, and cleavages may be articulated in a variety of pos-sibly shifting ways. However, they may fail to be ‘bridged’ orregulated in any systematic or orderly way. The EU recognizesand institutionalizes cleavages, e.g. between the supra-nationaland national levels, between capital and labour interests, be-tween industry and consumer and environmental interests. Thisrecognition translates into recruitment (and encouragement) ofinterest groups to participate in policy-making even to the pointof providing resources to such groups to be able to operate andparticipate in lobbying and policy-making.

In the neo-corporatist system, the participating actors arerelatively few, but well-defined collective interests such as cen-tral employers’ associations, central labour unions, and the cen-tral government. The participants are expected to adhere toagreed-upon principles of overall, collective benefit, distributivejustice, and compromise. In a liberal/pluralist system, on theother hand, special or individual interests tend to take prec-edence over general or collective interests. In the EU, the stressis on EU collective interests, at the same time allowing for con-siderable initiative and negotiation by special interests and lob-byists. In established policy areas, there are well-organized andclear-cut procedures. Hence, these sectors in the EU demon-strate many of the organized characteristics of neo-corporatistsystems.

In a neo-corporatist arrangement, established pressure groupshave highly institutionalized engagements and relationships. Al-lies and opponents are well defined, as are discourses, resources,and data. Outside lobbyists target these institutionalized lobby-ists. In a pluralist system, there are, of course, norms guiding theprocess of policy-making (and even lobbying), but any givenpolicy process is less formally institutionalized than in neo-corporatist or many EU policy-making processes. In pluralistsystems, just as there are shifts in the actors participating, thereare ambiguous, shifting discourses, resources utilized, and datacalled upon (although typically not reaching the degree of open-ness and ‘chaos’ envisioned in the ‘garbage-can model’ of policy-making [March and Olsen 1976; Andersen and Burns 1992]). Inother words, pluralist policy processes are neither as orderly, norare the outcomes as predictable, as in integrated, multi-actorregimes with well-defined relationships and forms of policy-making and more or less predictable policy outcomes. The EU is



characterized by a spectrum of arrangements and processes be-tween these two poles; that is, there are highly institutionalized,well-defined and well-organized areas of policy-making that ap-proach a neo-corporatist type of order, on the one hand, andmore open, issue-driven processes and fragmented (or as-of-yetnon-integrated), unpredictable policy-making (as in the alcoholor public health areas), on the other.

Governance and policy-making systems can be distinguishedin terms of their degree of openness (Flam 1994). For our pur-poses here, we dichotomize open and closed policy systemscorresponding to pluralist and neo-corporatist systems, respec-tively. Alternative concepts for relatively open as opposed torelatively closed policy systems are issue networks andpolicy communities, respectively (Rhodes 1991).21 A policycommunity – such as in a neo-corporatist set-up or in well-es-tablished EU sectors such as energy or pharmacy – is character-ized by highly restricted membership and stable relationshipsand procedures, as stressed earlier. These relatively closed struc-tures are likely to have a well-defined bargaining centre or powerlocus, or to be highly homogeneous.22 The concept of issue net-works, on the other hand, is close to that of open networks. Suchnetworks have no single focal point or dominant centre whereactors negotiate and bargain. The structures are polycentric;there are several centres, typically heterogeneous, rather thansimple homogeneous relations or a clear-cut bargaining andpower centre in the network. Such structural concepts (Knoke1990) should be regarded as ideal types.

Neo-corporatist arrangements (and also some well-estab-lished EU sectors such as agriculture) tend to be relativelyclosed and solitary (that in a certain sense accomplish homoge-neity), with a defined core of participants and procedures, and

21 The distinction between closed, stable, and predictable structures and open,dynamic, and unpredictable ones relates to older distinctions in the institutional andorganizational literature such as ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ or ‘institutionalized’ and‘non-institutionalized’. The most extreme form of ‘open process’ is the ‘garbage can’process (March and Olsen 1976; Andersen and Burns 1992). This proposition probablyrelates to Greenwood’s hypothesis (Greenwood 1997) that ‘well-defined and relativelyconcentrated sectors’ have an advantage in organizing at the European level, becausethey can develop common cognitive frames, normative orders, strategies, etc.22 These hypothetical models of networks, polycentric, clearly polarized, etc. (Knoke1990) are, however, not mutually exclusive in the real world, and should be regarded asideal types.



rather predictable outcomes and developments. They have rela-tively standard and effective procedures for producing policies,negotiating, resolving conflicts, etc. The maintenance of closureusually indicates a commitment to – or acceptance of and eventrust in – a common rule regime (including rules for excludingirrelevant agents, potential deviants, and irrelevant or improperissues and strategies). That is, other things being equal, the moreclosed the structure, the more orderly and predictable the policyprocess.

Agent strategies in open and closed policystructures

If we assume that agents, in trying to influence policy processesto their advantage, try to create and maintain social linkages thatare effective, then we would expect different strategies in differ-ent types of structural contexts. Actors participating (or tryingto participate) in policy-making will develop strategies for form-ing ties as a function of whether a policy structure is open orclosed. In order to achieve this, they try to create and maintain,for instance, network ties that are effective. These would include,for example, networks that provide lobbyists the necessary op-portunities or efficiency in the mobilization of resources and in-fluence in striving for their goals.

In an open network, one establishes redundant linkages formobilizing sufficient levels of each potentially essential resource,as well as other resources that might be important in an uncer-tain and unpredictable future. Thus, the actors strive to maxi-mize their contacts and to foster redundant contacts, since thecontext is much more uncertain and risky than in closed net-works. Actors cannot know beforehand what might be ‘redun-dant’ or ‘unnecessary.’ In other words, given that the actors inopen networks are more likely to be faced with an uncertain andrisky environment – but also one with potentially new (and yetto be discovered) opportunities – they strive to maximize con-tacts and even to make ‘redundant’, or apparently ‘unnecessary’contacts. This very strategy tends to increase the size of the net-work but does so in ways that elaborate its open, unstable nature.

Thus, one would expect to find linkages to several actors ineach type of position or role, whether they be bureaucrats, inter-est groups, or experts—corresponding to known, essential valu-ables. Thus, what might appear to be non-essential or redundantlinkages (but which relate to potential future needs or valuables)



tend to be established. In contrast, within closed policy struc-tures such as a neo-corporatist arrangement or the EU energyand pharmaceutical sectors (Carson, Nylander, and Burns2001), the policy processes are more stable and predictable. Par-ticipating actors’ level of uncertainty and sense of risk are lower.In such contexts, actors tend to minimize redundant or unneces-sary contacts (at least those that entail costs or burdens) so as toreduce costs and to free up resources for investment in core rela-tionships. Participants know the major resources – and how tomobilize them – in the network of neo-corporatist relationships.That is, they know which actors to turn to for information, re-source mobilization, and alliances. Interaction processes arerelatively stable and predictable. The level of perceived risktends to be low and to a certain extent can be calculated.Consequently, one can strategically minimize redundant or‘unnecessary’ contacts. In general, in a closed structure, an actormay determine the strategic values (resources, programmes,contacts), which he/she requires in exercising influence in thenetwork. He/she establishes linkages with those agents who canprovide each of these. There would be one link for each valuable,provided that the link is secure and enables the level of the valu-able necessary.

If a key resource is accessible through a given linkage or chan-nel is not sufficient, then the actor would be motivated to estab-lish additional ties (sufficient to providing the necessaryresources, votes, etc.). Such a self-limiting or conservative anddeliberative approach to establishing social ties for policy pur-poses contrasts sharply with the expansive character ofopen networks. This argument corresponds to Burt’s (1992)hypothesis that closed networks (as defined here) are character-ized by non-redundant contacts. The aim of participants is notto build large networks, but to build a network out of non-redundant contacts sufficient to deal with the problems, re-source mobilization, voting requirements, etc. that confrontthem (Burt 1992). There is, then, a built-in tendency to limit theextension or size of such closed policy structures. The distinc-tion between open and closed structures – and more specifically,open and closed social networks – suggests strategic and behav-ioural patterns as illustrated in Figure 1.23

23 Network structures are, however, never fully closed. Even if new actors are not readilyadmitted, there are external developments which impact on the network, generating



Social structural conditions

Pluralist and EU Neo-corporatist structuresstructural conditions (open, flexible) (closed, stable)

commitment to commitment to a few keymultiple, redundant relationships (deep,relations to deal with an non-redundant commitments);uncertain, unpredictable, high loyalty and high mutualrisky context; loyalty and trust, low flexibilitytrust limited; flexibility high

Figure 1 Strategic and behavioural patterns in open and closed social networks

ConclusionsEach governance arrangement, which we have examined in thispaper, is a particular authoritative rule complex or regime pro-viding a systematic, meaningful basis for actors to orient to oneanother and to organize and regulate their interactions, to frame,interpret, and to analyse their performances, and to produceparticular commentaries and discourses, criticisms, and justifi-cations. Each system specifies to a greater or lesser extent whomay or should participate, who is excluded, who may or shoulddo what, when, where, and how, and in relation to whom. It or-ganizes specified actor categories or roles vis-à-vis one anotherand defines their rights and obligations – including rules of com-mand and obedience – and their access to and control over hu-man and material resources. Each system has not only a certain

new problems or suggesting new strategies and initiatives. Thus, the principle formu-lated earlier that closed structures provide for more stability of the policy process andpredictability of policy outcomes calls for qualification. Under some conditions, open-ing up a structure may serve to stabilize a policy process and policy outcomes (that is,just the opposite of the principle that closure would stabilize the policy process andmake policy outcomes more predictable). In the EU, a key actor such as the Commis-sion manages policy networks, opening them up in some ways, even creating new net-works, or making a network more exclusive in order to reinforce support for, and therealization of, a policy initiative. These moves are intended to stabilize and make morepredictable policy processes and outcome.




interaction logic and coherence – and pattern of development –but also established expectations, meanings, and symbols as wellas normative discourses (the giving and asking of accounts, thecriticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes within theparticular institutional arrangement).

Our previous research utilizing the perspective of the newinstitutionalism – and in particular our EU research – empha-sizes the role of culture in explaining the ways in which concep-tions of governance and policy areas guide action and policyoutcomes. That is, attention is focused on the ways in whichpublic issues and ‘problems’ as well as ‘solutions’ are framed anddefined within a particular culturally defined conceptual frame-work established (and reproducing) system of governance ex-pressing or embodying a public policy or governance paradigm.Thus, each of the governance arrangements is not only a differ-ent institutional arrangement but is an expression or embodi-ment of a distinct model or paradigm for governance, publicpolicy-making, and regulation (Burns and Carson 2002; Burns,Carson, and Nylander 2001; Carson 2002; Hall and Taylor1996). More specifically, a public policy paradigm typically in-dicates or articulates: (1) which problems or issues are ‘public’and call for public policy-making (also, which issues should bedefined as ‘private’ and excluded from public consideration);(2) the location and distribution of appropriate problem-solvingresponsibility and authority to frame problems and solutions,make judgments, adopt strategies, and initiative action; (3) thelocation and distribution of ‘experts’ that are knowledgeable onthe problem and its solution; and (4) solution complexes fordealing with the problem or issue, that is appropriate institu-tional practices, technologies, and strategies. Variation in publicpolicy paradigms entails differences in one or more of thesecomponents, for instance the contrast between a ‘liberal or freemarket’ paradigm and a ‘public interventionist’ paradigm, or thecontrast between a national policy paradigm and a‘Euopeanisation’ paradigm.

In sum, these social systems of governance not only operate invery different ways and generate different policy-making pat-terns and developments, but entail substantially different waysof thinking about and judging matters of governance and poli-tics, policy-making, potential problems, and solutions. Ourcharacterization of the three governance and policy-making



systems is summarized in the following tables (this structure isbased on a multi-level, evolutionary systems perspective,24

stressing not only macro-structural factors (Table 1), but inter-action and strategic conditions (Table 2), and outputs (includ-ing feedback effects) (Table 3).

Table 2 specifies the opportunity structures and strategic con-ditions characterizing the three systems.

Table 3 shows some of the outcome and development pat-terns, in particular, degree of stability and predictability in thedifferent systems.

Clearly, the EU policy-making apparatus differs in severalways from either neo-corporatist or pluralist orders. On the onehand, the EU, as a system of policy-making and legislation, ismore organized than typical pluralist systems. On the otherhand, it is more open, flexible, and diversified than neo-corporatist systems. The neo-corporatist arrangement is morestable and predictable than the EU system, and the latter is moreso than pluralist systems. The latter are likely to function moreeffectively in a turbulent context than either the neo-corporatistor the EU systems, addressing new problems and issues, in partbecause they are more open and adaptable, less formally institu-tionalized. Arguably, the EU combines the best of both systems.The EU modes of policy-making, like those of the neo-corporatist system, stress the management of conflict and theuse of technical knowledge and cooptation in conflict resolu-tion.

This is not to overlook the serious problems and challenges tothe EU system such as the following.1 EU policy processes are highly fragmented as in pluralist sys-

tems. Neo-corporatist systems tend to generate greater over-all coherence in policy-making. The proliferation of EU

24 Underlying our analysis is a multi-level, evolutionary systems perspective (Burns,Baumgartner, and DeVille 1985; Burns, Baumgartner, Dietz, et al. 2003; Burns andCarson 2002; Burns and Dietz, 1992; Burns and Flam, 1987). This theory focuses onconfigurations of actors (individuals and collectives) exercising agency, their interac-tion processes, the institutional arrangements within which and on which they operate,selective environments, and key evolutionary processes (processes of generating inno-vation and variety, selection and reproduction and transformation). This perspectivestresses the importance of human agents – in cooperation and in conflict—in thegeneration, selection, and development of institutions – a factor largely missing in con-ventional evolutionary and functional approaches (or, if human agency and social con-flict is considered at all, it is done in an ad hoc and incoherent fashion).



Table 2 Opportunity structures and situational conditions generated in diversepolicy-making systems

Opportunitystructures andinteraction processes

Target agentsn Inside or outside

the formal policy-making process

Strategic pathwaysn Formal and

informal pathways

n Appropriate ornormativelygroundedstrategies oflobbyists

Policy-making system

Neo-corporatist(e.g., Sweden, Holland,Austria)

n Neo-corporatiststructure or itsrepresentatives,central actors(labour unions,business interests,governmentagencies) in the neo-corporatist structure(or those withlinkages to them, forinstance their sub-units.

n Formal, clear-cutstrategic pathwaysthrough well-established interestorganizations.

n Relatively fewinformal pathways,except for constantmovement ofpersonnel betweenkey organizationsand government.

n Establish ties toformal representa-tives or those withlinkages to them;establish oneself asa representativethrough recognizedinterests.

n Appeal to commongood and/or right ofparticular intereststo have a say;mobilize legitimacy.

Liberal/pluralist(USA)

n Key individualmembers and staff inexecutive, legislativeand judicialbranches,

n Key lobbyists,interest organiza-tions or other agentswith contacts to anyof the above.

n Multiple, divergentpathways; formaland informallinkages correspond-ing to multiplesegments.

n Establish ties toformal representa-tives or those withclose linkages tothem includingagents involved indeveloping orpreparing legislation;establish oneself asa representative ofrecognized interests,by demonstratingconnection torelevant constitu-ency, or bydemonstratedrelevant expertise.

n Mobilize power.Appeal to abstractrights, or rights tohave a �voice.�

European Union

n Directorates General(DGs), key expert groupsor networks, involvedinterests.

n European Parliament.n Member States, relevant

agencies.n Organizations, persons

or agents with contactsto any of the above.

n Multiple, divergentpathways, correspondingto multiple segments.Certainty of genuineinfluence varies widely.

n Multiple informalpathways.

n Establish ties to formalrepresentatives or thosewith linkages to them,including agents involvedin developing orpreparing legislation;establish oneself as arepresentative throughrecognized interests, bydemonstratingconnection to relevantconstituency, or bydemonstrated relevantexpertise.

n Show problem a relevant�European issue.� Appealto hegemonic EUprinciple plus exper tiseand systematic data.



Table 3 Outcome and development patterns in diverse policy-making systems

Outcomes anddevelopments

Institutionalcontinuity

Prominentinstitutionaldevelopments

Policy-making system

Neo-corporatist(e.g. Sweden, Holland,Austria)

n Relatively stablearrangement,characterized byestablished rulesand processesincluding those forpar ticipation.Stable groupings ofactors withrelatively orderlymovement of actorsinto and within thepolicy-makingsystem.

n The norms of acorporatist orderrequire inclusion ofall partiesconsidered�relevant�. Thenormative orderoffsets in part thepower differences.

Pluralist (USA)

n Actor movement inand out of policy-making system maybe rapid and highlyunpredictable.

n Extremely complexand changingsystem character-ized by shifting andrelatively unpredict-able configurationsof actors, powerrelationships, andpolicy develop-ments.

n Proposals areintroduced whenpowerful interests(and their allies)participate anddominate. On theother hand,proposals areblocked when theyfall too far outsidethe interests of anydominant interestor coalition (thatcan be formed).

n Policies thatemerge may notresolve, and mayexacerbate conflictand underminelegitimacy of policy-making system.

n Openness andflexibility. Mostlikely to functionoptimally inaddressing newpatterns and issueswhen there isdiversity amongactors.

European Union

n The established sectorsdisplay orderly, well-organized patterns ofpolicy-initiating and-making.

n Increases in numberand variety of interestsand lobbyists involved,both in established andemerging policysectors.

n Developing or emergingarenas display relativedisequilibrium, withrapid changes in actorsand procedures.

n Spectrum running frommulti-agent-highlyorganized systems topluralist systems,depending upon thesector.

n Established sectors(especially areascentral to EU�s goals ofintegrated market,harmonization, etc.),tend to be character-ized by consistent, well-organized proceduresand well-definedparticipants (as in thecase of EU competitionpolicy-making or of theEU energy or pharma-ceutical sectors(Carson, Nylander, andBurns 2001). Emergingsectors are oftencharacterized by lessclear mandates, newand emerging orshif ting participants,and changingrelationships (forinstance, health,alcohol, and othersocial issues) (Burns,Carson, and Nylander2001)



modes of governance – with highly diverse (and flexible)arrangements – results in incoherence and contradictions orinterference between sector-specific policies. There are at-tempts to overcome this at the Commission level by increas-ingly involving multiple DGs in any given policy area.

2 EU organic forms of governance typically lack transparencyand parliamentary oversight. Standardization and simplifica-tion would contribute to transparency. However, the prolif-eration of modes of governance and the very adaptability tospecific situational conditions effectively operate in opposi-tion to standardization and reduce insight and control.

3 One of the most characteristic features of EU organic govern-ance is the involvement of diverse interests in committees andquasi committees25 for preparing policy and carrying throughpolicy processes. Committee participants come from mem-ber states, often with technical expertise, together with inde-pendent experts, and representatives of industry, NGOs, andother stakeholders. They participate because they expect thatpolicies and regulations will impact on their interests and thatthey should and can try to influence them (Weiler 1999). Butthere are major problems with these arrangements as indi-cated earlier—issues of transparency and representation,equal access, and political accountability.

The ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU is multi-dimensional and athreat to long-term stability and viability (Andersen and Burns1996, 1998). As Weiler (2000) argues, ‘…the intolerability ofgovernance without government will, indeed become intoler-able. The violation by Europe of the most basic and fundamentalnorms of democratic accountability – the ability of the electorate‘to throw the scoundrels out’ – and its violation of the mostbasic and fundamental norm of democratic representation – the

25 This form is referred to as Comitology (Føllesdal 2000; Weiler 1999). It is unlikecorporatist mechanisms or normal lobbying in pluralist systems. It is less open andmore organized than the latter. It is less fixed – more open to new participants and is-sues – than neo-corporatist systems. Above all, Comitology in the EU context – unlikeneo-corporatist mechanisms or lobbying in pluralist systems – in that such activities areregulated, at least formally, by national parliaments that remain sovereign to overrulesuch processes. These EU arrangements remain beyond the control – and hence beyondthe responsibility and accountability – of any single directly or indirectly elected body;the European Parliament has challenged Comitology as undemocratic and lacking intransparency, a major area where the de facto and de jure powers at EU level are notsufficiently under democratic control (Weiler 1999).



ability of the electorate to influence, through elections, thepolicy orientation of European institutions – will begin to un-dermine the success of the past and impede would-be successesof the future. Hence the need to touch the hitherto untouchable:the basic Community architecture.’

AcknowledgementsThe research presented in this article was conducted in collabo-ration with Johan Nylander. We are grateful to Helena Flam andClaudio Radaello and two anonymous reviewers for their com-ments and suggestions relating to an earlier draft of this paper.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the EuropeanSociological Association’s 4th European Conference of Socio-logy, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 18–21 August 1999. The re-search underlying this paper has been funded by the SwedishCouncil for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, theSwedish Council for Social Research, and the Swedish Instituteof Public Health.

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Documents

European Union, neo-corporatist, and pluralist governance arrangements: lobbying and policy-making patterns in a comparative perspective